TRANSPORTATION LAW I. IntRopucTION Governing Laws (a) Articles 1732 to 1763 of the Civil Code; (b) Sections 349 to 379, 573 to 736, and 806-869 of the Code of Commerce. In case of conflict between the two (2) sets of laws, the Civil Code, being the later law, generally prevails. There are special laws that also govern particular cases such as the Public Service Act, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, etc. 2, Concept of “Common Carrier” ‘A“common carrier” is a person, corporation, firm or association, engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers and/or goods, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public. (Art. 1732, Civil Codey’ A.common carrier is a person or corporation whose regular business is to carry passenger or property for all persons who may choose to employ and to remunerate him. Caltex (Philigpines), Inc, v, Suipicio Lines, Ine., 315 SCRA 709 (1999) Acommon carrier is one who holds himself out to the public as eng aged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place, for compensation, offering his services to the public generally. First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA. 661 (1998). Perena v. Zarate 679 SCRA 208 (2012) A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or convey goods or persons from one place to another, gratuitously or ‘Cada! definition reiterated in Lea IMer Indus, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc, 471 SCRA 698 (2005); Aracia v. Caurt of Appeals, 210 SGRA 624 (199%), 129130 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW for hire. The true test for a common cartier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general public as his business or occupation. Thus, despite catering to a limited clientele, the Perenas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee. As such, there were bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances cf each case. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc. 622 SCRA 389 (2010) Art. 1732 of Civil Code defining "common carriers’ has deliberately refrained from making distinctions on whether the carrying of persons or goods is the carrier's principal business, whether it is offered on a regular basis, or whether it is offered to the general public. Fram the nature of their business and public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 409 SCRA 528 (2003) Travel Agent Not a Common Carrier. - By definition, a contract of carriage is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate themselves. to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price, and they may constitute as private or special carriers and common or public carriers. A travel agent is not a common carrier since he does not undertake to transport @ person from one piace to another, but simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf, which includes the procuring of tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours. Atravel agent is bound to observe the due diligence of a good father of a family and not the extraordinary diligence imposed on common carriers, First Phil. Industrial v. Court of Appeals 300 SCRA 661 (1998) ‘The test for determining whether a party is @ common carrier is that he must: (2) Be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as ‘a public employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in transportation of goods for person generally as @ business and not as a casual occupation;TRANSPORTATION LAW (b) Undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined; (c) Undertake to carry by the method by which his business is condueted and over his established roads; (@) Be for transport hire.* ‘entity engaged in carrying of petroleum products over its pipeline network for hire as a public employment is deemed to be a common carrier, because it undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that it has limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. Common Carrier versus Private Carrier National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals 283 SCRA 45 (1997) At the outset, it is essential to establish whether the contract of carriage was entered into as a common carrier or as @ private carrier, since the resolution of this preliminary question determines: (a) the law applicable to the case; (b) standard of diligence required of the carrier; and (©) burden of proof applicable to the case. Loadmaster Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage Corp. 639 SCRA 69 (2011) ‘One engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service, is a common carrier, as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. Also, a customs broker where the transportation of goods is an integral part of its business. is also regarded as a common carrier.” Loadstar Shipping Co. v. Pioneer Asia Ins. 479 SCRA 655 (2006) Where a company is engaged in the business of transporting car- go by water and for compensation, offering its services indiscriminately to the public, itis, without doubt, a common carrier. The voyage-charter agreement in this case did not in any way convert the common carrier into a private carrier. We have already resolved this issue with finality in Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that: First enunciated in Lastimoso v Daliente, 1 CAR 769 (1961). Westwind Shipping Corp. v. UCPB General insurance, 710 SORIA S44 (2013) 131192 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW = @ public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of the vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time- charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise, that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer.” PHILAMGEN v. PKS Shipping Co. 401 SCRA 222 (2003) Common Carrier as Public Service = The definition of “common carrier’ can best be shown by looking at the provisions of Art. 1732 of the Civil Code and Sec. 13(b) of the Public Service Act. Much of the distinction between a “common or public carrier’ and a “private or special carrier’ lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele, although invotving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation providing such service could very well be just a private carrier. The fact that a person or corporation engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such for a fee, then the regularity of its activities indicates more than just casual activity on its part, and make it a common carrier.* Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier, since such restrictive interpretation would make It easy for @ common carrier to escape liability by the simple expedient of entering into those distinct agreements with clients Asia Lighterage v. Court of Appeals 409 SCRA 340 (2003) Petitioner is clearly a common carrier because its principal business is that of lighterage, offering its barges to the public for carrying or transporting goods by water for compensation, done on an irregular rather than scheduled manner, albeit with an only limited clientele. A common carrier need not have fixed and publicly known routes, nor does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. “Tho doctrine that the concept of "common carrier” under Art. 1732 coincides neatly with the nation of “public service," under the Public Service Act (C.A. 1416, as amended) has been reltarated in Calva v. UCPS, General Insurance Co., 379 SCRA 510 (2002).‘TRANSPORTATION LAW National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals 283 SCRA 45 (1997) The true nature of a common carriers the carriage of passengers OF ewer Provided it has space, for ail who opt to avail themecce of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which does nor qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier. “Generally, private carriage, such as the rendering of tramping setvices, is underiare, by Special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry in Private carriage, the rights and obligations of parties, including fabilties for damage to cargo, are determined prima ‘ily by stipulations in their contract of carriage or charter party. In such case, the burden of proof is on the other party to show that the private carrier was Tesponsible for the loss of, or injury to, the cargo, ICLV: SC decision was more in conformity with the findings of eth lower court and CA that petitioner was a private carrier san is not In agreement with Bulk of SC decision on the matter] Planters Products v. Court of Appeals 228 SCRA 476 (1993) When carrier in the ordinary course of business transports goods as a common carrier and thereby bound by law to observe A common carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the Charter of the whole or portion of a vessel, provided the charter is itis only when the charter includes both the vessel and itr crew, as in & bareboat or demise charter, that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter party is concerned. "Gling Hersunoez 110 PERSIE, p. 243, uhieh in tum ced Soxoenens & Yusosrouios, p, 364, 183134 be COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW De Guzman v. Court of Appeals 168 SCRA 612 (1988) Art. 1732 of Civil Code makes no distinction between one ‘whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods ‘or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity, nor dogs it make distinctions between one who offers the service to the “general public’ or a narrow segment of the general population, Therefore, one who “back-hauled” goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, even when such activity was only periodical or ‘occasional and was not its principal line of business would be subject to the responsibilities and obligations of a common carrier.® Malayan Insurance Co. v. Philippines First Insurance Co. 676 SCRA 268 (2012) Accommon carrier becomes a private carrier when it undertakes to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only. In such case, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York 587 SCRA 429 (2009) Stevedoring Not a Gommon Carrier - Mindanao Terminal, a stevedoring company which was charged with the loading and stowing the cargoes, does not operate a business that is classified as a common carrier. Consequently, it had duly exercised the required degree of diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family. There is no specific provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than ordinary diligence for a stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the loading and stowing of cargoes Customs Broker as Common Carrier Schmitz Transport v. Transport Venture, Inc. 456 SCRA 587 (2005) Facts: Schmitz Transport, as customs broker, undertook to transport the cargoes from vessel's shipside to consignee’s warehouse at Cainta. It then retained TVI to send a barge and tugboat at shipside The operation was done outside of the breakwaters and while a storm signal was raised, and cargo was lost due to the rough waves. *Reiterated in Asia Lighterage and Shipping v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA. 340 (2002): Calvo v: UCPB General Insurance Co., 378 SORAS10 (2002).TRANSPORTATION LAW Issue 1: Schmitz puts liability solely on TVI, and posits that it ‘cannot be liable for the obligations of a carrier, and that any negligence committed by it was deemed the negligence of its principal. Held 1; Schmitz is liable as a common carrier, As long as a person holds itself to the public for the purpose of transporting goods as.a business, it is already considered a common cartier regardless if it owns the vehicle used or has to hire ane. The fact of loss of the cargo therefore made Schmitz liable to the consignee. Issue 2: TVI posits that its contract was with Schmitz and had no contract of carriage with the consignee, and therefore cannot be liable to the consignee. Held 2:Censignee'sclaim against TVI cannotbe based on the breach of contract of carriage. While TVI acted as private carrier for Schmitz, for which it was under no duty to observe extraordinary diligence, it was stil required to observe ordinary diligence to ensure the proper and careful handling, care and discharge of the carried goods. The gross negligence of TVIis discharging the cargo outside of the breakwaters under a storm signal constituted negligence for which it can be held liable to consignee. A.F, Sanchez Brokerage v. Court of Appeals 44T SCRA 427 (2005) Facts: Brokerage firm was engaged as customs broker but with duties to pay the customs duties, taxes and storage fees for the cargo and to deliver the merchandise to the client's premises. Evidence showed that the merchandise were in good condition when delivered to the brokerage firm atthe NAIA, but were damaged when delivered to the client. Brokerage firm contends that it was the defect in the packaging of the merchandise which it raised at the NAIA that was the main cause for the damage, and therefore its negligence cannot be presumed, and was not liable for the obligations of a common carrier. Held; Brokerage firm is also considered a common carrier, and for which the delivery of the merchandise in bad condition raises the presumption of negligence. Art, 1732 does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The rule is that if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but the common cartier nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception, he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage. Calvo v. UCPB Gen. Insurance Co., Inc. 379 SCRA 510 (2002) When transportation of goods is an integral part of a customs broker's functions, it is also a common carrier, for to declare otherwise 195138 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW would be to deprive those with whom it contracts the protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods for its customers, is part and parcel of its business. Lack of Certificate of Public Convenience Loadstar Shipping v. Court of Appeals 315 SCRA 338 (1999) Certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers, which liability arises from the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. Liability of the Registered Owner of Motor Vehicle Villanueva v. Domingo 438 SCRA 485 (2004) SRST: any voice is ci responsible to the public and third persons while irrelevant to determi of the registered owner whom the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death cau: eration of the vehicle in the streets and highways. he main je th eany entiation cf the Or any at famage or injury caused by the vehicle, Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyong 388 SCRA 445 (2002) Registered Owner of Vehicle Liable for the Deaths and Injuries: Regardless of sale made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned. In contemplation of law, the owner operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. 3. Nature of Business and Degree of Diligence of Common Carriers China Airlines v. Chiok 407 SCRA 432 (2003) The business of common carriers is imbued with public interest and duty, and the law governing them imposes an exacting standard. "Reiterated in RCJ Bus Lines, Inc. ¥.Standrd Insurance Co, Ine, 655 SCRA 893 (2011).TRANSPORTATION LAW Japan Airlines v. Simangan 552 SCRA 344 (2008) In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence of such contract and its non- performance by the carrier through the latter's failure to carry the passenger safely to his destination Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Chiong 543 SCRA 308 (2008) Although initially, the burden of proof was with the passenger to prove that there was a breach af contract of carriage, the burden of evidence shifted to the airline when the former adduced sufficient evidence to prove the facts he had alleged ~ at that point, the airline had the burden of going forward to controvert [passenger's] prima facie case, the burden of evidence to establish its claim. Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Fernandez 417 SCRA 474 (2003) The contract of air carriage is @ peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, the law requires commen carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. In action for breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prave that the commen carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that is necessary to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier, Delsan Transport Lines v. Court of Appeals 368 SCRA 24 (2001) From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers até bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers shall be responsible unless the same is brought about. among others, by flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. In all other cases, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.* *R Transport Corp. v. Panta, 588 SCRA TAT (2008). 137138 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Loadstar Shipping v. Court of Appeals 315 SCRA 339 (1999) The business of common carriers impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well-being and property of the members of the general community who happen to deal them. The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow @ common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations Degree of Diligence Required; Presumption of Fault Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad 444 SCRA 355 (2004) In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was al faultinegligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless presumption is rebutted, the courts need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. 471 SCRA 698 (2005) Extraordinary ciligence requires rendering service with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage and destruction to the goods: entrusted for carriage and delivery. Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently for loss of or damage to ‘the goods that they have transported. Loadmaster Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage Corp. 639 SCRA 69 (2011) “Extraordinary diligence” is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing or preserving their own property or rights — this, exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-detict is solidary. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises @ presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligienda) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its ‘employees.b. Ml TRANSPORTATION LAW. 139 Defenses Available to the Common Carrier Lea Mer Industries, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance 471 SCRA 698 (2005) This presumption of fault or negligence on the part of common carriers can be rebutted only by proof that: a (2) They observed extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees; or (b) The loss or damage was occasioned by any of the following causes: + flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; + actof the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; + actor omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; = the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and «order or act of competent public authority, Distinctions in Carriages of Cargo and Passengers Although the Civil Code and Code of Commerce in contracts of carriage are concemed with the same cause of action, particularly culpa contractual, nevertheless, both Codes provide for clear-cut divisions between contracts of carriage of cargo and contracts of carriage of passengers, because the rights and defenses in each kind of contract are different from the other. There are also special rules that pertain to air transportation. Contract oF CARRIAGE oF Passencers Nature of Contract of Carriage of Passengers Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86 (2001) ‘Acommon cartier, from the nature of its business and for resons of public poliey, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger it transports.® Rett Taled fh Philippines Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 886 SCRA 124 (2008): Vresue! x. Philippine Airings, 569 SCRA 487 (2008): Asian Terminals, ine. v. Philarnirsurance Co., 702 SGRAGS (201).140 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad 397 SCRA 75 (2003) The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost ence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances, In case of death or injury toa passenger, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. Northwest Airlines v. Catapang 594 SCRA 401 (2008) Passengers have the right o be treated by a carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that ‘any discourteous conduct on the part of these employeas toward a pessenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals 294 SCRA 19 (1998) A contract of transport of passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. Itis safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it lable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsibie for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by 2 fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of ‘force majeure,” as an exception trom any liability, lusory and ineffective. Fabre v, Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 426 (1996) Facts: A group contracted the bus for a particular trip, which met an accident due to the driver's fault. The employer alleged non-lability for injuries caused since the group that hired the bus was directly responsible for the trip, and that the employer is not a common carrier bound to extraordinary diligence. Held: The contract, even if only for a particular trip, stil involves a contract of carriage. Bus owner need not be engaged in the business of public transportation for the Civil Code provisions on common carri- ers to apply. Art. 1732 thereof as it defines common carriers, does not make distinctions between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancilary activity. It also avoids making any distinction be- tween a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regu-‘TRANSPORTATION LAW 141 lar or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it distinguish between @ carrier offering its services to the “general public,” and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. Causes of Action Arising from Same Negligent Act luusteario: X, Inc. — Public utility company Y = Bus driver, recklessly driving Z = Passenger injured. Z as injured passenger can avail of any of three (3) causes of action (a) Culpa contractual — negligence based on contract; (b) Culpa aquiliana — negligence based on tort; or (c) Culpa criminal — negligence based on a crime. Cura Cowrracruat — In the contract of carriage of passengers, it is the obligation of carrier to convey the passengers safely to the point of destination. In case a passenger is not brought safely thereto, there will be a breach of contract. Any case brought based on culpa contractual will be captioned “Passenger Z v. X, Inc.” because the contract is between them. The driver is not to be included as a party to the action, because he is nota party to the contract, there is no privity as to him. Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas 594 SCRA 569 (2009) Presumption of Negligence in Common Carriage of Passengers. — The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her to her destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the presumption, respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in the discharge of their duty or thet the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc. 622 SCRA 389 (2010) From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. When a passenger dies or is injured in the discharge of a contract of carriage, itis presumed that the common cartier Is at fault or negligent.142, COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Villoria v. Continental Airlines 663 SCRA 57 (2012) An airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agent's employees. In an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent—all that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non- performance by the carrier. b. Cura Aquiiana — Damage caused to another due to negligence. The case will be entitled “Passenger Z v. X, Inc. and Driver Y." and the defendants will be solidarily liable as joint tortfeasars. Tiu v. Arriesgado 437 SCRA 426 (2004) In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, both drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable. c. Cutra Crminat — The driver's act may amount to a crime: reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. The case will be entitle “People v Driver Y,” and ifthe latter is convicted but is insolvent, an action can be pursued by Passenger Z against X, Inc. to enforce the latter's subsidiary liability. Pajarito v. Seneris 87 SCRA 275 (1978) Conviction of employee is conclusive upon employer as to his subsidiary liability, although the latter may not in the strict sense be a party to the criminal case brought against the employee. The enforcement of the employer's subsidiary liability may be conveniently litigated within the same criminal proceedings because the execution of the judgment is @ logical and integral part of the criminal case. The employer will have the right to present evidence of the employee's solvency to avoid liability.” The Weakest cause of action is culpa aquiliana where the employer may raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver. Culpa criminal is a stronger cause of action because as to the company’s subsidiary liability the latter's defense are limited; however, the quantum of evidence needed to convict the employes would have to be guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ‘WAlso Bantoto v. Bobis, 18 SCRA 680 (1866),TRANSPORTATION LAW In Transportation Law, culpa contractualis the cause of action. In a contract of carriage of passengers, itis the obligation of the common cartier to bring the passengers safely to the point of destination. If injured, or death occurs, the presumption of negligence automatically arises, and the common carrier can be held liable if he fails to prove the extraordinary diligence for the duration of the carriage. Nature of the Liability Incurred Perena y. Zarate 679 SCRA 208 (2012) Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates—breach of contract of carriage—against the Perenas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates right to relief against the Philippine National Railways (PNR)—quasi-delict under Art, 2176 of the Civil Code— they nonetheless could be held jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence combining to cause the death of Aaron. Loadmaster Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage Corp. 639 SCRA 69 (2011) Where several causes producing an injury are concurrentand each: is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed te all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. Particular Aspects of Responsibility and Liability of Common Carriers Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad 397 SCRA 75 (2003) Under Culpa-Contractual - A common carrier becomes liable for the death or injury to passengers when: (a) _ through the negligence or willful acts of its employees; (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 143144 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Philtranco Service Enterprises v. Court of Appeals 273 SCRA 562 (1998) Under Quasi-Delict — Liability of registered owner of a public semvice vehicle for damages arising from the tortious act of driver is primary, direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver, pursuant to Art. 2194 of [the] Civil Code. The only recourse of such owner if the judgment is satisfied by him is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict pursuant to Art. 2181 3. When Does Contract of Carriage Begin? The best evidence of a contract of carriage of passenger is the ticket. May there be a contract of carriage even without a ticket? Yes. The Statute of Frauds covers six (6) contracts, none of which is a contract of transportation, which means that a contract of carriage may be oral. PAN-AM v. IAC 164 SCRA 268 (1988) However, as a general rule, the defense that a ticket is a “contract of adhesion’ is not acceptable, since “one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; ifhe adheres, he gives his consent.” British Airways v. Court of Appeals 248 SCRA 699 (1993) A contract of common carriage of passenger consists of two aspects, namely: (@) Contract to carry (at some future time), which contract is consensual and is necessarily perfected by mere consent under Art. 1356 of the Civil Code; and (b) Contract “of carriage” or ‘of common carriage” itself should be considered as a real contract, for not until carrier is actually used can carrier be said to have already assumed obligations of a carrier. Accarrier can be held liable for damages for failure to comply with the contract to carry which is consensual in nature. Dangwa Transpo. Co. v. Court of Appeals 202 SCRA 574 (1991) ‘The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to a contract of carriage. “iRoteratad in PAN-AM v, Rapadas, 208 SCRA 67 (1992).TRANSPORTATION LAW ‘San Diego v. Transit MD. (CA) 61 0.G, 3416 Facts: The bus stopped when an old man signaled that he wanted to ride. As soon as the old man stepped on the platform of the bus, the bus driver recklessly started to accelerate the bus. The old man slipped and was ran over, causing his death. The heirs sought to recover damages from the carrier based on culpa contractual. Carrier contended that there was as yet no contrat of carriage. Held: There was a perfected contract of carriage: as soon as the old man placed his foot on the platform, he was already a pas- senger. Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co, 52 Phil. 900 (1929) Although there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its care to take on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage, nevertheless when the mo- torman sees a person attempting to board the car while in mation, and at the place not appointed for stopping, he should not do any act to increase the peril of such person: and if, lation of this duty, the motorman accelerates speed while the intending passenger is in the act of boarding the care, with the result that he slips and gets his foot crushed under the wheel of the moving car, the company is civilly li- able in damages. Tamayo v. Pascua 8 CAR 741 (1965) Abus need not come to a dead stop to allow passengers to board; it is enough that the bus slows down to a negligible speed, allowing people to board it without danger to their ives and limbs. Indeed{ ] ithas been held that the duty of the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. Under such circumstance it is the driver's duty to see to it that every person who wants to board the bus is safe inside before Picking up speed and moving forward. Sweet Lines v. Teves 83 SCRA 361 (1978) Stipulation in the ticket providing that any action arising from the contract of carriage must be prosecuted in Cebu only, is void for being against public policy since it operated to unduly molest the passengers and effectively discourage them from bringing suits against the common carrier. 145148 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW When Does Contract of Carriage End? Aboitiz Shipping v. Court of Appeals 4179 SCRA 95 (1989) The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or 2 reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals 17 SGRA 793 (1966) Facts: A married couple, with their little child, were passengers in a La Mallorca bus which was proceeding to the bus terminal, The bus reached the terminal safely. The couple with their child went down the bus safely. While waiting for their baggage, the child went in front of another bus, and was run over and killed. The couple sought to recover damages from the carrier based on culpa contractual. Held: The couple can recover from the carrier under culpa contractual. The child was still a passenger at the time of the accident and hence, the carrier was still liable. The contract of carriage ends only after a reasonable time within which to get out of the bus terminal. Statutory Obligations of Carrier Article 1755 of Civil Code obliges the carrier to carry the passengers safely as fer as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. a. In General — Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86 (2001) ‘common cartier, by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy. is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Incase of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that itTRANSPORTATION LAW 147 observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Arts. 1733 and 1795 of [the] Civil Code. Yobido v. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the mode of travel he has taken, since after all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury. However, when a passenger is injured or dies while traveling, the law under Art. 1755 of [the] Civil Code presumes that the common carrier is negligent, and therefore the burden of proof is upon such common carrier that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required under the law to avoid damages or injury ta the passengers. Baliwag Transit, Inc, v. Court of Appeals 256 SGRA 746 (1996) ‘Acommon carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. It breaches its contract when it failed to deliver its passengers to their destination safe and sound, In contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the comman carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of [the] Civil Code. Tiu v. Arriesgado 437 SCRA 426 (2004) Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negli- gence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the case of his passengers. To overcome such presumption of negligence, the carrier must show (2) The utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human eare and foresight can provide; or (b) That the accident was caused by fortuitous event. Itis such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. Its nature is such that it is primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent operation and use of motor vehicles.COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW As to Equipment and Facilities Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals 536 SCRA 147 (2007) Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. While it is true that a person driving an automobile must use his faculties of seeing and hearing when nearing a railroad crossing, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any “through street” only accrues from the time the said “through street” or crossing is so designated and sign-posted, The authority in this jurisdiction is that the failure of a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train amounts to negligence. Pestafio v. Sumayang 346 SCRA 870 (2000) The fact that the driver was able to use a bus with a faulty ‘speedometer shows that the employer was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. Under Arts. 2180. and 2176 of [the] Civil Code, the owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees, ag well as in the defacts of equipment used. Yobideo v. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) The explosion of a new tire cannot by itself be considered @ fortuitous event to exempt the common carrier from liability in the absence of showing on the part of the carrier that other human factors that could have intervened to cause the blowout of the new tire did nat in fact occur. A common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone; it must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals 254 SCRA 260 (1996) ‘Before commencing a contracted voyage, carrier undertook some repairs on one of the vessel's two engines, but even before it could finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin onTRANSPORTATION LAW ‘only one functioning engine, instead of two. Even the lone functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run its course, it conked out. Plainly, vessel was unseaworthy even before voyage began. To be seaworthy, vessel must be adequately equipped for voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew, Failure of the common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel is clear breach of its duty under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, which binds the cartier to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of @ very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Spouses Landingan v. Pantranco 33 SCRA 284 (1970) Facts: A married couple with two children were passengers in a bus going to Baguio. Upon reaching an uphill point at the Kennon Road, the motor suddenly stopped and the bus backed down. The driver expertly guided the bus to rest on the mountainside of the road. But because of the noise, the two children became frightened and they jumped out of the bus and were killed. Is bus company held liable for their death? Hela: Yes. The bus, when it stopped, was not in perfect running condition. It is carrier's duty to ensure that the bus is always in perfect condition. Here, the defect was not latent. Necesito v. Paras 104 Phil. 75 (1958) Facts: While the Phil. Rabbit bus was traveling fast, its driver sensed that the wheels did not respond to the movement of the steering wheel. The bus hit a rut and it turn-turtled, killing a passenger. Mechanics of the bus company discovered that the worn-out gear of the steering wheel had a crack, which could not be seen by the naked eye from outside, Phil, Rabbit proved that the defect was attributed to GM USA and that defect was a factory defect which could not have been discovered by expert mechanics. Is bus company liable? Held: Yes. When a bus company places its bus for the use of the riding public it must be in good condition. If it was really the fault of GM, then the bus company's remedy would be to go after GM While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its equipment, if such flaws were discoverable. In such case, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier, and manufacturer's good repute will not relieve the carrier from liability. 149180 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW c. Circumstances at Time of Accident (1) When Vehicle Improperly Parked Batangas Trans. v. Caguimbal 22 SCRA 171 (1967) Facts: A Batangas Trans. bus going narth stopped on the highway when a passenger wanted to alight, Another bus was going south fast and recklessly, trying to pass @ carrefela. In trying to overtake the carretela, the driver of the approaching bus miscalculated and hit the Batangas Trans. bus, causing the alighting passenger to be thrown out and killed, The heirs of the victim sought recovery from Batangas Trans., which raised the defense of fortuitous event. Held: Batangas Trans. is still lable. In civil law, where a fortuitous event concurs with negligence, liability is net thereby extinguished. Although the bus was then in a “stop” position it did mot stop on road's shoulder at the time the passenger was alighting. That is considered negligence that concurred with fortuitous event and did not operate to extinguish the liability. (However, since Batangas Trans. and the company of the other bus were made alternative defendants, both were held liable: Batangas Bus for culpa contractual and the other company for culpa aquiliane.) (2) When Vehicle Bumped from Behind Raynera v. Hiceta 306 SCRA 102 (1999) Drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle must be presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, since the rear driver is deemed to have the last clear chance of avoiding the accident, and therefore deemed negligent. (3) When Driver Violating Rules at Time of Accident Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals 324 SGRA 147 (2000) Under Art. 2185 of Civil Code, unless there is contrary proof, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of mishap he was violating a traffic regulation, such as when he was driving at the wrong side of the road. (4) Rules on Overtaking Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 (2000) The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has theTRANSPORTATION LAW duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do 80 in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from opposite direction comes into view. Non-compliance with such rules constitute negligence. (8) Hit and Run Driver Abueva v. People 390 SCRA 62 (2002) A bus driver could not be considered a hitand-run driver where he exerted efforts to see to it that the victim had been attended to, such as when there were several people assisting the victim, including his co-employer working for the bus company. Injuries Caused by Employees R Transport Gorp. v. Pante 599 SCRA 747 (2009) Common carriers are liable for the death or injury to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 (2000) The negligence and recklessness of a jeepney driver is binding against the owner thereof, and in the action based on contract of car- riage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for payment of damages sought by the passenger, since under: (a) Art. 1758 of the Civil Code, the common carrier is bound to catry the passengers safely: (b) Art. 1756, in case of death or injury of the passenger, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault orto have acted negligently; and (6) Art. 1759, common carrier is liable for death of, or injury to, passengers through the negligence or willful acts of employees, and such liability of common carrier does not cease Upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. 151182 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Maranan v. Perez 20 SCRA 413 (1967) Facts: A taxi driver tried to hold-up his passenger, who resisted and was killed. His heirs sued based on culpa contractual against the taxi company, which denied liability on ground that the driver acted beyond the scope of his authority. Could the carrier be held liable for acts of employees beyond the scope of their authority? Held: It may be true that the taxi driver was acting beyond the scope of his authority, but Art. 1759 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the owner is liable for negligence of the employees even if such ‘acts are beyond the scope of his authority. The taxi company was held liable on culpa contractual. NOTE: This case repealed the doctrine of De Gillaco v. Manila Railroad, 97 Phil. 884 (1955), wherein a security guard rode on one of the trains to go to his place of duty. While en route, he killed @ passenger riding in the same train. Manila Railroad was absolved from any liability on the ground that the guard was not on duty at that time and therefore not acting within the scope of his authority e. As to Injuries Caused by Other Passengers (1) The Liability of Carrier is Expressly Covered by Article 1763 of the Civil Code Manila Railroad v. Ballesteros 6 SCRA 641 (1966) Facts: When a Manila Railroad bus reached one of the municipalities along its route, the driver stopped the bus and went down to answer a call of nature. While the driver was thus outside the bus, one of the passengers went into the driver's seat and drove off the bus. The bus met an accident, causing injury to another passenger. !s Manila Railroad liable for the act of the passenger? Held: Manila Railroad is liable for the injuries suffered by some passengers because its driver was guilty of negligence in leaving the key on the ignition. Had driver taken the key with himself, the passenger could not have driven off with the bus. The carrier is therefore liable for injuries when the carrier's employees could have prevented the injuries through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Obligation of Common Carriers for Baggage ‘Sarkies Tours Phil. v. Court of Appeals 280 SCRA 58 (1997) Where @ common carrier accepts its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it placed in the vehicle by its own employee,6. TRANSPORTATION LAW its failure to collect freight charges is the common carrier's own lookout, ‘and cannot be used to exempt the common carrier from liability for the consequent loss of the baggage. Philippine Airlines v. IAC 216 SCRA 334 (1992) Although the baggage of a passenger was eventually delivered to him, that did not constitute a case of mere delay in delivery “since the baggage was not delivered at all to the passenger for the purpose of the trip in contravention of a common carrier's undertaking to transport the goods from the place of embarkation to the ultimate point of destination.” The non-delivery of luggage during the entire length of passenger's stay abroad, is a breach of carrier's obligation. Defenses Available in Culpa Contractual 183 a. Proof of Negligence; Presumption ~ Under Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in case af death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. The cartier is presumed negligent as soon as the injury or death is proven. The carrier must rebut this presumption; otherwise, it will be liable for damages. LTB v. Tiongson 64 0.6. 10601 If a passenger is injured or dies, there immediately arises ‘the presumption that the commen carrier is negligent. The injured passenger or the heirs of the dead passenger do not have to prove the carrier's negligence; all they have to prove is the fact of injury or death in the course of the passenger's carriage, and the law automatically raises the presumption of negligence. Zamboanga Transit v. Court of Appeals 30 SCRA 717 (196) The presumption may be rebutted by evidence on any of the following: (a) Exercise of extraordinary due diligence; (b) Fortuitous event; or (c) Contributory negligence of the passenger under Arts. 1762 and 2179 of [the] Civil Code. Only evidence on one of these points is admissible. If the presumption is not rebutted, the carrier is automatically liable.154 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employees RGU Bus Lines, Inc. y. Standard Insurance Co. 655 SCRA 693 (2011) In a bus company, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, the basis of the llability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence, Heirs of Ochoa v. G&S Transport Corp. 645 SCRA 93 (2011) G&S as a common carrier “is bound te carry [2 passenger] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost dlligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances.” When the passenger dies during the course of the travel, then the rules prevails: “In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common cartier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier.” Unfortunately, G&S miserably failed to overcome the presumption. Both the courts below found that the accident which led to the passenger's death was due to the reckless ¢riving and gross negligence of the taxi driver, thereby holding G&S liable fo the heirs of the deceased passenger for breach of contract of carriage. The acquittal of the driver in the criminal case is immaterial to the determination of the breach of contract. Fabre v. Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 426 (1996) Fora bus company, due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed 2 professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.TRANSPORTATION LAW 185 Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals 386 SCRA 126 (2002) The mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt the employer from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon the employer to show that in recruiting and employing the errant driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals 386 SCRA 126 (2002) ‘The act of driver in bringing the victim to the nearest medical facility does not show adequate supervision by the employer over its employees; for one, the act was after the fact of negligence on the driver's part; for another, the evidence on record shows that the driver's act was neither voluntary nor spontaneous as he had to be prevailed upon by the victim's companions to render such assistance. ©. Coverage of Fortuitous Event A fortuitous event covers not only acts of God (lightning, earthquakes, shipwreck, etc.) but also acts of man (war, strikes, homicide, recklessness of other driver, latent mechanical defect, etc.). If a fortuitous event is proved, the carrier is absolved from liability. But the fortuitous event must not concur with negligence, otherwise, it is no longer a defense. In other words, the fortuitous event must be the sole element relied upon. Yobido v. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) A fortuitous event is possessed of the following character- istics: (a) The cause of unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, 1 failure of debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes caso fortuito; (©) Occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) Obligor must be free from any participation in aggrava- tion of the injury resulting to the creditor.’? Also Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA (1999).156 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW Based on the foregoing a bus company cannot be exempted from liability from a tire blowout which cannot be classified simply as a fortuitous event, in the absence of snowing that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers under the law. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc. 622 SCRA 389 (2010) In addition to the requisites provided in Yobido v. Court of Appeals, to fully free a common carrier from any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. New World Intl Dev., Inc. v. NYK-Fil Japan Shipping Corp. 656 SCRA 129 (2011) That the loss was occasioned by a typhoon, an exempting cause under Art. 1734 of [the] Civil Code, does not automatically relieve the common carrier of liability. The latter has the burden of proving that the typhoon was the proximate and only cause of loss and that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize such loss before, during, and after the disastrous typhoon, ‘Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Fernandez 417 SCRA 474 (2003) Facts: Airline company assails the award of damages for delay in the transport of the passenger which it attributed to Inclement weather beyond its control, and the longer route that had to be taken to avoid the airspace where the Gulf War was then being fought. Held: Airiine company is stil able, since it was not without recourse in meeting the bad weather's consequence to enable it to fulfil its obligation to transport the passengers safely as scheduled as far as human care and foresight can provide to their destination. Tagged as a premiere airline as it claims to be able to foresee and deal with such situation. It likewise showed indifference and negligence by its absence and insensitivity and [as] well as lack of diligence in communicating to its passengers the consequence of the delay in their fignts. Gatchalian v. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) The death or injury to a passenger raises the statutory presumption that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently. To exempt a common carrier from liability for death orTRANSPORTATION LAW physical injuries to passengers upon the graund of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of human will but also that itwas impossible to avoid Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 488 SCRA 216 (1990) ‘The act of passenger stabbing another passenger in the bus is considered as force majeure, However, to be absolved from liability in the case of force majeure, the common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident; otherwise, it would still be held liable. Nocum v. LTD 30 SCRA 69 (1969) Facts: One of the bus passengers had firecrackers inside his baggage, which ignited when another passenger smoked cigarettes, causing injuries to another passenger. The injured passenger sought to recover damages from the carrier. Held; Carrier is not liable for the injuries caused to a Passenger by exploding firecrackers in the baggage of another passenger. The reason is that the carrier cannot be expected to examine and search each and every piece of baggage of passengers, otherwise the bus may not all together be able to leave. But this is only true so long as the cause of the accident (presence of firecrackers) was not apparent and the carrier or its employees are not guilty of negligence. This illustrates an example when an ‘act of man" would exempt the carrier fram liability 187 Contributory Negligence of Passengers is governed by Article 1762 of the Civil Code which provides that it does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injury if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of common carrier, but amount of damages shall be equitably reduced. Estacion v. Bernardo 483 SCRA 222 (2006) Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. But even in a situation where a person has contributed to his own injuries, it must nevertheless be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. The1908 COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW passenger's act of hanging on the vehiclo is definitely dangerous {o his life and limb. Nonetheless, the underlying precept of the artice on contrbutory negligence is that the plaintiff who is partly fesponsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in ful but must bear part of the consequences of his own negligence ‘Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court of Appeals 255 SCRA 38 (1996) Facts: Passenger was on board fight originating from Casablanca to Brussels, although she was on her way back to Manila, She had valuables in her luggage, and while she stayed overnight in Brussels her luggage was left on board. When she arrived In Marila, her luggage was missing, and she demanded the money value thereof and its contents. Airline company refused the liability on ground that the loss was due to the passenger's contributory negligence by failing to decare the valuables and not heeding the warning to all passengers not to place valuables in their luggage. and not retrieving her undeclared valuables from her luggage at Brussels Airport since her fight from Brussels to Manila would still have to be confirmed. Held: Airline company is liable. Ar. 1733 of [the] Civil Code ‘equires common carriers in carriage of goods to observe extraordinary cate in the vigilance over the goods. The rule remains basically unchanged even when the contracts breached by tort although non-contradictory principles on quas-delict may then be assimilated ae also forming part of the governing law. ‘Airline company is not thus entirely offtrack when it has likewiee raised in its defense the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Unfortunately, the doctrine cannot in this particular instance support its defense. Proximate cause is that which, in the naturel and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without which the resutt would not have occurred. It remains undisputed that the passenger's luggage was lost while it was in the custody of the airline company. The facts showed that when the kiggage wes first reported missing it wes ‘subsequently found and again lost in the custody of the airline company The loss of said luggage not only once but twice “underscores the wanten nagligene and lack of care on the pert of the carrier.” The proven nagligence of the airline company foreclosed whatever rights it might have had to the possible limitation of liabilities enjoyed by international air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.