DANO, CHARRISE B. JD 1.

5A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - 9AM - 12NN

Immunity from Suit

The principle enshrined in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution which provides that the
“State may not be sued without its consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty.

(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693[1993])

A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

(Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 [1993])

It also rests on reasons of public policy—that public service would be hindered, and the
public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to lawsuits at the instance
of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means
required for the proper administration of the government.

(The Holy See v. Rosario Jr., 228 SCRA 524 [1994])

The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit may be invoked by any foreign state when it is
sued in the country just as the Philippines may invoke sovereign immunity from suit filed in
a foreign country, and except when it waives it, the suit will fail.

The doctrine, which says, “the state may not be sued without its consent” is clear that the
State may be sued, with its consent, either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law.

The Philippine government consents, through Republic Act (RA) 3083, to be sued upon any
money claim involving liability arising from contract, expressly or implied, which could serve
as a basis of civil action between private parties.

Implied consent, on the other hand, arises when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract in its proprietary capacity
but not in its sovereign or governmental capacity. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity.

(Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212 [1991])

When the state itself commences litigation, irrespective of whether or not it is in its
proprietary or non-governmental capacity, it waives its immunity from suit.

(Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, 192 SCRA 305 [1990])

A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent only when it enters into a business contract. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In other words,
the test is not the conclusion of a contract by the state but by the legal nature of the act.
Thus, it has been held that there is no waiver of state immunity where the contract is a
necessary incident of its prime government function.

(Philippine National Railways v. IAC, 217 SCRA 401 [1993])

By engaging in a particular business through a governmental agency or corporation, the
state divests itself of its sovereign character and makes itself amenable to suit, for in the
conduct of such business, there can be no one law for the sovereign and another for the
subject, and both should stand upon equally before the law.

The doctrine of state immunity from suit is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties. A public
officer who is sued in connection with the performance of his duties may properly invoke
the doctrine, when the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such
that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

(United States of America v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192 [1993])

The rule is that if the judgment against such official will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against him, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded .

In short, there can be no execution of judgment against government funds or properties.

The claim should be presented for payment with the Commission on Audit.

This rule is, however, subject to exception, such as when the official is sued in his personal
or private capacity for acts done with malice or in bad faith, or when the official does
unauthorized or illegal acts or goes beyond the scope of his authority, or commits a crime,
in which case, the principle of state immunity from suit does not apply and the official
concerned may be held personally liable therefor.

(Lansang v. CA, 326 SCRA 259 [2000])

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in
their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.

For the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice. High position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another (Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 [1990]).

For a public official may be made to account in his personal capacity for acts contrary to law
and injurious to the rights of the complainant, because illegal or unauthorized acts of
officers are not acts of the state (Begosa v. Phil. Veterans Adm, 32 SCRA 466 [1970]).