Form and Sensation

Symposium: Form and Sensation
Author(s): C. J. F. Williams and R. J. Hirst

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 39 (1965), pp.
139-172
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FORM AND SENSATION.
MR. C. J. F. WILLIAMS
and PROF.R. J. HIRST
I-C. J. F. WILLIAMS
It has been suggested1 that the doctrine of Greek and

Scholastic philosophers about the r81e of form in perception is
concerned with the relation between sensible objects and sensa-
tion-the relation, for instance, between red objects and the
sensation of red. This suggestion has, I believe, much to offer to
historians of philosophy who seek to understand, and not merely
to record, the theories of earlier schools. It could help to remove
the dissatisfaction with Aristotle's theory of perception felt by
Sir David Ross, who complained that it failed to " bring out the
distinctively mental, non-corporeal nature of the act (of sensa-
tion) ". " It is only ", he said, " if reception of form means
awareness of form that it is a true description of perception ",
and he accused Aristotle of ambiguity and confusion on this
point. (Aristotle, by W. D. Ross, pp. 136, sq.) If, however, when
talking about forms as received without matter by sense (De
Anima 424 a 18-19), Aristotle is actually talking about sensations,
this objection is answered. For a sensation already is, in terms
of the Cartesian dichotomy which Ross seems to be employing,
something mental. But I am not concerned in this paper with
whatever light the suggested relation between form and sensation
may throw on our understanding of form. This is not intended
as an historical exercise. I am interested rather in the possibility
of increasing our understanding of sensation and its importance
for the Theory of Knowledge by applying to it some of the things
our predecessors had to say about forms.
I shall be taking sides on a number of issues which are still
the subject of controversy, and in particular I shall follow those
who consider it proper to talk, not only of pains, itches, tinglings
and the like as sensations, but also of sensations of colour, taste,
smell, sound, etc. A defence of this practice would take up space
1 In certainall too brief remarksby Miss G. E. M. Anscombeand

Mr. P. T. Geach in ThreePhilosophers(pp. 55, 94-7). I am grateful
to Mr. Geach and also to Mr. I. M. Crombie,Dr. A. J. P. Kenny
and my colleaguesat Hull Universityfor theircommentson an earlier
draft of this paper.

140 C. J. F. WILLIAMS
which I require in order to make other points, but it may be as

well to say this much: What happens to us when we hear church
bells ringing (see a red object) is, to say the least, similar in a
certain respect to what happens to us when we have the hallu-
cination of hearing church bells ("see" an hallucinatory red
patch). In virtue of this similarity these two types of experience
can be said to fall under a single concept. It is this concept which
I shall use the word " sensation " to express.
About these sensations I want to say five different, though
connected, things, all of them prompted by things that have been
said about forms in a similar context. The first is that the world
of sensations (cf. "the world of forms") approximates to an ideal
condition in which no single token is a token of more than one
fully specific type. (I shall endeavour to remove these obscurities
as soon as possible.) The second is that sensations cannot by
themselves constitute objects of reference. The third is that they
differ from material objects in a way that tempts us to cast them
for the role of " objects of knowledge ". The fourth is that the
theory of forms suggests an explanation of the fact that their esse
is sentiri. And the fifth thing I want to say about them is that
they stand in a particular relation to material objects which I
shall try to characterize by the phrase " identity of form ".
1. Aristotle's forms are not Plato's, but they are not entirely
unrelated to them. One of the puzzles which Plato's forms were
introduced to solve was the puzzle how any sensible object could
give rise to the notion indicated by a word which describes that
object. How could a man acquire the notion of roundness by
inspecting a coin, which, however round it might be, was also,
probably, smooth, warm, brown, etc.? How could a statue serve
to teach men what beauty is, since any statue, as well as being
beautiful, will also be hard, white, large, etc.? What is necessary
before understanding of this notion is possible is that the mind
should be put in touch with something which is not F and G and
H as well as beautiful, but is just beautiful(kalonauto-cf. Phaedo
65 D). Only the form of beauty can live up to these require-
ments. In the case of sensible objects the criteria of numerical
identity and the criteria of specific identity do not coincide. The
same thing may exemplify different forms, just as the same form
may be exemplified by different things. Indiscernibles are not
necessarily identical. With forms it is otherwise. It is contrary

FORM AND SENSATION 141
to the nature of form that any two forms should be specifically,

but not numerically, identical. Pure forms such as Aquinas's
angels had always, so Leibniz remarked, been known to obey the
law of the identity of indiscernibles.
It cannot plausibly be argued where sensations are concerned
that there is no difference between specific and numerical identity,
in so far as this is taken as involving the claim that no two
sensations can be tokens of a single type. In the case of some
sensations, certainly, for example, those of smell, it is difficult to
imagine circumstances in which I could be said to have at one
and the same time two sensations which were specifically identical
but numerically distinct; but it is clear that I often want to say
that I had today a sensation which was specifically identical with
one I had last Friday. Co-existent sensations, too, may surely
be numerically, but not specifically, distinct in the case of those
senses whose affections admit of description in terms of place.
Could I not feel the same pain in both my right and my left wrist
at the same time? Philosophers have indeed denied this, main-
taining that it is only by experience that we learn to locate pains
and other sensations in parts of our bodies. The "local sign
theory " of the last century, which postulated qualitative differ-
ences between pains as necessary clues for ascribing them to
different places, has not been without its echoes in this century.
But it seems too shaky a support for the more sweeping thesis
that in the case of sensations numerical and specific identity
coalesce. The thesis is even less defensible if visual sensations
are admitted. If we want to talk of the sensation we usually get
from looking at the Seven of Diamonds there seems to be equally
good reason for speaking of seven sensations of diamond-shaped
red patches, each, if the card is perfectly printed, specifically
identical with all the others.
There is more to be said for the view that a given sensation
cannot be the token of more than one type. In this way at least
sensations may, perhaps, be said to meet the requirements which
even so deviationist a disciple of Plato as Aristotle must make of
anything purporting to be form. The taste I have when I eat a
strawberry is just sweet; or if it is also aromatic and slightly tart
what I am trying to identify in mentioning these qualities is the
species of taste we have here. I am attempting to single out a
particular type, not to describe a particular token. Certainly, the
claim that a given sensation cannot exemplify more than type is
K

overstated. Butthereis, afterall, a paralleldifficultywhichPlato

had to face in his later dialogues: forms participatein one
another;they are arrangedin genera and species, so that it is
only at the level of infimaspecies that overlappingbecomes
impossible. Similarlywithtastes:one tastemayresembleanother
in respectof some genericquality, but once the taste has been
fully specifiedthere can be no question of two fully specified
types of taste havingone and the same token. With the straw-
berryitself it is different. Here,just as in the case of the taste,
we can say that what is sweet is also aromaticand slightlytart,
but we can also say that it is fat, soft and red. It is not possible,
however,to call " fat, soft and red " the nameof a singlespecies,
or anythingconstructedon these lines the name of an infima
species. This is becausean infimaspeciesis a fully determinate
type correspondingto a real determinable. In the case we have
beenconsideringthe determinablein questionis taste. A " real"
determinableis herecontrastedwith a determinablesuchas thing,
or perhaps quality-what the Tractatuscalls a "formal con-
cept ". It would only be by mentioninga formalconceptof this
kindthat one could answerthe question" Typeof what?"which
is promptedby the assertionthat somethinglike " fat, soft and
red " is the name of a fully specifictype. It is only wherethe
answerto this questionis the name of a real determinablethat I
would be willing to call somethinga fully specifictype. The
doctrinethat a sensationcannot be the token of more than one
fully specifictype is thereforestrongerthan the trivialtautology
that would be obtainedby understanding" fully specifictype"
on the lines of Leibniz's" completenotions"-a meresummary
of all the predicateswhich can be truly said to apply to an
object. WhatI am assertingis that for any sensationthereis one
fully determinatetaste, smell,colour, sound or feeling,such that
the sensationis an instanceof that taste, smell,colour, sound or
feeling,and of no otherfully determinatetype of this kind.
What then of the Seven of Diamondswe were considering
earlier? Here,it seems,one does wantto allow that one and the
samesensationcan be describedboth as a sensationof something
red and as a sensationof somethingdiamond-shaped.Similarly,
somethingwhich can be called a sensationin the more familiar
sense can be describedboth as a pain and as intermittent. But
neither "red and diamond-shaped"nor "painful and inter-
mittent" can be regardedas determinatesof a single deter-

minable. Colour-expansesare not the only thingswhichcan be

described as diamond-shaped:hot or cold patches can be
describedin the same way. Being diamond-shapedis not only
a way in whichthings appearvisually:it is also a way in which
thingsfeel to us. Similarly," intermittent" is not only the name
of a particulartype of pain or feeling:it mayequallybe the name
of a particulartype of sound.
The shapesthingshave, however,and the ways in whichthey
are, so to speak, spreadout in time seem to be propertiesof a
differentkind from their colour, loudness, warmth, etc. We
mightreferto wordslike " diamond-shaped " or " intermittent"
generically as words for the patterns things or sensations,or
of
more briefly as pattern-descriptions.There have been philo-
sophers who were preparedto deny that pattern-descriptions
couldproperlybe usedof sensationsas such. Hume,for instance,
was unwillingto allow that our basic impressionsof colour were
themselvesextended. Kant distinguishedthe form of intuitions,
which may be regardedas the elementin them which renders
them capable of pattern-description,from their content,which
alone was contributedby the faculty of sensation. It would
requireheroismto take this line. More cautiouslyI should at
least maintainthat patterndescriptionsare importantlydifferent
from qualitativedescriptionsof the kind we have so far been
discussing,and that this differenceenablesme to revisemy claim
that a sensation cannot be the token of more than one fully
specifictype by addingthe words" other than those types which
are indicatedby pattern-descriptions ".
Further revision is necessary. There are, of course, in-
numerablethings whichcan be said about sensationsby way of
relatingthem to other things, events and states. Sensationsof
giddinessmay have as their cause damageof the inner ear, and
may produce as their effects emotions of fear and states of
depressionand despondency. Clearly,it is possiblefor a given
sensationof taste to be describable,not merelyas the taste of a
madeleinedippedin lime-tea,but as a taste liable to recallvisits
I madeto my aunt as a boy of eight. But liabilityto recallsuch
and such a scenedoes not standto taste as determinateto deter-
minable. We cannotthereforeincludethis liabilityamongstthe
things which go to make up a fully specifictype of taste. If
liabilityto recallsuch and such a scenewereregardedas picking
out a type of whicha givensensationof tasteis a token we would

144 c. J. F. WILJAMS
haveto admitthat it is possiblefor it to be a token of morethan

one fully specifictype. It is less clearthan in the case of pattern-
descriptionshow the doctrinecan be revisedto makeit invulner-
able to counter-examples of this sort. Let me neverthelessmake
an attempt. The doctrinewill now be formulatedthus: a sensa-
tion cannot be the token of more than one fully specifictype
other than those types indicated by pattern-descriptionsor
descriptionsrelatingit to other things,eventsor states.
A furtherobjectionmight be raised on the groundsthat I
sometimeshave a tinglingfeelingin, say, my little fingeraccom-
panied by a feeling of warmth. If these feelings were clearly
locatedin the samelittle fingerwe mighttalk, not of two feelings,
but of a singlewarm,tinglingfeeling. Are we to say in this case
that the feelingis a token of two fully specifictypes, one partly
describedby " warm", the otherby " tingling"? Or shouldwe
say ratherthat it is a token of a singlefully specifictype whichis
itself qualifiableby the two generic epithets in question? Or
should we go back on our descriptionof the situation as the
occurrenceof a singletoken feeling,and speakof it ratheras the
occurrenceof two feelings,one warm and one tingling,located
in the samepart of the body? It is difficultto regardany one of
these ways of talkingas mandatory.
Some help in answeringthese questions,and some further
clarificationof the notion of a fullyspecifictype, maybe obtained
by consideringvisual and auralsensations. Supposethat I have
the sensationof seeing a blue patch. The fully specifictype of
whichit is a token may be indicatedby referringto a particular
point on the spectrum. The determinableof whichthis type is a
determinateis called " hue ". What makesthis a determinable
and not a genusis the fact that the way in whichone type of hue
differsfrom anotheris similarto the way in which eitherdiffers
from a third. Differentdeterminatehues are all types of a single
determinablein so far as they all differfromeach otherin a single
way. But my visualsensationsdo not thus differfromeach other
in just one way. I may have two sensationsof blue identicalin
hue but differentin that one blue is lighterthan the other. Or
againI mayhavetwo sensationsof patchesidenticalin hue,neither
of themlighterthanthe other,but differingin the degreeof satu-
ration each of them possesses. And, of course, I may have
sensationsof colouredpatcheseachof whichdiffersfromthe other
in saturation,shade and hue. In this case thereis not just one

way in which each differsfrom the other, but three different

ways. Similarly,soundscan differfromone anotherin loudness,
timbre and pitch. It seems thereforethat in each case, that of
auraland that of visual sensations,thereare at least threedeter-
minablesunderwhich any type of which a sensationis a token
may fall. Accordingly,in specifyingfully the hue, shade and
degree of saturationof any patch of which I have a visual
sensation,I am treatingthat sensationas a token of threedistinct
fully specifictypes accordingto the interpretationI have givento
the phrase " fully specific type ".
If "warm" and "tingling" as applied to feelings are
analogousto the namesof specificdegreesof shadeor saturation
applied to colours, it seems that we must exclude one way of
answeringthe questionsraisedin the last paragraphbut one. The
feelingI sometimeshave in my little fingercannot at any rate be
regardedas a token of a single fully specific type which is
qualifiableby the two genericepithets" warm" and " tingling",
since these will be the names of determinatesof differentdeter-
minables. We shall have to choose betweendescribingthe situ-
ationas the occurrenceof a singletokenfeelingwhichis the token
of two distinctfully specifictypes, or describingit as the occur-
renceof two token feelings,one warm and one tingling,located
in the samepart of my body.
Whateverchoiceis madein this case,it is difficultto regardthe
choiceas open wherethe experiencein questionis visualor aural.
It would seem perverseto describeas two simultaneoussensa-
tions, one of somethingof a certainpitch,the otherof something
of a certaintimbre,what wouldnormallybe describedas a single
sensationof hearinga soundwhichwas describableboth as having
this pitch and as having this timbre. Could we not, however,
envisagecircumstancesin which it was possiblefor a personto
acquirethe skill of distinguishingsensationsof pitch from sensa-
tions of timbre,ratheras people now acquire,some with more
difficultythan others, the skill of distinguishingthe sounds of
differentinstrumentsin an orchestra,or the differentharmonics
detectablein a singlenote?
Thesequestionsand similarones whichcould be raisedin the
case of visual sensations,are of a kind which philosopherscan
answeronly by legislativefiat. What, in the course of the dis-
cussion which has led to our asking them, has become of the
doctrinethat a sensationcannotbe the token of more than one

fully specifictype? We can, I think,drawtwo conclusions. The

firstis that it is necessaryto abandonhope of defendinga literal
interpretationof the doctrine. It has alreadybegun to die the
death by a thousandqualifications. We may, nevertheless,be
able to regardthe doctrineas describingan ideal situationto
which sensationsapproximatein a way that materialobjectsdo
not. The world of sensationsis at least nearerto Plato's world
of formsthanis the so-calledexternalworld. Thepitfallsof which
Plato was awarein the path of anyone who tries to convey to
anotherwhatF-nessitselfis by pointingout F objectsarenotably
fewerfor the man who relies on a sensationof F-ness. Indeed,
my desireto communicateF-nessto you is sometimesexpressed
by analogywiththe desireto sharewithyou my sensationsof F-
ness. Thedesireis, of course,equallymisconceivedon both sides
of the analogy. But the importanceof sensationsfor the under-
standingof the words we use to name sensiblequalitiesis not
entirelydisconnectedwith this analogy,and is somethingwhich
I intendat a laterpoint to stress.
The secondconclusionwhich I think this discussionsuggests
is that it is extremelydifficultto decidewhetherthe doctrineis
true or false in the absence of a clear criterionof identityfor
sensations. Any attemptto provide a counter-exampleto the
thesisby assertingthe existenceof a sensationwhichis a token of
morethan one fully specifictype can be parriedby the claimthat
what we have is not a single sensationbut two or more simul-
taneoussensations. Withoutclearinstructionsabouthow we are
to count sensationsit is puzzlingto know how to proceedfrom
this point. Whatarethe rulesfor the identificationof sensations?
Are we indeedsurethat thereis any such thing? This question
leads me to my secondmaincontention,whichis concernedwith
the identificationof sensations.
2. Statementsabout material objects can be construed as

having two elements,a descriptiveelementand a referringele-
ment. The referringelementcannot,pace ProfessorQuine, be
analysedout so that we are left only with descriptiveexpressions
and somethinganalogousto the logical deviceof quantification.
Utterancesby two people of an existentialsentencecontaining
no referringexpressionscannot have the same force as their
utterancesof a subject-predicate sentence. For the way in which
their utterancescan fail to be expressionsof the same statement

in the latter case are differentfrom the ways in which they can
fail to be expressionsof the same statementin the formercase.
The failurein the lattercase may be due to failureof the second
speakerto identify correctlysomethingreferredto by the first
speaker;for their utterancesto expressthe same statementthey
mustbe referringto the samething. For thisto be achievedthere
must take place what Mr. Strawsonhas called " speaker-hearer
identification ".
In the case of material objects such identificationcan be
direct. That is to say, thereis no need for somethingelse to be
identified first before the material object itself is identified.
Sensations,however,can only be identifiedindirectly,e.g., via
the person who has them. You may fail to understandwhich
pain I am talkingaboutin so far as you thinkit is my aunt'spain
when in fact it is my great-aunt'spain; or if you think it is the
pain I had on Thursdaywhen in fact it is the pain I had on
Wednesday;or if you thinkit is the pain in my rightelbowwhen
in fact it is the pain in my left elbow. I cannot show you my
painsto makesurethat you knowit is this one I am talkingabout
and not that. It is difficultto see what could be meantby direct
referenceto, or speaker-hearer identificationof, sensations. In
this sense of " identification"at least there can be no identi-
ficationof sensations. Referencesto sensationscan thereforebe
analysedout of our sentencesin a Quinianmanner. What is
assertedby " The pain my aunt had on Fridaynight made her
cry out" could equallywell be assertedby the sentence" My
aunt had a pain on Fridaynight which made her cry out." I
believe,though it would take a considerableamountof exegesis
to substantiatethe belief,that it is this featureof sensationswhich
Aristotleis faintlyawareof when he calls themformsexistingin
the soul withoutmatter. It is this featurealso, I suggest,which
explainsthe need which certainphilosophershave felt to deny
that sensations can be described (Rhees, Proceedingsof the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 28, 1954, p. 84), or
to deny that a sensationis a " something" (Wittgenstein,Philo-
I 293-4). Sensation-statements
sophicalInvestigations, assertthat
a given universalis being instantiated. They do not referto a
sensationand go on to say somethingabout it, unlessthey refer
to it as the sensationwhose occurrencewas asserteda moment
ago. But this possibilitydoes not constitutesensationsobjects
of reference. I can say " I have a pain in my right hip. It is a

sharp,stabbingpain. I can't sleepbecauseof it." But herethe

"it" as Quineand Geach have frequentlypointed out (cf. P. T.
Geach, Reference and Generality, section 68), is simply a device
for cross-reference,servingthe samepurposeas a boundvariable
attached to a quantifierwhose scope is the whole narrative.
Sensationscan in this way be referredto insidea relativelylong
piece of narrative(as when I am " telling you about my opera-
tion "); but the narrativeas a whole has no referenceto anything
outsideitself. Viewedin its entiretyit says simplythat such and
such sensationsoccurred. Thereis no " something" whichcan
be accuratelyor inaccurately" described".
3. Oneof thepurposeswhichthe theoryof formswasintended

to servewas to providean answerto the question,what things,
or what sort of things,can properlybe saidto be known. To see
forms as modelledin part on sensationsis to see how the theory
of forms was able to acquiresome plausibilityas a means of
answeringthis question. For sensationsdo at least lack some of
the features which disqualifymaterial objects for the r1le of
objectsof knowledge. Epistemologistshave oftentriedto fill out
the sense of the mysteriousphrasewhichthey have taken to be
fundamentalto their enquiries,"knowing x ", by taking it as
equivalentto "knowing all there is to know about x ". It is
easy, with standardslike these, to show how far seeing x or
hearingx, wherex is a materialobject,falls shortof the ideal of
knowingx. Seeingx apprisesus of very little of what there is
to know aboutx, evenif we limit our intereststo whatthereis to
know aboutits sensiblequalities. For thereare alwayssidesof x
whichI am not currentlyseeing,and at any one timeI am limited
to views of what is then x's outside, having no access to x's
inside, unless indeed x is transparent. And there are ways of
hearingx which are availableonly if I strikex, or ring it, and I
can only be doing this in one way at any one time, so that I am
usuallyhearingx, if I am hearingit at all, in whatis only a small
percentageof the ways in whichx can be heard. Moreover,if I
am hearingx thereis no guaranteethat I am also awareof the
sensiblequalitiesaccessibleto the sensesotherthanhearing. But
sensationsare not hiddenfrom the personwho has them in any
of theseways. If I don't knowwhatthe sensationI am havingis,
this is becauseI don't know the namefor it, or don't know how
to describethe differencebetween it and similar,though not

identical, sensations, or don't notice these similarities and

differences. My ignorance is the consequence,not of some
opacityin the object,but of my failureto possessor to applysome
conceptualskill. My not knowingwhat the sensationis will be
due to a failureto recognizeit as a token of some type which
approximatesto the ideal which I spoke of earlieras the fully
specifictype. In the same way that I had to restrictmy claim
aboutthe sensation'sbeinga token of just one fully specifictype,
so I have now to restrictmy claimaboutthe sort of ignoranceof
the sensationwhich is possible. Clearlythere are many things
aboutmy sensationswhichI can fail to know. I maybe ignorant
of theircauses,of theirrelationsto othersensations,of whatthey
are sensationsof, or of how many sensationsof somethingred
and diamond-shapedI am having(Is this the Sevenor the Eight
of Diamonds?) Just as it seemednecessaryin makingmy first
claim about sensations to exclude relational and pattern-
descriptionsfrom the types I was considering,so now I have to
restrictthe types of ignoranceI am considering. But withinthe
limitsset by this restrictionI cannotbe ignorantof my sensations
in the way in which I can be ignorantabout materialobjects.
Not only does theretendto bejust one fullyspecifictype of which
the sensationis a token, but thereis nothingaboutthe sensation
itself whichcould hide from me the fact that it is a token of this
type. If I am not awareof this fact it mustbe on accountof some
failureon my partto have acquiredor properlyto applythe skill
involvedin assigningsuch tokens to their appropriatetypes. It
is tempting,therefore,to allow that thereis here an objectwhich
is entirelytransparentto my knowing, somethingwhich could
properlybe calledan " objectof knowledge".
4. As well as theirtransparency-letthis be the label for the
feature of sensationsI have just been trying to indicate-the
immediacyof sensationshas exercizeda fascinationon philo-
sophers. Theirsuitabilityfor the r81eof " objectsof knowledge"
has beenfelt to be enhancedby theirreputationas the only things
of which we can be " directlyaware". Here againthe doctrine
of formsmay shedsomelight. Aristotleassertsthat what occurs
in perceptionis the receptionof the form of the sensibleobjectby
the appropriatesense. Whenthe potentialitieson both sideshave
beenactualizedthe act of perceivingis thatwhichis actuallybeing
perceived. Sensus in actu est sensibilein actu. Since there is here

perfectidentitythereis no questionof that whichis perceived,in

its actualizedcondition, existingunperceived. What he means
by his assertionof the identityof the actualizedsense and the
actualizedsensiblemay, perhaps,best be seen from the example
he gives in the case of one particularsense, that of taste. Just
as I can have a sense of taste withoutactuallybeing engagedin
tasting anythingat this moment, so a strawberrycan have a
flavourwithoutits actuallybeingtasted at this moment. In this
case, in Aristotle'sterminology,what existsat this momentis the
potential sensible and the potential sense. When, however, I
begin actuallyto taste the strawberrya bit of tastingcomes into
existence and, simultaneously,something for which Aristotle
complainedthat there was no word in Greek. Since we have
anotherword besides"flavour" in English,we may assignthis
other word, namely,"taste ", to the actualizationof the thing
beingtasted. Thislatterentity,the tasteI haveof this strawberry
at this particularmoment,is somethingwhichlaterphilosophers
might well have called an " idea" or a " sense-datum'"and
spoken of as somethingof which we are immediatelyaware.
Aristotle,in commonwith other philosophers,earlierand later,
usedthe blanketterm"perceive",or its Greekequivalent,in these
cases. But his doctrinethat in this case the perceivingand that
whichis perceivedare one and the samethingmay haveservedto
protecthim from some of the errorsto whichthose who talked
readily about "perceiving ideas" were especiallyliable. He
approvedthe dictumthat the mind is " the place of the forms"
(De Anima429 A). There could be for him no question how
forms arrivedin this place. In so far as they were abstracted
from matterthey were ipsofacto mentalentities. If we consider
that in talking about forms Aristotle was sometimesmaking
philosophicalobservationsabout sensations,we may regardthis
as a reminderthat one of the thingsmeant by calling ourselves
conscious beings is that we are beings which have sensations.
The immediacyof our sensationsis explained,not by anyrelation
betweenthemand the mind,but by theirbeingthe actualizations
of that potentialitywhich, at this level, the mind is.

5. Simplyto identifyforms with sensations,however,would

be to ignorehalf the significanceof the theoryof forms. It would
also mean neglectingsome of the more importantfeatures of
sensationswhich the theory of forms is capableof illuminating.
For the form which exists in the soul of the man whose sense
facultyis actualizedis the form which enjoysa differentkind of
existencein the materialsubstancewhichis beingperceived.The
connexionbetweenthe visual sensationof ied and the rednessof
a seenobjectis not merelythe causal,andpresumablycontingent,
relationshipposited by Locke, foi instance:it is an identityof
form.
Miss Anscombe(loc. cit.) seemsto suggestthat this doctrine
is hinting at the sort of thing which Wittgensteinwas to say,
namely,that it is impossibleto givea meaningto the wordswe use
to talk about our sensationswithoutreferenceto publiclyobserv-
able objectsor processes. It is only as the form of materialsub-
stancesthat the form existingwithoutmatterin the soul can be
identified. Wittgensteinhas sometimesbeen taken as denying
the existenceof "privateexperiences"-asthoughhe weredenying
that thereare indeedpainswhichI feel and whichonly I can feel.
But his real purposeis to show as impossiblethe allegedr1le of
sensationsas paradigmobjectsin an interiorprocessof ostensive
definition. The conceptsof sensations(and of sensation)cannot
dispensewithpubliclyobservablehappenings. Privatelanguages,
not privateexperiences,are ruledout. SimilarlyAristotle,when
he talks of form, is usuallytryingto say somethingabout those
conceptualskills which we exercisein using language. If I am
right,whathe is talkingaboutin someof theseremarksis also sen-
sation. He may,in describingsensationsas the formsof sensible
objects,be feelingtowardsa full recognitionof the fact that the
conceptswhichapplyto sensationscan be identifiedonly by refer-
ence to publiclyobservableobjectsor events. This, perhaps,is
the point of the claimthat the form whichis the actualizationof
sense is the form of objectsin the externalworld.
The identity relation is logically symmetrical. Aristotle is
committedthereforeto the view that the form of sensibleobjects

is the form whichis the actualizationof sense. On the interpre-

tation I have been puttingforward,this meansthat we can only
apply concepts to sensible objects in so far as we can apply
relatedconceptsto sensations. I believethat this is in fact true,
that it is a conceptualtruthwhichunderliesthe Lockeandoctrine
that all our empiricalknowledgeis constructedout of simple
ideas of sensiblequalities. The congenitallyblind man who has
neverhadthe visualsensationof redcannotfullyunderstandwhat
" red" means. This has been disputed,but the dispute turns
largelyon the interpretationof the notionof samenessof meaning.
Certainly,there are many things which we can do with the
sentence" This is red" which the blind man can also do. He
can say, holdingup a tie, " This is red ", and can therebyinform
a sighted Frenchman of the correct English translation of
"rouge". He can do this becausehis friendshave told him that
the tie is red,or becausehe has a machinewhichdetectsthe wave-
length of light reflectedfrom the surfaces of red objects and
recordsit in braille. But there is one thing he cannot do: he
cannot retreat,as we can, when people questionthe statements
we make by use of the sentence" This is red " to a relatively
invulnerablepositionexpressibleby somethinglike " Well,at any
rate it looks red to me now." And this possibilityof retreatis
one of the thingswhich go to makeup the way " red " is ordin-
arily used. Even if the blind man is in no position to employ
this tactic to avoid disputesabout how thingslook, he will need
it to avoid disputesabout how thingssound, smell,taste or feel.
If he neveremploysit, if we cannot teach him to employit, we
shall not know what to make of his use of sentenceslike " This
is F ", where" F " is the name of a sensiblequality. The form
of F thingshas not been takeninto his soul.
The BritishEmpiricistscamein the endto adopta reductionist
policy wherebypubliclyobservableobjectswere analysedaway
in favourof ideas or sensations. Wittgensteinhas been thought
to have taughtan oppositereductionismwherebydescriptionsof
ostensiblyprivate experiencesare construedas descriptionsof
publicly observablebehaviour. It does not seem to me to be

necessary to understand him in this way. Certainly, his attack

on private languages made it impossible to maintain a reduction-
ism of the phenomenalist type; but to propose an equal and
opposite reductionist antithesis is not the only way to halt a
reductionist thesis. There were when Wittgenstein was writing
phenomenalist philosophies currentwhose programmesdemanded
a range of sensation-statements by reference to which all other
empirical statements obtained their meaning, and which did not
need any reference outside themselves in order to be meaningful.
Wittgenstein's concern was to demonstrate the dependence of
these statements on statements about the world of publicly
observable objects. He is not, it seems to me, committed to the
view that this dependence was one way, an asymmetrical relation.
There is no need to attribute to him such an inherently implaus-
ible doctrine. For the natural view seems to be that our language
about the world and our sensation-language are interdependent:
neither could have meaning without the other. Or, to be more
accurate, we have not got two languages, but a single language
which enables us now to record our feelings and sensations, now
to describe the world which is publicly accessible to the senses of
us all. To be the language it is it must allow us to do both these
things. It was said that in order to think about the sensible world
we must grasp the form of the objects which exist in it. This
may be taken as a way of asserting that to think about the world
we must employ concepts under which the objects in the world
are seen to fall. But the form which the concept-word signifies is
the form which has another existence as the actualization of our
senses, as sensation. There is here, in all probability, a confusion
between concepts and sensation, a confusion long embodied in
the use of the word " idea ". But if the confused notions are
separated, there may still be a residue of truth in Aristotle's
doctrine. The concepts we use in sensation-language must be the
same as those we use in talking of publicly observable objects,
and vice versa. This is what is intended by (or can be salvaged
from) the doctrine of identity of form. What is meant by " pain "
is the same when I say of myself, without the need of observations,

154 C. J. F. WILLAMS
that I am in pain and when you say of me, on the basis of

observations,that I am in pain. Whatis meantby " red" when
I say that I am seeingred and my refusalto let any observations,
mine or yours, count against my assertionshows that this is a
sensation-statement is the sameas what is meantwhenI say that
I am seeing a red rose and my anxiety about your agreement
showsthat this is a statementabout the externalworld. If there
is not some sensein whichin both contextssuchwordsmeanthe
same thing it is difficultto see how they can have any meaning
at all.

II-R. J. HIRST
ARISTOTLE'S doctrine, that the sense organ takes on the form of

the object perceived without its matter, provides for the charitable
an interesting anticipation of certain facts later discovered about
the physiology of perception. He knew that when one feels
something warm the hand becomes warm, takes on the property
of the object; but it now appears that the ear drum and ossicles
vibrate at the frequency of the heard sound and that the pattern
of the stimulus light rays is reproduced on the retina of the eye;
also it is claimed by Adrian that there is a cortical map of the
field of vision, i.e., a pattern of activity in the brain which is a
(distorted) representation of the spatial relations of what is seen.
This seems to be about all that can be said in Aristotle's favour,
however, and even in these cases it is the stimulus as much as the
object property that is reproduced. In smell and taste some of the
matter of the object stimulates the sense organ, which does not
become smelly or tasty; furthermore, the eye does not become
coloured, as he thought, nor do the fingers become hard or soft
according to the kind of object touched.
I have treated this point as one of physiology, for Aristotle
himself says that it is the sense organ that takes on the form of
the object (De Anima 425 b 23, 424 a 18-28; he also says it is
the sense, i.e., the sense organ regarded as a faculty, that does
this). Mr. Williams seems to think that Aristotle is talking about
a mental assimilation, i.e., the occurrence of sensations which
have the form of the object. But it would be unwise to assume
that Aristotle is thinking of mental sensations or Lockian ideas.
They presuppose a dualism of mind and body foreign to his
thought; for him the important distinctions were between reason
and sense and between the form and matter of the organism, not
mind and body, and he simply fails to distinguish between sensory
awareness and having one's senses affected. There are occasional
referencesto form in the soul, but " soul " for Aristotle was much
wider than " mind " and covered all faculties concerned with the
activity of the organism, e.g., the " nutritive soul ". In the
passage (op. cit. 429 a 27 ff.) on which Williams chiefly relies,
Aristotle is discussing the rational element of the soul, and in
agreeing that this is the place of forms he is presumably thinking
of Platonic forms or universals; at any rate he strongly contrasts

156 R. J. HIRST
this rationalelementwith the sensitiveelementand contrastsits

knowingwith sense-perception.
If we attempt to modernise Aristotle by interpretingthe
assimilatedforms as sensations,we run up against one of the
fundamentalambiguitiesin thedoctrineof matterandform.Onthe
one handis formproper,the metaphysicalcorrelateof matterand
descendantof Plato'sforms. It is regularlyequatedby Aristotle
with the essenceof a thing and is expressedin its definition;it is
common to all the membersof the species, and may also be
regardedas a formal cause, i.e., as the structureor plan which
makes the thing a whole and not an assemblageof disjecta
membra. Now as an essence to be graspedby the intelligence
and as the universaldefiningcharacteristicof a species,it may
not be perceptible;it certainlycannotbe equatedwith a sensation
or a groupof them or with all the sensiblecharacteristicsof an
object. For example,accordingto Aristotle,formsare fixedand
eternaland are not "generated". Also differentobjects of the
same type or species are always sensiblydifferent,and this in-
dividuationis attributableto matter,for their form is all alike;
when one perceivesa thing or animalone sees many accidental
qualities, e.g., hair colour, which do not enter into the form.
Similarly,formquaessenceor definingqualitiesmay not be some
simple sensoryquality like colour or shape, e.g., rationalityin
man or most scientificdefinitions;also Aristotleoften refersto
the soul as the form of the body.
On the otherhand,when one looks at a commonobject one
can distinguisha sensibleform, e.g., shapeor structure,and can
contrastthis with the materialof which the object is made-a
chairwith its wood, the shapeof the statuewith its bronze. But,
of course,chairsvaryenormouslyin shapeas do statues,andtheir
structureis " generated" and is not fixedor eternal;presumably,
however,for chairs(or for statues)there is only one intelligible
form, i.e., set of definingcharacteristics. In places in the De
AnimaAristotlerathercasuallydistinguishesthese two sensesof
form,but generallyand especiallyin the Metaphysicshe does not
seemto, blithelyusingsensibleformto illustrateintelligibleform,
or form proper. Ross recognisesthe two, but in his Aristotle,
p. 74, tries to link them in a far-fetchedway (" the shape of a
statuecould be expressedby a mathematicalformula"-but that
still won't be the definitionof a statue). Williamsdoes not seem
to distinguishthe two at all, and seemseven to confusePlatonic

form, the eternal non-sensibleuniversalessencepar excellence,

with sensibleform.
But even if we consideronly sensibleform it is difficultto see
how it can be assimilatedby the organismexceptat the physio-
logical stimulus/effectlevel. The view we are asked to acceptis
that there is a qualitativeidentity between sensationsand the
objectpropertieswhichmakeup the sensibleform. This bristles
with difficulties:
(1) Whataboutillusionsandperceptualrelativity? Oftenthe
sensed colour and shape differfrom the object'sreal colour or
shape(how " real" is to be analyseddoes not matterhere). If a
roundred dish looks ellipticaland orangefromherein this light,
thenclearlyI am not assimilatingthe object'sform,my sensations
and that form are not identical. Aristotle'sown explanationwas
that so far as the specialsensibles(e.g., colour,taste, sound)are
concerned,erroris rareanddue to malfunctionof the senseorgan
whichfails to take on the form correctly(op. cit. 422 b 8). So
far as the commonsensibles(shape,size, motion)are concerned,
he probablythought,as Block suggests(PhilosophicalQuarterly,
XI, 1961,p. 6), that the sense organwas liable to errorbecause
it was not specificallyadaptedto them; while errorslike mis-
identificationare mistakes in the judgments superveningon
sensation. We can hardly follow Aristotle on the first two.
Mistakesof colour may be due to light not to a faulty sense
organ,andthoseof sound,e.g., the Dopplereffect,to variationsin
the sound wave frequencies. Nor is there any justificationfor
supposingthat seeingshapeis more chancy than seeing colours
because we can both see and feel shape. Many illusions in
the common sensiblesare also due to changesin the stimulus
independentof the percipient.
(2) With any one sense or on any one occasion you will
observe only some of the sensible propertiesor form, so the
identityis at best partial.
(3) How does one decidewhat is form and what is matterin
these cases? They are correlativepresumably,but the relation
betweensensiblepropertiesand non-sensibleones is not like that
between form and matter. Non-perceivableatomic structure
mightstill be regardedas form, while causalpropertiesdo not fit
at all-the powerof an alkalito turnlitmuspaperblue is hardly
matter informed by sensible properties. Again, there are
L

158 R. J. HIRST
ambiguities: a statue's colour and coldness are not form in the

sense of shape or structure, but are quite perceptible.
(4) If the assimilation story is applied to sensations as
conscious experiences, the view attributed to Aristotle becomes a
simplified version of the Representative Theory. The form in the
percipient (the sensation) is an accurate representation of the
quality in the object. But how do we know this, as our awareness
is only of sensations?
(5) Aristotle's introduction of the potentiality/actuality dis-
tinction makes things worse. The drift of his discussion of this,
op. cit. 425 b 26 ff. seems to be: one must distinguish (i) the
capacity of the sense organ to hear, (ii) actually hearing (exercise
of that capacity), (iii) the capacity of the external object to
sound-its resonance, and (iv) its actual sounding; of these (ii)
and (iv) are identical, occur in the sense organ, and are caused by
the external object. But even on his view (i) and (ii) must differ,
for in the appropriate sensing the organ becomes green, tart or
shrill, yet is not these at other times. Hence, why should not
(iii) and (iv) differ? Why should the object when unperceived
possess the same characteristicsas the actual sensation? Indeed,
as the latter requires the co-operation of the sense-organ, this is
unlikely; the capacity of the object to cause the sensations of green
or shrillness may be a property of surface texture (to absorb some
light rays and reflect others) or be some kind of vibration. But,
of course, if they do differ, the sense organ does not take on the
form of the object at all.
The assimilation of form is not the only distinctive feature of
Aristotle's account of perception; space forbids discussion of the
others. I must, however, note one general characteristic of his
approach, namely, that he regards perception as essentially
passive, a mode of being affected, like, in his own simile, wax
being impressed with a signet ring; in this he resembles Locke,
and like Locke also he has moments of doubt in which he thinks
of perception as critical or as a mode of discernment. This over-
emphasis on passivity is one of the weaknesses of the notion of
assimilation of form in perception. By contrast, one of the major
contributions of modern psychology to the study of perception
has been its revelation of the extent to which perceiving is an
active process. To be fair, of course, the philosophers got in
first-the Idealists, for example, equated perceiving with judging
-but the psychologists have provided experimental evidence and

shown that judging is too narrow and intellectual a term for the
range of activities involved.' There is a conceptual element
(recognising, identifying), the use of cues (shadows, perspective,
etc.), adjustment for background (object constancy), supple-
mentation by the imagination (so that when the stimulus is weak
we may "see" what we expect to see), selection and organisation
(we observe only certain features of the scene and tend to pick
out wholes and patterns).
With this in mind let us pass to a second general question that,
of the legitimacy of applying the concept of sensation to more than
itches, pains and the like. Here again there is a fundamental
ambiguity, due this time to the two main reasons for advocating
sensations in the wider sense. One of these reasons is the con-
viction that one must distinguish between the intrinsic properties
of physical objects and the contents of sensory experience. The
former are public and external; the latter are private to the per-
cipient and in some way immediate. This distinction may be
forced on one by acceptance of the argument from illusion or by
consideration of the causal and psychological processes in per-
ception. Williams relies on the former, adducing the similarity
of veridical and hallucinatory experience. Students of Sense and
Sensibilia may well protest that the fact that hallucinations and
perceptions look alike does not mean that they are the same kind
of thing. The underlying difficulty is that one may use the same
descriptive concepts to indicate a qualitative similarity, but in
introducing sensations one is making an ontological claim that
colours or sounds in both hallucination and veridical perception
are private and in the mind of the percipient. My own view is
that the argument from illusion has lost most of its force and
survives only as an explanatory theory to explain the similarity of
experience in illusions and perception, particularly where there
is almost complete integration of the two as in some hallucina-
tions. But I am prepared to accept the causal arguments for the
distinction: being the product of neural and cerebral processes,
and being conditioned by factors both in the percipient and the
intervening media, the content of our experience cannot be
identical with the external object.
1 See R. J. Hirst, Problemsof Perception(1959), Chs. 8-10, and

G. M. Wyburn, R. W. Pickford & R. J. Hirst, Human Senses and
Perception(1964),parts II and III.

160 R. J. HIRST
The other reason for talking of sensations lies in the attempt

to find within perceptual consciousness of objects and scenes some
basic awareness of simple elements, a sensing of colour patches,
shapes, sounds, tastes, etc. Some put this forward as an ex-
planation of the active element in perception-one is interpreting
simple sensations which correspond to elements of the stimulus
-but others, e.g., Price, closely link it with the argument from
illusion.
In my view the two main reasons are independent: on the one
hand, whether seeking incorrigibility or data of interpretation,
one may analyse the field of view into colour patches and pick
out shadows and other cues, without any suggestion that one is
not examining the external world. Conversely the private con-
tents of sensory experience may not be sensations in the second
sense at all; they may be percepts, i.e., ostensible objects or
scenes, the contents of perceptual consciousness. (Any inter-
pretative activity in perceiving has then to be regarded as un-
conscious, perhaps even only as an integrative brain activity
which we are forced to describe as if it were conscious.) I prefer
the second approach, and shall say more about it below.
I pass now to Mr. Williams' detailed theses. My general view
should by now be apparent, namely, that his position is untenable
mainly through his persistent failure to distinguish intelligible and
sensible form, and partly through the too ready acceptance of a
simple Lockian view of sensation. Thesis (1) is that sensations
approximate to the ideal condition of forms in which no token is
a token of more than one specific type; in this at least they are
closer to forms than are material objects. It is not easy to see
what to make of this claim since " approximate " is vague and
looks like an attempt to rescue something from the thesis
Williams would originally have liked, namely, that no sensation
is of more than one specific type. He readily admits a number of
necessary revisions to the original thesis, though I should have
thought that the last one about hue, saturation, and brightness in
colour amounted to a complete retraction. What surprises me is
that he should expect to find any similarity between sensations
and form, especially when it is really intelligible form, Platonic
form even, that he has in mind. So far as these forms are con-
cerned, that there is only one of a kind is a purely analytic truth;
for they are universals each corresponding to the correct definition
of a species. That a form cannot be a token of two form-types is

plainly false in the Platonic system of " blending " forms, but it
becomes an analytic truth if one says that only infirnaespecies
count as forms, so that anything common to two forms is a genus
and not a form. Nothing of this can apply to sensations, which
are not universals, species, or correlates of definitions; in fact, as
transitory, sensory, and particulars they differ toto caelo from the
eternal, fixed and intelligible forms. So far as sensory forms are
concerned, however, not even Aristotle thought that each was
of only one type. Sight takes on the visual form of the object,
but this form possesses not only colour (proper, he thought, to
the sense of sight) but shape, size and perhaps motion, which are
discerned by sensus communis.
Any approximation of sensations to one token one type is, in
fact, due to their comparative simplicity, and that simplicity is a
gift of their theory godmother. It arises only in so far as you
adopt Locke's criterion of simple ideas and refuse to admit as
one sensation anything without uniform appearance. Williams
belatedly seems to see this and asks what are the rules for dis-
tinguishing sensations. One answer might well be, " Whatever
you wish to make them ", and certainly there has been plenty of
variety in the history of philosophy. Locke's criterion is midway
between the extreme atomism of Hume or the later Sensationalists
and the Pricean Sense-datum Theory in which a visual sense-
datum corresponds to the whole of the visible surface of an
object. Thus the seven of diamonds might be regarded as one
red and white variegated sense-datum, or one might say that each
diamond was a mosaic of many point-sensations of red. I want
to suggest myself that there are good reasons for preferring the
wider view of sensations or, indeed, for dropping that notion
altogether and thinking of percepts or ostensible objects. If this
is done Williams' thesis is wrecked; the sensation or percept has
more than one colour.
Sensationalism collapsed mainly because it could not explain
how we got from discrete point-sensations to consciousness of an
external world; the Associationism linked with it and put forward
to explain this was demolished by the Idealists. Also the simple-
minded psychophysics (one sensation per nerve ending) which
supported it in the 19th century, was abandoned as the result of a
greater knowledge of neurology and of the experiments of the
Gestalt school. But I suppose no one would want to defend it

162 R. J. HIRST
now, and I turn to the argumentsagainst the Locke/Williams

approach:
(1) Our perceptualexperiencecontains an inseparablecon-
ceptualelement,whetherwe describeit as identifying,recognising
or judging,and this is lost if we try to divideour experienceup
into simpleideasor sensations. (Historically,failureto recognise
this was veryimportant;once acceptBerkeley,Principles? I, and
the skidsareunderyou.) In otherwords,if we honestlyexamine
our experiencein the overwhelmingmajorityof cases, it is the
perceptionor seemingperceptionof objectsand scenescontaining
objects. We see not a red roundcolourpatchbut a tomato on a
dish (strictlyan ostensibletomato, i.e., a tomato or something
just like one), we see tables and chairs, cabbagesand kings.
These are perceivedas, we are consciousof them as, or they are
judgedto be, objectsof a certain kind;classification,identification
or recognition,even if faulty,are integratedin the awareness.
(2) Even if unfavourablecircumstancesor unfamiliarityof
the objectpreventidentification,binocularvisionandthe cuesfor
solidity, distance,etc., still operate, so that we see the field of
vision dividedup into objects,i.e., threedimensionalwholeswith
solidity and depth and at variousdistances. A " cue " is some
propertyin the objector scenewhichresultsin its beingseenwith
depth, solidity, etc.; tamperingwith the cues may produce
illusions,butthisdoesnot meanthattheyaregroundsof inference
or distinguishableelementswithinperceptualconsciousness.On
the contrary,the latter seems to the percipientto be an un-
analysablewhole. Similarly, even without identification,we
directlyhearsoundsas over thereor over here,i.e., as locatedin
the world,whilein touch we feel an objectas somethingexternal
to us (andoftenas somethingshapedand solid,roughor smooth,
wet or dry).
(3) If you go in for reallyclosephenomenological observation,
you noticemanyof thesecues-patches of light, shadows,texture
and colour variations,perspectiveshapes--which you do not
normallynotice at all. (Thisnoticingmay simplybe a different
formof perceptualconsciousnessratherthansomesensingwithin
the old one-R. Firth, Mind, 1949,p. 461.) What you see then
correspondsto Locke's" flat circlevariouslyshadowed" rather
than the " round globe of uniformcolours"(Essay, II, ix, 8).
Locke thought that the former was the idea imprintedon the
mind and that it was alteredby the judgmentinto the latter.

This shows up the ambiguities in the simple/complex idea dis

tinction. The former idea is simple qua not the product of mental
operations, but complex in that it is not uniform-it can be
distinguished into simpler ideas (patches of light and shadows).
The converse holds true of the latter. I don't know how
Williams would deal with this difficulty or what he counts as the
sensation.
(4) Gestalt experiments2 show that we perceive patterns or
figures against a background. Thus, if we look at a lot of dots on
a paper, then if it is possible at all we see them as a pattern of dots
and not as so many Williams/Locke separate sensations; similarly
in sound we tend to hear a rhythm of some kind not just separate
notes. Figure/ground studies and the reversals (e.g., the alter-
nating staircase) again show that we are perceiving the whole
pattern to which the parts are subordinate, not a collection of
primary independent sensations. Other psychological experi-
ments support this, e.g., the object constancies or the way in
which seen colour is affected by adjacent colours. In these latter
cases, if you cut off the background the seen colours or shapes
change, i.e., it is artificial to suppose a sense-field of independent
discrete sensations. Indeed, this point suggests that even to
distinguish percepts is to abstract-it is really percepts against a
background-but this is comparatively venial. At any rate the
general conclusion from all this is that any division of the con-
tents of consciousness into sensations differnetiated like Locke's
simple ideas is quite unrealistic.
Williams' second thesis is that sensations by themselves cannot
constitute objects of reference; they cannot be given direct
speaker/hearer identification. This is more likely to be true of
pains and itches, but since he is anxious to extend " sensation "
beyond these, it is strange that he never here discusses colour,
shapes or sounds. Surely they can prima facie receive direct
speaker/hearer identification; I can point to a colour expanse or
draw your attention to a sound or smell, just as easily as I can to
a book or a car. (This would in fact seem to be an argumentagainst
thus extending the term " sensation ".) Of course, upholders of
2 It is a
pity that Williamsnevermentionsthe Gestaltpsychologists
who have above all others emphasised the r61e of form (sensible
shape, structureor pattern) in perception,and yet have denied the
existenceof sensations.

164 R. J. HIRST
sensationanalysesof perceptionwill say that therecannotbe this

identificationbecause the colour expanse I see is numerically
differentfrom the one you do, similarlythe soundsare different;
so in pointing I am just inviting you to have a qualitatively
similarnumericallydifferentsensation. But this reinterpretation
rests on the premissthat such data are alwaysprivate,and why
shouldwe acceptthat? Most examplesfromthe argumentfrom
illusiondo not supportit: two or more people can be awareof
the bent stick,the mirage,the misleadingcolourof fluorescentor
eveninglight, the whistle distortedby the Doppler effect; even
hallucinationsmay be groupones, thoughthis is rare. The main
reason,it seemsto me, is the causal argument:if sensationsare
broughtabout by a causalprocesswhose last stage is activityin
the brain of the percipient,they must be private. But then so
must be the sensationgroupswhich correspondto objects,i.e.,
" speaker-heareridentification"at this level must similarlybe
reinterpreted.Onecannotmaintaindirector naiverealismabout
objects and representationalismabout colours, shapes and
sounds.
However,we obviouslycan communicatesuccessfullyat both
levels,and if this is only done on the basis of qualitativelysimilar
privatesensationswith a commonpubliccause,we must be able
to describeour sensationsinformativelyandidentifythemto each
otherby contextor assumedcause,so thatwe consideror observe
the same thing (have sensationswith a common cause). The
everydayproceduresof referring,pointing,givingdirections,etc.,
have to be reinterpreted theoreticallybecausethey rest on faulty
directrealistassumptions,but they work becausehumanbeings
are sufficientlyalike for the same external cause to produce
closely similarpatternsof sensationsin almosteveryone.
Williams'atomicview of sensationsmay make him reluctant
to say they can be described. If I lose my pen I may describeit
to you, " Ratherlong and thin, blackwith a gold band" which
is eo ipsodescribingthe sense-datumanyonewouldhaveon seeing
it. He may replythat I am just listingsensations,but equallyI
mightsay I was listingcharacteristics of the pen, i.e., listingrather
than describingis appropriate,not to sensationsas such, but to
elementsof what is described,whetherthese be sensationsor
publiccharacteristics.
But what of sensationsproper,e.g., pains? True, they are
privatein a way colours and sounds are not, but that this pre-

FORM
ANDSENSATION 165
cludes straightforwarddescription or reference is Wittgensteinian

language-myth. We have a large vocabulary for describing pains:
dull, sharp, stabbing, burning, gripping, gnawing, boring, aching,
radiating, shooting, throbbing, like an iron band, constant, of
varying intensity, etc. These are straightforwardly descriptive,
i.e., they say what the sensation is like and are not correlated with
different kinds of overt behaviour; also they are informative,
e.g., can help the doctor's diagnosis. Furthermore, both the
sufferer and others can refer to the pain in terms of its location,
time, and supposed physical cause, and then go on to describe it
or ask for a description of it. If you say you have a pain in your
hip the doctor may ask, " What sort of pain ?" and get the
description " sharp and stabbing " in return; he may then press
for more accurate details, " Is it only on movement ?" etc., and
eventually he may say, " The pain in your hip is due to osteo-
arthritis." That the description may be recast as instantiation-
statement (" I've an intermittent sharp stabbing pain in my
hip ") is irrelevant, for one may recast an object description in the
same way: " There are some birds eating the pears ". " What
sort of birds?" "Bluish-black speckled ones ", or " Some bluish-
black speckled birds are eating the pears "; it is just a matter of
how much you reveal first time.
Thesis 3, that sensations are transparent to our knowing, begs

the whole controversy of the striped tiger and the speckled hen,
i.e., the long argument on whether sense-data can have pro-
perties they do not appear to have.3 If I sense a speckled sense-
datum, I may easily fail to note the number and shape of the
specks; even if each speck is regarded as a separate sensation, its
shape or colour may not be clear at first glance--close careful
observation may be necessary. (I omit the many cases where a
more attentive look from the same viewpoint makes no difference
and so the transparency claim is more plausible.)
One has to decide here not just how much counts as one
sensation, but also whether, if one looks more attentively at a
colour expanse, one is sensing it more accuratley or is getting
another and different sensation. Introspective evidence supports
the former-a more attentive look seems like a change in the
3 R. M. Chisholm,Mind, 1942,pp. 368 ff., A. J. Ayer, Philosophical

Essays,pp. 90 ff., or my Problemsof Perception,p. 53.

166 R. J. HIRST
mode of apprehension not in its object. But if one holds that

perceptual consciousness is the unanalysable product of various
psychological processes, including selection and attention, then
there is a change in the consciousness and in its content (though
not in the external object, which is all that concerns the per-
cipient); at the same time, however, no incorrigibility can be
claimed because of the complexity of these processes. Ignorance
of this complexity has led philosophers to confuse clarity and
vividness (" transparency") with objective certainty and so treat
them as marks of knowledge.
To thesis 4 I must object: (1) Aristotle says the sense organ

not the mind takes on the sensible form. (2) The identity of
(mental) sensing and sensation is not obvious. It is maintained in
the " adverbial " or sense-content analysis of sensing, but whether
one should adopt this or the rival " act/object" analysis is a
matter of controversy.4 The adverbial analysis is prima facie
false so far as sight is concerned, for the coloured shapes seem at
a distance from us; but causal considerations support it. (3) The
immediacy often asserted is different; it means that awareness of
the sense-datum is " not reached by inference nor by any other
intellectual process nor by any passage from sign to significate "
(Price, op. cit. p. 3). This may be maintained along with an
act/object analysis: conversely the sense-content may be the pro-
duct of unconscious inference-at any rate the round red sensa-
tion would normally be conditioned by object constancy adjust-
ments, adjacent colours, etc.
The main claims of thesis number 5 are: A, that there is

identity of form between the sensation and the sensible form of
the object; B, a modernised version of that, namely, "the
4See my Problemsof Perception,p, 32, C. J. Ducasse'scontribution

to The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (ed. Schilpp), or C. D. Broad,
Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 28, 1942, pp. 127 ff. Price
held that the esse of sense-data is not sentiri-Perception, p. 41.

concepts we use in sensation-language must be the same as those

we use in talking of publicly observable objects and vice versa."
Unfortunately, the two versions are not really equivalent, for A
is concerned with matters of fact, while B is concerned not with
the truth of statements but with their meaning. This difference
is illustrated by the immunity of B to the difficulties raised for A
by illusions. Whereas sensation and object property may differ
widely in an illusion, what " X is red " means is not affected by
whether on a given occasion X happens in reality to be orange
not red.
With respect to B, pains and colours must be discussed
separately. I would accept Williams' claim that what is meant by
" pain " is the same when you say, without need of observation,
that you are in pain as when I say, on the basis of observations,
that you are in pain. I accept it because, in ordinary cases at
least, I attribute to you the same sort of pain sensation as I should
have in similar circumstances. But Wittgenstein rejected all this,
and his thesis is, I think, tougher than Williams thinks, involving
the denial of any relevance of private sensations to pain discussion
and attribution. For him sensation has no place in the language-
game even as a something, an unknown x; whether it is a some-
thing or a nothing does not matter as nothing can be said about
it (Philosophical Investigations ?? 293, 304)-which is surely
absurd, for as I mentioned earlier, one can give informative
descriptions of private pain sensations.
A detailed examination of Wittgenstein's misconceptions
would take too long, but I would say the following about the
attribution to another person of pain sensations like one's own.
(i) It does not involve imagining, in the sense of picturing, that
you have a pain like mine. (Cp. ibid. 300, 280, etc.) (ii) It does
not involve supposing that your pain is wholly identical with
mine-only a pain like mine, not my pain, is attributed. (Cp.
ibid., 350: " 5 o'clock on the sun " is anyhow inappropriate since
time measurement is a much more sophisticated business, and
talk of stoves is inappropriate in view of (iv) below.) (iii) Even
my pain is only mine in the sense that no one else can feel it;

168 R. J. HIRST
it is not so uniquely mine that no one else can feel anything like
it. (Cp. ibid. 302.) Indeed, most pains are experienced as some-
thing somehow set over against oneself in a part of the body, so
there is no more difficulty in supposing that X experiences a
similar pain sensation than in supposing he feels similar warmth
or pressure. (iv) Underlying the attribution is the awareness that
the other person is a human being also, with similar anatomy
and similar experiences and mental life (as evidenced by speech
and writing), as well as comparable behaviour. (Cp. ibid., 281.
The resemblance between human beings is not just similar overt
behaviour, and so " he is in pain" means more than " he is
groaning and needs assistance ".)
There seems also to be a positivist hangover in the Wittgen-
steinian position-we cannot verify that another person has
similar experiences so it is meaningless to suppose it. But we
need not be logical positivists. And anyhow we may regard the
supposition as justified partly on the general consideration (iv)
just mentioned and partly on specific evidence, e.g., that he says
he has a dull aching pain in his tooth and he is an honest man,
that his behaviour shows it and he is a poor actor, that he has
inflammation or other physical signs that accompanied our pain
experiences: on some occasions also, graphic descriptions (" I felt
as if red-hot needles were sticking into me") may "ring a bell"
if we have had the same ailment, and so may convince us of
some special quality of pain-experience not revealed in the be-
haviour.
Turning now to colours, I do not agree that what is meant by
saying, for example, " This is red " in a sensation statement is the
same as when it is said in describing a tie or a rose, still less that
this must be so or else the words would have no meaning. Thus
(1), the use of such statements in sensation contexts differs from
that in material-object contexts: "This is round, but looks
elliptical from here" and " This is red, even though it may look
orange " make sense when used of plates but not of sensations.
Indeed, some philosophers claim that " This is red " in sensation
language is equivalent to " This looks red to me now "in material-

object language, in which case it cannot mean the same as " This
is red " in the latter language. (2) Earlier Williams seemed to
indicate a difference in type between sensation concepts and
material-object concepts in his account of potentiality and
actuality, witness his distinction of flavour and taste. If this
difference is denied there is a risk of suggesting that on a hot day
at Billingsgate our sensations stink like the fish. Many descriptive
words for sensible properties of objects are essentially causal-
i.e., mean that they affect our senses in a certain way-and so are
inapplicable to sensations; thus, fragrant (= sweet smelling),
tasty, scalding, dazzling, deafening, etc. I should myself wish to
extend this to all secondary quality words; at any rate even with-
out this extension it suggests a difference in concept-type.
(3) We may ask, who is it that Williams conceives as meaning
the same by " This is red " in the two contexts? Certainly not
the plain man, for he does not use such expressions as part of a
sensation language. In fact, the question is not so much what is
meant as what should be meant by these expressions, and the
answer depends on one's theory of perception; indeed it does not
arise at all on some theories--the sophisticated Austinian
defenders of common sense would simply dismiss the thesis as
senseless since they do not admit sensation statements or any such
" incorrigible " unretractable statements, and do not distinguish
between private sensations of colour, etc. and public object pro-
perties. But the traditional RepresentativeTheory and its modern
scientific descendants, while accepting the question as meaningful,
would give a very different answer from Williams, namely, that
" This is red ", as a straightforward description, applies only to
sensations; if applied to roses or ties it means " This has the
power of causing sensations of red in normal people." They
would also maintain the distinction of primary and secondary
qualities and suppose this power to consist in properties, such as
surface texture, quite unlike the red sensation. This seems
plausible; at any rate the onus of proof would seem to rest on
anyone who asserts the qualitative similarity of sensation and
object property; for he is in fact implying first that the difference

170 R. J. HIRST
betweenthe psychicalnatureof sensationsandthe physicalnature

betweenthe physicalnatureof sensationsand the physicalnature
of matterdoes not affectthe issue,andsecondlythatthe similarity
holds despitethe conditioningof sensationsby the percipient's
senseorgansand nervoussystem,by his psychologicalstatesand
past experience,and by the mediainterveningbetweenthe object
and the percipient. And these implications are far from
negligible.
But, of course, the fundamentalepistemologicalproblem
affectingboth contestantsis well known;how, if our immediate
awarenessis confinedto sensations,do we get to know of the
existenceand propertiesof externalobjects? If our observation
of the latterconsistsin havingsensations,we can nevercompare
sensationswith externalobjectsto see that they have a similar
form. In sucha position,as I have arguedin my books, one has
to admitthat knowledgeon this point is unobtainableand seek
insteadthe best, i.e., interalia the simplest,hypothesisto explain
the order and nature of our sense experiences,includingthose
which give rise to the notion of a distinctionbetweensensations
and materialobjects. This rehabilitationshould be in stages:
first, as against Phenomenalism,to defend the suppositionof
externalpublic objects,and second,to seek the minimumhypo-
thesis abouttheirnaturewhichwill accountfor the orderof our
sense experiences. And that seems to be that they possess the
propertieswhichthe naturalsciencesattributeto them or which
are confirmedbehaviouristically,i.e., by operations such as
measurement. Some scientificproperties,e.g., electro-magnetic
ones, are clearlyquite unlike sensations,but of those for which
some sort of resemblancecould be claimed one has only the
primaryor spatio-temporalproperties. Even they can only be
allowed with qualification,e.g., measuredshape or size only
resemblethe sensoryshapeand size in favourablecircumstances.
Also the mental/physicaldifficultystill arises;one may in the end
have to claim that sensationsare not mental in the Cartesian
sense-there must be a mentalspace or else the sensationsmust

in some way be identical with spatially distributed patterns of

brain activity.
The scientifically established correlates of colours, warmth and
sound, however, seem to be so unlike the sensations as to make
it impossible to justify the claim to equivalence; nor is there any
operational confirmation, for attempts to measure these qualities
only measure light wave frequencies (or areas reflecting these),
sound wave frequencies and amplitude, or effects on instruments
such as thermometers. (By contrast, when one establishes shapes
or sizes by measurement one is discovering exact numerical
relations between external object properties, relations which may
hold equally between or within the corresponding sense-data.)
Furthermore, scepticism about secondary qualities is confirmed
by the nature of the nerve impulses between sense organ and
brain. They are basically the same for all senses, so that the great
subjective differences between colour, sound, warmth and taste
depend not on what is transmitted along the nerves, but only on
the neural paths and the part of the brain stimulated. Also the
impulses vary only in frequency, amplitude and spatial distiibu-
tion (if, for example, one could take a cross section of the million-
fibre optic nerve there would be a pattern of conducting and
non-conducting fibres); hence it would seem that the information
transmitted by them concerns only primary qualities and the
scientific correlates of secondary qualities. There seems no way
in which anything resembling the secondary-quality sensations
themselves could be assimilated or transmitted.
To sum up: if Aristotle's doctrine of the assimilation of form
is interpretedas claiming a qualitative identity between sensations
and corresponding object properties, then it chiefly breaks down:
(a) in illusions or whenever the relativity of perception makes a
difference between the two; (b) so far as most secondary qualities
are concerned, even in " veridical " perceptions; for any external
correlate that can there be established seems quite different from
the sensation. If the doctrine is interpreted as asserting equi-
valence of meaning between sensation and object statements, then
it may be challenged partly on the grounds of difference in use

172 R. J. HIRST
between the two and partly because the differencesbetween

sensationsand their correlatesin the secondaryqualitieslimit
" Thisis X ", whenappliedto objects,to " Thiscausessensations
of X in normalpeople."


Form and Sensation

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Symposium: Form and Sensation

Author(s): C. J. F. Williams and R. J. Hirst

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It has been suggested1 that the doctrine of Greek and

1 In certainall too brief remarksby Miss G. E. M. Anscombeand

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which I require in order to make other points, but it may be as

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to the nature of form that any two forms should be specifically,

This content downloaded from 216.165.126.139 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 15:51:04 PM

overstated. Butthereis, afterall, a paralleldifficultywhichPlato

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minable. Colour-expansesare not the only thingswhichcan be

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haveto admitthat it is possiblefor it to be a token of morethan

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way in which each differsfrom the other, but three different

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fully specifictype? We can, I think,drawtwo conclusions. The

2. Statementsabout material objects can be construed as

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sharp,stabbingpain. I can't sleepbecauseof it." But herethe

3. Oneof thepurposeswhichthe theoryof formswasintended

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identical, sensations, or don't notice these similarities and

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perfectidentitythereis no questionof that whichis perceived,in

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5. Simplyto identifyforms with sensations,however,would

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is the form whichis the actualizationof sense. On the interpre-

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necessary to understand him in this way. Certainly, his attack

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that I am in pain and when you say of me, on the basis of

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ARISTOTLE'S doctrine, that the sense organ takes on the form of

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this rationalelementwith the sensitiveelementand contrastsits

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form, the eternal non-sensibleuniversalessencepar excellence,

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ambiguities: a statue's colour and coldness are not form in the

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1 See R. J. Hirst, Problemsof Perception(1959), Chs. 8-10, and

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The other reason for talking of sensations lies in the attempt

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now, and I turn to the argumentsagainst the Locke/Williams

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This shows up the ambiguities in the simple/complex idea dis

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sensationanalysesof perceptionwill say that therecannotbe this

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cludes straightforwarddescription or reference is Wittgensteinian

Thesis 3, that sensations are transparent to our knowing, begs

3 R. M. Chisholm,Mind, 1942,pp. 368 ff., A. J. Ayer, Philosophical

This content downloaded from 216.165.126.139 on Mon, 2 Dec 2013 15:51:04 PM

mode of apprehension not in its object. But if one holds that

To thesis 4 I must object: (1) Aristotle says the sense organ

The main claims of thesis number 5 are: A, that there is

4See my Problemsof Perception,p, 32, C. J. Ducasse'scontribution