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The Isagoge or "Introduction" to Aristotle's Categories (text) was a the standard textbook on logic for more
than a thousand years after his death in the third century, and was one of the six books of the Ars Vetus or
corpus of writings on Aristotelian logic that survived in the Latin West during the dark ages and early middle
ages, before Aristotle's other books were recovered. It was composed by Porphyry in Greek in Sicily during
the years 268-270, and sent to Chrysaorium, according to the commentators Ammonius, Elias, and David.
It includes an influential hierarchical classification ('the Tree of Porphyry') of genera and species from the
most general genus down to the most specific species and individuals, and an introduction which mentions
the problem of universals. Boethius' translation of the work, in Latin, became a standard medieval textbook
in European schools and universities. Many writers, such as Boethius himself, Averroes, Abelard, Scotus,
wrote commentaries on the book. Other writers such as Albert of Saxony and William of Ockham
incorporated them into their textbooks on logic.
The earliest Latin translation, no longer extant, was made by Marius Victorinus in the fourth century.
Boethius relied upon it in his own translation. The earliest known Syriac translation was made in the
seventh century by Athanasius of Balad. There is also an early Armenian translation. The Introduction was
translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ from a Syriac version. With the Arabicized name Isaghuji it was for
a long time a standard introductory logic text in the Muslim world and influenced the study of theology,
philosophy, grammar, and jurisprudence. The work contains on account of the 'predicables'
(Lat. praedicabilis, that which may be stated or affirmed), also known as the quinque voces. The
predicables are a classification of the possible relations in which a predicate may stand to its subject, based
on the original classification given by Aristotle in the Topics (iv. 101 b 17-25): definition (horos), genus
(genos), differentia (diaphora), property (idion), accident (sumbebekos). In the scholastic classification,
species (eidos) is substituted for definition.
The work is celebrated for prompting the medieval debate over the status of universals. Porphyry writes
For the moment, I shall naturally decline to say, concerning genera and species, whether they
subsist, whether they are bare, pure isolated conceptions, whether, if subsistent, they are corporeal
or incorporeal, or whether they are separated from or in sensible objects, and other related matters.
This sort of problem is of the very deepest, and requires more extensive investigation.
Though he did not mention the problem further, his formulation constitutes the most influential part of
his work, since it was these questions that formed the basis of medieval debates about the status of
universals. Do universals exist in the mind, or in reality? If in reality, are they physical things, or not? If
physical, do they have a separate existence from physical bodies, or are they part of them?

Logic Museum online text

 Greek-Latin-English parallel
Editions
 A. Busse (ed): Porphyrii Isagoge, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca IV I (Berlin, 1887)
See also
 Boethius' commentaries on the Isagoge
 Aristotle's Categories
 Translation by Barnes
Authors/Porphyry/isagoge/parallel
< Authors | Porphyry | isagoge

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Translated by Octavius Freire Owen, M. A. of Christ Church, Oxford. Rector of Burstow, Surrey; and
Domestic Chaplain to the Duke of Portland. This translation appears in volume 2 of The Organon, or logical
treatises of Aristotle, with the introduction of Porphyry, published by Henry G. Bohn in London in 1853. The
notes are by Owen.

The Greek was scanned and some corrections made, but is included for reference purposes only, and
should not be considered reliable.

 On genus

 On species

 Of difference

 Of property

 Of accident

 Of things common and peculiar to the five predicates

 Of the Community and Distinction of Genus and Difference

 Of Community and Difference of Genus and Species

 Of Community and Difference of Genus and Property

 Of Community and Difference of Genus and Accident

 Of Community and Difference of Species and Difference

 The same subject continued

 Of Community and Difference of Property and Difference

 Of Community and Difference of Accident and Difference

 Of Community and Difference of Species and Property

 Of Community and Difference of Species and Accident

 Of Community and Difference of Property and Accident

Greek Latin English

PORPHYRII ISAGOGE INTRODUCTION OF PORPHYRY [1]

INTRODUCTIO

Ὄντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσαόριε, Cum sit necessarium, Since it is necessary, Chrysaorius, both to
καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Chrisaorie, et ad eam quae est the doctrine of Aristotle's Categories, to
Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν apud Aristotelem know what genus, difference, species,
διδασκαλίαν τοῦ γνῶναι τί
γένος καὶ τί διαφορὰ τί τε εἶδος
καὶ τί ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός,
εἴς τε τὴν τῶν ὁρισμῶν
ἀπόδοσιν καὶ ὅλως εἰς τὰ περὶ
διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως
χρησίμης οὔσης τῆς τούτων
θεωρίας, σύντομόν σοι
παράδοσιν ποιούμενος
πειράσομαι διὰ βραχέων
ὥσπερ ἐν εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπῳ τὰ
παρὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις
ἐπελθεῖν, τῶν μὲν βαθυτέρων
ἀπεχόμενος ζητημάτων, τῶν δ'
ἁπλουστέρων συμμέτρως
στοχαζόμενος.
αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ
εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν
εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς
ἐπινοίαις κεῖται εἴτε καὶ
ὑφεστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ
ἀσώματα καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ
ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ
ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα,
παραιτήσομαι λέγειν
βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης
πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης
μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως:
τὸ δ' ὅπως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
προκειμένων λογικώτερον οἱ
παλαιοὶ διέλαβον καὶ τούτων
μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου,
νῦν σοι πειράσομαι δεικνύναι.
Περὶ γένους
Ἔοικεν δὲ μήτε τὸ γένος μήτε
τὸ εἶδος ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι. γένος
γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἡ τινῶν
ἐχόντων πως πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἄθροισις, καθ'
ὃ σημαινόμενον τὸ
Ἡρακλειδῶν λέγεται γένος ἐκ
τῆς ἀφ' ἑνὸς σχέσεως, λέγω δὴ
τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, καὶ τοῦ
πλήθους τῶν ἐχόντων πως
πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπ' ἐκείνου
οἰκειότητα, κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τὴν
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν
κεκλημένου.
λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πάλιν
γένος ἡ ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως
ἀρχὴ εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τεκόντος
praedicamentorum doctrinam
nosse quid genus sit et quid
differentia quidque species et
quid proprium et quid
accidens, et ad definitionum
assignationem, et omnino ad
ea quae in divisione vel
demonstratione sunt utilia, hac
istarum rerum speculatione
compendiosam tibi traditionem
faciens temptabo breviter velut
introductionis modo ea quae
ab antiquis dicta sunt aggredi;
altioribus quidem
quaestionibus abstinens,
simpliciores vero mediocriter
coniectans.
Mox de generibus et speciebus
illud quidem sive subsistunt
sive in solis nudis purisque
intellectibus posita sunt sive
subsistentia corporalia sunt an
incorporalia, et utrum separata
an in sensibilibus et circa ea
constantia, dicere recusabo.
Altissimum enim est
huiusmodi negotium et maioris
egens inquisitionis.
Illud vero quemadmodum de
his ac de propositis
probabiliter antiqui
tractaverint, et horum maxime
Peripatetici, tibi nunc
temptabo monstrare.
[01] DE GENERE
Videtur autem neque genus
neque species simpliciter dici.
Genus enim dicitur et
aliquorum quodammodo se
habentium ad unum aliquid et
ad se invicem collectio,
secundum quam
significationem Romanorum
dicitur genus, ab unius scilicet
habitudine -- dico autem
Romuli -- et multitudinis
habentium aliquo modo ad
invicem eam quae ab illo est
cognationem secundum
divisionem ab aliis generibus
dictam.
Dicitur autem et aliter rursus
genus quod est uniuscuiusque
generationis principium vel ab
property, and accident are, and also to the
assignments of definitions, in short, since
the investigation of these is useful for
those things which belong to division and
demonstration[2], I will endeavour by a
summary briefly to discuss to you, as in
the form of introduction, what on this
subject has been delivered by the ancients,
abstaining, indeed, from more profound
questions, yet directing attention in a
fitting manner, to such as are more
simple.
For instance, I shall omit to speak about
genera and species, as to whether they
subsist (in the nature of things) or in mere
conceptions only; whether also if
subsistent, they are bodies or incorporeal,
and whether they are separate from, or in,
sensibles[3], and subsist about these[4], for
such a treatise is most profound, and
requires another more extensive
investigation[5].
Nevertheless, how the ancients, and
especially the Peripatetics, discussed these
and the other proposed subjects, in a more
logical manner, I will now endeavour to
point out to you.
On genus[6]
Neither genus nor species appear to be
simply denominated, for that is called
genus which is a collection of certain
things, subsisting in a certain respect
relatively to one thing, and to each other,
according to which signification the genus
of the Heraclidae is denominated from the
habitude from one, I mean Hercules, and
from the multitude of those who have
alliance to each other from him,
denominated according to separation from
other genera.
Again, after another manner also, the
principle of the generation of every one is
called genus, whether from the generator
εἴτε ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου ἐν ᾧ τις
γέγονεν. οὕτως γὰρ
Ὀρέστην μὲν ἀπὸ Ταντάλου
φαμὲν ἔχειν τὸ γένος, Ὕλλον
δὲ ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους, καὶ
πάλιν Πίνδαρον μὲν Θηβαῖον
εἶναι τὸ γένος, Πλάτωνα δὲ
Ἀθηναῖον· καὶ γὰρ ἡ πατρὶς
ἀρχή τίς ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου
γενέσεως, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ πατήρ.
τοῦτο δὲ ἔοικε πρόχειρον εἶναι
τὸ σημαινόμενον· Ἡρακλεῖδαι
γὰρ λέγονται οἱ ἐκ γένους
κατάγοντες Ἡρακλέους καὶ
Κεκροπίδαι οἱ ἀπὸ Κέκροπος
καὶ οἱ τούτων ἀγχιστεῖς. καὶ
πρότερόν γε ὠνομάσθη γένος ἡ
ἑκάστου τῆς γενέσεως ἀρχή,
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς οἶον
Ἡρακλέους, ὃ ἀφορίζοντες καὶ
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίζοντες
ἔφαμεν τὸ ὅλον ἄθροισμα
Ἡρακλειδῶν γένος.
ἄλλως δὲ πάλιν γένος λέγεται,
ᾧ ὑποτάσσεται τὸ εἶδος, καθ'
ὁμοιότητα ἴσως τούτων
εἰρημένον· καὶ γὰρ ἀρχή τίς
ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος τῶν ὑφ'
ἑαυτὸ καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος
περιέχειν πᾶν τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτό.
Τριχῶς οὖν τοῦ γένους
λεγομένου περὶ τοῦ τρίτου
παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος·
ὃ καὶ ὑπογράφοντες
ἀποδεδώκασι γένος εἶναι
λέγοντες τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί
ἐστι κατηγορούμενον οἷον τὸ
ζῷον.
τῶν γὰρ κατηγορουμένων τὰ
μὲν καθ' ἑνὸς λέγεται μόνου,
ὡς τὰ ἄτομα οἷον Σωκράτης
καὶ τὸ οὗτος καὶ τὸ τοῦτο, τὰ
δὲ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς τὰ γένη
καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ
τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα
κοινῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδίως τινί. ἔστι
δὲ γένος μὲν οἷον τὸ ζῷον,
εἶδος δὲ οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
διαφορὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ λογικόν,
eo qui genuit vel a loco in quo
quis genitus est. Sic enim
Oresten quidem dicimus a
Tantalo habere genus, Illum
autem ab Hercule, et rursus
Pindarum quidem Thebanum
esse genere, Platonem vero
Atheniensem; et enim patria
principium est uniuscuiusque
generationis quemadmodum
pater.
Haec autem videtur
promptissima esse significatio;
Romani enim qui ex genere
descendunt Romuli, et
Cecropidae qui ex genere
descendunt Cecropis et horum
proximi. Et prius quidem
appellatum est genus
uniuscuiusque generationis
principium, dehinc etiam
multitudo eorum qui sunt ab
uno principio; ut a Romulo,
dividentes et ab aliis
separantes, dicebamus omnem
illam collectionem esse
Romanorum genus.
Aliter autem rursus dicitur
genus, cui supponitur species
ad horum fortasse
similitudinem dictum. Etenim
principium quoddam est
huiusmodi genus earum quae
sub ipso sunt specierum,
videturque et omnem eam
multitudinem continere quae
sub ipso sunt specierum.
Tripliciter igitur cum genus
dicatur, de tertio apud
philosophos sermo, quod etiam
describentes assignaverunt,
dicentes, genus esse quod de
pluribus et differentibus
specie, in eo quod quid sit
praedicatur, ut animal.
Eorum enim quae praedicantur
alia quidem de uno dicuntur
solo, sicut individua sicut
Socrates et hic et hoc, alia vero
de pluribus, quemadmodum
genera et species et
differentiae et propria, et
accidentia communiter sed non
proprie alicui. Est autem genus
quidem ut animal, species vero
ut homo, differentia autem ut
or from the place in which a person is
generated, for thus we say that Orestes
had his genus from Tantalus, Hyllus from
Hercules, and again, that Pindar was by
genus a Theban, but Plato an Athenian,
for country is a certain principle of each
man's generation, in the same manner as a
father.
Still, this signification appears to be most
ready,[7] for they are called Heraclidae
who derive their origin from the genus of
Hercules, and Cecropidae who are from
Cecrops; also their next of kin. The first
genus, moreover, is so called, which is the
principle of each man's generation, but
afterwards the number of those who are
from one principle, e. g. from Hercules,
which defining and separating from
others, we call the whole collected
multitude the genus of the Heraclidae.
Again, in another way that is denominated
genus to which the species is subject,
called perhaps from the similitude of
these; for such a genus is a certain
principle of things under it, and seems
also to comprehend all the multitude
under itself.
As then, genus is predicated triply, the
consideration by philosophers is
concerning the third, which also they
explain by description, when they say that
genus is that which is predicated of many
things differing in species, in answer to
what a thing is, e. g. animal.
For of predicates some are predicated of
one thing alone, as individuals, for
instance, "Socrates," and "this man," and
"this thing;" but others are predicated of
many, as genera, species, differences,
properties, and accidents, predicated in
common, but not peculiarly to any one.
Now genus is such as "animal," species as
"man," difference as " rational," property
as " risible," accident as "white," "black,"
"to sit."
ἴδιον δὲ οἷον τὸ γελαστικόν,
συμβεβηκὸς δὲ οἷον τὸ λευκόν,
τὸ μέλαν, τὸ καθέζεσθαι.
τῶν μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου
κατηγορουμένων διαφέρει τὰ
γένη τῷ ταῦτα κατὰ πλειόνων
ἀποδοθέντα κατηγορεῖσθαι,
τῶν δὲ αὖ κατὰ πλειόνων τῶν
μὲν εἰδῶν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἴδη εἰ
καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων
κατηγορεῖται ἀλλ' οὐ
διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἀλλὰ τῷ
ἀριθμῷ· ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος
ὢν Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος
κατηγορεῖται, οἳ οὐ τῷ εἴδει
διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀλλὰ τῷ
ἀριθμῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον γένος ὂν
ἀνθρώπου καὶ βοὸς καὶ ἵππου
κατηγορεῖται, οἳ διαφέρουσι
καὶ τῷ εἴδει ἀλλήλων ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
τῷ ἀριθμῷ μόνον.
τοῦ δ' αὖ ἰδίου διαφέρει τὸ
γένος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον καθ'
ἑνὸς μόνου εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν
ἴδιον, κατηγορεῖται καὶ τῶν
ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, ὡς τὸ
γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπου μόνου
καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων,
τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἑνὸς εἴδους
κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ πλειόνων
τε καὶ διαφερόντων. τῆς δ' αὖ
διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
συμβεβηκότων διαφέρει τὸ
γένος, ὅτι εἰ καὶ κατὰ πλειόνων
καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει
κατηγοροῦνται αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ
τὰ κοινῶς συμβεβηκότα, ἀλλ'
οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγοροῦνται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ἐν τῷ ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς
ἔχον ἐστιν. ἐρωτησάντων γὰρ
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνο καθ' οὗ
κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα τὸ γένος
ἀποκρινόμεθα, τὰς δὲ
διαφορὰς καὶ τὰ κοινῶς
συμβεβηκότα οὐκ
ἀποκρινόμεθα, οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί
ἐστι, φαμέν, κατηγορεῖται,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί
ἐστιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐρωτᾶν ποῖόν
τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ὅτι
λογικόν, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ὁ
κόραξ φαμὲν ὅτι μέλαν· ἔστιν
δὲ τὸ μὲν λογικόν διαφορά, τὸ
δὲ μέλαν συμβεβηκός· ὅταν δὲ
τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος
ἐρωτηθῶμεν, ζῷον
ἀποκρινόμεθα· ἦν δὲ
ἀνθρώπου γένος τὸ ζῷον.
rationale, proprium ut risibile,
accidens ut album, nigrum,
sedere.
Ab his ergo quae de uno solo
praedicantur differunt genera,
eo quod haec de pluribus
dicuntur. Ab his autem rursus
quae de pluribus, a speciebus
quidem, quoniam species etsi
de pluribus praedicentur, non
tamen de differentibus specie,
sed numero: homo enim cum
sit species, de Socrate et
Platone praedicatur, qui non
specie a se invicem differunt,
sed numero. Animal vero cum
sit genus, de homine, equo, et
boue praedicatur, qui differunt
a se invicem specie, non
numero solum.
A proprio quoque differt
genus, quoniam proprium de
una sola specie, cuius est
proprium, praedicatur, et de iis
quae sub una specie sunt
individuis, quemadmodum
risibile de homine solo, et de
particularibus hominibus:
genus autem non de una solum
specie praedicatur, sed de
pluribus et differentibus. A
differentia vero et ab iis quae
communiter sunt accidentia
differt genus, quoniam etsi de
pluribus et differentibus specie
praedicentur differentiae, et
communiter accidentia, non
tamen in eo quod quid sit
praedicantur, sed potius in eo
quod quale est, et quomodo se
habet. Interrogantibus enim
aliquibus quid est illud de quo
praedicantur haec? genus
respondebimus: differentias
autem et communiter et
accidentia non respondebimus.
Non enim in eo quod quid est
praedicantur de subiecto, sed
magis in eo quod quale sit.
Interrogantibus enim qualis est
homo? dicimus rationalis, et
qualis est corvus, dicimus
niger. Est autem rationale,
differentia: nigrum vero,
accidens. Quando autem quid
est homo interrogamur, animal
respondemus: est autem genus
hominis animal.
From such things then, as are predicated
of one thing only, genera differ in that
they are predicated of many, but on the
other hand, from those which are
predicated of many and from species,
(they differ) because those species are
predicated of many things, yet not of
those which differ in species, but in
number only, for man being a species, is
predicated of Socrates and Plato, who do
not differ from each other in species, but
in number, while animal being a genus is
predicated of man, and ox, and horse,
which differ also in species from each
other, and not in number only.
From property, moreover, genus differs
because property is predicated of one
species alone of which it is the property,
and of the individuals under the species,
as "risible" of man alone, and of men
particularly, for genus is not predicated of
one species, but of many things, which are
also different in species. Besides, genus
differs from difference and from accidents
in common, because though differences
and accidents in common are predicated
of many things, different also in species,
yet they are not so in reply to what a thing
is, but (what kind of a thing) it is. For
when some persons ask what that is of
which these are predicated, we reply, that
it is genus; but we do not assign in answer
differences and accidents, since they are
not predicated of a subject, as to what a
thing is, but rather as to what kind of a
thing it is. For in reply to the question,
what kind of a thing man is, we say, that
he is rational, and in answer to what kind
of a thing a crow is, we say that it is
black, yet rational is difference, but black
is accident. When however we are asked
what man is, we answer, an animal, but
animal is the genus of man,
ὥστε τὸ μὲν κατὰ πλειόνων
λέγεσθαι τὸ γένος διαστέλλει
αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου
τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορουμένων,
τὸ δὲ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει
διαστέλλει ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς εἰδῶν
κατηγορουμένων ἤ ὡς ἰδίων,
τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγορεῖσθαι χωρίζει ἀπὸ
τῶν διαφορῶν καὶ τῶν κοινῇ
συμβεβηκότων, ἃ οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί
ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν
ἤ πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν κατηγορεῖται
ἕκαστον ὦν κατηγορεῖται.
οὐδὲν ἄρα περιττὸν οὐδὲ
ἐλλεῖπον περιέχει ἡ τοῦ γένους
ῥηθεῖσα ὑπογραφὴ τῆς
ἐννοίας.
Περὶ εἴδους
Τὸ δὲ εἶδος λέγεται μὲν καὶ ἐπὶ
τῆς ἑκάστου μορφῆς, καθὸ
εἴρηται πρῶτον μὲν εἶδος ἄξιον
τυραννίδος.
λέγεται δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ
ἀποδοθὲν γένος, καθὸ
εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τὸν μὲν
ἄνθρωπον εἶδος τοῦ ζῴου
γένους ὄντος τοῦ ζῴου, τὸ δὲ
λευκὸν τοῦ χρώματος εἶδος, τὸ
δὲ τρίγωνον τοῦ σχήματος
εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ γένος
ἀποδιδόντες τοῦ εἴδους
ἐμεμνήμεθα εἰπόντες τὸ κατὰ
πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ
εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγορούμενον, καὶ τὸ εἶδός
φαμεν τὸ υπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν
γένος, εἰδέναι χρὴ ὅτι, ἐπεὶ καὶ
τὸ γένος τινός ἐστιν γένος καὶ
τὸ εἶδος τινός ἐστιν εἶδος
ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου, ἀνάγκη
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων λόγοις
κεχρῆσθαι ἀμφοτέροις.
ἀποδιδόασιν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ
οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ
ταττόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος καὶ
οὗ τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγορεῖται.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ οὕτως· εἶδός ἐστι τὸ
κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ
τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ἀλλ'
αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπόδοσις τοῦ
εἰδικοτάτου ἂν εἴη καὶ ὅ ἐστι
μόνον εἶδος οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ
Quare genus de pluribus
praedicari dividit ipsum ab iis
quae de uno solo dicuntur,
sicut individua; de
differentibus vero specie,
separat eumdem ab iis quae
sicut species praedicantur, vel
sicut propria: in eo autem quod
quid sit praedicari, dividit
ipsum a differentiis et
communiter accidentibus, quae
singula non in eo quod quid sit
praedicatur, sed in eo quod
quale est, vel quomodo se
habet. Nihil igitur neque
superfluum, neque minus
continet generis dicta
descriptio.
[02] DE SPECIE
Species autem dicitur quidem,
et de uniuscuiusque forma,
secundum quam dictum est:
primum quidem species digna
est imperio:
Dicitur autem species, et ea
quae est sub assignato genere,
secundum quam solemus
dicere, hominem quidem
speciem animalis, cum sit
genus animal; album autem
coloris speciem, triangulum
vero figurae speciem. Quod si
etiam genus assignantes
speciei meminimus, dicentes
quod de pluribus et
differentibus specie in eo quod
quid praedicatur, et speciem
dicimus id quod sub assignato
genere ponitur. Nosse oportet
quod quoniam genus alicuius
est genus, et species alicuius
est species, idcirco necesse est
et in utrorumque rationibus
utrisque uti. Assignant ergo et
sic speciem: Species est quae
sub assignato genere ponitur,
et de qua genus in eo quod
quid sit praedicatur.
Amplius autem sic quoque:
Species est quae de pluribus et
differentibus numero, in eo
quod quid sit praedicatur; sed
haec quidem assignatio
specialissimae est, et eius quae
solum species est, non etiam
Wherefore, from genus being predicated
of many, it is diverse from individuals
which are predicated of one thing only,
but from being predicated of things
different in species, it is distinguished
from such as are predicated as species or
as properties. Moreover, because it is
predicated in reply to what a thing is, it is
distinguished from differences and from
accidents commonly, which are severally
predicated of what they are predicated,
not in reply to what a thing is, but what
kind of a thing it is, or in what manner it
subsists: the description therefore of the
conception of genus, which has been
enunciated, contains nothing superfluous,
nothing deficient.[8]
Species indeed is predicated of every
form, according to which it is said, "form
is first worthy of imperial sway;"[9]
still that is called species also, which is
under the genus stated, according to
which we are accustomed to call man a
species of animal, animal being genus, but
white a species of colour, and triangle of
figure. Nevertheless, if when we assign
the genus, we make mention of species,
saying that which is predicated of many
things differing in species, in reply to
what a thing is, and call species that
which is under the assigned genus, we
ought to know that, since genus is the
genus of something, and species the
species of something, each of each, we
must necessarily use both in the
definitions of both. They assign, therefore,
species thus: species is what is arranged
under genus, and of which genus is
predicated in reply to what a thing is:
moreover, thus species is what is
predicated of many things differing in
number, in reply to what a thing is. This
explanation, however, belongs to the most
special, and which is species only, but no
longer genus also,[10] but the other
(descriptions) will pertain to such as are
γένοϛ, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι εἶεν ἂν καὶ
τῶν μὴ εἰδικοτάτων.
σαφὲς δ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καθ'
ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν ἐστίν τινα
γενικώτατα καὶ πάλιν ἄλλα
εἰδικώτατα καὶ μεταξὺ τῶν
γενικωτάτων καὶ τῶν
εἰδικωτάτων ἄλλα ἃ καὶ γένη
καὶ εἴδη λέγεται τὰ αὐτὰ. ἔστιν
δὲ γενικώτατον μέν, ὑπὲρ ὃ
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς
γένος, εἰδικώτατον δέ, μεθ' ὃ
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ὑποβεβηκὸς
εἶδος, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ
γενικώτατου καὶ τοῦ
εἰδικωτάτου ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ γένη
καὶ εἴδη ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτά, πρὸς
ἄλλο μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο
λαμβανόμενα.
Γινέσθω δὲ ἐπὶ μιᾶς
κατηγορίας σαφὲς τὸ
λεγόμενον. ἡ οὐσία ἔστι μὲν
καὶ αὐτὴ γένος, ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτην
ἐστὶν σῶμα, καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ σῶμα
ἔμψυχον σῶμα, ὑφ' ὃ τὸ ζῷον,
ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν ζῷον,
ὑφ' ὃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον Σωκράτης καὶ
Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος
ἄνθρωποι.
ἀλλὰ τούτων ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ
γενικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον
γένος, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος τὸ
εἰδικώτατον καὶ ὃ μόνον εἶδος,
τὸ δὲ σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τῆς
οὐσίας, γένος δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου
σώματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον
σῶμα εἶδος μὲν τοῦ σώματος,
γένος δὲ τοῦ ζῴου, πάλιν δὲ τὸ
ζῷον εἶδος μὲν τοῦ ἐμψύχου
σώματος, γένος δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ
ζῴου. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ζῷον εἶδος
μὲν τοῦ ζῴου, γένος δὲ τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος
εἶδος μὲν τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου,
οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος τῶν κατὰ
μέρος ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ μόνον
εἶδος· καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρὸ τῶν
ἀτόμων προσεχῶς
κατηγορούμενον εἶδος ἂν εἴη
μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ γένος.
ὥσπερ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀνωτάτω
οὖσα τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸ αὐτῆς
genus: aliae vero et non
specialissimarum esse possunt.
Planum autem erit quod dicitur
hoc modo: In unoquoque
praedicamento sunt quaedam
generalissima, et rursus alia
specialissima, et inter
generalissima et specialissima
sunt alia quae et genera et
species eadem dicuntur. Est
autem generalissimum quidem
supra quod non est aliud
aliquod superveniens genus.
Specialissimum autem post
quod non est alia aliqua
inferior species. Inter
generalissimum autem et
specialissimum, alia sunt quae
et genera et species sunt
eadem, ad aliud tamen et aliud
sumpta.
Sit autem manifestum in uno
praedicamento quod dicitur
substantia: est quidem et ipsa
genus, sub hac autem est
corpus, et sub corpore
animatum corpus, sub quo
animal: sub animali vero,
rationale animal, sub quo
homo: sub homine vero,
Socrates et Plato, et qui sunt
particulares homines.
Sed horum substantia quidem,
generalissimum est, et genus
solum: homo vero
specialissimum, et solum
species; corpus vero, species
quidem est substantiae, genus
vero corporis animati, sed et
animatum corpus, species
quidem est corporis, genus
vero animalis. Rursus animal
species quidem est corporis
animati, genus vero animalis
rationalis, sed rationale
animal, species quidem est
animalis, genus autem
hominis: homo vero species
est rationalis animalis, non
autem etiam genus
particularium hominum, sed
solum species. Ac omne quod
est ante individua proximeque
de ipsis praedicatur, species
erit solum, non etiam genus.
Quemadmodum igitur
substantia cum suprema sit, eo
not the most special.
Now, what we have stated will be evident
in this way: in each category there are
certain things most generic, and again,
others most special, and between the most
generic and the most special, others which
are alike called both genera and species,
but the most generic is that above which
there cannot be another superior genus,
and the most special that below which
there cannot be another inferior species.
Between the most generic and the most
special, there are others which are alike
both genera and species, referred,
nevertheless, to different things,
but what is stated may become clear in
one category. Substance indeed, is itself
genus, under this is body, under body
animated body, under which is animal,
under animal rational animal, under which
is man, under man Socrates, Plato, and
men particularly.
Still, of these, substance is the most
generic, and that which alone is genus; but
man is most specific, and that which alone
is species; yet body is a species of
substance, but a genus of animated body,
also animated body is a species of body,
but a genus of animal; again, animal is a
species of animated body, but a genus of
rational animal, and rational animal is a
species of animal, but a genus of man, and
man is a species of rational animal, but is
no longer the genus of particular men, but
is species only, and every thing prior to
individuals being proximately predicated
of them, will be species only, and no
longer genus also.
As then, substance being in the highest
place, is most generic, from there being
γένος ἦν τὸ γενικώτατον,
οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἶδος
ὧν, μεθ' ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος οὐδέ
τι τῶν τέμνεσθαι δυναμένων
εἰς εἴδη, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀτόμων
(ἄτομον γὰρ Σωκράτης καὶ
Πλάτων καὶ τουτὶ τὸ λευκόν)
μόνον ἂν εἴη εἶδος καὶ τὸ
ἔσχατον εἶδος καὶ ὡς ἔφαμεν
τὸ εἰδικώτατον· τὰ δὲ μέσα
τῶν μὲν πρὸ αὐτῶν εἴη ἂν εἴδη,
τῶν δὲ μετ' αὐτὰ γένη.
ὥστε ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει δύο
σχέσεις, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ πρὸ
αὐτῶν, καθ' ἣν εἴδη αὐτῶν
εἶναι λέγεται, τήν τε πρὸς τὰ
μετ' αὐτά, καθ' ἣν γένη αὐτῶν
εἶναι λέγεται· τὰ δὲ ἄκρα μίαν
ἔχει σχέσιν· τό τε γὰρ
γενικώτατον τὴν μὲν ὡς πρὸς
τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ ἔχει σχέσιν, γένος
ὂν πάντων τὸ ἀνωτάτω, τὴν δὲ
ὡς πρὸς τὰ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ οὐκέτι
ἔχει, ἀνωτάτω ὂν καὶ ὡς πρώτη
ἀρχὴ καί, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὑπὲρ ὃ
οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἐπαναβεβηκὸς
γένος· καὶ τὸ εἰδικώτατον δὲ
μίαν ἔχει σχέσιν τὴν μὲν ὡς
πρὸς τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ὧν ἐστιν
εἶδος, τὴν δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ'
αὐτὸ οὐκ ἀλλοίαν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων εἶδος λέγεται
ἀλλ' εἶδος μὲν λέγεται τῶν
ἀτόμων ὡς περιέχον αὐτά,
εἶδος δὲ πάλιν τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ
ὡς περιεχόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν.
Ἀφορίζονται τοίνυν τὸ μὲν
γενικώτατον οὕτως, ὃ γένος ὂν
οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καὶ πάλιν,
ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο
ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος· τὸ δὲ
εἰδικώτατον, ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ
ἔστιν γένος καὶ ὃ εἶδος ὂν οὐκ
ἂν διελοίμεθα ἔτι εἰς εἴδη καὶ ὃ
κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ
τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. τὰ δὲ
μέσα τῶν ἄκρων ὑπάλληλά τε
καλοῦσι γένη καὶ εἴδη, καὶ
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶδος εἶναι καὶ
γένος τίθενται, πρὸς ἄλλο
quod nihil supra eam sit, genus
est generalissimum, sic et
homo, cum sit species,
postquam non est alia species,
neque aliquid eorum quae
possunt dividi in species, sed
solum individua (individuum
enim est Socrates et Plato, et
hoc album), species erit solum,
et ultima species (et ut dictum
est) specialissima: quae vero in
medio sunt, eorum quidem
quae supra se sunt species
erunt, eorum vero quae post
genera sunt,
quare haec quidem duas
habent habitudines, illam quae
est ad superiora, secundum
quam species dicuntur esse
ipsorum, et eam quae est ad
posteriora, secundum quam
genera ipsorum esse dicuntur.
Extrema vero habent unam
habitudinem, nam et
generalissimum ad ea quae
posteriora sunt, habet
habitudinem, cum genus sit
omnium supremum: eam vero
quae est ad superiora non
habet, cum sit supremum, et
primum principium, et (ut
diximus) supra quod non est
aliud superveniens genus: et
specialissimum etiam unam
habet habitudinem, ea quae est
ad superiora, quorum est
species: eam vero quae est ad
posteriora non diversam habet
sed eandem, nam et
individuorum species dicitur.
Sed species quidem
individuorum, velut ea
continens, species vero
superiorum, ut quae ab illis
contineatur.
Determinant ergo
generalissimum ita, quod cum
genus sit non est species: et
rursus, supra quod non est
aliud superveniens genus:
specialissimum vero, quod
cum sit species, non est genus,
et quod cum sit species, non
amplius in species dividere
possumus, et hoc modo quod
de pluribus et differentibus
numero, in eo quod quid sit,
praedicatur. Ea vero quae sunt
in medio extremorum,
subalterna vocantur genera et
no genus prior to it, so also man being a
species, after which there is no other
species, nor any thing capable of division
into species, but individuals, (for Socrates,
Plato, Alcibiades, and this white thing, I
call individual,) will be species alone, and
the last species, and as we say the most
specific. Yet the media will be the species
of such as are before them, but the genera
of things after them,
So that these have two conditions, one as
to things prior to them, according to
which they are said to be their species, the
other to things after them, according to
which they are said to be their genera. The
extremes on the other hand, have one
condition, for the most generic has indeed
a condition as to the things under it, since
it is the highest genus of all, but has no
longer one as to those before it, being
supreme, and the first principle, and, as
we have said, that above which there
cannot be another higher genus.
Also, the most specific has one condition,
as to the things prior to it, of which it is
the species, yet it has not a different one,
as to things posterior to it, but is called the
species of individuals, so termed as
comprehending them, and again, the
species of things prior to it, as
comprehended by them,
Wherefore the most generic genus is thus
defined to be that which being genus is
not species, and again, above which there
cannot be another higher genus; but the
most specific species, that, which being
species is not genus, and which being
species we can no longer divide into
species; moreover, which is predicated of
many things differing in number, in reply
to what a thing is.[11]Now, the media of the
extremes they call subaltern species and
genera, and admit each of them to be
species and genus, when referred indeed
to different things, for those which are
prior to the most specific, ascending up to
μέντοι καὶ ἄλλο
λαμβανόμενον. τὰ δὴ πρὸ τῶν
εἰδικωτάτων ἄχρι τοῦ
γενικωτάτου ἀνιόντα γένη τε
λέγεται καὶ εἴδη καὶ ὑπάλληλα
γένη ὡς ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων
Ἀτρείδης καὶ Πελοπίδης καὶ
Τανταλίδης καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον
Διός.
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενεαλογιῶν
εἰς ἕνα ἀνάγουσι, φέρε εἰπεῖν
τὸν Δία, τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πλεῖστον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γενῶν καὶ
τῶν εἰδῶν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ
γάρ ἐστι κοινὸν ἓν γένος
πάντων τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ πάντα
ὁμογενῆ καθ' ἓν τὸ ἀνωτάτω
γένος, ὥς φησιν ὁ
Ἀριστοτέλης. ἀλλὰ κείσθω,
ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, τὰ
πρῶτα δέκα γένη οἷον ἀρχαὶ
δέκα πρῶται·
κἂν δὴ πάντα τις ὄντα καλῇ,
ὁμωνύμως, φησί , καλέσει,
ἀλλ' οὐ συνωνύμως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
ἓν ἦν κοινὸν πάντων γένος τὸ
ὄν, συνωνύμως ἂν πάντα ὄντα
ἐλέγετο· δέκα δὲ ὄντων τῶν
πρώτων ἡ κοινωνία κατὰ
τοὔνομα μόνον, οὐκέτι μὴν καὶ
κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν κατὰ
τοὔνομα.
δέκα μὲν οὖν τὰ γενικώτατα,
τὰ δὲ εἰδικώτατα ἐν ἀριθμῷ
μέν τινι, οὐ μὴν ἀπείρῳ· τὰ δὲ
ἄτομα, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰ
εἰδικώτατα, ἄπειρα. διὸ ἄχρι
τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν
γενικωτάτων κατιόντας
παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων
παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν
διὰ μέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς
εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς· τὰ δὲ
ἄπειρά φησιν ἐᾶν, μὴ γὰρ ἂν
γενέσθαι τούτων ἐπιστήμην.
κατιόντων μὲν οὖν εἰς τὰ
εἰδικώτατα ἀνάγκη
διαιροῦντας διὰ πλήθους ἰέναι,
ἀνιόντων δὲ εἰς τὰ γενικώτατα
species, et unumquodque
eorum species esse potest et
genus, ad aliud quidem, et ad
aliud sumpta. Ea vero quae
sunt supra specialissima usque
ad generalissimum
ascendentia, vicissim genera
dicuntur et species, ut
Agamemnon, Atrides,
Pelopides, Tantalides, et
ultimo Iovis.
Sed in familiis quidem
plerumque reducuntur ad
unum principium, verbi gratia
ad Iovem. In generibus autem
et speciebus non sic se habet;
neque enim unum commune
genus omnium est ens, nec
omnia eiusdem generis sunt
secundum unum supremum
genus, quemadmodum dicit
Aristoteles, sed sint posita,
quemadmodum dictum est in
praedicamentis, prima decem
genera, quasi decem prima
principia.
Et si omnia quis entia vocet,
aequivoce inquit nuncupabit,
non univoce: si enim ens unum
esset commune omnium
genus, univoce omnia entia
dicerentur: cum vero sint
decem prima, commune est
ens secundum nomen solum,
non etiam secundum rationem,
quae secundum entis nomen
est.
Decem quidem igitur
generalissima sunt,
specialissima vero in numero
quidem quodam sunt, non
tamen infinito. Individua
autem quae sunt post
specialissima, infinita sunt
quapropter usque ad
specialissima a generalissimis
descendentes iubebat Plato
quiescere. Descendere autem
per media dividendo specificis
differentiis, infinita vero
relinquenda suadet, neque
enim eorum posse fieri
disciplinam.
Descendentibus igitur ad
specialissima necesse est,
dividendo per multitudinem
ire, ascendentibus vero ad
the most generic, are called subaltern
genera and species. Thus, Agamemnon is
Atrides, Pelopides, Tantalides, and lastly,
(the son) of Jupiter,
Yet in genealogies they refer generally to
one origin, for instance, to Jupiter; but this
is not the case in genera and species, since
being is not the common genus of all
things, nor, as Aristotle says, are all things
of the same genus with respect to one
summum genus. Still, let the first ten
genera be arranged, as in the Categories,
as ten first principles.
And even if a person should call all things
beings, yet he will call them, so he says,
equivocally, but not synonymously, for if
being were the one common genus of all
things, all things would be synonymously
styled beings, but the first principles being
ten, the community is in name only, yet
not in the definition also belonging to the
name:
There are then ten most generic genera.
On the other hand, the most specific they
place in a certain number, yet not in an
infinite one, but individuals which are
after the most specific are infinite;
wherefore, when we have come down to
the most specific from the most generic,
Plato exhorts us to rest,[12] but to descend
through those things which are in the
middle, dividing by specific differences;
he tells us however to leave infinites
alone, as there cannot be science of these.
In descending then, to the most specific, it
is necessary to proceed by division
through multitude, but in ascending to the
most generic, we must collect multitude
ἀνάγκη συναιρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος
εἰς ἕν· συναγωγὸν γὰρ τῶν
πολλῶν εἰς μίαν φύσιν τὸ εἶδος
καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ γένος, τὰ δὲ
κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθ' ἕκαστα
τοὐναντίον εἰς πλῆθος ἀεὶ
διαιρεὶ τὸ ἕν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
εἴδους μετουσίᾳ οἱ πολλοὶ
ἄνθρωποι εἷς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ
μέρος ὁ εἴς καὶ κοινὸς πλείους·
διαιρετικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ καθ'
ἕκαστον, συλληπτικὸν δὲ καὶ
ἑνοποιὸν τὸ κοινόν.
Ἀποδεδομένου δὲ τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ εἴδους τί ἐστιν
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν
γένους ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν δὲ
εἰδῶν πλειόνων (ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς
πλείω εἴδη ἡ τομὴ τοῦ γένους)
τὸ μὲν γένος ἀεὶ τοῦ εἴδους
κατηγορεῖται καὶ πάντα τὰ
ἐπάνω τῶν ὑποκάτω, τὸ δὲ
εἶδος οὔτε τοῦ προσεχοῦς
αὐτοῦ γένους οὔτε τῶν ἐπάνω·
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει. δεῖ γὰρ
ἢ τὰ ἴσα τῶν ἴσων
κατηγορεῖσθαι ὡς τὸ
χρεμετιστικὸν τοῦ ἵππου ἢ τὰ
μείζω τῶν ἐλαττόνων ὡς τὸ
ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὰ δὲ
ἐλάττω τῶν μειζόνων οὐκέτι·
οὐκέτι γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἴποις ἂν
εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον εἴποις ἂν εἶναι
ζῷον.
καθ' ὧν δ' ἂν τὸ εἶδος
κατηγορῆται, κατ' ἐκείνων ἐξ
ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ τοῦ εἴδους
γένος κατηγορηθήσεται καὶ τὸ
τοῦ γένους γένος ἄχρι τοῦ
γενικότατου· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὸ
τὸν Σωκράτην εἰπεῖν
ἄνθρωπον, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον
ζῷον, τὸ δὲ ζῷον οὐσίαν·
ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην
ζῷον εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐσίαν. ἀεὶ οὖν
τῶν ἐπάνω κατηγορουμένων
τῶν ὑποκάτω τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ
ἀτόμου κατηγορηθήσεται, τὸ
δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους
καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου, τὸ δὲ
γενικώτατον καὶ κατὰ τοῦ
γένους ἢ τῶν γενῶν, εἰ πλείω
εἴη τὰ μέσα καὶ ὑπάλληλα, καὶ
κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ
generalissima necesse est
colligere multitudinem in
unum: collectivum enim
multorum in unam naturam
species est, et magis etiam
genus. Particularia vero et
singularia e contrario, in
multitudinem semper dividunt
id quod unum est,
participatione enim speciei,
plures homines, sunt unus
homo, in particularibus autem
et singularibus, unus et
communis, plures, divisivum
enim est semper quod
singulare est, collectivum
autem et adunativum quod
commune est.
Assignato autem genere,
specie quid sit utrumque, et
genere quidem uno existente,
speciebus vero pluribus:
semper enim divisio generis in
species plures est, genus
quidem semper de speciebus
praedicatur, et omnia superiora
de inferioribus, species autem
neque de proximo sibi genere,
neque de superioribus, neque
enim convertitur. Oportet enim
aut aequa de aequis praedicari,
ut hinnibile de equo, aut
maiora de minoribus, ut
animal de homine, minora
vero de maioribus minime: nec
enim animal dicis esse
hominem, quemadmodum
dicis hominem animal,
De quibus autem species
praedicatur, de his necessario
et speciei genus praedicatur et
generis genus, usque ad
generalissimum. Si enim
verum est dicere: Socratem
hominem, hominem autem
animal, animal vero
substantiam, verum est
Socratem animal dicere atque
substantiam: semper igitur
cum superiora de inferioribus
praedicentur, species quidem
de individuo praedicabitur,
genus autem et de specie et de
individuo; generalissimum
autem et de genere, et de
generibus, si plura sunt media
et subalterna, et de specie, et
de individuo:
into one, for species is collective of the
many into one nature, and genus yet more
so; but particulars and singulars, on the
contrary, always divide the one into
multitude, for by the participation of
species, many men become one man; but
in particulars and singulars, the one, and
what is common, becomes many; for the
singular is always divisive, but what is
common is collective and reductive to
one.[13]
Genus then, and species, being each of
them explained as to what it is, since also
genus is one, but species many, (for there
is always a division of genus into many
species,) genus indeed is always
predicated of species, and all superior of
inferior, but species is neither predicated
of its proximate genus, nor of those
superior, since it does not reciprocate. For
it is necessary that either equals should be
predicated of equals, as neighing of a
horse, or that the greater should be
predicated of the less, as animal of man,
but the less no longer of the greater, for
you can no longer say that animal is man,
as you can say that man is animal.
Of those things however whereof species
is predicated, that genus of the species
will also be necessarily predicated, also
that genus of the genus up to the most
generic; for if it is true to say that Socrates
is a man, but man an animal, and animal
substance, it is also true to say that
Socrates is animal and substance. At least,
since the superior are always predicated of
the inferior, species indeed will always be
predicated of the individual, but the genus
both of the species and of the individual,
but the most generic both of the genus or
the genera, (if the media and subaltern be
many,) and of the species, and of the
individual.
ἀτόμου.
λέγεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν
γενικώτατον κατὰ πάντων τῶν
ὑφ' ἑαυτὸ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν
καὶ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ γένος τὸ πρὸ
τοῦ εἰδικωτάτου κατὰ πάντων
τῶν εἰδικωτάτων καὶ τῶν
ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ μόνον εἶδος
κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀτόμων, τὸ
δὲ ἄτομον ἐφ' ἑνός μόνου τῶν
κατὰ μέρος. ἄτομον δὲ λέγεται
ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ τουτὶ τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ οὑτοσὶ ὁ προσιὼν
Σωφρονίσκου ὑιός, εἰ μόνος
αὐτῷ είη Σωκράτης ὑιός.
ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα,
ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν
ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ
ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου ποτὲ τὸ αυτὸ
γένοιτο· αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους
ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου
τινὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο
ἂν αἱ αὐταί, αἱ μέντοι τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου, λέγω δὴ τοῦ
κοινοῦ, ἰδιότητες γένοιντ' ἂν αἱ
αὐταὶ ἐπὶ πλειόνων, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν κατὰ μέρος
ἀνθρώπων, καθὸ ἄνθρωποι.
περιέχεται οὖν τὸ μὲν ἄτομον
ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ὑπὸ
τοῦ γένους· ὅλον γάρ τι τὸ
γένος, τὸ δὲ ἄτομον μέρος, τὸ
δὲ εἶδος καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρος,
ἀλλὰ μέρος μὲν ἄλλου, ὅλον δὲ
οὐκ ἄλλου ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις· ἐν
γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν γένους καὶ εἴδους
καὶ τί τὸ γενικώτατον καὶ τί τὸ
εἰδικώτατον καὶ τίνα καὶ γένη
τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ εἴδη τίνα τε τὰ
ἄτομα καὶ ποσαχῶς τὸ γένος
καὶ τὸ εἶδος, εἴρηται.
Περὶ διαφορᾶς
Διαφορὰ δὲ κοινῶς τε καὶ
ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα λεγέσθω.
κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν
ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τὸ
ἑτερότητι διαλλάττον ὁπωσοῦν
ἢ πρὸς αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο·
Dicitur enim generalissimum
quidem de omnibus sub se
positis generibus et speciebus
et individuis; genus autem
quod ante specialissimum est,
de omnibus specialissimis et
de individuis, solum autem
species de omnibus individuis,
individuum autem praedicatur
de uno solo particulari.
Individuum autem dicitur
Socrates, et hoc album, et hic
veniens Sophronisci filius, si
solus sit ei Socrates filius).
Individua autem dicuntur
huiusmodi, quoniam ex
proprietatibus consistit
unumquodque eorum, quarum
collectio numquam in alio
quolibet eadem erit. Socratis
enim proprietates nunquam in
alioquo quolibet erunt
particularium eaedem. Hae
vero quae sunt hominis
proprietates: dico autem eius
qui est communis, erunt
eaedem pluribus, magis autem
in omnibus particularibus
hominibus in eo quod homines
sunt.
Continetur igitur individuum
quidem sub specie, species
autem sub genere. Totum enim
quidem est genus, individuum
autem pars, species vero totum
et pars: sed pars quidem
alterius, totum vero non
alterius, sed in aliis. In
partibus enim totum est.
De genere quidem et specie, et
quid sit generalissimum, et
quid specialissimum, et quae
genera, et species eadem sunt,
et quae individua, et quot
modis genus et species dicatur,
sufficienter dictum est.
[03] DE DIFFERENTIA
Differentia vero communiter,
proprie, et magis proprie
dicitur. Communiter quidem
differre alterum ab altero
dicitur, quoniam alteritate
quadam differt quocunque
For the most generic is predicated of all
the genera, species, and individuals under
it, but the genus which is prior to the most
specific (species), is predicated of all the
most specific species and individuals; but
what is species alone of all the individuals
(of it), but the individual of one particular
alone.[14] Now, an individual is called
Socrates, this white thing, this man who
approaches the son of Sophroniscus, if
Socrates alone is his son,
And such things are called individuals,
because each consists of properties of
which the combination can never be the
same in any other, for the properties of
Socrates can never be the same in any
other particular person;[15] the properties
of man indeed, (I mean of him as
common,) may be the same in many, or
rather in all particular men, so far as they
are men.
Wherefore the individual is
comprehended in the species, but the
species by the genus, for genus is a certain
whole, but the individual is a part, and
species both a whole and a part; part
indeed of something else, but a whole not
of another, but in other things, for the
whole is in its parts.
Concerning genus then, and species, we
have shown what is the most generic, and
the most specific, also what the same
things are genera and species, what also
are individuals, and in how many ways
genus and species are taken.
Of difference
Difference may be predicated commonly,
properly, and most properly: for one thing
is said to differ from another in common
from its differing in some respect in
diversity of nature, either from itself, or
from something else; for Socrates differs
διαφέρει γὰρ Σωκράτης
Πλάτωνος τῇ ἑτερότητι καὶ
αὐτός γε ἑαυτοῦ παιδός τε
ὄντος καὶ ἀνδρωθέντος καὶ
ἐνεργοῦντός τι ἢ παυσαμένου
καὶ ἀεί γε ἐν ταῖς τοῦ πῶς ἔχειν
ἑτερότησιν.
ἰδίως δὲ διαφέρειν λέγεται
ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὅταν ἀχωρίστῳ
συμβεβηκότι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ
ἑτέρου διαφέρη· ἀχώριστον δὲ
συμβεβηκὸς οἷον γλαυκότης ἢ
γρυπότης ἢ καὶ οὐλὴ ἐκ
τραύματος ἐνσκιρωθεῖσα.
Ἰδιαίτατα δὲ διαφέρειν ἕτερον
ἑτέρου λέγεται, ὅταν εἰδοποιῷ
διαφορᾷ διαλλάττη, ὥσπερ
ἄνθρωπος ἵππου εἰδοποιῷ
διαφορᾷ διενήνοχε τῇ τοῦ
λογικοῦ ποιότητι.
καθόλου μὲν οὖν πᾶσα
διαφορὰ ἑτεροῖον ποιεῖ
προσγινομένη τινί· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν
κοινῶς καὶ ἰδίως ἀλλοῖον
ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰδιαίτατα ἄλλο.
τῶν γὰρ διαφορῶν αἱ μὲν
ἀλλοῖον ποιοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ ἄλλο.
αἱ μὲν οὖν ποιοῦσαι ἄλλο
εἰδοποιοὶ κέκληνται, αἱ δὲ
ἀλλοῖον ἁπλῶς διαφοραί. τῷ
γὰρ ζῴῳ διαφορὰ
προσελθοῦσα ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ
ἄλλο ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
κινεῖσθαι ἀλλοῖον μόνον παρὰ
τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ἐποίησεν, ὥστε ἡ
μὲν ἄλλο, ἡ δὲ ἀλλοῖον μόνον
ἐποίησεν.
κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὰς ἄλλο
ποιούσας διαφορὰς αἵ τε
διαιρέσεις γίνονται τῶν γενῶν
εἰς τὰ εἴδη, οἵ τε ὅροι
ἀποδίδονται ἐκ γένους ὄντες
καὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαφορῶν,
κατὰ δὲ τὰς μόνον ἀλλοῖον
ποιούσας αἱ ἑτερότητες μόνον
συνίστανται καὶ αἱ τοῦ πῶς
ἔχοντος μεταβολαί.
Ἄνωθεν οὖν πάλιν ἀρχομένῳ
ῥητέον τῶν διαφορῶν τὰς μὲν
χωριστὰς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ
ἀχωρίστους· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
modo, vel a seipso vel ab alio;
differt enim Socrates a Platone
alteritate quadam, et ipse a se
puero iam vir factus, et a se
faciente aliquid cum quiescit,
et semper in aliquo modo
habendi se alteritatibus
spectatur.
Proprie autem differre alterum
ab altero dicitur, quando
inseparabili accidente alterum
ab altero differt. Inseparabile
vero accidens est, ut nasi
curvitas, caesitas oculorum, et
cicatrix cum ex vulnere
occalluerit. Magis autem
proprie alterum differre ab
altero dicitur, quando specifica
differentia differt,
quemadmodum homo ab equo
specifica differentia differt
rationali qualitate.
Universaliter ergo omnis
differentia alteratum facit
cuilibet adveniens, sed ea quae
est communiter et proprie,
alteratum facit: illa autem quae
est magis proprie, aliud.
Differentiarum enim, aliae
quidem alteratum faciunt, aliae
vero aliud. Illae igitur quae
faciunt aliud, specificae
uocantur; illae vero quae
alteratum, simpliciter
differentiae: animali enim
rationalis differentia adveniens
aliud facit, et speciem animalis
facit. Illa vero quae est
movendi, alteratum facit a
quiescente. Quare haec quidem
aliud, illa vero alteratum
solum facit.
Secundum igitur aliud
facientes differentias et
divisiones fiunt a generibus in
species, et diffinitiones
assignantur, quae sunt ex
genere, et huiusmodi
differentiis: secundum autem
eas quae solum alteratum
faciunt, alterationes solum
consistunt, et aliquo modo se
habentis permutationes.
A superioribus rursus
inchoanti dicendum est,
differentiarum alias quidem
esse separabiles, alias vero
from Plato in diversity of nature, and
himself from himself when a boy, and
when become a man, also when he does
any thing, or ceases to do it, and it is
always perceived in the different ways in
which a thing is somehow effected.
Again, one thing is said to differ properly
from another, when one differs from
another by an inseparable accident; but an
inseparable accident is such as blueness,
or crookedness, or a scar become
scirrhous from a wound. Moreover, one is
most properly said to differ from another,
when it varies by specific difference, as
man differs from horse by specific
difference, i. e. by the quality of rational.
Universally then every difference
acceding to a thing renders it different, but
differences common and proper render it
different in quality, and the most proper
render it another thing. Hence, those
which render it another thing are called
specific, but those, which make it
different in quality, are simply (called)
differences, for the difference of rational
being added to animal, makes it another
thing, (and makes a species of animal,)
but difference of being moved makes it
different in quality only from what is at
rest, so that the one renders it another
thing, but the other only of another
quality.[16]
According then, to the differences which
produce another thing do the divisions of
genera into species arise, and the
definitions arising from genus and such
differences are assigned. On the other
hand, as to those which only make a thing
different in quality, diversities alone
consist, and the changes of subsistence of
a thing.
Beginning then, again, from the first, we
must say that of differences some are
separable, others inseparable, thus to be
moved, and to be at rest, to be ill, and to
κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ τὸ
ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ὅσα
τούτοις παραπλήσια χωριστά
ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γρυπὸν εἶναι ἢ
σιμὸν ἢ λογικὸν ἢ ἄλογον
ἀχώριστα.
τῶν δὲ ἀχωρίστων αἱ μὲν
ὑπάρχουσι καθ' αὑτάς, αἱ δὲ
κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
λογικὸν καθ' αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ θνητόν καὶ τὸ
ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δεκτικόν, τὸ
δὲ γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐ καθ' αὑτό.
αἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὰς
προσοῦσαι ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας
λαμβάνονται λόγῳ καὶ
ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο, αἱ δὲ κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς οὔτε ἐν τῷ τῆς
οὐσίας λόγῳ λαμβάνονται οὔτε
ποιοῦσιν ἄλλο ἀλλὰ ἀλλοῖον.
καὶ αἱ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰς οὐκ
ἐπιδέχονται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ
ἧττον, αἱ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
κἂν ἀχώριστοι ὦσιν, ἐπίτασιν
λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἄνεσιν· οὔτε
γὰρ τὸ γένος μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
κατηγορεῖται οὖ ἂν ᾖ γένος
οὔτε αἱ τοῦ γένους διαφοραί,
καθ' ἃς διαιρεῖται· αὖται μὲν
γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τὸν ἑκάστου λόγον
συμπληροῦσαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι
ἑκάστῳ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔτε
ἄνεσιν οὔτε ἐπίτασιν
ἐπιδεχόμενόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ
γρυπὸν ἢ σιμὸν εἶναι ἢ
κεχρῶσθαί πως καὶ ἐπιτείνεται
καὶ ἀνίεται.
Τριῶν οὖν εἰδῶν τῆς διαφορᾶς
θεωρουμένων καὶ τῶν μὲν
οὐσῶν χωριστῶν τῶν δὲ
ἀχωρίστων καὶ πάλιν τῶν
ἀχωρίστων τῶν μὲν οὐσῶν
καθ' αὑτὰς τῶν δὲ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, πάλιν τῶν καθ'
αὑτὰς διαφορῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι
καθ' ἃς διαιρούμεθα τὰ γένη
εἰς τὰ εἴδη, αἱ δὲ καθ' ἃς τὰ
διαιρεθέντα εἰδοποιεῖται. οἷον
τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς διαφορῶν
πασῶν τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ ζῴου
οὐσῶν ἐμψύχου καὶ
αἰσθητικοῦ, λογικοῦ καὶ
inseparabiles. Moveri enim et
quiescere, et sanum esse, et
aegrum, et quaecunque his
proxima sunt, separabilia sunt.
At vero aquilum esse, vel
simum, vel rationale, vel
irrationale, inseparabilia sunt.
Inseparabilium autem, aliae
quidem sunt per se, aliae vero
per accidens; nam rationale per
se inest homini, et mortale, et
disciplinae esse susceptibile.
At vero aquilum esse vel
simum, per accidens et non per
se.
Illae igitur quae per se sunt, in
ratione substantiae accipiuntur,
et faciunt aliud: illae vero quae
secundum accidens, nec in
substantiae ratione accipiuntur,
nec faciunt aliud, sed
alteratum. Et illae quidem
quae per se sunt, non
suscipiunt magis et minus:
illae vero quae per accidens, et
si inseparabiles sint,
intentionem accipiunt et
remissionem: nam neque
genus magis et minus
praedicatur de eo cuius est
genus, neque generis
differentiae, secundum quas
dividitur: ipsae enim sunt quae
uniuscuiusque rationem
complent: esse autem
unicuique unum et idem, nec
intentionem nec remissionem
suscipiens est, aquilum autem
vel simum esse, vel coloratum
aliquo modo, et intenditur et
remittitur.
Cum igitur tres species
differentiae considerentur, et
cum hae quidem sint
separabiles, illae vero
inseparabiles, et rursus
inseparabilium, hae quidem
sint per se, illae vero per
accidens, et rursus earum quae
per se sint differentiarum, aliae
quidem sunt, secundum quas
dividimus genera in species
aliae vero secundum quas haec
quae divisa sunt specificantur;
ut, cum per se differentiae
omnes huiusmodi sint
be well, and such as resemble these, are
separable, but to have a crooked, or a flat
nose, to be rational, or irrational, are
inseparable differences.
Again, of the inseparable, some exist per
se, others by accident, for rational, mortal,
to be susceptible of science, are inherent
in man per se, but to have a crooked or
flat nose, accidentally, and not per se.
Wherefore, such as are present per se, are
assumed in the definition of substance,
and effect a different thing, but what are
accidental are neither taken in the
definition of substance, nor render a thing
another, but of another quality. Those too,
which are per se, do not admit of the more
and less, but the accidental, even if they
be inseparable, admit of intention and
remission, for neither is genus more and
less predicated of that of which it is the
genus, nor the differences of genus
according to which it is divided. For these
are such as complete the definition of
each thing, but the essence of each is one
and the same, and neither admits of
intention, nor remission; to have however
a crooked or a flat nose, or to be in some
way coloured, admits both of intension
and remission.
Since then, there are three species of
difference considered, some indeed
separable, but others inseparable, again, of
the inseparable, some are per se, but
others accidental, moreover of differences
per se, some are those according to which
we divide genera into species, but others
according to which the things divided
become specific: thus of all such
differences per se of animal as these,
animated and sensitive, rational and
irrational, mortal and immortal, the
difference of animated and sensitive is
constitutive of the essence of animal, for
animal is an animated substance, endued
ἀλόγου, θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου,
ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐμψύχου καὶ
αἰσθητικοῦ διαφορὰ συστατική
ἐστι τῆς τοῦ ζῴου οὐσίας, ἔστι
γὰρ τὸ ζῷον οὐσία ἔμψυχος
αἰσθητική, ἡ δὲ τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ
ἀθανάτου διαφορὰ καὶ ἡ τοῦ
λογικοῦ τε καὶ ἀλόγου
διαιρετικαί εἰσι τοῦ ζῴου
διαφοραί· διʹ αὐτῶν γὰρ τὰ
γένη εἰς τὰ εἴδη διαιρούμεθα.
ἀλλ' αὖταί γε αἱ διαιρετικαὶ
διαφοραὶ τῶν γενῶν
συμπληρωτικαὶ γίνονται καὶ
συστατικαὶ τῶν εἰδῶν·
τέμνεται γὰρ τό ζῷον τῇ τε τοῦ
λογικοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀλόγου
διαφορᾷ καὶ πάλιν τῇ τε τοῦ
θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου
διαφορᾷ. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τοῦ
θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ
διαφοραὶ συστατικαὶ γίνονται
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, αἱ δὲ τοῦ
λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου τοῦ
θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ τοῦ
θνητοῦ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω
οὐσίας διαιρετικῶν οὐσῶν τῆς
τε ἐμψύχου καὶ ἀψύχου
διαφορᾶς καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς
καὶ ἀναισθήτου ἡ μὲν ἔμψυχος
καὶ αἰσθητικὴ συλληφθεῖσαι
τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀπετέλεσαν τό ζῷον,
ἡ δὲ ἔμψυχος καὶ ἀναίσθητος
ἀπετέλεσαν τὸ φυτόν.
ἐπεì οὖν αἱ αὐταì πὼς μὲν
ληφθεῖσαι γίνονται
συστατικαí, πὼς δὲ διαιρετικαί,
εἰδοποιοὶ πᾶσαι κέκληνται. καὶ
τούτων γε μάλιστα χρεία εἴς τε
τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν γενῶν καὶ
εἴς τοὺς ὁρισμούς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῶν
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀχωρíστων
οὐδ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν χωριστῶν.
Ἃς δὴ καὶ ὁριζόμενοί φασιν·
διαφορά ἐστιν ᾗ περισσεύει τὸ
εἶδος τοῦ γένους. ὁ γὰρ
ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ζῴου πλέον ἔχει
τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητόν· τὸ
γὰρ ζῷον οὔτε οὐδὲν τούτων
ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πόθεν ἂν τὰ εἴδη
σχοῖεν διαφοράς· οὔτε δὲ
animalis, animati et sensibilis,
rationalis et irrationalis,
mortalis et immortalis, ea
quidem quae est animati et
sensibilis differentia,
constitutiva est animalis
substantiae: est enim animal
substantia animata sensibilis,
ea vero quae est mortalis et
immortalis differentia, itemque
rationalis et irrationalis,
divisivae sunt animalis
differentiae, per eas enim
genera in species dividimus.
Sed hae quidem quae divisivae
sunt differentiae generum,
completivae fiunt et
constitutivae specierum:
dividitur enim animal rationali
et irrationali differentia, et
rursus mortali et immortali
differentia, sed ea quae sunt
rationalis differentiae et
mortalis, constitutivae sunt
hominis, rationalis vero et
immortalis, Dei: illae vero
quae sunt irrationalis et
mortalis, irrationabilium
animalium. Sic et suprema
substantia, cum divisiva sit
animati et inanimati
differentia, sensibili et
insensibili, animata et
sensibilis congregatae ad
substantiam, animal
perfecerunt, animata vero et
insensibilis perfecerunt
plantam.
Quoniam ergo eaedem aliquo
modo acceptae fiunt
constitutivae, aliquo modo
autem divisivae, omnes
specificae dicuntur: et his
maxime opus est ad divisiones
generum et diffinitiones
specierum, sed non his quae
secundum accidens
inseparabiles, nec magis his,
quae sunt separabiles.
Quas etiam determinantes
dicunt: Differentia est qua
abundat species a genere.
Homo enim ab animali plus
habet rationale et mortale:
animal enim ipsum nihil
horum est, nam unde haberent
species differentias? nec enim
with sense, but the difference of mortal
and immortal, and that of rational and
irrational, are the divisive differences of
animal, for through these we divide
genera into species.
Yet these very differences which divide
the genera are constitutive and completive
of species.
For animal is divided by the difference of
rational and irrational, and again, by the
difference of mortal and immortal; but the
differences of rational and mortal are
constitutive of man, but those of rational
and immortal of God, those again, of
mortal and irrational, of irrational
animals.[17] Thus also, since the
differences of animate and inanimate,
sensitive and void of sense, divide the
highest substance, animate and sensitive
added to substance, complete animal, but
animate and deprived of sense, form plant.
Since then, the same differences taken in
one way become constitutive, but in
another divisive, they are all called
specific. These indeed are especially
useful for divisions of genera, and for
definitions, yet not with regard to those
which are inseparable accidentally, nor
still more with such as are separable.[18]
And indeed defining these, they say that
difference is that by which species
exceeds genus, e. g. man exceeds animal
in being rational and mortal, for animal is
neither any one of these, (since whence
would species have differences?) nor has
it all the opposite differences, (since
otherwise the same thing would at the
πάσας τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἔχει,
ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἕξει τὰ
ἀντικείμενα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀξιοῦσι,
δυνάμει μὲν πάσας ἔχει τὰς
τῶν ὑφ' αὑτὸ διαφοράς,
ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδεμίαν. καὶ
οὕτως οὔτε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τι
γίνεται οὔτε τὰ ἀντικείμενα
ἅμα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται.
Ὁρίζονται δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ οὕτως·
διαφορά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων
καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν
τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι
κατηγορούμενον· τὸ γὰρ
λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου κατηγορούμενον ἐν
τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
λέγεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν.
τί μὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ἐρωτωμένων ἡμῶν οἰκεῖον
εἰπεῖν ζῷον, ποῖον δὲ ζῷον
πυνθανομένων λογικὸν καὶ
θνητὸν οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν.
τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐξ ὕλης
καὶ εἴδους συνεστώτων ἢ
ἀνάλογόν γε ὕλῃ καὶ εἴδει τὴν
σύστασιν ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ ὁ
ἀνδριὰς ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τοῦ
χαλκοῦ, εἴδους δὲ τοῦ
σχήματος, οὕτως καὶ ὁ
ἄνθρωπος ὁ κοινός τε καὶ
εἰδικός ἐξ ὕλης μὲν ἀναλόγου
συνέστηκεν τοῦ γένους, ἐκ
μορφῆς δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς, τὸ δὲ
ὅλον τοῦτο, ζῷον λογικὸν
θνητόν, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ
ἀνδριάς.
Ὑπογράφουσι δὲ τὰς τοιαύτας
διαφορὰς καὶ οὕτως· διαφορά
ἐστιν τὸ χωρίζειν πεφυκὸς τὰ
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος· τὸ λογικὸν
γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τὸν
ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸν ἵππον ὄντα
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὸ ζῷον
χωρίζει.
ἀποδιδόασι δὲ καὶ οὕτως·
διαφορά ἐστιν ὅτῳ διαφέρει
ἕκαστα. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ
ἵππος κατὰ μὲν τὸ γένος οὐ
διενήνοχεν· θνητὰ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ
ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ τὸ
λογικὸν προστεθὲν διέστησεν
ἡμᾶς ἀπ' ἐκείνων· καὶ λογικά
omnes oppositas habet,
namque idem simul habebit
oppositas, sed quemadmodum
probant, potestate quidem
habet omnes differentias sub
se, actu vero nullam. Et sic nec
ex his quae non sunt, aliquid
fit, nec in eodem simul
opposita erunt.
Definiunt autem eam et hoc
modo: Differentia est quod de
pluribus et differentibus specie
in eo quod quale sit
praedicatur rationale enim et
mortale, de homine
praedicatum in eo quod quale
quiddam est homo dicitur sed
non in eo quod quid est; "Quid
est" enim "homo?" interrogatis
nobis conveniens est dicere
"Animal"; quale autem animal
inquisiti, quoniam rationale et
mortale est convenienter
assignabimus.
Rebus enim ex materia et
forma constantibus vel ad
similitudinem materiae
specieique constitutionem
habentibus (quemadmodum
statua ex materia est aeris,
forma autem figura), sic et
homo communis et specialis
ex materia quidem similiter
consistit genere, ex forma
autem differentia, totum autem
hoc animal rationale mortale
homo est quemadmodum illic
statua.
Describunt autem huiusmodi
differentiam et hoc modo:
Differentia est quod aptum
natum est dividere quae sub
eodem sunt genere rationale
enim et irrationale hominem et
equum, quae sub eodem sunt
genere quod est animal,
dividunt.
Assignant autem etiam hoc
modo: Differentia est qua
differunt a se singula nam
secundum genus non differunt;
sumus enim mortalia animalia
et nos et irrationabilia sed
additum rationabile separavit
nos ab illis; rationabiles sumus
same time have opposites,) but (as they
allege) it contains all the differences
which are under it in capacity, but not one
of them in energy, and so neither is any
thing produced from non-entities, nor will
opposites at the same time subsist about
the same thing.
Again, they define it (difference) also
thus: difference is that which is predicated
of many things differing in species in
answer to the question, of what kind a
thing is,[19] for rational and mortal being
predicated of man, are spoken in reply to
what kind of thing man is, and not as to
the question what is he. For when we are
asked what is man, we properly answer,
an animal, but when men inquire what
kind of animal, we say properly, that he is
rational and mortal.
For since things consist of matter and
form, or have a constitution analogous to
matter and form, as a statue is composed
of brass, matter, but of figure, form, so
also man, both common and specific,
consists of matter analogous to genus, and
of form analogous to difference, but the
whole of this, animal, rational, mortal, is
man, in the same manner as the statue
there.
They also describe it thus, difference is
what is naturally adapted to separate
things which are under the same genus, as
rational and irrational separate man and
horse, which are under the same genus,
animal.
Again, they give it in this way: difference
is that by which each singular thing
differs, for man and horse do not differ as
to genus, for both we and horses are
animals, but the addition of rational
separates us from them; again, both we
and the gods [20] are rational, but the
addition of mortal separates us from them.
ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ θεοί ,
ἀλλὰ τὸ θνητὸν προστεθὲν
διέστησεν ἡμᾶς ἀπ' ἐκείνων.
προσεξεργαζόμενοι δὲ τὰ περὶ
τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ τὸ τυχόν φασι
τῶν χωριζόντων τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ
αὐτὸ γένος εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν,
ἀλλ' ὅπερ εἰς τὸ εἶναι
συμβάλλεται καὶ ὃ τοῦ τί ἦν
εἶναι τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι
μέρος. οὐ γὰρ τὸ πεφυκέναι
πλεῖν διαφορὰ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ
καὶ ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου· εἴποιμεν
γὰρ ἂν τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν πλεῖν
πεφυκέναι τὰ δὲ μή χωρίζοντες
ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ
πεφυκέναι πλεῖν οὐκ ἦν
συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας
οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἀλλ'
ἐπιτηδειότης μόνον αὐτῆς διὰ
τὸ μὴ εἶναι οἷαι αἱ ἰδίως
εἰδοποιοὶ λεγόμεναι διαφοραί.
εἶεν ἂν οὖν εἰδοποιοὶ διαφοραί,
ὅσαι ἕτερον εἶδος ποιοῦσιν,
καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι
παραλαμβάνονται.
Καὶ περὶ μὲν διαφορᾶς ἀρκεῖ
τοσαῦτα.
Περὶ ἰδίου.
Τὸ δὲ ἴδιον διαιροῦσι
τετραχῶς· καὶ γὰρ ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ
εἴδει συμβέβηκεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ
παντί, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ
ἰατρεύειν ἢ τὸ γεωμετρεῖν· καὶ
ὃ παντὶ συμβέβηκεν τῷ εἴδει,
εἰ καὶ μὴ μόνῳ, ὡς τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· καὶ ὃ
μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ποτέ, ὡς
ἀνθρώπῳ παντὶ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ
πολιοῦσθαι. τέταρτον δέ, ἐφ'
οὗ συνδεδράμηκεν τὸ μόνῳ
καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν· κἂν
γὰρ μὴ γελᾷ ἀεί, ἀλλὰ
γελαστικὸν λέγεται οὐ τῷ ἀεὶ
γελᾶν ἀλλὰ τῷ πεφυκέναι·
τοῦτο δὲ ἀεὶ αὐτῷ σύμφυτον
ὑπάρχει, ὡς καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ
χρεμετιστικόν. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ
κυρίως ἴδιά φασιν, ὅτι καὶ
ἀντιστρέφει· εἰ γὰρ ἵππος,
χρεμετιστικόν, καὶ εἰ
χρεμετιστικόν, ἵππος.
et nos et dii sed mortale
appositum disiunxit nos ab
illis.
Interius autem perscrutantes et
speculantes differentiam,
dicunt non quodlibet eorum
quae sub eodem sunt genere
dividentium esse differentiam
sed quod ad esse conducit et
quod eius quod est esse rei
pars est; neque enim quod
aptum natum est nauigare erit
hominis differentia, etsi
proprium sit hominis. Dicimus
enim: animalium haec quidem
apta nata sunt ad nauigandum,
illa vero minime dividentes ab
aliis, sed aptum natum esse ad
nauigandum non erat
completiuum substantiae nec
eius pars sed aptitudo quaedam
eius est (idcirco quoniam non
est talis quales sunt quae
specificae dicuntur
differentiae). Erunt igitur
specificae differentiae
quaecumque alteram faciunt
speciem et quaecumque in eo
quod quale est accipiuntur.
Et de differentiis quidem ista
sufficiunt.
[04] DE PROPRIO
Proprium vero quadrifariam
dividunt. Nam et id quod soli
alicui speciei accidit, etsi non
omni (ut homini medicum esse
vel geometrem), et quod omni
accidit, etsi non soli
(quemadmodum homini esse
bipedem), et quod soli et omni
et aliquando (ut homini in
senectute canescere), quartum
vero in quo concurrit et soli et
omni et semper
(quemadmodum homini esse
risibile; nam, etsi non ridet,
tamen risibile dicitur, non
quod iam rideat sed quod aptus
natus sit; hoc autem ei semper
est naturale; et equo hinnibile).
Haec autem proprie propria
perhibent, quoniam etiam
convertuntur; quicquid enim
equus, et hinnibile, et quicquid
hinnibile, equus.
They however who more nicely discuss
what pertains to difference, say that it is
not any casual thing dividing those under
the same genus, but such as contributes to
the essence, and to the definition of the
essence of a thing, and which is part of the
thing. For to be naturally adapted to sail is
not the difference, though it is the
property of man, since we may say that of
animals, some are naturally adapted to
sail, but others not, separating man from
other animals; yet a natural ability to sail
does not complete the essence, neither is a
part of it, but only an aptitude of it,
because it is not such a difference as those
which are called specific differences.
Wherefore specific differences will be
such as produce another species, and
which are assumed in explaining the very
nature of a thing:
And concerning difference this is
sufficient.
Of property
Property they divide in four ways: for it is
that which happens to some one species
alone, though not to every (individual of
that species), as to a man to heal, or to
geometrize: that also which happens to a
whole species, though not to that alone, as
to man to be a biped: that again, which
happens to a species alone, and to every
(individual of it), and at a certain time, as
to every man to become grey in old age:
in the fourth place, it is that in which it
concurs (to happen) to one species alone,
and to every (individual of it), and always,
as risibility to a man; for though he does
not always laugh, yet he is said to be
risible, not from his always laughing, but
from being naturally adapted to laugh, and
this is always inherent in him, in the same
way as neighing in a horse. They say also
that these are validly properties, because
they reciprocate, since if any thing be a
horse it is capable of neighing, and if any
thing be capable of neighing it is a horse.
Περὶ συμβεβηκότος.
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται
καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.
διαιρεῖται δὲ εἰς δύο· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ αὐτοῦ χωριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ
δὲ ἀχώριστον. τὸ μὲν οὖν
καθεύδειν χωριστὸν
συμβεβηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλαν εἶναι
ἀχωρίστως τῷ κόρακι καὶ τῷ
Αἰθίοπι συμβέβηκεν, δύναται
δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι καὶ κόραξ
λευκὸς καὶ Αἰθίοψ ἀποβαλὼν
τὴν χροιὰν χωρὶς φθορᾶς τοῦ
ὑποκειμένου.
ὁρίζονται δὲ καὶ οὕτως·
συμβεβηκός ἐστιν ὃ ἐνδέχεται
τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ
ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ὃ οὔτε γένος ἐστιν
οὔτε διαφορὰ οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε
ἴδιον, ἀεὶ δέ ἐστιν ἐν
ὑποκειμένῳ ὑφιστάμενον.
Ἀφορισθέντων δὲ πάντων τῶν
προτεθέντων, λέγω δὴ γένους,
εἴδους, διαφορᾶς, ἰδίου,
συμβεβηκότος, ῥητέον τίνα τε
κοινὰ πρόσεστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ
τίνα ἴδια.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν πέντε
φωνῶν.
Κοινὸν μὲν δὴ πάντων τὸ κατὰ
πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ
τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ
τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ
ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῶν ὑπ'
αὐτὸ ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον τοῦ
τε εἴδους, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ
τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀτόμων, τὸ δὲ
συμβεβηκὸς καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ
ἀτόμων.
τό τε γὰρ ζῷον ἵππων τε καὶ
βοῶν κατηγορεῖται εἰδῶν
ὄντων καὶ τοῦδε τοῦ ἵππου καὶ
τοῦδε τοῦ βοὸς ἀτόμων ὄντων,
τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἵππων καὶ βοῶν
κατηγορεῖται καὶ τῶν κατὰ
μέρος, τὸ μέντοι εἶδος οἷον ὁ
ἄνθρωπος τῶν κατὰ μέρος
μόνον, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον οἷον τὸ
γελαστικὸν καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, τὸ δὲ
μέλαν τοῦ τε εἴδους τῶν
[05] DE ACCIDENTI
Accidens vero est quod adest
et abest praeter subiecti
corruptionem. Dividitur autem
in duo, in separabile et in
inseparabile; namque dormire
est separabile accidens, nigrum
vero esse inseparabiliter coruo
et Aethiopi accidit (potest
autem subintellegi et corvus
albus et Aethiops amittens
colorem praeter subiecti
corruptionem).
Definitur autem sic quoque:
Accidens est quod contingit
eidem esse et non esse uel:
Quod neque genus neque
differentia neque species
neque proprium, semper autem
est in subiecto subsistens.
Omnibus igitur determinatis
quae proposita sunt, dico
autem genere, specie,
differentia, proprio, accidenti,
dicendum est quae eis
communia adsunt et quae
propria.
[06] DE
COMMUNITATIBUS ET
PROPRIETATIBUS
Commune quidem omnibus est
de pluribus praedicari; sed
genus quidem de speciebus et
de individuis, et differentia
similiter, species autem de his
quae sub ipsa sunt individuis,
at vero proprium et de specie
et cuius est proprium et de his
quae sub specie sunt
individuis, accidens autem et
de speciebus et de individuis.
Namque animal de equis et
bubus et canibus praedicatur
quae sunt species, et de hoc
equo et de hoc boue quae sunt
individua; irrationale vero et
de equis et de bubus
praedicatur et de his qui sunt
particulares; species autem, ut
homo, solum de his qui sunt
particulares praedicatur;
proprium autem, quod est
risibile, de homine et de his
Of accident
Accident is that which is present and
absent without the destruction of its
subject. It receives a two-fold division, for
one kind of it is separable, but the other
inseparable, e. g. to sleep is a separable
accident, but to be black happens
inseparably to a crow and an Ethiopian;
we may possibly indeed conceive a white
crow, and an Ethiopian casting his colour,
without destruction of the subject.
They also define it thus; accident is that
which may be present and not present to
the same thing; also that which is neither
genus, nor difference, nor species, nor
property, yet is always inherent in a
subject. Having discussed all that were
proposed, I mean, genus, species,
difference, property, accident, we must
declare what things are common, and
what peculiar to them.
Of things common and peculiar to the five
predicates
Now it is common to them all to be
predicated, as we have said, of many
things, but genus (is predicated) of the
species and individuals under it, and
difference in like manner; but species, of
the individuals under it; and property,
both of the species, of which it is the
property, and of the individuals under that
species; again, accident (is predicated)
both of species, and individuals.
For animal is predicated of horse and ox,
being species, also of this particular horse
and ox, which are individuals, but
irrational is predicated of horse and ox,
and of particulars. Species however, as
man, is predicated of particulars alone, but
property both of the species, of which it is
the property, and of the individuals under
that species; as risibility both of man, and
of particular men, but blackness of the
species of crows, and of particulars, being
an inseparable accident; and to be moved,
κοράκων καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος
συμβεβηκὸς ὂν ἀχώριστον, καὶ
τὸ κινεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ
ἵππου χωριστὸν ὂν
συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ
προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν
ἀτόμων, κατὰ δεύτερον δὲ
λόγον καὶ τῶν περιεχόντων τὰ
ἄτομα.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας γένους καὶ
διαφορᾶς.
Κοινὸν δὲ γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς
τὸ περιεκτικὸν εἰδῶν· περιέχει
γὰρ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ εἴδη, εἰ καὶ
μὴ πάντα ὅσα τὰ γένη. τὸ γὰρ
λογικὸν εἰ καὶ μὴ περιέχει τὰ
ἄλογα ὥσπερ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ
περιέχει ἄνθρωπον καὶ θεόν,
ἅπερ ἐστὶν εἴδη.
ὅσα τε κατηγορεῖται τοῦ
γένους ὡς γένους, καὶ τῶν ὑπ'
αὐτὸ εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὅσα
τε τῆς διαφορᾶς ὡς διαφορᾶς,
καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἴδους
κατηγορηθήσεται. γένους τε
γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου ὄντος ὡς γένους
κατηγορεῖται ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ
ἔμψυχον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ
ζῷον εἰδῶν πάντων
κατηγορεῖται ταῦτα ἄχρι καὶ
τῶν ἀτόμων· διαφορᾶς τε
οὔσης τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ
κατηγορεῖται ὡς διαφορᾶς τὸ
λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, οὐ μόνον δὲ τοῦ
λογικοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ
λογικὸν εἰδῶν
κατηγορηθήσεται τὸ χρῆσθαι
λόγῳ.
κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀναιρεθέντος
ἢ τοῦ γένους ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς
ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπ' αὐτά· ὡς
γὰρ μὴ ὄντος ζῴου οὐκ ἔστιν
ἵππος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως
μὴ ὄντος λογικοῦ οὐδὲν ἔσται
ζῷον τὸ χρώμενον λόγῳ.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ γένους
καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς
qui sunt particulares; nigrum
autem et de specie coruorum et
de his qui sunt particulares,
quod est accidens inseparabile;
et moueri de homine et de
equo, quod est accidens
separabile sed principaliter
quidem de individuis,
secundum posteriorem vero
rationem de his quae continent
individua.
[07] De communibus generis
et differentiae
Commune est autem generi et
differentiae continentia
specierum; continet enim et
differentia species, etsi non
omnes quot genera; rationale
enim, etiam si non continet ea
quae sunt irrationabilia ut
genus quemadmodum animal
sed continet hominem et deum
quae sunt species.
Et quaecumque praedicantur
de genere ut genus, et de his
quae sub ipso sunt speciebus
praedicantur; quaeque de
differentia praedicantur ut
differentiae, et de ea quae ex
ipsa est specie praedicabuntur.
Nam, cum sit genus animal,
non solum de eo praedicantur
ut genus substantia et
animatum sed etiam de his
quae sunt sub animali
speciebus omnibus
praedicantur haec usque ad
individua; cumque sit
differentia rationalis,
praedicatur de ea ut differentia
id quod est ratione uti, non
solum de eo quod est rationale
sed etiam de his quae sunt sub
rationali speciebus
praedicabitur ratione uti.
Commune autem est et
perempto genere vel
differentia simul perimi quae
sub ipsis sunt; quemadmodum,
si non sit animal, non est
equus neque homo, sic, si non
sit rationale, nullum erit
animal quod utatur ratione.
De propriis generis et
differentiae
of man and horse, being a separable
accident. Notwithstanding, it is pre-
eminently (predicated) of individuals, but
secondarily of those things which
comprehend individuals.
Chap. VII. Of the Community and
Distinction of Genus and Difference.
It is common to genus and difference to
be comprehensive of species, for
difference also comprehends species,
though not all such as the genera; for
rational, though, it does not comprehend
irrational, as animal does, yet it
comprehends man and divinity, which are
species.
Whatever things also are predicated of
genus as genus, are predicated of the
species under it, and whatever are
predicated of difference as difference, will
be also of the species formed from it. For
animal being a genus, substance is
predicated of it as of a genus, also
animated, and sensible, but these are
predicated of all the species under animal,
as far as to individuals. As moreover,
rational is difference, the use of reason is
predicated of it, as of difference, yet the
use of reason will not be predicated of
rational only, but also of the species under
rational.
This too is common, that when genus or
difference is subverted, the things under
them are also subverted, for as when
animal is not, horse is not, nor man, thus
also, when rational is not, there will be no
animal which uses reason.
Ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ γένους τὸ ἐπὶ
πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἤπερ
ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ
ἴδιον καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός· τὸ
μὲν γὰρ ζῷον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου
καὶ ἵππου καὶ ὀρνέου καὶ
ὄφεως, τὸ δὲ τετράπουν ἐπὶ
μόνων τῶν τέσσαρας πόδας
ἐχόντων, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ
μόνων τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ τὸ
χρεμετιστικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου
μόνον καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, καὶ
τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁμοίως ἐπ'
ἐλαττόνων. δεῖ δὲ διαφορὰς
λαμβάνειν, αἷς τέμνεται τὸ
γένος, οὐ τὰς συμπληρωτικὰς
τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ γένους.
ἔτι τὸ γένος περιέχει τὴν
διαφορὰν δυνάμει· τοῦ γὰρ
ζῴου τὸ μὲν λογικὸν τὸ δὲ
ἄλογον.
ἔτι τὰ μὲν γένη πρότερα τῶν
ὑπ' αὐτὰ διαφορῶν, διὸ
συναναιρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ
συναναιρεῖται δέ·
ἀναιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ ζῴου
συναναιρεῖται τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
τὸ ἄλογον. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ
οὐκέτι συναναιροῦσι τὸ γένος·
κἂν γὰρ πᾶσαι ἀναιρεθῶσιν,
οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητικὴ
ἐπινοεῖται, ἥτις ἦν τὸ ζῷον.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν γένος ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν,
ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί
ἐστιν, ὡς εἴρηται,
κατηγορεῖται. ἔτι γένος μὲν ἓν
καθ' ἕκαστον εἶδος οἷον
ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον, διαφοραὶ
δὲ πλείους οἷον λογικόν,
θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης
δεκτικόν, αἷς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
διαφέρει. καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος
ἔοικεν ὕλῃ, μορφῇ δὲ ἡ
διαφορά.
προσόντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων
κοινῶν τε καὶ ἰδίων τῷ γένει
καὶ τῇ διαφορᾷ ἀρκείτω ταῦτα.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ εἴδους
Proprium autem generis est de
pluribus praedicari quam
differentia et species et
proprium et accidens; animal
enim de homine et equo et aue
et serpente, quadrupes vero de
solis quattuor pedes
habentibus, homo vero videtur
de solis individuis, et hinnibile
de equo et de his qui sunt
particulares; et accidens
similiter de paucioribus.
Oportet autem differentias
accipere quibus dividitur
genus, non eas quae complent
substantiam generis.
Amplius genus continet
differentiam potestate;
animalis enim hoc quidem
rationale est, illud vero
irrationale.
Amplius genera quidem priora
sunt his quae sunt sub se
positis differentiis propter
quod simul quidem eas aufert,
non autem simul aufertur
(sublato enim animali aufertur
rationale et irrationale),
differentiae vero non auferunt
genus (nam, si omnes
interimantur, tamen substantia
animata sensibilis subintellegi
potest quae est animal).
Amplius genus quidem in eo
quod quid est, differentia vero
in eo quod quale quiddam est,
quemadmodum dictum est,
praedicatur. Amplius genus
quidem unum est secundum
unamquamque speciem (ut
hominis id quod est animal),
differentiae vero plurimae (ut
rationale, mortale, mentis et
disciplinae perceptibile)
quibus ab aliis differt. Et genus
quidem consimile est materiae,
formae vero differentia.
Cum autem sint et alia
communia et propria generis et
differentiae, nunc ista
sufficiant.
[08] De communibus generis
et speciei
Now, it is the property of genus to be
predicated of more things than difference,
species, property, and accident are, for
animal (is predicated) of man and horse,
bird and snake, but quadruped of animals
alone, which have four feet; again, man of
individuals alone, and capacity of
neighing of horse alone, and of
particulars. Likewise, accident of fewer
things: yet we must assume the
differences by which the genus is divided,
not those which complete, but which
divide the essence of genus.
Moreover, genus comprehends difference
in capacity, for of animal one kind is
rational, but another irrational, but
differences do not comprehend genera.
Besides, genera are prior to the
differences under them, wherefore they
subvert them, but are not co-subverted
with them. For animal being subverted,
rational and irrational are co-subverted,
but differences no longer co-subvert
genus, for even if all of them should be
subverted, yet we may form a conception
of animated, sensible substance, which is
animal.
Yet more, genus is predicated in reference
to what a thing is, but difference in
reference to what kind of a thing it is, as
was observed before; besides there is one
genus according to every species; e. g. of
man, animal (is the genus), but there are
many differences, as rational, mortal,
capable of intellect and science, by which
he differs from other animals. Genus also
is similar to matter, but difference to
form.
However since there are other things
common and peculiar to genus and
difference, these will suffice.
Chap. VIII. --Of Community and
Difference of Genus and Species.
Γένος δὲ καὶ εἶδος κοινὸν μὲν
ἔχουσι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς
εἴρηται, κατηγορεῖσθαι·
εἰλήφθω δὲ τὸ εἶδος ὡς εἶδος,
ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ὡς γένος, ἄνπερ
ᾗ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶδος καὶ γένος.
κοινὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ
προτέροις εἶναι ὧν
κατηγορεῖται καὶ τὸ ὅλον τι
εἶναι ἑκάτερον.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ εἴδους
Διαφέρει ᾗ δὲ τὸ μὲν γένος
περιέχει τὰ εἴδη, τὰ δὲ εἴδη
περιέχεται καὶ οὐ περιέχει τὰ
γένη· ἐπὶ πλεῖον γὰρ τὸ γένος
τοῦ εἴδους. ἔτι τὰ γένη
προυποκεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ
διαμορφωθέντα ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς
διαφοραῖς ἀποτελεῖν τὰ εἴδη,
ὅθεν καὶ πρότερα τῇ φύσει τὰ
γένη. καὶ συναναιροῦντα, ἀλλ'
οὐ συναναιρούμενα, καὶ εἴδους
μὲν ὄντος πάντως ἔστι καὶ
γένος, γένους δὲ ὄντος οὐ
πάντως ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶδος.
καὶ τὰ μὲν γένη συνωνύμως
κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑφ' ἑαυτὰ
εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν
οὐκέτι.
ἔτι τὰ μὲν γένη πλεονάζει τῇ
τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ εἰδῶν περιοχῇ, τὰ
δὲ εἴδη τῶν γενῶν πλεονάζει
ταῖς οἰκείαις διαφοραῖς.
ἔτι οὔτε τὸ εἶδος γένοιτ' ἂν
γενικώτατον οὔτε τὸ γένος
εἰδικώτατον.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου
Γένους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν μὲν
τὸ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς εἴδεσιν· εἰ γὰρ
ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον, καὶ εἰ
ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν. καὶ τὸ
ἐπίσης κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ γένος
τῶν εἰδων καὶ τὸ ἴδιον τῶν
αὐτοῦ μετεχόντων ἀτόμων·
ἐπίσης γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
ὁ βοῦς ζῷον καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ
Μέλητος γελαστικόν. κοινὸν
Genus autem et species
commune quidem habent de
pluribus (quemadmodum
dictum est) praedicari; sumatur
autem species ut species et non
etiam ut genus, si fuerit idem
species et genus.
Commune autem his est et
priora esse eorum de quibus
praedicantur et totum quiddam
esse utrumque.
De propriis generis et speciei
Differt autem eo quod genus
quidem continet species sub
se, species vero continentur et
non continent genera; in
pluribus enim genus quam
species est (genera enim
praeiacere oportet et formata
specificis differentiis perficere
species, unde et priora sunt
naturaliter genera et simul
interimentia sed quae non
simul interimantur). Et species
quidem cum sit, est et genus,
genus vero cum sit non
omnino erit et species.
Et genera quidem univoce de
speciebus praedicantur,
species vero de generibus
minime.
Amplius quidem genera
abundant earum quae sub ipsis
sunt specierum continentia,
species vero generibus
abundant propriis differentiis.
Amplius neque species fiet
umquam generalissimum
neque genus specialissimum.
[09] De communibus generis
et proprii
Generis autem et proprii
commune quidem est sequi
species (nam, si homo est,
animal est, et, si homo est,
risibile est), et aequaliter
praedicari genus de speciebus
et proprium de his quae illo
participant (aequaliter enim et
homo et bos animal, et Cato et
Cicero risibile). Commune
Genus and species possess in common,
(as we have said,) the being predicated of
many things, but species must be taken as
species only, and not as genus, if the same
thing be both species and genus.
Moreover, it is common to them both to
be prior to what they are predicated of,
and to be each a certain whole.
But they differ, because genus indeed
comprehends species, but species are
comprehended by, and do not comprehend
genera, for genus is predicated of more
than species. Besides, it is necessary that
genera should be presupposed, and when
formed by specific differences, that they
should consummate species, whence also
genera are by nature prior. They also co-
subvert, but are not co-subverted, for
species existing, genus also entirely
exists, but genus existing there is not
altogether species.
Genera too, are indeed univocally
predicated of species under them, but not
species of genera.
Moreover, genera exceed, from
comprehending the species which are
under them, but species exceed genera by
their proper differences.
Besides, neither can species become most
generic, nor genus most specific.
Chap. IX. --Of Community and
Difference of Genus and Property.
Both to genus and to property it is
common to follow species, for if any thing
be man, it is animal, and if any thing be
man, it is risible. Likewise to genus, to be
equally predicated of species, and to
property, (to be equally predicated) of the
individuals which participate it; thus man
and ox are equally animal, and Anytus
and Melitus risible. [21] It is also common
that genus should be univocally
δὲ καὶ τὸ συνωνύμως
κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ γένος τῶν
οἰκείων εἰδῶν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ὧν
ἂν ᾖ ἴδιον.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς γένους καὶ
τοῦ ἰδίου.
Διαφέρει δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν γένος
πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ ἴδιον·
δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι ζῷον, εἶτα
διαιρεῖσθαι διαφοραῖς καὶ
ἰδίοις.
καὶ τὸ μὲν γένος κατὰ
πλειόνων εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται,
τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἑνὸς εἴδους, οὗ
ἐστιν ἴδιον.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον
ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστιν
ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐδενὸς
ἀντικατηγορεῖται· οὔτε γὰρ εἰ
ζῷον, ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε εἰ ζῷον,
γελαστικόν· εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπος,
γελαστικόν, καὶ ἔμπαλιν.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον παντὶ τῷ εἴδει
ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ
μόνῳ καὶ ἀεί , τὸ δὲ γένος
παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει, οὗ ἂν ᾖ
γένος, καὶ ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι καὶ
μόνῳ.
ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἀναιρούμενα οὐ
συναναιρεῖ τὰ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη
ἀναιρούμενα συναναιρεῖ τὰ
εἴδη, ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια, ὥστε καὶ
ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια ἀναιρουμένων
καὶ αὐτὰ συναναιρεῖται.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
Γένους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος
κοινὸν τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων, ὡς
εἴρηται, κατηγορεῖσθαι, ἄν τε
τῶν χωριστῶν ᾖ ἄν τε τῶν
ἀχωρίστων· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
κινεῖσθαι κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
τὸ μέλαν κατὰ κοράκων καὶ
Αἰθιόπων καί τινων ἀψύχων.
Περὶ τῆς διαφοράς τοῦ γένους
καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.
autem et univoce praedicari
genus de propriis speciebus et
proprium quorum est
proprium.
De propriis generis et proprii
Differt autem quoniam genus
quidem prius est, posterius
vero proprium (oportet enim
esse animal, dehinc dividi
differentiis et propriis).
Et genus quidem de pluribus
speciebus praedicari, proprium
vero de una sola specie cuius
est proprium.
Et proprium quidem
conversim praedicatur cuius
est proprium, genus vero de
nullo conversim praedicatur
(nam neque si animal est,
homo est, neque si animal est,
risibile est; sin vero homo, et
risibile est, et e converso).
Amplius proprium omni
speciei inest cuius est
proprium et uni et semper,
genus vero omni quidem
speciei cuius fuerit genus et
semper, non autem soli.
Amplius species quidem
interemptae non simul
interimunt genera, propria vero
interempta simul interimunt
quorum sunt propria, et his
quorum sunt propria
interemptis et ipsa simul
interimuntur.
[10] De communibus generis
et accidentis
Generis vero et accidentis
commune est de pluribus
(quemadmodum dictum est)
praedicari sive separabilium sit
sive inseparabilium; et enim
moueri de pluribus, et nigrum
de coruis et hominibus et
Aethiopibus et aliquibus
inanimatis.
De propriis generis et
accidentis
predicated of its proper species, and
property of the things of which it is the
property.
Still they differ, because genus is prior,
but property posterior, for animal must
first necessarily exist, afterwards be
divided by differences and properties.
Also genus indeed is predicated of many
species, but property of one certain
species of which it is the property.
Besides property is reciprocally
predicated of that of which it is the
property, but genus is not reciprocally
predicated of any thing, for neither if any
thing is an animal, is it a man, nor if a
thing be animal is it risible, but if any
thing is a man it is risible, and vice versa.
Moreover, property is inherent in the
whole species, of which it is the property,
in it alone, and always, but genus in the
whole species indeed of which it is the
genus, and always, yet not in it alone;
once more, properties being subverted do
not co-subvert genera, but genera being
subverted, co-subvert species, to which
properties belong; wherefore, also those
things of which there are properties, being
subverted, the properties themselves also,
are co-subverted.
Chap. X. -- Of Community and Difference
of Genus and Accident.
It is common to genus and accident to be
predicated, as we have said, of many
things, whether they (the accidents) be
separable or inseparable, for to be moved
is predicated of many things, and
blackness of crows, and of Ethiopians,
and of certain inanimate things.
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ γένος τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
γένος πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν, τὰ δὲ
συμβεβηκότα τῶν εἰδῶν
ὕστερα· κἂν γὰρ ἀχώριστον
λαμβάνηται συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ'
οὖν πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ ᾧ
συμβέβηκε τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν γένους ἐπίσης τὰ
μετέχοντα μετέχει, τοῦ δὲ
συμβεβηκότος οὐκ ἐπίσης·
ἐπίτασιν γὰρ καὶ ἄνεσιν
ἐπιδέχεται ἡ τῶν
συμβεβηκότων μέθεξις, ἡ δὲ
τῶν γενῶν οὐκέτι.
καὶ τὰ μὲν συμβεβηκότα ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀτόμων προηγουμένως
ὑφίσταται, τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰ
εἴδη φύσει πρότερα τῶν
ἀτόμων οὐσιῶν. καὶ τὰ μὲν
γένη ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται
τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ
συμβεβηκότα ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι ἢ
πῶς ἔχον ἕκαστον· ποῖος γὰρ
Αἰθίοψ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐρεῖς μέλας,
καὶ πῶς ἔχει Σωκράτης ἐρεῖς
ὅτι κάθηται ἢ περιπατεῖ.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων
τεττάρων διαφέρει εἴρηται,
συμβέβηκεν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστον διαφέρειν τῶν
τεττάρων, ὥστε πέντε μὲν
ὄντων, ἑνὸς δὲ ἑκάστου τῶν
τεττάρων διαφέροντος, τετράκι
τὰ πέντε, εἴκοσι γίνεσθαι τὰς
πάσας διαφοράς. ἀλλ' οὐχ
οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῶν
ἐφεξῆς καταριθμουμένων καὶ
τῶν μὲν δύο μιᾷ λειπομένων
διαφορᾷ διὰ τὸ· ἤδη εἰλῆφθαι,
τῶν δὲ τριῶν δυσίν, τῶν δὲ
τεττάρων τρισί, τῶν δὲ πέντε
τέτρασι, δέκα αἱ πᾶσαι
γίνονται διαφοραί, τέσσαρες,
τρεῖς, δύο, μία.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένος διαφέρει τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ
τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος· τέσσαρες οὖν
Differt autem genus accidente
quoniam genus ante species
est, accidentia vero speciebus
inferiora sunt; nam si etiam
inseparabile sumatur accidens
sed tamen prius est illud cui
accidit quam accidens.
Et genere quidem quae
participant aequaliter
participant, accidente vero non
aequaliter; intentionem enim et
remissionem suscipit
accidentium participatio,
generum vero minime.
Et accidentia quidem in
individuis principaliter
subsistunt, genera vero et
species naturaliter priora sunt
individuis substantiis. Et
genera quidem in eo quod quid
est praedicantur de his quae
sub ipsis sunt, accidentia vero
in eo quod quale aliquid est vel
quomodo se habeat
unumquodque; "Qualis est"
enim "Aethiops?" interrogatus
dicis "Niger", et
quemadmodum se Socrates
habeat, dicis quoniam sedet
vel ambulat.
[11]
Genus vero quo aliis quattuor
differat dictum est. Contingit
autem etiam unumquodque
aliorum differre ab aliis
quattuor, ut, cum quinque
quidem sint, unum autem ab
aliis quattuor differat, quater
quinque (uiginti) fiant omnes
differentiae; sed, semper
posterioribus enumeratis et
secundis quidem una
differentia superatis (propterea
quoniam iam sumpta est),
tertiis vero, duabus, quartis
vero tribus, quintis vero
quattuor, decem omnes fiunt
(quattuor, tres, duae, una).
Genus enim differt differentia
et specie et proprio et
accidenti; quattuor igitur sunt
omnes differentiae.
Genus however differs from accident, in
that genus is prior, but accident posterior
to species, for though an inseparable
accident be assumed, yet that of which it
is the accident is prior to the accident.
Also the participants of genus participate
it equally, but those of accident do not
equally; for the participation of accidents
accepts intension and remission, but not
that of genera.
Besides, accidents primarily subsist about
individuals, but genera and species are by
nature prior to individual substances.
Moreover, genera are predicated of the
things under them, in respect to what a
thing is, but accidents in respect to what
kind of a thing it is, or how each thing
subsists; for being asked, what kind of
man an Ethiopian is, you say that he is
black; or how Socrates is, you reply that
he is sick or well.
Chap. XI. --Of Community and
Difference of Species and Difference.
We have shown then, wherein genus
differs from the other four, but each of the
other four happens also to differ from the
rest, so that as there are five, and each one
of the four differs from the rest, the five
being four times (taken), all the
differences would appear to be twenty.
Nevertheless, such is not the case, but
always those successive being
enumerated, and two being deficient by
one difference, from having been already
assumed, and the three by two differences,
the four by three, the five by four; all the
differences are ten, namely, four, three,
two, one.
For in what genus differs from difference,
species, property, and accident, we have
shown, wherefore, there are four
differences.
αἱ διαφοραί.
ἡ διαφορὰ δέ πῇ μὲν
διενήνοχεν τοῦ γένους εἴρηται,
ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει τὸ γένος αὐτῆς
ἐρρέθη· λοιπὸν δὲ πῇ διαφέρει
τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ
τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος ῥηθήσεται, καὶ
γίνονται τρεῖς. πάλιν τὸ εἶδος
πῇ μὲν διαφέρει τῆς διαφορᾶς
ἐρρέθη, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει ἡ
διαφορὰ τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο·
πῇ δὲ διαφέρει τὸ εἶδος τοῦ
γένους ἐρρέθη, ὅτε πῇ διαφέρει
τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους ἐλέγετο·
λοιπὸν οὖν πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ
ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
ῥηθήσεται· δύο οὖν καὶ αὗται
αἱ διαφοραί.
τὸ δὲ ἴδιον πῇ διαφέρει τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος
καταλειφθήσεται· πῇ γὰρ τοῦ
εἴδους καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς καὶ
τοῦ γένους διαφέρει,
προειρημένον ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ
ἐκείνων πρὸς αὐτὸ διαφορᾷ·
τεσσάρων οὖν λαμβανομένων
τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα
διαφορῶν, τριῶν δὲ τῆς
διαφορᾶς, δύο δὲ τοῦ εἴδους,
μιᾶς δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου πρὸς τὸ
συμβεβηκός, δέκα ἔσονται αἱ
πᾶσαι, ὧν τὰς τέσσαρας, αἳ
ἦσαν τοῦ γένους πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα,
φθάσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους.
Κοινὸν τοίνυν διαφορᾶς καὶ
εἴδους τὸ ἐπίσης μετέχεσθαι·
ἀνθρώπου τε γὰρ ἐπίσης
μετέχουσιν οἱ κατὰ μέρος
ἄνθρωποι καὶ τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ
διαφορᾶς. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ
παρεῖναι τοῖς μετέχουσιν· ἀεὶ
γὰρ Σωκράτης λογικός, καὶ ἀεὶ
Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ εἴδους
καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς.
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς μὲν τὸ ἐν
τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι
κατηγορεῖσθαι, εἴδους δὲ τὸ ἐν
τῷ τί ἐστιν· κἂν γὰρ ὁ
ἄνθρωπος ὡς ποιὸν
Differentia vero quo differt
genere dictum est quando quo
differret genus ab ea dicebatur;
relinquitur igitur quo differat
specie et proprio et accidente
dicere, et fiunt tres. Rursus
species quo quidem differat a
differentia dictum est quando
quo differret specie differentia
dicebatur, quo autem differt
species genere dictum est
quando quo differret genus
specie dicebatur; reliquum est
igitur ut quo differat proprio et
accidente dicatur; duae igitur
etiam istae sunt differentiae.
Proprium autem quo differat
accidente relinquitur, nam quo
specie et differentia et genere
differt praedictum est in
illorum ad ipsum differentia.
Quattuor igitur sumptis generis
ad alia differentiis, tribus vero
differentiae, duabus autem
speciei, una autem proprii ad
accidens, decem erunt omnes;
quarum quattuor quae erant
generis ad reliqua superius
demonstravimus.
[12] De communibus
differentiae et speciei
Commune ergo differentiae et
speciei est aequaliter
participari; homine enim
aequaliter participant
particulares homines et
rationali differentia. Commune
vero est et semper adesse his
quae participant; semper enim
Socrates rationalis et semper
Socrates homo.
De propriis differentiae et
speciei
Proprium autem differentiae
quidem est in eo quod quale sit
praedicari, speciei vero in eo
quod quid est; nam, et si homo
velut qualitas accipiatur, non
Also we explained in what respect
difference differs from genus, when we
declared in what genus differs from it.
What remains then, viz. in what respect it
differs from species, property, and
accident, shall be told, and three
(differences) arise. Again, we declared
how species differs from difference, when
we showed how difference differs from
species; also we showed how species
differs from genus, when we explained
how genus differs from species; what
remains then, viz. in what species differs
from property and from accident, shall be
told: these, then, are two differences.
But in what respect property differs from
accident, shall be discovered, for how it
differs from species, difference, and
genus, was explained before in the
difference of those from these. Wherefore,
as four differences of genus with respect
to the rest, are assumed, but three of
difference, two of species, and one of
property with regard to accident, there
will be ten (differences altogether), of
which, four we have already
demonstrated, viz. those of genus, with
respect to the rest.
Chap. XII. --The same subject continued.
It is common then to difference and
species to be equally participated, for
particular men partake equally of man,
and of the difference of rational. It is also
common always to be present to their
participants, for Socrates is always
rational, and always man.
But it is the property of difference indeed
to be predicated in respect to what kind a
thing is of, but of species in respect to
what a thing is, for though man should be
assumed as a certain kind of thing, yet he
λαμβάνηται, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη
ποιόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ τῷ γένει
προσελθοῦσαι αἱ διαφοραὶ
ὑπέστησαν αὐτό.
ἔτι ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἐπὶ πλειόνων
πολλάκις εἰδῶν θεωρεῖται, ὡς
τὸ τετράπουν ἐπὶ πλείστων
ζῴων τῷ εἴδει διαφερόντων, τὸ
δὲ εἶδος ἐπὶ μόνων τῶν ὑπὸ τὸ
εἶδος ἀτόμων ἐστίν.
ἔτι ἡ διαφορὰ προτέρα τοῦ κατ'
αὐτὴν εἴδους· συναναιρεῖ γὰρ
τὸ λογικὸν ἀναιρεθὲν τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος
ἀναιρεθεὶς οὐκ ἀνῄρηκεν τὸ
λογικὸν, ὄντος θεοῦ.
ἔτι διαφορὰ μὲν συντίθεται
μετὰ ἄλλης διαφορᾶς· τὸ
λογικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θνητὸν
συνετέθη εἰς ὑπόστασιν
ἀνθρώπου· εἶδος δὲ εἴδει οὐ
συντίθεται, ὥστε ἀπογεννῆσαι
ἄλλο τι εἶδος· τὶς μὲν γὰρ
ἵππος τινὶ ὄνῳ σύνεισιν εἰς
ἡμιόνου γένεσιν, ἵππος δὲ
ἁπλῶς ὄνῳ οὐκ ἂν συντεθεὶς
ἀποτελέσειεν ἡμίονον.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου
Διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἴδιον κοινὸν
μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ ἐπίσης
μετέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν
μετεχόντων· ἐπίσης γὰρ τὰ
λογικὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὰ
γελαστικὰ γελαστικά.
καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ παρεῖναι
κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν· κἂν γὰρ
κολοβωθῇ ὁ δίπους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τὸ πεφυκέναι τὸ ἀεὶ λέγεται,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν τῷ
πεφυκέναι ἔχει τὸ ἀεί, ἀλλ'
οὐχὶ τῷ γελᾶν ἀεί.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ ἰδίου
καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς
Ἴδιον δὲ διαφορᾶς ὅτι αὕτη
μὲν ἐπὶ πλειόνων εἰδῶν λέγεται
simpliciter erit qualitas sed
secundum id quod generi
aduenientes differentiae eam
constituerunt.
Amplius differentia quidem in
pluribus saepe speciebus
consideratur (quemadmodum
quadrupes in pluribus
animalibus specie
differentibus), species vero in
solis his quae sub specie sunt
individuis est.
Amplius differentia prima est
ab ea specie quae est
secundum ipsam; simul enim
ablatum rationale interimit
hominem, homo vero
interemptus non aufert
rationale, cum sit deus.
Amplius differentia quidem
componitur cum alia
differentia (rationale enim et
mortale compositum est in
substantia hominis), species
vero speciei non componitur ut
gignat aliquam aliam speciem
(quidam enim equus cuidam
asino permiscetur ad muli
generationem, equus autem
simpliciter asino numquam
conveniens perficiet mulum).
[13] De communibus
differentiae et proprii
Differentia vero et proprium
commune quidem habent
aequaliter participari ab his
quae eorum participant;
aequaliter enim rationalia
rationalia sunt et risibilia
risibilia sunt.
Et semper et omni adesse
commune utrisque est; sive
enim curtetur qui est bipes,
non substantiam perimit sed ad
quod natum est semper dicitur;
nam et risibile, eo quod natum
est habet id quod est semper
sed non eo quod semper rideat.
De propriis differentiae et
proprii
Proprium autem differentiae
est quoniam haec quidem de
will not be simply so, but in as far as
differences according to genus constitute
him.
Besides, difference is often seen in many
species, as quadruped in many animals,
different in species, but species is in the
individuals alone, which are under the
species.
Moreover, difference is prior to the
species which subsists according to it, for
rational being subverted, co-subverts man,
but man being subverted, does not co-
subvert rational, since there is still
divinity.
Further, difference is joined with another
difference, (for rational and mortal are
joined for the subsistence of man,) but
species is not joined with species, so as to
produce some other species; for indeed a
certain horse is joined with a certain ass,
for the production of a mule, but horse
simply joined with ass will not produce a
mule.
Chap. XIII. -- Of Community and
Difference of Property and Difference.[22]
Difference also and property have it in
common to be equally shared by their
participants, for rational are equally
rational, and risible (equally) risible
(animals).
Also it is common to both to be always
present, and to every one, for though a
biped should be mutilated, yet (the term
biped) is always predicated with reference
to what is naturally adapted, since also
risible has the "always" from natural
adaptation, but not from always laughing.
Now, it is the property of difference, that
it is frequently predicated of many
πολλάκις, οἷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ
δὲ ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑνὸς εἴδους, οὗ
ἐστιν ἴδιον.
καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἕπεται
ἐκείνοις, ὧν ἦν διαφορά, οὐ
μὴν καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· τὰ δὲ ἴδια
ἀντικατηγορεῖται ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδια
διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ
συμβεβηκότος
Διαφορᾷ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότι
κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων
λέγεσθαι, κοινὸν δὲ πρὸς τὰ
ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα τὸ ἀεὶ
καὶ παντὶ προσεῖναι· τό τε γὰρ
δίπουν ἀεὶ πρόσεστι πᾶσι
κόραξι τό τε μέλαν ὁμοίως.
Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων διαφορᾶς καὶ
συμβεβηκότος
Διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν
διαφορὰ περιέχει, οὐ
περιέχεται δέ· περιέχει γὰρ τὸ
λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον· τὰ δὲ
συμβεβηκότα τρόπον μέν τινα
περιέχει τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι,
τρόπον δέ τινα περιέχεται τῷ
μὴ ἑνὸς συμβεβηκότος εἶναι
δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ἀλλὰ
πλειόνων.
καὶ ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἀνεπίτατος
καὶ ἀνάνετος, τὰ δὲ
συμβεβηκότα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ
ἧττον ἐπιδέχεται.
καὶ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν αἱ ἐναντίαι
διαφοραί, μιγείη δ' ἂν τὰ
ἐναντία συμβεβηκότα.
Τοιαῦται μὲν οὖν αἱ
κοινότητες καὶ αἱ ἰδιότητες τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
τὸ δὲ εἶδος πῇ μὲν διαφέρει
γένους καὶ διαφορᾶς, εἴρηται
ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγομεν, πῇ τὸ γένος
διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ πῇ ἡ
διαφορὰ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων.
pluribus speciebus dicitur
saepe (ut rationale de homine
et deo), proprium vero in una
sola specie cuius est proprium.
Et differentia quidem illis est
consequens quorum est
differentia sed non convertitur,
propria vero conversim
praedicantur quorum sunt
propria idcirco quoniam
convertuntur.
[14] De communibus
differentiae et accidentis
Differentiae autem et accidenti
commune quidem est de
pluribus dici, commune vero
ad ea quae sunt inseparabilia
accidentia semper et omnibus
adesse; bipes enim semper
adest omnibus coruis, et
nigrum esse similiter.
De propriis differentiae et
accidentis
Differunt autem quoniam
differentia quidem continet et
non continetur (continet enim
rationalitas hominem),
accidentia vero quodam
quidem modo continent eo
quod in pluribus sint, quodam
vero modo continentur eo
quod non unius accidentis
susceptibilia sunt subiecta sed
plurimorum.
Et differentia quidem
inintendibilis est et
inremissibilis, accidentia vero
magis et minus recipiunt.
Et impermixtae quidem sunt
contrariae differentiae, mista
vero contraria accidentia.
Huiusmodi quidem
communiones et proprietates
differentiae et caeterorum sunt.
Species vero quo quidem
differat a genere et differentia
dictum est in eo quod
dicebamus quo genus differt
caeteris et quo differentia
differret caeteris.
species, as rational of divinity and man,
but property (is predicated) of one
species, of which it is the property.
Difference moreover follows those things
of which it is the difference, yet does not
also reciprocate, but properties are
reciprocally predicated of those of which
they are the properties, in consequence of
reciprocating.
Chap. XIV. --Of Community and
Difference of Accident and Difference.
To difference and accident it is common
to be predicated of many things, but it is
common (to the former) with inseparable
accidents to be present always and with
every one, for biped is always present to
man, and likewise blackness to all crows.
Still they differ in that difference indeed
comprehends but is not comprehended by
species; for rational comprehends divinity
and man, but accidents after a certain
manner comprehend from their being in
many things, yet in a certain manner are
comprehended from the subjects not being
the recipients of one accident, but of
many.
Besides, difference indeed docs not admit
of intension and remission, but accidents
accept the more and less.
Moreover contrary differences cannot be
mingled, but contrary accidents may
sometimes be mingled.
So many then are the points common and
peculiar to difference and the others.
In what respect species differs from genus
and difference, was explained in our
enunciation of the way in which genus,
and also difference, differ from the rest; it
now remains that we should point out how
it (species) differs from property and

Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ εἴδους
καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ ἰδίου κοινὸν τὸ
ἀλλήλων ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι·
εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, γελαστικόν,
καὶ εἰ γελαστικόν, ἄνθρωπος·
τὸ γελαστικὸν δὲ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ
πεφυκέναι γελᾶν ληπτέον,
πολλάκις εἴρηται· ἐπίσης τε
γάρ ἐστι τὰ εἴδη τοῖς μετέχουσι
καὶ τὰ ἴδια ὧν ἐστιν ἴδια.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τοῦ εἴδους
καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου
Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἰδίου,
ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος δύναται ἄλλων
γένος εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον εἶναι
ἄλλων ἴδιον ἀδύνατον.
καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος προυφέστηκεν
τοῦ ἰδίου, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον
ἐπιγίνεται τῷ εἴδει· δεῖ γὰρ
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ
γελαστικὸν ᾖ.
ἔτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ
πάρεστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τὸ δὲ
ἴδιόν ποτε καὶ δυνάμει·
ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐνεργείᾳ
ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν, γελᾷ δὲ οὐκ
ἀεί, καίπερ ἀεὶ πεφυκὼς εἶναι
γελαστικός.
ἔτι ὧν οἱ ὅροι διάφοροι, καὶ
αὐτὰ διάφορά ἐστιν· ἔστιν δὲ
εἴδους μὲν τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ γένος
εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ
διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ
τί ἐστιν κατηγορούμενον εἶναι
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἰδίου δὲ τὸ
μόνῳ καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ παντὶ
προσεῖναι.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ εἴδους
καὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος
Εἴδους δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότος
κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ πολλῶν
κατηγορεῖσθαι, σπάνιοι δὲ αἱ
[15] De communibus speciei et
proprii
Speciei autem et proprii
commune est de se invicem
praedicari; nam, si homo,
risibile est, et si risibile, homo
est (risibile vero quoniam
secundum id quod natum est
dicitur, saepe iam dictum est);
aequaliter enim sunt species
his quae eorum participant et
propria quorum sunt propria.
De propriis speciei et proprii
Differt autem species proprio
quoniam species quidem
potest et aliis genus esse,
proprium vero et aliarum
specierum esse impossibile est.
Et species quidem ante
subsistit quam proprium,
proprium vero postea fit in
specie; oportet enim hominem
esse ut sit risibile.
Amplius species quidem
semper actu adest subiecto,
proprium vero aliquando
potestate; homo enim semper
actu est Socrates, non vero
semper ridet quamuis sit natus
semper risibilis.
Amplius quorum termini
differentes, et ipsa sunt
differentia; est autem speciei
quidem sub genere esse et de
pluribus et differentibus
numero in eo quod quid est
praedicari et caetera
huiusmodi, proprii vero quod
est soli et semper et omni
adesse.
[16] De communibus speciei et
accidentis
Speciei vero et accidentis
commune quidem est de
pluribus praedicari; rarae vero
accident.
Chap. XV. --Of Community and
Difference of Species and Property.
It is common then to species and property,
to be reciprocally predicated of each
other, since if any thing be man, it is
risible, also if it be risible, it is man, still
we have frequently declared that risible
must be assumed according to natural
adaptation to risibility. It is also common
(to them) to be equally present, for species
are equally present to their participants,
and properties to the things of which they
are properties.
But species differs from property, in that
species indeed may be the genus of other
things, but property cannot possibly be the
property of other things.
Again, species subsists prior to property,
but property accedes to species, for man
must exist, in order that risible may:
Besides, species is always present in
energy with its subject, but property
sometimes also in capacity, for Socrates is
a man always in energy, but he does not
always laugh, though he is always
naturally adapted to be risible.
Once more, things of which the
definitions are different, are themselves
also different, but it is (the definition) of
species to be under genus, and to be
predicated of many things, also differing
in number, in respect to what a thing is,
and things of this kind, but of property it
is to be present to a thing alone, and to
every individual and always.
Chap. XVI. --Of Community and
Difference of Species and Accident.
To species and accident it is common to
be predicated of many, but other points of
community are rare, from the
ἄλλαι κοινότητες διὰ τὸ
πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστάναι
τό τε συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ᾧ
συμβέβηκεν.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αυτῶν
Ἴδια δὲ ἑκατέρου, τοῦ μὲν
εἴδους τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
κατηγορεῖσθαι ὧν ἐστιν εἶδος,
τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἐν τῷ
ποῖον ἢ πῶς ἔχον.
καὶ τὸ ἑκάστην οὐσίαν ἑνὸς
μὲν εἴδους μετέχειν,
συμβεβηκότων δὲ πλειόνων,
τῶν τε χωριστῶν καὶ τῶν
ἀχωρίστων. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἴδη
προεπινοεῖται τῶν
συμβεβηκότων, κἂν ἀχώριστα
ᾖ (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ
ὑποκείμενον, ἵνα ἐκείνῳ τι
συμβῇ)· τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα
ὑστερογενῆ πέφυκεν καὶ
ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν φύσιν ἔχει.
καὶ τοῦ μὲν εἴδους ἡ μετοχὴ
ἐπίσης, τοῦ δὲ συμβεβηκότος,
κἂν ἀχώριστον ᾖ, οὐκ ἐπίσης·
καὶ γὰρ Αἰθίοψ Αἰθίοπος ἔχοι
ἂν τὴν χροιὰν ἢ ἀνειμένην ἢ
ἐπιτεταμένην κατὰ μελανίαν.
Λείπεται δὴ περὶ ἰδίου καὶ
συμβεβηκότος εἰπεῖν· πῇ γὰρ
τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ τε εἴδους καὶ τῆς
διαφορᾶς καὶ τοῦ γένους
διενήνοχεν, εἴρηται.
Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ ἰδίου
καὶ τοῦ ἀχωρίστου
συμβεβηκότος
Κοινὸν δὴ τῷ ἰδίῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀχωρίστῳ συμβεβηκότι τὸ
ἄνευ αὐτῶν μὴ ὑποστῆναι
ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ὧν θεωρεῖται· ὡς
γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ γελαστικοῦ οὐχ
ὑφίσταται ἄνθρωπος, οὕτως
οὐδὲ ἄνευ τοῦ μέλανος
ὑποσταίη ἂν Αἰθίοψ.
καὶ ὥσπερ παντὶ καὶ ἀεὶ
πάρεστι τὸ ἴδιον, οὕτως καὶ τὸ
ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκός.
aliae sunt communitates
propterea quoniam plurimum a
se distant accidens et cui
accidit.
Propria vero utriusque sunt,
speciei quidem in eo quod
quid est praedicari de his
quorum est species, accidentis
autem in eo quod quale
quiddam est vel aliquo modo
se habens.
Et unamquamque substantiam
una quidem specie participare,
pluribus autem accidentibus et
separabilibus et
inseparabilibus. Et species
quidem ante subintellegi quam
accidentia vel si sint
inseparabilia (oportet enim
esse subiectum ut illi aliquid
accidat), accidentia vero
posterioris generis sunt et
aduenticiae naturae.
Et speciei quidem participatio
aequaliter est, accidentis vero,
vel si inseparabile sit, non
aequaliter; Aethiops enim alio
Aethiope habebit colorem vel
intentum amplius vel
remissum secundum
nigritudinem.
Restat igitur de proprio et
accidenti dicere; quo enim
proprium specie et differentia
et genere differt, dictum est.
[17] De communibus proprii et
accidentis
Commune autem proprii et
inseparabilis accidentis est
quod praeter ea numquam
consistant illa in quibus
considerantur; quemadmodum
enim praeter risibile non
subsistit homo, ita nec praeter
nigredinem subsistit Aethiops.
Et quemadmodum semper et
omni adest proprium, sic et
inseparabile accidens.
circumstance of accident, and that to
which it is accidental, differing very much
from each other.
Now, the properties of each are these: of
species, to be predicated of those of which
it is the species, in respect to what a thing
is, but of accident, in reference to what
kind a thing is of, or how it subsists.[23]
Likewise, that each substance partakes of
one species, but of many accidents, both
separable and inseparable: moreover,
species are conceived prior to accidents,
even if they be inseparable, (for there
must be subject, in order that something
should happen to it,) but accidents are
naturally adapted to be of posterior origin,
and possess a nature adjunctive to
substance.
Again, of species the participation is
equal, but of accident, even if it be
inseparable, it is not equal; for an
Ethiopian may have a colour intense, or
remitted, according to blackness, with
reference to an(other) Ethiopian.
It remains to speak of property and
accident, for how property differs from
species, difference, and genus, has been
stated.
Chap. XVII. -- Of Community and
Difference of Property and Accident.[24]
It is common then to property and
inseparable accident not to subsist without
those things in which they are beheld, for
as man does not subsist without risible[25],
so neither can Ethiopian subsist without
blackness,
And as property is present to every, and
always, so also is inseparable accident.
Περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν De propriis proprii et
accidentis

Διενήνοχεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἴδιον
μόνῳ ἑνὶ εἴδει πάρεστιν ὡς τὸ
γελαστικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ δὲ
ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οἷον τὸ
μέλαν οὐκ Αἰθίοπι μόνον ἀλλὰ
καὶ κόρακι πρόσεστι καὶ
ἄνθρακι καὶ ἐβένῳ καὶ ἄλλοις
τισίν.
Differunt autem quoniam
proprium uni soli speciei adest
(quemadmodum risibile
homini), inseparabile vero
accidens, ut nigrum, non
solum Aethiopi sed etiam
coruo adest et carboni et ebeno
et quibusdam aliis.
Nevertheless, they differ, in that property
is present to one species alone, as the
being risible to man, but inseparable
accident, as black, is present not only to
an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a coal,
to ebony, and to certain other things.

διὸ τὸ μὲν ἴδιον Quare proprium conversim Moreover, property is reciprocally

ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστὶν praedicatur de eo cuius est predicated of that of which it is the
ἴδιον καὶ ἔστιν ἐπίσης, τὸ δὲ proprium et est aequaliter, property, and is equally (present), but
ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ inseparabile vero accidens inseparable accident is not reciprocally
ἀντικατηγορεῖται. conversim non praedicatur. predicated.

καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἐπίσης ἡ Et propriorum quidem aequalis

μετοχή, τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων
ἡ μὲν μᾶλλον ἡ δὲ ἧττον.
Besides, the participation of properties is
est participatio, accidentium
equal, but of accidents one (subject
vero haec quidem magis, illa
partakes) more, but another less.
vero minus.

Εἰσὶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλαι
κοινότητές τε καὶ ἰδιότητες
τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀλλ'
ἐξαρκοῦσι καὶ αὗται εἰς
διάκρισίν τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς
κοινωνίας παράστασιν.
Sunt quidem etiam aliae
communitates vel proprietates
eorum quae dicta sunt sed
sufficiunt etiam haec ad
discretionem eorum
communitatisque traditionem.
There are indeed other points of
community, and peculiarity of the above-
mentioned (predicables), but these are
sufficient for their distinction, and the
setting forth of their agreement.

Notes

1. Jump up↑ 1 “At the request of Chrysaorius, his pupil, who had recently met with the Categories of Aristotle,

Porphyry wrote this introduction, in order to his comprehension of that treatise: nearly the whole of it is composed

from the writings, and often almost in the very words of Plato. As philosophers reduced all things under ten

common natures, as grammarians also, with respect to eight words, so Porphyry has comprehended every

significant word, except such as are significant of individuals, under five terms. The five heads of predicables

therefore, taken from this Isagoge, which was written in the third century, are an addition to the Aristotelian Logic,

in part of which, (the Topics,) the doctrine laid down differs from that enunciated here, in several points, as

Porphyry's view also differs from that of Aldrich. Upon the subject generally, the reader may compare Albertus

Magnus de Praedicab. Aquinas. Occam Logica. Abelard de Gen. et Spec. ed Cousin. Trendelenb. Elem.

Crakanthorpe's, Whately's, Hill's, and Wallis' Logics, also Boethius de Divisione”.

2. Jump up↑ "2. Dialectic, according to Plato, consists of four parts, division, definition, demonstration, and analysis;

hence a treatise adapted to the formation of these, will be evidently useful to the dialectic of Plato. The difference

between the dialectic of Plato and that of Aristotle, is noticed in the subsequent notes upon the Organon, and the

reader will find the subject ably discussed in the introduction to Mansel's Logic; here we need only observe that

Aristotle in the Topics, looks to opinion (in his treatment of dialectic), while Plato disregards it, and the former
 delivers many arguments about one problem, but the latter, the same method about many problems. Cf. Proclus.

MSS. commentary on the Parmenides, Philip., Schol. p. 143, ch, 4; Waitz, vol. ii. p. 137."

3. Jump up↑ "3. On the metaphysical part of this question, the opinions of philosophers are as vague as (I may add)

they are unprofitable, hence the term "universals," is the best to be employed, as least liable to commit the

logician to any metaphysical hypothesis; since the realist may interpret it of "substances," the nominalist of

"names," the conceptualist of "notions." Cf. Occam, Log. p. 1, Albertus Magnus, Abelard. The agreement between

the first and last, proves that there is no real difference between nominalism and conceptualism, since they were

both. Vide also Mansel, Appendix A, where the authorities upon each side will be found quoted."

4. Jump up↑ "4. Genus and species, in short all forms, have a triple subsistence, for they are either prior to the

many, or in the many, or posterior to the many. Taylor. Philoponus, in his extracts from Ammonius, illustrates this

as follows: Let a seal-ring be conceived, having the image of Achilles upon it, from which seal let there be many

impressions taken in pieces of wax, afterwards let a man perceiving the pieces of wax to have all the impression

of one seal, retain such impression in his mind: then the seal in the ring is said to be prior to the many; the

impression in the wax to be in the many, and the image remaining in the conception of the spectator, after the

many, and of posterior origin. This he applies to genus and species."

5. Jump up↑ "5. Viz. metaphysics; it is, in fact, psychological. Cf. Leibnitz Meditat. de Cognit. Ver. opera. ed

Erdmann. and Mansel's Prolegomena Logica."

6. Jump up↑ "6. With this chapter compare ch. 5, of the Categories, and Top. i. 5 and 8, whence the discrepancies

between the account of the predicables given by Arist. and this by Porphyry will appear, upon which see Mansel's

comment. Log. App. A, p. 9. Cf. also Albertus Mag. de Predicab. Trac. 11, cap. 1, Metap. iv. 28."

7. Jump up↑ "7. Ammonius remarks that, "It is worth while to doubt why Porphyry says that the first signification of

genus appears to be the one easily adopted, and not the second signification, which is the habitude of one thing

to one; since this nature first knows, for she first produces one thing from one, and thus many from many." But as

Taylor observes, the second signification of genus, which is second with reference to us, is first to nature; for from

Hercules, one man is first produced, and thus afterwards the multitude of the Heraclidae. Universally, whatever is

first to nature is second to us, and vice versa, e. g. she begins with form and matter, then flesh and bone; we

begin from man, so that things prior to nature are posterior to our knowledge, wherefore the first signification is

clearer than the second."

8. Jump up↑ "8. Porphyry does not recognise the distinction between "quale quid" and "quale," (cf. Aldrich, Abelard

de Gen. et Spe. ed. Cousin,) but makes difference, property, and accident to be all predicated ἐϝ τῷ ὁποῖόν τὶ

ἐστιν: Boethius distinguishes quale in substantia, from quale non in substantia. Moreover, Porphyry makes

difference to be always predicated de specie differentibus; upon his consideration of property, vide note to ch. 4,

Isagog."

9. Jump up↑ "9. Athenaeus attributes this verse to Euripides. Vide Ath. lib. xiii. ch. 7."

10. Jump up↑ "10. An infima species can be maintained by none consistently but a Realist. Vide Mansel, p. 21"

11. Jump up↑ "11. For the exemplification of the above, see the "Arbor Porphyriana," (sometimes called by the Greek

logicians, the "ladder," κλίμαξ,) given at page 7, ch. 5, of the Categories, with the note. [Note to the online text: vol.

1 can be found online at books.google.com]"

12. Jump up↑ "12. See notes to pp. 6 and 8, Categor. An infima species implies a notion so complex as to be

incapable of further accessions, the Realist maintains it to be the whole essence of the individuals of which it is

predicated. Cf. Boethius; also Wallis, lib. i. 13, et seq.; Whately, b. ii. ch. 5, sect. 3 and 5."

13. Jump up↑ "13. Cf. Mansel, pp. 18 and 21, note; Whately, p. 52, 138; Outline of Laws of Thought, p. 44; Stewart,

Philo. of Human Mind, part i. ch. 4."

14. Jump up↑ "14. Properly speaking, there cannot be more than one highest genus, which is a cognate term to every

substance and quality supposed to exist; yet a subaltern genus may be relatively considered as a highest genus.

Species, when resolved into its component parts, is found to be combined of genus and difference, and in different

points of view, may be referred to different genera, also many species have no appropriate name, but are

expressed by the combination of their constituent parts, genus and difference, e. g. "rectilinear-figure," " water-

fowl;" indeed, some are denoted by the difference alone, as " repeater" (a watch which strikes the hour). Cf. ch. 3,

Cat. note; Crakanthorpe, Log. lib. ii. Any singular term (denoting one individual) implies, (vide Whately, b. ii. ch. 5,

5,) not only the whole of what is understood by the species it belongs to, but also more, namely, whatever

distinguishes that single object from others of the same species, as London implies all that is denoted by the term

" city," and also all that distinguishes that individual city. Cf. Wallis, ch. 2."

15. Jump up↑ "15. Hence, in describing an individual, we do not employ properties (which belong to a whole species),

but generally, inseparable accidents, i. e. such as can be predicated of their subject at all times."

16. Jump up↑ "16. According to Porphyry, difference is always predicated "de specie differentibus," and he recognises

only a relative difference between two given species; thus "rational" is not the difference of man per se, but of man

as distinguished from brutes. ..."

17. Jump up↑ "17. Porphyry's definition of man, "animal rationale mortale," was adopted by Abelard, Albertus Magnus,

and Petrus Hispanus, though sometimes with the saving clause, that it must be understood with reference to the

Stoical notions of the gods. Aquinas first removed the genus animal rationale from the Arbor Porphy., and limited

rationality to man, distinguishing angels as intellectuales. Cf. Summa, p. 1; Qu. lviii. 3; Opusc. xlviii. Tract 1. In the

Aristotelian definition of man, ζῷον πέζον δίπουν, the last would be regarded by him as a difference."

18. Jump up↑ "18. Boethius agrees with Porphyry, that accidents, properly so called, are useless in definition, (vide

Opera, p. 3,) accidental definition is, in fact, merely a description. Cf. Albert. 1. c. Occam, pt. i. ch. 27. The only

proper definition is by genus and differentiae, hence all definable notions will be species. The definition here given

of difference, as to its being the excess of species over genus, is clear, from a reference to what was stated in the

last note of the preceding chapter."

19. Jump up↑ "19. "Ratione ejus, quale quid est predicatur." Buhle; so Aldrich. There is no warranty, as we have

observed, by Porphyry, for distinction between "quale quid" and "quale.""

20. Jump up↑ "20. "Rationales enim sumus et nos et Dii," vetus interpres Latinus. Commonly the word ἄγγελοι was

substituted here, probably, as Casaubon conjectures, from the emendation of some Christian: Ammonius and

Boethius (Comment, v.) attest that Porphyry wrote θεοὶ."

21. Jump up↑ "21. The property of a subaltern genus is predicated of all the species comprehended in that genus; that

of a lowest species is predicated of all the individuals which partake of the nature of that species: thus,"Shape is
 the generic property of body, Growth is the generic property of living body, Voluntary motion is the generic

property of animal, Risibility, the specific property of man." Vide Hill's Logic."

22. Jump up↑ "22. Whately observes, "It is often hard to distinguish certain properties from differentia, but whatever

you consider as the most essential to the nature of a species, with respect to the matter you are engaged in, you

must call the differentia, as rationality to man, and whatever you consider as rather an accompaniment (or result)

of that difference, you must call the property, as the use of speech seems to be a result of rationality. He adds

also, that the difference is not always one quality, but is frequently compounded of several together, no one of

which would alone suffice." Vide also Huyshe's Log., pp. 33, 34."

23. Jump up↑ "23. Buhle retains the distinction here, between quid and quale quid, upon which, see notes on ch. 2

and 3. The reading is that of Julius Pacius, whom all later editors have followed: the Latin interpretation renders it,

"accidentis vero in eo, quod quale quiddam, vel quomodo se habens.""

24. Jump up↑ "24. 4 Accidents may be distinguished from properties by the very definitions given of them. The latter

belong necessarily, and therefore universally, to an essence, whereas the former are those qualities which do not

of necessity belong to any essence, but are mere contingencies. Huyshe. Vide also note ch. 4, and cf. Albert de

Predicab. Tract, vi. cap. I."

25. Jump up↑ "25. Risibility is considered to be so dependent upon rationality, as that the latter could not exist without

the former, and if this were not so, the term risible would not be a property of man, but only an inseparable

accident. Cf. Whately and Mansel."