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IPT0010.1177/1755088219832992Journal of International Political TheoryMende

Article

Journal of International Political Theory

Are human rights

2021, Vol. 17(1) 38­–57
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1755088219832992
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international political theory

Janne Mende
Justus Liebig University Giessen, Germany

Abstract
A widespread assumption alleges that human rights are not universal, as they claim to
be, but are instead Western oriented. Yet a growing body of research provides evidence
that human rights are not just Western. Both perspectives are critical of repressive
dimensions in the human rights regime, though they recommend different approaches
to addressing them. This article explores both viewpoints from an International Political
Theory perspective. Examining the pluralist idea, institutionalization, and application
of human rights, the first section argues that human rights are not just Western. The
second section investigates why it nevertheless matters to ask whether human rights are
Western. This article develops four interrelated criteria: dynamic pluralism, awareness
of power and inequalities, contextual universalism, and open normativity. These criteria
help determine whether human rights are (not just) Western, and, more importantly,
they provide the basis for an emancipatory human rights regime.

Keywords
Global inequalities, human rights, normativity, particularism, post-colonialism, power,
universalism

Introduction
There is a widespread assumption that human rights1 are not universal, as they claim to
be, but rather that their origin, institutionalization, and application are Western. This
assumption is based on three perspectives with differing intentions, implications, and

Corresponding author:
Janne Mende, Department of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, Justus Liebig University
Giessen, Karl-Glöckner Str. 21 E, D-35394 Gießen, Germany.
Email: janne.mende@sowi.uni-giessen.de
Mende 39

effects. The first rejects the project of universal human rights in order to legitimate and
reproduce (own) human rights violations.2 The second perspective takes into account
only Western contributions to human rights in order to prove the alleged superiority of
Western values. The third is fueled by the critical intention to address inequalities, colo-
nial legacies, power relations, and repressive mechanisms that are exacerbated by human
rights and their very claim to universality. This article focuses primarily on the third
perspective, and to a lesser extent the second. All three perspectives have differing foci
(e.g. on so-called Asian, Muslim or African values) and concepts (e.g. the post-colonial
notions of Global South/Global North substituting for East/West). This article refers to
these distinctions where applicable. Otherwise, it refers to their commonalities. One rea-
son for this is that the three perspectives share an image of a dichotomously divided
world (Huntington, 2002) that does not allow for universal values or a reconciliation of
different values. Thus, the third perspective fuels an assumption of which it is simultane-
ously critical, albeit to some extent unwillingly.
This article invokes the growing body of research in Political Philosophy, and in con-
structivist and neo-institutionalist International Relations, which puts forward the coun-
ter-thesis that human rights are not just Western. This counter-thesis does not neglect
Western contributions to human rights, or ignores the repressive dimensions and misuse
of human rights. Rather, it underlines their pluralist and heterogeneous character. It is
also sensitive to the possible repressive effects of the assumption that human rights are
Western.
While the critical assumption that human rights are Western implies that the current
human rights regime is unequal, Eurocentric and power fueled, the counter-thesis that
human rights are not just Western envisions a universal human rights regime that includes
everyone equally. Therefore, both perspectives can be said to be critical of repressive
dimensions of human rights, though they imply differing assumptions regarding how to
address them.
This article combines these accounts into an International Political Theory perspec-
tive that is situated simultaneously within and beyond the fields of Political Philosophy
and International Relations. It is based on the two disciplines, but it does not simply
blend the concepts that are common to both disciplines. Rather, it combines the two dis-
ciplines to generate independent perspectives that cannot simply be traced back to either
(cf. Mende, 2015a: 208).
Against this backdrop, the article addresses two questions. Section “Are human rights
western?” explores whether human rights are Western, in more depth than a simple yes
/no dichotomy. Focusing on the idea (“The idea of human rights”), the institutionaliza-
tion (“The institutionalization of human rights”), and the application (“The application
of human rights”) of human rights, it argues that human rights are broader than a Western
construction: they are pluralist.
Section “Why does the question matter?” addresses the question of why it is impor-
tant to ask whether human rights are Western. This question, along with its counter-the-
sis, can contribute to an emancipatory human rights regime. Section “Why does the
question matter?” proceeds from this common endeavor by developing the criteria of
dynamic pluralism (“Dynamic pluralism”), awareness of power and inequalities
(“Awareness of power and inequalities”), contextual universalism (“Contextual
40 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

universalism”), and open normativity (“Open normativity”). These four criteria are the
direct result of the discussion in Section “Are human rights western?”. They are indis-
pensable not only for determining whether human rights are Western, but also for devel-
oping an emancipatory human rights regime.

Are human rights western?

The question of whether human rights are a Western notion has been a matter of dispute
since the introduction of the concept. Its prevalence suggests that it cannot be answered
unambiguously, with a simple yes or no. Taking into account research on both the critical
assumption and the counter-thesis, this section does not seek to deny Western influences
on human rights, but to acknowledge pluralist contributions to the idea, institutionaliza-
tion, and application of human rights.

The idea of human rights

The idea of human rights precedes the modern human rights regime that was established
with the foundation of the United Nations in 1945. There is one omnipresent narrative
that places today’s international human rights on a clear trajectory that is aligned with
historical Western documents and declarations including the English Magna Carta
(1215), the English Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the English Bill of Rights (1689), the
United States Declaration of Independence (1776), the French Déclaration des Droits de
l’Homme et du Citoyen (1789), and the United States Bill of Rights (1789). The tradi-
tions of enlightenment, liberalism, Protestantism, and natural law are invoked to vouch
for this Western origin of human rights (Douzinas, 2007: 34ff; Panikkar, 1982: 80; Pollis
and Schwab, 1980).
Others point out that these documents are based on the exclusion of others, most nota-
bly women, slaves, and people in the non-Western world (Hunt, 2008; Mbembe, 2003:
24; Scott, 2004: 177f.). While this argument highlights the ambivalent and exclusionary
role of Western human rights ideas, it too adopts the narrative of the Western foundation
of human rights. However, this narrative can be challenged in three ways.
First, the Western human rights tradition cannot be equated with the contemporary
human rights regime, which differs from its pre-1945 predecessors (Moyn, 2012). It was
not the gradual increase of declarations or a smooth combination of natural law and citi-
zenship rights that led to the foundation of the international human rights regime, but
rather the international reaction to the genocide and atrocities committed by National
Socialist Germany (Menke and Pollmann, 2007: 16f.). To be sure, it was not solely a mor-
ally driven reaction to the Holocaust that launched the extensive institutional development
including the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and the Genocide Convention. Still, the Holocaust and the Nuremburg trials
played an important role in shaping international law (Douzinas, 2007: 21; Lauren, 2011:
204). The important point is that the peculiar historical situation of the 1940s disrupts the
narrative of a direct and linear path from the (Western) Magna Carta to the UDHR.
Second, the standard references to pre-1945 Western declarations represent a particu-
laristic and selective reading. Historical accounts generally pose the risk of selection
Mende 41

bias, that is, that “the choice of such documents reflects a pre-conceived understanding
[…]. Instead, supplementing an examination of these documents with other texts of the
same period, as well as secondary sources, can expand insights” (Klotz and Lynch, 2007:
30). Interpreting the pre-1945 declarations in their historical contexts reveals that they
were not fully embraced by Western societies at the time but were the subject of highly
controversial struggles (Bielefeldt, 2007: 182f.).3 What is more, pre-1945 non-Western
movements and struggles encompassed similar or even further-reaching ideas that pro-
vided a foundation for human rights. For example, in 1792 Haitian revolutionaries
(Bhambra, 2015, also cf. Buck-Morss, 2000) fought against slavery and colonialism.
They demanded the political participation of persons of color, and played a major role in
the subsequent abolition of slavery in other parts of the world. A Haitian delegation to
Paris (unsuccessfully) advocated the inclusion of an anti-slavery clause in the French
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen.4
In a third challenge to the narrative, the search for the sources, origins and predeces-
sors of human rights ideas can be extended indefinitely. The analysis of philosophy,
religious thought, and cultural traditions provides plenty of sources of non-Western
human rights ideas. For example, the values of freedom, individual liberty and tolerance
can be found in Buddhism, Confucianism, Mandarin and Brahman traditions (Chan,
1999; Dohrmann, 2007; Sen, 1999: 227ff; Zhang, 2007). The idea of universal tolerance
was embraced by the Buddhist emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century BC (Sen, 1999:
235ff.). Sharma shows how Hinduism embraces the uniqueness of every person as a
moral agent. This moral agency forms the basis of an entitlement to basic rights, and thus
for obligations of the state and society to fulfill it (Sharma, 2004, 2006). Likewise, Sen
shows how the idea of ijtehad allows a broad interpretation of Islamic values including
tolerance, pluralism and the protection of minorities (Sen, 2007: 59ff., also cf. Bielefeldt,
2000: 102ff; Othman, 1999). The West African concept of Akan mirrors the human rights
notion of personhood and the rights to education, freedom of thought and political par-
ticipation, among others (Wiredu, 1990). Most religions and cultures share—with vary-
ing emphasis and forms—the idea of responsibility for other people and the duty to
combat suffering.5 Joas (2013) analyzes transitions from religious to secular values and
locates human rights ideas in the concepts of moral agency and personhood, which
developed in Christian as well as in Indian and Chinese societies.
Yet each religion, culture, and value system also has repressive aspects:

the presence of these components must not be confused with the absence of the opposite, viz.,
of ideas and doctrines that clearly do not emphasize freedom and tolerance. Championing of
order and discipline can be found in Western classics as well. […] The real issue is not whether
these nonfreedom perspectives are present in Asian [and other, JM] traditions, but whether the
freedom-oriented perspectives are absent there. (Sen, 1999: 234)

Furthermore, the examples cited above cannot simply be equated with human rights,
because they often applied only to certain groups, castes, sexes or classes—not to all
people (Yasuaki, 1999: 109f.), and were developed in societies that differ from contem-
porary societies in important regards (An-Na’im, 1999: 156ff.). Yet, this holds true for
Western pre-1945 ideas as well.
42 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

In conclusion, the goal of this section is not to deny historical differences. Research
on the role of Western ideas of human rights can also enhance contemporary understand-
ings of human rights (An-Na’im and Deng, 1990; Bauer and Bell, 1999). The important
point is that human rights do not spring from just one homogeneous religion, value sys-
tem, or culture, but from various, pluralistic and heterogeneous sources (Bhambra, 2009;
Brotton, 2002; Cousin, 2011). Thus, the narrative of the Western idea of human rights
turns out to be a “retrospective teleology” (Bielefeldt, 2007: 179) that has been con-
structed ex post facto, and highly selectively.

The institutionalization of human rights

The critical assumption holds that Western states initiated and led the institutionalization
of the contemporary human rights regime: “The Western, mainly liberal protestant roots
of the Human Rights Declaration are well known” (Panikkar, 1982: 79). The argument
asserts that, to the extent that newly decolonized states took part in establishing the
human rights regime, they did so to emphasize their sovereignty (Donnelly, 1998; Moyn,
2012: 117), or because they were following powerful Western states (Douzinas, 2007:
180f.).
These assumptions are “partially fact and partially fiction” (Waltz, 2002: 440). On the
one hand, Western states played a tremendously important role in fighting against
National Socialism in World War II, and the subsequent shaping of the world order. The
spread of the Westphalian model of state sovereignty after World War II has arguably
contributed to the institutionalization of human rights (Kingsbury, 1998: 607), with both
repressive and emancipatory effects.
On the other hand, the institutionalization of human rights was much more pluralistic
and global. Colonized states, states from the Global South, Western states, and a variety
of individual diplomats, philosophers, activists, civil society organizations, and nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) actively participated in the fora, discussions, and con-
ferences that founded and established the contemporary human rights regime. Many
participating states, including Western ones, also sought to protect state sovereignty from
interventions based on human rights ideas. This section provides paradigmatic examples
of the pluralist institutionalization of human rights.
During the first session of the UN General Assembly in 1946, Egypt introduced a
resolution against racial and religious persecution that was supported by Latin American,
Asian and African states. Likewise, Cuba, India and Panama highlighted the issue of
genocide. Delegates from Haiti and India argued for the dignity of every human being.
India led several attacks against the apartheid system in South Africa. South Africa, in
turn, invoked the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, which were
actively supported by Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, among others
(Lauren, 2011: 204ff.).
Panama submitted a draft Declaration on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms,
supported by Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France and Liberia, among others (Lauren,
2011: 209). This declaration eventually led to the creation of the Commission of Human
Rights that drafted the UDHR, which was composed by Eleanor Roosevelt from the
United States, Charles Malik from Lebanon, René Cassin from France, Peng-chun Chan
Mende 43

from China, Hernán Santa Cruz from Chile, and John-Peter Humphrey from Canada.
Their work was shaped by numerous submissions and complaints from individuals and
civil society organizations. Among them was W.E.B. Du Bois’ petition addressing the
lynching, racism and segregation in the United States. While Roosevelt refused to incor-
porate Du Bois’ petition in the General Assembly agenda in an attempt to avoid exposing
the United States, the Soviet Union embraced it (Douzinas, 2007: 28). The drafting pro-
cess was generally marked by numerous political, cultural, ideological, religious, and
gender conflicts (Adami, 2017). The deliberations produced a document that reflects this
plurality: it is based on consensus as much as on ambiguity, contestation, and even omis-
sion (Adami, 2017; Hoover, 2013). In the final decision about the endorsement of the
UDHR in the UN General Assembly in December 1948, of the then 58 member states 48
states voted in favor of the declaration (none voted against it), 33 of which were
non-Western.
In December 1943, the African National Congress endorsed the Africans’ Claims in
South Africa document, which demanded the end of apartheid and segregation as well as
the political right to vote and full citizenship rights for everyone in South Africa (Asmal
et al., 2005). In April 1948, at the Ninth International Conference of American States in
Bogotá, Colombia, all 20 Latin American countries, along with the United States, unani-
mously approved the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Carozza,
2003; Glendon, 2003; Morsink, 1999; Sikkink, 2017: 57f.).
Contrary to the assumption that there were no considerable contributions to the human
rights regime during the 1950s and 1960s (Hopgood, 2013; Moyn, 2012), the global
efforts that began in the 1940s continued during this period. Various global and regional
struggles contributed to the establishment of legally binding treaties, as well as non-
binding but normatively and politically important declarations, amendments and resolu-
tions, regional courts of justice, international treaty bodies, national legislation, and civil
society movements. These included contributions from colonized, newly decolonized
and other non-Western states (Barreto, 2013; Nkrumah, 1962; Rajagopal, 2006). During
the negotiations of the international covenants designed to codify the Universal
Declaration into binding law, representatives from Western and non-Western states,
including India and Mexico, relentlessly emphasized the need to protect human rights
internationally as well as domestically (Reus-Smit, 2001: 533). In 1950, Afghanistan and
Saudi Arabia—later supported by Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Yemen, and others—suggested there was a strong link
between human rights and self-determination (Reus-Smit, 2001: 535). Non-Western
states continued to address the racism underlying the colonial system. During the 1960s,
an alliance between Jamaica, Ghana, the Philippines, Liberia, Costa Rica and Senegal
fueled the development of mechanisms to implement the new human rights regime,
including fact-finding missions, national human rights commissions, and monitoring
through treaty body and regional mechanisms (Jensen, 2016: 102ff.). Jamaica’s
Ambassador to the UN, Egerton Richardson, facilitated the first foreign policy strategy
that integrated human rights in 1964 (Jensen, 2016: 69ff.).
These examples from in-depth studies suggest three conclusions. First, the institution-
alization of human rights was not a homogeneous, Western-driven project, but the result
of diverse perspectives, sources and contributions.
44 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

Second, the institutionalization of human rights was not only a power-driven

concept:

The less powerful embraced the idea of the international protection of human rights in attempts
to restrain the more powerful, not vice versa. These less powerful groups, however, were more
likely to succeed when they had allies within powerful states […] and eventually were able to
persuade the United States to support them, not the other way round. (Sikkink, 2017: 88)

While the US Carter administration’s endorsement of human rights from 1977

onwards largely contributed to the success of human rights (Moyn, 2012), it did not initi-
ate the process.
Third, the institutionalization of human rights was marked by idealism and commit-
ment, as well as by strategic reasoning, power struggles and open opposition, by both
Western and non-Western states and civil society actors, for different reasons. The impor-
tant point is that these conflicts did not solely occur along the line between Western and
non-Western states: but there were many different conflicts and contestations. In spite of
this, the international human rights regime has been established. States, movements, and
individuals from both the Global North and the Global South actively contributed to its
institutionalization.

The application of human rights

The assumption that human rights are Western also touches on their contemporary char-
acter, forms and applications. Critical accounts identify a tendency to overemphasize
human rights violations in the Global South. This tends to construct a non-Western
“other” that needs to be saved by Western states (Chakrabarty, 2008; Kapur, 2006).
Thereby, the human rights regime creates a dichotomy between the Western embrace-
ment and the non-Western violation of human rights (Mutua, 2008). This dichotomy
neglects human rights violations in Western states and disregards the complicity of the
latter with the former (Chowdhry, 2005). What is more, critical accounts emphasize that
Western states use the frame of human rights to legitimize their interventions in other
states (Kapur, 2006: 671ff; Nair, 2005; Nesiah, 2010).
Critics also assert that the “bearer” of human rights is Western, white, male, individ-
ual, and liberal. Accordingly, the human rights regime neglects the needs and living
conditions of others, such as the values of communities and groups (An-Na’im, 1999;
Kapur, 2006: 673; Panikkar, 1982: 86, cf.).6 This line of critique advocates collective and
community-based forms of human rights, and asserts that the current human rights
regime ostensibly applies only to individuals (cf. Mende, 2016a).
These critiques provide tremendously important points of critique. They fuel discus-
sions that are relevant to the further development of human rights, as discussed in Section
“Why does the question matter?.” However, they can be challenged, or rather comple-
mented, in two ways.
First, the human rights regime is used by non-Western as well as Western activists and
states. Deliberations within UN human rights for a highlight fault lines characterized by
regional, substantial, and strategic alliances, not simply Western versus non-Western
Mende 45

states. Human rights activists and diplomats from the Global South use the human rights
framework to strengthen their demands. In a recent example, a group of non-Western
states initiated a working group dedicated to drafting a binding treaty for corporate
responsibility for human rights. The group was led by Ecuador and South Africa, and
supported by Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela,
Kenya, Namibia, and Peru, among others, as well as by NGOs from all parts of the
world. Although their proposal was opposed by the USA, the United Kingdom, France,
Austria, Germany, and the European Union, they were successful in that the UN Human
Rights Council founded an intergovernmental working group (Mende, 2017) that pub-
lished its Zero Draft in 2018.
Second, these movements pluralize and transform the human rights regime in turn.
The development of indigenous human rights challenges assumptions that characterize
the human rights regime as individualistic and Western. After decades of struggles, nego-
tiations and re-negotiations, the UN established a framework for indigenous human
rights that is used by indigenous groups all over the world.7 This framework challenges
centuries of international law, above all the doctrines of discovery and terra nullius.
Indigenous human rights also expand existing human rights law. For example, they
emphasize a human right to tradition and cultural identity, and have introduced collective
human rights as group rights, which is a highly controversial topic (Pritchard, 2001;
Stapleton, 1995). Thus, although they have conflicts and problems of their own (Mende,
2015b), indigenous human rights provide a way to reconcile the conceptual struggle
between individual and collective human rights that is often framed in terms of Western
versus non-Western approaches (Mende, 2016a).
In conclusion, contemporary human rights movements do not just adapt in order to fit
into a given institutional framework. Rather, they simultaneously form and influence that
very framework, thereby contributing to the ongoing development of a dynamic human
rights regime that addresses diverse issues, forms and subjects.

Why does the question matter?

The persistence of the question of whether human rights are Western leads to another
question: ‘Why does it matter so much that it remains to be a subject of debate through-
out the decades?’ The remainder of the paper addresses this issue. It proceeds from the
critical assumption that human rights are Western, and the counter-thesis that human
rights are not just Western. In certain regards, both aim to improve the human rights
regime. Building on the discussion in section Are Human Rights Western?, this section
proposes four criteria—dynamic pluralism, awareness of power and inequalities, contex-
tual universalism, and open normativity. The four criteria interact to form an emancipa-
tory human rights regime.

Dynamic pluralism
Some critics of human rights employ the image of a static, stable human rights regime
that is no longer useful to address today’s global challenges. They propose to “see the
human rights moment for what it was—a status quo project for a stable time” (Kennedy,
46 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

2012: 34). They differ from perspectives that—while critical of the current human rights
regime—acknowledge its dynamic character: “human rights are a contested terrain and
not one that can simply be read in linear terms” (Kapur, 2006: 670). The latter perspec-
tive contributes to a dynamic and pluralist reading of human rights. This aligns with the
examples in section “Are Human Rights Western?” that testify to an ever-developing and
transforming human rights regime.
The language of human rights helps articulate differing and newly developing
demands. While new demands need to adapt to the relevant human rights institutions,
language, and procedures in order to be heard, they can also challenge and change
them—thereby increasing pluralism within the framework of human rights. This
dynamic pluralism within the human rights regime can be traced to the development
of new needs, identities, subjects, violations, or violators of human rights. For exam-
ple, the establishment of women’s human rights challenged the male-centered charac-
ter of human rights. Gender issues were not simply added onto the otherwise
unchanged human rights regime, but transformed its understandings and notions
(Peters and Wolper, 1995). The development of indigenous human rights, as discussed
above, introduced new ideas and concepts to human rights, while simultaneously
acknowledging their core principles.
Dynamic pluralism entails contradicting and pluralistic struggles. As discussed with
regard to the institutionalization of human rights, many such struggles consist of contra-
dictions, contestation, and ambiguities (Hoover, 2013). In effect, they may be strength-
ening as well as weakening human rights. Therefore, dynamic pluralism requires further
normative qualification. The binding core and central normative ideas of international
human rights are designed to prevent basic rights from being undermined in new strug-
gles. This generates a constant tension between the core ideas of human rights, on the one
hand, and the need to develop and adapt to pluralist demands and needs, on the other.
While this tension does not prevent contradictions and struggles, it allows human rights
to be used as an instrument by those who need it.
The critical question of whether human rights are institutionalized, applied, and
extended with a Western bias is able to contribute to their dynamic pluralism in three
scenarios: (1) when it cautions against homogeneous readings of human rights, (2) when
it allows for dynamic interpretations, and (3) when it warns against the assumption that
any culture, value system, state, or religion is homogeneous and static.

Awareness of power and inequalities

The dynamic pluralism of human rights infers participation, dialogue, and deliberation
on the form and content of human rights. These processes require access to the fora of
deliberation, especially for those whose human rights are violated, as well as conditions
for equitable dialogue.8 Yet, as critics emphasize, “sometimes the very conditions for
dialogue are not given, because there are unspoken conditions” (Panikkar, 1982: 75). It
is therefore necessary to scrutinize the quality of the dynamic pluralism of human rights
by looking at global inequalities and power relations. This directly resonates with one of
the pivotal aims of the critical assumption that human rights are Western: revealing
global inequalities between Western and non-Western states,9 and how they are
Mende 47

reproduced by the human rights regime. The question of whether human rights are
Western has the potential to reveal global inequalities in three areas.
First, it addresses inequalities in power relations that date back to colonialism and
economic exploitation (Barreto, 2013; Spivak, 1994). Historically, the differentiation
between “the West and the rest” (Hall, 1992) was based on ideologies closely connected
to racism and colonialism that divide the world into a supposedly civilized part “that is
developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern” (Hall, 1992: 186)
and a part that is not. The concept of the West produced representations, narratives,
images, implications, effects, criteria of comparison, evaluation—and devaluation
(Conrad and Randeria, 2002: 35ff; Hall, 1992: 186):

It had real effects: it enabled people to know or speak of certain things in certain ways. It
produced knowledge. It became both the organizing factor in a system of global power relations
and the organizing concept or term in a whole way of thinking and speaking. (Hall, 1992: 187)

The concept of the West legitimized the domination, exploitation, and murder of huge parts
of the non-Western world by powerful Western actors. Global relations today are still marked
by inequalities in power, material and ideal resources, and access to international fora.
Second, the question of whether human rights are Western addresses the difficulties
that non-Western societies may face in implementing human rights principles. It acknowl-
edges the necessity to translate and adapt the human rights regime to local conditions and
different (pluralist) constellations (Acharya, 2004):

Unlike Western countries, they do not have the luxury of executing the process of nation
building, economic growth, and democracy in a sequential fashion, spread over centuries.
Instead, these three processes must be carried out simultaneously, even though they are not
always mutually reinforcing. (Karan, 2005: 52)

Third, the question of whether human rights are Western addresses the ways in which
the human rights regime exacerbates global inequalities: “There is a need to address the
complicity of human rights in making the world less stable, less peaceful, more divisive,
more polluted and more violent” (Kapur, 2006: 683). This is the case when human rights
are used to justify repressive politics or interventions (Ignatieff and Gutmann, 2003). It
also applies to the question of who is able to grant human rights to whom, that is, the
positioning in human rights institutions (Mutua, 2008). Finally, critical perspectives
identify the concepts and notions on which human rights are based as Western, for exam-
ple, the notions of individuals (McDonald, 1991), rights (Spivak, 2004), democracy
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997), the common good (Hastrup, 2003), equality (Al-Hibri,
1999), and statehood (Mbaya, 1999). In certain ways, such critiques can reveal the plu-
rality of understandings and interpretations, which are discussed in further detail below.
In these three regards, the question of whether human rights are Western can contrib-
ute to an emancipatory human rights regime that is aware of its own imbalances, inequal-
ities, and genesis. However, this question also implies a dichotomy between “the West
and the rest,” which entails severe pitfalls.
First, the “West versus the rest” construct risks subsuming all differences and phenomena
under that dichotomy. This becomes visible in the tendency to equate all kinds of Western
48 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

ideas with human rights ideas. Scholars criticize certain incidents from western politics well-
founded,10 but they equate these examples from western politics with the general idea of
human rights. In effect, this tautology marks an idea or practice from the Western hemisphere
as a human rights practice—in order to criticize human rights for being Western. More gener-
ally, the dichotomy between “the West and the rest” risks obscuring other, cross-cutting types
of inequalities and conflict such as gender, class, and ethnicity. It also neglects the plurality
and diversity within the regions that are characterized as Western and non-Western.
Second, the dichotomy between Western and non-Western dimensions of human
rights risks neglecting similarities and overlaps between them. Activists, NGOs, civil
society movements and diplomats from all parts of the word use the human rights frame-
work to articulate their demands (Pinheiro, 2014: 94). Both Western and non-Western
scholars have backed the assumption that human rights are Western, just as scholars with
diverse backgrounds aim to prove the opposite.
More importantly, the dichotomy risks withholding human rights (or the notions on
which they are based) from non-Western citizens, thereby (unwillingly) supporting gov-
ernments that exploit the same argument to legitimize their repressive regime:

The belief that human rights ideas come only from the Global North flattens differences and
disagreements about human rights within countries and regions and calls into question the
legitimacy and authenticity of human rights activists in the Global South. This historical
critique by scholars inadvertently echoes the discourse of many repressive governments in the
Global South, who try to discredit their local human rights activists by portraying them as
“foreign agents,” carrying inappropriate ideas from abroad. (Sikkink, 2017: 30)

Third, the dichotomy between “the West and the rest” risks neglecting their mutual
constitution. Each is the other’s “other” which builds the basis for defining the “own”
(Mende, 2016b). Under colonialism, the “own” was defined as modern and civilized by
characterizing the “other” as barbaric and wild, masking the mutual constitution as a
hierarchical dichotomy. This constellation is pointed out extensively in post-colonial
research (Bhabha, 1994; Bhambra, 2014; Hall, 1992; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988). If this
mutual constitution is acknowledged, it is possible to recognize the “own” within the
“other.” This approach could enhance understanding of plurality and diversity within the
human rights framework, instead of dichotomous segregation and “othering.”
In conclusion, global inequalities in power and resources—and the ways in which the
human rights regime may (unwillingly) reproduce them—must be addressed in order to
shape human rights in an emancipatory way. Yet, the question of whether human rights
are Western may invoke the very dichotomy that it intends to criticize. A more nuanced
terminology that addresses heterogeneous lines of conflict and inequalities will not only
circumvent a dichotomous reduction to “the West versus the rest.” It will also better
reflect the complexity of global (and other) inequalities.

Contextual universalism
An early critique of human rights asserts that there can be no such thing as universal values.
Rejecting the draft UDHR, the American Anthropological Association argued in 1947 that
values are always culture bound, and that therefore the declaration is Western rather than
Mende 49

universal (American Anthropological Association EB, 1947). This cultural-relativist cri-

tique deeply influenced the later assumption that human rights are a Western product: “No
concept as such is universal. Each concept is primarily valid where it was conceived”
(Panikkar, 1982: 84). Yet, this argument contains two elements with differing implications.
The first argument founded in cultural relativism is significant. Values, norms, con-
cepts, morals and ideas are always associated with specific historic, geographic, eco-
nomic, political and social contexts and conditions. They are not universal in the sense
of being naturally pre-existent or god given. Rather, they are a product of societies, and
societies are a matter of context.
However, in his second argument, Panikkar confounds origin with validity. Ideas and
norms can be developed in one context, and then adapted or translated into other con-
texts. One reason for this is that ideas and norms are not static or homogeneous. Nor are
the societies they arise from or are integrated into. Certain norms may be embraced by
elements of society and opposed by others, and built upon by yet other interest groups,
as was the case with the French Declaration of 1789, which caused fierce rejections and
congratulations from both inside and outside of France.
From this it follows that human rights can be universal, but not an abstract, colonialist
universalism that denies its particularity or context of origin. Nor is it the kind of empiri-
cal universalism that is purely based on globally shared universals, naturalistic assump-
tions, or an overlapping consensus. Rather, it is a contextual universalism that takes its
own conditions into account—and does not assume that these conditions are so singular
or homogeneous that they cannot be translated, transferred, extended or challenged. This
kind of contextual universalism thus embraces dynamic pluralism. Accordingly, the
entanglement between universalism and particularism is the very condition for multicul-
turalism and pluralism:

A demand, arising from within a particular culture, is expanded and its link with the originating
culture transformed as it is obliged to negotiate its meaning with other traditions within a wider
“horizon” which now includes them both. (Hall, 2000: 235, also cf. Derrida, 1992)

The human rights regime can provide this horizon of negotiation. Furthermore, rather
than pursuing an overall, homogeneous universalism that denies any differences, contex-
tual universalism is always incomplete. “Why incomplete? Because it cannot […] be
filled by a specific and unchanging content” (Hall, 2000: 234). At the same time, the
universal element provides a normative core. Although this core is not an abstract moral,
but a matter of context and deliberation, it provides ideas and values that can prove to be
normatively essential over time. Cultural relativism and universalism can thus be mutu-
ally constitutive and mutually corrective, and thereby able to contribute to an emancipa-
tory human rights regime (Mende, 2018).
On this basis, it is possible to distinguish between different concepts of universalism.
Then it becomes clear that the question of whether human rights are Western often
addresses an abstract, homogeneous universalism:

Now in order for a concept to become universally valid it should fulfill at least two conditions.
It should, on the one hand, eliminate all the other contradictory concepts. […] On the other
50 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

hand, it should be the universal point of reference for any problematic regarding human dignity.
[…] To put it another way, the culture which has given birth to the concept of Human Rights
should also be called upon to become a universal culture. This may well be one of the causes of
a certain uneasiness one senses in non-Western thinkers who study the question of Human
Rights. They fear for the identity of their own cultures. (Panikkar, 1982: 84)

However, the universalism of human rights does not equate (or necessarily lead) to
this kind of homogenization. The reformulated question—whether the universalism of
human rights is a disguise for homogeneous or Western models—helps keeping the uni-
versalism of human rights contextual and pluralistic.

Open normativity
Dynamic pluralism, awareness of power and inequalities, and contextual universalism
are interrelated criteria for an emancipatory human rights regime. Hence, they all contain
a normative component (in addition to their political, social, economic, and other com-
ponents). Dynamic pluralism does not aim to be indifferent to just any kind of values and
ideas; it is connected to the normative core of human rights that includes the dignity of
every human being. Awareness of power and inequalities resonates with (differing) nor-
mative ideas about equality, equity and justice. Contextual universalism links pluralism
with the highly normative aspiration that certain living conditions should be available to
everyone. The acknowledgment of its own normative stance distinguishes contextual
universalism from the assumption of a pre-societal, natural, or homogeneous moral,
because normative ideas are always embedded and located within certain social contexts.
However, these ideas can travel to other contexts, or entail norms and values that go
beyond existing ones. In fact, this is what makes them normative aspirations as opposed
to empirical deductions. The linkage between context dependence and normative aspira-
tions for something better (cf. Mende, 2016a: 166ff.) provides the basis for differentiat-
ing between emancipation and repression, and for the notion of an emancipatory human
rights regime. It includes normative readings of dynamic pluralism, awareness of power
and inequality, and contextual universalism of human rights.
One major requirement for these normative readings is their openness, which has
two main characteristics. First, openness entails reflexivity, that is, an acknowledgment
of the normative character of the readings, so that one’s own normative assumptions and
implications can be revealed. Second, openness means incompleteness, that is, being
open to inquiry, criticism, deliberation, negotiation, and transformation. This incom-
pleteness requires oscillating between the normative core and the contextual develop-
ment of human rights.
Just as the defense of the human rights regime is normative, so is its critique. It is
therefore instructive to explore the open normativity of the question of whether human
rights are Western. Does the question aim to reveal global inequalities, or confine human
rights to certain regions? And does the universal aspiration for human rights seek to
overlook their own particularity, or to provide access to human rights for everyone?
Just as the defense of human rights is dependent on normativity that is open to inquiry
and transformation, so is its critique. Both are in need of reflexivity and incompleteness.
Mende 51

Only on this basis can the question of whether human rights are Western contribute to an
emancipatory human rights regime.

Conclusion
This article explores two interrelated questions. Section “Are Human Rights Western?”
examines whether human rights are Western. It discusses the idea, the institutionaliza-
tion, and the application of human rights and concludes that human rights are not just
Western. It finds that every narrative is based on a certain choice and interpretation of a
plurality of artifacts, incidents, and cases (Lustick, 1996). But there is a peculiar constel-
lation between the narrative that human rights are Western, and the counter-narrative that
human rights are not just Western. While the former has to demonstrate an allegedly
homogeneous Western character of a global, multi-level, complex regime, the latter can
be more easily proven by exemplifying non-Western contributions to the human rights
regime. Therefore, while both narratives can be selective, the latter integrates the plural-
ity of dimensions that helps compensate for selective interpretations. Ultimately, the aim
of section “Are Human Rights Western?” is twofold. On the one hand, it invokes the
plurality of contributions to human rights; on the other hand, it demonstrates that every
interpretation has implications and effects that need to be addressed. What is more, it
shows that universality and pluralism can go hand in hand.
Given the persistence of the question of whether human rights are Western, section
“Why does the question matter?” traces why it is relevant, addressing its important
contributions as well as its limitations. If the question only aims to strengthen the
assumption that human rights are Western, regardless of the implications, it contributes
to the phenomenon that it calls into question: that human rights are restricted to “the
West” and exclude “the rest.” In contrast, the question of whether human rights are
Western can contribute to an emancipatory human rights regime, when it reveals global
inequalities, when it helps to identify Eurocentrism and colonial legacies, when it is
able to distinguish between homogeneous and contextual forms of universalism, when
it encourages reflection on normativity, and when it is open to pluralist deliberation.
Then, it can enter into a dialogue with the counter-thesis that human rights are not just
Western.

Notes
  1. The international human rights regime was established with the United Nations Charter and
the UDHR in the 1940s, and the two binding covenants from 1966/1976. Since then, it has
been further developed by numerous treaties and declarations. Throughout the article, the
term “human rights” refers to the legal and normative regime based on these developments;
section “The idea of human rights” discusses the underlying ideas. The term human rights
thereby is based on the notion of their indivisibility, which was reiterated at the 1993 United
Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, including civil and political, as well
as economic, social and cultural human rights (cf. Mende, 2016a: 6).
 2. I do not discuss this perspective here, as it has been extensively examined elsewhere.
Compare, for example, An-Na’im (1999), Karan (2005: 55ff.), Mayer (2017), Sen (1999:
231ff.), Tatsuo (1999), and Zakaria and Lee (1994).
52 Journal of International Political Theory 17(1)

  3. Famous interventions with regard to the French Declaration from 1790 were Edmund Burke’s
(1970) conservative refusal and Olympe de Gouges’ (2012 [1791]) and Mary Wollstonecraft’s
(1792) feminist objections.
  4. Likewise, the writ of amparo, which originated in 19th-century Mexico, called for protecting
individual rights against despotism and state authority. It is similar to, but more encompassing
than, the habeas corpus principle (Morsink, 1999). A much earlier reference to human rights
ideas can be found in the Cyrus Cylinder, a clay cylinder from the 6th century BC that features
an inscription that some refer to as the “first declaration of human rights” (Kuhrt, 1983: 84).
 5. Lauren (2011) provides examples from Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Confucianism,
Christianity and Islam.
  6. Ake provides a more rigorous example of this line of critique:

The idea of human rights, or legal rights in general, presupposes a society which is atom-
ized and individualistic […]. The values implicit in all this are clearly alien to those of our
traditional societies. We put less emphasis on the individual and more on the collectivity, we
do not allow that the individual has any claims which may override that of the society. We
assume harmony, not divergence of interests, competition and conflict; we are more inclined
to think of our obligations to other members of our society rather than our claims against
them. The western notion of human rights stresses rights which are not very interesting in the
context of African realities. (Ake, 1987: 5)

  7. The framework includes the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and
the UN Special Rapporteur.
 8. For further discussion of who should be participating in global fora of deliberation, cf.
Näsström (2010) who scrutinizes the all-affected principle and the concept of discursive rep-
resentation. See Adami (2017) for the concept of intersectional dialogue that reveals power
inequalities in transcultural fora, Hoover (2013) for plurality through contestation, and
Deitelhoff (2009) for islands of persuasion in international fora.
  9. More recently, the terms Western and non-Western have been replaced by the terms Global
North and Global South to highlight global inequalities independently of the colonizing
implications associated with the former terms. The discussion in this section largely relates to
these newer terms, too.
10. Examples are Tony Blair’s reference to value change (Douzinas, 2007: 184), the Danish fam-
ily reunification law (Kapur, 2006: 676), or the Australian rule of colonial difference (Kapur,
2006: 678).

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Author biography
Janne Mende is a senior researcher at the University of Giessen, where she conducts her DFG
funded research project about “Business Actors beyond Public and Private: Authority, Legitimacy
and Responsibility in the United Nations Human Rights Regime.” Prior to that, she worked as a
post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Development and Decent Work at the University of
Kassel, and the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences. She has held visiting positions at the
WZB—Berlin Social Science Center, the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the Research Center
Human Rights (University of Vienna), the Center for the Study of Social and Global Justice
(University of Nottingham), and the New School for Social Research (New York). Her research
interests include human rights, global governance, and international institutions.