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Paradigms, Processes, and Values in Family Research

Article  in  Journal of Family Theory & Review · September 2014

DOI: 10.1111/jftr.12043

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 Allen W. Barton
Robert C. Bishop
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
in Family Research
In research on the family, considerable amounts
of scholarship have occurred with respect to
central domains of theory, methodology, and
substantive content. In contrast, attention to
philosophy, another domain whose influence is
arguably just as central, appears noticeably
scant. Considering philosophical issues reveals
important yet frequently unrecognized values,
beliefs, and modes of inquiry that underlie and
inform research endeavors. The present article
offers an accessible overview of important philo-
sophical and paradigmatic issues that arise in
family research, specifically describing differ-
ent modes of social inquiry as well as cultural
ideals and values embedded in family research.
In doing so, implications for current and future
family research are highlighted and discussed.
Throughout the past century, multiple scholars
have underscored the centrality of philosoph-
ical matters to researchers in both the natural
and social sciences (e.g., Fleck, 1935/1981;
Kuhn, 1962; Taylor, 1985). These writings
highlight the important yet rarely critically
Center for Family Research, Department of Human
Development and Family Science, University of Georgia,
1095 College Station Rd., Athens, GA 30602
(awbarton@uga.edu).
∗ Department of Physics, Wheaton College, 501 College
Ave., Wheaton, IL 60187 (robert.bishop@wheaton.edu).
Key Words: family research, ideologies, modes of inquiry,
philosophy, values.
Journal of Family Theory & Review 6 (September 2014): 241–256
DOI:10.1111/jftr.12043
University of Georgia
Wheaton College∗
examined paradigms that inform researchers
and their work. Such paradigms encompass
key epistemological (nature of knowledge) and
ideological (system of ideas and ideals that
guide an individual or group) issues that entail
“an entire scientific outlook—a constellation
of shared assumptions, beliefs, and values that
unite a scientific community and allow normal
science to take place” (Okasha, 2002, p. 81). Of
particular note, these paradigmatic beliefs and
values that shape research are centrally guided
by philosophical matters, not research facts.
Infrequent attention to these issues is repre-
sentative of research in many disciplines, with
family research no exception. Although family
theory sourcebooks highlight the importance
of understanding epistemological issues in
sourcebooks (e.g., Bengston, Acock, Allen,
Dilworth-Anderson, & Klein, 2005), actual
commentary is quite limited. Recent scholar-
ship in the family studies literature has, rather
constructively, devoted attention to reexamining
central issues of theory (e.g., Knapp, 2009)
and methodology (e.g., Fincham & Rogge,
2010). Extending the discussion to philosoph-
ical topics—which inform both theory and
methodology—is a logical next step. Greater
awareness of the ideologies and values shap-
ing research not only beneficially exposes their
disguised presence but also constructively facili-
tates the development of novel, forward-thinking
theories, methods, and outcomes within family
studies.
241
242
Despite the recognized importance of these
issues, few articles to date have robustly
characterized central philosophical issues
that arise in family research or help bridge
between disciplines. The present article aims to
provide an accessible and applicable discussion
outlining pertinent philosophical issues that
inform family research. We aim to provide
readers with a framework, vocabulary, and
insight for understanding and addressing how
philosophical and paradigmatic issues exist in
family research endeavors, the anticipated fruit
of which we hope will strengthen individual
research programs and foster new research
directions in the field.
To this end, the remainder of the article is
organized as follows. After a brief commentary
on values and objectivity, we present five modes
of social inquiry that each reflect different
paradigmatic approaches shaping social science
research endeavors. We then direct attention
to articulating prominent underlying values
and cultural ideals in family research and their
subsequent impact. The present article provides
an overview of salient topics but, recognizably,
does not describe all the arguments and concepts
of the philosophy of social science for family
researchers. Readers are encouraged to consult
the cited sources for further exploration.
Values and Objectivity in Social Science
Research
The aim of value neutrality and lack of
researcher bias in scientific activity reflects
a central ambition of post-Enlightenment scien-
tific endeavors. As represented in any course on
research methods, a prescribed set of method-
ologies and practices has been established with
the intent of promoting unbiased, value-free
research. However, both philosophers (e.g.,
Nagel, 1961) and family scholars (e.g., K. R.
Allen, 2000) have emphasized the difficulty
of defending such a position, particularly in
the social sciences. Nagel (1961), for instance,
highlighted how ideals and values enter into
social sciences through avenues such as problem
selection, assessment of evidence, and evalua-
tion of conclusions. Moreover, no matter how
much effort is expended to refine the opera-
tionalization and measurement of a construct,
restricting emphasis to method refinement fails
to address the underlying question of which
constructs are chosen for measurement. No
Journal of Family Theory & Review
doubt the question of how a specific construct
is measured is important, but perhaps equally
or more important is the fundamental question
of why the construct is considered important
or warranted for measurement. In essence,
construct validity does not imply complete
construct neutrality. As Fincham and Beach
(1999) noted more than a decade ago, there is
a fundamental need on the part of relationship
scholars to “make explicit and critically ana-
lyze the assumptions that informed the choice
of what to observe in the first place” (p. 55).
Accordingly, the question no longer concerns if
assumptions, beliefs, and values are embedded
within the research, but which assumptions,
beliefs, and values are embedded within it.
Drawing attention to the subjectivity and
value-ladenness of scientific endeavors does
not, however, remove all objectivity from sci-
entific research or everyday life. Recognition
of this value-ladenness does, though, introduce
more complexity than might be initially per-
ceived to exist regarding the objectivity of these
matters. To better grasp the nature of objectivity
with respect to social science research, distin-
guishing between two types of objectivity can
be beneficial. As Longino (1998) described,
objectivity in one sense arises with questions
about “the truth and referential character of
scientific theories” (p. 170). Objectivity, here,
refers to the created, empirical world—that is,
the product. A natural world, with trees and
leaves, elements and electrons, exists, as does a
social world, with families and children, friends
and foes. Objectivity in the sciences equates
to discovering and to accurately, consistently
describing those existential elements and the
nature of their relationships.
In a second sense, “objectivity has to do
with modes of inquiry . . . the view pro-
vided by science is one achieved by reliance
upon non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria
for developing, accepting, and rejecting the
hypotheses and theories that make up this view”
(Longino 1998, pp. 171–172, emphasis added).
Here, objectivity concentrates on the process
rather than on the product. The key tenet for
maintaining objectivity in process commonly
involves the practitioner adhering to a particular
accepted methodology. However, the activities
carried out by practitioners are done so only in
the context of a paradigm (or set of paradigms)
assented to by the scientific community, with
such paradigms being shaped by researchers’
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
subjectively held presuppositions, irrespec-
tive of whether they are consciously aware of
those presuppositions or not (Fleck, 1935/1981;
Kuhn, 1962; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon,
1999; Taylor, 1985).1 Thus, this second sense of
objectivity in process is more tenuous and liable
to the influence of subjective values and beliefs,
as the following section elucidates.
Modes of Social Inquiry
Applying philosophical concepts to family
research advances the discussion beyond the-
ory, methods, and empirical findings and to
the broader ideologies undergirding and shap-
ing such theories, methods, and results. Such
ideologies are reflected in different modes
of inquiry—the “process” aspect of scientific
thinking—that subsequently inform how a par-
ticular topic is conceptualized and investigated.
At this level, issues that begin to be considered
include the nature of the distinction between
subject and object, the meaning-making pro-
cesses occurring within communities, and the
appearance and role of values in scientific
research. The different stances taken on these
issues are manifested not only in different
methodologies but also in theoretical frame-
works, conclusions drawn from analyses, and
the overall purpose of research (see Bishop,
2007; Nagel, 1961).
The social sciences, in contrast to the nat-
ural sciences, offer a much broader range of
modes of inquiry (illustrating just one distinction
between them). Recognizing such modes is help-
ful not only for framing research efforts but also
for understanding unique obstacles that social
science researchers encounter in their efforts
to understand human behavior. Thus, under-
standing these various modes of inquiry and
how a topic appears within them can provide
insights into some of the complexity surround-
ing particular topics in family research and how
researchers can study them. Following a frame-
work originally described by Richardson and
Fowers (1998) and expounded by Bishop (2007),
we describe and assess five modes of social sci-
ence inquiry here. Although it is by no means
1 Note that just because researchers operate with a set of
presuppositions does not imply that all of their results are
subjective (e.g., Gauch, 2002).
243
exhaustive, the subsequent content aims to pro-
vide readers with an overview of each mode
as well as a functional understanding of the
nature and appearance of the mode in research.
In addition, we consider how family research is
exhibited within each mode with examples from
recent research literature.
Natural Scientific
The natural scientific mode of inquiry views
the social realm no differently than the nat-
ural realm, and thereby it studies social phe-
nomena with methods modeled on those in the
physical sciences. Its motivating goal is to pro-
duce universal, ahistorical, and context-free laws
of psychological and social behavior, derivable
from a few assumptions and definitions (Bern-
stein, 1976; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Nagel, 1961; Tay-
lor, 1985). Propositions, rules, and cause-effect
pathways receive much of the attention, typically
using correlation or causal methods. Scientific
naturalism endorses a clear subject-object ontol-
ogy, or the nature of being, by proposing a sharp
distinction between subjects (i.e., the researcher)
and their inward state of awareness and feel-
ing versus a mind-independent realm of external
objects (i.e., sample participants, cause-effect
connections). From this framework, ideals of
naturalism and empiricism are paramount to
understanding how things are and how research
is performed. Early advocators of this stance in
the social sciences included Auguste Comte and
Émile Durkheim, both of whom were influen-
tial to the foundations of sociology. Writings
by Ernest Burgess, an influential early figure
in the field of family studies, similarly reflect
this stance (e.g., Burgess & Cottrell, 1939). This
mode strongly separates facts from values, with
scientific knowledge being purely about facts.
Values are to be eschewed and withheld from
research, being conceptualized and marginalized
as subjective feelings, attitudes, or preferences.
Main critiques of this approach question its
adherence to true value neutrality, its failure to
capture the meanings and purposes that under-
gird and inform behavior and social entities,
its presupposition of sociohistorical regularity
of human nature, and a general overembracing
of scientism (e.g., Bernstein, 1976; Bishop,
2007; Slife & Williams, 1995; Taylor, 1985).
For instance, when applied to the human realm,
natural scientific methods import particular
assumptions about human subjects and the
244
results social scientists seek. Such methods
treat human subjects as no different in kind
from protons, plants, or planets. This position,
however, reflects a value judgment rather than
a value-neutral approach to human inquiry.
Moreover, natural science methods completely
abstract away from the meanings animating
human activity and focus strictly on quantifiable
properties (see Bishop, 2007).
From a purely statistical stance, this approach
is well suited for studying the correlational and
conditional phenomena that probabilistically
exist in family research. Though advantageous
for statistical analyses and identifying condi-
tional relationships, the unexamined assumption
that the social realm is no different in kind
from the natural realm is limited and limiting.
For instance, locating correlations between
life stress and marital satisfaction says little
about how spouses evaluate their own and their
partner’s stress levels or how they understand
and experience their satisfaction as a couple.
Variables such as personal life stress and marital
satisfaction must be standardized and quantified,
but in doing so, the meanings that stress and
satisfaction have for spouses are cut away from
investigation (see Fowers & Owenz, 2010).
Both the adherence to value neutrality and
the separation from meanings and purposes
reflect a form of scientism, the view that only
natural science methods can deliver genuine,
objective knowledge (Hayek, 1942; Stenmark,
1997). Thus, individuals’ values, motivations,
and meanings, the very understandings that
make human activity what it is, get ignored
or squeezed out.2 Scientism, rather than being
genuinely value neutral and meaning-free as it
purports, is merely another value choice and
represents the adoption of an alternative mean-
ing. Hence, those who pursue a natural scientific
mode of social inquiry adopt a particular kind of
interpretation of the human realm, one privileg-
ing correlations and cause-effect relationships
among variables in human behavior.
The majority of family research (and social
science research collectively) employs this
2 Of course, the natural scientific mode of inquiry uses
surveys and interviews designed to elicit participants’ values
and attitudes. However, these approaches typically objec-
tify subjects’ responses as the relata of correlations or other
forms of quantifiable variables so that the interpretive signif-
icance and impact these values have for humans are mini-
mized.
Journal of Family Theory & Review
mode, with efforts devoted to identifying cor-
related or causal relationships between a set of
variables, either cross-sectionally or longitudi-
nally (e.g., partner contempt with divorce rates,
work–family conflict with parental investment).
For example, Kamp Dush (2013) found that
cohabitation and marital dissolution increased
depressive symptoms for mothers and fathers,
with hypothesized time-variant mediators not
accounting for the effect. Consistent with the
natural scientific approach, such analyses aim to
arrive at context-free laws derived from quanti-
fied cause-effect patterns; however, illustrative
of limitations of this mode, such analyses detach
personal meaning. For instance, despite control-
ling for variance accounted for by other factors,
this approach is unable to assess the central
question—were participants more depressed
because of the dissolution?
Despite arguments that research into social
science matters can be improved exclusively
by strengthening and refining methodologies to
be more analogous to natural science research
(e.g., Kincaid, 1996), such a position largely
fails to stand up to criticism. Increasingly
refined arguments have appeared, suggesting
the difficulties of social science ever attaining
genuine empirical theory are a result of its
applying inappropriate epistemological and
cultural ideals to its subject matter (Bishop,
2007; Gergen, 1982; Richardson et al., 1999;
Taylor, 1985). In essence, research in the social
sciences and natural sciences are different in
kind, not just in degree, as the following mode
of inquiry emphasizes.
Descriptivism
Descriptivism devotes central attention to
understanding the personal and social mean-
ings that structure human life. This mode of
inquiry, formed to some extent in response to
naturalistic and functionalistic views, seeks to
describe purposive human action in a mean-
ingful, intersubjective world. Geertz (1973)
illustrates tenets of descriptivism when noting
how “the analyses of it [humanity in culture] [is]
not an experimental science in search of law but
an interpretive one in search of meaning” (p. 5).
Such an approach emphasizes individual subjec-
tivity and the uniqueness of experience within
a diverse culture, focusing on personal motives,
reasons, and goals within the objects of study
(Winch, 1958). Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel,
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
1967) offers an exemplar of this mode of inquiry
likely familiar to family researchers (for others,
see Bernstein, 1976).
The relevance of this approach to the social
sciences appears given the doubly interpretive
nature of human behavior research, with mat-
ters of interpretation inescapably embedded
within the subject (i.e., researcher) and object
(i.e., sample participant) of study (Giddens,
1976; Taylor, 1985). The first interpretive
aspect, present in both natural and social sci-
ence research, entails the investigator’s (i.e.,
the subject’s) own framework of assumptions,
conventions, and purposes (e.g., the natural
scientific mode of inquiry described earlier).
The second interpretive aspect, unique to the
social sciences and of particular interest to
descriptivists, involves how the objects of study
are self-interpreting beings: beings who are
always striving to make sense of and cope with
their world and who do so from their own inter-
pretative framework. Accordingly, inquiry from
this mode seeks to uncover the attitudes, words,
emotions, and meaning-making processes as
described by the object of study, but from an
objective viewpoint (i.e., describing the truth of
the matter).
Descriptivist approaches place heavy empha-
sis on the lived experiences of the objects
of their study and then aim to portray that
experience to others. Studies within research
on the family involving qualitative methods
often exhibit descriptivist approaches. For
instance, R. E. Allen and Wiles (2013) recently
applied this approach to the study of later-life
childlessness. Findings, consistent with aims
of descriptivism, outlined the specific words,
meaning-making processes, and accompanying
actions that individuals assigned to their expe-
rience of childlessness as well as its subjective
experience across individuals.
Central critiques of descriptivism concern its
introduction of additional bias into the scientific
process (e.g., Bernstein, 1976). Researchers
interpret on the basis of their own terms and
own categories, never entirely escaping them,
and thus never give neutral, objective insightful
descriptions of others’ actions. No subject (i.e.,
no researcher) can avoid subjectively interpret-
ing his or her objects of study. Indeed, to adopt
a natural science or descriptivist approach to the
study of human behavior is already to adopt a
particular kind of interpretation of the object of
study. Additionally, descriptivists’ interpretive
245
process (Part 1 of the doubly interpretive nature
of human inquiry) is influenced by interactions
with their objects and their objects’ values and
biases, thus further reducing unbiased analyses
(Bishop, 2007; Taylor, 1985). Moreover, every
researcher’s description will necessarily be
selective and partial, meaning that any descrip-
tions of an object can be accurate only with
respect to some purposes of the researcher. Such
limitations in study methodology and analysis
have been recognized by researchers adopting
this mode of inquiry, with various practices
introduced by descriptivists to address dimen-
sions of subjectivity and bias in their research
(Glesne, 2011). Because of this awareness,
descriptivist approaches in qualitative research
have noticeably progressed in moving beyond
the ahistorical perspectives found in the natural
scientific mode of inquiry. Nevertheless, the
descriptivist still remains acritical and detached
from the social reality under study in a way that
mirrors the supposed value-neutral viewpoint of
natural science inquiry. Hence, such approaches
remain apt to pass through broader cultural ideas
and do not provide a rational basis for thought-
fully critiquing the human experiences they
attempt to describe and explain (see Bernstein,
1976, p. 84).
Critical Social Science
Critical social science begins by acknowledging
that all research endeavors are inextricably inter-
pretive and evaluative. According to the critical
social science stance, values and a moral bent are
inescapable. Hence, any attempt to be value neu-
tral or free of any evaluative agenda implicitly
advocates another set of values that may be as
or more questionable (Held, 1980). Supposedly
value-neutral methods do not avoid reinforcing
particular values and ideals in practice. As an
example, consider natural scientific inquiry on
the topic of childhood socialization and parent-
ing practices. In a culture where child auton-
omy and independence is deemed desirable, a
natural scientific mode of inquiry may con-
duct a study that identifies a positive association
between early childhood autonomy and family
well-being, along with parenting practices that
predict children who demonstrate greater auton-
omy. Consequently, a natural science mode of
inquiry (despite attempts to be value neutral) is
prone to reinforce and perpetuate the cultural
values and ideals of childhood autonomy.
246
With its explicit attention to the unavoidable
presence of values informing all modes of
inquiry, the critical social scientist advocates for
a community of researchers who acknowledge,
articulate, and adhere to a set of appropriate
moral values in their research. Adherents of
this mode assume and frequently communi-
cate an explicit set of self-defined values that
inform their research. Common foci receiv-
ing attention from critical social scientists are
power, inequality, and disguised ideologies (i.e.,
unnoticed cultural values of social scientists
and social actors). In doing so, critical social
science approaches conduct research with stated
intentions of aiding the reduction or elimination
of power imbalances, inequity, or oppressive
systems.
The popularity of discussions surrounding
issues of injustice and power highlight the
formidable presence that critical social science
has acquired in the field of family research,
with many dominant “isms” and “ivities” (e.g.,
feminism, heteronormativity) largely deriving
from a critical social science perspective. Many
gender studies offer a clear example of research
employing this mode. Here, gender roles and
relations (both inside and outside the family)
are frequently conceptualized as a form of insti-
tutionalized power, describing gender as one of
the “pervasive structures of social inequalities
in society” (Ferree, 2010, p. 421). Such research
then investigates how “gender power gets exer-
cised and institutionalized” (Ferree, 2010, p.
425) within the family.
Critics of this approach note that critical
social scientists must also be subject to the cri-
tiques they weigh against other modes of inquiry
(e.g., Warnke, 1987). Though admonishing the
disguised ideologies and values of others, the
ideology of critical social science itself rests on
particular beliefs, assumptions, and values that
also equally warrant scrutiny. For instance, is the
mere presence of a power imbalance—whether
in the home, business, or society—inherently
oppressive and in need of dismantling? Using
the aforementioned gender example, such
writing makes the a priori assumptions that
institutionalizing gender is detrimental and
that eliminating such institutions and power
expressions is the appropriate response. Fur-
thermore, a lack of internal consistency exists
within this approach. Given its antagonism
and criticism toward dominant and oppres-
sive ideologies, if this approach gains such
Journal of Family Theory & Review
popularity that it becomes the dominant mode
and thereby oppressive toward other approaches
and values, does it begin to refute itself? Rather
than resolving the problems of subjective and
dogmatic viewpoints that exist within other
modern Enlightenment-based moral outlooks,
such matters are merely reframed and recreated
within this mode of inquiry.
Postmodern
A postmodern mode of inquiry prizes the subjec-
tive reality of human existence and rejects any
universalizing law, belief, or “grand narrative.”
Modes of naturalism, descriptivism, and critical
social science are all seen as plagued by desires
to “absolutize” a particular stance. For instance,
applied to research on parenting, a postmodern
approach would rebuff scientific naturalism’s
emphasis on universal laws and value neutrality
(e.g., universal statements regarding the path-
ways linking fathers’ and mothers’ parenting
styles to child outcomes), descriptivism’s pre-
sumed objective and value-free depiction of
human meaning and explanation (e.g., impartial
characterizations for how parents understand
“Dad” and “Mom”), and critical social science’s
privileging of a distinct ethical outlook (e.g.,
absolute critique of gendered-based power dis-
plays in parenting). In contrast, postmodernists
would, for example, examine the discourse par-
ents use with each other and with their child to
“construct” gender within the life of each person.
In addition to rejecting universal statements and
grand narratives, a postmodern approach places
extremely high importance on the role of lan-
guage in constructing reality. In the postmodern
view, we are always inescapably “inside” lan-
guage and “inside” reality (e.g., Lacan, 1968).
Social constructionism (e.g., Rorty, 1982), with
its focus on local, community meaning, offers a
theory appearing with family research informed
by this mode. K. R. Allen (2000) illustrated
tenets of postmodernism applied to family stud-
ies by advocating for abandoning “the search
for the discovery of a single universal truth in
favor of allowing for multiple truths” (p. 8) and
insisting on “complex, inclusive perspectives
that examine race, class, and gender” (p. 13).
A second application of this approach is also
evident in how researchers conceptualize and
discuss marriage teleologically. Does marriage
possess a particular fixed, culturally transcen-
dent telos (i.e., goal or end state), or, consistent
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
with postmodernism, is marriage culturally
defined and created?
Although multiple authors have lauded the
new tools and insights for studying human
behavior that postmodernist approaches have
provided (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2001), many oth-
ers have also raised strong objections to the
approach (e.g., Guignon, 1991; Richardson &
Fowers, 1998; Slife & Richardson, 2010). As
one critique, a statement about being able to
know reality only from the inside is, itself, a
universalizing statement and can be made only
from the vantage point of someone “outside,”
a perspective that postmodernists claim is not
possible. Postmodernist thinkers typically argue
that the absence of universal or culturally tran-
scendent natures should free people from our
tendencies toward dogmatism and domination
(e.g., Rorty, 1982). However, with no restraints
or orientation beyond possibly those of the local
community, what is to keep such “free” or “liber-
ated” spouses from pursuing shallow diversions
or freedom from family responsibilities? Addi-
tionally, postmodernism can be self-defeating,
as the proposition that no universal truth-claims
exist is, itself, a universal truth-claim. Although
these critiques legitimately question some of
postmodernism’s central foundations and argu-
ments, they do not entirely negate the potency
of particular concepts and questions raised by
postmodern thought (e.g., the historical and
cultural embeddedness of research activities).
Contemporary Hermeneutics
A fifth mode of inquiry, contemporary
hermeneutics, considers the self-interpreting
nature of human beings and the fact that we
live out these interpretations as its fundamental
insights (e.g., Gadamer, 1975; Guignon, 1991;
Ricoeur, 1992; Taylor, 1985; Warnke, 1987).
Overall, contemporary hermeneutics commits
to some form of objectivity in terms of clear
understanding and acknowledges that accuracy
and reproducibility are possibilities for the
social world. Recognizing that human action is
always interpretive, contemporary hermeneutics
values the richness of meaningful human behav-
ior and seeks to uncover disguised ideologies,
as both aspects influence the self-understanding
of an individual. Further, given the inescapable
interpretation occurring via the historically
and culturally conditioned nature of human
actions, hermeneutic thinkers view natural
247
and social sciences as fundamentally different
(electrons are neither culturally conditioned nor
self-interpreting, whereas humans are).
Hermeneutic thinkers endorse absolutes but
recognize that absolutes still stand in need of
interpretation and are not univocal in meaning.
Writing about the interplay of science, religion,
and postmodernism, Carson (2002) illustrated
tents of contemporary hermeneutics, noting how
“no truth which humans beings may articulate
can ever be articulated in a culture-transcending
way—but that does not mean that the truth thus
articulated does not transcend culture” (p. 119).
Meanings within a contemporary hermeneutic
approach are recognized as both “out there” and
“in us.”
Of the five modes of social inquiry, this mode
of inquiry remains the most inchoate. Accord-
ingly, little research related to the family (and
social science topics more generally) reflects this
nature of understanding, although writings by
Fowers (e.g., Fowers, 1998; Fowers & Owenz,
2010; Richardson & Fowers, 2010) offer an
exception. As an illustration, a hermeneutic
perspective devotes emphasis to what spouses
themselves evaluate when reporting their marital
satisfaction rather than investigators’ predeter-
mined criteria. The search for regularities and
predictive patterns of family interaction still
occurs within contemporary hermeneutics, but
efforts simultaneously consider the broader
cultural and historical beliefs and meanings in
which such associations appear (for additional
discussion, see Fowers, 1998, Fowers & Owenz,
2010; Richardson & Fowers, 2010).
Research endeavors within this mode are
more nuanced than those based on identifying
statistical likelihoods of parameter estimates
derived from optimization algorithms or cre-
ating thematic summaries of interview data.
For instance, in a hermeneutic approach, the
observed correlations from measured items are
understood in terms of the self-interpretations
of the study participants, not in terms of some
univocal conception of efficient cause-effect
patterns. Accordingly, the meaning of the
correlations can differ greatly depending on
the meaning-making processes present within
an individual and couple. For example, the
meaning of the correlation between particular
communication patterns and marital satisfaction
will differ between individuals who view their
spouses and their marriages as means for pursu-
ing individual fulfillment and happiness versus
248
those who view their union in terms of mutual
obligation, selfless giving, and the building of
community.3
Overall, contemporary hermeneutics func-
tions as a meta-orientation that situates research
(and all of life) with an awareness to its inter-
pretive aspects, modifies the interpretations
research findings offer, and highlights topics
and questions neglected by research from other
metatheoretical viewpoints. However, specific
application of this mode of inquiry is limited in
family research, partially exhibiting the broader
question of whether hermeneutic inquiry exists
at a level of methodology (e.g., Packer & Addi-
son, 1989) or metatheory (e.g., Bishop, 2007).
At the level of metatheory, as previously noted,
hermeneutic inquiry positions research, tempers
conclusions to be more morally conscious and
contextually sensitive, and draws attention to
the personal meanings and cultural values that
are often neglected in research endeavors. At
the methodological level, a lingering question
remains concerning the methods offered that
make hermeneutic inquiry something more than
a meta-level orientation. If no methodology
distinguishes contemporary hermeneutics from
other modes, why consider it a form of social
science inquiry rather than something more
akin to social theory or philosophical analysis?
Finally, if contemporary hermeneutics is a
meta-level approach, is it best used in conjunc-
tion with other modes of social inquiry? Such
questions, which partially reflect the insistence
on clearly defined methodology from natural
science and descriptivist modes of inquiry,
emphasize the need for further clarification of
hermeneutic inquiry.
Table 1 provides a summary of the five
aforementioned modes of inquiry, providing a
description, application, and critique of each
approach.
Elucidating these different modes is not
merely an intellectual exercise; it addresses
issues central to the trajectory of marital and
family research as a whole. As previously
described, different paradigms and different
modes of inquiry provide general frameworks
3 Hermeneutic approaches to family research would also
highlight the role cultural ideals such as individualism (see
next section) play in spouses’ conceptions of family life as
well as the way such ideals tend to shape family research
itself (e.g., Richardson et al., 1999).
Journal of Family Theory & Review
for perceiving the world. For researchers,
this equates to shaping their understanding
of pertinent problems, appropriate solutions,
and preferable methods to address identified
problems (see Table 2). As Rosenberg (2008)
noted, “The sides scientists take on answers to
philosophical questions determine the questions
they address as answerable by science and the
methods they employ to answer them” (p. 4,
emphasis added). Thus, such paradigmatic pro-
cesses come to dictate both the preferred means
and the desired ends of research, shaping both
what researchers investigate and how research
precedes.
In summary, though they are all under the
umbrella of social science research, not all
family researchers approach problems similarly.
Different research endeavors employ different
modes of inquiry, modes that inform a broad
range of topics including perceptions of the
world, meaning-making processes, ontologi-
cal beliefs, and the bifurcation of subject and
object. Given the centrality of such matters,
understanding different modes of inquiry is use-
ful for developing a robust understanding of, and
reflection on, social science research endeavors.
Recognizing underlying philosophical issues
helps elucidate why particular research topics
are chosen for study versus others and how the
phenomena are studied. Focusing on philosoph-
ical issues also uncovers how cultural ideals
and values shape research activities, whether
in construct formation or in the practice of
particular modes of inquiry. We now turn to
those questions.
Cultural Ideals and Values in Family
Research
Writings on the philosophy of social science
highlight how ideals and values can impinge
on the research process at many different lev-
els (e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Bohman, Hiley, &
Schusterman, 1991; Root, 1993). At one level,
values embraced by the individual researcher
or research team inform the research activi-
ties. Here, the previously outlined modes of
inquiry are implicated, with each containing a
particular set of values and ideals. For example,
values and ideals within critical social science
research may lead to studies centrally focused on
measuring perceived power in the marital rela-
tionship or the gender socialization of young
children.
Paradigms, Processes, and Values 249

Table 1. Modes of Inquiry in Social Science Research on the Family

Mode Description Application Critique

Natural scientific Social realm is equivalent to the
natural; aims to produce
universal, context-free laws of
relationships among
individual, interpersonal, and
external factors
Descriptivism Focuses on the personal and
social meanings structuring
human life; illustrates doubly
interpretive nature of social
science research
Critical social Acknowledges values in
science research; advocates adopting
the “correct” set of values that
will best serve and advance
human welfare
Postmodern Rejects any universalizing law,
belief, or grand narrative;
emphasis on local, contextual
meanings and the subjective
reality of human existence
Contemporary Some degree of reproducible
hermeneutics objectivity with simultaneous
recognition of human action as
interpretive and influence of
existing ideologies
In statistical modeling of
cause-effect pathways that
encompass family outcomes
of interest
To identify meanings, attitudes,
and experiences of
individuals in marriage,
personally and collectively.
To uncover and combat matters
of power, oppression, and
disguised ideologies within
family and society
Articulate contextual and
pragmatic lived experiences
of individuals in local
communities
Highlight and understand
interpretations and
meaning-making processes
in family relationships
Adherence to supposed value
neutrality; failure to capture
the meanings informing
human behavior
Researcher’s own subjective
framework inhibits neutral,
objective description of
others’ actions
Determination of “correct” set
of values; lack of internal
inconsistency
Inability to make any
generalizing statements;
self-contradiction in tenets
Lack of distinct and clear
methods for inquiry; actual
methodology or framework
for applying other methods

In addition to modes of inquiry, values Political Liberalism

and ideals can also be embedded in research
endeavors on the basis of the general milieu of
the culture in which research takes place. Within
current Western culture, autonomy and indi-
vidualism are two powerful ethical ideals, with
social science research significantly influenced
by them (Bishop, 2007; Richardson et al., 1999).
Although autonomy and individualism can take
various forms within culture and research, for
the sake of brevity, only two forms—political
liberalism and liberal individualism4 —are dis-
cussed here. As described the following, both
forms appear influential in research on the
family.
4 The term liberal here does not refer to its common
political usage in culture (e.g., anticonservative). Rather,
it connotes emphasis on freedom of choice and lack of
constraints.
According to the ideal of political liberalism
and its attendant values, the state (including
academic scholarship) “should not support one
conception of the good life—to seek happiness,
to live with honour and integrity, to become
rich and famous—over any other, nor favour any
particular religion, sexual mores and so forth”
(Root, 1993, p. 15). The focus for research, as
typified by the natural science mode of inquiry,
as well as descriptivism, concentrates on ques-
tions of appropriate means while refraining from
addressing questions of appropriate ends. For
instance, although much research aims to iden-
tify “optimal” or “effective” conditions for fam-
ilies (e.g., parenting style, marital communica-
tion patterns), such research does not endorse
some forms of parenting or conflict resolution as
more desirable or preferable on any other basis
than effectiveness for achieving desired ends.
This is exactly political liberalism as a disguised
ideology in research.
250 Journal of Family Theory & Review

Table 2. Dictates of Modes of Inquiry on Research Endeavors

Pertinent Problems Solutions Appropriate Methods Example

Natural Limited knowledge of Refined measurement and Computational Structural

scientific universal laws that analysis of optimization modeling functionalism
govern relationships relationships among of quantified variables
variables
Descriptivism Inattention to personal, Allow participant’s own Observation of personal Ethnomethodology
subjective voice to be heard meanings and social
experiences structures
Critical social Oppressive ideologies, Equity, power To identify experiences Feminism
science power imbalances, equivalency, research of marginalized groups
differences between informed by right and remove inequality
groups values
Postmodern Absolutized and Disregard of grand To identify personal Social
universalized truth narratives, focus on narratives and constructionism
and meaning contextual lived reality subjectivity with focus
on language
Contemporary Inattention to values, Focus on self-interpreting To identify values and Eudaimonic theory
hermeneutics meanings, and nature of human beings meaning-making (as described by
interpretations in while maintaining processes; correlations Fowers & Owenz,
human relationships generalizability and and causal pathways, 2010)
that inform objects of absolutes suitably interpreted
study

Root (1993) additionally characterized the
ideal of political liberalism as the “underlying or
unifying theme among the social sciences” (p.
15). Its influence contributes to the belief in the
social sciences that no researcher can prescribe
how an individual should behave or how a rela-
tionship should be structured. In essence, one
should not define what is objectively good and
right ideology or morality. For example, the val-
ues of political liberalism appear in the notion
that research cannot (or at least should not) tout
one form of family as superior and preferred
to others (e.g., arranged versus free-choice
marriages). As another example, research on
parenting typically focuses on “effective” or
“ineffective” parenting techniques (based on
positive associations with particular preselected
outcomes) rather than on the “right” ways to
parent (irrespective of outcome).
Despite its pervasive presence, the unques-
tioning (and usually surreptitious) adoption
of political liberalism by the social science
and broader academic community has tenuous
logical underpinning. The stance of political lib-
eralism does not hold up under its own scrutiny,
as it touts an ideological position (namely,
political liberalism and its version of neutrality)
as superior to all others. In other words, the
statement that one person or group should not
promulgate or proselytize its beliefs on any
others is itself a belief being promulgated and
proselytized. Political liberalism, whether in
the political arena or in academia, represents a
version of the good life, the right way to live as
mature enlightened human beings free from the
judgments of others. It therefore engages in the
very activity it condemns and warns others from
doing, holding itself up as the preferred way of
life in contrast to its insistence that no points of
view be favored over others.
For the family researcher, one consequent
implication involves recognizing the degree to
which this ideal covertly informs one’s approach
to and evaluation of research endeavors and
dissemination of findings. The pervasive cul-
tural presence of political liberalism suggests
that, in the absence of such reflection, research
likely will default to reinforcing this ideal as
the norm in research and to encouraging its
adoption by families. As previously noted, even
research that identifies and endorses “healthy,”
“successful,” or “effective” features of family
interaction and functioning still reflects polit-
ical liberalism ideology. To challenge or do
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
the opposite of political liberalism would be to
explicitly endorse some forms of life as supe-
rior to others regarding ends (e.g., what is just,
worthwhile, or of ultimate concern). Focusing
solely on issues such as functionality and effec-
tiveness does not explicitly imply any form of
life as being better than any other regarding ends,
but it does, surreptitiously, endorse functionality
and effectiveness as preeminent values.
Conversely, if this form of liberalism is
rejected and some other viewpoint is embraced,
how does research endorse or prescribe what
people should believe, and again, on what basis
or foundation? Could researchers prescribe
just and right (and not merely “effective”)
parenting practices or household division of
labor? These are questions critical social inquiry
faces. Further, for all modes of social inquiry,
how often are researchers already endorsing
such prescriptions in the name of optimality or
happiness without even realizing it?
Liberal Individualism
A second broad cultural ideal noticeably inform-
ing family research is liberal individualism,
which originated in the 18th century from a
combination of factors such as Enlightenment
philosophy, the rationalization of society, the
rejection of stultifying theological and political
systems, and the rise of capitalism, industrial-
ization, and modern science. This ideal places
the individual at the focus and center of life,
stressing and prizing matters of individuality,
rights, dignity, autonomy, and freedom (Gunton,
1993; Taylor, 2007; Turner, 1985). Liberal
individualism manifests in different forms,
including utilitarian, expressive, existential, and
ontological (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler,
& Tipson, 1986; Richardson et al., 1999). The
first two forms—utilitarian individualism and
expressive individualism—are subsequently
expanded upon, on the basis of our perceptions
of their dominance in much of the academic
and, to a greater extent, societal conceptions of
marriage and the family.
Utilitarian individualism. Utilitarian individu-
alism sees human life as an effort by individuals
to maximize self-interest relative to personal
appetites and fears. Personal well-being and
satisfaction are the acme, with both human
thought and action merely instruments aimed
toward bringing about such ends. Classical
251
social exchange (Blau, 1964) and rational
choice (Coleman & Fararo, 1992) theories
illustrate the influence of utilitarian individu-
alism in the social sciences and provide prime
exemplars of how underlying values and ideals
can shape the nature of theory construction.
For instance, on the social exchange account,
individuals’ presumed aim is to maximize out-
comes (e.g., personal well-being), entering into
and maintaining relationships on the basis of an
evaluation of rewards or benefits minus costs.
Within research on romantic relationships,
utilitarian individualism conceives the dyadic
union mainly in terms of economic exchange
and personal satisfaction. The relationship is
understood as being founded and continued on
the basis of each partner’s self-interest. Given
the assumed ultimate objective of personal
satisfaction and happiness, a person’s satisfac-
tion with his or her relationship immediately
suggests itself as a natural construct to study.
Studies that principally focus on personal rela-
tionship satisfaction as the main ends for a
romantic union illustrate how this value can
shape relationship research efforts—even those
seemingly neutral in design. Moreover, natural
science or descriptivist approaches “objectively”
reporting personal satisfaction or happiness as
the result of particular qualities or characteris-
tics of the relationship surreptitiously reinforce
utilitarian individualism despite their attempt to
be value neutral.
Expressive individualism. In contrast to the
pragmatic nature of utilitarian individualism,
expressive individualism is foundationally
much more aesthetic. Self-autonomy and
self-actualization emerge as prized constructs,
believing that each person’s “true self” should
be respected and nurtured. Under this ideal,
marriage, family, and other relationships more
broadly function as an arena for providing indi-
vidual belonging, purpose, and growth where
the “true self” can be realized and developed.
Expressive individualism originated in the
late 18th century and began to alter marriage
practices and expectations as early as the 19th
century (see May, 1980; Mintz & Kellogg,
1988). Following the social revolutions in the
1960s and 1970s, this ideal has come to appear
highly influential in Western culture and roman-
tic relationships therein (Bellah et al., 1986;
Cherlin, 2009). Self-expansion theory (Aron
& Aron, 1986) provides an apt illustration of
252
how ideals about self-expression have shaped
intimate relationship research. From this theo-
retical perspective, romantic relationships are
perceived as one means by which individuals
seek to expand the self (whether cognitively,
social, physically, or experientially), and rela-
tionships are initiated and maintained to the
degree that each individual’s self is expanded by
being with the other person. To the extent that a
mode of social inquiry aiming at value neutrality
reports positive correlations between intimate
relationships and individuals’ self-actualization
and self-expression, expressive individual-
ism is being reinforced by that very mode of
inquiry.
Presence and implications of individualism.
Although not articulating these two ideals
explicitly, writings by prominent family schol-
ars demonstrate the presence of these liberal
individualistic ideals in both academic and
societal understandings of the family. For
instance, in characterizing shifts that began in
the 1960s concerning individuals’ conceptu-
alization of marriage and that have continued
since then, family demographer Cherlin (2009)
commented:
When wives and husbands evaluated how satisfied
they were with their marriages, they began to think
more in terms of self-development, as opposed
to the satisfaction they gained through pleasing
their spouse and raising their children. They asked
themselves questions such as: Am I getting the per-
sonal satisfaction I want from my marriage? [i.e.,
utilitarian individualism] And Am I growing as a
person? [i.e., expressive individualism]. The result
was a transition from the companionate marriage
to what we might call the individualized marriage.
(p. 88)5
Similarly, Amato, Booth, Johnson, and Rogers
(2007) documented this ideal within academics,
observing how “the current focus among fam-
ily scholars on marital happiness as the central
defining characteristic of high-quality marriages
reflects the culture of expressive individualism
5 Note how Cherlin’s (2009) description illustrates that
both utilitarian and expressive individualism are fundamen-
tally instrumental in character. That is to say, both forms of
liberal individualism focus on how marriage—among other
relationships—is a means toward the end of personal satis-
faction and growth. Compare with Bellah et al. (1986).
Journal of Family Theory & Review
and self-growth that has become pervasive in
American society since the 1960s” (p. 251).
Multiple authors have recognized and
critiqued the hegemonic focus on marital
satisfaction (see, e.g., Carroll, Knapp, & Hol-
man, 2005; Hawkins, Blanchard, Baldwin, &
Fawcett, 2008). However, less attention has
been devoted to understanding why there is
such interest in satisfaction. Considering the
role of cultural ideals embedded in the research
process helps elucidate the fascination with
marital satisfaction—personal marital satisfac-
tion originates from a highly individualistic
conceptualization of marriage. From the stance
of utilitarian individualism, as the main focus
in human affairs is individual personal satis-
faction, then satisfaction with marriage is one
of the most salient factors to measure. For
expressive individualism, marital satisfaction is
emphasized because it promotes personal fulfill-
ment through bonding and intimacy. Although
differing in underlying reasons, utilitarian and
expressive individualism uniformly lead both
marital researchers and individual spouses to
place a premium on marital satisfaction.
Most discussion regarding clarifying mar-
ital assessments (e.g., Fincham & Rogge,
2010), though beneficial and warranted in many
respects, has remained at empirical (identifying
measures with robust psychometric properties)
and theoretical (conceptually clarifying the
construct being measured) levels. However, at
a more fundamental level, all these questions
turn on matters of why and how variables are
selected. Indeed, an essential question for con-
sideration by marital researchers is what makes
the construct of marital satisfaction so important
as to warrant assessment?
The emergence and continued presence of
these ideals in cultural and academic concep-
tions of marriage and family is not merely an
ivory-tower issue; it is one with significant ram-
ifications. Writing shortly after the beginnings
of this cultural shift toward self-fulfillment and
expressive individualism, Yankelovitch (1981)
rather prognostically described the potential
detrimental impact on marriage of widespread
adoption of this ideal:
Successful marriages are woven out of many
strands of inhibited desire—accessions to the
wishes of the other; acceptance of infringements
on one’s own wishes; disappointments swallowed;
confrontations avoided; opportunities for anger
Paradigms, Processes, and Values
bypassed; chances for self-expression muted.
To introduce the strong form of self-fulfillment
urge into this process is to take a broomstick to
a delicate web. Often all that is left is the sticky
stuff that adheres to the broom; the structure of
the web is destroyed. (p. 76)
Viewing marriage along such utilitarian and
expressive individualist lines (i.e., that a
good marriage enhances personal happiness,
self-growth, and self-actualization) leads to
a peculiar paradox in the American marriage
(Fowers, 1998). When such conceptions are
present, individuals have “maximized their
expectations for emotional fulfillment and
self-satisfaction in marriage . . . [yet simulta-
neously] minimized their sense of obligation
and commitment to spouses and children as
well as to marriage as an institution” (Bishop,
2007, p. 182). Consequently, and quite impor-
tantly, researchers and practitioners who aim to
strengthen marriages, yet operate under a util-
itarian or expressive individualistic conception
of the purpose of marriage (and whose measures
reflect this), find themselves in a perplexing
situation. By focusing on the emotional ful-
fillment and satisfaction of individual spouses
and encouraging participants to evaluate their
marriage similarly, researchers may encourage
a mind-set within individuals that directs the
focus away from accessions and accommo-
dations to the other and toward expectations
for personal self-fulfillment. Such ideals of
self-fulfillment and self-satisfaction in mar-
riage tend to undermine, rather than bolster,
fundamental constructs and practices needed
for healthy, stable marriages (Fowers, 1998).
Thus, by focusing measurement on emotional
fulfillment and satisfaction, researchers may be
perpetuating the frailties in marriage they are
attempting to prevent, passing the disease on
through the cure, so to speak.
Reconsidering Outcomes
The cultural ideals of political liberalism and
liberal individualism have exerted noticeable
influence both on how families are studied and
on which variables are considered relevant for
study. This section considers criterion variables
that shift from these dominant cultural ide-
als. Presently, this exploration revolves around
examples with marital research, although many
points immediately relate to other content areas
253
as well. Just as the outcome of satisfaction can
have positive and negative consequences, the
following constructs are not inherently benefi-
cial. They do, however, illustrate constructs that
differ from the underlying cultural ideals that
have dominated outcomes of interest in many
previous research studies.
An alternative focus could involve increased
weight on marital commitment (Stanley, 2007).
Again, quoting Amato et al. (2007):
A good argument can be made, however, that com-
mitment is central to what we mean by marital
quality as is happiness. . . . [A] focus on com-
mitment as a central feature of marital quality
represents a necessary corrective to the individu-
alistic and hedonistic slant of much contemporary
research on marriage. (p. 251)
Instruments currently exist for measuring
indicators of commitment (e.g., Stanley &
Markman, 1992; Weigel, 2008), although these
are infrequently conceptualized as the targeted
end for married individuals. Taken further, the
outcome of marital commitment could focus
on permanent stability of the marital union
(regardless of spousal levels of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction).6
Other potential outcomes for marital research
could concentrate on the character, conduct, and
societal contributions of each spouse (Hawkins,
Fowers, Carroll, & Yang, 2007). Outcomes of
interest here include the demonstration and
development of individual virtues such as for-
giveness, generosity, patience, and devotion
(Fowers, 1998, 2000; Hawkins et al., 2008),
all of which are highly important to handling
the ebb and flow of married life as well as
life in a community. At the communal level,
marriage could be centrally conceptualized
in relation to fostering social responsibility,
such as workplace productivity, involvement in
local organizations, and avoidance of deviant or
illegal activity. Previous research has alluded to
marriage producing changes in such areas, par-
ticularly for men (e.g., Beaver, Wright, DeLisi,
& Vaughn, 2008; Nock, 1998).
Furthermore, underexplored or new con-
structs could receive attention. For instance,
6 In no way should such a stance be construed as endors-
ing that partners continue staying in an abusive marriage. An
abusive marriage is one where commitment has already dis-
sipated and some other kind of unhealthy power relationship
is in play.
254
marital research could focus on communal
orientation, a construct that reflects mutual
concern for spousal (rather than self) well-being
and giving assistance as needed rather than on
the basis of equitable exchange or quid pro quo
reciprocation (see also Clark & Mills, 1979).
A second construct could be family happiness,
reflecting an individual’s or couple’s content-
ment in sacrificial service that leads to being and
building a family together (see Stanley, 2009).
This latter construct represents a constitutive
goal in which the actions taken to achieve the
goal help constitute the goal itself. The ends,
in essence, are inseparable from the means (for
more discussion, see Fowers & Owenz, 2010).
Importantly, individuals with such a constitutive
goal can have a sense of marital and family
satisfaction and success even in the midst of per-
sonally unpleasant times, for it is only through
self-denial, forbearing irritations, and enduring
relationship difficulties that this goal can be
fully realized (for other potential constructs, see
Fowers, 2000; Fowers & Owenz, 2010).
Conclusion
Multiple family researchers have emphasized
the importance of understanding context and
“taking context seriously” (e.g., Karney & Brad-
bury, 2005; Karney, 2007). In such instances,
context typically has been in reference to envi-
ronmental stressors such as economic hardship,
job strain, and poor neighborhood conditions.
However, as social ecology models illustrate,
macroenvironmental factors extend beyond sit-
uational and environmental aspects and to cul-
tural norms and belief systems (e.g., Huston,
2000). Without lessening these calls for greater
incorporation of context in research, we further
recommend broadening the context lens to con-
sider the cultural, ideological, and epistemologi-
cal factors that influence participants in research
studies as well as the researchers conducting
them. Although the presence of beliefs, values,
and ideals is inescapable, awareness of them
need not be.
An overview of philosophical themes within
family research raises a variety of questions.
Here are four we think are pressing:7 (1)
7 As previously mentioned, this content only reflects
our position on a portion of philosophical issues. Differ-
ent authors adopting different philosophical positions could
Journal of Family Theory & Review
Have the constructs of personal happiness
and self-esteem been overutilized in family
research? (2) What outcomes are relevant,
moving beyond those advocated by the values
represented in cultural ideals of political liber-
alism and liberal individualism? (3) How are
strengths of particular modes of inquiry lever-
aged and their limitations taken into account
in research on families? (4) How can family
researchers simultaneously embrace an objec-
tive reality of family interaction while still
maintaining the meaning-making processes and
interpretations of the individuals within the
family itself?
As these questions demonstrate, attention to
philosophical issues does not lessen the value of
human inquiry; instead, it offers a means to bet-
ter reflect on and refine it. Articulating values
and different modes of inquiry, rather than being
a deterrent to research, uncovers fundamental
philosophical assumptions by which the founda-
tions of the field can be probed and clarified, thus
strengthening its overall state (also see Knapp,
2009). In summary, integrating insights from
the philosophical domain into established areas
of expertise provides family scholars with the
opportunity to develop novel, forward-thinking
theories, methods, and programs of research that
expand, challenge, and refine existing findings as
well as existing ideologies.
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