1024319

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MSS0010.1177/17506980211024319Memory StudiesWang and Chew

Article

Memory Studies

State, market, and the

2021, Vol. 14(4) 877­–891
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
manufacturing of war memory: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/17506980211024319
https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211024319
China’s television dramas on the War journals.sagepub.com/home/mss

of Resistance against Japan

Yi Wang
Waseda University, Japan

Matthew M. Chew
Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

Abstract
Remembering the War of Resistance against Japan is central to China’s memory and identity politics.
By focusing on the production of China’s War of Resistance television dramas, this study analyzes how
collective memory is shaped by market actors and their interactions with the state. The first substantive
section investigates how commercial media and the state cooperate in the production of War of Resistance
television dramas. The second explicates how market actors undermine the state’s ideological imperatives
by adding entertainment content to repackage war memory, which then conflicts with the propagandistic
task. This study contributes to introducing the market factor to research on the remembering of War of
Resistance in China and enriching the political economy of memory approach by examining an authoritarian
state-capitalist case, which is centrally characterized by these cooperative and conflictual relations between
the state and the market.

Keywords
Chinese media, collective memory, political economy, state capitalism, television drama, War of Resistance

Introduction
The collective memory of the War of Resistance against Japan (KangRi zhanzheng 抗日战争), also
known as the Second Sino-Japanese War, is a key problematic in the scholarship on Chinese nation-
alism and Sino-Japanese relations (e.g. Coble, 2007; Denton, 2007; Gries, 2004; He, 2007; Mitter,
2000; Reilly, 2011; Waldron, 1996; Wang, 2012). The institutionalized production of war memory,
including the traumatic and heroic stories of the past struggle for national independence, plays a
vital role in shoring up the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The remembering of

Corresponding author:
Yi Wang, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan.
Email: wangyi@aoni.waseda.jp
878 Memory Studies 14(4)

the War of Resistance is of utmost importance for memory and identity politics in contemporary
China.
Most studies of the remembering of the War of Resistance focus on the dominant role of the
state and state-led mnemonic practices such as the “patriotic education campaign.” However, with
China’s social and economic transition, the Party-state does not monopolize the remembering of
the war. Along with the increasing commercialization of Chinese society, the market becomes a
prominent force in memory-making. Especially with the transition of Chinese media, the availabil-
ity of government support and capital investment in state-owned marketized media has given com-
modified memory a powerful role in narrating the past. Additionally, market mechanisms of
memory-making substantially differ from those of the state. They tend to shape a market-oriented
war memory that is more flexible, dynamic, and efficient in generating creative content and respon-
sive to audience demands. Although some scholars recognize that non-state social actors such as
history activists or netizens proactively reproduce and extend state propaganda (Reilly, 2004;
Schneider, 2018), the attention to the role of market actors is scant. Delving into the market pro-
duction of war memory, therefore, can fill a significant gap in the literature and help us understand
a different side of memory-making in China.
By highlighting the market, we do not suggest that the market is an independent force com-
pletely separated from the state. China is recognized as the most internationally impactful case of
“state capitalism,” an alternative and variant to conventional liberal capitalism (Bremmer, 2010;
Kurlantzick, 2016). China practices an authoritarian state capitalist model (which is sometimes
called the “China model”) that emphasizes economic development on one hand, and monopolizes
political power and suppresses civil freedom on the other (Kurlantzick, 2016). Under the authori-
tarian context of China, the state strongly regulates state-owned media corporations, private media
businesses, and media content. This renders the Chinese marketized manufacturing of memory
very different from that found in capitalistic and democratic Western societies. The market manu-
facturing of memory in an authoritarian state-capitalist context features state intervention in the
market and complex interactions between the state and businesses. A consequence is that market
forces are more constricted in their capacity to produce alternative memories that challenge the
official memory.
This study analyzes one of the most widely circulated and commercially successful instances of
market-produced memory in China: television dramas that feature the War of Resistance against
Japan as their main theme (hereafter “WORAJ dramas”). Abetted by capricious censorship policy
changes and keen market competition, Chinese television witnesses the spectacular rise of WORAJ
dramas since 2005. These dramas managed to gain a large television viewership and generated
considerable profits. This boom renders WORAJ dramas a central memory site and competitive
field in which political power and capital become interwoven. WORAJ dramas constitute an
informative case for investigating the interplay between different agents of marketized memory-
making in the state-capitalist context.
This study is organized into two substantive sections. The first focuses on the cooperation or
collusion between the state and the market. More specifically, it examines how television drama-
related businesses are compelled to orient themselves toward the dual task of making profits for
themselves and promoting propaganda for the CCP. This analysis reveals that the production pro-
cess is significantly marketized on one hand, and directly or indirectly shaped by the state on the
other. The second substantive section investigates the conflictual relations between the state and
the market. It analyzes how commercial media construct war memories that significantly differ
from those produced by conventional war narratives and propaganda, such as the use of exagger-
ated, stylish, risqué, and vulgar content. Such market-oriented memories have created tensions
with policymakers and aroused social criticism.
Wang and Chew 879

The political economy of memory

Collective memory, in Halbwach’s tradition, is a selective remembering of the past that is intersub-
jectively shared by social groups (Halbwachs, 1992[1925]). The dominant or hegemonic memory
of a national community is often orchestrated by ruling elites to legitimize the political status quo.
This presentist approach tends to prioritize analyzing how political and intellectual elites construct
a “usable past” for present interests. But in societies dominated by capitalism, the role of capital
and commerce in shaping memory is also significant. Numerous history-related products are man-
ufactured by commercial media, such as historical films, television programs, comics and anima-
tion, documentaries, and video games. Capitalistic media systems encourage entertainment-oriented,
populist constructions of the past that can greatly differ from official and academic histories.
History becomes commodified and is “consumed” as a part of popular culture (De Groot, 2009;
Sturken, 2008).
Some memory scholars propose a political economy approach to research the material base and
institutional structure of memory-making, by investigating the factors such as corporate interests,
budget and fund, labor, audience, technology, and regulation (Edy and Castleberry, 2021; Hammar,
2019; Reading, 2014). The political economy approach in memory studies closely ties to, or over-
laps with, the political economy approach in media and communication studies—memory is a type
of information and culture. According to Mosco (2009: 2), “political economy is the study of the
social relations, particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribu-
tion, and consumption of resources, including communication resources.” The political economy
of communication “sets out to show how different ways of financing and organising cultural pro-
duction have traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public
domain and for audiences’ access to them” (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 15). It is particularly
concerned with media commercialization and concentration and their impacts on culture and dem-
ocratic politics. Likewise, the political economy of memory investigates how corporate power and
structure shape the process and pattern of historical representation and what the broader cultural
and political consequences are.
Like developed Western societies, capital and corporations also powerfully participate in mne-
monic practices in China. “Consuming history” has become a routine practice of contemporary
Chinese popular cultural audiences. With the marketization of Chinese media, commercial factors
increasingly impact media operation, financing, and content production. The production of televi-
sion dramas, for example, is mainly financed by private capital, and television channels primarily
depend on drama programs for advertisement revenue (Zhu et al., 2008: 10). Chinese media gain
bargaining power and further their organizational interests in various negotiations with the state
(Zhang, 2011).
Yet, the political economy of memory in China also significantly differs from its counterpart in
Western liberal societies. Edy and Castleberry (2021: 4) argue that in a post-Cold War world, com-
mercial profits overwhelm political ideology in shaping media and memory content. But in China,
political power and ideology retain their powerful roles. A large part of the Chinese media system
remains under the party-state framework. Television channels are owned by the state. The state
often exercises authoritarian power to regulate media products including popular entertainment.
Propaganda remains a major task for state-owned media to accomplish; private capital and market
forces are compelled to compromise with state goals. Consequently, media products that represent
the past need to meet both political and commercial imperatives. Aside from censorship, the state
can use different means, including direct and hidden ones, to support and steer memory-making.
The relationship between the state and market actors may be conceptualized as a “principal-agent”
one. The state plays a hegemonic guiding role in setting the principles of remembering, while
880 Memory Studies 14(4)

market actors are entrusted to carry out the ideological work. To understand the political economy
of memory in China, one needs to investigate both the state, the market, and their interplay.
Some existing studies already attend to the impact of the market when they analyze mnemonic
practices in China, though some of them may do this without adopting a memory studies frame-
work (Cai, 2013, 2016; Callaha, 2006; Hung, 2018; Nie, 2013; Song, 2017; Wu and Bergman,
2019). Most of them focus on historical representation and/or audience consumption. But their
discussion of the production processes and their underlying political-economic structure lacks
details and first-hand information. An exception is Nie’s study (2013) on the War of Resistance
online games, which documents how the state incorporates the game industry into its propaganda
orbit. Yet, it underestimates the tension between the state and the market. WORAJ dramas are a
broader-based and more politicized media genre than War of Resistance online games. They pro-
vide an opportunity to observe the cooperation, conflict, and negotiation between the state and the
market in manufacturing memory.
There are a number of Chinese-language studies on WORAJ dramas. Many of them approach
WORAJ dramas from an aesthetic or media perspective; others adopt a moralistic or official frame
to criticize the distortion of history by the television dramas (Chen, 2013; China Federation of
Literary and Art Theory Research Group, hereafter CFLATRG, 2014; Wang, 2016; Zhang, 2015,
2017; Zhong, 2014). This study complements these studies by adopting a memory framework and
a critical perspective.

Data and methods

This study’s data were mainly collected from two sources: a wide variety of documentary materials
and in-depth interviews. The documentary data were largely collected from media coverage and
comments. In the context of the popularity of WORAJ dramas and the intensive public debates on
them, there are many reports and analyses on WORAJ dramas scattered in different sources,
including those published by official media, such as the People’s Daily, and those published by
semi-official and online media, such as the China Youth Daily, Netease, Tencent, and Ifeng. The
decent reports contain valuable interviews of industry insiders, useful summaries and assessments
of content, and a reflection of the official line and popular attitude on the topic. Entertainment news
media also produce many reports on individual WORAJ dramas and offer useful data with their
interviews of relevant directors, producers, and actors. Moreover, online commentaries, parody
videos, spoof pictures, and other user-generated contents derivative of WORAJ dramas are volu-
minous and scattered in different online forums, which can be used as first-hand data of audience
reception. Through these documentary sources, we acquired both background knowledge and
detailed information on WORAJ dramas.
Our interviews were conducted after we have collected most documentary data and settled on
the research framework. We enrolled informants through our personal networks. Our informants
worked in different roles in both state-owned television channels and private media companies (see
Table 1). Most of them are located in major cities such as Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Beijing. Some
informants have direct experiences in the production of WORAJ dramas; for those who do not
directly participate in WORAJ dramas, they can provide their insights on WORAJ dramas as expe-
rienced practitioners. We asked semi-opened questions on the reasons for WORAJ dramas’ popu-
larity, content creation, state-market relations, the influence of policy change, market prospects,
their own experiences in producing and marketing them, and other relevant questions. The first ten
interviews were conducted in 2018 and 2019, and the eleventh in 2020.
The data we collected from interviews are smaller in amount than those from various documen-
tary sources. Although a larger sample size of interviews would have been better, our current data
Wang and Chew 881

Table 1.  The 11 main informants.

Professional position Institutional affiliation

1 WORAJ drama screenwriter Private company
2 WORAJ drama screenwriter Private company
3 WORAJ drama screenwriter Private company
4 Screenwriter, mainly writing dramas on business competition Private company
5 Director of web series, entrepreneur in the film, and television industry Private company
6 Director of a city-level television channel State-owned media
7 High-level manager of a province-level satellite television channel State-owned media
8 Administrative staff of a province-level satellite television channel State-owned media
9 Editor-in-charge of a private film and television company Private company
10 Owner of a media production company that has produced television dramas Private company
11 Ex-vice chairperson of a city-level television channel State-owned media

are adequate for this study’s purpose. The informants offered a valid empirical basis for us to carry
out triangulation with our documentary data. They provided detailed and in-depth information that
is unobtainable from documentary sources and helped us to understand the practical nuances in the
making of WORAJ dramas. Some informal production rules are powerful, yet they remain
unknown to audiences. Although our interview data are not suitable for the grounded theory
approach or middle-range theory-building, this study’s objective does not involve these two tasks.
Instead, it aims to confirm the utility of an emerging approach in memory studies (i.e. the political
economy approach) and enrich the approach by investigating a state-capitalist case.

Behind the boom of War of Resistance dramas: Cooperative

relations between the state and the market
The boom of WORAJ dramas began in 2005 when 17 WORAJ dramas were broadcasted. Their
annual average broadcast rate used to be 3.3 between 2001 and 2004. After 2005, the broadcast
volume steadily increased to 29 in 2009 and then to 38 in 2012 (CFLATRG, 2014: 152). The gen-
eral reason that WORAJ dramas became so popular is that they are politically safe and marketa-
ble.1 But this general account does not inform us about the details and context of the story. This
section explicates the multiple causes of the WORAJ drama boom.
First of all, the boom was facilitated by government policy changes on television dramas. The
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARTF) 2 enacted a variety of regulations to
restrict the broadcasting of several types of TV dramas with proven market reception. In 2004, the
SARTF announced a Notice on Strengthening the Management of the Censorship and Broadcasting
of Crime Dramas (Guanyu jiaqiang shean ju shencha he bochu guanli de tongzhi 关于加强涉案
剧审查和播出管理的通知) to restrict crime dramas (sheanju 涉案剧), which were then dominat-
ing the market. In 2006, the SARTF released a notice to restrict “costume dramas” (guzhuangju 古
装剧, i.e. ancient historical dramas). In 2011, it banned the broadcasting of palace dramas (gong-
douxi 宫斗戏), time-travel dramas (chuanyueju 穿越剧), crime dramas, and remakes of foreign
television dramas (guowai dianshiju kelong fanpaiju 国外电视剧克隆翻拍剧) on prime-time sat-
ellite channels. The official excuses for “cleansing the television screen” ranged from political
incorrectness to moral concerns.
Given that television dramas need a large amount of upfront investment, these unpredictable
policy changes frustrated drama producers and brought much uncertainty to market competition.
882 Memory Studies 14(4)

Investors and producers sought politically safe genres to avoid unforeseeable policy restrictions.
The ideological significance, political correctness, and marketability of the War of Resistance ren-
der it a popular theme that potentially satisfies both political and commercial imperatives.
Consequently, the entire range of media business actors, including television drama production
companies, investors, directors, scriptwriters, artists, and entertainment celebrities, are attracted to
this lucrative “memory industry” of WORAJ dramas. According to Informant 2, the prime-time
ban of crime dramas facilitated the popularization of WORAJ drama, since the two genres are
considerably similar. He estimated that many producers of crime dramas likely migrated to the
production of WORAJ dramas.
Aside from policy changes, the state’s proactive encouragement of “main melody television
dramas” (zhuxuanlü dianshiju 主旋律电视剧) also facilitated the boom. “Main melody television
dramas” refer to the ideologically charged dramas on the Communist revolution (including the War
of Resistance), post-1949 Chinese history, and contemporary Chinese politics. They typically con-
tain historical narratives that promote the official memory and “mainstream values” such as patri-
otism. The SARFT adopts various measures to ensure that national and provincial-level television
channels broadcast these television dramas during prime time (Yin, 2002: 33). Informant 3 observed
that commercialized WORAJ dramas on the market may not be truly “main melodic,” but their
theme is classified as main melody dramas.
When private media companies join in producing main melody dramas, they may get various
support from governments and state-owned media. For example, some WORAJ dramas were
jointly produced by governments, television corporations, and private media enterprises. Informant
2 explained that it sometimes took the form of the government approving a theme or nominally
leading a project, and then private media enterprises carrying out the actual production. Informant
9 recounted how a private media enterprise she worked for cooperated with a large state-owned
media in producing a WORAJ drama: the state-owned media paid a large share of the investment
costs; her company only dealt with advertising and marketing.
The state support for producing and broadcasting main melody dramas is particularly evident
during periods of historical commemoration such as Anniversaries of the Victory of the War of
Resistance. During such periods, the state encourages and requires television channels to broad-
cast a number of main melody dramas (Netease, 2015). For example, the significant increase of
WORAJ dramas in 2005 was partly due to the 60th anniversary of the Victory of the War of
Resistance. The commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Victory of the War of Resistance
in 2015 similarly boosted the production of WORAJ dramas (Gansu Daily, 2014). It is an estab-
lished practice for drama producers and television broadcasters to present television dramas as
“tributes” (xianli 献礼) during state-led historical commemorations.3 Informant 1 reported that
the state gives the “green signal” to dramas with suitable themes during these commemorative
periods, and that even if the state does not make any announcements, industry practitioners know
it and scramble to make tribute dramas. Informant 9 argued that industry practitioners use “trib-
utes” to develop ties with officials for future cooperation.
Besides the central government, provincial-level officials support WORAJ dramas in direct and
prevalent ways. Provincial-level governments and provincial-level private media enterprises have
developed many connections. On one hand, local governments encourage or compel private enter-
prises to produce certain types of television dramas for propaganda. An example is the advertising
of the local culture. On the other, private media enterprises generally rely on local governments to
gain political and economic resources for business development. In addition, some local govern-
ments directly pay private companies to produce WORAJ dramas, although it is uncommon. A
provincial-level private media enterprise described that some WORAJ dramas it produced were
Wang and Chew 883

“assigned compositions” given by the provincial government; these assignments usually came
with joint investment capital that ranged between 5 and 10 million RMB (Netease, 2015).
From the commercial perspective, the boom of WORAJ dramas was inaugurated by the success
of Drawing Sword (Liangjian 亮剑). First broadcasted in 2005, Drawing Sword is a War of
Resistance television drama that won enoumous profit and critical acclaim. The commercial suc-
cess of Drawing Sword, together with the policy restrictions of other genres of television dramas,
strongly motivated market forces to turn to WORAJ dramas (Huang and Zhang, 2013). The com-
mercial outcome was very successful. WORAJ dramas gained good, and in some cases astonish-
ingly high, profits. Popular WORAJ dramas’ profit margin once reached 200%, which was far
higher than the market average of 40 or 50% profit margin of other genres of Chinese television
dramas (Huang and Zhang, 2013; Wang, 2015). Moreover, WORAJ dramas dominated many pro-
vincial satellite television channels in terms of audience ratings.
The commercial success of WORAJ dramas created a demonstration effect that compelled prac-
titioners to follow suit, which in turn reduced market uncertainty. More producers, investors, tele-
vision channels, actors, and other productive agents participated in the wave of producing WORAJ
dramas. Informant 11 observed that a smoothly functioning and prosperous supply chain became
well-established by the early 2010s. As informant 5 said, when more television dramas of the same
genre are invested and produced, the costs of props, costumes, and stage sets decrease, and the
typical example is the Hengdian World Studios, which has become the major base for producing
WORAJ dramas.
Aside from policy and profits, there might be a remote driver of the boom of WORAJ dramas:
tensions in Sino-Japanese relations and the surging anti-Japanese nationalism triggered by territo-
rial disputes since 2010. Informant 1 thought that it was impactful, because:

Practitioners (such as enterprise bosses and investors) tend to anticipate what the government wants. They
are very sensitive in this regard; they have the channels to learn about policy orientations.

Yet, informants 2 and 3 argued that the influence of Sino-Japanese relations had been insignificant.
They claimed that Sino-Japanese tensions may not translate into an increase in the production vol-
ume of WORAJ dramas.
Whether Sino-Japanese relations affected business decisions to produce WORAJ drama was
unclear. But on the macro social level, nationalistic sentiments against Japan likely facilitated audi-
ences’ psychological resonance with WORAJ dramas. Businesses and producers likely understood
this popular psychology and were ready to capitalize on it. For example, the producer of Drawing
Sword advertised the drama New Drawing Sword (Xin Liangjian 新亮剑) in 2011 with these
words: “Don’t forget the national humiliation! We love China! The Diaoyu Islands belong to
China!” (Wang, 2015). A director deliberated:

In the current context of unstable Sino-Japanese relations, WORAJ dramas not only satisfy the audience’s
psychological need for anger-venting. They also have low risks of being censored. It is not difficult to
understand, monitored by the market, why capital increasingly flows to them (Ibid.).

Based on our documentary data and interviews, we estimate that the boom of WORAJ dramas
peaked between 2009 and 2012. The production of them decreased after 2012, due to new policy
restrictions, public critiques, and market fatigue. But because 2015 was the 70th Anniversary of the
Victory of the War of Resistance, the production volume again increased in that year. In the second
half of the 2010s, WORAJ dramas receded from a dominant market position but remained visible.
A few informants thought that future historical commemorations would likely facilitate additional
884 Memory Studies 14(4)

waves of production of WORAJ dramas. For example, informant 10 reasoned that “it looks like
WORAJ dramas should experience another boom. [. . .] The state needs propaganda; the busi-
nesses need to produce television dramas.” We agreed with them. Considering the tightened con-
trol over media and the re-vitalization of revolutionary ideology in recent years, WORAJ dramas
could be an attractive choice for both the state and media.

How to remember the war: Conflictual relations between the

state and the market
The previous section shows how the boom of WORAJ dramas resulted from cooperation between
political and commercial interests. Yet, this relation was not exclusively cooperative. It became
partly conflictual because of the inherent contradiction between the political demand for propa-
ganda and the commercial demand for profits. To ensure profits, commercial media introduce into
WORAJ dramas various kinds of novel and creative elements that ultimately aim at entertainment
value. Yet some of these elements cannot peacefully co-exist alongside the dramas’ propagandistic
content. The resultant incongruence has provoked the state to criticize and discipline the WORAJ
drama industry. It has also led a part of the public to protest.
Market competition has not only unleashed productivity to reproduce the past but also changed
war narratives and created significant cultural repercussions. Conventional War of Resistance nar-
ratives are solemn and ideologically loaded. They usually exist in the form of official texts and
propaganda-like cultural products. The majority of WORAJ dramas produced after the mid-2000s
are different. With some exceptions such as Eastern Battlefield (Dongfan zhanchang 东方战场)
broadcasted in 2016, most contemporary WORAJ dramas do not favor the conventional politicized
narratives, since they are not marketable. Drama producers need to create new attractive stories of
the war that match consumer preferences, and the market competition in the WORAJ drama indus-
try has motivated businesses to experiment with bold innovations. Informant 4 described the mar-
ket pressure to experiment with these novel elements:

There were already so many dramas that adopt the War of Resistance theme. This theme has become
unattractive. [To remain attractive to audiences,] one must rely on the expression and form. [. . .] There is
a need for continual innovation.

It is almost impossible for market actors to alter the core nationalist ideology or the principal
narratives of the War of Resistance. WORAJ dramas keep intact some key constituent elements of
conventional War of Resistance themed propaganda. They include Japanese invasion, Japanese
militarism, “Chinese traitors” (hanjian 汉奸), corrupted Nationalist Party members, and the
Chinese people’s brave resistance. Alternatively, market actors choose the strategy of “periphery
innovations”: major innovations of narratives are made in non-ideological periphery areas.
Embedded in the master narratives of invasion and resistance, drama producers innovate with
micro-narratives, which are often organized on personalized and dramatic plots that enhance pro-
tagonists’ legendary roles in national salvation. At the same time, an impressive array of commer-
cial and entertainment elements is grafted onto these conventional elements. They include, for
example, unconventional heroes, intriguing plots, exaggerated fight scenes, special effects, stylish
costumes, luxurious settings, and starring by youth idols. Some WORAJ dramas intentionally
sought to construct “alternative” (linglei 另类) and “subversive” (dianfu 颠覆) images as their
marketing strategies.
Notably, contemporary WORAJ dramas have revised the conventional image of Chinese army
men. They avoid featuring stories about high-ranking leaders in the Communist or Nationalist
Wang and Chew 885

party. Instead, they feature protagonists from among a wide range of classes and groups, including
low-ranking military officers, foot soldiers, spies, bandits, martial art experts, spies, and busi-
nesspersons. The protagonists often have idiosyncratic personalities and imperfect human emo-
tions. They use superior fighting skills, tactics, and strategies to defeat the Japanese army, which,
ironically, is often portrayed as militarily incompetent. The most exaggerated scenes are that the
Chinese heroes even use Chinese martial arts to defeat a larger number of the Japanese army.4
Informant 2 argued that these WORAJ dramas are converging with American superhero movies,
using superheroes to fight against the Japanese.
Moreover, many WORAJ drams adopt narrative elements borrowed from commercially proven
popular cultural genres, such as romance, idol, suspense, and action, to make their plots more
attractive to apolitical mass audiences. Informant 1 claimed that the current mainstream of WORAJ
dramas is “Republic idol dramas” (minguo ouxiangju 民国偶像剧). Good-looking and fashionable
idols from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are turned into the main attraction of these
dramas. The War of Resistance theme is only utilized in these dramas as a veneer of political loy-
alty; the narrative elements of other commercialized genres are the main driver of these dramas’
broad appeal. In this way, WORAJ dramas become a “melting pot” in which various narrative ele-
ments are introduced with a patriotic veneer. Although these dramas ostensibly promote nationalist
ideology, the market-oriented entertainment elements trivialize and dilute it. Informant 1
commented,

[They] inject various kinds of [entertainment] elements into WORAJ dramas, but all of them forget about
the War of Resistance itself. They simply don’t care.

Therefore, contemporary WORAJ dramas create a glamorous but inauthentic war memory. It is
glamorous because it redresses war memory with fashion, beauty, spectacular fighting scenes, and
American-style superheroes. It is inauthentic is because much of its content is against basic histori-
cal knowledge. The use of martial arts to defeat well-equipped army soldiers sounds incredible; a
person in the 1940s with contemporary Korean hairstyle looks improbable and anachronistic.
Many of WORAJ dramas are nicknamed “ridiculous WORAJ dramas” (kangRi shenju 抗日神剧,
kangRi leiju 抗日雷剧) by the media and netizens.
The Chinese audience and public display divided opinions on WORAJ dramas. On the one
hand, some WORAJ dramas won decent audience ratings and commercial profit. On the other
hand, the overproduction of WORAJ dramas and the “ridiculousness” of some of their contents
have angered a part of the public, who post online to criticize such dramas. According to a survey
conducted by the China Youth Daily, 46.8% of the respondents think that “ridiculous WORAJ
dramas” distort history, 45.6% of them are worried that such dramas mislead youths on historical
facts, and 75.0% of them think the department who is in charge of censorship should take the ulti-
mate responsibility (Xu, 2015). A questionnaire survey of residents of Wuhan, by asking questions
regarding “WORAJ dramas” (kangzhan ticai dianshiju 抗战题材电视剧, not only “ridiculous dra-
mas”), finds that 29.7% of the respondents like WORAJ dramas very much and 14.9% do not like
such dramas (CFLATRG, 2014: 197).
Commercialized historical dramas that do not feature the War of Resistance also contained
many inauthentic and entertainment-oriented elements. For example, Cai (2016) shows how com-
mercialized television dramas depoliticize and romanticize the collective memory of the Cultural
Revolution and conceal the true history. But the special role of the War of Resistance as a core
component of national memory and state ideology renders its commercialization (and its overpro-
duction) to arouse social antipathy. Some netizens criticize these dramas for making people forget
history. Many of these critiques, as Wu and Bergman (2019) find, are based on the patriotic
886 Memory Studies 14(4)

ideology promoted by the party-state. Namely, a part of the Chinese audiences blames the market
for distorting history and assumed that the “true history” is similar to the official history promul-
gated by the CCP. 5 Some even call for more state censorship on WORAJ dramas (Ibid.).
The excessive adoption of entertainment-oriented elements in WORAJ dramas also antago-
nized the state. The official media initiated their critiques on WORAJ dramas. For example, in
February of 2013, the People’s Daily criticized WORAJ dramas for their “profit-centered direction
and consumerist cultural tendency” (Zhu, 2013). In April, an influential Central Chinese Television
(CCTV) news program accused them of distorting history for profit (CCTV, 2013). In May, the
SAPPRFT released the Notice on the Regulation of television Dramas in Prime Time of the Satellite
Channels (Guanyu guifan weishi huangjindang dianshiju bochu de tongzhi 关于规范卫视黄金档
电视剧播出的通知) to regulate WORAJ dramas. In April of 2015, it further strengthened the
regulation of these dramas by prohibiting their “excessive entertainment-ization” (guodu yulehua
过度娱乐化).
This conflict between the state and the market reflects competing views on what constitutes
appropriate historical representation. The state wants “main melody dramas” that promote nation-
alism based on the official history. It mainly cares about memory products’ educational and propa-
gandist impacts. In contrast, media investors and businesses understand that an entertainment-rich
war memory is marketable to audiences and advertisers. Although market actors dare not openly
oppose the state, they strived to maximize market imperatives by smartly gaming the system. As
informant 2 elaborated:

One has to write main-melodic content. But production studios and directors wish to dilute it. To reach a
certain degree [of presenting main-melodic content] is fine. Five percent [of a drama] devoted to the spirit
of main melody is sufficient. This is a result of the negotiation between production companies and the
SAPPRFT. It is optimal. Having five percent of main melody lets a drama pass the censorship. If there is
too much [main-melodic content], producers and audiences complain. It will become too didactic.

The market logic has indeed interfered with the propagandistic functions of WORAJ dramas.
With romantic love triangles and superhero-like action scenes overlaying the master narratives of
the war, these dramas’ ideological functioning is undermined to a non-negligible degree. For exam-
ple, these entertainment elements encourage at least a part of the audience to forget about the War
of resistance as a politically charged and humiliating event. The following passage, published in
the People’s Daily in 2018, indicated the state’s recognition of this undermining:

The purpose of the War of Resistance genre of film and television is to facilitate audiences’ historical
knowledge and national sentiments. The genre should do it by using artistic language to represent history
and to promote the magnificent spirit of our War of Resistance. [. . .] We cannot represent history for fun,
consume history, or treat history as entertainment. To do so is to dilute, forget, and distort the true history
of the War of Resistance (Hu, 2018).

The conflict between the state and the market did not end with regulatory policies and the state’s
self-righteous criticisms. Some industry practitioners and audiences counter-critique the state. As
informant 10 confessed, industry insiders generally admitted that entertainment-oriented elements
conflicted with historical facts, but they “doubted that this conflict was more serious than that
generated by political ideology requirements.” For example, television dramas or films that authen-
tically portray the Nationalist Party, its army, and its supporters are likely banned or censored. The
state suppresses market actors who want to authentically represent a past that differs from the
official history. This counter-critique is commonly made by netizens in online discussions and
Wang and Chew 887

critical public intellectuals. A netizen tersely voices his/her counter-critique: “To resist Japan or
love Japan— it is only a matter of state strategy.”6
The immediate effect of this state regulation was a decline in the production of WORAJ dramas.
Drama producers and satellite channels became more cautious about the making and broadcasting
of WORAJ dramas. Informants 2 and 11 reported that production studios were alarmed by the new
policy regulation and correspondingly reduced their investments in WORAJ dramas. Informant 9
reported that when her former company tried to sell a WORAJ drama to CCTV, CCTV requested
her company to edit out its “ridiculous” content first. Moreover, drama producers and television
channels became more sensitive to audience critiques. They confronted the combination of pres-
sure from audiences and new state regulations. According to a media report, the staff of a major
satellite channel explained that if her channel broadcasted “ridiculous dramas,”

The audiences would complain, and a lot of negative news would appear. This would hurt the channel’s
brand. More importantly, the SAPPRFT might ban the dramas or request major revisions of content. None
are willing to bear these risks (Tencent, 2015).

Nonetheless, the new regulations and official criticism are executed in a lukewarm way. The
officials did not genuinely stop the commercial production of WORAJ dramas. They only targeted
the most “ridiculous” ones. They loudly proclaimed to suppress “excessive entertainment-ization”
but have left the definition of this term open. Nor did the officials clarify what “ridiculous dramas”
are. They left a moderate amount of room for television drama producers to maneuver. For exam-
ple, even though drama producers no longer dare to place obviously “ridiculous” elements into
WORAJ dramas, they are unlikely to stop dressing up protagonists in cool styles or adding martial
arts action to fighting scenes. A WORAJ drama broadcasted in November of 2020, Thunder
Warriors (Leiting zhanjiang 雷霆战将), an “idol WORAJ drama,” once again resulted in public
critiques and official suppression. Under the current political environment and public pressure,
WORAJ dramas may include more conventional, politically charged narratives, but the primary
concerns of investors, media businesses, and apolitical mass audiences are profit and entertainment
instead of propaganda—this will not change.

Discussion and conclusion

The previous analysis clarifies an important case of commercialized memory-making in state-
capitalist China. We have shown that policy shift, state support, market change, regulation, audi-
ence, and more importantly, media system and the interplay of political and economic power
behind it, all contribute to shaping commercialized historical representation. We have also seen
that “consuming history” in authoritarian societies—especially the histories central to state legiti-
macy—could be a target of political repression. Even though market actors may not intentionally
challenge the hegemonic memory, “consuming history” in an apolitical way may contain a dimen-
sion of resistance, functioning to dilute a politically charged past.
The contribution of this study is two-fold. Firstly, it introduces the market factor to research on
the remembering of the War of Resistance in China. Although many scholarly works on the collec-
tive memory of the War of Resistance presumes a coherent, sedimented “national memory,” this
study suggests a more multifaceted view of point. War memory has increasingly become an indus-
try within which capitalistic interests dominate. Driven by profit-making and competition, market
forces are more capable of creatively representing and repackaging memory, making state propa-
ganda more sophisticated and entertaining. However, they paradoxically frustrate the state by trivi-
alizing revolutionary symbols and undermining the official memory. At least some audiences are
888 Memory Studies 14(4)

encouraged to remember history in an entertainment-oriented way and forget the ideologically

loaded past.
Compared to traditional propaganda, market-produced memory is much more responsive to
audience preference. It allows consumers in the market, or television audiences in our case, to have
a say in mnemonic practices. Consumers can indirectly participate in making commercialized
memories by choosing which memory products to consume or reject. Both the state and mass con-
sumers need the market to keep manufacturing war memory, even though it involves a continual
process of trial and error. The market acts as a middle ground between the state and society. It
depends on the state to gain political protection and permission, and it depends on society to gain
commercial resources and profits. But it is difficult to please both at the same time.
Secondly, it enriches the political economy of memory approach by uncovering an authoritarian
state-capitalist case, in which the state plays a powerful role to regulate the marketplace of mem-
ory-making. As our analysis study demonstrates, under the authoritarian context, the market is not
an independent force that has the freedom to choose what they want to say about the past. The
authoritarian state requires the market to undertake propaganda work and uses various means to
sponsor and regulate the memory production process. The media market unleashes incredible pro-
ductivity that significantly popularizes the past, but cannot give ample representation to alternative
memories. It is to a large extent compelled by the state to reproduce the hegemonic memory.
At the same time, like many other aspects of authoritarian politics, the “principal-agent prob-
lem” also appears in memory-making, when the state and market actors have a conflict in priori-
ties. Market actors ostensibly obey their political task but adroitly game the system for their
organizational and individual interests. They employ various strategies and tactics to find a balanc-
ing point that let them simulaneously win profits and avoid state censorship, and flexibly respond
to changing state policies and audience demand. Both the state and the market need to continually
adjust their behaviors in response to transformation in the dometic and global contexts. A tug-of-
war of memory-making between the state and the market will go on.

Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Anthony Fung, Emil Lundedal Hammer, James Reilly, Peter Gries, and Stephen Nagy, and
anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs
Yi Wang https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3242-189X
Matthew M. Chew https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5065-5652

Notes
1. This perspective can also be used to explain the general nationalistic discourses in Chinese news media.
See Wang and Chew (2016).
2. The SARTF merged with the Press and Publication Administration into the State Administration of
Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) in 2013. In 2018, the State Administration of
Radio and Television (SART) was established based on SAPPRFT.
Wang and Chew 889

3. Paying “tributes” to the state-led historical commemorations is a Chinese political ritual. The tribute-
payers can be governmental organizations, the media, as well as other institutions, and historical films
and dramas are typical tribute products.
4. In fact, non-mainland Chinese directors played an essential role in this kind of genre-mixing. Due to the
policy restrictions on costume dramas, some Hong Kong and Taiwanese directors who specialized in
martial arts productions migrated to the field of WORAJ dramas.
5. Note that the online discussions on WORAJ dramas, as we observed, have some degrees of pluralism.
For example, they also contain critiques of the state censorship and skepticism on the “political cor-
rectness” in the dramas. Such a voice could regard both the official memory and the market-oriented
memory as being manipulated by political or economic purposes.
6. To protect the online user’s privacy, we do not quote his/her ID and the web address.

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Author biographies
Yi Wang is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Political Science and Economics of Waseda University in
Tokyo. Prior to taking up this position, he worked as a postdoctoral research associate at the University of
Manchester. He studies the politics of memory and identity in China. His work has appeared in journals such
as Memory Studies, The China Quarterly, and Journal of Contemporary China.
Matthew M Chew is an associate professor at the Sociology Department of Hong Kong Baptist University in
Hong Kong. His research interests include social theory, cultural sociology, sociology of knowledge, Chinese
societies, and media sociology. He has published numerous articles in journals including New Media and
Society, Current Sociology, Chinese Sociological Review, The China Quarterly, Globalizations, and Cultural
Studies.