2.

Gorgias the Sophist

Gorgias of Leontini, born in Sicily around 483 ca. BC,

is also the character of an early Platonic Dialogue. A
Rhetorician and a philosopher, Gorgias focuses on
language and seems to argue for the non-
communicability of ‘being’.
Apart from the reference edition that, as with the
other Presocratic thinkers, remains the one
established by Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz,
the edition by Mario Untersteiner1 certainly deserves
attention. The recent edition and translation by
André Laks and Glenn W. Most must be taken into
account as a reference edition :
A. LAKS – G.W. MOST (eds.), Early Greek Philosophy,
voL. VIII-IX, Sophists, Cambridge, MA, Harvard UP,
2016 (Loeb Classical Library, 531-532). The section
consecrated to Gorgias is found in the first part (vol.
VIII), pp. 114-291.
Hegel famously said of the Sophists that they were
“the masters of Greece”. Useful contributions on the
Sophistic movement is: G.B. KERFERD (ed.), The
Sophists and their legacy (Wiesbaden, Steiner,
1981).2 For an analysis of Gorgias’s philosophy of
language and of its implications which might still be
relevant for some late 20th century philosophical
debates, one may read S. CONSIGNY, Gorgias: Sophist
and Artist, Columbia, University of South Carolina
Press, 2001.
The Reader offers, unmodified, the translation by
John Dillon and Tania Gergel, available in: The
Greek Sophists, translated and with Introduction
and Notes by J. DILLON and T. GERGEL (London,
Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 43-97.

1 Cf. M. UNTERSTEINER, Sofisti : testimonianze e frammenti, fasc.

2 (Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1954).
2 Although guided by the author’s specific agenda, see also the

reflections put forward by S.IJSSELING, Rhetoric and

Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey (The Hague, Nijhoff,
20082).
A testimony on Gorgias3

The admirers of Gorgias were noble and numerous: first, the

Greeks in Thessaly, among whom ‘to be an orator’,
(rhêtoreuein) acquired the synonym ‘to gorgianize’
(gorgiazein), and, secondly, all Greece, in whose presence at the
Olympic Games he denounced the barbarians, speaking from
the platform in front of the temple. Aspasia of Miletus is said
o have sharpened the tongue of Pericles in imitation of
Gorgias, and Critias and Thucydides were not unaware of how
to acquire from him grandiloquence and solemnity,
converting it into their own work, the one by dexterity, the
other by vigour of expression. Aeschines the Socratic, in
whom you were recently interested on the ground that he was
clearly criticizing dialogues, did not hesitate to gorgianize in
the speech for Thargelia. For at one point he says: “Thargelia
the Milesian, coming to Thessaly, lived with Antiochus the
Thessalian, who was king of all Thessaly”. The digressions
(apostaseis) and transitions (prosbolai) of Gorgias’s speeches
became the fashion in many quarters and especially among
the epic poets.

3 This is a testimony from the Sophist Lucius Flavius Philostratus (ca. 170
AD – ca. 247 AD), in one of his letters, addressed to Empress Julia Domna
(= Philostratus, Letters 73). Cf. J. DILLON – T. GERGEL (eds.), The Greek
Sophists (London, Penguin Books, 2003), p. 66.
 < Texts and Fragments >

On Not-Being or On Nature4

[65] Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same party as those

who abolish the criterion, although he did not adopt the same
line of attack as Protagoras. For in his book entitled On Not-
Being, or On Nature, he tries to establish successively three
main points – firstly, that nothing exists; secondly, that even
if anything exists it is inapprehensible (akatalêpton) by man;
thirdly, that even if anything is apprehensible, yet certainly
it is inexpressible and incommunicable (anexoiston kai
anhermêneuton) to one’s neighbour

[66] That nothing exists he argues in the following fashion. If

anything exists, either it is the existent that exists or the non­
existent, or both the existent and the non-existent exist. But
neither does the existent exist, as he will establish, nor the
non-existent, as he will demonstrate, nor both the existent
and the non-existent, as he will also make plain. Nothing,
therefore, exists.

[67] Now the non-existent does not exist. For if the non­
existent exists, it will at one and the same time exist and not
exist; for inso far as it is conceived as non-existent it ill not
exist, but in so far as it is non-existent, it will, in turn, exist.
But it is wholly absurd that a thing should both exist and not
exist at one and the same time.Therefore the non-existent does
not exist. Moreover, if the non-existent exists, the existent will
not exist; for these are contrary the one to the other, and if
existence is a property of the non-existent, non-existence will
be a property of the existent. But it is not the case that the
existent does not exist; neither, then, will the non­ existent
exist.

[68] Funhermore, the existent does not exist either. For if the
existent exists, it is either eternal (aidion) or created (genêton),

4 Gorgias’s treatise On Not-Being, which is reported to us by the 2nd

century AD sckeptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and by the author
of a curious little work included in the Aristotelian corpus: On Melissus,
Xenophanes, Gorgias. As John Dillon writes : “It is not clear that either
the author of On Melissus, cit., or Sextus is quoting abolutely verbatim, but
it seems likely that they are not altering very much.” The Reader includes
the version by Sextus Empiricus, on whose writings and thought one can
read :
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sextus-empiricus/
or at once both eternal and created; but, as we shall prove, it
is neither eternal nor created nor both; therefore the existent
does not exist. For if the existent is eternal, it has no beginning
(arkhê); [69] for everything created has some beginning, but
the eternal, being uncreated, has no beginning. And having no
beginning, it is infinite (apeiron). But if it is infinite, it is
nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that in which it is is different
from it, and thus the existent, being encompassed by
something, will no longer be infinite; for that which
encompasses is larger than that which is encompassed,
whereas nothing is larger than the infinite; so that the infinite
is not anywhere.

[70] Nor, again, is it encompassed by itself . For, if so, that in

which it is will be identical with that which is in it and the
existent will become two things, place and body (for that
wherein it is is place, and that which is therein is body). But
this is absurd; so that the existent is not in itself either.
Consequently, if the exisent is eternal it is infinite, and if it is
infinite it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. So
then, if the existent is eternal, it is not even existent at all.

[71] Nor, again, can the existent be created [produced]. For if

it has been created, it has been created either out of the
existent or out of the non-existent. But it has not been created
out of the existent; for if it is existent it has not been created,
but exists already; nor out of the non-existent; for the non-
existent cannot create anything, because what is creative of
anything must of necesity partake of real existence. Neither,
then, is the existent created.

[72] In the same way, it is not both together – at once eternal

and created; for these are destructive the one of the other, and
if the existent is eternal it has not been created, while if it has
been created it is not eternal. So then, if the existent is neither
eternal nor created nor both at once, the existent will not
exist.

[73] Moreover, if it exists, it is either one or many; but, as we

shall show, it is neither one nor many; therefore the existent
does not exist. For if it is one, it is either a discrete quantity
(poson) or a continuous one (synekhes) or a magnitude
(megethos) or a body (soma). But whichever of these it be, it is
not one; but if it be a discrete quantity it will be divisible, and
if it be a continuous one it will be capable of being cut up; and
similarly if it be conceived as a magnitude it will not be
indivisible, while if it is a body it will be three-dimensional, for
it will possess length and breadth and depth. But it is absurd
to say that the existent is none of these; therefore the existent
is not one. [74] Yet neither is it many. For if it is not one,
neither is it many; for the many is a sum of ones, and hence if
the one is done awaywith, the many also are done away with
along with it.

Well, then, it is plain from this that neither does the existent
exist nor the non-existent exist; [75] and that they do not both
exist – both the existent and the non-existent – is easy to
prove. For if the non-existent exists and the existent exists,
the non­existent will be identical with the existent so far as
regards existing; and for this reason neither of them exists. For
it is admitted that the non-existent does not exist; and it has
been demonstrated that the existent is identical therewith;
therefore it too will not exist.

[76] And what is more, if the existent is identical with the non-
existent, both of them cannot exist; for if the pair of them
both exist, there is no identity, and if there is identity, there
is no longer a pair. From which it follows that nothing exists;
for if neither the existent exists nor the non­existent nor both,
and besides these no other alternative is conceived, nothing
exists.

[77] In the next place it must be shown that even if anything

exists it is unknowable and inconceivable (agnoston te kai
anepinoeton)5 by man. If – says Gorgias – the things thought
are non-existent, the existent is not thought. And this is
logically valid: for just as, if it is a property of things thought
to be white, then it would be a property of things white to be
thought, so, if it is a property of things thought to be non-
existent, then it will necessarily be a property of things
existent not to be thought. [78] Consequently, it is logically
sound and consistent to say: “if things thought are not
existent, then the existent is not thought”. But things
thought (for we must take them first) are not existent, as we
shall establish; therefore, the existent is not thought. And in
fact that the things thought are not existent is plain; [79] for
if things thought arc existent, all the things thought exist, and
in the way, too, inwhich anyone has thought them. But this is
repugnant to reason; for if someone thinks of a man flying, or
of chariots running over the sea, it does not straight away

5The Greek ‘anepinoeton’, a few century later, will be commonly used with
an economic connotation, in reference to a need that ‘cannot be satisfied’,
‘unsatisfiable’. We find such a use and meaning, for instance, in the
Orationes by Gregory of Nazianzen. The term ‘agnostos’ refers to God in a
crucial Biblical passage, from the New Testament, viz., the Acts of the
Apostles 17, 23.
follow that a man is flying, or that chariots are running over
the sea. So that the things thought are not existent.

[80] Furthermore, if the things thought are existent, the non­

existent things will not be thought. For opposites are
properties of opposites, and the non-existent is the opposite of
the existent; and because of this, if to be thought is a property
of the existent, not to be thought will most certainly be a
property of the non­ existent. But this is absurd; for Scylla
and Charybdis and many non-existent things are thought.
Therefore the existent is not thought. [8I] And just as the
things seen are called visible because of the fact that they are
seen, and the audible termed audible because of the fact that
they are heard, and we do not reject the visible things
becausethey are not heard, nor dismiss the audible things
because they are not seen (for each object ought to be judged
by its own special sense and not by another) – so also the
things thought will exist, even if they should not be viewed by
the sight nor heard by the hearing, because they are perceived
by their own proper criterion [warrant]. If, then, a man thinks
of a chariot running over the sea, even if he does not behold it
he ought to believe that a chariot is running over the sea. But
this is absurd; therefore the existent is not thought and
apprehended.

[83] And even if it should be apprehended, it is incapable of

being communicated (anexoiston) to another person. For if
existent things, as objects of vision and of hearing and of the
senses in general, are by definition externally existent, and if
these visible things are apprehensible by sight and audible by
hearing, and not vice versa, how, in this case, can these things
be indicated to another person?

[84] For the means by which we indicate is speech (logos), and

speech is not identical with the really subsistent things;
therefore we do not indicate to our neighbour the existent
things but speech, which is other than what subsists. Thus,
just as the visible things will not become audible, and vice
versa, so too, since the existent subsists externally, it will not
become identical with our speech; and not being speech, [85]
it cannot be revealed to another person.

Speech, moreover, as he <i.e., Gorgias> asserts, is formed

from the impressions caused by external objects, that is to say,
objects of sense; for from the occurrence of flavour there is
produced in us the speech uttered concerning this quality,
and, by the incidence of colour, speech respecting colour. And
if this be so, it is not speech that serves to reveal the external
object, but the external object that proves to be explanatory
of speech.

[86] Moreover, it is not possible to assert that speech subsists

in the same fashion as things visible and audible, so that the
subsisting and existent things can be indicated by it as by a
thing subsisting and existent. For, he says, even if speech
subsists, yet it differs from the rest of subsisting things, and
visible bodies differ very greatly from spoken words; for the
visible object is perceptible by one sense-organ and speech by
another. Therefore speech does not serve to indicate the great
majority of subsisting things, even as they themselves do not
reveal each other’s nature.6

The Encomium of Helen

[1] The adornment (kosmos) of a city is manpower, of a body

beauty,
of a soul, wisdom,
of an action, virtue,
of a speech, truth;
and the opposites of these make for disarray (a-kosmia).
Man and woman and speech and deed and city and object
should be honoured, if praiseworthy, with praise
and incur, if unworthy, blame,
for it is an equal error and mistake
to blame the praiseable and to praise the blameable.

[2] It is the part of one and the same man

both to speak the needful rightly
and to refute <what is said not rightly; it is fitting, then> to
refute those who rebuke Helen,
a woman about whom univocal and unanimous has
been the testimony of inspired poets,
as has the ill omen of her name,
which has become a memorial of misfonunes.
For my part, by introducing some reasoning into my speech,
I wish to free the accused from blame (pausai tes aîtias),
and, by revealing her detractors as liars and showing forth the
truth,
to free her from ignorance (pausai tês amathias).

[3] So then, that in nature and in ancestry

the woman who is subject of this speech
6Taken from: SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, Against the Mathematicians, VII, 65-
86.
 is pre-eminent among pre-eminent men and
women
is not unclear, even to a few.
For it is clear that her mother was Leda,
and her father was in fact (genomenou) a god, Zeus,
but said to be (egomenou) a mortal, Tyndareus,
of whom the one was shown to be her father
because he was (dia to einai),
and the latter was disproved,
because he was said to be (dia to phanai),
and the latter was the most powerful of men,
while the former was lord of all things.

[4] Born of such stock, she had godlike beauty,

which, taking and not mistaking (labousa kai ou lathousa),
she kept;
In many did she work much desire for her love,
and with her one body she brought together many bodies
of men
thinking great thoughts for great goals,
of whom
some had greatness of wealth
some the glory of ancient nobility,
some the vigour of personal agility,
some command of acquired knowledge;
and all came
because of a passion which loved to conquer
(philonikou)
and a love of honour which was unconquered (aniketou).

[5] Who it was, and why and how he sailed away, taking Helen
as his love, I shall not say.
To tell the knowing what they know already
shows the right but brings no delight.
Having passed over the time then in my speech now,
I shall go on to the beginning of my future speech,
and I shall set forth the causes which made it likely
that Helen’s voyage to Troy should take place.

[6] For either it was by the will of Fate

and the wishes of the Gods
and the votes of Necessity
that she did what she did,
or by force reduced
or by words seduced
<or by love possessed>.
Now if through the first,
 it is right for the responsible to be held responsible;
for God’s predetermination (prothymian) cannot be
hindered
by human premeditation (promêthiâi).
For it is the nature of things,
not for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker,
but for the weaker to be ruled and drawn by the
stronger,
and for the stronger to lead and the weaker to
follow.
God is a stronger force than man
in might
and in wit
and in other ways.
If then on Fate and on God one must place blame
(anatheteon)
Helen from disgrace one must free (apolyteon).

[7] But if she was by violence raped

and lawlessly forced
and unjustly outraged
it is plain that the rapist, as the outrager,
did the wronging,
and the raped, as the outraged,
did the suffering.
It is right, then,
for the barbarian who undertook a barbaric
undertaking
in word and law and deed
to meet with blame in word,
exclusion in law,
and punishment in deed.
And how would it not be reasonable for a woman
raped and robbed of her country
and deprived of her friends
to be pitied rather than pilloried?
He did the dread deeds; she suffered them.
It is just, therefore,
to pity her, but to hate him.

[8] But if it was speech which persuaded her

and deceived her soul,
not even to this is it difficult to make an answer
and to banish blame,
as follows:
Speech is a powerful lord, who
with the finest and most invisible body
achieves the most divine works:
 it can stop fear and banish grief
and create joy and nurture pity.
I shall show how this is the case,
for I must offer proof to the opinions (doxêi
deixai) of my hearers.
I both deem and define all poetry
as speech possessing metre.

[9] There come upon its hearers

fearful shuddering (phrikê
periphobos) and tearful pity (eleos
polydakrys)
and grievous longing (pothos philopenthes),7
and at the good fortunes and evil actions
of others’ affairs and bodies
through the agency of words
the soul experiences suffering of its own.
Buf come, I shall turn from one argument to another.

[10] Inspired incantations conveyed through words

become bearers of pleasure (epagôgoi hedones)
and banishers of pain (apagôgoi lypês);
for, merging with opinion in the soul,
the power of the incantation beguiles it
and persuades it
and alters it by witchcraft.
Of witchcraft and magic twin arts have been discovered,
which are errors of the soul (psychês
hamartêmata)
and deceptions of opinion (doxês apatêmata).

[11] All who have and do persuade people of things

do so by moulding a false argument.
For if all men on all subjects
had both memory of things past
and <awareness> of things present
and foreknowledge of the future,
speech would not be similarly similar,
since, as things are now, it is not easy for them
to recall the past

7 Scholars like Max Pohlenz (1872-1962) argued that the terminology of

§9, combined with the medical approach displayed in § 14, might

consitute an early formulation fo the theory of “catharsis”, i.e., purgation
of the emotions (especially ‘pity’ and ‘fear’) as release from tension; such
“relief” would primarily happen through art. Aristotle introduces such
theory in his Poetics. For those who might be interested in the topic, a good
reading to begin with is L. GOLDEN, “The Purgation Theory of Catharsis”,
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31 (1973), 4, pp. 473-479.
 nor to consider the present
nor to divine the future;
so that on most subjects most men
take opinion as counsellor to their soul.
But opinion, being slippery and insecure,
casts those employing it into slippery and insecure successes.

[12] What cause, then, prevents the conclusion

that Helen similarly, against her will,
might have come under the influence of speech,
just as if ravished by the force of pirates?
For the mode of persuasion is in no way like that of necessity,
but its power is the same.
For the speech which persuades the soul
constrains that soul which it persuades
both to obey its utterances
and to approve its doings.
The persuader, as contrainer, does the wrong,
and the persuaded, as constrained, is wrongly blamed.

[13 ] That persuasion, when added to speech,

can impress the soul as it wishes,
one may learn.
first from the utterances of the astronomers
who,substituting opinion for opinion,
taking away one but creating another,
make what is incredible and unclear
seem true to the eyes of opinion;
and second, compelling contests in words,
in which a single speech,
written with art, but not spoken with truth,
may charm and persuade a large multitude;
and third, the struggles of philosophic arguments,
in which swiftness of thought is also shown
making belief in an opinion easily changed.

[14] The effect of speech upon the structure of soul

is as the structure of drugs over the nature of bodies;
for just as different drugs dispel different secretions
from the body,
and some bring an end to disease,
and others to life,
so also in the case of speeches
some distress, others delight,
some cause fear,
others embolden their hearers,
and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil
persuasion.
[I5] It has been stated, then, that, if she was persuaded by
speech,
she did not do wrong (edikesen),
but was unfortunate (etykhesen).
The fourth cause I shall discuss in a fourth section. For if it
was love which did these things,
no difficulty will she have in escaping the charge
of the sin which is alleged to have taken place.
For the things we see
do not have the nature
which we wish them to have,
but the nature
which each happens to have;
through sight the soul is impressed even to its core.

[16] For example,

when enemy bodies fit themselves out
against enemies,
with warlike gear of bronze and iron,
some for defence, some for offence,
if the sight sees this,
it is alarmed, and alarms the soul,
so that often men flee in terror
from future danger as if it were present.
For strong as is the habit of obedience to the law,
it is driven out by fear resulting from sight
which, coming to a man, causes him to set at
naught
both the noble that is adjudged through law,
and the good that comes about through victory.

[I7] It has happened that people,

having seen frightening sights,
have lost presence of mind for the
present moment;
even thus does fear extinguish and expel thought.
And many have fallen victim
to useless labour (mataiois ponois)
and dread diseases (deinais nosois)
and madnesses hard to cure (dysiatois
maniais).
In this way the sight engraves upon the mind
images of things seen.
And many frightening impressions linger,
and what lingers is very similar to what is said.

[18] Moreover, whenever pictures from many colours and

figures
 perfectly create a single figure and form,
they delight the sight;
while the crafting of statues and the production of art-works
provide a pleasant vision to the eyes.
So it is natural for the sight
to be grieved by some things
and to long for others;
and much love and desire for many things and bodies
is wrought in many people.

[19] If, therefore, the eye of Helen,

pleased by the body of Alexander,
presented to her soul eager desire and contest of
love,
what is wonderful in that?
If, being a god, love has the divine power of the gods,
how could a lesser being reject and refuse it?
But if it is a disease (nosêma) of human origin
and a blind-spot (agnoêma) in the soul,
it should not be condemned as a sin (hamartema),
but considered a misfortune (atykhema);
for she came – as she did come –
by the snares of fate (tychês agreumasin)
not by the counsels of reason (gnômês bouleumasin),
and by the constraints of love (erôtos anangkais),
not by the devices of art (technês paraskeuais).

[20] How then can one regard the blame of Helen as just,
seeing as, whether she did what she did,
by love o’ermastered
or by speech persuaded
or by force ravished
or by divine constraint compelled,
she is utterly acquitted of all charge?

[21] I have through speech removed ill fame from a woman.

I have stayed true to the procedure that I set up
at the outset of my speech.
I have tried to end the injustice of blame (mômou adikian)
and the ignorance of opinion (doxês amathian).
My purpose was to compose a speech
as an encomium of Helen
and an amusement for myself.
 ◊ ◊ ◊

Tragedy flourished and was acclaimed – it was a marvellous

spectacle for the ears and eyes of men who lived in those times,
which produced by means of stories and sufferings, «a deception
– as Gorgias says – in which the one who deceives is more just
than the one who does not deceive, and the one who is
deceived is more intelligent [sophoteros, viz., wiser] than the
one who is not deceived».8

◊ ◊ ◊

What Gorgias said is not absolutely true. He said: «Being (to

einai) is obscure (aphanes) if it is not graced by seeming (to
dokein), ad seeming is feeble (asthenes) if not graced by
being».9

8 This fragment on tragedy is from an unindentified work, as the following

on being and appearing. See PLUTARCH, On the Glory of the Athenians, 5,

348C. The English translation is that of Lask-Most, cf. Early Greek
Philosophy, vol. VIII, part 1, p. 251.
9 PROCLUS, Commentary on Hesiod’s “Works and Days”, 83, newly edited

by PATRIZIA MARZILLO, Der Kommentar des Proklos zu Hesiods ‘Werken

und Tagen’. Edition, Übersetzung und Erläuterung der Fragmente,
Tübingen, Narr, 2010, p. CCLIX. The text follows the translation of Dillon-
Gergel, cf. The Greek Sophists, p. 97. Is this a “serious epistemological
objection” (Dillon-Gergel) or does it simply mean that a truly honorable
deed will remain obscure if nobody knows about it, while the mere
reputation of a noble deed won’t last if it is not supported by facts? In the
first case, Gorgias’s statement might kave a far Kantian ring to it:
“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are
blind” (I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/ B76).