Anacta vs. Resurreccion

4/7/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 678
A.C. No. 9074. August 14, 2012.*

GRACE M. ANACTA,** complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION, respondent.
Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; One of the qualifications

required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession
of good moral character.—As early as In Re: Sotto, 38 Phil. 532,
548-549 (1918), this Court held that: One of the qualifications
required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession
of good moral character, and, when one who has already been
admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does
not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of
an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and
with the courts, he disre-
_______________
* EN BANC.
** Also known as Grace Mino y Anacta.
353
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 353
Anacta vs. Resurreccion
gards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by

every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the
interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal
standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to
deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily
abused.
Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”—
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
“[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” “The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm
respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017151b8e46bb395ce36003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary

relationship.”
Same; Disbarment; The Court is not mandated to
automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment. It is
allowed by law to exercise its discretion either to disbar or just
suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation of the facts
and circumstances of the case.—In any of the following
circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7)
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8)
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority
and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment
or mere suspension. Certainly, the Court is not placed in a
straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed. There is no
ironclad rule that disbarment must immediately follow upon a
finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated
to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment. It is
allowed by law to exercise its discretion either to disbar or just
suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation of the facts
and circumstances of the case.
Same; Gross Misconduct; Failure to return the monies
received from complainant despite repeated demands constitute
gross misconduct.—In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386
(2003), the Court found respondent therein to have committed
dishonesty and abused the confidence of his client for failing to
file the ejectment suit de-
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
spite asking for and receiving from the complainant the money
intended as filing fees. In his bid for exoneration, therein
respondent attempted to mislead the Court by claiming that he
has not yet received the registry return card of the notice to
vacate hence his failure to file the ejectment suit. However, the
records indubitably showed that he had already received the
same. Moreover, therein respondent likewise refused to return the
monies he received from the complainant despite repeated
demands. The Court thus concluded that therein respondent's
actions constitute gross misconduct. Nevertheless, based on its
appreciation of the evidence, the Court refrained from imposing
the penalty of disbarment. Instead, it imposed the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.
Same; Disbarment; Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should
not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired.
—The Court is not bound to impose the penalty of disbarment in
cases of gross misconduct and/or dishonesty, if in its appreciation
of facts and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of
suspension would be more commensurate. “Disbarment,
jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine,
would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life
and honor of the erring person.” In this case, we believe that the
penalty of suspension of four years will provide Atty. Resurreccion
“with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his
misconduct.” “While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the
evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.” We note that
there is no mention in the records of any previous or similar
administrative case filed against herein respondent.
Same; Same; It is imperative to first determine whether the
matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or
whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against
lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and
code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s disciplinary
authority.—It is imperative to first determine whether the matter
falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the
matter is a proper subject
355
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 355
of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations

of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from
acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not
directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer,
then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action
which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s
disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter
subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of
the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the
issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount

received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s
disciplinary authority.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rex G. Rico and Jose Voltaire A. Bautista for
complainant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“[T]he purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and
the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.”1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment filed on August 22, 2007
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Grace M. Anacta
(complainant) prays for the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Edu-
_______________
1 Diaz v. Atty. Gerong, 225 Phil. 44, 48; 141 SCRA 46, 49 (1986).
2 Rollo, pp. 1-6.
356

ardo D. Resurreccion (respondent) for “gross misconduct,

deceit and malpractice.”3
Records show that on November 15, 2004, complainant
engaged the services of respondent to file on her behalf a
petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid
respondent P42,000.00.4
In December 2004, respondent presented to the
complainant a supposed copy of a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage5 which bore the stamped receipt dated December
8, 2004 of the RTC, as well as its docket number, Civil Case
No. 04-25141.
From then on, complainant did not hear from
respondent or receive any notice from the trial court
relative to the said petition. This prompted her to make
inquiries with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Quezon City (OCC-RTC). To her surprise and dismay, she

discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-25141 was ever filed before the said court.6
Thus, complainant terminated the services of respondent
“for loss of trust and confidence”7 and requested the OCC-
RTC to refuse any belated attempt on the part of
respondent to file a petition for annulment of marriage on
her behalf.8
On July 30, 2007, complainant, through her new
counsel, wrote a letter9 to the respondent demanding for an
explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify
the complainant for damages she had suffered due to
respondent’s deceitful acts. Respondent has not replied
thereto. Hence,
_______________

3 Id., at p. 4.
4 See Service of Agreement dated November 15, 2004, id., at
p. 45.
5 Id., at pp. 9-12.
6 See Certification dated March 7, 2005, id., at p. 16.
7 See Letter dated March 6, 2005, id., at p. 15.
8 See Letter dated March 9, 2005, id., at p. 17.
9 Id., at p. 18.
357
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 357

complainant filed before the IBP a verified complaint

praying that respondent be disbarred.
In an Order10 dated August 22, 2007, the Director for
Bar Discipline of the IBP, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal,
required the respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint within 15 days from notice. However, respondent
did not heed said directive. Hence, complainant filed
Motions to Declare Respondent in Default and Hear the
Case Ex-Parte.11 The Investigating Commissioner,
Romualdo A. Din, Jr., held in abeyance the resolution of
the above motions and instead set the complaint for
Mandatory Conference on October 6, 2008.12 On the said
date, however, only the complainant and her counsel
appeared. Accordingly, in an Order13 dated October 6,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner deemed respondent
to have waived the filing of an answer; noted complainant’s
motion to declare respondent in default; and gave the

complainant 10 days from notice within which to file her
verified position paper, after which the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.
Complainant filed her verified Position Paper14 on
October 15, 2008.
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated December 8,
2008, the Investigating Commissioner found clear and
convincing evidence that respondent is guilty of deceit and
dishonesty when he misrepresented having filed the
petition for annulment of marriage after receipt of
P42,000.00 when in fact no such petition was filed. He thus
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period
_______________
10 Id., at p. 19.
11 Id., at pp. 20-21.
12 See Notice of Mandatory Conference, id., at p. 33.
13 Id., at p. 35.
14 Id., at pp. 36-44.
15 Id., at pp. 60-63.
358

of two years and to reimburse/return to the complainant

the amount of P42,000.00.
In a Resolution16 dated August 28, 2010, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the
recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of
law from two years to four years and ordered respondent to
return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00,
otherwise his suspension will continue until he returns the
sum involved.
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
In Narag v. Atty. Narag17 this Court held that “[t]he
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes
her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.”
In this case, complainant submitted the following
documents to prove her allegations: (1) the Service
Agreement dated November 15, 2004 to prove the existence
of attorney-client relationship between the parties; (2) the

Petition for Annulment of Marriage18 supposedly filed by
respondent on December 8, 2004 with the RTC of Quezon
City and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141; (3) the
Certification issued by the Assistant Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Quezon City showing that “no Petition for
Annulment of Marriage with Civil Case No. Q-0425141 was
filed on December 8, 2004”; (4) the letter dated March 6,
2005 of the complainant to the respondent informing the
latter that she is terminating his legal services effective
immediately; (5) the letter of complainant to the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Quezon City wherein she re-
_______________
16 As quoted in the Notice of Resolution, id., at p. 59.
17 353 Phil. 643, 655-656; 291 SCRA 451, 464 (1998).
18 Supra note 5.
359
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 359

quested that “any belated attempt by my former lawyer

Atty. Resurreccion to file any Petition for Annulment x x x
be refused acceptance”; and, (6) the letter dated July 30,
2007 of complainant’s new counsel demanding for an
explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify
the complainant for damages she had suffered by reason of
respondent’s fraudulent misrepresentations.19
In the face of such a serious charge, the respondent has
chosen to remain silent.
Thus, we find the confluence of the evidence submitted
by the complainant to have clearly, convincingly and
satisfactorily shown that indeed the respondent has
authored this reprehensible act. Respondent committed
deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he
had already filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the
complainant and pocketing the amount of P42,000.00. He
even went to the extent of presenting to the complainant a
supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court.
After he was found out, he made himself scarce. He ignored
all communications sent to him by the complainant. After
the disbarment complaint was filed, he failed to file his
answer despite due notice. He totally disregarded the
proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons.
“The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring
the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite

due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal
proceedings.”20
We thus agree with the observation of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner that “[s]uch action of the
respondent is patently deceitful and dishonest, considering
further that he received an amount of money from the
complainant.”21 “The natural instinct of man impels him to
resist an unfounded
_______________
19 Supra note 9.
20 Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 342; 410 SCRA 258, 265
(2003).
21 Rollo, p. 68.
360

claim or imputation and defend himself. It is totally

against our human nature to just remain reticent and say
nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in
such cases is almost always construed as implied admission
of the truth thereof.”22
As early as In Re: Sotto,23 this Court held that:
One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission

to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when
one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a
series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as
should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his
dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the
rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every
attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of
society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of
professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of
his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused.
In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility states that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” “The
Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.”24
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,

respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for
committing deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus:
_______________
22 Noel-Bertulfo v. Nuñez, A.M. No. P-10-2758, February 2, 2010, 611
SCRA 270, 280 citing Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson, 355 Phil. 266, 271; 293
SCRA 524, 528 (1998).
23 38 Phil. 532, 548-549 (1918).
24 Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, supra note 20 at pp. 342-343; p. 266.
361
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 361

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of

the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8)
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with
the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme
penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Certainly, the
Court is not placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty
to be imposed. There is no ironclad rule that disbarment
must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross
misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically
impose the extreme penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by
law to exercise its discretion either to disbar or just
suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation of the
facts and circumstances of the case.
We examined the records of the case and assessed the

evidence presented by the complainant. After such
examination and assessment, we are convinced beyond
doubt that respondent should only be meted the penalty of
four-year suspension as properly recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. In the exercise of our discretion, we
are unquestionably certain that the four-year suspension
suffices and commensurable to the infractions he
committed. As will be pointed out later,
362

there have been cases with more or less the same factual
setting as in the instant case where the Court also imposed
the penalty of suspension and not disbarment.
We have gone over jurisprudential rulings where the
respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and/or
dishonesty and we observe that the Court either disbars or
suspends them based on its collective appreciation of
attendant circumstances and in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,25 the Court found respondent
therein to have committed dishonesty and abused the
confidence26 of his client for failing to file the ejectment suit
despite asking for and receiving from the complainant the
money intended as filing fees. In his bid for exoneration,
therein respondent attempted to mislead the Court by
claiming that he has not yet received the registry return
card of the notice to vacate hence his failure to file the
ejectment suit. However, the records indubitably showed
that he had already received the same. Moreover, therein
respondent likewise refused to return the monies he
received from the complainant despite repeated
demands.27 The Court thus concluded that therein
respondent’s actions constitute gross misconduct.
Nevertheless, based on its appreciation of the evidence, the
Court refrained from imposing the penalty of disbarment.
Instead, it imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months, ratiocinating
thus:
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we

find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court

and member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to remove an
erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where
the evidence calls for it,
_______________
25 443 Phil. 479; 395 SCRA 386 (2003).
26 Id., at p. 486; p. 389.
27 Id., at p. 487; p. 388.
363
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 363

we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be
sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add,
is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.28
In Ceniza v. Rubia,29 respondent therein was alleged to

have misrepresented having already filed in court the
necessary complaint by showing the copy of the complaint
stamped “received” with a docket number
30
thereon. However, upon verification with the appropriate
court, it was discovered that none was filed.31 It was also
noted that respondent therein prompted the complainant to
borrow money from a third party just to be able to pay her
attorney’s fees. When the case reached this Court, it
imposed the penalty of suspension and not disbarment. In
so doing, the Court lent more credence to the explanation of
the respondent that the case was “withdrawn” after it had
been stamped “received” by the court.
In Roa v. Moreno,32 the Court found respondent therein
guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. He issued a
bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to the
33
complainant and refused to return the amount paid by
the complainant.34 For said infractions, the Court meted
him with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for two years.35
In Barcenas v. Alvero,36 respondent failed to deposit in
court the amount of P300,000.00 which he received from
his client supposedly as redemption price. He also failed to
return
_______________
28 Id., at p. 489; p. 392.
29 A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 1.

30 Id., at p. 9.
31 Id., at pp. 4 and 9.
32 A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693.
33 Id., at p. 698.
34 Id., at p. 699.
35 Id., at p. 700.
36 A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 1, 10.
364

the amount despite repeated demands. He was suspended

for two years.
In Small v. Banares37 respondent received P80,000.00
from complainant for his legal services and as filing fees.
He however failed to file the necessary complaint and was
never heard from again. He was thus suspended from the
practice of law for two years.
In Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,38 therein respondent
failed to promptly report that he received money on behalf
of his client. However, for lack of evidence of
misappropriation, he was only suspended and not
disbarred.
In Gonato v. Atty. Adaza,39 Atty. Adaza asked money
from his client supposedly as filing fees when in fact no
such filing fees are needed or due. Worse, he issued a
falsified “official receipt” as proof of payment. Finally, when
he was discovered, he failed to heed his client’s demand to
return the amount. For such infractions, Atty. Adaza was
suspended for a period of six months.
In Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona,40 Atty. Barcelona
deliberately misrepresented to his client that he was able
to successfully facilitate the restructuring of his client’s
loan with a bank through his “connection”. On the basis of
said false pretenses, he collected P60,000.00 from his
client. His client eventually became aware of such
misrepresentations when his property was foreclosed by
the bank. Atty. Barcelona was thus charged with
misconduct and for which he was suspended by the Court
for a period of six months.
The foregoing cases illustrate that the Court is not
bound to impose the penalty of disbarment in cases of gross
misconduct and/or dishonesty, if in its appreciation of facts
and in
_______________
37 A.C. No. 7021, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 323.
38 386 Phil. 221; 330 SCRA 6 (2000).
39 385 Phil. 426; 328 SCRA 694 (2000).
40 431 Phil. 59; 381 SCRA 355 (2002)
365
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 365

the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of

suspension would be more commensurate.41 “Disbarment,
jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or
fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should
be considering the consequence of disbarment on the
economic life and honor of the erring person.”42 In this case,
we believe that the penalty of suspension of four years will
provide Atty. Resurreccion “with enough time to ponder on
and cleanse himself of his misconduct.”43 “While we will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we
will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.”44 We note that there is no
mention in the records of any previous or similar
administrative case filed against herein respondent.
Anent the issue of whether respondent should be
directed to return the amount of P42,000.00 he received
from the complainant, we note that the rulings of this
Court in this matter have been diverse. On one hand, there
are cases where this Court directed respondents to return
the money they received from the complainants. On the
other hand, there are also cases where this Court refrained
from venturing into this matter on the ground that the
same is not within the ambit of its disciplinary authority as
the only issue in administrative cases is the fitness of the
lawyer to remain a member of the bar.
Now is the most opportune time to harmonize the
Court’s ruling on this matter. Thus, it is imperative to first
determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary
authority of
_______________
41 See Ducat, Jr. v. Atty. Villalon, Jr., 392 Phil. 394, 404-405; 337
SCRA 622, 628 (2000).
42 Salomon, Jr. v. Frial, A.C. No. 7820, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA
9, 15-16.
43 Id.
44 Wilkie v. Limos, A.C. No. 7505, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 1, 10.
366

the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of

judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves
violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it
falls within the Court’s disciplinary authority. However, if
the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal
liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into
the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a
proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably
outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority.
Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry
pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent
to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of
whether the respondent be directed to return the amount
received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s
disciplinary authority.
In this case, respondent received the amount of
P42,000.00 supposedly as payment for his legal services
and as filing fees. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL

MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. x x x
In this case, it is thus clear that respondent violated his

lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when he withheld the
amount of P42,000.00 despite his failure to render the
necessary legal services and after complainant demanded
its return. He must therefore be directed to return the
same.
Finally, we emphasize that “[t]he object of a disbarment
proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of

offi-
367
VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 367

cers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law

persons whose disregard for their oath of office [has] proved
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
them as members of the bar.”45
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo D.
Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the
complainant the amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from the promulgation of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
their information and guidance. The Court Administrator
is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza
and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sereno, J., On Official Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On Leave.
Respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion suspended

from practice of law for four (4) years.
Notes.—A lawyer’s failure to return the client’s money

upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client—it
may border on the criminal as it may constitute a certiorari
case of swindling or estafa. (Belleza vs. Macasa, 593 SCRA
549 [2009]).
_______________
45 Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona, supra note 20 at p. 340; p. 264, citation
omitted.
368

Possession of good moral character is not only a

condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing
requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal
profession. (Tiong vs. Florendo, 662 SCRA 1 [2011]).
——o0o——
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Anacta vs. Resurreccion

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4/7/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 678

A.C. No. 9074. August 14, 2012.*

Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; One of the qualifications

** Also known as Grace Mino y Anacta.

VOL. 678, AUGUST 14, 2012 353