DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Under this doctrine, the State cannot be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution). It
reflects nothingless than recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation
of the unwritten rule effectivelyinsulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very
essence of sovereignty. (Department of Agriculture v.NLRC, G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)There
can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends (Republic vs.
Villasor, GRNL‐30671, November 28, 1973). However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether
express or implied. Express consent of the State may be manifested through general or special law.
Solicitor General cannot validly waiveimmunity from suit. Only the Congress can (Republic v. Purisima,
G.R. No. L‐36084, Aug.31, 1977). Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or
when it enters into a contract. There is an impliedconsent when the state enters into a business
contract. (US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L‐35645 May 22, 1985). However, this rule is notabsolute. Not all
contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability. Distinction must still
be madebetween one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which
is done in its proprietarycapacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can this be deemed to have actually givenits consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to theexercise of its sovereign functions.
(Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993) A suit considered as suit
against the State under the following instances:1. When the Republic is sued by name; 2. When the suit
is against an unincorporated government agency; 3. When the suit is on its face against a government
officer but the case is such.While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaintsfiled against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if thejudgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as theappropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against thestate itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded. It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law andinjurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of govt.officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have beeninvaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity ofthe State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued
in his individual capacity such as where heacts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. A public official may be liable in his personal capacity forwhatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority orjurisdiction. In this case,
the officers are liable for damages.The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are
sought to be sued in the courts of the local State. Theadded basis in this case is the principle of the
sovereign equality of States, under w/c one State cannot assert jurisdictionover another in violation of
the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. To do so would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Under this doctrine, the State cannot be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution). It
reflects nothing less than recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation
of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very
essence of sovereignty. (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, G. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)

There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends
(Republic vs. Villasor, GRN L‐30671, November 28, 1973). However, it may be sued if it gives consent,
whether express or implied.

Express consent of the State may be manifested through general or special law. Solicitor General cannot
validly waive immunity from suit. Only the Congress can (Republic v. Purisima, G. No. L‐36084, Aug,
1977).

Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract.
There is an implied consent when the state enters into a business contract. (US v. Ruiz, G. No. L‐35645
May 22, 1985). However, this rule is not absolute.

Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability. Distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. (Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)

A suit considered as suit against the State under the following instances:

When the Republic is sued by name;

When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself, although it
has not been formally impleaded.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against
the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual capacity
such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may
be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable
for damages.

The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the
local State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign equality of States, under w/c
one State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium. To do so would "unduly vex the peace of nations."