Politikon

South African Journal of Political Studies

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Challenges of Governance During COVID-19

Pandemic: The Case Study of Mauritius

Linganaden Murday, Sadasivam Jaganada Reddi & Sheetal Sheena

Sookrajowa

To cite this article: Linganaden Murday, Sadasivam Jaganada Reddi & Sheetal Sheena
Sookrajowa (2021) Challenges of Governance During COVID-19 Pandemic: The Case Study of
Mauritius, Politikon, 48:2, 226-241, DOI: 10.1080/02589346.2021.1913806

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2021.1913806

Published online: 13 Apr 2021.

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POLITIKON
2021, VOL. 48, NO. 2, 226–241
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2021.1913806

Challenges of Governance During COVID-19 Pandemic:

The Case Study of Mauritius
Linganaden Murdaya, Sadasivam Jaganada Reddib and
Sheetal Sheena Sookrajowa c
a
African Leadership Centre Alumnus and Department of History and Political Science, University of
Mauritius, Réduit, Mauritius; bIndependent Researcher, Réduit, Mauritius; cDepartment of History and
Political Science, University of Mauritius, Réduit, Mauritius

ABSTRACT
Mauritius is usually portrayed as one of the most democratic countries in the world and a
symbol of good governance. In the COVID-19 context, it is also cited as one of the very
few countries that has successfully halted local transmission of the virus. While this
reputation is deserved to some extent, there are very real governance issues and
undemocratic tendencies that are experienced by its people but rarely captured by
outsiders. Using documentary analysis, this article draws from the COVID-19 context to
provide a different view of governance in Mauritius. It shows that Mauritius has long-
standing governance issues and points out that the government that came to power in
2014 has had a pronounced autocratic tendency that has exacerbated these governance
issues. However, no major protest occurred because it was able to balance public outcry
with populist measures. The responses to the pandemic acted as a magnifying glass on
those governance issues and the new socio-economic situation created by the pandemic
neutralised the effect of populist measures. This, in turn, generated an explosive context
worsened by another event like the Wakashio oil spill that led to an emerging citizen’s
movement that holds the potential to fuel reforms of the country’s ailing governance.

Introduction
As for most countries in the world, the coronavirus pandemic has been a testing time for
Mauritius. However, unlike many other countries, after three months of nationwide lock-
down coupled with other measures like testing and contact tracing, it has not registered
any local cases of transmission of the virus since April 2020 (Simon and Abdul 2020). This
is remarkable especially bearing in mind that when the pandemic began, the World
Health Organisation (WHO) classified Mauritius as a high-risk country because of factors
like its openness to the world, high population density and an aging population (WHO
2020). In addition, constantly adjusting upon several hiccups, the government crafted
economic measures to alleviate the sufferings of those who could not earn a living due
to the lockdown. Both achievements have been widely used by the government to illus-
trate its effective leadership. Yet, there is a much less rosy and insidious side to that nar-
rative as it glosses over several governance issues to which the population became more
sensitive in the dire COVID-19 economic situation.
This article shows that the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed the several long-stand-
ing governance problems in Mauritius, but this may be a blessing in disguise. The

CONTACT Sheetal Sheena Sookrajowa s.sookrajowa@uom.ac.mu

© 2021 South African Association of Political Studies
 POLITIKON 227

discontent related to a lack of good governance coupled with the dire economic context,
triggered unprecedented widespread protests demanding a renewal of the democratic
political system. This article is divided into four key parts. It firstly elucidates the
concept of governance and democratic governance. Then it proceeds to examine the
key governance issues that existed in Mauritius prior to the sanitary crisis. Thirdly it exam-
ines how the weaknesses in the Mauritian governance structures manifested themselves
during the sanitary crisis. Finally, it discusses the reactions to these issues.

Democracy and governance conceptual framework

To understand how democracy and governance have been underpinned or undermined
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Mauritius, it is important to contextualise the
concept of democratic governance. Basically, an overarching understanding of the
concept of governance in the twenty-first century represents transparency, accountabil-
ity, separation of powers, free and fair elections, devolution of power, multipartyism,
freedom of the press, rule of law, property rights and human development (Cheema
2005). There are however different interpretations of the concept of governance in scho-
larly literature. As Farazmand (2013, 351) maintains, there are three aspects about the
concept of governance: ‘the good, the bad, and the ugly’ but none of them provides
an all-embracing understanding. In a separate paper, Farazmand (2017) sustains that
the concept of good governance itself is acclaimed as well as slated across the globe
and he further probes, ‘good governance for whom, and bad for whom’. For example,
he refers to the former president of Tanzania who vehemently condemned the doctrine
of good governance as an ‘imperialistic and colonizing concept’ which has been dumped
on African countries by the Western countries and transnational corporations.
Governance as a concept refers to the changing role of the citizens from ‘passive to
active participants in democracy’ (Mudacumura 2014, 1). Owing to its widespread
interpretation, Bevir (2010) sustains that governance reflects the mechanisms and
exchanges that link the state to civil society rather than centring on state institutions.
Hence, under the notion of good governance according to Stockemer (2009, 241),
‘states are obliged to perform their functions efficiently; to value non-corruptibility, to
be responsive to civil society and to guarantee stability. Governments must also be trans-
parent in the allocation of services and equitable in the distribution of goods’. Likewise,
Cheema (2005) implies that when governance is democratic, incorporating the demo-
cratic ideals of participation, rule of law, transparency, accountability, much progress is
made towards human development. On the contrary, Fukuyama (2013) refuses to
include democracy and governance in a definition because he posits that the two con-
cepts cannot be empirically proven together. Fukuyama (2013, 351) contends that a gov-
ernment is an institution that can perform better or worse while governance refers to the
act of executing the demands of the leaders. As he postulates ‘an authoritarian regime can
be well governed, just as a democracy can be maladministered.’ There can even be ‘dis-
satisfied democrats’ in a democracy who on the one hand accept democracy as a form of
governance but are exasperated with the functioning of the system (Norris 1999, 32).
Norris (1999) explains that the people’s discontent does not necessarily suggest a
threat to the maintenance of democracy. They are rather an impetus for change and
development of democratic practices and organisations. Similarly, although Mauritius is
228 L. MURDAY ET AL.

perceived as a full-fledged democracy in the African region, yet it can be maladministered

and thereby triggering ‘dissatisfied democrats’ as Norris (1999) suggests, particularly in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The centralised Mauritian state in context

Historically, the Mauritian state has been centralised and based on the rule of law. Unlike
other African countries, it did not have any indigenous population and had been colo-
nised for a much longer period. These peculiarities mean that it has had more time
and societal as well as cultural space for western liberal institutions to take roots.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the state’s institutions and practices are
not mere western transplants; they were also shaped and maintained by domestic
struggles including labour protests (Seegobin and Collen 1977; Reddi 2017).
In 2019, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) classified Mauritius as one of the only 22
full democracies in the world and as the only full democracy in Africa (The Economist
Intelligence Unit 2020). The index takes into account factors like electoral processes, func-
tioning government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. Between
2006 (when the index started) and 2019, Mauritius has scored an average 8.16 – slightly
above the minimum required notation to be considered a full democracy (The Economist
Intelligence Unit 2020). Similarly, Mauritius has regularly earned the top spots in Mo-
Ibrahim governance reports which take into consideration factors like safety and rule of
law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human
development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2018). The above-mentioned indexes are more
nuanced when read closely for they do highlight areas where improvements are required.
For examples, the EIU index does indicate an average score for Mauritius in terms of pol-
itical participation and the Mo Ibrahim index did indicate that Mauritius’s performance in
terms of elements like ‘Absence of favouritism’ had declined (Mo Ibrahim Foundation
2018). However, it is usually the overall scores and ranks that make headlines (Anganan
2017). Therefore, the way that such indexes are consumed masks several shortcomings
of Mauritian governance. This is unsurprising because already in 1997, Carroll and
Carroll (1997) remind us that ‘democratic consolidation is best conceptualized as a con-
tinuous variable with no finishing point’. In the case of Mauritius, they foresee that the
dangers the country face ‘have a greater potential to undermine the functioning of demo-
cratic institutions than to create a short term or medium risk of their collapse’ (Carroll and
Carroll 1999, 179).
Given its attributes as a welfare state, Mauritius appears to be adequately equipped
with institutions such as a civil service, medical services, parastatal institutions and
resources to deal with the pandemic. Its welfare state system provides for instance free
education, free healthcare, non-contributory old age pension and a minimum wage
amongst others. Its strengths also include a parliamentary system, the rule of law, inde-
pendent institutions, freedom of the press, a free media. However, at the time of the out-
break it also had glaring weaknesses at the onset of the pandemic. It had a government
that had won the elections held at the end of 2019 with only 37% of total votes and whose
election was contested in several court cases owing to alleged irregularities (Harris 2019).
The country has had a sluggish economy with a growth rate that had remained at only
around 3% since 2012 (Statista 2020). Public debt as percentage of GDP which remained
 POLITIKON 229

at around 57% between 2009 and 2013, and increased to 66.25% in 2018 (CountryEcono-
my.com 2018).
Mauritius also had several governance issues before the pandemic. Mungiu-Pippidi’s
(2013, 101) observation that democratisation is now triggering a new type of system
where leaders are monopolising power and follow ‘nonuniversal allocation of public
resources based on patronage, nepotism, and the exchange of favors’ which is simul-
taneously contradicting the notion of ‘ethical universalism’ is certainly true for Mauritius.
The island’s political elite has maintained a tight control over the key political parties and
made several attempts to protect themselves from accountability mechanisms other than
general elections. This has led to several attempts to control the press, the police, the
nomination of complacent characters at the helm of institutions that deal with corruption
for instance and appealing to sectarian identities to deflect legitimate criticisms and
questions.
The current governance system is also flawed because of the concentration of power in
the hands of the Prime Minister. In such a system the Prime Minister’s approval is required
for the appointment of the heads of the civil Service and other parastatal bodies including
an institution like the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). As Mungiu-
Pippidi (2013, 103) argues, ‘those who have the most discretionary power also have the
most opportunities to act corruptly’ where the political nominees are mostly appropriate
to control anti-corruption bodies or to influence decisions in favour of certain interest
groups, who are subsequently functioning as a ‘patron or gatekeeper for corruption’. In
such circumstances, the independence of such institutions is therefore regularly
questioned.
Parliament as a space to hold the government accountable is also undermined by that
high degree of political centralisation. For example, the nomination of the speaker usually
emanates from the ranks of the party in power. While some have shown a semblance of
objectivity and fair play in conducting parliamentary affairs, this has not always been the
case. Similarly, parliamentary schedules are decided by the government and most promi-
nently, the Prime Minister which means that parliament as an institution where the gov-
ernment can be held accountable is compromised when the Prime Minister refuses to
answer parliamentary questions. Very often important questions remain unanswered or
the answers provided remain vague. More recently, even the question of the Leader of
the Opposition was amended by the Speaker to suit the answer that the Prime Minister
was willing to give (Le Mauricien 2020c).
There have also been several attacks on the freedom of the press including instructing
government institutions to withhold their subscription to buy newspapers that are
deemed too critical towards government actions. These same newspapers have also
been excluded from government advertising. There is also a winner takes all mentality
with government usually failing to pay attention to suggestions/criticisms coming from
opposition parties: this mindset is epitomised by the statement made by one minister
in 2015 when questioned about the nomination of a close one in a position of responsi-
bility: ‘government is government, government decides’ (Le Mauricien 2015a). This situ-
ation, therefore, corresponds to the debate of ‘African governance as neo-
patrimonialism’ by Kjær (2014, 26) who argues that formal institutions are likely to be con-
trolled by close and unofficial ties which are highly inefficient with prevailing corruption
practices and where policies are developed in favour of specific groups rather than for the
230 L. MURDAY ET AL.

welfare of the population. Hence, this paper argues how political centralisation in Maur-
itius and its waning democratic governance have influenced the management of the
COVID-19 which eventually reinforces the debate of neo-patrimonialism of African
governance.
Therefore, despite the general understanding that it is a democratic country, lack of
good governance practices is a long-standing problem in Mauritius. However, one can
argue the government that came to power after the 2014 elections exacerbated the situ-
ation by showing a more pronounced propensity to centralise power through increased
control over important institutions in the country. This is also clearly shown by its unpre-
cedented and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to control the office of the Director of
Public Prosecution by placing it under the supervision of the Attorney General’s Office
(Le Mauricien 2015b). Nonetheless, for a long time it has been able to quell public
outcry to poor governance by using several populist economic measures. One of them
is the use of generous old age pensions which increased from Rs 6000 to Rs 9000 at
the beginning of December 2019 (Le Mauricien 2019). Another example is the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage of Rs 8140 is said to have benefitted some 120,000 workers
despite flaws in its implementation (L’Express 2017).

Governance issues during the COVID-19 pandemic in Mauritius

Like many other countries, the Mauritian government underestimated the spread of the
epidemic when it was thought to be raging only in specific countries like China. Yet, it
took preventive measures from 7 January 2020 which were gradually strengthened as
the threat worsened (Hansard 2020d). Apart from the setting up of an inter-ministerial
committee to monitor the situation; with the help of the WHO, the government intro-
duced preventive measures at the two key points of entries in the country- namely the
seaport and the airport. Understandably, these measures targeted especially passengers
coming from China (Hansard 2020a). As the Minister of Health put it ‘all passengers travel-
ling from China are invariably and systematically put on surveillance (quarantine or iso-
lation) for a period of 14 days’ (Hansard 2020a). At the same time, the government
promised that it has set up a well-oiled communication strategy to educate and maintain
transparency on the evolution of the sanitary crisis and the measures being taken
(Hansard 2020a). Eventually, at the beginning of February 2020, passengers from China
or any passenger who had been to China fourteen days prior to travelling to Mauritius,
were banned from entering the Mauritian territory (ION News 2020). At the end of Febru-
ary, visitors from Italy and Iran were also temporarily banned from Mauritius (Business
Mega 2020).
Yet despite the caring image that the government tried to project to the population
and the world, the loopholes and contradictions in its actions quickly became apparent.
In an analysis on ‘Corruption in Africa: The Health Sector and Policy Recommendations for
Managing the Risks’, Hope (2017, 3) explains that the prevailing forms of corruption in
Africa are: ‘(1) Bribery, kickbacks, and facilitation payments; (2) Embezzlement, theft,
and fraud; (3) Offering or receiving of an unlawful gratuity, favor, or illegal commission;
(4) Favoritism, nepotism, patronage, and clientelism; (5) Money laundering; and (6)
Conflict of interest/influence peddling.’ Hence, the following section shall provide a
different picture from the one that merely depicts Mauritius as a country that has
 POLITIKON 231

successfully dealt with COVID-19 to a country that fits Hope’s (2017) analysis on corrup-
tion in Africa to a certain extent.
At first, the quarantine facility (established on the second floor of a hospital) could
admit only 36 (Hansard 2020a). These facilities were gradually improved when hotels
were used for quarantining, but the very limited initial capacity means that it is poss-
ible to question the degree to which passengers from China were systematically and
invariably put in isolation. There were also reports of a liner disembarking at the
port without any proper tests being conducted beforehand. As one MP puts it ‘I am
reporting it to this Assembly, pas un seul des 1,200 passagers de ce paquebot n’a été
testé, be it with a swap or with a blood test!’ (Hansard 2020c). Furthermore, there
were no negative pressure wards to ensure that an infected individual being quaran-
tined does not contaminate other patients using the hospital (Hansard 2020a). The
Opposition (reflecting the position held by several quarters of the population) made
constant calls for complete closing of the borders but they remained unheeded (L’Ex-
press 2020b, 2020f).
On the contrary, the government wanted to use the prevalence of COVID-19 as an
opportunity to boost the country’s stalling tourism sector that had seen a 1.1% decline
in arrivals between 2018 and 2019 (from 1,399,408 to 1,383,488 arrivals) (Central Statistics
Office 2020). Surprisingly, two days after COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic by the
World Health Organisation, the government proposed several measures to boost arrivals
(BBC News 2020). These included generous duty-free allowance especially on liquor and
the suspension of passenger fees on air tickets for tourists arriving from South Africa,
Reunion Island (France) and Australia (L’Express 2020a). Hotels rooms were also proposed
at a discounted rate (Hansard 2020c). All this happened in a climate where the govern-
ment spent much time denying the existence of COVID-19 cases in Mauritius in the
midst of recurrent rumours of the contrary. With economic concern as a priority of the
government, it failed to heed public opinion and the opposition to close the borders
(Hansard 2020c).
The inevitable happened on the 18 March 2020 when the Prime Minister confirmed the
first cases- one of which has had extensive contacts with the local population (L’Express
2020c). To its merit, the government immediately took strong measures after the first
case. A contact tracing exercise was started to identify and quarantine all those who
had been in contact with the infected individual. The country was closed to international
travellers as from the 19th and the mandatory 14-days quarantining was required for all
passengers who had enter the country in the meantime. Finally, a sanitary confinement
was imposed on 20 March and a curfew order issued two days later to prevent the
spread of the disease internally (Hansard 2020d). These measures were painful but
effective in dealing with the situation. Yet, they worked not only because of their severity
but also because the population has generally embraced them. As the now former Direc-
tor of Public Health himself recognised, with the benefit of hindsight, while the govern-
ment and public health officials played an important role in battling the spread of the
virus, the population deserves the greatest credit for showing resilience in accepting
the dire living conditions that accompanied the lockdown (Teleplus 2020c). It was the
police which had to implement the lockdown and there were a few cases of police
abuses which were condemned by the public and measures were taken to prevent
such abuses.
232 L. MURDAY ET AL.

The belated closure of borders for passengers from Europe was shrouded in controver-
sies because it was done in such a way as to accommodate the travel plans of the family of
the Prime Minister who travelled to the UK via France on 8 March 2020 and an initial
intended return date of 22 March (L’Express 2020f). On the 16th of March, in the face of
increasing pressure to close the country from international travel, the government took
the strange decision to stop foreign passengers from Reunion Island (which counted 9
cases at that time with up to three new cases per day) from entering Mauritius and any
Mauritian coming back from Reunion Island had to go through compulsory quarantine.
Nonetheless, strangely enough, the same restriction would be applicable only as from
the 18th March (midnight) for the United Kingdom (1500 confirmed cases and up to
400 new cases per day) and France (6600 confirmed cases and 1000 new cases per
day) (L’Express 2020f). Documentary evidence shows that on the 16th of March, just a
few hours before the Prime Minister made the above announcement, his family’s travel
plan changed and were now expected to be in Mauritius on the 18th-just on time to
escape the travel restrictions and the two-weeks quarantine (L’Express 2020f).
In the face of the above-mentioned documentary evidence and coincidence evidence
followed by the resulting outcry; the Prime Minister failed to explain the logic behind the
timing of the closure of the borders. Instead, he dismissed the evidence as mere attacks
on his family (Top FM 2020). The absence of a reasonable explanation only fed into the
widespread perception of favouritism. A mouthpiece of the government tried to justify
the coincidence between the government’s decision and the travel plan of the Prime Min-
ister’s family on the ground that the COVID-19 Committee had already taken the decision
to close the Mauritian territory on the 15th of March and anyone who knew about it could
modify their travel plan accordingly (L’Express 2020i). This further reinforced the percep-
tion of favouritism as it showed that those with privileged access to information could
escape the sufferings associated with being stranded in a foreign country or with quaran-
tining. It became a sensitive subject especially for families of the four thousand Mauritians
(many of whom worked on cruise ships) who were stranded for months in foreign
countries – many of whom have had to live in dire conditions (Bhoobdasur 2020;
Chamroo 2020).
Already on the 19th of March, when the government announced a total ban from
entering the Mauritian territory including for Mauritian nationals, there was an outcry
from several quarters of the Mauritian society. The very constitutionality of banning
Mauritian citizens from entering the territory was challenged by a panel of lawyers and
a law academic based on section 15(1) of the Mauritian Constitution (Narsinghen
2020). They all called for a ‘more humane approach’ (Narsinghen 2020). At the same
time, the pertinence of Mauritian embassies and consulates (mostly manned by political
nominees) were regularly questioned due to their inability to help those who did not have
the means to live in foreign lands for an extended period of time. Mauritian citizens
stranded in Delhi (India), even protested in front of the Mauritian High Commission
despite the curfew prevailing in India at that time (Le Mauricien 2020b). It should be
acknowledged, however, that there were extremely complex logistical barriers to the
repatriation exercise. Mauritians were stranded in several countries, some of which had
already closed their airports and even if they could all be repatriated, there was not
enough space in quarantine facilities in Mauritius all of them at once (Teleplus 2020b).
All this meant that repatriation could happen only gradually. It should be noted
 POLITIKON 233

however the extent of the problem is also due to a lack of foresight and the lack of con-
sideration for the Opposition’s call for the government to start working on the repatria-
tion especially students in the first instance (Teleplus 2020a).
A major problem that cropped up as the country fought the pandemic is the lack of
medical equipment like ventilators and masks especially for frontliners including those
working at the airport and port. The Opposition raised the issue at the end of January
and again in early February but the Minister of Health responded by saying that ‘you
know, you can’t make people afraid at the airport and start wearing all types of gowns’
(Teleplus 2020a; Hansard 2020a). In early February the Minister of Health boasted of
being ‘fully satisfied with … the degree of preparedness of Mauritius to face the risks of
a potential outbreak of the virus’ and that ‘[t]he personel is fully equipped. We have all
the equipment for them … ’ (Hansard 2020a). The Prime Minister gave a similar reassuring
response at the beginning of March: ‘[w]e have prepared our hospital services so that we
are able to cope effectively with the threat. We have addressed issues of essential supplies
and training … ’ (Hansard 2020b).
Yet when the first cases were announced on the 18th of March, it was found that hos-
pital staff lacked basic medical equipment including N-95 masks (Carpayen and Chelvan
2020). In one of the hospitals dedicated to the treatment of COVID-19 patients, seven of
the ten nurses posted there were infected (St Cyr 2020). The personnel blamed this situ-
ation on inappropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) which were not available for
all sizes and had expired since 2017 (St Cyr 2020). In addition, there was a lack of spatial
arrangement to promote social distancing among staff especially in shared spaces like
mess rooms where the wearing of masks is utterly impractical (St Cyr 2020). Even
worse, paramedics who were involved in moving patients to quarantine centres were
not provided with any equipment and had to have recourse to a sit-in to elicit a
change in policy (Le Mauricien 2020a). This reality on the ground widely reported in the
press and by hospital staff contrasted sharply with the discourse of the Minister of
Health who maintained that the necessary equipment was available (Carpayen and
Chelvan 2020).
However, the absence of parliamentary sessions during the confinement made it
almost impossible for the opposition to hold the government accountable. No attempt
was made to use the several new technological advances that were widely available to
hold parliamentary sessions most probably to avoid questions from the Opposition.
Already before confinement, ministers used shrewd strategies in the form of overbroad
answers full of unnecessary details to eat on the time available for questions or simply
provide answers that digress from the question asked by the Opposition. In addition, it
is important to underline that parliamentary questions many times remain unanswered.
In fact, between January 2020 and the end of August 2020, out of the 371 parliamentary
questions asked, 195 remained unanswered (L’Express 2020k). Even if the Standing Order
provides that written answers have to be submitted to the Assembly for unanswered
questions, over the years, it has been observed that many questions are simply left unan-
swered (L’Express 2020k).
Even when questions are answered, they are not always trustworthy. This was the case,
for instance, when the Minister of Health had to answer several questions about the emer-
gency procurement of medicines and medical equipment during the confinement. Not
only the emergency procurements attest to a lack of preparedness, but they were also
234 L. MURDAY ET AL.

tainted with gross acts of corruption, patronage, and clientelism. In one case, it has been
widely reported that almost 100 million rupees were spent to buy medicine from a
company called Hyperpharm Ltd against the advice of the Principal Pharmacist of the
Ministry of Health (Kanhye and Jaulim 2020). The latter disapproved because the
company did not have the World Health Organisation Good Manufacturing Practice
Status and could not provide key information like the sources of supply (L’Express
2020d). To make matters worse, some of the drugs bought from the company were
more than 2000 times higher than the normal price (Kanhye and Jaulim 2020). Initially,
the Minister of Health denied any purchase of drugs from Hyperpharm Ltd: ‘as far as medi-
cation is concerned, not a single medication has been procured from the said company … ’
(Hansard 2020e). However, documentary evidence produced by the Leader of the Opposi-
tion and the list of companies that supplied drugs during the confinement that the Minister
eventually tabled attest to the contrary (Hansard 2020g). Thus overall, as the Leader of the
Opposition observed, the Minister misled the parliament (Hansard 2020g).
Nonetheless, this was just the tip of the iceberg. Following the above-mentioned case,
several other companies belonging to individuals who have publicly shown their proxi-
mity with the government and without any prior experience in supplying medical equip-
ment were given public contracts to supply N95 masks (L’Express 2020e). Even worse, the
government purchased 50 ventilators and other medical equipment at a cost of more
than Rs 476 million from a Spanish company (Pack and Blister) even though the
company did not have a local branch (Hansard 2020f). Moreover, no due diligence was
made before allocating contracts (L’Express 2020h).
The government tried to legitimise its questionable decisions by putting forward the
emergency nature of the situation which did not allow for the necessary time for
normal procedures (Hansard 2020h). Yet this whole emergency discourse falls apart
when one takes into account that the equipment remained undelivered more than
three months after they have been ordered and the island was by that time COVID-
free. The emergency procurement also reveals the lack of preparations between
January and March to face the impending pandemics despite claims to the contrary
made by members of the government. Despite calls from private media outlets, the Min-
ister of Health has not accepted the invitation to answer questions that members of the
public have on procurement during the lockdown.
Attacks on the freedom of the press under the guise of sanitary measures also allowed
uncertainties and rumours to flourish. Many questions like the number of ventilators avail-
able in Mauritius remained unanswered (Carpayen and Chelvan 2020). There were daily
evening press conferences broadcast on the pro-government national television
station, but the private press outlets were not allowed to be physically present.
Instead, they were only allowed to submit their questions beforehand. This also means
that no follow up questions could be asked. It seems that the government’s priority
was to reassure the public even if not all information was presented to them on the
ground that they did not want to panic the population. Nonetheless, though the
public regularly watched the official channel of the government for information, it is
alternative channels such as private radio, social media and the international TV channels
they used to gather supplementary information and to make up their own judgements.
Consequently, the official channel lost some credibility as questions were selectively
answered by the committee and others avoided.
 POLITIKON 235

Government faced special challenges as a result of the pandemic. During the lock-
down, it had to take a number of economic measures to support private companies finan-
cially and provide income support to employees and also to self-employed for the whole
duration of the lockdown. Though state institutions like the Mauritius Revenue Authority
were roped in, there were several implementation problems. Indiscriminate financing of
private companies resulted in public criticisms. Furthermore, many people could not to
use their mobile phone or other IT devices to register for support. In addition, the Rs.
5000 per month support was less than the minimum wage (Rs 8140) and naturally
many workers found it insufficient (Sivaramen 2020).
The most important criticism was the COVID-19 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020
(the ‘COVID-19 Act’) and the Quarantine Act 2020 (the ‘New Quarantine Act’) which con-
tained an array of measures to deal with pandemic. The COVID-19 Act and the New Quar-
antine Act were passed by the national assembly on the 15th May 2020 and approved by
the President of the Republic on 16th May 2020. The main purpose of the COVID-19 (Mis-
cellaneous Provisions) Bill was to revise a series of 56 legislations to adapt to the new
context of the coronavirus whereas the Quarantine Bill (No.II of 2020) aimed at rescinding
the Quarantine Act of 1954 and to present a new legislation with adequate measures to
prevent and contain the virus (Sivaramen 2020). However, the two legislations have been
vehemently decried by the general public, in particular by the civil society because it
infringes existing workers’ rights, grants excessive political leeway to the Prime Minister
and gives extensive powers to the Police at the expense of basic civil liberties and demo-
cratic governance. Most importantly, the COVID-19 Act which comprises the amended
Workers’ Rights Act 2019 was severely condemned as it predominantly relates to
inadequate wages to employees, improper working conditions, a reduction in pay includ-
ing overtime and annual leave, no right to be involved in trade unions and the facilitating
of the laying-off of the workers.
All these inefficiencies and infringement of people rights undermined the legitimacy of
the government especially as the pandemic became associated with an increasing
number of financial scandals leading the country to being placed on the blacklist of Euro-
pean Union for money laundering. Hence, governance and corruption in Mauritius corre-
sponds to what Rispel, de Jager, and Fonn (2015, 10) concludes in their study on South
Africa that, ‘poor governance’ and ‘corruption’ have a mutual link which as a result
adversely affect the health care services.

COVID-19 crisis as an opportunity for advancing democratic governance

in Mauritius?
The panic caused by the pandemic may have led policy makers to think that the context
would make the population more prepared to accept repressive measures and practices
that violate good governance. Instead, the above issues boiled up to contribute in provok-
ing an unprecedented collective reaction. The first protest was organised by the Kolektif
Konversasion Solider, a movement led by trade unionists, on the 11th July 2020. The aim
was to protest against the repressive measure taken during the COVID-19 pandemic
including the COVID-19 Act and the Quarantine Act (5 Plus Dimanche 2020). The
protest also saw the participation of those who lost their jobs during the pandemic
and people whose family members remained stranded overseas, mobilised some 6000
236 L. MURDAY ET AL.

people. While Mauritius has a culture of protest dating back to the colonial era,
most of the time these protests mainly organised by trade unionists only manage to
mobilise a very small number of people to the extent that they are usually dismissed
as insignificant. Against this trend, the protest that took place on 11 July was so
successful in terms of mobilisation that the pro-government national television station
provided rigged televised reports in an attempt to minimise its importance (Luckoo
and Edwards 2020; L’Express 2020g). The protest was significant because it showed
that Mauritians were increasingly willing to express their grievances through street
protests.
The second protest on the 29 August was spearheaded by a social activist, but which
also saw the active participation of Kolektif Konversasion Solider, enjoyed unprecedented
success. This can be explained by the fact that the existing discontent was amplified by
the Wakashio disaster. Though not directly related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the disas-
ter occured when a cargo ship (The Wakashio) entered Mauritius territorial waters and hit
the reef in the south east of the island and after twelve days caused a major oil spill in the
lagoon (Degnarain 2020). It was an unprecedented ecological disaster which not only
damaged the marine environment but also affected the livelihoods of the inhabitants
in many ways (L’Express 2020l).
The authorities’ mismanagement of the man-made and avoidable disaster was not
only the result of miscalculated and centralised decision-making but also prolonged
and exacerbated the authoritarian attitude of the government. The government is
blamed by both local and international observers and the public opinion for its delays,
indifference and top-down management of the whole affair (L’Express 2020j). This is in
contrast with the initiative and resourcefulness of the local population and NGO’s and
civic organisations as well as the public who responded with promptitude to the oil
spill and deployed a vast effort to cleanse the lagoon by making and placing oil booms
made of dried sugarcane leaves to limit the spread of the spill (Dahir and Peltier 2020).
The neglect, incompetence and authoritarian tendencies by the authorities triggered
two unprecedented mass protests by the public, attracting more than 100 thousand
people in each of the protest and called the Prime Minister to resign. The demands of
the protestors were broader in that it not only asked the government to resign but
also the end to corruption, nepotism, and other ills of the Mauritian political system.
Opposition parties joined the protest and despite the leader of Opposition’s demand
to recall parliament to debate the whole affair especially after a fresh maritime disaster
occurred when three people lost their lives when a tug was being used to tow a part
of the Wakashio ship capsized, the government refused to recall the National Assembly
and even tried to intimidate the organizer of the protest by reviving a police case
against him (Dinally 2020; Abel et al. 2020).
The importance of the Wakashio affair in the wake of COVID-19 is exacerbating the
authoritarian tendencies of the government while on the other hand the protest move-
ment which first occurred against the COVID-19 Bill on the 11th July had been gathering
momentum in the last two protests and seems to be inaugurating a fresh protest move-
ment to defend democracy in the island. This will mark a departure in local politics, but it
remains to be seen whether the protesters will succeed in their struggle to redress public
grievances over time.
 POLITIKON 237

The absence of opposition parties at the helm of the movement probably illustrates
the point that people are generally fed up with a whole system of which opposition
parties are part of. In fact, it should be remembered that the governance issues identified
above also existed in various forms and degrees when they were themselves in govern-
ment, although the government which came to power in 2014 exacerbated them. At this
stage, it is not clear whether the movement would eventually lose momentum and die
out or it will sustain its pressure on the government and the whole political class in
general to force them into implementing the necessary reforms that will improve govern-
ance in Mauritius.

Conclusion
This article has provided a critical view of governance in Mauritius – away from the
polished and sanitised image of one of the best examples of democracy in Africa and
the broader world. There is little research on the impact of epidemics on governance,
and even in the case of Aids, what it does to governments has barely been touched at
all though it is noted that it affects governance namely the style, manner and legitimacy
of governments (Barnett and Whiteside 2002). COVID-19 has brought into sharp focus
several aspects of the illiberal democracy in Mauritius, which in normal circumstances
would have received little attention. Consequently, the COVID-19 crisis has provoked
civil society to claim back democratic practices through street protests. It has also
forced Mauritian to measure the extent to which the Mauritian democracy needs to be
rethought. However, it is too early to predict how far this movement will succeed in revi-
talising Mauritian democracy.
Probably, one key lesson that one can take from the Mauritian case study is that the
governance structures in so-called mature democracies need regular maintenance other-
wise they experience decay. Fred Halliday’s (2001, 76) observation: ‘a central assumption
of many political orders, the finality of their constitutional development, has been chal-
lenged, reminding us that political forms are never static and wither if they do not
develop’ certainly applies to Mauritius. Overall, the COVID-19 context not only showed
the many governance issues affecting Mauritius but also created the conditions that
can propel potentially many significant improvements.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
Sheetal Sheena Sookrajowa http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9447-6899

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