Russian National Security

Thinking

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

October 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 7)

Russian National Security Thinking

By Baidya Bikash Basu *

Introduction

Russia's security environment has undergone fundamental changes

since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So has Russian power.
The old Soviet Union was a superpower and for nearly forty-five years
provided a global strategic balance along with the United States. With
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Russian power that
strategic stability and security order too collapsed. A plethora of new
challenges have emerged in the past decade since the emergence of
the new democratic Russia in 1991. Among these are serious
undermining of its international power, status and influence; loss of
diplomatic and economic leverages; increasing disparity in power with
the United States and now even China; rise of secessionist movements
in areas such as Chechnya, terrorism and growth of fundamentalism;
serious economic crisis and the decline of both military power and
military industrial capabilities. In such a situation the Russian leaders
have struggled to articulate a security concept and doctrines that
would enable Russia to deal with the existing and emerging threats
and challenges. National Security Concept of 1993, 1997 and 1999
have clearly spelt out the manifold challenges, that the Russian state
has been facing in the domestic as well as in the international arena.

This article describes the main elements of Russia's new National

Security Concept, its key concerns and the broad policies it intends to
follow to deal with the emerging challenges.

Evolution of Russia's National Security Concept

In January 1993, a policy memorandum was forwarded by Foreign

Minister Andrei Kozyrev to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Supreme Soviet, Yevgeny Ambartsumov. After
extensive reviewing and redrafting in the Security Council, three
months later in April 1993, it was signed by President Yeltsin. The
Concept, Kontzeptzia and the Main Tenets, Osnovnye polozhenia,
formalised a revolutionary shift in Russia's national security priorities
between 1987 and 1993. The Concept gave priority to economic
progress and democratic stabilisation over national security and
foreign policy. In the foreign policy realm, the 1993 Concept
highlighted the development of an elite consensus around the core
issue of 'Near-Abroad' and elaboration of national interest of Russia as
a regional superpower, Russia as a world's great power, and Russia as
the nuclear superpower. The Concept stressed importance on
developing cooperative relations with the West and particularly the
United States as Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev felt that economic
factors were critical in shaping this Concept and therefore the post-
Soviet Russian foreign policy focused on the wealthiest, Western
capitalist states to gain economic assistance and to integrate Russia
into the global economy. 1

Anti-Western feeling, particularly towards the United States was

gaining ground among almost all Russians. This feeling intensified
 during the Balkan war of 1995-96 and the role of the United States
was clearly seen by the Russian elite as hegemonistic. In December
1995, Yevgeny Primakov was the new Foreign Minister, replacing
Andrei Kozyrev. The new Foreign Minister in his first press conference
promised that Russian foreign policy would reflect the "country's
status as a great power" and, at the same time, seek "equal, mutually
beneficial partnership" with the West.

In May 1997, the new national security doctrine was adopted. It

identified major threats, not external in nature but emanating from
socio-economic instability. Significantly, it stressed on economic
stability over defence from external military threats. 2

The concept of 'multi-polar' world was formulated by Yevgeny

Primakov. According to the Primakov doctrine, in a multi-polar world
Russia is to play the role of an independent center of power and
influence, enjoying diversified and multiple contacts and partnerships
with other world powers. It is necessary for Russia to find the right
balance between the West and the East. Russia should act according to
its own interests and enter into cooperation with other actors in the
international system where their interests also coincide with that of
Russia. Rejecting the 'uni-polar' concept this multi-polar concept was
accepted by the Russian political class. This shift towards realism
affirmed Russia's priority of maintaining itself as a great power
directed towards enhancing its economic and social realities in its
domestic firmament. Indeed, Primakov doctrine was a "middle course"
between the "extremes of Soviet anti-Westernism" and Kozyrev's "pro-
Western romantic approach". This "middle course" in Russian foreign
policy provided a more confident and forceful approach with a greater
sense of confidence among Russian elite that Russian interests,
prestige and status would be enhanced. 3

Russian description of the current international system is one of multi-

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 polarity. According to both 1997 and 1999 National Security Concept,
end of the Cold War brought about a transition from the
confrontational bipolar world to a multi-polar one. The decades of the
Cold War saw the competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union. After collapse of the Soviet Union, the painful loss of
power, explained the rejection of the uni-polar concept, which
supposes an international structure with the United States at the very
top of it and Russia far below. The basic conception of international
structure and process is a relatively traditional understanding of the
role and influence of the great powers. The essence of the multi-polar
concept implies:

after the end of the Cold War, centrifugal forces are leading the
world from a bipolar to a multi-polar structure;

the disintegration of the Soviet Union saw the countries of

Eastern and Central Europe as well as the former Soviet republics
moving politically away from Russia and closer to the West;

at the same time the role of the United States in the Western
world began to decline. Euro centrism in Western Europe
prevailed over the traditional Atlanticism;

China which was not part of the bipolar confrontation, asserted

itself as a new center of economic power by enhancing its
economic potential;

in the East and Southeast Asia new centers of economic power

emerged.

The previous security concept could not deal with the present plethora
of problems and President Vladimir V. Putin wants to deal with them
in his own way. President Putin has put forward a new "National
Security Concept" indicating the current Russian government's views.
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 This comes in the form of "National Security Concept," is the
considered view of the new Russian elite in the post Yeltsin
administration, and takes into account the Russian experiences of the
past decade. Vladimir Putin's ambition is to re-establish Russia's
influence and great power status in the international arena. The bench
mark being the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Soviet Union and
emergence of new democratic Russia. According to Sergei Ivanov,
secretary of Russia's Security Council the new National Security
Concept is intended to "more distinctly outline the definition of a
multipolar world and the way Russia will work on safeguarding
national interests". 4 The National Security Concept of the Russian
Federation was approved by the Presidential Decree number 1300 of
December 17, 1999. The Presidential Decree number 24 on January
10, 2000 further approved this.

Five factors in particular have deeply affected Russian security

thinking and the concerns are reflected in the new security concept.

lNATO expansion

ldifferences over the United States on ABM Treaty and possible

deployment of BMDs

lseparatist movement and rise of fundamentalist Islam in

Chechnya and elsewhere in the Russian periphery

growth of terrorism as a serious security problem; and

lack of agreement with the United States and Europe over

management of the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Kosovo where
NATO pursued a unilateralist course bypassing the UN Security
Council.

The National Security Concept constitutes a system of views on

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 ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state from
external and internal threats in all spheres of life. The dynamic
transformation of the international system has seen the end of bi-
polarity leading to a unipolar international system, sharply tilted
towards the West. In global politics, unilateral solutions, especially by
the United States, very often using military force and violating the
fundamental norms of international law is seen by Russia as a
negative development in the world political scenario. This Concept
criticises "attempts to create an international relations structure based
on domination by developed Western countries in the international
community, under U S leadership and designed for unilateral
solutions...in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international
law". Russia understands the development of a multipolar world and it
strongly wants to facilitate this development. The interests of Russia
and those of other states are similar on problems of international
security including resistance to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), prevention and settlement of regional conflicts,
struggle with international terrorism and drug trafficking, solution of
the acute global ecological problems and problems of ensuring nuclear
and radiation safety. 5

Two major trends dominate the nature of the international system

today; first is that of cooperation where a number of states and
associations are playing a greater role in the integration process
thereby strengthening the international system. Second is that of
domination by the developed countries, led by the United States in
violation of the international law. Some countries are trying to
influence world politics through the use of force. The significance of
military force remains. Proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction, means of their delivery and the newest technologies
of military production are the cause of major concern for Russia. The
use of military and nuclear options cannot be ruled out in today's
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 global politics. Every nation, especially the developed ones, wants to
dictate terms and exert influence directly over the weaker ones, thus
marginalising the importance of the United Nations and destabilising
international security. 6

Russian President Vladimir V. Putin pointed out that stability in many

parts of the world is being undermined by the increasing gap between
the rich and poor countries, inter-ethnic contradictions and
separatism. The danger of proliferation of WMD is acquiring an acute
form. Russia understands the need to mobilise efforts in looking for
effective replies to such global problems.

Threats to National Security

The primary threats to Russia's security environment exist in Russia's

extraordinary international, domestic, political, economic and social
disorders. In this context, the most distinctive threats in the
international sphere, according to the new Concept paper are:

lthe desire of some states and international associations to

diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring
international security, above all the United Nations and the
OSCE;

the danger of weakening Russia's political, economic and military

influence in the world;

the strengthening of military-political blocks and alliances, above

all NATO's eastward expansion;

the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major

military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;

proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery

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 vehicles;

the weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth

of Independent States (CIS);

outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state borders of the

Russian Federation and the external borders of the CIS countries;

territorial claims on Russia. 7

In the border sphere the threats are:

economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion of the

adjacent states into the Russian territory;

growing activity of trans-border organised crime and foreign

terrorist organisations. 8

i) NATO Expansion

In the post-Cold War phase, international relations have taken a new,

different path. Russia's internal development and more so it's foreign
policy creates the opportunity for Russia not only to be a part of
Europe but that Europe which is far more benign than ever before.
Becoming part of the West and Europe is not that easy, viewing the
internal dynamics of Russia, which tells a tale of instability. To become
like the countries of Europe in political and economic terms,
democratic Russia would have to create and sustain the kind of
relationship, which France and Germany have developed over the last
half-century. Very similar would be the relationship of Russia with
Ukraine. Russia's relationship with Ukraine constitutes one of the most
significant bilateral relationships in Europe. Both these countries
pursue radically different foreign policies. At times they have been at
loggerheads on basic security questions. With regard to NATO,
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 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma showed concern at the initial
stage that NATO enlargement would complicate the external security
environment, but later on supported NATO enlargement and even
described NATO as 'the only real guarantor of security in the
continent' during his visit to Warsaw in 1996. 9 Russia's sensitivity
towards the Baltic Sea area, the Black Sea area and the Trans-
Caucasus is natural, viewing it through the prism of traditional
strategic considerations. It's assertiveness in the Baltic Sea area is
because of the Russo-phone minorities in this area; in the Black Sea
area it is due to relationship with Ukraine leaving the confrontational
approach; and in the Trans-Caucasus, for the prospects of Caspian oil
project. 10 The pace at which Russia moves westward will depend on
its socio-political and economic reforms. It is worth noting that Russia
would then be a part of a community of peaceful, democratic,
economically integrated nation-states. The dilemma lies more on the
Western side. Russia is ready to enter the gates of the West, is the West
ready to receive Russia? For the time being Western aid is the life
saving drug for the Russian economy. The two international
organisations in Europe, NATO and the European Union (EU) are
closely monitoring Russian policy. NATO and Russia are fully
determined to contribute to build a stable and undivided Europe.
NATO and Russia will conscientiously meet their commitments to
international law and contribute to stronger security in the Euro-
Atlantic region on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May
1997 and through cooperation in the Joint Permanent Council. In the
Balkans, Russian and NATO military contingents operate jointly as
part of the KFOR in Kosovo, with the view of fully implementing the
UN Security Council resolution 1244, to which Russia and NATO are
committed. 11 According to Russian scholars and think tanks, US-
NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in many respects was aimed against
Russia. The use of force against Yugoslavia in violation of the
provisions of international law and without the authorisation of the
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 UN Security Council explains Russian suspicions about NATO. It is
only natural that Russia cannot agree to NATO's eastward expansion
and NATO cannot become a dominant European security structure in
which Russia is not a member. There is a strong consensus in Russia
against NATO's expansion.

ii) Missile Defence and ABM Treaty

On the arms control issue, dispute over missile defence systems has
come to the forefront between Russia and the United States. The
United States proposes to amend the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty to allow limited land based defences against a limited
missile attack, not from Russia but from 'rogue' states like North
Korea, Iran and Iraq. Russia has strongly opposed any changes in the
1972 ABM treaty. For almost three decades this ABM treaty has been
the benchmark in the arms control process. The Clinton
administration is seeking Russian agreement to amend the 1972 ABM
treaty to make room for a limited National Missile Defence (NMD).
Russia is not yet convinced of the need to amend the ABM treaty.
Russia has relied on its nuclear deterrent as a guarantee against
possible WMD attack since it signed the ABM treaty. Even the
European allies of the US have shown their concerns for the proposed
NMD. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called on the European
Union and NATO to set up a joint anti missile shield. Russian Duma
ratified the START-II on April 14, 2000. Ratification of START-II is a
major political boost to President Putin. Russia's ratification of START-
II clearly shows that despite disagreements on matters such as Kosovo
and Iraq, US and Russia can do business on arms control to make the
world safer. START-II reduces the number of nuclear weapons from
6,000 to a maximum of 3,500 for each side by the end of 2007. It also
paves the way for negotiations on more reduction in the Russian and
US nuclear arsenals under START-III accord. Mr. Putin warned that
Russia would pull out of all nuclear and conventional arms control
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 agreements if the US does not adhere to the 1972 ABM treaty. Russian
deputies have reserved Russia's right to withdraw from START-II if the
US violated the ABM treaty by deploying a NMD. 12

With regard to ballistic missile defence (BMD) Russia wants to

preserve its special status as a strategic peer vis-à-vis the United
States. Russia holds the view that the United States wants to take
strategic advantage of Russia's weakness. US NMD programme is
evidence of this. Russian policy makers' view the American NMD
programme as a direct challenge to the 1972 ABM Treaty. From a
Russian perspective the United States seems to be less inclined to take
Russian interests and demands into account. 'Traditionalists' who
continue to dominate Russian policy making are for the preservation
of the 1972 ABM treaty. They perceive Russian 'losses' in relation to
the United States; particularly the rapid deterioration of Russian
military power and unfair arms control deals that may reduce Russia's
credible deterrence. 13 During the discussion between Mr. Vladimir
Putin and Mr. Bill Clinton in the first week of June 2000, the Russian
President skilfully countered the US plan to build NMD by threatening
to withdraw from all arms control agreements with the United States
and the West if the US went ahead with building an NMD system.
NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, the US led NATO air war on
Yugoslavia, disputes over Iraq, Iran and Caspian Oil have strained the
Russo-American relationship. 14

The Russian relationship with the United States will always have a
prominent place in Russian foreign policy priorities. Russia
understands the dominant role of the United States in world affairs.
Russia would prefer this role to be checked and balanced through
international, regional and bilateral mechanisms. Russo-American
bilateral relationship in the sphere of security and disarmament would
help to create a peaceful and non-violent world.
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 iii) Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism

Terrorism and organised crime is a cancerous tumour squeezing the

Russian society and state. The outgrowth of terrorism and organised
crime is stifling investment in economy. The scale of terrorism has
grown significantly after the break up of the erstwhile Soviet Union.
In Russia, terrorism is operating through clandestine organisations
with their own facilities to produce WMD. The frequent conflicts for
power on the basis of ethnic national interests with the absence of an
effective system for social prevention of transgression, inadequate
legal material and technical base to prevent terrorism and organised
crime and the exodus of qualified legal personnel from the law
enforcing agencies is increasing the influence of this threat on the
individual, society and the state.

The rise of religious Islamic extremism and violence in North

Caucasus and Central Asia is significant to Russian security policy.
Islamic extremists with ties to organisations in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and other Muslim countries may begin to pose a serious threat to
Russia's security. Islamic fundamentalism beyond Central Asia can
instigate Islamic upheaval in the muslim majority areas of Russia like
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. The worsening situation in this sphere is
linked to a variety of causes. The socio-economic crisis in the Russian
Federation and in the Central Asian states, resulting in interethnic
conflicts; power struggle among groups seeking to redistribute control
over property and drastic decline of state control provide fertile soil
for the growth of religious extremism. This may also be encouraged
from the outside by Islamic movements and foundations that provide
financial support and indoctrination.

In Chechnya the terrorists are getting outside support. Chechen-

Ingushetia is a predominantly muslim enclave within the northern
Caucasus region of Russia. The Dzhokar Dudayev leadership
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 demonstrated strong commitment to political independence since
1991. In the final analysis it was the individual leadership and
ideological commitment that clearly distinguished Chechnya from
other Russian regions that have had conflicts and disputes with
Moscow in the post Soviet years. 15

The rise of 'Islamic factor' with ethno-nationalist aspirations may

indeed constitute a real danger to the integrity of Russia. In the
Russian Federation more than 10 percent of the population are
Muslims and they are mainly in the north Caucasus region. 16 Local
wars and regional conflicts can cause serious threat to Russian
national security interests. Conflict in Chechnya is a serious domestic
challenge for the Russian armed forces. In the post Cold War breakup
of the Soviet Union the present Chechen problem is destabilising the
whole of North Caucasus. A number of villages in neighbouring
Daghestan region have Islamic insurgents who want to establish an
independent Islamic republic in Daghestan. The diverse ethnic
composition of Daghestan makes the situation even more chaotic. The
Russian armed forces have suffered great losses during their military
campaign in this region. Extensive use of air strikes and artillery
power has resulted in capture of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya.
Islamic fighters of the Taliban and the Osama bin Laden group are in
Chechnya. The decisive victory is still to come. Peaceful life is
returning to the liberated areas of the Chechen republic. General
Valery Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff estimated that
200-300 rebels remained in Grozny at the time of its takeover by
Russian troops in January 2000. In Chechnya, Russian forces are still
battling with 2,500 to 3,500 rebels. 17 According to General Manilov,
2,508 Russian servicemen have died in combat fighting the rebels and
in the same period rebel losses were about 14,000 men. 18 During his
visit to United Kingdom after winning the election, the Russian
President Vladimir Putin strongly defended his country's intervention
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 in Chechnya and said that the Russian forces were waging a legitimate
battle against Islamic terrorism and he promised to investigate
allegations of human rights abuses. After a meeting with the British
Prime Minister Mr. Tony Blair, Mr. Putin said, "We do not consider our
aims to be the enslavement of the Chechen people, the actions of
Russia are a struggle against extremism." 19 By using the Russian
military might and playing the strong nationalist card President Putin
is able to firmly deal with the Chechnya problem. The commander of
the Russian military forces in Chechnya Colonel General Gennadi
Troshev urged politicians to end the conflict in the breakaway
Caucasian region. Recently, the Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov was
wounded badly and has called for peace talks to resolve the conflict.
Colonel General Troshev said that Chechnya's elected parliament
should put together a government to continue the struggle against
'terrorists' and restore the economy. 20

The Caucasus and Central Asia are both conduits for the Islamic
influence infiltrating from abroad. Rise of the Taliban is a cause of
concern for Russia. Drugs are another serious problem. The export of
drugs from Afghanistan through northwest Tajikistan into Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan and further West poses grave danger to the domestic
law and order situation in Russia. 21

iv) Disorganised Economy

The state of the Russian economy requires a deeper integration into

the world economy through the economic and financial institutions.
The Security Concept places particular emphasis on 'economic crisis'
as a major threat to Russia's security. Due to the ageing and obsolete
production technology, output has been extremely stagnant. Russia
has other problems too. These include large scale tax evasion, crime
syndicates, widespread corruption, a large number of general
economic crimes, massive illegal outflow of foreign currency, huge
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 deficits and cumulative foreign debts, long overdue wage payments,
corrupt dealings in the privatisation process, shady relationships
among big companies, politicians and high-ranking government
officials, widening gulf between the rich and the poor and an
increasing sense of social injustice and frustration among ordinary
citizens. Russia suffers not only from economic stagnation but also
from social disorder and lawlessness. Good relations with
industrialised nations are instrumental to Mr. Putin's stated goal of re-
building the Russian economy. Russia badly needs Western investment
and long term rescheduling of its multi-billion foreign debt to sustain
and speed up the economic growth.

The unofficial underground economy is present everywhere. Illegal

cash has become a way of life in Russia. Practically every organisation
in Russia, whether private or public, keeps two sets of books. The first
is the official book, which is reported to the authorities and on which
taxes are paid. The second is the unofficial kind, the 'accounting out of
the safe', which is strictly cash and strictly unreported. The rise of the
private sector in Russia has spun off the economy from 'non-cash to
cash' illegally. Tax evasion is rampant in modern day Russia. The best
way to evade taxes is to leave no paper trail, and the best way to do
that is deal in hard currency. In Russia the most serious forms of crime
are not crimes of violence but of money. It is really difficult to clean
the unofficial underground economy because at the bottom it reflects
society's mistrust of the state and its promises. The answer will
depend on Mr. Putin's economic and tax reforms. 22

v) Near-Abroad

The "Near-Abroad" concept refers to the fourteen non-Russian Soviet

republics, which became independent states after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Near-Abroad stands for its diversity. Each republic has
its own flavour of nationalism. Out of the fourteen non-Russian
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 republics, with the exception of Belarus, three Baltic republics are not
members of the CIS. 23 On September 14, 1995, former President
Boris Yeltsin signed a decree confirming the Near-Abroad a "priority
area" because of the 'vital interests' that Russia had in the area's
'security, economics and defence of Russians living abroad'. Russia's
national security depends strongly on the degree of economic,
political and military stability in neighbouring countries. Yeltsin gave
top priority for a stronger relationship of Russia with the West, the
Baltic States and the CIS countries. The issue of ethnic Russians in the
post Soviet era has made Russia negotiate with individual CIS
countries. Considerable volatility in the Central Asian region and the
Russian involvement may not always be a matter of choice but of
necessity. Significantly, Russia has the military and political potential
to reduce the conflicts in this area or to minimise their spillover
effects. Sometimes Russia's role in this area is to act as an'external
stabiliser' of domestic turbulence in some CIS countries. Indeed Russia
has to play a very delicate role, especially in the overall context of the
CIS countries intending in pursuing a more independent and
diversified policy. Democratic Russia has to prevent the hostile forces
(Islamic fundamentalism, ethno-nationalism) from crossing over
across its border. 24

The weakening of research in strategic spheres and exodus of

specialists and intellectual property abroad threaten Russia with the
loss of its prestigious status. In the uneasy atmosphere of society and
the state, the legal space is continuously being undermined. There has
been a demographic imbalance. Russia's life expectancy has declined
stunningly and infant mortality rate has gone up. Since the early
nineties infectious diseases which were wiped out in the West like
measles, typhoid-fever, syphilis, dysentery, hepatitis, diphtheria, etc.
have started taking their toll.

Structure of National Security Decision-Making

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 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, decrees and
instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, resolutions and
instructions of the government of the Russian Federation and several
federal programmes lay down the basis for creation and development
of the system of ensuring national security of the Russian Federation.
The core group consists of the agencies, forces that take political,
legal, organisational, economic and military measures in fulfilling the
security of the individual, society and the state. The composition of
the agencies and the forces and their principles and procedures for
operation are again stipulated in the corresponding legislative acts of
the Russian Federation. 25

The President of the Russian Federation acts within the framework of

his constitutional powers to guide the agencies and forces, sanctions
the actions designed to ensure national security, initiates reforms and
liquidates the agencies and forces, issues statements, addresses and
directives on problems of national security, amends the individual
provisions of the National Security Concept in his annual addresse to
the Federal Assembly; thereby determining the directions of the
domestic and foreign policy of Russia. The Federal Assembly acts on
the basis of the Constitution and on presidential and government
recommendations. The government of the Russian Federation
prioritises its national security policies and takes necessary actions in
the implementation. 26

The Security Council of the Russian Federation acts to ensure pre-

emptive determination and evaluation of threats to the national
security by promptly drafting decisions on preventing them. Also it
coordinates and controls the operation of the agencies in
implementing the decisions. Federal bodies ensure the implementation
of the legislation and decisions in the sphere of national security. 27

Military Doctrine
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 The Russian Security Council ensures pre-emptive determination and
evaluation of threats and promptly drafts decisions on preventing
them for the President of the Russian Federation as well as proposing
specific individual provisions in the National Security Concept,
coordinating the operation of the agencies and implementing the
decisions. On February 4, 2000 Russia's Security Council adopted a
military doctrine. The document includes the latest changes that have
taken place in the world since 1993 – when the previous doctrine was
adopted. The 1993 military doctrine has been in force for seven years.
The Russian Security Council and President Putin endorsed the new
military doctrine on April 21, 2000. The Russian leadership believes
that today the danger of a nuclear war is much less than what it was
in 1993, but the 'nuclear threshold' has not subsided. On the nuclear
issue, the military doctrine highlights that nuclear weapons can be
used only if there has been an act of aggression against Russia and
when conventional means are exhausted. In other words, Russia will
never use nuclear weapons unless an act of aggression is committed
against it, thus clarifying its 'nuclear weapons' use policy. The 1997
national security concept allowed the first use of nuclear arms only "in
case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation". 28 This
military doctrine has also taken into account the basic tenets of the
national security concept. The term 'military security' has replaced the
term 'defence security' which was used in the 1993 doctrine. Viktor
Yesin, Chief of the military construction directorate of the Russian
Security Council has this to say, " There should be no more illusion,
even if there were the most favorable conditions and Russia achieved
considerable progress in the military and economic spheres, it would
never be able to confront NATO as an equal with the help of
conventional weapons. This is why our new military doctrine clearly
states that the security of our country will be ensured by the entire
package of means at our disposal. However, Russia will not use
nuclear weapons if there is no aggression". 29
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 In the present doctrine twelve new external threats and six internal
ones have been reflected. In the formulation of this doctrine the latest
events in the North Caucasus have played a vital role in bringing out
the possible internal threats, which requires concrete military
solutions. 30

The experience of Chechnya reflects a realistic approach to the new

internal situation. The new military doctrine defines the purposes of
using armed forces and other troops in internal armed conflicts as
destruction and elimination of illegal armed formations and creation
of conditions for elimination of armed conflicts on the basis of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and existing federal
legislations. This doctrine includes a provision on the establishment of
a temporary joint body for controlling all defence personnel. The
doctrine will specify the Concept's provisions with regard to the
military area. Politically this doctrine emphasises that Russia views all
states in the world as its partners. With all member states of the
United Nations, Russia intends to develop mutually advantageous
military-technical cooperation. However, special preference is to be
given to the members of the CIS and also to old allies and strategic
partners like China and India. For the first time in Russian history the
new military doctrine speaks of the country's single military
organisation. Its integral and inseparable components: the armed
forces, the defence enterprises, and the agencies, which command and
control the system and the scientific-industrial potential. The new
Russian military doctrine has no intention to extend the sphere of
Russian interests to the whole world; instead it is the defending of the
security of Russia and its allies from external and internal threats that
is important. In the Soviet era, expansion of Soviet interests meant
spread of the Communist ideology on a global scale. But in the non-
communist Russian Federation there is no such ideological
expansionist compulsion. More importantly, this new doctrine aims at
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 protecting and advancing the country's interests by reforming the
armed forces, including their hardware, which is possible only
through injection of appropriate finance. 31

The Russian National Security Concept and Military Doctrine point out
in light of the changing relationship of Russia with leading world
powers that 'the threat of large-scale aggression against Russia is
practically absent in the foreseeable future'. Thus, threats to national
security of Russia are mainly non-military in character. The military
doctrine and the national security concept are closely correlated.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in an

unprecedented economic crisis in Russia with socio-politico
demographic calamities also having their reflection in the military
industrial complex as well. The highly integrated defence industry and
the armed forces of the former Soviet Union (FSU) fell apart for the
first time, increasing the feelings of vulnerability in the minds of many
strategically minded Russians.

The Russian defence industry is in the process of an economic boom.

The structural nature of the Russian defence industry is undergoing
tremendous change. Privatisation has developed rapidly to the extent
that the majority of defence-sector enterprises have gone public and
are now joint-stock companies. Many defence enterprises can
substantially generate income to fund their restructuring. There is a
rising tide within the Russian defence industry to acknowledge the
new reality of defence competitiveness in the international arena.
Collaborations and cooperation with other defence industry is the
main principle of the Russian defence industry, making optimum use
of its highly skilled scientific-technical potential in stimulating the
national economic growth. To a significant degree the defence
industry in Russia has achieved the strategic superiority in
maintaining a reasonable sufficiency for defence. The defence
:
 scientific industrial complex has realised the long-term military-
technical strategy of Russia and it is continuing its pursuit of
integrating military and civilian sectors of the economy through
effective utilisation of the state resources. Conversion, Privatisation
and Corporatisation are the three major aspects of Russian defence
industry reforms. The new Russia with its dynamic market economy is
taking into account the priorities of socio-economic development and
the demands of preserving its national security that includes
significant reforms of the defence industry. The transformation process
is working steadily and the West is providing financial, legal and
technical assistance in the conversion process, which is mutually
beneficial business cooperation. 32

Policy Options

Russia's loss of political, military and economic importance in the

international sphere has focused on the need to define the foreign
policy of the new Russia.

The Concept paper says that pursuing an active foreign policy, Russia
has to:

reinforce the key mechanisms of multi-lateral organisations

specially the United Nations;

lcreating favourable conditions for the economic and social

development of the country and the maintenance of global and
regional stability;

protecting the legitimate rights and interests of Russian citizens

abroad;

developing relations with countries who are members of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in accordance with
:
 the principles of international law;

ensuring the full fledged involvement of Russia in global and

regional economic and political structures;

lcontributing to the settlement of conflicts under the auspices of

the UN peacekeeping operations;

ensuring progress in the sphere of nuclear arms control and

maintaining strategic stability in the world on the basis of the
fulfilment of international obligations by other states;

fulfilling mutual obligations in the sphere of reducing and

liquidating WMD and conventional weapons, thereby creating
proper confidence building measures;

ensuring international control on the export of military

technologies;

ladjusting the existing agreements on arms control and

disarmament to the new conditions in international relations;

assisting in the creation of WMD free zone;

developing international cooperation in the sphere of combating

transnational crime and terrorism. 33

The Russian Federation prefers political, diplomatic, economic and

non military measures in preventing wars and armed conflicts. The
national interest of the Russian Federation requires the armed forces
to play the key role in ensuring its military security by deterring
aggressions of any scale against it or its allies including with the use of
nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation has nuclear forces capable
of delivering specific damage to any aggressor state or a coalition of
states in any situation. This reinforces that Russia is a nuclear
:
 superpower. The peacetime combat composition of the armed forces
of the Russian Federation must suffice in ensuring reliable protection
from possible air attacks acting jointly with other troops, military
formations and agencies. For ensuring the military security of the
Russian Federation it has to initiate effective collaboration and
cooperation with countries which are the members of CIS. The
deployment of limited military contingents in some of the strategically
important regions of the world facilitates the creation of a stable
military strategic balance of Russia with other states in attaining
national security. 34

Restructuring and reform is a serious challenge, that the Russian

armed forces are facing today. On December 17, 1997 former
President Boris Yeltsin approved 'National Security Concept' which
was further developed in a Presidential policy document known as the
'Fundamentals of Russian Federation State Policy for Military
Development upto the year 2005'. 35 According to the Russian
Ministry of Defence (MoD) the first phase of military reform was
completed by the end of 1999, which involved reduction in personnel,
and the reorganisation of the military districts and the armed forces
command structure. The next phase upto 2001 is to focus on
operational readiness and modernisation of equipment. The defence
minister of the Russian Federation Marshal Igor Sergeyev announced
force reductions upto 1.2 million personnel in April 1999 assuring no
further cuts in the near future, rather enlarging some of the units
within the reduced overall force level. 36 As there has been reduction
of external aggression to Russia's national security for at least ten to
fifteen years the main threat is the socio-economic instability.

With regard to the use of military force, in ensuring national security:

lthe use of all available means and forces including nuclear

weapons to repel an armed aggression when all other means of
:
 settling the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved
ineffective;

lwithin the country the use of military force is possible under the
Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws in case of
threat to the life of citizens and to the territorial integrity of the
country, or in case there is a threat of violent change of the
constitutional regime. 37

According to the Concept paper, the primary tasks of the Russian

Federation in the border sphere are:

to create a requisite normative legal base;

to develop international cooperation in this sphere;

to resist the economic, demographic, cultural and religious

expansion into the territory of the Russian Federation by the
other states;

to preclude the operation of transnational organisations of

organised crime and illegal migration;

to take collective measures in ensuring the security of the border

space of the countries, which are the members of CIS. 38

In the area of information security the national security concept

ensures:

to implement the constitutional rights and freedoms of the

citizens in the sphere of information;

to improve and protect the national information infrastructure

and integrate Russia into the world information network;
:
 to counter the threat of the development of rivalry in the
information sphere.

All this can be done by the effective use of intelligence and counter
intelligence with the purpose of promptly revealing threats and
determining their sources. 39

Conclusion

Russian views of the international system have an Eurasian texture.

Culturally and civilisationally Russia is an European country. But,
Russia cannot negate its Asiatic role. In other words, although
geographically it is more Asian, politically it is more European. Six
vital Eurasian areas lie along Russia's borderline–Eastern Europe,
South West Europe and the Balkans, West Asia, Central Asia, South
Asia and the Far East. An Eurasian giant, Russia has interests in these
regions and at the same time interacts with multilateral
interdependence considerations.

Russian economic integration into the world economy is the first

priority condition for the survival of the country and the salvation of
the nation. Without economic rebirth, Russia cannot become a full-
fledged member of the club of the great powers at the beginning of
the 21st Century, and consequently, it will be more difficult for it to
defend its own interests in the international arena. In the economic
sphere there has been considerable reduction in investment and
innovation activities, growing domestic and foreign debts, unstable
financial and banking system and stagnation in the agrarian sector. In
the research and technical sphere there has been an exodus of
specialists from Russia threatening Russia in the research and
technical field with a great loss. By radically simplifying the code and
slashing rates, Putin hopes to raise collections by cutting down the
corruption that has left his government starving for revenue. The
:
 dysfunctional personal income tax is to be replaced by a simple flat
tax. This will encourage the people to pay taxes and make it easier for
the government to track down those who do not pay taxes. This
economic reform of streamlining the Russian taxation system, would
increase the inflow of revenue and thus will be of great help to the
Russian government in tackling chronic problems like failing health-
care, poverty of millions of elderly citizens and erratic law
enforcement. 40

To win the West's trust, Mr. Putin has manoeuvred tactfully in getting
the START-II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified
by the Russian Parliament. Putin has also resumed Russia's contact
with NATO, which was freezed, after the Alliances attacked Yugoslavia
last year, by overruling objections from the Russian military.

The new Russia as a sovereign state in the international arena has at

least three important tasks to perform: to prevent a further
disintegration of the country, economic recovery, and to build up a
relationship with other states on mutual beneficiary lines. Russia is
going through a period of transition. Profound domestic changes have
produced a number of factors, which have started influencing Russian
foreign policy like–strong public opinion, interests of the regions, the
Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the oil and gas companies and
other actors. Russian state power needs to be organised to tackle the
growing organised crime and terrorism, which is posing a threat to
civil society and to national security as well. The scale of terrorism
and crime is growing due to the frequent conflicts over change of
property and the struggle for power on the basis of group and ethnic
national interests.

Russia after Yeltsin is definitely looking for a new foundation. Russian

foreign policy will have to show sufficient amount of broad consensus
on Russia's basic goals and interests, geo-strategic understanding of
:
 the international system and work decisively for a stable international
order. The new Russian leadership under the new President Vladimir
V Putin will have to assert the right to influence political, economic
and security decisions in the international arena, to see that Russia
remains a power to reckon with. Should Russia regard itself as a
member of the European or North American world community, or
maintain a distinctive 'Eurasian' stance? No matter how the West sees
Russia, on its part Russia is taking considerable political and
diplomatic steps to promote a 'pan European security architecture'. In
this context Russia's foreign and security policy can be broadly defined
in terms of ensuring its vital domestic needs, by preserving its
territorial integrity and maintaining its economic sustainability.

Endnotes

Note *: Research Officer, IDSA Back.

Note 1: Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist

Russia and its Domestic Context" in Michael Mandelbaum ed., The
New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Book, 1998) pp. 25-27. Also see, Peter Shearman "Defining the
National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics" in
Roger E. Kanet & Alexander V. Kozhemiakin ed., The Foreign Policy of
the Russian Federation (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1997) pp. 1-25.
Back.

Note 2: Ibid. p. 32. Back.

Note 3: Ibid. p. 30. Back.

Note 4: "Russia adopts New Security Concept; appears to lower

nuclear threshold" Arms Control Today, January/February 2000, p. 23.
Back.
:
 Note 5: "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation",
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, January. 18, 2000, Information Department,
Embassy of Russian Federation in India, New Delhi. Back.

Note 6: Ibid. Back.

Note 7: Ibid. Back.

Note 8: Ibid. Back.

Note 9: Sherman W. Garnett, "Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the

West in the New Borderlands" in Michael Mandelbaum ed., The New
Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book,
1998) p. 88. Back.

Note 10: Vladimir G. Baranovsky and Alexei G. Arbatov, "The

Changing Security Perspective in Europe" in Arbatov Kaiser & Legvold
eds., Russia and the West-the 21st Century Security Environment (
New York: East West Institute, 1999) p. 59. Back.

Note 11: Ibid., pp. 60- 64. Also see News from Russia, vol. III, no. 7,
Information Department, Embassy of Russian Federation in India, New
Delhi, p. 17. Back.

Note 12: Michael R. Gordon, "Old missile defense issue haunts US

and Russia", International Herald Tribune, April 26, 2000. Also
see,Vladimir Radyuhin, "START-II a boost to Putin" , The Hindu, April
15, 2000. High price for START-II –Editorial, International Herald
Tribune, April 18, 2000, "Russia-EU-NATO missile shield needed:
Putin", The Hindustan Times, June 7, 2000. "You have sword, I need
shield", The Economist, April 29, 2000, pp. 34-35. "A shield in space",
The Economist, June 3, 2000, pp. 19-21. Back.

Note 13: Andrei Shoumikhin, "Current Russian Perspectives on Arms

:
 Control and Ballistic Missile Defense", Comparative Strategy, vol.18,
no.1, January-March, 1999, pp.49-57. Back.

Note 14: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Putin takes the wind out of Clinton's
sails", The Hindu, June 11, 2000. Back.

Note 15: Mikhail A. Alexseev, "Conclusion: Asymmetric Russia:

Promises and Dangers", in Mikhail A. Alexseev ed., Center-Periphery
Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1999)
p.257. Back.

Note 16: Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky, "Russian-Afghan relations" in

Gennady Chufrin ed., Russia and Asia-The Emerging Security Agenda
(Sweden:SIPRI,OUP, 1999) p. 201. Back.

Note 17: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia admits heavy losses in

Chechnya", The Hindu, March 12, 2000. Back.

Note 18: See Fred Weir, "2,508 Russian soldiers died in Chechen war",
The Hindustan Times, August 5, 2000. Back.

Note 19: Tom Buerkle, "Putin, meeting Blair, is firm on Chechnya",

International Herald Tribune, April 18, 2000. Back.

Note 20: "General urges end to Chechen Conflict", International

Herald Tribune, June 7, 2000. Back.

Note 21: Belokrenitsky, n. 16. pp. 201-203. Back.

Note 22: Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (UK:Cambridge

University Press, 1999) pp.203-206. Also see, "Russia's Tax Plan",
Editorial, International Herald Tribune, May 29, 2000. Back.

Note 23: Robert H. Donaldson & Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy
of Russia-Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (New York: M.E.
:
 Sharpe, 1998) pp. 155-156. Back.

Note 24: Leon Aron, "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist

Russia and its Domestic Context" in Michael Mandelbaum ed., The
New Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Book, 1998) pp. 33-42. Back.

Note 25: n.5. Back.

Note 26: Ibid. Back.

Note 27: Ibid. Back.

Note 28: n.4. Back.

Note 29: See Sergei Ishchenko, "To the new century with a new
Military Doctrine", Trud, April 24, 2000, Information Department,
Embassy of Russian Federation in India, New Delhi. Back.

Note 30: News from Russia, vol. III no. 6, Information Department,
Embassy of Russian Federation in India, New Delhi, pp. 3-6. Back.

Note 31: Ibid. Back.

Note 32: Clifford G. Gaddy, The Price of the Past (Washington D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1996) p.183. Also see, Kevin O' Prey, A
Farewell to Arms (New York: Twentieth Century press, 1995) pp. 85-
91. Back.

Note 33: n.5. Back.

Note 34: Ibid. Back.

Note 35: Military Balance1998-1999, IISS, OUP, London, 1998, p.

108. Back.
:
 Note 36: Military Balance1999-2000, IISS, OUP, London, 1999, p.104.
Back.

Note 37: n.5. Back.

Note 38: Ibid. Back.

Note 39: Ibid. Back.

Note 40: "Russia's tax plan" Editorial, International Herald Tribune,

May 29, 2000. Back.
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