Luxmoore - 2014 - DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM

DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
Author(s): Matthew Luxmoore

Source: International Journal on World Peace , JUNE 2014, Vol. 31, No. 2 (JUNE 2014),
pp. 73-112
Published by: Paragon House
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24543801
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal on
World Peace
This content downloaded from

130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM:
THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S
REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
Matthew
Matthew Luxmoore Queen Mary University of London
Luxmoore
Mile End Road
London El 4NS
United Kingdom
Matthew Luxmoore is a student of International Relations at Queen Mary

London. He was born in Warsaw and has worked as a journalist in Russia,
Poland and as an intern at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He wr
on Russian and Eastern European affairs and from June 2014 will be based a
Moscow. An expanded version of this article was submitted as his undergradua
This
This article examines
article Russia's
examines Russia's INTRODUCTION
approach
approach to
to the
thepost-Soviet
post-Sovietspace
space
inin
relation to
relation todomestic
domestic stability
stability during Vladimir Putin's presidency has coi
during
Putin's first two terms. It identifies
Putin's first two terms. It identifies cided with a shift in perception toward
three
three dimensions
dimensions of securityof security which . . . . _ . .
which
underpinned
underpinned foreign
foreign policy during policy during RuSSla S in
this
this period—ideological,
period—ideological, economic, economic, with fresh co
and
and military—and demonstrates
military—and demonstrates energy prices,
how each interacted with policies
how each interacted with policies accused of co
on
onthethe
domestic front. Assessing
domestic front. Assessing ... .
Russia's
Russia's response
response to Ukraine's to Ukraine's policy in
Orange Revolution,
Orange Revolution,ititshows
shows reconstitute the Soviet Union on infor
how the events of 2004 initiated
how the events of 2004 initiated maj terms Contemporary Russia is seen
aashift towards insulation from
shift towards insulation from . . _
perceived
perceived external
external threats threats to political as the aut
to political
stability.
stability. A policy ofA policy of "defensive bent on r
"defensive
imperialism"
imperialism" emerged whereby emerged whereby on t]lc wor
offensive
offensive actions actions
abroad were abroad
aimed were aimed , . r , .
c , _ .. _e ... . . ,. the region often presented in mterna
fundamentally
tundamentally at facilitating
at facilitating
a stablea stable ° r
external
external environment
environment to politically tional media and academ
to politically
safeguard
safeguard the the
regime. The article
regime. The article ways that reflect this vie
concludes
concludes with a with
brief assessment
a brief assessment . ■ ■ „„„„„„„
_ , . „„„„ , expansionism narrative appears to nave
of
ofdevelopments
developments since 2008,
sinceand 2008, and
offers
offers a pessimistic
a pessimistic prognosis of prognosis of emerged as the
the
the impact
impact this trend this trend
will have on will have on of post-Soviet
Russia's domestic stability and its
Russia's domestic relations.
stability and its Russia is seen
international
internationalrelations. .. . . . . .
at its disposal in
on the internati
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXXI NO. 2 JUNE 2014 73

130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM
on its status as the region's primary energy supplier, citing its use
weapon" as a means of blackmailing former dependencies and m
the economic benefits of possessing resources upon which most ca
but rely (see Balmaceda 2013; Orban 2008; Goldman 2008a). Ne
approaches have identified a positive correlation between rising ene
and Russian foreign policy belligerency, drawing direct parallels be
2008 intervention in Georgia and the eight years of impressive
growth that preceded it. Such accounts also point to the enduring
of military power in Russia's foreign policy, seeing the 2008 i
testament to the country's will and readiness to use any mean
necessary to maintain regional hegemony (see Mankoff 2011; S
Brugato 2008). Recently, a growing body of literature has em
Russia's use of soft power as a new tool for covertly spreading
abroad, pointing to programmes aimed at diffusing Russian cultur
m·····^guage throughout the post-Soviet space
A traditional black-and- and appealing to the large Rus
white notion of national Pora spread throughout the reg
interest ignores ongoing 2004; Myers 2004). Whether pla
internal processes of focus on Russia's projection of
identity-formation which dominance through soft powe
preclude a collective or militlry md economic man
, , such accounts see these foreign policy
sense of purpose from r ·
, r vectors not as instruments for ensuring
emerging. Stability but for the coercive spre
influence across post-Soviet space. While
acknowledging history's role in shaping mindsets, the assumption of
dependence from which such analyses proceed assumes a black-and
notion of national interest while ignoring ongoing internal proce
identity-formation which preclude a collective sense of purpose
emerging.2
Nevertheless, the elusive "post-Soviet identity" remains a major th
in scholarly literature on modern Russia. Such identity-based, Constr
approaches often centre on Russia's attempts to regain its status as a
power on the world stage while failing to account for periods of
tion with the international community and the basic economic pr
that drive them (see Laenen 2012; Thorun 2009). In the con

74 VOL. XXXI NO. 2 JUNE 2014

130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
Russia's regional policy, Suny (2007) argues that the search for an
commensurate with the country's history as a great power mak
unpredictable foreign policy motivated by enduring notions of ter
entitlement. Determined to regain influence, Russia is likely to
regional presence for "simple geopolitical reasons," he conclud
2007:66). The search for identity is thus divorced from the domes
upon which it plays out. Correspondingly, both the Neorealist or r
expansionism narrative on the one hand, and the Constructivist,^r
identity school on the other interpret Russia's global reassertion c
as an end in itself, a goal placed over and above competing and
gible domestic and international concerns. As a result, the former
internationalises the economic dimension as a tool for expansio
coercion, overlooking its role in shaping domestic politics and
ing inter-state cooperation; the latter, conversely, treats Russia's s
identity as a framework for aggressive
conduct abroad rather than a hindrance Studies focusing
to achieving the level of foreign policy connection betwe
cohesion required for its execution. In domestic and forei
short, a preoccupation with Russia's loss CQme c|oge|1
of superpower status and an excessive , . . ,
c . , ... explaining Russia s
focus on its determination to regain it has . ...
ι ι , „ , _ , regional behaviour.
led many observers to neglect the run
damental interconnectedness between
foreign and domestic policy in a country still recovering from the effects
of Soviet collapse, leaving largely unexplored the link between internal
stability and international power projection.
Studies focusing on the connection between domestic and foreign policy
come closer to explaining Russia's regional behaviour. While accounting for
the interplay between the two spheres, however, they tend to treat them as
distinct and separate objects of analysis. A notable study of the connection by
Donaldson and Nogee (2009:109) sees domestic factors in contemporary
Russia influencing foreign policy on two levels. Firstly, domestic priorities
rival international objectives, leading to an enduring "guns versus butter"
debate. Secondly, foreign policy decisions are shaped by a contest for influ
ence among the political elite. This is a theme that features prominently
in analyses of Russia, with studies dividing the political establishment into


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
various groups, each with a distinct vision for the country's inter
role. The battle for influence plays out in various narratives
Statists and Reformers, between Eurasianists and Atlanticists, or b
Slavophiles and Westernisers.3 While the political establishment is
of groups with competing perspectives, the ideological faultline
them are far from clear-cut. In accounting for Russia's regiona
such categorisation runs the danger of simplifying a far more
dynamic. Treating the two spheres as mutually constitutive but an
separate political arenas, most accounts focusing on the foreign
link overlook a central element of the political landscape in today'
foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is ultimately an extension of
policy, with both fundamentally directed at maintaining political
With actions determined by an elite few, safeguarding the domest
from a destabilising influx of ideas from
Foreign policy in the abroad is motivated by the need to
post-Soviet space is power through prevention of
ultimately an extension of within society and, by implication
domestic policy, with both the leadership structure itself
fundamentally directed regional conduct is thus motivat
at maintaining political more Personal dynamic than the
stability f°r a post-Soviet "great power id
ôr the struggle between competing
internal discourses that underpins
encompasses the very political survival of those in power,
of appeasing public opinion to retain the benefits of offic
In attempting to bridge the gap between political stabil
tional reassertion as foreign policy priorities, this article
approach to the post-Soviet space during Vladimir P
presidential terms. It is divided into three sections. The
domestic policies pursued, presenting these as fundamenta
international developments, with assertion of political con
aimed at consolidating the means necessary to respond to
identifies three dimensions of regional foreign policy that
this period: ideological, economic, and military security. A
turn, it demonstrates how each dimension represents a sp


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
operation while reinforcing a parallel policy on the domestic f

three dimensions furthermore combine to ensure political security
tating a stable external environment for economic growth and ide
security at home. The final section takes a closer look at the 20
Revolution in Ukraine as a pivotal event in the evolution of Putin'
policy, showing how the three security vectors combined to shape
response to unfolding events.
Before proceeding, some clarification is in order. This article ap
Russia not as an imperial power determined to regain lost territor
fragile state vulnerable to internal upheaval and still coming to te
its restricted capabilities. With the post-Soviet space providing
from destabilising external forces, regional intervention can he
internal stability. This paradox drives a policy of "defensive imper
which can be seen to operate on three distinct levels or concentric
The outer represents the global arena, upon which Russia aims to r
its position as a great power. The middle circle is the regional leve
it pursues economic and military security as well as ideological
from "Western" ideas; here, the post-Soviet space serves as a bu
against destabilising forces along Russia's periphery. Finally, t
circle represents the domestic sphere—stability on this level i
with economic growth, a strong national identity and military
The three levels underpin the regime's political stability and the e
ideological, and military security vital to its legitimacy. The ev
Putin's foreign policy thus coincided with a redefinition of secu
mensurate with Russia's new international ambitions. The post-Sov
exists on the intersection between its search for identity as a grea
and its domestic stability, enthusing regional foreign policy with
even existential, significance.
ASSERTING CONTROL: THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATIONS

OF FOREIGN POLICY
With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, "500 y

territorial expansion ended" (Trenin 2002:88). The newly de
borders of the federation that emerged from its ashes resembled n
the structure of the former empire nor any previous configuration


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
independent Russian state (Donaldson and Nogee 2009:108). At

of the Soviet Union's dissolution, only 16 percent of the borde
former republics had been officially demarcated, with the remain
tuting mere "pencil borders" arbitrarily drawn on maps (Nikitin 2
Faced with the loss of a quarter of its territory and almost half i
tion, the new state sought to come to terms with its new posit
international arena. With a Russian diaspora in the region coun
than 25 million, many found it psychologically hard to accept
tions with countries like Ukraine and Georgia now fell under t
of foreign policy. Having inherited from its predecessor an in
framework primed to approach regional developments as inter
the new state was thus ill prepared to
The Russia that Vladimir conf,ont ,the n£w territorial d

_ .. . . . with a coherent foreign policy.
Putin took over in _ ,.
In this volatile period, regional
2000 was a country e , , · „ , „ .
' foreign policy was directed at retain
disillusioned with the ing effective control over vital energy
liberal democratic values infrastructure spread throughout th
on which it had pinned former Soviet Union and mediating
its hopes. secessionist conflicts erupting across the
region; Russia's economic recovery and
domestic stability were prioritised. The so-called "near abroad" becam
enthused with an emotional dimension, providing the spark for dispute
among political factions variously disposed towards the liberal turn Russia
had taken. The liberalisation failed to last its course. Public opinion at
decade's end came to reflect disenchantment with the "Western" model, and
changes in the presidential administration gave representation to advocates
of a more statist, nationalist course.
This is the Russia that Vladimir Putin took over in 2000: a country
disillusioned with the liberal democratic values on which it had pinne
its hopes only a decade prior and united in a resolve to re-emerge as
respected international actor able to ensure good quality of life for its citi
zens and defend its interests abroad. It also remained a society in whic
leader legitimation relied less on electoral victory than the ability to appeas
public sentiment, both in word and in deed. Acutely aware of the prevailin
mood, Putin played upon the passions of the disenchanted populace and


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
vowed to reassert Russia's prestige on the world stage. The po

space, subordinated under Yeltsin to the goal of integration with t
emerged in official rhetoric as a vital reference point in the reinv
search for Russia's new, post-Soviet identity.
Institutionalising a Collective Vision

The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept sought to articulate this new dire
rally public support behind the new leadership. Marking a departu
the chaos of Yeltsin's 90s, it sought to build a bridge from present
and a united vision accommodating both reformist and conservativ
ment within society. As Neumann puts
it, the aim was to develop "a seemingly whj|e R(jssia

continuous identity in time for a country „ . ...
l j t0 define itself socially
that felt itself to have had no continuous
history " (Neumann 2005:14). While and Politically, a broad

Russia struggled to define itself socially consensus existed
and politically, a broad consensus existed aiyong public and
among the public and elite regarding e'ê regarding its basic
its basic international role (Judah et al international role.
2011:27; Lukyanov 2008:24; Mankoff
2011:29). Russia's historical status as a great power thus served as the
sentiment uniting opposing voices, and the foundation upon which Putin
sought to restore the country's damaged pride. The following passage
outlines the objectives that would emerge as foundations of foreign policy
during Putin's presidency:
To ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its

sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious posi
tions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of
the Russian Federation as a great power, as one of the most influential
centres of the modern world (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000).
In highlighting its sovereignty, Russia expressed its desire to be left

alone in conducting its affairs: reference to prestige and great power status
embodied its long-term goals; in emphasising the "centres of the modern
world,9 it stated its determination to wield this status in a world governed


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
by multipolarity and denounced the US-led system that had co

dominate.4
Through a series of official documents, a sense of collective i
as a great power was institutionalised in Putin's foreign policy d
Yet regaining Russia's international position was not a goal in itself
new leadership, and Putin was conscious that great power status
balising world is dependent upon economic viability and internal sta
not defiant pronouncements. Behind his oft-quoted statement t
collapse of the Soviet Union "was the greatest geopolitical catast
the century" (Putin 2005) lay a clear awareness of the economi
that had rendered that collapse inevitable.
Through a series of Furthermore, as Mankoff (2
official documents, argues, public support for the cam
a sense of collective reflected this understanding of
identity as a great power power as economic strength bac
was institutionalised in high living standards. Putin had lea
Putin's foreign policy lessons from the Yeltsin period, wit
discourse. Yet regaining thc raPid fal1 in the one-time rev
Russia's international ai7's popularity as wages went unp
position was not a goal his mana8erial flaws were exposed
in itself for the new rouble crisis of 1998 hit, Yeltsin's r
leadership had sunk to a mere 2 percent (Cha
2010:19).
Stabilisation from Within
One of these lessons was that the task of reigniting economic growth was
closely tied to confronting the internal situation. Putin immediately moved
to limit the level of public scrutiny in the political sphere, restricting its role
in both domestic governance and the foreign policy process (Donaldson
and Nogee 2009:124). Creating a system commonly referred to as the
vertikal vlastii (power vertical) he initiated a recentralisation of political
power, bringing regional leadership under the direct supervision of the
Kremlin and effectively dismantling the superficial democratic foundation
established under Yeltsin (Konitzer and Wegren 2006). As a pillar in the
newly-created political order, even the military did not escape the broader


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
administrative reshuffle; Putin handed his defence minister and r

man Sergey Ivanov operational control of the armed forces, al
allegiance, perforce, with the foreign policy preferences of th
(Saradzhyan 2004).
Recentralisation of control extended to the economic sphere, w
levers were held by those who had acquired ownership of state com
in the wave of privatisation that followed Soviet collapse and u
financial clout to steer the political trajectory of the Yeltsin admin
Between them, they owned over 60 percent of the state's industri
a substantial proportion of which were auctioned off at exorbitan
to finance Yeltsin's desperate campaign for re-election in 199
2011:41). The new leadership attributed Yeltsin's weaknesses l
the privileged policy access he had given
to these individuals. Putin's demand for _ , . , ,
r, . r ... Putins demand for a
a separation or business from politics . ...
riled the "oligarchs," who had reaped separation of b
tangible benefits under Yeltsin. This was jj0™
not a purely political affair: in seeking oligarchs, who
to raise taxes from those involved in the reaped tangible
energy industry the government aimed to under Yeltsin.
save around $2 billion a year in lost taxes
(Sixsmith 2010:53). Disagreement over the issue led some to
untary exile in order to uphold their business empires. The impr
of Russia's richest man Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and subsequent st
of his energy company, initiated a consolidation of state control
energy sector which paved the way for its use as a foreign polic
the Kremlin. Aside from removing a troublesome figure whose f
opposition parties challenged the leadership's control, the Kho
case allowed the state to take advantage of the sharp rise in oil p
accompanied Putin's first two terms.
Beyond the need for economic and political stability, the m
ing concern when Putin took over was the ongoing insurgency in
North Caucasus and the need to militarily secure the country.
the realistic prospect of Russia's territorial disintegration, the new
was provided a perfect opportunity to demonstrate his leader
tials by bringing an end to a conflict that had eluded his predece


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
understood well the gravity of the situation, designating its resolu

"historic mission" (Putin 2000:139). The brutal suppression of
forces in Chechnya served like nothing else to cement public su
acquaint the average Russian with the man who had been pluc
obscurity to assume authority over the state: between Septem
December 1999 the share of poll respondents intending to vote
in the 2000 presidential election jumped eight-fold (Treisman 2011
Stabilising the domestic arena also involved the curtailment
with a more subtle impact on public opinion. Putin had learnt fro
experience the power of the media, having himself been elected o
of a campaign assiduously conducted by Boris Berezovsky, whose t
channel ORT served as propaganda machine to galvanise suppor
former KGB officer and discredit his rivals.
. . As one of his first initiatives as president,

• ° 'S irS . . . Putin approved a new National Sec
initiatives as president, T r τλ ,. , *'
. , Information Doctnne which sanctioned
Putin approved a new increased ^ control o
National Security information (Donaldso
Information Doctrine 2009:124). Policy disagre
which sanctioned souring of his relationship
increased state control who had orchestrated his
over the flow of Berezovsky relinquish his
information. Putin effectively drove the oligarch out of
the country (Gessen 2012:173). A simi
lar fate befell NTV, another major TV channel run by Vladimir Gusinsky.
Within a year of Putin's inauguration, all three federal television networks
were in state hands; by the end of his second term, around 90 percent of
the country's media had been brought under direct or indirect state control
(Gessen 2012:174; Lynch 2011:78). Media became another tool with which
the Kremlin sought to stabilise public opinion and encourage backing for its
foreign policy initiatives, and was instrumental in the period following the
so-called "colour revolutions" that broke out in several post-Soviet states
between 2003 and 2005. Convinced of Western involvement in the wave of
mass protest against incumbent leaders in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan,
the leadership initiated an anti-Western media campaign which continued
throughout Putin's time in office (Judah 2013:244).


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Having inherited a state on the brink of collapse, Putin thus

swiftly and ruthlessly to distance himself from the legacy of his pr
sor and stabilise the country. This stabilisation occurred in three
but overlapping phases: economic stabilisation, ideological stabil
and military stabilisation. Economic stabilisation was achieved throug
consolidation of control over the country's major source of rev
hydrocarbons. Luckily for Putin, the terminally ill state he inherited
also one perfectly positioned to benefit from the rapid rise in energy
that followed: between 1999 and 2008 Russia experienced a 7% a
GDP growth rate and a 10.5% annual increase in real wages; une
ment halved. This unprecedented growth paved the way for eco
recovery and the settling of international obligations, over three year
of schedule (Cooper 2009). Energy became a foreign policy tool
means of leader legitimation, with the revenue accrued intimately ti
the political security of the regime. With the country's territorial int
equally under threat, the campaign of military stabilisation spear
by Putin's suppression of the Chechen insurgency was greeted wit
spread support among the Russian public. This support, combined
revenue from energy exports, provided the regime with a basis to em
on a form of ideological stabilisation. Consolidation of media con
the wake of the fight against business interference in the policy-
process was accompanied by a broader process of political recentra
and a "narrowing of the circle of decision-making" to the Kreml
(Chambers 2010:116). While military and economic stabilisation
prioritised during Putin's first term, from 2000 to 2004, the exp
of the colour revolutions and the fear of similar events at home led to a
greater focus on achieving ideological stability during between 2004 and

2008. The second term also coincided with a reduced use of resources on
ensuring military stability, with the conflict in Chechnya largely pacified by
the time of Putin's re-election.
Great Power Populism

Assertion of control on the domestic front played out against the wider
international campaign of reasserting Russia's status as a great power in a
multipolar world. Chambers (2010:118) identifies four key criteria for the


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
achievement of great power status: leader legitimacy, military sec

clear identity, and gravity oî "geopolitical weight." He continue
ing a distinction between the interplay of these factors in "libera
where a clear separation between foreign and domestic policy i
and "non-democratic" states, where foreign policy can provide
for self-legitimation by a government seeking a popular mandate
means other than victory in competitive elections. Russia under P
intriguing case for analysis in this regard; reserving judgement on
cratic credentials, a glance at public opinion polls can offer an ins
the extent to which the conduct of an aggressive foreign policy in
with domestic public opinion during Putin's first two terms in
recent surveys by Russia's largest independent pollster, a majority
confessed to considering NATO a threa
, . to Russian security and a quarter advo
ln recent surveys , ; \ ,
_ . , , , cated measures at counter-balancing its
by Russia s largest inf|uence Ccntrc 2
independent pollster, 2009:174). In another poll,
a majority of Russians ofaccused
respondents
the US of inter
confessed to considering fering in Russia's internal affairs and over
NATO a threat to Russian three quarters sawit as an aggressor intent
security. on establishing control over other coun
tries (Levada Centre 2008:186). Further
to this, a majority expressed support for the exploitation of European
dependency on Russian energy supplies to achieve Russia's foreign policy
objectives (Levada Centre 2009:166). In this context it becomes clear that,
in a country embracing alternate forms of leader legitimation, assertiveness
abroad can serve to bolster the regime's political stability providing basic
needs of the citizen are satisfied.
What emerges is a fundamental connection between behaviour abroad
and the political stability of the regime. The need for internal stabilisation
along economic, ideological and military lines combines with the need to
demonstrate resolve on the international stage and pander to the popular
vision of a resurgent Russia commanding global respect. While preserving
an ideological vision took precedence in Soviet times over domestic con
cerns, in the Russia that Putin took over the reverse proved true: the great
power campaign came second to the priority of economic development,


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
and opportunities to exert influence abroad were calculated again

economic costs involved. Putin had learnt his lessons from the past; R
was no longer prepared to subordinate foreign policy to the impo
of abstract ideas abroad, having witnessed the financial burdens of su
campaign that had pulled the Soviet Union apart.
The following section provides a broad overview of the re
foreign policy that emerged during this period and charts its ev
during Putin's first two presidential terms. Exploring the inter
dence between the foreign and domestic policy spheres, it approaches
administration's conduct in the region as an extension of policy at
Distinguishing between the three dimensions of security identified a
it shows how each dimension interacts with Russia's broader camp
international reassertion on the one hand, hiημμμμμημιη
and the leadership's aim of preserving Wsever and Buzan divide
domestic political stability on the other, the Russian security
The foreign policy tool used to ensure space into four sub
each sphere of stability complements a complexes: the Baltic,
corresponding tool in safeguarding this the western or European,
stability on the domestic level. the Caucasus and the
Central Asian.
THE THREE FACES OF
SECURITY
The post-Soviet space, comprising fifteen independent states, constitutes

not a monolithic geographical block but an ethnically and religiously diverse
expanse. Discussions of Russian foreign policy tend to divide the region
into separate priority spheres, each symbolising a distinct policy vector.
For present purposes the distinction made by Wœver and Buzan's (2003)
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) will be adopted. Their analysis
of the Russia-led regional security complex divides the space into four sub
complexes·. the Baltic, the western or European, the Caucasus and the Central
Asian? Each carries unique significance from a foreign policy perspective.
The Retreat of Hard Power? Military Security
It is neither a coincidence that military security constituted Putin's first

priority as president nor that it served as the primary cause of initial public


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
support for his leadership. In the context of the post-Soviet sp

policy vector encompasses two elements: maintaining a peace-time s
presence in the region through military bases and troop contingent
capability and preparedness to stage military intervention when th
of doing so are deemed commensurate with the targeted gains.
The greatest threats from a military security standpoint d
Putin's first two terms emanated from the Caucasus and Central Asian
sub-complexes. This was the scene of both the brutal suppression of the
Chechnya conflict and the widest-ranging cooperation with a Western
power in Russia's modern history. The decision to tolerate the positioning
of American troops in Central Asia following the 9/11 terrorist attacks was
an opportunistic tactic by the Putin administration, which hoped to take
attention off its own battle with radicalism
The greatest threats in the Caucasus and Protect its own bor"
from. a. military security ?fs from Λ<: spread °f
. Islamist movements. As a member of
standpoint during Putin s , . , , , ,
Putin s close circle Gleb Pavlovsky pu
first two terms emanated . „ . Ώ ■ « ,, ,
it at the time, Russia would rather have
from the Caucasus the υ $ in Uzbekistan ώίη T
and Central Asian in Tatarstan" (CBS News2001 ). M
sub-complexes. (2011:247) further argues that the
fitted with Putin's wider campaign fo
Russia's reassertion, as close involvement with the global "war o
placed it in a good position to become a key actor in determini
national developments.
Following the campaign in Chechnya and cooperation with
during Putin's first term, the paranoia provoked by the colour rev
caused the leadership to direct increasing resources towards ensurin
logical security. Despite phenomenal economic growth, Russia's
budget in this period remained less than 5 percent of the U.S.'s
below the level of expenditure of Soviet years (Donaldson and
2009:148). Putin summed up the new approach in his 2006 annua
"We must not repeat the mistakes of the Soviet Union... neithe
tics nor in defence strategy. We must not resolve our defence issu
expense of economic and social development" (Putin 2006). Pre
with the possibility of social unrest at home, the leadership thus f


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
pacifying the public through raising living standards and salaries

Yet military hard power was not abandoned as a foreign p
Alongside the economic costs of ensuring military security, R
increasingly concerned with NATO's presence on its borders
tolerance of the 1999 round of NATO expansion was based on the
agreement that no further enlargement of the alliance would
Despite arguing that the mooted inclusion of the Baltic states wa
for Moscow, it accepted even this round of expansion in 2004 in
for the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council, a forum for
discussion between the two sides (Mankoff2011:159). As shown
opinion surveys and official pronouncements ever since, incor
countries in the vital European sub-complex is deemed a step
Russia. Shortly before its 2008 war with Georgia, Moscow rei
readiness to prevent this by any means
necessary (Tsygankov 2013:199). The Russia wf
military intervention that followed was a .. . ..
. . , r. ,. achieving its objective
clear signal of its continuing readiness to , . .. _
utilise hard power where other foreign of Precluding Georgia s
policy tools prove insufficient; the failure membership in NATO.
of both economic and ideological (soft
power) means to persuade Georgia to alter the West-leaning course it was
pursuing under president Saakashvili in the run-up to the conflict led Russia
to take decisive measures to force compliance.6
The 2008 conflict provoked a renewed chorus from advocates of the
recidivist expansionism narrative (see Asmus 2010). However, judging
Georgia's pro-West orientation against Russia's views on potential NATO
expansion into the Caucasus and European sub-complexes paints a picture
of a country seeking security over expansionism. As Tsygankov (2012:707)
argues, by limiting itself to recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia's inde
pendence and not attempting to remove Saakashvili from power and install
a pro-Kremlin leadership in Georgia, Russia was content with achieving its
objective of precluding Georgia's membership in NATO. Just as telling was
Russia's decision not to intervene in 2010 during ethnic riots in Kyrgyzstan
despite direct calls by the Central Asian state for Moscow's assistance—the
wave of violence was an "internal" affair, then-president Dmitry Medvedev
stated at the time (Elder 2010).


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
After the Chechen campaign in the early period of Putin's presiden

the military dimension played a reduced role in foreign policy during
second term. The colour revolutions in the early 2000s led to an in
ing preoccupation among the leadership with a foreign policy capa
safeguarding political stability, leading to a focus on energy relatio
facilitate economic growth and soft power abroad as a means to pr
ideological security. Nevertheless, hard power remained in Russia's arse
Driven by the motive of preventing NATO expansion, the 2008 int
tion in Georgia demonstrated its enduring foreign policy role; foll
the ceasefire negotiated by the EU, the U.S. announced it wou
longer pursue Georgia's integration with NATO (Donaldson and N
2009:376). Military security thus appeared to be governed both by
nomic concerns, with hard power calcu
Demonstrating an lated against the costs involved, and
aggressive attitude in the need to counter NATO expansion.
post-Soviet space served dimension in foreign policy, it also c
to boost the popularity corresponded with efforts to pro
of the ruling regime. Russia's image internationally as a
power. Demonstrating an aggressive atti
tude in the post-Soviet space served to boost the popularity of the
regime: the 2008 clash not only brought Putin his highest popularity r
ever (Judah 2013:164)—it also rallied public support behind the off
Kremlin line concerning the threat of Georgia's incorporation into
(Chambers 2010:120).
Exploiting Dependency? Economic Security

The second foreign policy dimension, economic security, predicate
maintenance of a regional presence to facilitate use of the post-Soviet
for Russia's internal development. It encompasses not only control
energy infrastructure but also efforts at deepening economic integ
with neighbouring states through institutional channels. Ensuring econ
security thus involves both elements of hard power—exploitation of reg
energy dependency networks—and soft power—promotion of inter
economic cooperation to facilitate more effective trade links. Owing to
restrictions, this section focuses on energy dependency; with 70 perce


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Russia's export revenue coming from hydrocarbons (Sherr 2013

component is particularly vital for Russia's economic security.7 It
the area of economic security that the specificity of each post-Sov
complex becomes apparent. Despite political and institutional in
with the West, the Baltic sub-complex remains deeply dependent o
energy. In the European sub-complex, Russia has fought to wre
of key infrastructure in Ukraine and Belarus in an effort to avoid
tivist tactics from states aware of their strategic location as inter
for Russian deliveries to Western Europe. Central Asia has been
of particular geopolitical rivalry, a battle
in which Russia is continuing to cede . _ ,
, A , ., ~ . , ,. In the European sub
ground. And with Georgia s recalcitrance .
threatening to offset the power balance, COmPleX RuSS,a haS
the Caucasus remains problematic. fought to wrest co
Analysts often frame Russia's energy key infrastructur
politics in the post-Soviet space as part of 'n Ukraine and Belar
a broader expansionist drive, an accusa- in an effort to avoi
tion to which Russia's behaviour under obstructivist tactics
Putin has often given credence. In the 90s from states aware of
Russia moved swiftly to cement energy their strategic location
dependency networks across the territory as intermediaries for
of the former Soviet Union, negotiat- Russjan energy deliveries
ing a continuation of the discretionary Western Europe
pricing arrangements that had governed
Moscow's relations with its republics
throughout the preceding decades. The policy was not met with universal
success, with some states—especially Azerbaijan and Georgia—resisting
Russia's overtures while simultaneously soliciting external involvement
in their energy industries (Stuhlberg 2007:14-15). Nonetheless, the vast
centralised network of Soviet pipelines upon which these states still rely
has meant that even those who have become producers in their own
right—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan—remain highly vulnerable
to Moscow's regional policy in their capacity as exporters.
The re-emergence of economic dependency in post-Soviet relations
has provided Russia increased foreign policy leverage and coercive capacity
in regional issues. Some denounce this "gas weapon" as an instrument of


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
blackmail used to attain geopolitical objectives. Upon closer ins

however, an explanation premised on rational cost calculation and ec
stability appears to hold more weight. A clear case in point is t
gas dispute with Ukraine, when Russia announced a tripling of
prices to its western neighbour (Goldman 2008b:144). Occurrin
aftermath to the Orange Revolution, the dispute has been widely pr
in Western media and academic literature as an example of Mosc
of the "gas weapon" to coerce a weaker state (see Goldman 2008
2008:217). Far less cited in this context is the broader trend of
policy economisation under Putin, which saw a generous but incr
unsustainable energy subsidization scheme gradually replaced w
more reflective of market prices; Kiev was putting up opposition to
moves at raising prices almost uniformly across post-Soviet space (J
al 2011:28).8 The political ramifications of Ukraine's shift to a West
leadership further provoked Russia's uncompromising attitude in 20
Moscow stepping up demands for a higher tariff that it had been m
for a number of years (Tsygankov 2006b:685). As argued in the f
section, reclaiming influence in Ukraine was subordinated to the
goal of economic growth, and stability took precedence over any im
designs Russia may have been entertaining. In addition Russia ac
construction of new routes bypassing the European sub-complex; th
Stream, Blue Stream and South Stream pipelines provide direct tran
the Baltic and Black Seas (Goldman 2008b: 152-160).
Economic security as a dimension of foreign policy under Put
prioritised the domestic level. Efforts at retaining strategic energy in
ture across the post-Soviet space in the 1990s were followed by a do
campaign during Putin's first term to consolidate state control over
flows. This facilitated use of energy as a tool in the Kremlin's su
foreign policy towards its neighbours, a tactic enshrined in Russ
Energy Strategy (Smith 2012:130). Use of the "gas weapon" to
regional dependency on Russia's reserves was at the same time ca
against the potential domestic repercussions of such policy, wit
cal stability dependent on economic stability at home. Dominan
regional networks can thus be used as a tool to apply pressure for p
change abroad (or reversal, in post-2004 Ukraine's case), and as a
tive for political and economic alignment with Moscow. In both


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
can serve to bolster the regime's political stability and facilitate th

power campaign" when aggressive behaviour abroad is needed to
public sentiment.
Cooption over Coercion: Ideological Security

The final dimension of security is also the most elusive. It encomp
threat that foreign policy is increasingly being configured to guar
Ideological security concerns first and foremost insulation from an
ideas the Russian leadership considers destabilising to the climate o
opinion. In the early stage of Putin's presidency, the pursuit of id
stability abroad manifested itself predominantly through the prom
Russia's newly institutionalised foreign policy concepts of mult
sovereignty, and jjreat power status. These
themes paradoxically achieved promi- _ ηΛΛΜ . ..
. i, . , . . . F Bv 2004, in the run-up
nence in Putin s international pronounce- ... . , ...
ι*. τί · to Ukraine s presidential
ments at around the time Russia was , .
ι tit . · . election, the ideological
cooperating with the West in a number _ α
of crucial spheres, for instance by "allow- dimension of fore
ing" US troops to station in Central Asia P°''Çy was under
following the 9/11 attacks. a from defian
By 2004, in the run-up to Ukraine's geopolitical rhetor
presidential election, the ideological an increased focu
dimension of foreign policy was undergo- soft power as a ne
ing a shift from defiant geopolitical rheto- pragmatic means
ric to an increased focus on soft power as achieving this Stab
a new, pragmatic means of achieving this
stability. The concept, developed by Joseph Nye (1990; 2004),
an international actor with the ability to "shape the preferen
ers," to get others to want the outcomes it wants through cooptio
than coercion (Nye 2004:5). For present purposes a narrower de
adopted, confined to cooption through the advancement and prom
cultural ties, with this seen as the main component of Russia's reg
power offensive. As Tsygankov (2006a: 1081) notes, "soft power
people and societies, rather than governments and elites."
Some commentators have interpreted the new focus on soft


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Russian foreign policy as just another imperialist tactic (see Mye

The emphasis on society that underpins the shift, however, suggest
ferent interpretation. The series of so-called "colour revolution
post-Soviet space towards the end of Putin's second term drove the
tion that the absence of pro-Russian governments necessitated a
the cultural ties that bind citizens across the region; the incorpo
soft power into foreign policy was used above all as a defensive
against outside influence. The change of orientation was articul
speech made by Putin in 2004, in which he argued that Russia
using sufficiently well the historical credits of trust and friendship,
ties that link the peoples of our countries" (Putin 2004). The sta
emphasis is implicitly on bolstering Russia's ideological stability
the strengthening of cultural ties with former dependencies and
larly the sizeable Russian diaspora. This is particularly evident in th
sub-complex, where the familiarity with Russian language and cultu
existing business links are used to establish what Grigas (2012:
"Kremlin-friendly networks of influence" throughout society.
Soft power today is used across the region, with cultural initiativ
not only at retaining links with Russians abroad but also at diff
culture and language throughout society. It is implemented both
cally and institutionally. The former is achieved through the prom
"the Russian perspective" abroad, with substantial state funds poure
media agencies such as Russia Today television, whose reach exte
beyond the post-Soviet space to over 100 countries and 644 million
(RTn.d.). An example of the formal institutionalisation of soft
foreign policy was the 2007 creation by presidential decree of Russk
(Russian World), a foundation whose stated aim is "to preserve and
Russian language and culture in today's world" (Russkiy Mir Fou
n.d.). Within three years, Russkiy Mir had set up 50 Russian ce
29 countries (Kudors 2010). Of particular significance are the f
tion's close ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, whose role a
authority in Russian society is used to lend the project legitimac
2013:89; Gorham 2011:31). Gvosdev and Marsh (2014:48) highlig
substantial role the church has played in Russia's soft power campai
its promotion of a "Russian-Slavic-Eurasian cultural space" to cou
spread of Western values. The observable convergence of state and c


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
under Putin is in this light a particularly salient development.9

Soft power abroad functions as an effective tool for ensuring ideo
stability in Russia's domestic sphere. Combined with state consoli
of information flows on an internal level, it allows for a uniform di
to reach the domestic public and influence views on international dev
ments held by compatriots abroad. It is not an imperialist policy;
with Putin's focus on economic development, it is seen by the lea
as a cost-effective way of spreading influence. Soft power is in this s
an offensive means for a defensive end. Tsygankov (2006a:1098)
lates this paradox well, arguing "there is no escape from the simp
that Russia will jeopardise its own stability if it refrains from attemp
deepen [regional] ties." A monopolisation
of truth at home through media control The initial focus on
and state propaganda can thus combine ensuring military se
with insulation from competing "truths" and economic grow
espoused in the West to bring the regional between 2000 and
sphere in line with the domestic and facili- 2004 gradually shif
tate its use as a buffer against the influx of towards efforts at
competing discoures. Finally, soft power ide0, ica||y stabHis
has a place in Russia s identity campaign ...»
. . . , , . . &, the country from a
by proiecting its favoured international . , ; ,, .
,7 . . . , perceived influx of
image as a bastion of alternative values ·*
encompassing the vast Eurasian space. estern idea
The broad regional overview pre
sented above demonstrates the interplay between the three f
vectors prioritised during Putin's first two terms, and the r
dimension of security had with parallel developments on the d
The initial focus on ensuring military security and economic g
2000 and 2004 gradually shifted towards efforts at ideologica
the country from a perceived influx of Western ideas. Th
voked by a wave of revolutions across the post-Soviet space a
a fear of the unrest spreading to Russia, felt acutely by an e
for its political stability and a public susceptible to increasing
media coverage. The following section analyses the most sign
events, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Charting
ment in the election and its response to the political crisis th


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
assesses the impact of these events on Russia's subsequent regio

and domestic political landscape. Moscow's failure to prevent th
of a pro-Western leadership in Ukraine led to a marked reasse
both policy spheres, placing greater focus upon internal consol
power and external insulation from the West's "démocratisation d
experience further strengthened the interconnectedness of foreig
conduct and regime stability.
THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND RUSSIA'S RESPONSE
Russia's involvement in Ukraine's internal affairs predates the

matic regional foreign policy course of Vladimir Putin, with finan
rhetorical support extended to favoured pro-Russian candidat
independence (Bugajski 2004:92). However, 2004 constituted
moment for Russia's wider role within the post-Soviet space:
^dential election pitted against each other
In the months leading candidates with divergent
up to Ukraine's Orange Ukraine's future and, crucia
Revolution, the Kremlin Place in " Aeeording to P
was guided by a zero- Ryabov '2006:146 )·,hc decis
, Moscow's support to Viktor Yanukovych,
sum conception of , . , „ .,
, , .. the incumbent pro-Russian president
what was at stake: the „ , , ... .
Kuchma s proposed candida
battle was for Ukraine s as ear|y as 2
political orientation, and Yushchenko>
whether it would align path for ukra
with Russia or the West, vehemently
presidency was seen as tantam
pression of Russian language and culture in U
EU and NATO, and an end to Russia's ongoin
membership in its planned regional custom
2006:147). In short, it threatened the three dim
leadership directly relied on for its political su
As a result, in the months leading up to U
the Kremlin was guided by a zero-sum concept
battle was for Ukraine's political orientation


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
with Russia or the West. This perception initiated a policy of

support for Yanukovych, which operated on two fronts. One invol
active promotion in Ukraine of a pro-Russian stance alongside atte
discredit the Yushchenko camp. This was achieved through the use
ganda to condition viewpoints as well as economic incentives to
an association of growth and stability with pro-Russian Yanuko
first front thus represented a test for Russia's nascent soft power
in the post-Soviet space. Against this backdrop, Russia engaged
in Ukraine's political process, deploying so-called political tech
the ground, a means of further swaying the electorate and man
the political landscape. This second front functioned as a predo
destabilizing force, and ultimately served to exacerbate existing
between eastern and western Ukraine.
Soft Power and Black PR
Russia's soft power campaign operated on multiple levels. Although

Ukraine's media landscape was not subject to the same state control in
2004 as Russia's, the largest reach was enjoyed by outlets allied with the
incumbent regime. Television and press coverage by pro-Russian medi
was supplemented by Russian television stations with considerable aud
ences in Ukraine (McFaul 2007:61). Billboards proclaiming "Yanukovych
is Our President" were even erected in central Moscow, a testament to the
election's significance for Russia domestically and the psychology of Russo
Ukrainian relations (Petrov and Ryabov 2006:155). Exploiting his high
approval rating in Ukraine, Putin himself twice visited Kiev in the buildup
to demonstrate his support for Yanukovych, receiving extensive coverage
on Ukrainian television including a 90-minute phone-in broadcast live on
three national channels (Wilson 2005a:94).
But propaganda tactics extended beyond mere support for the pro
Russian candidate. Fuelled by growing resentment of Western aid for the
opposition, black PR was deployed in a campaign to discredit Yushchenko
and "expose" his Western links. The Yanukovych camp took advantage of
the fortuitous timing of Ukraine's presidential election (it coincided with
the US's) to spread this view. Posters playing on the opposition campaign
slogan were printed, displaying George Bush's face superimposed onto


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Yushchenko's and proclaiming "Yes! For Bushchenko." Many alle

idea had been conceived by Yanukovych's Russian campaign advisors
2004). Even the Russian Orthodox Church tacitly cooperated in
power campaign, invoking the candidates' religious credentials (or ap
lack thereof) to praise Yanukovych and discredit his rival (Wilson 2
Alongside the rhetorical campaign, numerous economic ince
were offered by Russia to those willing to support the pro-Kremlin
date. Moscow publicly endorsed freedom of movement between
countries and extended dual citizenship to Ukrainians with business
Russia; it cut Ukraine's gas debt by around $1 billion and held o
soaring energy prices constant throughout the election; it transfer
collection rights for energy delivery to Ukraine, reducing its petro
by 16% at a cost to Russia of $800 mil
MOSCOW publicly lion; and it offered reduced energy
endorsed freedom of as well as increased trade and invest
movement between all conditional upon a Yanukovych
the two countries and (Wilson 2005a:89; Petrov and
extended dual citizenship 2006:150). This was supplemen
to Ukrainians with direct sponsorship of Yanukovych's
business ties in Russia; tion campaign. Estimates on this
it cut Ukraine's gas debt varY considerably, but the most
by around $1 billion and cited sources suggest some $
held Otherwise soaring lion was contributed by Russia,
energy prices constant financed through state-run energ
throughout the election. Gazprom. with incrcased tL1,,ds
disposal, Yanukovych—then prime min
ister—was able to conduct populist policies and offer his own
incentives, doubling state pensions in the run-up to the election and
state officials (Vanderhill 2013:146).
Political Technology and "Directed Conflict"

The phenomenon of political technology is seen by most contem
analysts of the former Soviet Union as a powerful new force h
démocratisation across the region. In a notable study of this inf
Wilson (2005b:49) defines "political technologists" as those who


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
apply whatever 'technology' they can to the construction of polit

a whole. The manipulation of the media is central to their work, but
definition it extends beyond this—to the construction of parties
destruction of others, the framing of general campaign dynamics an
manipulation of results.
The Yanukovych side had an abundance of such individuals

posal. Commenting on his involvement during this period, the mo
of these, Gleb Pavlovsky, stated of his colleagues: "take any rec
name—they all became Kievites" (Samarina 2004). The "techno
quickly settled upon a strategy they termed "directed conflict
involved exacerbating divisions between east and west Ukraine
ring up animosity between religious and ethnic groups. With
divisions, Crimea was considered a particularly fertile ground for
such confrontation (Wilson 2005a:90; Kuzio 2010:384). The
encompassed both anti-Yushchenko propaganda and so-calle
association"—expressions of faux support and affiliation with t
tion, aimed at blackening its image. One example apparently in
TV campaign encouraging the public to "vote for Yushchenko. T
we will kick the Russians and Jews out of Ukraine!" (Wilson 2
The use of political technology thus worked hand-in-hand with
soft power initiatives in Ukraine. Hard power, if exercised to any
ible degree, was confined to subtle methods of provoking broa
cal déstabilisation within the country. Speculation continues co
Russia's role in attempts on Yushchenko's life, including his fa
soning in early September (see Wilson 2005a:96-103). The sam
to claims of low-scale Russian military involvement in Kiev—c
evidence has thus far not materialised (Petrov and Ryabov 20
More plausible are reports that the Russian leadership encour
action by their Ukrainian counterparts once mass protest had b
(Kuzio 2010:392).
Why did Russia Fail?

Russian involvement and the zero-sum logic by which it was drive
judged within the context of parallel, though less direct, Western a
McFaul (2007:48 ) claims over $ 18 million was spent by the US gov


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
on election-related assistance in Ukraine between 2002 and 2004.10 The

funds were distributed among democratic institutions and independent
media outlets, and only indirectly used to sponsor civic mobilisation ini
tiatives. Far more instrumental, according to McFaul (2007:79), was the
effect that Western condemnation of the fixed election—and its subsequent
support for the protesters—had on keeping people in the streets. The fact
that Western opinion mattered to such a degree in Kiev testifies to the soft
power it could exert, albeit in direct competition with cruder and more
overt Russian efforts. As Wilson (2005a:189) notes, "the pulling power
of Western capital and political institutions [provided] a multiplier effect
to offset the crude cash spending advantages of the incumbent regime."
This was the Russian elite's fundamental mistake. Excessive confidence
in how it was perceived in Ukraine led Moscow to overestimate its soft

power leverage. Sanctioning crude and
Excessive confidence in often dangerous tactics aimed at discred
how it was perceived 'ting Yushchenko's leadership credentials
in Ukraine led Moscow οη1>'served to galvanise the suPPort base
to overestimate its soft he already εη^εά· The need to secure
power leverage. a Pro"Russian reêime in ukraine was
approached as a domestic concern, with
strategies used in prior Russian elections redeployed without considering
"the specifics of the Ukrainian political public conscience" (Petrov and
Ryabov 2006:149). This conflation between the domestic and foreign
policy arenas was compounded by an underestimation of Western interest
in Ukraine's future, with the events dealing a shock to the Putin adminis
tration (Petrov and Ryabov 2006:158).
Against this background Russian foreign policy demonstrated pragma
tism in conceding defeat when a re-run of the vote was commissioned by
Ukraine's Supreme Court. Moscow immediately moved to normalise rela
tions with the new government led by president Yushchenko. While some
analysts have put Russia's restraint during the crisis down to a reluctance
to sever ties with the West (Tsygankov 2006a: 1088; Mankoff2011:226), it
seems plausible that Putin's administration was also aware of the economic
pressure it could bring to bear on Kiev in subsequent years and the tools
still at its disposal to hinder Yushchenko's West-leaning ambitions.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
The Legacy of the Orange Revolution

The experience of the Orange Revolution and the failure to forestall
ratisation in Ukraine had wide-ranging repercussions on Russia's r
foreign policy as well as its domestic sphere. The first conclusion dra
that Russia's ideological appeal had to be improved. As Sherr (20
argues, Putin's decision to prioritise soft power as a foreign policy too
2005 was driven by his perception that the Orange Revolution repres
a triumph of the West's capacity in this field. Somewhat paradoxically
was a concurrent realisation that soft power alone was insufficient as
of exerting influence in the post-Soviet space. As shown in Georg
years later, preventing NATO expansion
was considered imperative enough to A Russia faced with
justify the use of hard power. reduced political
In the economic sphere the approach influence in Ukraine
also changed. Russia had demonstrated was no longer prepa
its willingness to pay dearly for regional to subsidise its ene
stability in 2004. Financial aid and energy needs. Raising Ukr
discounts for the pro-Russian camp energy price was al
involved short-term economic loss with motivated by politi
a view to ensuring long-term military, calculations, and m
economic and ideological security: cutting & cont jnuation of th
short NATO enlargement, expanding the «directed conf |ict» tac
Russia-led regional customs union and ued durj the
preventing a democratic, pro-Western . .
r ~ & T1 , , , election campaign.
state from appearing on Russia s borders.
Failure to secure these conditions led to a
dramatic reassessment of regional economic policy during Putin's second

term. The 2005 gas dispute is a clear example of this change in course;
a Russia faced with reduced political influence in Ukraine was no longer
prepared to subsidise its energy needs. Raising Ukraine's energy price
was also motivated by political calculations, and marked a continuation
of the "directed conflict" tactic pursued during the election campaign.
Russia played upon internecine political dispute in Ukraine and strove to
discredit the West-leaning Yushchenko government. According to Fraser,
the combination of these methods with targeted use of the "gas weapon"


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
worked directly to damage Yushchenko's popularity and contrib

his party's loss—and Yanukovych's victory—in the 2006 parliam
election. Having regained some influence in Ukraine with the
of a pro-Russian prime minister, Moscow immediately negotiat
Yanukovych a more favourable gas deal (Fraser 2008:167).
These developments appeared to signal the emergence of a g
trend towards promoting instability within the post-Soviet spac
coincided with further consolidation of power at home. To excuse it
and stabilise itself politically, the Russian leadership painted the We
aggressor and accused it of staging a conspiracy to install a Wes
regime. Assertiveness abroad as a traditional means of leader legi
was being challenged, and the regime resorted to defensive mea
retain public support. Following the
To excuse its defeat and Orange Revolution, a climate of f
stabilise itself politically, distrust reminiscent of cold war Eas
the Russian leadership animosity arose in Russia. Nati
painted the West as the anti-Western propaganda dom
aggressor and accused it Driven by a conv
- A . that the colour revolutions had been the
of staging a conspiracy , . XT„ _ , ,
β „ ... , . product or Western NGOs and other
to install a West-leaning c c , , . .
α roreign-runded organisations oper
regime. in the post-Soviet space, the le
commenced a crackdown on NGOs work
ing in Russia, passing a law branding those receiving funds from abroad
"foreign agents" and demanding they declare their finances. As part of
the campaign against the "enemy within," a nationwide pro-Kremlin
youth movement called Nashi ("Ours") was established on the back of a
$17 million government initiative (Judah 2013:87). Counting thousands
of members and primed to physically counter any mass protest that may
break out in Moscow, the movement derided the Russian opposition as
"the unnatural alliance of liberals, fascists, sympathizers of the West and
ultranationalists, international foundations and international terror, united
by one and only thing—the hatred for Putin" (cited in Finkel and Brudny
2013:19). It went into action with an aggressive anti-Western offensive,
including public harassment of Britain's ambassador to Moscow, Tony
Brenton. Amid fear ofWestern-sponsored social unrest spreading to Russia,


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
relations with the West became an ideological instrument for

domestic stability during Putin's second term.
As in 2000, when the new president sought to break with
and rally public support, the "orange threat" necessitated a rear
of Russia's identity. Invoking the theme of sovereignty that ha
the cornerstone of foreign policy since Putin officially enshrined
2000s Foreign Policy Concept, the Kremlin embraced a new pol
"sovereign democracy," with its emphasis on Russia's statist
rejection of liberal democratic principles, became the ideologica
Russia's democracy-prevention campaign (Finkel and Brudny
The concept dominated the political landscape for subsequent y
as a paradigm for consolidation of control internally and as a fore
approach aimed at precluding démocratisation across post-Sovie
CONCLUSION
Putin's first two presidential terms were marked by an econo

foreign policy and greater reliance on it as a means of leader leg
Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution signalled a shift towards in
logical insulation—threats to Russia's political stability became eq
a Western campaign to democratise the post-Soviet space. Wi
foreign policy emerging as an extension of domestic policy, the
goal of maintaining influence in the region was calculated agains
to Russia's internal economic and, by extension, political stab
soft power was prioritised as a cost-effective and covert method o
this objective, enduring fears of NATO expansion ensured that h
remained an available foreign policy tool. Aggressive measures in
became a fundamentally defensive tactic of maintaining stability
With Putin's return to the presidency in 2012 it seems apt to
by briefly assessing the evolution of this approach since 2008. It s
be noted that, although presiding over a temporary improvement
with the West, the Medvedev presidency was marked by relative
in the practice of foreign policy (Duncan 2013: Mankoff2011
2008 Foreign Policy Concept ratified by Medvedev was said to "su
and develop" the ideas advanced in the 2000 version (Russian M
Foreign Affairs 2008). Furthermore, the five foreign policy prin


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
announced following the Georgian conflict suggested an unchang

of Russia's regional priorities: by asserting a claim to "privileged in
in the post-Soviet space, Medvedev was implicitly demanding rec
of Russia's regional sphere of influence (Duncan 2013:8).
The international setting had also changed. For many in Russia t
financial crisis had discredited the "Western model," and its non-ac
Georgia seemed to symbolise its loss of the monopoly on force
politics (Tsygankov 2013:208). Yet the changing economic climate
foundly affected Russia's political landscape—the crisis caused more
to Russia than to any other G-20 economy (Aslund et al 2010:xi
price fell by 70 percent, contracting the
Unable to maintain the economy by 8.9 percent in 200
pace Of improvement (Judah et d 2012:18). Putin's ret
in living standards, the the Presidency on the back ofa d
leadership appears to conducted election and no clear
. , for Russia's future provoked thousands
have returned to great . , , .
to take to the streets demand
power posturing as a equitab|e
leadership (Judah 2013
means of rallying public ^ a resujt^ putin's th
support. National pride âs been marked b
at the 2014 Winter logical insulation facili
Olympics in Sochi and censorship, state c
the Russian team's media and a continue
triumph culminated "Western values."12
a year of aggressive Unable to maintain the pace of
diplomacy. improvement in living standards, the
leadership appears to have returned to
great power posturing as a means of ral
lying public support. National pride at the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi
and the Russian team's triumph culminated a year of aggressive diplomacy,
in particular towards the crisis in Syria. Justifying its choice of Putin as
"international person of the year," British daily The Times argued that he
had "succeeded in one of his most enduring ambitions: to bring Moscow
back to the international high table" (RT2013). Unprecedented recent
developments in Ukraine suggest Russia's leaders are prepared to sacrifice
its place at "the high table" in order to stabilise their position through an


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
aggressive restoration of national pride. Conditioned by state

coverage denouncing Kiev's new "fascist" government, the pu
overwhelmingly supported Russia's annexation of the Crimean
a fact testified to by a 15 percent jump in Putin's approval rating (K
2014). Does the move mark a departure from a defensive foreign p
one of outright imperialism? Notwithstanding the opportunism dis
Putin, it seems rather to reflect a continuing policy of democracy-
in the post-Soviet space of the kind witnessed in 2004. Promoting in
and unrest abroad prevents Western ideas from infiltrating Russia's
landscape. Domestic stability remains key for the leadership, but e
stagnation and an absence of measures to counter it are provoking
moves to capture public sentiment.
Recent developments suggest Russia Recent developme

may be heading fiirther down a vicious suggest Russja m
spiral. On the ideological front, domes- , .. , , .
Γ ...... . , ,. ' heading further down
tic stability is increasingly reliant upon . . . . _
., .c „ . a vicious spiral. On
identification against an other —the .
West, above all, and its "sympathisers" * e 1 e° 09'ca r0
in Russia—and patriotism equated with domestic stability
loyalty to the authorities. This creates increasingly relian
a paradox whereby efforts to spread identification agains
democracy in post-Soviet space provoke "other."
authoritarian retrenchment in Russia. ■■■
On the economic front, conversely, this spiral leads to an exacerbation o

Russia's dangerous reliance on a single resource for its material wellbeing.
With oil and gas accounting for 75 percent of its exports, Russia is a on
dimensional economy in a multi-dimensional, globalised world. In 200
it needed an oil price of $20 a barrel to balance its budget; by 2013 tha
figure was $103 ( The Economist2014). To overturn this trend, especially in
the face of accelerated efforts to wean Europe off Russian gas, institutions
fostering elite accountability and a reallocation of resources are needed—
all things that would threaten the leadership's survival. A decade on from
the Orange Revolution it seems Ukraine has reignited the post-Cold Wa
ideological standoff which those events first set in place, a state of affairs
likely to place Russia increasingly at odds with the international community.
This article has not sought to account for the complexity of Russia's


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
relations with the surrounding region. Out of necessity it has t

complex developments and categorised the anomalous in its attempt
light on what it considers the defining factors. It has overlooked in
dynamics within Russia's leadership and only given passing attentio
growing involvement in the post-Soviet space of outside powers
China, which is likely to determine Russia's regional position in the
to come. Russia in the 21st century is a country still in search of an
meaning any attempt to define its future role in global politics is b
be inconclusive. The article instead calls for renewed focus on a p
in studies of Russian foreign policy which is only recently begi
gain recognition. In a country where rule is increasingly persona
decisions determined by an elite few, offensive actions abroad sh
immediately be dismissed as neo-imperialist but instead consider
context of Russia's volatile social and political landscape, and the
nature of leader legitimation in a society unlikely to embrace "the
model" anytime soon.
NOTES
* I would like to thank Jolanta Babiuch-Luxmoore, Jorgen Mork, An

Short and George Wright for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. For examples of this perspective see Lucas 2008; Bugajski 2004; O

2008. More recent works have drawn parallels between Russia's "author
ian culture" and its expansionist behaviour—for a critique of this narrati
Tsygankov 2012.
2. Russia's "path-dependence" is often used to account for its refusa
"Westernise." See, for instance, Hedlund 2012.
3. For examples of such categorisation, see Zweynert 2007; Pursi

Patomàki 2004; Kuchins, Zevelev 2012; Tsygankov 2013.
4. Taken in isolation the inference may appear far-fetched. For contex
among others, Putin 2007.
5. See Waever and Buzan 2003, chapter 13. For an in-depth discussio
Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space from an RSCT perspective, see N
2008.
6. Although occurring at the start of the Medvedev presidency, the Georgian

conflict is included in the analysis as largely a product of foreign policy developments

104 VOL XXXI NO. 2 JUNE 2014

130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
under Putin. For context see, among others, Mankoff 2011:86.

7. For an overview of the institutionalist vector in Russia's foreig
see Nikitin 2008.
8. Tsygankov (2006b:685) points out that even close allies Armenia and
Belarus were presented with the same threefold price increase. See also Balmaceda
2013:39-41.
9. For more on this see Garrard and Garrard 2008.
10. Wilson's figure (2005a:184) is substantially higher.

11. For recent studies on this phenomenon, see Vanderhill & Aleprete 2013;
Wilson 2005b; Tolstrup (2009:940) calls this Russia's "extrovert authoritarian
resistance."
12. See Freedom House's "Freedom of the Press 2013" report, "Russia" sec
tion. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP%20
2013%20Full%20Report.pdf [accessed 26 March 2014],
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arbatov. Α. (1993) "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives." Internation

18:2, Autumn, pp.5-43.
Arbatov, A. (2000) "The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Co
Era," Atlantic Council of the United States Occasional Paper
Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publ
pdfs/82/0003-Kosovo_Crisis_End_Post-Cold_War_Era.pdf [Acc
March 2014],
Aslund, A. (1995) How Russia Became a Market Economy. Washingt
Brookings.
Aslund, Α., Guriev, S. and Kuchins, A. (2010) (eds.) Russia After the Global
Economic Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International
Economics.
Asmus, R. (2010) A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the
Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Balmaceda, M. (2013) The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus and
Lithuania Between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Bouzarovski, S. and Basin, M. (2013) "Energy and Identity: Imagining Russia

as Hydrocarbon Superpower." Annals of the Association of American


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Geographers 101:4, pp.783-794.

Bugajski, J. (2004) Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism. Westport: Pr
Byrne, P. (2004) "Yes, Bushchenko!" Kiev Post, October 7. Available at:
www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/yes-bushchenko-21645
[Accessed 26 March 2014],
CBS News (2001) "Odd Partners: U.S. and Russia in C. Asia," Oct
Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/odd-partners-us-and
in-c-asia/ [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Chambers, L. (2010) "Authoritarianism and Foreign Policy: The Twin
Resurgent Russia." Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4:2,
pp.112-125.
Cooper, W. (2009) "Russia's Economic Performance and Policies and Their
Implications for the United States." CRS Report for Congress, June 29.
Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34512.pdf [Accessed
26 March 2014].
Donaldson, R. and Nogee, J.(2009) The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing
Systems, Enduring Interests, 4th ed. London: M. E. Sharpe.
Duncan, P. (2013) "Batman and Robin? Exploring Foreign Policy Differences
Between Putin and Medvedev During the Medvedev Presidency." Centre
for European Politics, Security and. Integration (CEPSI) Working Paper.
London: CEPSI.
The Economist (2014) "Sochi or Bust," February 1. Available at: http://ww

economist.com/news/briefing/21595428-conspicuous-dazzle-gam
masks-country-and-president-deepening-trouble-sochi [Accessed 26 Marc
2014],
Elder, M. (2010) "Kyrgyzstan Tests Russian Regional Commitments." Global
Post, June 15. Available at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/rus
sia/100614/kyrgyzstan-ethnic-violence [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Finkel, E. and Brudny, Y. (2012) "Russia and the Colour Revolutions."
Democratization 19:1, February, pp.15-36.
Fraser, D. (2008) "Taking Ukraine Seriously: Western and Russian Responses
to the Orange Revolution." In Schmidtke, O. and Yekelchyk, S. (eds.)
Europe's Last Frontier: Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine Between Russia and
the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Garrard, J. and Garrard, C. (2008) Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and
Power in the New Russia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gessen, M. (2012) The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin.
New York: Riverhead Books.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Goldman, M. (2008a) "Moscow's New Economic Imperialism." Curren

107:711, October, pp.322-29.
Goldman, M. (2008b) Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia.
Oxford University Press.
Gorham, M. (2011) "Virtual Rusophonia: Language Policy as 'Soft Pow
New Media Age." Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and
European New Media 5, pp.23-48.
Grigas, A. (2012) Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influe
Baltic States. Chatcham House Briefing Paper, August. Available a
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Ru
and%20Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Gvosdev, N. and Marsh, C. (2014) Russian Foreign Policy: Interests,
Sectors. London: Sage.
Hancock, K. (2007) "Russia: Great Power Image Versus Economic
Asian Perspective 31:4, pp.71-98.
Hedlund, S. (2012) Russian Path Dependence: a People with a Troubled
London: Routiedge.
Hill, F. (2004) Energy Empire: Oil, Gas and Russia's Revival. Washing
Brookings.
Judah, B., Kobzova, J. and Popescu, N. (2011) "Dealing with a Post-BRIC
Russia." European Council of Foreign Relations 44, November.
Judah, B. (2013) Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with
Vladimir Putin. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kagarlitsky, B. (2002) Russia under Teltsin and Putin: Neo-Liheral Autocracy.
London: Pluto Press.
Kanet, R (2012) "The Return of Imperial Russia." In Sussex, M. (ed.) Conflict

in the Former USSR. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kessler, G. (2005) "Rice Encourages Belarus Opposition." The Washington Post,
April 22. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A6481-2005Apr21.html [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Konitzer, A. and Wegren, S. (2006) "Federalism and Political Recentralisation in
the Russian Federation: United Russia as the Party of Power." The Journal
of Federalism 36:4, pp.503-22.
Kravtsova, Y. (2014) "Putin's Crimea Move Cripples Opposition." The Moscow
Times, March 21. Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/
article/putins-crimea-move-cripples-opposition/496547.html [Accessed
26 March 2014],
Kuchins, A. and Zevelev, E. (2012) "Russia's Contested National Identity and


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Foreign Policy." In Nau, H. and Ollapally, D. (eds.) Worldviews of Asp

Powers. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kudors, A. (2010) '"Russian World'—Russia's Soft Power Approa
Compatriots Policy." Russian Analytical Digest (Research Centre for
European Studies) 81:10, pp.2-5. Available at: http://e-collection.libr
ethz.ch/eserv/eth:2215/eth-2215-01.pdf [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Kuzio, T. (2010) "State-led Violence in Ukraine's 2004 Elections and O
Revolution." Communist and Post-Communist Studies43, pp.383-395
Laenen, L. (2012) "Russia's 'Vital and Exclusive' National Interests in the
Abroad." In Kanet, R. and Freire, M. (eds.) Russia and Its Neighb
Identity, Interests and Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laruelle, M. (2008) Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washin
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center.
Levada Centre (2008) Russian Public Opinion 2007. Available at: http://www.
levada.ru/sites/default/files/levada_2007_eng.pdf [Accessed 26 March
2014],
Levada Centre (2009) Obshchestvennoe Mneniye 2009. Available at: http://www.
levada.ru/sites/default/files/levada_2009_rus.pdf [Accessed 26 March
2014],
Levitin, O. (2000) "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle." Survival 42:1, Spring,
pp.130-140.
Lo, B. (2002) Russian Foreign Policy in the post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and
Mythmaking. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lucas, E. (2008) The New Cold War: How The Kremlin Menaces both Russia and
the West. London: Bloomsbury.
Lukyanov, F. (2008) "Interactions Between Russian Foreign and Domestic
Politics." Irish Studies in International Affairs 19, pp.17-24.
Lynch, A. (2011) Vladimir Putin and Russian Statecraft. Washington, D.C.:
Potomac Books.
Mankoff, J. (2011) Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, 2nd
ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Litdefield.
McFaul, M. (1999) "Russia's Many Foreign Policies." Demokratizatsiya 7:3,
pp.393-412.
McFaul, M. (2007) "Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the
Orange Revolution." International Security 32:2, Fall, pp.45-83.
Menon, R. and Motyl, A. (2007) "The Myth of Russian Resurgence." The
American Interest 2:4, Spring, pp.96-101.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Myers, S. (2004) "Putin Uses Soft Power to Restore the Russian Emp
The New York Times, November 14. Available at: http://www.nytim
com/2004/1 l/14/weekinreview/14myer.html?_r=0 [Accessed 26 Mar
2014],
Neumann, I. (1996) Russia and the Idea of Europe. New York: Routledge.
Neumann, I. (2005) "Russia as a Great Power." In Hedenskog, J., Konnander,
V., Nygren, B., Oldberg, I. and Pursiainen, C. (eds.) Russia as a Great
Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin. New York: Roudedge.
Nikitin, A. (2008) "Russian Foreign Policy in the Fragmented Post-Soviet
Space." International Journal on World Peace 25:2, June 2008, pp.7-31.
Nye, J. (1990) Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Politics. New
York: Basic Books.
Nye, J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York:
Public Affairs.
Nygren, B. (2008) The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy

Towards the CIS Countries. London: Roudedge.
Orban, A. (2008) Power, Energy and the New Russian Imperialism. Westport:
Praeger.
Petrov, N. and Ryabov, A. (2006) "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution."
In Aslund, A. and McFaul, M. (eds.) Revolution in Orange: The Origins
of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Pursianen, C. and Patomâki, H. (2004) "The State and Society in Contemporary

Russian Political Thought." In Rindzeviciute, E. (ed.) Contemporary Change
in Russia. Stockholm: Sodertôrns University.
Putin, V. (2000) First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self Portrait by Russia's
President. London: Hutchinson.
Putin, V. (2004) "Address to the Plenary Session of the Russian Federation

Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives Meeting," Foreign Ministry,
Moscow, July 12. Available at: http://www.geneva.mid.ru/press/2004-04.
html [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Putin, V. (2005) "Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsiy,"
Kremlin, Moscow, April 25. Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/
appears/2005/04/25/1223_type63372type63374type82634_87049.
shtml [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Putin, V. (2006) "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly," Kremlin,
Moscow, May 10. Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/
speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_l 05 566.shtml


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
[Accessed 26 March 2014],

Putin, V. (2007) "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Co
on Security Policy," Munich, February 10. Available at: http://a
kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type8
pe82917type84779_l 18123.shtml [Accessed 26 March 2014].
RFE/RL (2013) "Armenia to Join Russian-Led Customs Union,"
September 3. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-cus
toms-union/25094560.html [Accessed 26 March 2014],
,RT(2013) "Putin Named International Person of the Year," Dec 30. Available at:
http://rt.com/news/putin-times-person-year-979/ [Accessed 26 March
2014],
RT (n.d.) "Distribution." Available at: http://rt.com/about-us/distribution/
[Accessed 26 March 2014].
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) The Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation, June 28. Available at: https://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) The Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation, July 12. Available at: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/
text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Russkiy Mir Foundation (n.d.) "About Russkiy Mir Foundation." Available
at: http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/fund/about [Accessed 26
March 2014].
Rutland, P. (2012) "Still Out in the Cold? Russia's Place in a Globalizing World."
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, pp.343-354.
Samarina, A. (2004) "Moskovskie Degustatory Ukrainskogo Sala." Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, December 7. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2004-12
07/l_pavlovskiy.html [Accessed 26 March 2014].
Saradzhyan, S. (2004) "Bill Hands Ivanov Full Control of the Army." Moscow
Times, June 15. Available at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/
article/bill-hands-ivanov-full-control-of-army/230309.html [Accessed 26
March 2014],
Sherr, J. (2013) Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's Influence Abroad.
London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Sixsmith, M. (2010) Putin's Oil: The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia.
New York: Continuum.
Smith, H. (2012) "Russian Foreign Policy and Energy: The Case of the Nord
Stream Gas Pipeline." In Aalto, P. (ed.) Russia's Energy Policies: National,
Interregional and Global Levels. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Stuhlberg, Α. (2007) Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation an

Energy Statecraft in Eurasia. Albany: State University of New York
Suny, R. (2007) "Living in the Hood: Russia, Empire and Old a
Neighbours." In Legvold, R. (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st C
and the Shadow of the Past. New York: Columbia University Press.
Szaszdi, L. (2008) Russian Civil Military Relations and the Origins of
Chechen War. Lanham: University Press of America.
Szrom, C. and Brugato, T. (2008) "Liquid Courage." The American, F
22. Available at: http://www.american.eom/archive/200
ary-02-08/liquid-courage [Accessed 26 March 2014],
Thorun, C. (2009) Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The
Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct Towards the West. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Tolstrup, J. (2009) "Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management

of Stability and Instability in the 'Near Abroad'." Democratization 16:5,
October, pp.922-944.
Treisman, D. (2011) The Return: Russia's Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev.
New York: Free Press.
Trenin, D. (2002) The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics
and Globalisation. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Tsygankov, A. (2006a) "If Not by Tanks, Then by Banks? The Role of Soft
Power in Putin's Foreign Policy." Europe-Asia Studies 58:7, November,
pp.1079-1099.
Tsygankov, A. (2006b) "Projecting Confidence, Not Fear: Russia's Post-Imperial
Assertiveness." Orbis 50:4, Autumn, pp.677-690.
Tsygankov, A. (2012) "Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations
of Russia's Foreign Policy. 'Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by
Habit'?" Europe-Asia Studies64:4, June, pp. 695-713.
Tsygankov, A. (2013) Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National
Identity, 3rd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Vanderhill, R. (2013) "Ukraine: A Democratic Post-Soviet State?" In Vanderhill,
R. and Aleprete, M. (eds.) International Dimensions of Authoritarian
Persistence. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
Waever, O. and Buzan, B. (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, A. (2005a) Ukraine's Orange Revolution. New Haven: Yale University
Press.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC
Wilson, A. (2005 b) Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Sovi

New Haven: Yale University Press.
Zweynert, J. (2007) "Conflicting Patterns of Thought in the Russian D
Transition: 1992-2002." Europe-Asia Studies 59:1, pp. 47-69.


130.208.130.230 on Sun, 26 Dec 2021 18:27:50 UTC

Luxmoore - 2014 - DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Luxmoore - 2014 - DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEFENSIVE IMPERIALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA'S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

Author(s): Matthew Luxmoore

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24543801

This content downloaded from

Matthew Luxmoore is a student of International Relations at Queen Mary

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

operation while reinforcing a parallel policy on the domestic f

ASSERTING CONTROL: THE DOMESTIC FOUNDATIONS

With the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, "500 y

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

independent Russian state (Donaldson and Nogee 2009:108). At

The Russia that Vladimir conf,ont ,the n£w territorial d

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

vowed to reassert Russia's prestige on the world stage. The po

Institutionalising a Collective Vision

it, the aim was to develop "a seemingly whj|e R(jssia

history " (Neumann 2005:14). While and Politically, a broad

To ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its

In highlighting its sovereignty, Russia expressed its desire to be left

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

by multipolarity and denounced the US-led system that had co

Stabilisation from Within

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

administrative reshuffle; Putin handed his defence minister and r

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

understood well the gravity of the situation, designating its resolu

. . As one of his first initiatives as president,

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

Having inherited a state on the brink of collapse, Putin thus

greater focus on achieving ideological stability during between 2004 and

Great Power Populism

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

achievement of great power status: leader legitimacy, military sec

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

and opportunities to exert influence abroad were calculated again

The post-Soviet space, comprising fifteen independent states, constitutes

The Retreat of Hard Power? Military Security

It is neither a coincidence that military security constituted Putin's first

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

support for his leadership. In the context of the post-Soviet sp

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

pacifying the public through raising living standards and salaries

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

This content downloaded from

After the Chechen campaign in the early period of Putin's presiden

Exploiting Dependency? Economic Security