THE ETHICS OF CARE IN HEIDEGGER ’S “BEING AND TIME”

Abstract:

In Being and Time, Heidegger as a radical thinker tries to dig down to the roots of our lived
experience of the world rather than accepting the authority of tradition.

He set himself a task of the "destruction" of the philosophical tradition. Heidegger refused to
avail himself of the standard terminology of modern philosophy, with its talk of epistemology,
subjectivity, representation, objective knowledge and the rest. He has the audacity to go back to
the drawing board and invent a new philosophical vocabulary. For example, he thinks that all
conceptions of the human being as a subject, self, person, consciousness or indeed a mind-brain
unity are hostages to a tradition of thinking whose presuppositions have not been thought
through radically enough.

Keywords

Dasein, Originary, Care, Ontological, Authentic, Self, Being, Ethical, Ethics,

Introduction

Heidegger's name for the human being is Dasein, a term which can be variously translated, but
which is usually rendered as "being-there". The basic idea of Being and Time is extremely
simple: being is time. That is, what it means for a human being to be is to exist temporally in the
stretch between birth and death. Being is time and time is finite, it comes to an end with our
death. Therefore, if we want to understand what it means to be an authentic human being, then it
is essential that we constantly project our lives onto the horizon of our death, what Heidegger
calls "being-towards-death".

Heidegger maintains that the self can only become what it truly is through the confrontation with
death, by making a meaning out of our finitude. If our being is finite, then what it means to be
human consists in grasping this finitude, in "becoming who one is" in words of Nietzsche's that
Heidegger liked to cite.
The question of ethics

Heidegger’s Being and Time, presents us with two conflicting schools of thought on ethics. He
maintains that fundamental ontology is neither anti ethical, nor ante ethical.

He proffers that moral philosophy must give up the model of ethical "theory," the insistence on
rational justification, and the privileging of abstract principles over concrete situations. Ethics
should be understood as the heuristic engagement of basic practical questions: How should
human beings live? How should we live together? What are better and worse ways of conducting
our lives? Moreover, ethics must acknowledge a prephilosophical, traditional heritage that
presents us with a degree of consensus ahead of time regarding better and worse ways of living
(this is an Aristotelian point reaffirmed by Heidegger).

I maintain that neither of the proposed solutions is satisfactory. I further contend that no solution
is called for. It is rather promising to return to Heidegger’s early description of the two
conflicting ethical tendencies in Being and Time. This description entails a profound insight,
which presents the ethical existence as torn between ethical regulations and moral motivations.
According to my central thesis, Heidegger’s central contribution to ethics consists in the insight
that this incongruity is irresolvable.

In Being and Time, ethical questions are not posed. In this work, whenever Heidegger addresses
a subject matter that remotely resembles ethical themes, he reminds, his readers that his analyses
are contributions to fundamental ontology, not ethics. Such an awkward silence regarding ethical
issues might easily give rise to the impression that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is of no
ethical importance.

However, Heidegger’s silence can be interpreted in two diametrically opposite ways, and for this
reason, one could say that a real ethical drama unfolds in Being and Time – a drama, moreover,
which has profound ethical significance.

On the one hand, one can interpret this silence as Heidegger’s straightforward denial of the
ethical import of his work. In such a view, ethics is simply not ontological, or at least it has
nothing to do with fundamental ontology. Such an approach to Heidegger’s analysis allows one
to speak of the anti-ethical character of Being and Time. On the other hand, one could also see in
this silence, and in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of ethical problems as ontological, an attempt to
address the question of the existential origins of ethics and to give an account of what one could
call “originary ethics.” From such a standpoint one could speak of the ante-ethical problematic in
Being and Time. Is fundamental ontology anti-ethical or ante-ethical? In Being and Time this
question never gets foreclosed. This back and forth movement between anti- and ante-ethics is
significant precisely because it clears the ground on which one becomes free to address a
fundamental question, which in many ethical frameworks remains only peripheral. What is it
about human existence that calls for something like an ethics? It is this question that I would like
to identify as the question of ethics in Being and Time.

I will address the anti- and ante-ethical tendencies in the context of Heidegger’ s analysis of
conscience in Being and Time. I will also turn to Heidegger’s analysis of ethics in the
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Here we will see that after the publication of Being and
Time, Heidegger abandoned the “ethical ambivalence” that was characteristic of his earlier
analysis. One can understand this abandonment as Heidegger’s early solution to ethical
incongruity. The fourth and final section will then briefly turn to the “ Letter on Humanism”, for
here Heidegger proposes a different resolution of the conflict between the anti-ethical and the
ante-ethical character of his earlier thought. Yet I will argue that neither Heidegg’esr early, nor
his late resolution is satisfactory; I will, moreover, maintain that no resolution can be
satisfactory. My conclusion will consist in calling back to the ethical incongruity between anti-
and ante-ethics that we still find present in Being and Time. It is this incongruity, I will suggest,
that constitutes the core value of Heidegger’s phenomenological contribution to the ethical
problematic.

In Heidegger’s Anti-Ethics

In Being and Time, Heidegger’ s most polemical confrontation with ethics unfolds in the second
chapter of Division II, a chapter dedicated to the problematic of conscience, guilt, and
authenticity. One cannot ignore the plain fact that all For Heidegger’ s own qualification of
fundamental ontology as originary ethics, see Martin Heidegger, “ Letter on Humanism”, in
Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell, New York: Harper & Row 1977 p 235 In the recent
critical readings of Heidegger there have been a few attempts to disclose what such an originary
ethics would look like. See, for instance, Joanna Hodg eH,eidegger and Ethics, New York:
Routledge 1995, pp. 18–9204. See also Frederick Olafson ,Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics.
A Study of Mitsein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, pp. 95– 105. Donovan
Miyasak’is “ A Ground for Ethics in Heidegge’sr Being and Time,” in Journal

for the British Society of Phenomenolog,y 38 [3], 2007, pp. 26–1279, is also worth noting.
Recognizing that such is the case, Heidegger makes it patently clear that a phenomenological
interpretation of these phenomena comes at the price of cutting off the bond that ties these
themes to morality and ethics. In Heidegge’sr view, the liberation of these themes from their
moral and ethical interpretations is a necessary condition for their phenomenological
appropriation.

According to the common view, conscience and guilt have their basis in morality, religion, or
law. It seems that we, humans, can be conscientious insofar as we are capable of experiencing
guilt, and that our experience of guilt stems from law-breaking, be the law moral, religious, or
civic. The law in question rules over inter-human relations by qualifying what is admissible and
what is not admissible. It thus seems that conscience and guilt rely upon two conditions: our
indebtedness to Others and our respect for the law. More precisely, the common-view
problematic of conscience and guilt (1) unfolds in the context o fd iscursive speech that (2)
makes us responsible to a particular law and that (3) is meaningful in the intersubjective context
that binds us to fellow human beings.

Being and Time challenges this common view. These three qualifications do not characterize
conscience and guilt themselves; they rather qualify the inauthentic interpretation of these
phenomena. The common interpretation of guilt and conscience covers up their genuine
phenomenality; the common view reinterprets and misinterprets guilt and conscience in such a
way that their existential significance is not only concealed but also reversed. And yet, as is the
case with each and every theme addressed in Being and Time, the inauthentic interpretation of
phenomena in question nonetheless entails a few clues, which hold the promise of disclosing the
concealed significance of phenomena under scrutiny.

It is hard to overstate the ontological significance of the call of conscience: once freed from its
widespread (mis)interpretations (be they psychological, biological, religious, or moral), the call
will have the power to chart the course between inauthenticity and authenticity. Its ontological
significance is thus indeed profound: it consists in the fact that the call of conscience can be
heard in inauthenticity and that it announces the possibility of authentic voice of conscience is
indeed discursive. Medium of its expression is however not that of discursive speech. This
should come as no surprise, given Heidegger’ s insistence that discursive speech itself is always
already “ The existential interpretation is necessarily a far cry from everyday ontical common
sense, though it sets forth the ontological foundations of what the ordinary way of interpreting
conscience has always understood within certain limits and has conceptualized as ‘atheory’ of
conscience.” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson, New York: Harper and Row Publishers 2008 [1962], p. 314

The question of care

Conceptually, Heidegger was strongly influenced by Kierkegaard’s teachings on concern and

care; yet there is a notable difference. Whereas Kierkegaard saw care or concern always in an
individualized, subjective, and psychological fashion, Heidegger used the word at an abstract,
ontological level to describe the basic structure of the human self. Although Heidegger insisted
that he was not speaking of concrete and practical aspects of care, such as worry or nurturing, it
can also be argued that his writings on care do have existential moral significance. He certainly
developed some ideas that provide useful insights for a practical ethic of care (Stack, 1969).

Heidegger’s interest was to show how care is the central idea for understanding the meaning of
the human self, which is another word for Dasein. His philosophy explains how, at a deeper level
than the psychological experience of care, care is what accounts for the unity, authenticity, and
totality of the self, that is, of Dasein. Briefly, Heidegger claims that we are care, and care is what
we call the human being (Gelven, 1989).

Heidegger explains the radical role of care by pointing to the tendency of the human self to turn
away from its own authentic being to seek security in the crowd. It accommodates itself to what
“they” think and forms its conduct in accordance with the expectations of public opinion. Care
(Sorge) summons the self (Dasein) back from the feeling of insignificance and anxiety found in
this flight from the self, and instead enables one to be one’s own self, that is, to be authentic
(Flynn, 1980; Martinez, 1989).

Heidegger also explains care in the context of openness to future possibilities. We are not simply
“spectators for whom in principle, nothing would ‘matter'” (Olafson, 1987, p. 104). To say that
the self (Dasein) is care means that we understand and care about ourselves-in-the-world in
terms of being connected with what we can and cannot do. Because of the connectedness brought
about by care, it matters that we can act, and we must act to choose among our own possibilities
(Olafson, 1987). In so doing, Dasein chooses itself; and the meaning of its existence unfolds in
every resolute act. This is all implicit in care (Martinez, 1989).

For Heidegger, care has the double meaning of anxiety and solicitude–the same duality we found
among the Romans–and these two meanings of care represent two conflicting, fundamental
possibilities (Heidegger, 1973).

Anxious, worrisome care (Sorge) represents our struggle for survival and for favorable standing
among our fellow human beings. It continually drives us to avoid the significance of our finitude,
by immersing ourselves in conventionality and triviality, so as to “conceal from ourselves the
question of the meaning of being, and in the process truncate our humanity as well” (Ogletree,
1985, p. 23). Yet care also bears the meaning of solicitude or “caring for” (Fürsorge): tending to,
nurturing, caring for the Earth and for our fellow human beings as opposed to merely “taking
care of” them. However, anxious care never totally dissolves: In the everyday world we cannot
avoid the dual sense of care-as-anxiety and care-as-solicitude. Accepting the kinds of beings we
are entails embracing a deep ambiguity in which we know that worrisome cares may drive us to
escape and that solicitous care can open up all our possibilities for us (Ogletree, 1985).

Heidegger also contrasts Besorgen (taking care of, in the sense of supplying the needs of others)
with Fürsorge (solicitous care). The human self (Dasein), which is essentially related to others,
enters the world of others by way of care in two ways. On the one hand, we can take care of the
“what” that needs to be done for the other, in a rather functional way. This sort of minimal taking
care (Besorgen) requires few qualities–principally circumspection, so that the service is done
correctly. Yet other humans are never merely things like equipment that need to be taken care of
in this way; for they, too, are selves oriented to others. Hence they are not simply objects of
service but of solicitude (Fürsorge). Solicitous care is guided by the subsidiary qualities of
considerateness and forbearance. But Heidegger insists that when someone nurses the sick body
as a mere social arrangement, that is, without considerateness, the nursing care should still be
regarded as solicitude, albeit a deficient solicitude, and never as (mere) service-care (Heidegger,
1973).

Heidegger also speaks of two extreme forms of solicitous care. Intending to show solicitous care,
one can “jump in” and take over for the other, who then is dominated and dependent in the
caring relationship. Doing what the other can do for himself or herself, the “solicitous” person is
actually taking “care” away from the other. In contrast, Heidegger continues, there is a solicitous
care that “jumps ahead” of the other, anticipating his or her potentiality–not in order to take away
his or her “care” but to give it back. This kind of solicitude is authentic care, for it helps the other
to know himself or herself in care, and to become free for care (Heidegger, 1973; Bishop and
Scudder, 1991).

Heidegger’s substantive development of the notion of care drew from and contributed to the
“Cura” tradition of care. At the “highpoint” of his inquiry (Heidegger, 1973), Heidegger directly
cited the Myth of Care as a primordial justification of his central claim that the human self
(Dasein) has the stamp of care (Klonoski, 1984, p. 65). In spite of Heidegger’s complexities,
some writers are attempting to develop elements of an ethic of care from his insights; and some
scholars, such as Anne Bishop and John Scudder, are utilizing Heidegger’s ideas in their
arguments regarding the moral practice of health care (Bishop and Scudder, 1991).

End note

In a variety of settings–mythological, religious, philosophical, psychological, theological, moral,

and practical–the notion of care has developed throughout history, influencing moral orientations
and behaviors. The tasks for the future will be to more fully understand the richness and
complexity of the history of the idea of care, do justice to the texts that have imaginatively
portrayed it and the thinkers who have made this idea central to their work, and enter into
dialogue with them.

This history reveals, not a unified idea of care, but a family of notions of care. Yet it is a fairly
closely related family, for the ideas of care are united by a few basic sentiments, some formative
narratives whose influence stretches over time, and several recurring themes. Furthermore, in the
history of the English word “care,” this single word serves a range of meanings but with a subtle
coherence.

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The Question of Ethics in Heidegger’s Being and Time | Saulius Geniusas

GELVEN, Michael. 1989. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Rev. ed. De Kalb:
Northern Illinois University Press.

KAELIN, Eugene Francis. 1988. Heidegger’s “Being and Time”: A Reading for

Readers. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press.

History of the Notion of care – Warren T Reich