GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES

1. PHILIPPINES
● Philippines-China Relations: Beyond the Territoral Disputes
Relations between the Philippines and China, which span several centuries, have been
predominantly warm and cordial. But in recent years, both countries have experienced fiery
issues that have resulted in their “cooling off,” hitting a low point since the establishment of their
diplomatic relations in June 1975.

Philippines-China relations have lately been dominated by the territorial disputes in the West
Philippine Sea, which has escalated since the naval standoff over the Scarborough Shoal in April
2012 and aggravated by issues of Chinese illegal occupation, unlawful establishment of
infrastructures, and incidents of incursions and encroachment within the Philippines’ exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). Bilateral ties took a downturn when the Philippine government filed an
arbitration case against China under the United Na-tional Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) in January 2013 challenging the legality of China’s nine-dash line claim over the
contested waters.Although the territorial disputes have been in the spotlight for years, these
should not hinder the two countries from maintaining cooperation in other areas. Given the
wide-ranging and comprehensive ties between the Philippines and China, other aspects in the
relations, such as those mentioned in this paper, should prompt them to cooperate for their
mutual benefit.

Bilateral trade. Trade between the Philippines and China is not only stable, but also growing.
According to the Philippine Depart-ment of Trade and Industry (DTI), total trade reached USD
14.6 billion in 2013, which is a considerable increase from the years 2011 and 2012 and rising
trade statistics indicate that economic and political areas in the bilateral relations can be
compartmental-ized for mutual benefit.

The Philippines, however, may have to face stricter implementation of rules and regulations by
Chinese authorities in its trade dealings and commercial transactions. This was evident when
China imposed stringent food and safety standards and require-ments leading to the ban on
Philippine banana imports in 2012 upon the discovery of millibugs in several containers of
bananas shipped to China. Moreover, with the possibility of the recurrence of a similar or related
incident remaining high, both the Philip-pine and Chinese governments may likewise be tempted
to enforce stricter rules in other areas such as visa applications. Such ac-tions could prove
counterproductive and would only result in fueling bilateral tensions.
(https://fsi.gov.ph/philippines-china-relations-beyond-the-territoral-disputes/ )
Philippines businesses most affected by geopolitical tensions
The Philippines, along with Vietnam, reported the highest impact on business operations among
countries in Southeast Asia from geopolitical tensions, according to a Milieu Insight survey.

The consumer research and analytics firm’s survey showed 68 percent of businesses in the
Philippines said they have been affected by international geopolitical events.
 Milieu Insight said this is highest in the region, along with Vietnam, which also had 68 percent of
their businesses say they have been impacted by geopolitical events.Overall, 59 percent of
businesses surveyed in the region said their operations have been “somewhat” or “to a great
extent” affected by international geopolitical events such as tensions between the US and China,
and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Conducted from Aug.26 to Sept.8, of this year, the study covered a total of 1,200 business
leaders in the region or 200 each from the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia
and Thailand.Top concerns in the next 12 months cited by businesses in the Philippines are
increase in prices of raw materials or commodities (64 percent), increase in oil or energy prices
(57 percent), and further difficulties in supply chain management.

For businesses in the region, the main concerns foreseen in the next 12 months are upticks in
prices of raw materials or commodities (59 percent), higher oil or energy prices (51 percent) and
declining customer demand (45 percent).

While there are concerns, Milieu Insight said 66 percent of businesses in the region said they do
not have the means to navigate around the issues that can potentially arise from international
geopolitical events. (
https://www-philstar-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.philstar.com/business/2022/10/07/221
4762/philippines-businesses-most-affected-geopolitical-tensions-study-/amp/?amp_gsa=1&amp
_js_v=a9&usqp=mq331AQKKAFQArABIIACAw%3D%3D#amp_tf=From%20%251%24s&aoh=1676
7867862660&csi=1&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2F
www.philstar.com%2Fbusiness%2F2022%2F10%2F07%2F2214762%2Fphilippines-businesses-mo
st-affected-geopolitical-tensions-study- )
2. MYANMAR
● 2021 Myanmar coup d'état

In February 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and other military leaders staged a coup. The move
came after the military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), suffered a
major blow in the 2020 elections. The junta—officially called the State Administration Council—detained
and charged de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi with corruption and other crimes. It placed
lawmakers from her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and other parties, as well as many
activists, under house arrest. Massive protests erupted nationwide in the \weeks after the coup. Tens of
thousands of people, including health workers, bankers, and teachers, joined what was originally a
peaceful civil disobedience movement, refusing to go to work until the elected government returned to
power. Eventually, ousted NLD lawmakers, protest leaders, and activists from several minority groups
established a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG). It aims to bring
together the disparate groups opposed to the junta, foster greater unity among ethnic groups, create an
agenda for a post-junta Myanmar, and cultivate support from foreign governments. In September, the
NUG declared war on the junta and formed an armed division known as the People’s Defence Force.(
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#chapter
-title-0-8)
● MYANMAR ECONOMIC SITUATION

Myanmar has long been poorer than most of its neighbors due to isolationist policies favored by the
military junta in the 1960s and 1970s, economic mismanagement since then, and ongoing conflict,
among other issues.Much of the population relies on agriculture to make a living. Poverty has
remained high in rural areas, where most people live. The country’s significant mineral deposits,
particularly of jade and rubies, and natural gas reserves have drawn international attention. But
some countries, including the United States, have sanctions on exports of many types of gems from
Myanmar, because gems, natural gas, and other resources are often directly controlled by
military-dominated firms or by firms close to the armed forces.Reforms launched in 2011, including
opening up to trade and investment, led to some modest economic gains and a burst of foreign
investment. By 2019, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita reached around $1,400, nearly double
what it was in 2008. The country’s poverty rate dramatically declined, falling from 48 percent in 2005
to 25 percent in 2017. Donors, such as the European Union, Japan, and the United States,
dramatically increased their aid to Myanmar.However, many of these gains are now being reversed.
The pandemic-induced economic downturn, as well as widespread political unrest and violence in
the wake of the coup, has led the UN Development Program to warn that Myanmar will slip into a
level of deprivation it has not seen in decades. The poverty rate is expected to double in 2022
compared to its pre-pandemic level. Myanmar’s GDP is also likely to fare significantly worse than its
neighbors, with a contraction of 18 percent in 2021.Even before the coup, many foreign investors
had pulled out of Myanmar. Now, even more foreign firms are leaving due to significant constraints,
civil unrest, and foreign sanctions. (Many Chinese companies, as well as some Japanese firms, have
remained.) Cash is often difficult to access, and the financial system is near chaos. The tourism
industry, a vital source of hard currency, has also collapsed.(
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#cha
pter-title-0-6)

● US POLICY TOWARDS MYANMAR

The United States maintained a distant relationship with Myanmar after the late 1980s, enforcing
broad-based economic sanctions on the country in the next two decades. Myanmar’s return to
quasi-civilian rule led the United States to reestablish ties with it and drop broad-based sanctions.

But the coup has brought another downturn in the relationship.President Barack Obama ushered in
a new approach to U.S. relations with Myanmar. His administration boosted humanitarian aid, eased
bans on new U.S. investments, and in 2012 named its first ambassador to the country in twenty-two
years. (The United States had kept an embassy in Myanmar, but it had been run by a chargé
d’affaires.) Obama visited Myanmar twice, and President Thein Sein made a trip to Washington.
Obama removed most U.S. sanctions a year after Myanmar’s 2015 elections, though a variety of
noneconomic restrictions remained in place, including an embargo on arms sales and visa
restrictions on some officials. The Donald Trump administration continued on a similar path,
welcoming increased ties with Myanmar but maintaining sanctions on some individuals and certain
restrictions on U.S. relations [PDF] with the country. The administration imposed targeted sanctions
on top military commanders, including Senior General Min Aung ` Hlaing, due to their role in
overseeing the killings of Rohingya. Some members of Congress called for additional restrictions over
what the administration labeled as ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya.Since the 2021 coup, the Joe
Biden administration has taken a tougher approach. The Biden administration sanctioned individuals
in the military and others involved in military companies and conglomerates under its control.
Officials have condemned the junta’s human rights abuses and pushed ASEAN countries to increase
pressure on the junta. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met virtually with the NUG in October.
Washington also granted temporary protected status to people from Myanmar who were in the
United States when the coup occurred. In addition, Congress passed legislation requiring the
administration to make a plan to respond to the coup in 2022, urging actions including imposing
costs on the junta and legitimizing the NUG. But activists and analysts say Washington could do
more, such as increasing aid to the NUG, pressuring countries that provide military supplies to the
junta, and sanctioning Myanmar’s oil and gas revenues.(
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya#cha
pter-title-0-8)

● ETHNIC CONFLICT AFTER THE COUP

Over the past nine months, Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts have entered a new era that is both more
complex and more fluid. Ethnic armed groups have been forced to make difficult strategic decisions,
sometimes under strong pressure from their grassroots supporters to escalate the fight with the
military. Some have played a key role in training and supplying newly formed militias, or even fought
the Tatmadaw alongside them. Ethnic armed groups also tend to have close ties to new militias
formed in ethnic minority areas, particularly in and on the periphery of Chin, Kayah, Karen and
Kachin States. The key questions that all ethnic armed groups are facing in this new environment are
whether and to what extent to work with either the opposition, particularly the NUG, or the regime
in Naypyitaw, and to what end.(
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-confli
cts)

3. THAILAND
Violence and Abuses in the Southern Border Provinces
The armed conflict in Thailand’s Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla provinces, which has
resulted in more than 7,000 deaths since January 2004, subsided in the first half of 2021, partly
due to the unilateral ceasefire announcement by Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) to facilitate
humanitarian assistance for people affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. The ceasefire ended
when BRN issued a statement on July 20, criticizing the government for taking advantage of the
situation to raid their strongholds. Insurgent attacks on military targets and civilians have since
increased.The government has not prosecuted members of its security forces responsible for
torture, unlawful killings, and other abuses of ethnic Malay Muslims. In many cases, the
authorities provided financial compensation to the victims or their families in exchange for their
agreement not to speak out against the security forces or file criminal cases against officials.
Thailand has not endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration.
(https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/thailand )
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrant Workers
 Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 protocol. The authorities
continue to treat asylum seekers as illegal migrants subject to arrest, detention, and deportation.

In September, the Bangkok Criminal Court released Malaysian transgender activist Nur Sajat,
who was recognized as a refugee by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on bail after she
was arrested on illegal entry charges. The Malaysian authorities unsuccessfully attempted to
extradite her from Thailand to face charges of insulting Islam for having dressed as a woman.
The authorities have made no progress in investigating the apparent enforced disappearance of
exiled dissidents from Vietnam and Laos in Bangkok.

The government refused to let the UN refugee agency conduct status determinations for Lao
Hmong, ethnic Rohingya, and Uighurs, and people from Myanmar and North Korea held in
immigration detention. More than 50 Uighurs and several hundred Rohingya remain in indefinite
detention in squalid conditions in immigration lockups.Despite government-instituted reforms in
the fishing industry, many migrant workers face forced labor, remain in debt bondage to
recruiters, cannot change employers, and receive sub-minimum wages that are paid months
late.

The government has failed to adequately provide migrant workers with internationally
recognized worker rights, such as protection for freedom of association and collective
bargaining. Migrant workers are barred in law from organizing and establishing labor unions, or
serving as a government recognized labor union leader.Thammakaset Company Limited
continues to retaliate against migrant workers, rights activists, and journalists who report on
abusive labor conditions at its chicken farm in Lopburi province.

In July, Thailand was downgraded in the US Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report from Tier 2 to the
Tier 2 Watchlist for the first time in four years. (
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/thailand )
Lack of Accountability for State-Sponsored Abuses
Despite evidence showing that soldiers were responsible for most of the casualties during the
2010 political confrontations with the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (the “Red
Shirts”) that left at least 99 dead and more than 2,000 injured, no military personnel or officials
from the government of then-Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva have been charged.

The government also has failed to pursue criminal investigations of extrajudicial killings related
to anti-drug operations, especially the more than 2,800 killings that accompanied then-Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s “war on drugs” in 2003.
(https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/thailand )
4. VIETNAM
● VIETNAM: SUPPRESSION ON BASIC CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Vietnam systematically suppresses basic civil and political rights. The government, under the
one-party rule of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), severely restricts freedom of
expression, association, peaceful assembly, movement, and religion.
 Prohibitions continued in 2021 on the formation or operation of independent unions and any
other organizations or groups considered a threat to the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
Authorities blocked access to sensitive political websites and social media pages, and pressured
social media and telecommunications companies to remove or restrict content critical of the
government or the ruling party.

Critics of the government or party face police intimidation, harassment, restricted movement,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and imprisonment after unfair trials. Police hold political
detainees for months without access to legal counsel and subject them to abusive
interrogations. Party-controlled courts sentence bloggers and activists on bogus national security
charges.

In January 2021, the CPV held its 13th congress, during which it selected the country’s new
politburo. Of the 18 members, at least seven, including Vietnam’s new prime minister, Pham
Minh Chinh, have affiliation with the Ministry of Public Security. In May, Vietnam held a tightly
controlled and scripted national election in which all candidates had to be approved by the CPV.
Several dozen independent candidates were intimidated and disqualified, and two were
arrested.(
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/vietnam#:~:text=lockdown%20was%
20eased.-,Freedom%20of%20Expression%2C%20Opinion%2C%20and%20Speech,to%20many%2
0years%20in%20prison. )
● Freedom of Association, Assembly, and Movement
Government prohibitions remain in place on independent labor unions, human rights
organizations, and political parties. People trying to establish unions or workers’ groups outside
approved government structures face harassment, intimidation, and retaliation from the
authorities. Authorities require approval for public gatherings, and systematically refuse
permission for meetings, marches, or public gatherings they deem to be politically
unacceptable.The Vietnamese government routinely violates the right to freedom of movement
by subjecting dissidents, environmental activists, human rights defenders, and others to
arbitrary periods of house arrest, intimidation, and even kidnapping to stop them from attending
protests, criminal trials, meetings with diplomats, and other events. In January, a number of
dissidents and activists including Huynh Ngoc Chenh, Nguyen Thuy Hanh, Dinh Duc Long, Truong
Thi Ha, Tran Bang, Mac Van Trang, and Nguyen Thi Kim Chi reported that they were placed under
house arrest during the Communist Party Congress. In August, during the visit of United States
Vice President Kamala Harris to Hanoi, security agents also put Huynh Ngoc Chenh under house
arrest.Authorities blocked critics from domestic and international travel, including by stopping
them at airports and denying passports or other documents that allow them to leave or enter
the country.(
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/vietnam#:~:text=lockdown%20was%
20eased.-,Freedom%20of%20Expression%2C%20Opinion%2C%20and%20Speech,to%20many%2
0years%20in%20prison )
● FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The government restricts religious practice through legislation, registration requirements, and
surveillance. Religious groups must get approval from, and register with, the government and
 operate under government-controlled management boards. While authorities allow
government-affiliated churches and pagodas to hold worship services, they ban religious
activities that they arbitrarily deem to be contrary to the “national interest,” “public order,” or
“national unity,” including many ordinary types of religious functions.Police monitor, harass, and
sometimes violently crack down on religious groups operating outside government-controlled
institutions. Unrecognized religious groups—including Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Christian, and Buddhist
groups—face constant surveillance, harassment, and intimidation. Followers of independent
religious groups are subject to public criticism, forced renunciation of faith, detention,
interrogation, torture, and imprisonment.

In August, a court in Gia Lai put Rah Lan Rah, Siu Chon, and Ro Mah Them on trial for being
associated with an independent religious group disapproved by the government, sentencing
them to between five and six years in prison.
● RIGHTS ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN
Violence against children, including sexual abuse, is pervasive in Vietnam, including at home and
in schools. Numerous media reports have described cases of guardians, teachers, or government
caregivers engaging in sexual abuse, beating children, or hitting them with sticks. During the first
six months of 2021, amid the pandemic lockdown, there were reports of increasing physical and
sexual abuses of children in Vietnam.The pandemic was also linked, including in 2021, to rising
incidence of violence against women, while organizations assisting survivors of gender-based
violence struggled to adapt and continue their services during the pandemic. (
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/vietnam#:~:text=lockdown%20was%
20eased.-,Freedom%20of%20Expression%2C%20Opinion%2C%20and%20Speech,to%20many%2
0years%20in%20prison)
SINGAPORE
Geopolitical tensions and inflation: How Singapore can weather the challenges ahead
Singaporeans are taking a greater interest in international affairs – as they should – but greater
interest is not matched by greater understanding and that is particularly so with regard to the
foremost challenge of our time: US-China strategic competition.
Geopolitical tensions have directly hit most states due to the dependence of South-east Asia and
the world on imports of crude oil, natural gas and even basic necessities such as rice, wheat and
eggs. The Inflationary pressures caused by global conflicts have the effect of impoverishing
societies and, in turn, putting pressure on national governments to deliver basic goods at
affordable prices to their populace. A failure to do so can prove fatal for governments, as was
evident in Sri Lanka.
Headline inflation in Singapore breached 6.7 per cent in June, and looks set to continue rising at
least till the year end. According to Deputy Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, inflation may well
settle at a higher rate, especially since geopolitical uncertainty, persistent supply chain
difficulties and rising costs of the green transition do not look to be dissipating any time in the
near future.But we experience inflation in different ways. Two headlines this month highlight
this. A DBS study examined 1.2 million customer bank balances. It found that two-fifths of the
customers experienced income gains that failed to keep up with inflation. Put another way, their
real incomes have diminished since the start of the year. For the lowest income group earning
less than $2,500 a month, expenses have grown almost six times faster than their salaries. In
 contrast, an HSBC study projects that by 2030, 13.4 per cent of adults in Singapore will be worth
more than US$1 million (S$1.39 million), a higher proportion than in any other economy
included in the study, and up from 7.5 per cent in 2021. While Department of Statistics data
shows inflation is now affecting high-income households to a greater extent – driven by the
rising prices of cars and petrol – these are problems of a different magnitude than those faced by
low-income Singaporeans.(
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/weathering-challenges-ahead-how-singapore-can-brac
e-itself-and-ride-them-out )
5. CAMBODIA
● ATTACKS AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVIST
Starting in 2020, the authorities stepped up their attempts to intimidate peaceful environmental
activists, accusing them of attempting to use foreign funds to topple the government. In May
2021, a Phnom Penh court convicted five Mother Nature Cambodia (MNC) activists of incitement
and sentenced them to between 18 and 20 months in prison. The activists had publicly raised
concerns over the filling-in of a lake in Phnom Penh and its expected negative environmental
impacts. In July, the authorities imposed additional charges of conspiracy against three of the
activists.In June, the authorities charged four other MNC activists for documenting the
government’s destruction of the environment and prosecuted them on charges including
conspiracy and insulting the king. Authorities detained three of them and remanded them to
pre-trial detention; the fourth remained outside the
country.(https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/cambodia)
● Cambodia hedges
Cambodia’s foreign policy is largely shaped by the worldview of Prime Minister Hun Sen, who
has more than four decades of practical experience in diplomacy and foreign affairs.
Understanding Cambodian foreign policy, including its decision to co-sponsor the UN resolution
to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, means grasping the pragmatism that informs Hun Sen’s
decision-making.
Hun Sen does not buy into the notion of a unipolar world, run by the United States, or a bipolar
world order split between Beijing and Washington. He wants to revive the spirit of the
non-aligned movement and improve South–South cooperation to form a goodwill coalition
against foreign interference and protect the legitimate interests of the developing world.

At the Davos World Economic Forum in May 2022, Hun Sen said that Cambodia was uninterested
in taking sides in the US–China rivalry despite mounting pressure from major powers. But he
acknowledged that Cambodia faces challenges caused by volatile geopolitical rivalries. In
response to these challenges, Hun Sen supports multilateral initiatives such as the Belt and Road
Initiative and Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific — a strategy that promotes regional peace and
prosperity without forming alliances against third countries, making it consistent with ASEAN
centrality.As an open and small economy, Cambodia must be connected with the region and the
world for its own survival and economic progress. ASEAN acts as a springboard from which
Cambodia can connect with the global economy. ASEAN cushions its members from the effects
of foreign intervention, especially from superpowers by emphasising the non-interference
principle and consensus-based decision-making norms. As the 2022 ASEAN chair, Cambodia is
 striving to enhance ASEAN unity, centrality and the spirit of cooperation to address emerging
challenges facing the region.

Although Cambodia has strong economic and political ties with China, this does not mean it has
put all its eggs in one basket. Amid increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainty,
Cambodia increasingly hedges between the United States, China and regional institutions.
Cambodia was the first Southeast Asian country to register its support for the Japan-led ‘Free
and Open Indo-Pacific’ — an initiative that Phnom Penh sees as complementary to ASEAN-led
regional mechanisms.( https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/09/13/cambodia-hedges/ )
Cambodia ‘at risk from geopolitical manoeuvres’
Three of Cambodia’s top leaders used the Annual Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Parliamentary
Forum (APPF) to warn that small- and medium-sized countries were facing geopolitical
challenges due to the machinations of powerful states.

This included trade disputes which could affect the economic progress of developing nations.
Prime Minister Hun Sen, Senate President Say Chhum and National Assembly President Heng
Samrin said the Asia-Pacific region was facing threats, such as trade wars, armed conflict,
terrorism and trans-national crimes.

The Korean peninsula issue, the South China Sea dispute and human rights violations in
Myanmar were also of particular concern.
Cambodia and other nations were deeply concerned by the tensions between world powers, he
said, especially the US-China trade dispute, which could affect developing countries.Kin Phea,
the director-general of the International Relations Institute of Cambodia at the Royal Academy of
Cambodia, said that generally, powerful countries like the US, China, Russia, France or UK have
their own political agendas and are only concerned with their own interests, regardless of the
consequences to other nations. (
https://m.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/cambodia-risk-geopolitical-manoeuvres )

6. BRUNEI
● Brunei Between Big Powers: Managing US-China Rivalry in Asia
The recent visit by President of China Xi Jinping to Brunei marked the strengthening of
Brunei-China relations. But only a few days earlier the U.S. Navy carried out its 24th annual
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) maritime exercise at Brunei’s Muara
Naval Base.
Brunei Between Big Powers: Managing US-China Rivalry in Asia
The recent visit by President of China Xi Jinping to Brunei marked the strengthening of
Brunei-China relations. But only a few days earlier the U.S. Navy carried out its 24th annual
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) maritime exercise at Brunei’s Muara
Naval Base. Brunei’s friendship with the United States is still strong. It still relies heavily on
American military protection in the region and depends on international law to sustain and
guarantee its sovereignty and independence. It is the United States that can sustain this
status. Such was the importance of the United States to the country’s security that in 2013
the Sultan of Brunei flew himself to Washington to meet then-U.S. President Barack Obama.
 However, the introduction of Sharia in the same year also caused global condemnation by
the West. The endless barrage of bad news led to the boycott of Brunei government-owned
hotels and properties by celebrities such as Jay Leno. The more recent rise of U.S. President
Donald Trump — and the whiff of Islamophobia that came with him — only makes Brunei’s
position and image more troublesome. These factors dented American soft power appeal for
the sultanate. Meanwhile, China is fast becoming a Crucial economic partner to the country.
China becoming the biggest investor in the Brunei economy has alleviated short-term
problems such as rising youth unemployment. The $12 billion Hengyi petrochemical plant is
also a testament to the reliance on investments needed to keep the economy stable in the
post-oil 2013 crash. Xi also announced a joint partnership between the two countries to drill
oil in the heavily contested South China Sea.Unfortunately, China’s overtly aggressive stance
in the South China Sea, with its military base build-up, may affect Brunei’s relations with its
ASEAN counterparts. Being seen as too friendly to China may only end up alienating Brunei
among ASEAN member states that have claims in the South China Sea. They are also relying
heavily on the ASEAN “centrality” and unity to push back against China’s geopolitical
influence in the region, which can be affected if Brunei refuses to cooperate.
A host of complex situations have influenced and will continue to influence Brunei’s foreign
policy. It is never easy to identify the motif of a nation-state especially in regards to its
relations with other countries, or in this context between Brunei, China, and the United
States.

But if there is one motif for Brunei allying itself with these big power states, it is to ensure its
survivability will be guaranteed well into the future as a sovereign independent state. The
big power that can offer this will be the clear winner in securing Brunei’s partnership, and
move a step closer in securing geopolitical dominance in the Asia-Pacific.(
https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/brunei-between-big-powers-managing-us-china-rivalry-in
-asia/ )
7. LAOS
● LAO ECONOMICS: MACROECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES

The Lao economy faces increased challenges from a sharp currency depreciation and high
inflation, amid a deteriorating global economic environment and slow domestic reforms.
Following signs of economic recovery in early 2022, the domestic and external environment has
deteriorated significantly. The kip lost 68 percent of its value against the US dollar over the year
to October, undermining recovery and fueling inflation, which in turn dampens private
consumption and investment. The World Bank has lowered its economic growth forecast for
2022 to 2.5 percent, down from an earlier projection of 3.8 percent. Although employment had
risen by mid-2022, earnings did not keep pace with inflation. Year-on-year consumer price
inflation had risen to 37 percent by October 2022, with food price inflation at almost 39 percent.
This particularly affects the urban poor, with some families forced to reduce their consumption
of food and fuel. Two-thirds of households report spending less on health and education, which
could undermine long-term human development.(
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-economic-monitor-oct-2022-tacklin
g-macroeconomic-vulnerabilities-key-findings#:~:text=The%20Lao%20economy%20faces%20incr
eased,external%20environment%20has%20deteriorated%20significantly. )

● Hunger remains a major problem in Laos, despite economic gains

Despite economic growth, one-third of Lao children and about 20 percent of the country’s
population as a whole continue to experience food insecurity, the World Food Program and
Lao government reported.The WFP said that Laos ranked 87th out of 117 countries on the
2019 Global Hunger Index. Representatives from the group and the government shared the
findings after meeting in Vientiane on Jan. 27.WFP identifies floods, droughts, land
degradation, deforestation, relocation and migration as continuing threats to food access in
the country.(
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/laos/hunger-02102022191522.html#:~:text=One%2Dthir
d%20of%20children%20in,food%2C%20World%20Food%20Program%20says.)
● LAOS: NO PROGRESS ON RIGHTS
Restrictions on civil and political rights in Laos include draconian controls over freedom of
speech, association, and peaceful assembly. The lack of fair trials of criminal suspects,
widespread judicial corruption, and entrenched impunity for human rights violations are
continuing problems, Human Rights Watch said.

All TV, radio, and printed publications are strictly monitored and controlled by the Lao
government. The constitution prohibits all mass media activities that run contrary to
“national interests” or “traditional culture and dignity.”

The government has arbitrarily arrested and detained civil society activists and those
deemed critical of the government. The penal code contains broad limitations that prohibit
“slandering the state, distorting party or state policies, inciting disorder, or propagating
information or opinions that weaken the state.”

In July 2015, the government enacted a cybercrime law that provides vague definitions of
web content criminalized under the law, giving authorities maximum discretion in
determining what can trigger a prosecution. Citizens who share information, images, or
animations that the government deems to “distort truth” are subject to “re-education and
disciplinary measures.”

The government not only monitors and suppresses free speech inside the country, but also
that of citizens living abroad. In May, three Lao workers were fined and sentenced to prison
terms of between 12 and 20 years in a secret trial after criticizing the Lao government while
working in neighboring Thailand.(
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/17/laos-no-progress-rights#:~:text=Key%20areas%20of
%20concern%20in,repression%20of%20minority%20religious%20groups.)
● LAOS: RURAL POVERTY
Rural poverty is a major issue in Laos and most of the rural poor survive on subsistence
agriculture with low productivity. Unemployment and underemployment is widely observed.
Farm productivity is low. But this is not the only factor contributing to rural poverty. Rapid
privatization of lands and forests, for mining, and hydropower activities has also threatened
 livelihoods. Also, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) dropped by US bombing still contaminates
rural areas. This limits agricultural production and contributes to food insecurity. This has
also caused deformities and health issues in children. Since over 80 percent of the
population is involved in agriculture, this puts immense pressure on the land.Malnutrition is
common in the country. One fifth of the entire population of Laos consumes less than the
minimum dietary energy requirements. Laos has the highest levels of rice consumption in
the world. But since rice does not contain all nutrients for adequate nutrition, this has left
children undernourished in the region. Education is the only way to make people aware
about the nutritional value required to sustain a healthy life. The ethnic minorities, the poor
and the upland groups are disproportionately affected. (IFAD, n.d.)
(https://www.skillsphere.org/global-jigyasas/laos-current-issues/ )
● LAOS:HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Laos is a source country for human trafficking. Young women and girls well below the age of
18 often find their way into the commercial sex industry of Thailand. Laos men too are the
victims of forced labour like fishing or commercial industries and are trafficked illegally to
regions outside the country. In a joint report by the Government of Lao PDR and United
Nations, it was observed that 72 percent of the trafficked children are girls under the age of
18. Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, China and Vietnam are the countries where men, women and
children of Laos find themselves in abject conditions in the sex trafficking industry. Ethnic
minorities are particularly vulnerable in Laos. The country has increasingly become a child
sex tourist destination for people around the world. (Laos, n.d.)In spite of these gruesome
reports, the government of Laos does not comply with the minimum standards for
elimination for human trafficking. Lack of public trust in government has further aggravated
this situation. The government should disseminate adequate information about the victim
identification procedures so that steps can be taken to rehabilitate and address the concerns
of the victims. Civil society organisations must deliver adequate assistance to the victims and
help them reintegrate into their home communities. The government must also take
stringent steps to prosecute people complicit in trafficking. Prevention and rehabilitation
should be a prime concern for the government of Laos.(
https://www.skillsphere.org/global-jigyasas/laos-current-issues/ )
8. MALAYSIA
● Malaysia’s economy emerges from the shadow of COVID-19

KUALA LUMPUR: Rebounding from the pandemic-induced economic shock, the Malaysian
economy gathered momentum in 2022 as its growth rate surpassed expectations quarter after
quarter. The first quarter of 2022 saw a growth rate of 5 per cent year-on-year. This was a
remarkable rate compared to the 3.9 per cent that was achieved in the fourth quarter of 2021.
The pace continued through 2022. The second quarter registered a growth rate of 8.9 per cent,
while a growth rate of 14.2 per cent was achieved in the third quarter. The high growth rates
indicated that the Malaysian economy was recovering from the smothering effects of the
pandemic. The most significant sign of recovery came from an improvement in private
consumption. By the third quarter of 2022, consumption had risen by 15 per cent year-on-year.
The labour market also showed signs of improvement as the year progressed. Unemployment
figures moderated over the course of the year.
 Global demand for Malaysia’s exports was also up. Exports grew as borders opened and global
pent-up demand materialised. It was not surprising that Malaysian exports increased almost 19
per cent (year-on-year) in the third quarter of 2022.

But while there were clear signs that the Malaysian economy had recovered from the
debilitating effects of the pandemic, other problems arose. One of those problems was a labour
shortage.

Migrant workers who had to leave Malaysia did not return for a range of reasons. But there was
a burgeoning need for their services in many areas – including in plantations, restaurants and
some manufacturing sub-sectors.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict put a major obstacle in the way of Malaysia’s recovery. Although the
war did not directly affect Malaysia’s growth, it did lead to higher prices.
(https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/malaysia-economy-gdp-covid-19-health-educ
ation-politics-anwar-3216941#:~:text=KUALA%20LUMPUR%3A%20Rebounding%20from%20the,
cent%20year%2Don%2Dyear. )

9. INDONESIA
● INDONESIA GAMBLES ON REFINED NICKEL AMID THE GLOBAL ENERGY TRANSITION

-Indonesia is attempting to capitalize on the growing global demand for high-quality refined nickel to
attract investment and secure a foothold in the key metal used in developing electric vehicles. If
Indonesia overcomes the sizable technological and economic limitations in ramping up its nickel
production, it could shift how the world obtains high-quality refined nickel products. As the world
increasingly looks to electric vehicles (EVs) to help reduce carbon emissions and combat climate change,
Indonesia is looking to take advantage of its large reserves of nickel -- a key component used in EV
batteries -- to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and boost economic growth. Demand for refined
nickel is expected to skyrocket in the coming years in tandem with global demand for EV batteries. In a
statement issued on Sept. 7, Brazilian mining company Vale said it expected global annual demand for
the metal to increase by roughly 44%.
(https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/indonesia-gambles-refined-nickel-amid-global-energy-transition)

● Land Rights

The Indonesian government is failing to protect the rights of communities living on or near land allotted
to commercial agriculture. Due to minimal ongoing monitoring and oversight, some of these plantations
degrade the environment they operate in and, in some cases, cause almost irreparable damage to
peatlands, one of the world’s most important carbon sinks. PT Sintang Raya, a subsidiary of South Korean
Daesang Corporation, has established and expanded its plantations in peatlands in three tidal villages in
West Kalimantan without genuine consultation with local residents and without adequate compensation
for loss of their farmland or livelihoods. (
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/indonesia )

West Papua issue

Sporadic fighting between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army
continued in the central highlands area, killing at least 25 civilians in 2021, including Reverend Yeremia
Zanambani, who had translated the Bible into the Nduga language.On May 9, Indonesian police arrested
Victor Yeimo, a spokesman for the West Papua National Committee, in Jayapura. Police charged him with
treason for a 2019 statement made during anti-racism protests and ensuing riots in Papua and West
Papua calling for a referendum on independence.
(https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/indonesia )

Climate Change Policy and Impacts

Indonesia, one of the world’s top 10 emitters of greenhouse gases, is contributing to the climate crisis
taking a mounting toll on human rights around the globe. In its 2021 update to its national climate action
plan, Indonesia reiterated its 2016 goals, rather than establishing more ambitious targets as required by
the Paris Agreement. Its climate plan is “critically insufficient” to meet the agreement’s goal to limit
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, according to The Climate Action Tracker. If all
countries’ commitments were in this range, the global temperature increase would exceed 4°C by the
end of the century.Government data released in March suggests deforestation dropped significantly
between 2019 and 2020. Alternative estimates by Global Forest Watch (GFW) confirm a downward
trend. In September, a government-mandated moratorium on new oil palm plantations lapsed. Despite
an official ban on primary forest clearing in force since 2011, the latest GFW data indicates Indonesia lost
250,000 hectares in 2020. In November 2021, at the global climate summit in Glasgow, the Indonesian
government signed a global pledge to end forest loss by 2030 – but its environment minister promptly
criticized the pledge and vowed to continue clearing forests as part of ‘development’ plans.Indonesia has
taken few steps to move away from reliance on coal for electricity generation, a major contributor to
greenhouse gas emissions. In May, the government said it would build more coal-fired power stations
but would shut them all down in 2060. Indonesia could prevent tens of thousands of premature deaths
linked to air pollution by rapidly reducing its reliance on coal-fired electricity.

Floods, droughts, sea level rise, changes in rainfall patterns, and warmer temperatures induced by
climate change are expected to take a toll, requiring Indonesia to take steps to protect at-risk
populations from their foreseeable harms. In January 2021, South Kalimantan and Borneo declared a
state of emergency after heavy rainfall and flooding displaced tens of thousands.(
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/indonesia )