Criminal Law Review

(Midterm Examination)

Glaiza G. Vender

I.
a.)
No, Otoy cannot interpose self-defense.
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that one of the elements of self-
defense, as a justifying circumstance, is unlawful aggression. However, jurisprudence
dictates that the unlawful aggression must be continuous or existing at the time of the
exertion of reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression.
The unlawful aggression of Oboy was no longer existing at the time Otoy stabbed
and eventually killed him because he was dispossessed of the knife. Hence, Otoy cannot
interpose self-defense.
b.)
No, Otoy cannot interpose the defense of fulfilment of duty.
The Supreme Court ruled in various cases that while it is true that a police officer
can employ such force to repel the attack against his person, this right cannot be
exercised arbitrarily. The police officer is mandated to bring the aggressor to the police
station and not kill him on the spot, when it’s not necessary.
In the given facts, Oboy was already dispossessed of the kitchen knife so the
unlawful aggression ceased to exist. Otoy, as a police office, had no right to kill him
because it’s no longer necessary to defend his person and to fulfill his duty.

II.
a.)
Manny Lumabao is a neither a quasi-recidivist nor a recidivist.
The Revised Penal Code defines a quasi-recidivist as someone who was convicted
by a final judgment for an offense or a felony and when he’s about to serve or serving his
sentence, he committed a new felony. On the other hand, a recidivist is one who, at the

Page 1|6
time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.
Manny Lumabao was not yet convicted by final judgment for an offense. There
was no mention that a commitment order was already issued by the court. Premises
considered, Manny is neither a recidivist nor a quasi-recidivist.

b.)
Yes, both circumstances can be appreciated.
The Revised Penal Code inflicts greater and more severe punishment for habitual
delinquent who committed the specific crimes enumerated under the law for a third time
or oftener. Aside from being meted out to serve the penalty for the last crime committed,
the additional penalty provided by law is also given. Meanwhile, recidivism is an
aggravating circumstance and may be appreciated in a way that the additional penalty for
habitual delinquency is set to the maximum.

III.
a.)
I would advise Nenita that Nikolai is covered by Philippine penal laws.
It is settled in the Civil code and jurisprudence that penal laws have the
characteristic of generality. It means that any person, who live or sojourn in the
Philippines, is covered by our penal laws.
Provided in the facts is that Nikolai was residing in Bicol so he was within the grasp
of our penal laws such as RA. No. 9262.
Further, I would advise Nenita to file a case against Nikolai, citing violation of RA
No. 9262 in order for the German national to be obliged to support their 5-year old
daughter, Sonia.
b.)
Yes, Nikolai would be held criminally liable for the acts of marital infidelity and non-
support committed in the United Arab Emirates under RA No. 9262.
The Supreme Court held in various cases that Psychological violence set forth in
RA 9262 can be filed despite the acts complained of were committed in a foreign country
as long as the effects are felt in the Philippines by the aggrieved spouse.
Although the marital infidelity and non-support were committed by Nikolai in United
Arab Emirates, the effects of the same, such as terrible mental anguish and emotional

Page 2|6
suffering, were felt by Nenita in the Philippines. As such, Nikolai would be criminally liable
for violation of RA No. 9262.

IV.
a.)
As the Inquest Prosecutor, I would dismiss the complaint.
It is already settled that when the Philippines is not the port of destination and the
vessel is in transit, the local courts have no jurisdiction to try and hear cases committed
onboard foreign vessels.
SS Abana was a foreign vessel and Singapore was its port of destination.
Premises considered, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the offense committed
which was violation of RA No. 9165. Thus, I would dismiss the complaint.

b.)
Yes, this fact would matter in my answer.
Established is the fact that when the Philippines is the port of destination, the
violation committed onboard the foreign vessel is triable in the local courts.

V.
a.)
Yes, Brent can be held criminally liable for the death of Joseph.
Principal by direct participation is one of the people criminally liable under the
Revised Penal Code. Moreover, case law provides that the person, who committed a
felony, is responsible for the natural and logical consequences of his act when the same
is the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the victim.
Brent is liable as principal by direct participation because he was the one who
attacked Joseph. As a result of such altercation, the latter died due to hemorrhagic stroke.
Brent’s attack was the proximate cause of the death of Joseph and he must be held
criminally responsible for it.
b.)
Yes, the victim’s age can be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Age, as an aggravating circumstance, can be appreciated when the victim is of
tender age or old age.
Page 3|6
 VI.
a.)
I would appreciate conspiracy in the imposition of criminal liability of Akloy, Ontoy,
Gimo, and Pilo. Bontol is not included.
Jurisprudence dictates that implied conspiracy can be appreciated through the
overt acts of those involved. Al though, the persons involved did not expressly give their
concurrence, conspiracy still exists by adhering to the single criminal design as evidenced
by their actions.
In the instant case, only Akloy, Ontoy, Gimo, and Pilo conspired to rob the house
of Otreb. Hence, they’re the ones who would be criminally liable for the robbery as well
as the murder and rape.
Bontol did not agree to the conspiracy nor give his concurrence to the same. His
presence during the proposal of Akloy to commit a felony is of no moment because he
did not take part in the crime/s. As such, he should not be included.

b.)
No, Pilo was not a mere accomplice, but a principal due to the presence of
conspiracy.
It is settled by the Supreme Court that when conspiracy is established, the act of
one is the act of all.
Pilo’s role as a look out cannot be appreciated as minor because he’s part of the
conspiracy. Thus, his liability is that of a principal.

VII.
a.)
No, complex crimes are not present in this case.
Complex crime as stated in the Revised Penal Code is committed when a single
act resulted to grave and less grave felonies. Further, the Supreme Court laid down the
rule that when the victims cannot be identified with certainty, there is complex crime;
otherwise, there is not.
While it is true that the gunmen were impelled by a single impulse and that is to
kill; and their felonious act resulted to grave and less grave felonies, still there is no
complex crime. In this case, the victims could be identified with certainty. Thus, there are
no complex crimes and each gunman is responsible for each felony committed.

Page 4|6
 b.)
The prize cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case
because it was given as a result of killing the late Mayor and not as a strong temptation
to induce the henchmen to do the deed.
On the other hand, the prize would have no effect to the criminal liability of the
mastermind. The latter could not be considered as principal by inducement because the
prize given was for killing the mayor and not used to induce the henchmen to kill. In other
words, the killing preceded the giving of prize so it has no effect. However, this statement
is without prejudice to the other acts of the mastermind.

VIII.
a.)
I would charge Nelson as principal by direct participation and Naldo as an
accomplice.
The criminal liability of Nelson is established because he was the one who killed
Lino. On the other hand, Naldo’s criminal liability is sourced from the fact that he exercised
moral ascendancy over Nelson, but his participation was that on an accomplice only
because when he uttered the words, a fight was already happening.

b.)
No, Bontol’s utterance would not make him a principal by inducement because of
two reasons: First, he did not exercise moral ascendancy over Nelson since he’s a mere
neighbor; and second, his words could not be considered as so direct, efficacious and
powerful as to amount to moral coercion. Premises considered, Bontol would not be
considered as principal by inducement.

IX.
a.)
Yes.
The law provides that if the offender is abroad and is charged under the Revised
Penal Code, the running of the prescriptive period for the crime is interrupted.
Thus, the running of the prescriptive period for the crime of Malversation is
interrupted because it is a felony under the Revised Penal Code.
Page 5|6
 b.)
No.
The contrary rule applies when the offender committed a violation of special penal
law as decided by the Supreme Court.
His presence abroad will not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
because he’s charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts, which is a
special penal law.

X.
a.)
No, Mikyo may not be criminally exempt under Article 20 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The law provides that any person who facilitates the escape of his descendant is
criminally exempt if such descendant is an author of any specific crimes enumerated such
as murder.
In the given case, there was no mention of any attendant circumstance that
qualifies the killing as murder so this doubt will be ruled in favor of Ontoy. The latter would
only be held criminally liable for homicide. Although, Ontoy was a descendant of Mikyo.
This relationship would not be appreciated because the crime Ontoy committed was not
one of those expressly provided by law.
b.)
No, Mikyo is not criminally liable.
When those specific relatives enumerated by law acted as an accessory, they will
not be held liable.
Strictly speaking, Mikyo would be held as an accessory because he facilitated the
escape of his son who committed parricide; however, his relationship with Ontoy is
appreciated as absolutory cause so he would not be criminally liable as an accessory.

Page 6|6