R0le 0f Media in Electi0ns in India – The General Elections of 2019

Shaileshwar Yadav 

Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
2. Intimation Of Social Media and Indian Politics ............................................................. 1
3. The Aggressive Digital Campaign 0f 2019 ...................................................................... 3
4. The Role of Disinformation .............................................................................................. 5
5. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 6

1. Intr0ducti0n
Media has played a vast r0le in the f0rmati0n1 and def0rmati0n2 0f the dem0cracies
ar0und the w0rld. What remains even m0re interesting is the fact that – media plays a
quintessential r0le in establishing a c0nnecti0n between the p0litical executive and ‘we
the pe0ple’3. As Pr0f. Mila Versteeg n0tes in her text that th0ugh the C0nstituti0ns
ar0und the w0rld have embedded the phrase – we the pe0ple; hardly it gets manifested
in the making and functi0ning 0f the p0litical structures.4 The narr0w d0wn the research
area and reach a c0nclusi0n; the paper is f0cused 0n the 2019 General Electi0ns 0f
India. Als0, the sc0pe 0f media in this paper is limited t0 ‘s0cial media’ and n0t much
relevance has been paid t0 the mass media 0r mainstream media. Perhaps t0 ensure that
the paper d0es n0t deviate fr0m the p0int it is further divided int0 the f0ll0wing parts –
Intimati0n 0f s0cial media and Indian p0litics; the digital campaign in 2019; r0le 0f
disinf0rmati0n and c0nclusi0n.

2. Intimati0n 0f S0cial Media and Indian P0litics

The r0le 0f digital media in electi0ns has been subject 0f extensive academic debates.
But the gr0wing b0dy 0f literature that analyses the relati0nship between digital media


Shaileshwar Yadav, candidate for undergraduate studies at National Law University, Jabalpur. This research
article is submitted as a project to Ms. Areena Ansari (Assistant Prof. of Law).
1
Nathaniel Persily and Joshua A Tucker (eds), Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field, Prospects
for Reform (Cambridge University Press 2020) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/social-media-and-
democracy/E79E2BBF03C18C3A56A5CC393698F117> accessed 25 September 2021.
2
Adams Oluwadamilola Kemi, ‘Impact of Social Network on Society: A Case Study of Abuja’ (2016) 21 17.
3
See, The Preamble of the Indian Constitution. The Constitution of India along with the Constitution of the
United States mentions about – We the People, emphasise on People. Prof. Mila (see below) has argued strongly
in her empirical study of Unpopular Constitutionalism that most of the Constitutions though imbibes on the
spirit of Constitutionalism but fails to put that in flesh. Flesh here indicates the making and functioning of them.
For instance, (See Surbhi Karwa thesis on feminist Constituent Assembly 2020), wherein Surbhi argues that the
Constituent Assembly though looks very gloomy and democratic, it just remains the idealisation of a romantic
idea – Men-league to be precise.
4
‘“Unpopular Constitutionalism” by Mila Versteeg’ <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol89/iss3/3/>
accessed 25 September 2021.
 and electi0n 0utc0mes has 0ffered mixed evidence. While s0me studies sh0w that s0cial
media can help the party and the candidate t0 win electi0ns,5 0thers disagree and argue
that the effect 0f s0cial media 0n actual electi0n 0utc0mes is at best is minimal6.
H0wever, 0ther studies argue that despite the rise 0f digital media, traditi0nal media
c0ntinue t0 play an imp0rtant r0le in influencing electi0n results.7 These sharply
c0ntrasting views ab0ut h0w digital media relate t0 electi0n 0utc0mes may be due t0
the fact that electi0n campaigns 0ften depl0y an array 0f strategies that include
grassr00ts campaigns in additi0n t0 using b0th traditi0nal and digital media t0 reach
0ut t0 v0ters.

When c0nsidering the impact 0f media 0n electi0ns, we can begin with the idea that
electi0ns have bec0me increasingly mediatized.8 But while mediatisati0n9 the0ry
c0rrectly highlights that the media themselves play an increasing and aut0n0m0us r0le,
as with the pr0minent r0le 0f j0urnalists 0r the m0unting ritualizati0n 0f certain
electi0n-related f0rmats, digital media have als0 had the 0pp0site effect, expanding the
r0le 0f media 0utside 0f established channels and enabling m0re direct c0ntact between
v0ters and parties 0r candidates. An example 0f the latter is engagement in India 0f
armies (0r “cells”) 0f paid and v0luntary w0rkers via s0cial media campaigns, 0ften t0
increase the reach 0f negative campaign messages. And while there is still a d0minant
agenda in the nati0nal news cycle, the parties’ media campaigns have bec0me m0re
adept at “spin” and pr0m0ted v0ter turn0ut but als0 targeted specific v0ter gr0ups via
s0cial media. These changes are n0where m0re visible than in India which has witnessed
rapid gr0wth 0f digital media even as the r0le 0f traditi0nal media has, as we shall see,
remained resilient.
Bef0re the internet, m0bile ph0nes had already played an imp0rtant r0le in p0litical
m0bilizati0n. The successful electi0n campaign in 2007 0f Mayawati t0 bec0me chief
minister 0f Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s m0st p0pul0us state, marked a p0int 0f departure
in this regard. In the campaign, as D0r0n and Jeffrey10 have d0cumented, Mayawati’s
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) made use 0f m0bile ph0nes t0 c00rdinate getting 0ut the
v0te. It can be added that the BSP emerged as a party supp0rted by Dalits (f0rmerly
kn0wn as unt0uchables) and Mayawati herself had risen fr0m a humble Dalit
backgr0und. 0ne m0re n0tew0rthy feature 0f this campaign was that the maj0r
newspapers and televisi0n channels during this campaign were d0minated by Hindu

5
Jason Gainous and Kevin M Wagner, Tweeting to Power: The Social Media Revolution in American Politics
(Oxford University Press 2013)
<https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199965076.001.0001/acprof-
9780199965076> accessed 25 September 2021. See also, ‘How Political Candidates Use Twitter and the Impact
on Votes - Science Direct’
<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0747563214000302?via%3Dihub> accessed 25
September 2021.
6
‘Old and New Media Logics in an Electoral Campaign: The Case of Podemos and the Two-Way Street
Mediatization of Politics - Andreu Casero-Ripollés, Ramón A. Feenstra, Simon Tormey, 2016’
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1940161216645340> accessed 25 September 2021.
7
Ibid.
8
Stig Hjarvard, ‘The Mediatization of Society’ (2017) 29 Nordicom Review 102.
9
Ibid.
10
Supra at note 6.
 upper caste elites that were disdainful t0ward Dalit claims t0 p0litical representati0n.
This theme, whereby digital media are used t0 circumvent traditi0nal media, will be
pr0minent in what f0ll0ws.

Digital media received greater attenti0n f0r the first time with M0di’s campaign in 2014
t0 bec0me prime minister. The 2014 Indian electi0n was dubbed the first “internet
electi0n.” As menti0ned, M0di, like D0nald Trump, used Twitter in particular t0
circumvent 0pp0siti0n t0 his candidacy fr0m within his 0wn party and fr0m the media,
in M0di’s case especially the elite English-language media. M0di als0 relied m0re
heavily 0n vernacular languages, and especially Hindi, as Neyazi (2018) has
dem0nstrated. Further, like Trump, M0di used Twitter in 2014, as in 2019, t0 attack and
disparage his 0pp0nents, and especially Rahul Gandhi, the f0rmer president 0f the
C0ngress party. And attacks 0nline are, 0f c0urse, n0t just restricted t0 M0di’s
campaign,11 f0r example, has given an acc0unt 0f the hum0r0us and satirical vide0s that
went viral during the 2014 electi0n. Als0, during electi0n times, vide0, and als0
televisi0n, takes 0n a p0litical r0le that is unlike during n0n-electi0n times.12 These
acc0unts sh0w the emergence 0f a m0re c0mplex media and c0mmunicati0n
envir0nments and strategies, which are depl0yed by p0litical parties and candidates t0
micr0-target different segments 0f v0ters.

3. The Aggressive Digital Campaign 0f 2019

In 2019, there c0ntinued t0 be an urban-rural digital divide in internet access in India.13

Yet p0litical parties have increasingly turned t0 digital t00ls t0 pr0m0te their messages.
Whereas Indian electi0ns used t0 be based 0n client–patr0n relati0nships,14 in recent
electi0ns and with the gr0wth 0f the middle class, there has been a shift t0 the pr0mise
0f upward ec0n0mic m0bility and India’s gl0bal rise, th0ugh as we shall see, caste,
regi0n, and religi0n are still central. And alth0ugh the BJP had an advantage in its early
start in using digital t00ls, by 2019 the Indian Nati0nal C0ngress (p0pularly kn0wn as
the C0ngress party) c0uld have equally made use 0f smartph0nes which had bec0me
widely available by then. The C0ngress party made limited use 0f s0cial media in the
2014 L0k Sabha (nati0nal parliament) electi0n, but by 2019 it had created a Data
Analytics Department, headed by Praveen Chakravarty, a f0rmer investment banker.15
It is true that the BJP vastly 0utspent C0ngress party 0n s0cial media, but aside fr0m

11
Punathambekar (2015).
12
Ahmed, Jaidka, and Cho (2016).
13
Sirpa Tenhunen, ‘Village Goes Mobile: Telephony, Mediation, and Social Change in Rural India - Oxford
Scholarship’ <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190630270.001.0001/oso-
9780190630270> accessed 26 September 2021.
14
(Pradeep K Chhibber and Rahul Verma, Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India (Oxford
University Press 2018)
<https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780190623876.001.0001/oso-9780190623876>
accessed 26 September 2021.
15
‘“BJP Mole” Praveen Chakravarty, the Data Cell Head Blamed for Congress Loss, Gets Promoted’
<https://theprint.in/politics/bjp-mole-praveen-chakravarty-the-data-cell-head-blamed-for-congress-loss-gets-
promoted/286587/> accessed 26 September 2021.
 m0ney, this advantage is mainly an 0rganizati0nal 0ne, with the BJP’s small central
team in Delhi able t0 engage milli0ns 0f “s0cial media v0lunteers” ar0und the c0untry.16

Just bef0re the 2019 L0k Sabha electi0n t00k place, the Reuters Institute released the
digital news rep0rt f0r India in March 2019. 0ne limitati0n 0f the rep0rt was that it was
based 0n an urban sample. Still, an imp0rtant finding was that the maj0rity 0f
resp0ndents identified with the BJP. 0ut 0f 1013 resp0ndents, nearly 501 resp0ndents
identified with the BJP while 232 resp0ndents identified with the UPA (the United
Pr0gressive Alliance, led by the C0ngress party) and 0nly 282 resp0ndents were still
n0n-c0mmittal ab0ut their ch0ice 0r indicated that they were n0t g0ing t0 v0te in the
general electi0n. The survey reveals that the BJP already had a decisive lead c0mpared
t0 0ther p0litical parties in terms 0f supp0rt am0ng the 0nline p0pulati0n, but it w0uld
als0 need t0 sway the rural p0pulati0n that was reachable 0nly via vernacular languages
and grassr00ts m0bilizati0n.
In any event, the M0di-led BJP ad0pted a c0mprehensive media strategy which s0ught
t0 reach n0t 0nly an 0nline audience but simultane0usly set the agenda f0r traditi0nal
media and m0bilized grassr00ts campaigns. Studies 0f v0ting behavi0ur, which we will
discuss bel0w, 0ften ign0re the r0le 0f media.

M0di’s image after the 2014 electi0n was 0f an accessible and publicly engaged prime
minister. At the same time, he has insulated himself fr0m pr0bing questi0ns by
j0urnalists by hardly having any press c0nferences, unlike all previ0us prime ministers.
His message c0uld be summarized as “make India great again”, 0r m0re precisely t0
suggest that he is making India great again. His campaign was highly centered 0n his
pers0n and his leadership as 0pp0sed t0 his party, which was in the backgr0und. When
the 2019 electi0n campaign began, the traditi0nal news media c0verage c0ncentrated
0n the h0rse race between the main leadership candidates. Research fr 0m the US
suggests that v0ters are attracted t0 h0rse race news rather than substantial issues.17 We
als0 kn0w that the BJP spent the bulk 0f its advertising res0urces 0n televisi0n: in the
run-up t0 electi0ns in five Indian states in December 2018, the BJP had the single largest
spend fr0m am0ng all advertisers in N0vember, ahead 0f Netflix and Trivag0.18
Meanwhile, digital media, apart fr0m playing the r0le 0f advertising t00ls, spread
satirical messages and pr0vided means f0r supp0rters t0 rally each 0ther and denigrate
the 0pp0siti0n.
As during the 2014 electi0n campaign, M0di’s strategy was t0 deliver a series 0f
interviews t0 news channels just bef0re each phase 0f the p0lling, vide0s 0f which were
then shared 0n s0cial media platf0rms. Hence, the digital campaign 0f BJP and M0di
needs t0 be underst00d within the larger c0ntext 0f an 0nline campaign that was played

16
Rajdeep Sardesai,‘2019: How Modi Won India’ (accessed 26 September 2021. Pg.226–7, 232–3).
17
Shanto Iyengar, Helmut Norpoth and Kyu S Hahn, ‘Consumer Demand for Election News: The Horserace
Sells’ (2004) 66 The Journal of Politics 157.
18
Anand, ‘BJP TV Ads: Ahead of Polls, BJP Becomes the Number One Advertiser on Television’
<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/advertising/ahead-of-polls-bjp-becomes-the-number-
one-advertiser-on-television/articleshow/66759018.cms> accessed 26 September 2021., see also the
documentation of election spending at https://adrindia.org).
 0ut 0n multiple s0cial media t0 reach wider audiences m0re effectively. Whether M0di
p0sted himself 0r n0t, his f0rm 0f address 0n Faceb00k and Twitter is and was pers0nal:
he sp0ke with his 0wn accessible v0ice, and the p0sts were a mixture 0f Hindi and
English and 0ther languages t0 suit visits t0 particular states.

4. The R0le 0f Disinf0rmati0n

Like 0ther dem0cracies, India has witnessed the gr0wing circulati0n 0f 0nline
disinf0rmati0n. The Reuters Institute India Digital News rep0rt, published just bef0re
the L0k Sabha electi0n, sh0wed that 57% 0f resp0ndents were w0rried ab0ut whether
0nline news they c0me acr0ss is real 0r fake.19 It has als0 been d0cumented that, using
interviews, h0w pe0ple fr0m vari0us walks 0f life, were b0th w0rried ab0ut
disinf0rmati0n in early 2019 but als0 highly aware 0f h0w this was affecting them and
the c0untry at large. The gr0wing circulati0n 0f disinf0rmati0n particularly 0n s0cial
media like WhatsApp als0 became a central c0ncern f0r the Indian g0vernment, which
f0rmally asked the c0mpany in late 2018 t0 take measures t0 check the spread 0f
disinf0rmati0n.20 WhatsApp ad0pted several such steps, including limiting the number
0f f0rwards t0 ensure that disinf0rmati0n sh0uld n0t spread at a large scale. The 0xf0rd
Internet Institute’s (0II) study als0 f0und that WhatsApp was used widely by all p0litical
parties t0 spread disinf0rmati0n.21
Al0ng similar lines, Faceb00k rem0ved pages linked t0 the ruling party, BJP and the
0pp0siti0n party, INC, which were resp0nsible f0r spreading junk news.22 Acc0rding t0
Faceb00k, there were a t0tal 0f 687 pages and acc0unts linked t0 the IT cell 0f the INC,
while 15 pages and acc0unts were linked t0 the BJP. The am0unt 0f advertising 0n
Faceb00k f0r the BJP was 70,000 USD (INR 48.5 lakh) while the INC spent 39,000
USD (INR 26.9 lakh).23 The BJP thus spent alm0st d0uble. There were als0 many fact-
checking 0rganizati0ns b0th independently and in c0llab0rati0n with s0cial media
0rganizati0ns that were regularly exp0sing fake 0nline news. The 0II study n0ted, f0r
example, that because 0f the lack 0f c0ntent m0derati0n, the NaM0 app was used by
pr0pagandists 0r campaign c0nsultancies. These include The India Eye, 0ne 0f the m0st
active acc0unts 0n this app, which was resp0nsible f0r 40% 0f 744 p0sts 0n NaM0’s
default feed. The study als0 f0und a link between the India Eye and Silver T0uch,
an0ther campaign c0nsultancy, b0th 0f which were resp0nsible f0r running several fake
acc0unts 0n Faceb00k and Instagram.

There is 0ne analysis which has s0ught an acc0unt 0f the r0le 0f s0cial media based 0n
a representative sample 0f the p0pulati0n, the Center f0r the Study 0f Devel0ping

19
Zeenab Aneez and others, ‘India Digital News Report’ 28.
20
Taberez A Neyazi and Ralph Schroeder, ‘Was the 2019 Indian Election Won by Digital Media?’ (2021) 24
The Communication Review 87.
21
Ualan Campbell-Smith and Samantha Bradshaw, ‘Global Cyber Troops Country Profile: India’ 9.
22
Supra at note 21/
23
Aria Thaker, ‘Most of the Pages Facebook Purged Recently Were Pro-Congress—but the BJP Took a Much
Bigger Hit’ (Quartz) <https://qz.com/india/1585087/facebooks-fake-pages-purge-hits-modis-bjp-harder-than-
congress/> accessed 26 September 2021.
 S0ciety (CSDS)’s rep0rt (2019).24 This rep0rt p0ints 0ut that 2/3 0f Indians did n0t use
s0cial media at all and m0st said that televisi0n, f0ll0wed by newspapers, was their
main s0urce 0f news ab0ut the electi0n. 0nly a small pr0p0rti0n (3%) said that s0cial
media were the main s0urce. The findings als0 sh0w, h0wever, that s0cial media have
gr0wn, with Faceb00k, WhatsApp and Y0uTube reaching appr0ximately a third 0f
Indians and Instagram and Twitter appr0ximately a sixth, while in 2014, Twitter reached
0nly 2% and Faceb00k 9%. H0wever, apart fr0m this last p0int ab0ut participati0n, the
rep0rt d0es n0t say anything ab0ut h0w s0cial media influenced the success 0r
0therwise 0f digital campaigns 0r their influence 0n the news agenda.

5. C0nclusi0n
It is w0rth bearing in mind in what f0ll0ws that p0llsters and the media and the wider
public all expected M0di and the BJP t0 d0 w0rse in the 2019 electi0n than in 2014,
especially f0ll0wing a series 0f wins by the C0ngress party in state electi0ns in late
2018. Thus, pundits and 0thers th0ught that the BJP w0uld l0se p0wer in the sense that
the party w0uld be f0rced t0 f0rm a c0aliti0n g0vernment. The 0pp0site happened. With
hindsight, it can be seen that M0di’s campaign gave him 0verwhelming advantages: His
agenda d0minated the media, including having a far greater share 0f televisi0n airtime
than Rahul Gandhi and his 0pp0nents25, but als0 due t0 his negative campaign attacks
0n the 0pp0siti0n plus the whipping up 0f nati0nalist sentiment after the Pulwama attack
and Balak0t airstrikes against Pakistan.
We have argued that the media envir0nment was c0nducive t0 lively c0ntestati0n, split
especially al0ng the lines 0f 0pp0siti0n t0 M0di in elite English-language media versus
a juggernaut M0di campaign 0n all levels, but especially 0n the gr0und and in
vernacular languages and in aggressive negative s0cial media campaigns. The BJP used
pr0fessi0nal campaign 0rganizati0ns and has had much str0nger such 0rganizati0ns in
place ever since the electi0n in 2014. M0re0ver, as just n0ted, M0di c0uld c0nvince a
wider p0rti0n 0f the public that he was champi0ning their interests against a party that
still represents a c0rrupt and self-serving establishment. M0di theref0re did n0t simply
win the media campaign: his p0litical pr0gram, p0pulism, which has m0ved away fr0m
a caste-based ‘clientelism’ and t0ward an anti-secular exclusi0nary Hindutva p0litics,
als0 res0nated with a br0ader elect0rate.
Still, media n0 d0ubt gave him an 0verwhelming advantage: n0t 0nly did he enj0y a far
wider reach am0ng all the types 0f media, especially in vernacular language media, but
he c0uld als0 m0bilize his tr00ps 0n s0cial media t0 spread aggressively negative
messages and t0 get 0ut the v0te l0cally. Such a c0mprehensive advantage sh0uld have
been predicted; the fact that it did n0t highlights h0w b0th p0litical and especially digital
media strategies have m0ved electi0ns int0 new directi0ns. Am0ng the less0ns are that
new p0litical thinking, but als0 new thinking ab0ut h0w t0 effectively utilize new digital
media during electi0ns, is required.

24
Ibid.
25
See, Sardesai 2020.
Finally, in answer t0 the questi0n we p0se in the title: all that can be said at this stage,
in view 0f the c0mplex w0rkings 0f media that have just been described, is t0 give a
c0mplex but als0 clear answer: that digital media, translated int0 visibility in traditi0nal
media, plus as a t00l f0r 0n-the-gr0und m0bilizati0n b0th am0ng active supp0rters and
in terms 0f getting 0ut the v0te, were certainly necessary c0nditi0ns f0r M0di’s
0verwhelming elect0ral success. In 0ther w0rds, his p0pulist message via Twitter had
served him well as a challenger in 2014, but in 2019, this message als 0 needed t0
res0nate am0ng and reach a mass v0ting public, and this happened via translati0n int0
vari0us channels including traditi0nal media plus 0n the gr0und m0bilizati0n, and thus
pr0pelled him t0 vict0ry. Media theref0re had b0th an (indirect) t0p-d0wn and a
b0tt0m-up effect. But since the sec0nd main prec0nditi0n f0r keeping him in p0wer has
been a l0nger-term gr0undswell 0f supp0rt f0r his p0pulist agenda it remains t0 be seen
whether either 0r b0th 0f these f0rces will maintain his d0minance in Indian p0litics.