KOINE AISTHESIS

T h e phrase koine aisthesis {KOIVT\ aladriais) appears, as far as I can

see, very rarely in Aristotle. There is one definite use of the phrase in
the De Anima, at 425 a 27. T h e word koine without aisthesis but such
that the latter must be supplied may possibly occur at 431 b 5 , but the
text is uncertain there, and there is every reason why the word should
be deleted from the text. This leaves us with a single occurrence of
the phrase koine aisthesis in the De Anima and it is used explicitly to
deal with perception of the koina, the so-called common sensibles.
Outside the De Anima, the phrase occurs at De Memoria 450 a 10, and
at De Partibus Animalium 686"27, and I think nowhere else. Of these
two passages that from the De Memoria is, although somewhat obscure,
in line with the De Anima reference; it seems to invoke the common
sense for the perception of magnitude, motion and time, and also
says that an image is a pathos of the common sense, presumably be-
cause an image must be of a magnitude. T h e De Partibus Animalium
passage is somewhat more eccentric. It is concerned with the fact that
man is the only animal to walk upright, and associates this with the
fact that man can think. This would not be easy if he had much of
his body weighing down on him from above, for weight makes unre-
sponsive thought and the common sense—rf/v biavoiav KO.1 ri)v Koivfju
odadriaiv. Whatever be the other curiosities in this passage, the close
association of thought and the common sense is itself at first sight
rather strange. If any account can be given of it, it is presumably
because of the facts adduced in the De Memoria passage, that thinking
involves images, and these the koine aisthesis.
While the koine aisthesis is not explicitly referred to except in these
few passages, the koina which are its objects are of course referred to
liberally in the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia and no doubt else-
where (e.g. 418"7 ff., 425 a 14, 428 b 22, De Sensu 437*8 ff., 442 b 5, De
Insomn. 458 b 5). When such references appear one need be in no doubt
as to the form of perception of which they are objects. But in certain
works of the Parva Naturalia other phrases occur which have some-
times been taken as equivalent to koine aisthesis. T h u s the De Somno
 196 THE MONIST

455 a 16 speaks of a koine dunamis (KOLV^ Svvams), and the De Sensu

449 a l 8 speaks of to aisthetikon panton (T6 aLo-8r)Tinbv TT6.VTO>V). I shall argue
later that neither of these phrases is equivalent to koine aisthesis and
cannot be taken as referring to the same thing. T h e final phrase to
proton aisthetikon (rb irpwrov aiadrjTucbv) which occurs at De Memoria
450 a l 2 may, perhaps, be taken as equivalent to koine aisthesis; it indeed
occurs in the next sentence and without change of theme to the occur-
rence of koine aisthesis mentioned above, and is repeated a few lines
later. Aristotle is arguing here that memory, since it is found in other
animals besides man, cannot belong essentially to the thinking part
of the soul; the images on which it depends are really a function of
sense. T h e reason which he adduces for this is the one mentioned
earlier, that images are a pathos of the koine aisthesis. However, it does
not follow immediately from this that koine aisthesis and to proton
aisthetikon are one and the same. Koine aisthesis might be merely one
manifestation or instance of to proton aisthetikon. And I am inclined to
think that this is the truth of the matter, that to proton aisthetikon is
merely sense in general, as opposed to intellect. However, since little
enough depends on this, the passage may be noted and left on one
side. T h e other phrases are more crucial, and I shall return to them
in due course.
W h a t are the problems which suggest to Aristotle the necessity of
postulating the existence of a koine aisthesis? T h e most obvious one of
course is the problem of the perception of the koina—the so-called
common sensibles, like shape and magnitude. I have discussed this to
some extent in an earlier paper ("Aristotle's Account of Aesthesis in
the De Anima," Classical Quarterly, New Series, Volume I X , No. 1,
M a y 1959, esp. pp. 13-15), although I was more inclined then than
I am now to think that Aristotle gave the koine aisthesis other functions.
Aristotle's problem here is obvious enough. We manifestly perceive
certain properties of objects through more than one sense. Aristotle's
list varies to some extent (e.g. De Sensu 442 b 6 mentions the rough and
the smooth and sharp and blunt, which are not normally to be found
in the list), and it may indeed be something of a problem to decide
exactly what should be put into the list. But the fact that there are
such properties is obvious enough and has been emphasised by
philosophers down the ages. I t may be noted in passing that Aristotle
was not in the least tempted to suppose, as e.g. Berkeley was, that
visible shape is different from tactual shape. H e merely noted the fact
 KOINE AISTHESIS 197

that we do perceive, e.g. the shape of things, by means of different

senses or at least, as De Sensu 442 b 8 puts it, by sight and touch. Apart
from the degree of fallibility of such perception, into which I shall not
go here (cf. Classical Quarterly 1959, p. 15), the only remaining problem
is presented by De Anima 4 2 5 a l 4 ff., with its suggestion that we per-
ceive the koina incidentally by each sense, but that the relation between
them and the koine aisthesis is not incidental. Put like this, it is evident
that there is no real conflict between the two remarks, and I have
tried to point this out in my earlier paper. T h e point is that the koina
are not essential to any one sense; shape, for example, is perceptible
by touch as well as sight and is in consequence essential to neither.
On the other hand, they do not have the same status as the so-called
incidental sensibles which are not essential to any form of perception.
They are perceptible qualities of objects and are thus, Aristotle thinks,
essential to some form of perception. Hence the koine aisthesis. I shall
not pursue the matter further here.
On the other hand, it has been suggested, e.g. by Ross, 1 that
Aristotle invokes the koine aisthesis to deal with other problems. Ross,
for example, suggests that Aristotle uses the koine aisthesis to deal with
the following problems: (i) the perception of the difference between
the objects of different senses, (ii) the perception of the incidental
sensibles, (iii) the perception that we perceive, and (iv) the phenomena
of sleeping and waking, and the simultaneous inoperation of the
senses when one goes to sleep. I shall survey each of these suggestions
in turn.
(i) T h e question how we discriminate between objects of different
senses is raised at De Anima 426 b l2 ff. and also at De Sensu 449 a 3 ff.,
although the latter is in the context of a general discussion of the
problems inherent in simultaneous perception of different objects,
to which the whole of Section 7 is given up. Neither of the two pas-
sages explicitly mentions the koine aisthesis, although the De Sensu
passage mentions the aisthetikon panton already referred to, at 449 a l 8.
T h e De Anima passage is somewhat obscure and the text is not alto-
gether certain. But Aristotle is clearly against compromise. He argues
first that it must be by perception that we discriminate objects of
different senses (426 b 14). There follows a parenthetical remark to the

1
Sir David Ross, Aristotle, pp. 140-2 etc., although he speaks of it there as
unspecialized perception. Also Edition of De Anima p. 34 and ad. loc.
198 THE MONIST

effect that this shows that flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ, "for if
it were it would be necessary for that which judges (or discriminates)
to judge when it is itself touched." Hicks is so sure that the following
passage is all about the koine aisthesis that he invokes it here, suggesting
that the ultimate sense-organ is that of the koine aisthesis; Ross in his
commentary suggests that it is the sense-organ of touch which is
under consideration, on the parallel of 423 b 20 ff., which argues that
flesh cannot be the sense-organ of touch because there is in general no
perception when the object is in contact with the sense-organ. I think
that neither of these suggestions is to the point; it seems to me that
what Aristotle is saying is that the fact that we can discriminate
between objects of different senses by perception shows that flesh is
not the ultimate sense-organ for all perception—including the per-
ception of the difference between objects of the senses. Otherwise,
discrimination would follow inevitably on contact with the flesh—
which it does not, e.g. when the eye is touched. You might then feel
the object but not see it. T h e denial of a common sense-organ of this
kind is in line with what follows, which is not the postulation of a
common sense but a unity of senses. I shall amplify this remark shortly.
Aristotle goes on in the De Anima to emphasise first that it must
be the same thing which discriminates different objects; otherwise, it
would be like different people concerned with different objects. It
could not in the latter case be evident to any one of them straight
away that the objects were different. Secondly, it must be at the same
time. In other words, it must not only be the same person or subject
that discriminates, but so to speak, in the same act of consciousness;
and Aristotle adds, though obscurely, that not only must the judgment
belong to a single act of consciousness but that the objects discrimi-
nated must be judged as occurring at a single time—"it so asserts
both now and that they are different now." W h a t Aristotle seems to
be trying to say is that the objects must be actually simultaneous and
not merely conceived as such.
Having got so far Aristotle is confronted with difficulties of the
kind which he rehearses at length in De Sensu 7—as to how the same
thing can be affected in either opposed or different ways simulta-
neously. He seems to toy with the same answer in both places, although
obscurely—namely that what is required is something which is nu-
merically one but divided in function. At the same time he seems to
rule out the possibility of the same thing being affected actually and
 KOINE AISTHESIS 199

simultaneously by strict opposites, so that simultaneous perception of

opposites within one sense-modality is impossible. (Aristotle seems here
to ignore the possibility of seeing black at one point in one's field of
vision and white at another—he ignores, that is, anything.which is a
function of the fact that there is a field of vision. Whether the same
could be said for other senses is problematical.) This difficulty, how-
ever, does not arise, or at any rate does not seem to arise where the
objects of perception are just different, not opposites. I have to admit,
however, that at 431 a 20 ff., where he returns in a very obscure and
possibly corrupt passage to the same theme, he appears to say that it
makes no difference whether the objects are opposite or merely differ-
ent. At all events his general answer both there and at 427 "9, is that
what discriminates between different objects is like a point or limit
which is in a way both one and two; it is a single thing and yet acts
as a boundary between different sections. How this analogy works is
not altogether clear especially when Aristotle says that the thing
which discriminates uses the same point twice. But what Aristotle is
after is rather more clear. W h a t he is seeking is something like the
notion of a unity of consciousness or Kant's synthetic unity of apper-
ception, as has been frequently enough suggested. This too is conveyed
by the phrase to aisthetikon panton in the De Sensu—it is a common and
unified faculty of sense, of which the ordinary senses, both special and
common, are merely manifestations. So much, then, for the first issue,
(ii) There are, I think, no grounds for thinking that the koine
aisthesis is responsible for perception of the incidental sensibles, so
called. There are two passages from which this supposition has arisen
(Philoponus 460.1 and 461.5 mentions the koine aisthesis in both con-
nections). These are 425 a 21 ff. and 425 a 30 ff. of the De Anima. Neither
is strictly concerned with the so-called incidental sensibles, e.g. the
son of Cleon, which are so called because they are incidental to each
and every sense. T h e first passage indeed makes a contrast between
perception of the incidental sensibles and perception of the sweet by
sight. T h e commentators react almost unanimously to the second, by
saying that we do not, strictly speaking, see that something is sweet.
This seems to me a prejudice, based on a special view of perception.
There is nothing wrong in speaking of our seeing that something is
sweet, and one will suppose that it is wrong only if one has some special
view about the relation between sight and its objects. Aristotle indeed
has an explanation of the phenomenon. He says: " W e happen to have
200 THE MONIST

a perception of both, as a result of which we recognise them at the

same time when they fall together." This could be taken in several
ways, of which the most noncommittal is to suppose that we see that
sugar is white and taste that it is sweet, and as a consequence recog-
nise sugar as sweet immediately by sight, i.e. whenever the sweetness
and the whiteness are presented to us together, even without our
tasting it. This interpretation does not even presuppose necessarily the
simultaneous perception of different qualities of an object, over which
De Sensu 7 finds such problems.
It is, however, just possible that this passage is concerned with the
same issues as the later one at 425 a30 ff., which on the interpretation
which I have given is concerned with a quite different issue—though
one which has no more connection with the incidental sensibles. In
this later passage Aristotle asserts that the senses may perceive each
other's objects incidentally. This may seem to make, e.g. bitterness an
incidental object of sight; and so it does, but by no means in the same
way as the son of Cleon is one. Aristotle indeed adds that the senses
perceive each other's objects incidentally "not insofar as they are
themselves but insofar as they form a unity (§ /iia)." And here his
explanation does presuppose simultaneous or joint perception of differ-
ent objects, and he is maintaining that this is possible insofar as the
senses form a unity. He goes on to say that this may give rise to mis-
takes of identity. We may, for example, take something to be bile
because it is yellow, just because of a previous joint perception of
yellowness and bitterness in bile. (There is a problem about the sen-
tence in parenthesis at b 2-3—ov yap S-q Irkpas ye TO eiireiv fin an<j>o} h>.
The word heteras might be taken as meaning 'either sense', meaning
that neither sense by itself can say that the objects form a unity. But
since the noun has to be supplied, I think that it is naturally to be
taken as referring back to aisthesis in the previous line. While the
translation 'either perception' is still possible,2 aisthesis in the previous
line being translated in that way rather than as 'sense', I take heteras
as meaning 'any further perception'; the point of the whole sentence
is then that we do not need another perception to perceive the objects
as one—we do not perceive yellowness and bitterness and then that
they are together. My translation implies the sufficiency of joint per-
ception, the alternative one its necessity.) At all events, what is pre-

2
Although only one perception has in fact been mentioned.
 KOINE AISTHESIS 201

supposed in all this is a unity of the senses, something of the same sort
which was presupposed under (i). T h e thesis that the koine aisthesis
is invoked for the perception of the incidental sensibles is then doubly
wrong. T h e relevant passages are not strictly concerned with the
incidental sensibles in the ordinary sense, and they do not invoke the
koine aisthesis in any case.
(iii) T h e De Anima treatment of the question of the perception that
we perceive at 425 b 12 ff. is difficult and obscure. Aristotle is concerned
here with the problem of self-consciousness, but he starts from the
premise that we do perceive that we perceive. H e first argues against
the suggestion that we perceive that we see by means of another sense
from sight. He does this on two grounds: (a) that this other sense will
then be concerned with the same objects as sight, so that the same
thing e.g. colour will be an object of two senses—which goes against
his whole notion of such an object of a sense: (b) that the supposition
generates an infinite regress, since there will have to be another sense
for perception of the second and so on. This leaves him with the posi-
tion that it is by sight that we perceive that we see, but he immediately
raises difficulties against this, which he seems never to resolve, except
by saying that " t o perceive by sight is not a single thing." T h e snag is
that the aigument seems to have no direct relevance to the preceding
point. W h a t he seems to say is that if it is by sight that we perceive
that we see, and what we see is colour or in possession of colour, that
which sees will be coloured. But apart from the fact that the conclu-
sion does not seem to follow from the protasis, he admits the truth of
the conclusion any way, at b 22. (There is, however, a textual diffi-
culty as to whether in each of three occurrences at b 19 and b 22 we
should read rb bpwv or rb bpav. O n the third occurrence at b 22 it is
clear that we should read rb bpCiv, as this is immediately identified with
the sense-organ. This means that the second occurrence should be
T6 bpwv too; otherwise the remark at b 22 would have no point. As for
the first occurrence, I doubt whether speaking of seeing to horan is
grammatical, and it is still less clear, if one reads T6 bpav why the con-
sequences drawn will follow—that that which sees primarily will have
colour.) T h e main trouble is that Aristotle has moved from talking of
perceiving that one perceives to perception of objects, and this gives
his discussion little relevance to his initial point. Nevertheless, the
outcome is clear—it is somehow by sight that we perceive that we see.
There is no reference to the koine aisthesis here.
202 THE MON 1ST

De Somno 455 a l 6 ff., on the other hand, says that there is a koine
dunamis which goes with the senses, through which one perceives that
one sees and hears. Moreover, it goes on to make the apparently
paradoxical remark that it is not by sight that one sees that one sees.
If it is not by sight that one sees anything, what then is it? After this
it goes on to deal with the problem of discrimination between objects
of different senses, which it treats as an analogous problem and to be
dealt with in the same way by reference to the koine dunamis. T h e only
remark here which explicitly conflicts with the De Anima passage is
the one to the effect that it is not by sight that one sees that one sees.
But of course the De Anima itself was not altogether unambiguous on
this point, and the De Somno remark is, as I have noted, paradoxical
as it stands. T h e latter might still be compatible with the notion that
it is in a sense by sight that one sees that one sees. W h a t is less clear is
why the two problems, (a) how one is aware that one is perceiving
and (b) how one discriminates between objects of different senses,
must be connected and receive a common answer. Does the self-
awareness involved in perception immediately imply the kind of unity
of the senses or unity of apperception involved in discrimination be-
tween objects of different senses? Could there be self-awareness without
a plurality of senses? These are difficult questions to which it is not
easy to give a clear answer, but Aristotle at all events seems to assume
that the issues are the same and that the two problems require the
same answer—the koine dunamis which goes with all the senses. Is this
itself a sense?
I shall try to answer this question later, along with the question
whether it can be identified with the koine aisthesis. Meanwhile it is
worth while to review briefly what follows in the De Somno passage
under consideration. Aristotle says that one sees that one sees and
discriminates between objects of the different senses by "some part
which is common to all the sense-organs." And he goes on,
For there is one aisthesis, and the supreme sense-organ is one, while
what it is to be aisthesis is different for each kind, e.g. sound and colour,
and this is to be found especially along with the faculty of touch (for
this is separable from the other sense-organs, but the others are in-
separable from it; and we have spoken about these things in the
observations about the soul.
W h a t is the meaning of aisthesis here? It cannot mean 'sense', as e.g.
sight is a sense. He must mean the general faculty of sense-perception,
 KOINE AISTHESIS 203

and what he says about touch confirms this; for the significance of
that remark is that touch is the primary form of sense-perception, so
that to have touch is to have the general faculty of sense-perception.
The single sense-organ which is primary and supreme is, as he reveals
later at 456 "1 ff., the heart, this being the arche of aisthesis in animals.
(Cf. De. Iuv. 469 a l2.) It is this, presumably, which he refuses to
equate with flesh at De Anima 426 b 15, as previously noted. T h e heart,
one might point out, is not a sense-organ, in the same way that the
eye is, though on it, of course, sense-perception, like other forms of
life, ultimately depends.
T h e outcome of all this is clear enough. According to the De
Somno, it is because the senses form a unity and are forms of a general
faculty of sense-perception that we are aware that we perceive when
we do. So, the solution of this problem falls together with that to the
problem of how we discriminate between objects of different senses.
Why it should do so is, as I have already pointed out, never explained.
There is nothing really inconsistent with the De Anima here, although
the latter is, in some ways, much more inexplicit and inconclusive. It
is indeed by sight that we perceive that we see, according to both
works, but not just that. T h e only thing is that the De Anima leaves it
at that; the De Somno goes further.
(iv) There is little that need be said about the last issue, the
simultaneous inoperation of the senses when we go to sleep. It goes
along with the previous problem and is discussed at the same place.
It is because the senses form a unity, being forms of a single general
faculty, and due ultimately to a single organ, the heart, that they go
out of operation simultaneously. There is nothing further to be said
on this.

If we survey the issues presented so far, it is clear that while there

is no explicit reference to the koine aisthesis on any of the issues, the
situation over (ii) the perception of the incidental sensibles is different
from that over the other problems. For the suggestion that he invokes
the koine aisthesis to deal with this matter is a misunderstanding resting
of a misinterpretation of De Anima 425 "21 ff. and 30 ff. O n the other
hand, the real issue which is actually presented at 425 °30 ff. at least
is one which involves simultaneous or joint perception of objects of
different senses, and of the senses functioning as one (17 nia). Both of
these things are also involved in discrimination between objects of
204 THE MONIST

different senses, for which the De Anima introduces the analogy of a

point, and in connection with which the De Sensu speaks of to aisthetikon
panton and the De Somno the koine dunamis or single aisthesis. Moreover,
the De Sensu and De Somno speak similarly, as does the De Anima also
in effect, of the general faculty of perception being numerically one,
but plural in einai. Finally, the De Somno, in dealing with issues (iii)
and (iv)—the problems of perceiving that we perceive and the simul-
taneous inoperation of the senses in sleep—runs them together with
the issues under (i)—the discrimination between the objects of differ-
ent senses (although the rationale for so doing is not altogether clear).
It follows from all this that the solution to problems (i), (iii) and (iv)
is the same, and although this has nothing to do with the perception
of the incidental sensibles it is the same view as is really being pre-
sented at De Anima 425 a30 ff. Hence, the koine dunamis, to aisthetikon
panton, the single aisthesis are all the same, and are due ultimately to
the heart. It is this too which Aristotle is getting at, though perhaps
obscurely, in using the analogy of the point at De Anima 427 a10. Could
any of this be identified with the koine aisthesis?
Now, the koine aisthesis as the sense concerned with the koina is
undoubtedly a sense, although not a special one. For Aristotle, a sense
is a potentiality—a dunamis—for perceiving an object, for receiving the
form without the matter. In the case of the special senses this poten-
tiality is possessed by a sense-organ, but as De Anima 425a14 makes
clear, there is no special sense-organ for the perception of the koina.
This, however, does not mean that the koine aisthesis is a potentiality
belonging to no sense-organ (which would have presented a problem
for Aristotle, even if a similar problem does indeed exist for the intel-
lect in his system). Rather the koine aisthesis is a potentiality possessed
by each of the individual sense-organs, or at least by that of sight and
touch. Hence, in the case of the eye for example, we have the poten-
tiality for seeing two kinds of object, one of which, colour, is essential
to sight, such that there could not be actual sight without it, while
the other, e.g. shape, is not essential to sight and is perceptible by
other senses. The common sense, therefore, is common to different
sense-organs, and is responsible for the perception of objects which are
common to different senses. It is not, however, itself common to
different senses. To suggest so would have no meaning.
The situation is quite different over the koine dumanis of the De
Somno. Indeed that notion is explicitly introduced to cover what is
 KOINE AISTHESIS 205

common to different senses. 455 "13 begins by distinguishing between

what is idion (IStov) and what is koinon (KOLVOV) for each sense. It makes
clear that what is idion for each sense is its specific function, e.g. seeing
for sight. About what is koinon the passage is less definite, but if one
thinks along the same lines it will become clear that the 'something
c o m m o n ' to each sense must be the sense's general function—percep-
tion (T6 aiadavtcrdai). And this is what is suggested later when it is
said that there is a single aisthesis, and also when the De Sensu refers to
to aisthetikon panton; for the latter is the faculty for perceiving anything
and everything, as distinct from the specific faculties for perceiving
different kinds of thing. It is that which can perceive in general; it is
presupposed in a way by all the individual senses and the common
sense, but is not a sense itself distinct from them. It is what they are
capable of doing in general. (If I a m right about the proton aisthetikon
of the De Memoria, that this is something of which the koine aisthesis
is an instance, then the same thing can be said of this also.) T h e mat-
ter might be put by saying that in speaking of the koine dunamis etc.,
Aristotle is concerned with sensibility, not a sense. T h e phrase koine
aisthesis has sometimes been translated 'general sensibility'; this, if
I a m right, is incorrect, although it is a fair enough representation of
what Aristotle is concerned with in speaking of a koine dunamis etc.
Given all this, the application of the notion of a koine aisthesis
remains a limited one. T h e koine aisthesis is a sense, it is the one con-
cerned with the koina, and is to be defined in terms of them. It iscom-
mon in the sense that it is a potentiality shared by more than one
sense-organ, and concerned with objects which are perceptible
through more than one sense-organ. T h e koina, being perceptible
through more than one sense-organ, are essential to no one of them,
and hence Aristotle can rightly say at 425 a l 5 that we perceive the
koina by each sense incidentally. O n the other hand the koina are not,
like the so-called incidental sensibles, incidental to all forms of per-
ception. Shape and colour are alike in this respect. T h e matter might
be put by saying, that we cannot have a full understanding of the
notions of shape or colour without recourse to sense-perception; their
criteria are perceptual. T h e same is not true in the same way of an
understanding of the notion of the son of Cleon. Hence shape and
colour may be classed together in this respect. T h a t is why Aristotle
insists that both shape and colour are essential to some form of sense,
although the former cannot be essential to any one special sense. This
206 THE MONIST

is where the koine aisthesis comes in. To speak of it is merely to make

reference to a potentiality for the perception of objects of this kind,
and it is a potentiality which is manifested via the ordinary sense-organs.
It is for this reason that it would be wrong for Aristotle to postulate
any special sense-organ for the koine aisthesis, as he himself asserts at
425 a l4. Nor, as far as I can see, does he ever do so. The heart, which
is referred to as the kurion aistheterion (niiptov aicdT)Ti}piov) in the De
Somno 455 a 21 a n d the koinon aistheterion (koivdv aiadrir-qpi.ov) in the De
luventute 469 a l 3, is not the organ of the common sense, although being
the underlying organ of life in general and thereby of all sense-percep-
tion in animals it can justly be spoken of as the organ for the koine
dunamis, the general faculty of sense-perception. There is thus no dis-
crepancy between the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia in this respect,
despite what has sometimes been asserted.
It might be argued against what I have said, that I have assumed
too easily that Aristotle speaks of a common sense at all and that when
he uses the term koine aisthesis he is speaking of a sense. Aisthesis does
not have to be translated as 'a sense'; might it not after all better be
translated 'perception' or 'sensibility' in this connection? This thesis
would amount to support for those who maintain that when Aristotle
speaks of the koine aisthesis he is speaking of a generalized form of
perception, and not a sense as such. To examine this thesis it is neces-
sary to look again at the passages in which the words koine aisthesis
explicitly occur, and to ask whether, even if the suggested translation
were accepted, this would amount to the identification of the koine
aisthesis with the koine dunamis. Of the three passages in question, the
De Partibus Animalium passage, as we have already seen, is vague, and
it could be taken either way in itself; on the other hand its general
import seems to fit in with the passage from the De Memoria. But this
speaks of les koines aistheseos pathos (rrjs Kolv-qs aiadrjcrews irados). It might
plausibly be argued that for something to be a pathos, it must be a
pathos of a sense. I doubt whether it makes sense to speak of a pathos
of a generalized form of perception. Hence koine aisthesis in its occur-
rence in the De Memoria most probably refers to the common sense.
What of De Anima 425 "27? One thing in favour of the generalised
perception interpretation is the lack of a definite article. On the other
hand it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide an interpretation
of the words 'not incidentally' without supposing a reference to a
sense. For, when Aristotle speaks of a form of perception being inci-
 KOINE AISTHESIS 207

dental he is always saying something about the relation between a

kind of object and a sense. Thus he has already, earlier in the same
passage, spoken of the koina as incidental to or perceived incidentally
by the individual senses. And he goes on at "30 to speak of the indi-
vidual senses perceiving each other's objects incidentally. It would
appear indeed from these two passages that the koina and the idia are
on a par, insofar as they are incidental to some at least of the individual
senses. But they differ of course in that while the koina are incidental
to all of the individual senses, the idia are incidental only to some, i.e.
to all except that particular one to which they are essential. Moreover,
"28 makes explicit that the koina are not incidental to every form of
perception. In other words, it is the very differences that exist between
perception of the idia, the incidental sensibles so-called, the objects of
other senses by any given sense, and the koina, that lead Aristotle to the
notion of a common sense to which the koina are 'not incidental'.
Thus, despite the lack of the definite article at a 27, it does seem that
Aristotle must be referring to a common sense.
But even if this were not so, one could not identify the koine aisthesis
with the koine dunamis for the reasons already given. T h e sense of
koinos in these two locutions is different, as are the problems which give
rise to the notions in question. It might be said that the fact that it is
possible for two or more senses to have the same objects, even if only
incidentally, shows that they form a unity and that this brings the
problem of perception of the koina into line with the other problems
with which Aristotle deals. This is not so. 'Same object' does not entail
'same sense' nor that the senses which have the same object form a
unity in any other way than that they have the same object. If this
were not so, to perceive an object and to think of it would be a n exer-
cise of the same capacity, and thinking and perceiving would form a
unity. Clearly they are not the same capacity and they form a unity
only in that it is the same person or subject of consciousness which
engages in them. Now the problems which lead Aristotle to the koine
dunamis etc., are problems about the unity of consciousness, although
Aristotle himself could not have put it in that way, since, as far as I
can see, he does not have the concept of consciousness in this way
(nor, I think, did any other Greek). But what this shows is not that
these problems and that of the perception of the koina are the same
but, if anything, that perception of the koina presupposes some kind of
unity of consciousness or personal identity, for the same reasons as
208 THE MONIST

any perception or awareness of identical objects does, no matter what

kind of objects these are. (It may be for this reason that the De Memoria
passage, if I am right in my suggestion, speaks of the koine aisthesis as a
manifestation of to proton aisthetikon—the primary faculty of percep-
tion; although the real problems go, as I have indicated, much deeper
than this. Aristotle remains with the concept of a unity of sense; he
does not put forward a concept of a unity of consciousness in general
or, despite the remark at De Anima 408 b l 4 about the man doing things
with his soul, a concept of personal identity.) It remains the case that
the problems of the koine aisthesis are local in a way that the problems
of the koine dunamis are not; and it follows that they are different.
Aristotle does speak of a common sense, but only in connection with the
perception of the koina.

It is perhaps worth asking, finally, what light my findings shed on

the relations between the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia.3 I think
that the answer is 'Little enough directly', for what I have shown is
that there is little in the way of discrepancy between the two works,
even, as I have indicated, on the role of the heart as an organ of sense-
perception. There are, on the other hand, certain differences in ap-
proach or attitude, which might be summed up by saying that the
Parva Naturalia is more explicit in its answers to questions, or at least
uses more explicit or more technical terminology. Perhaps the only
place at which the De Anima seems more explicit is in its apparent
assertion that it is by sight that we perceive that we see. But even here
the explicitness turned out to be more apparent than real. In dealing
with what is in effect the problem of the unity of the senses, both works
recite the formula of the senses being numerically one but plural or
divided in einai. But in the Parva Naturalia one finds terminology such
as the phrases to aisthetikon panton and the koine dunamis, while the De
Anima is content with the analogy of the point. What, if anything,
does this show? I cannot myself have confidence that it shows any-
thing. There are, after all, differences in the nature and scope of the
works in question, and in a comparatively large-scale work like the
De Anima recourse to verbal formulae in the search for definite answers
to questions might have seemed inappropriate. It may indeed be the
case that indefiniteness in verbal formulation is a general charac-

s See on this I. Block, Amer. J. Philology 82 (1961), 50 ff.

 K O I N E AISTHESIS 209

teristic of the discussion of the De Anima. Finally, on the issues with

which we have been concerned—the unity of consciousness and the
like—given the conceptual apparatus which Aristotle had to bring to
his problems, a lack of explicitness and a recourse to analogies might
well be set down as a positive virtue rather than a defect. To put the
matter in other words, in discussing these problems in the De Anima
Aristotle might properly be accused of being reluctant to commit
himself, rather than being just vague; and this might be due to a
proper sense of his own inability to produce the precise solution to his
problems—an inability only partially disguised by the use of the
technical terminology of the Parva Naturalia. If that is so, and if other
things tend to suggest a later date of composition for the De Anima,
as I think that they probably do, then the least that can be said is
that nothing in the issues which I have discussed does anything to
upset that point of view.4
D. W. HAMLYN
BIRKBECK COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

4
Since writing this paper I have come to read that of Charles H. Kahn entitled
'Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology" in Archiv jiir Geschichte
der Philosophic, Band 48, Heft 1 (1966), pp. 43 ff. Many of the things which he
says are in line with what I have said here, but apart from specific points I am
still inclined to think that he has not made a radical enough distinction between
the koine aisthesis as the sense responsible for the koina, and the koine dunamis etc.