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SSO
COURSE BOOKLET
PONDICHERRY MARITIME ACADEMY – SSO BOOKLET
INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………….……………….…….02
2. MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES ………………………………...........................06
3. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES ……………………………….…………................23
4. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ………………...............................................26
5. SECURITY EQUIPMENT…..………………......................................................34
6. SHIP SECURITY PLAN..….........................................................................57
7. THREAT IDENTIFICATIONS, RECOGNITION & RESPONSE……..................62
8. SHIP SECURITY ACTIONS..……………….....................................................74
9. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, DRILLS AND EXERCISES.…………….………..79
10. SECURITY ADMINISTRATION……………….............................................84
11. SECURITY TRAINING………………….......................................................94
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1. INTRODUCTION
Indian being party to the 1978 and 2005 convention of the STCW, the 2010 revision of which
enters into force on 1st January 2012, makes is a mandatory requirement for Security
Training for all Seafarers at different levels. All seafarers are therefore, required to comply
with these provisions, latest by 31stDecember, 2013.
The Directorate General of Shipping (DGS) hereby mandates that all DGS approved pre-sea
training institutes provide "Security Training for Seafarers with designated Security Duties" as
prescribed in the Annex 1.
The training given in this course (IMO Model Course 3.27-Ed: 2012) will provide the
knowledge required to enable personnel without designated security duties in connection
with a Ship Security Plan (SSP) to enhance ship security in accordance with the requirements
of ChapterXI-2 of SOLAS 74 as amended, the ISPS Code, and section A-VI/6-1 of the
STCW Code, as amended. The seafarers successfully completing this course will
be adequately competent to be able to contribute to the enhancement of maritime security
by having a heightened awareness and ability to recognize security threats and to respond
appropriately. This knowledge shall include but is not limited to:
• the meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels;
• knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans;
• recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
• recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioral patterns
of persons who are likely to threaten security; and
• Techniques used to circumvent security measures.
Course overview and History

IMO MARITIME SECURITY MEASURES – BACKGROUND:
The International Maritime Organization, as the United Nations’ regulatory body responsible
for the safety of life at sea and environmental protection, has adopted a great number of
conventions and regulations since its creation in 1959. Due to the new security challenges
imposed by the devastating terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the
Organization had to respond swiftly and firmly to any threat against the security of transport
by sea. This resulted in the development of the new SOLAS chapter XI-2 on Special measures
to enhance maritime security and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS
Code).
The terrorist attacks in the United States put in doubt the vulnerability of ships and ports
around the world, but they also proved that the maritime industry is determined to stand firm
and to respond to one of the biggest challenges of all the times. The new regulatory regime
entered into force on 1 July 2004. These requirements represent the culmination of co-
operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations
and shipping and port industries to assess security threats and take preventive measures
against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used by international seaborne
trade.
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The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, in October 1985, marked one of the first
actual terrorist acts recorded in modern maritime history. Following that incident, the
International Maritime Organization adopted resolution A.584(14) on Measures to prevent
unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and
crews. Subsequently in 1986, taking also account the request of the United Nations General
Assembly to study the problem of terrorism on board ships and to make recommendations on
appropriate measures, the Organization issued MSC/Circ.443 on Measures to prevent
unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships.
Pursuant to the Achille Lauro incident the Organization continued working towards the
development and adoption of conventions and security regulations and adopted, in March
1988, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA). The Convention, which is a legal instrument, extends the
provisions to unlawful acts against fixed platforms located on the Continental Shelf (Protocol
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the
Continental Shelf, 1988).
The SUA Convention ensures that appropriate action is taken against persons committing
unlawful acts against ships, including the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against
persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy
or damage it. The Convention provides for application of punishment or extradition of persons
who commit or have allegedly committed offences specified in the treaty. The Convention has
recently been updated with the addition of further provisions.
1.2 COMPETENCES TO BE ACHIEVED

Describes the competences that will be achieved through completion of course
Standard of competence for seafarers with designated security duties
 Every seafarer who is designated to perform security duties, including anti-piracy and
anti-armed-robbery-related activities, shall be required to demonstrate competence to
undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities listed in column 1 of table A-VI/6-2.
 The level of knowledge of the subjects in column 2 of table A-VI/6-2 shall be sufficient
to enable every candidate to perform on board designated security duties, including
anti-piracy and anti-armed-robbery-related activities.
 Every candidate for certification shall be required to provide evidence of having

achieved the required standard of competence through:
3.1 demonstration of competence to undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities listed in
column 1 of table A-VI/6-2, in accordance with the methods for demonstrating competence
and the criteria for evaluating competence tabulated in columns 3 and 4 of that table; and
3.2 Examination or continuous assessment as part of an approved training programme
covering the material set in column 2 of table A-VI/6-2.
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Special emphasis shall be laid on Piracy and Armed Robbery related training during the
programme. Industry Guidelines on Best Management Practices Volume 4 (revised June
2010), as may be modified from time to time, may be used as the reference material for this
purpose.
1.3. Current security threats and patterns

.1 Threats to the maritime transportation industry, such as:
 Piracy and armed attacks
 Terrorism
 Contraband smuggling
 Stowaways and refugees
 Cargo theft
 Collateral damage
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) represents the culmination
of just over a year’s intense work by IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee and its Maritime
Security Working Group since the twenty-second session of the Assembly adopted resolution
A.924 (22), on the review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which
threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships, in November 2001.
The ISPS Code was adopted by one of the resolutions that were adopted on 12 December
2002 by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (London, 9 to 13 December 2002). Another resolution also
includes the necessary amendments to chapter V and XI of SOLAS by which compliance with
the Code will become mandatory on 1 July 2004, if deemed accepted on 1 January 2004. The
existing chapter XI of SOLAS was amended and re-identified as chapter XI-1 and a new
chapter XI-2 was adopted on special measures to enhance maritime security. The ISPS Code
and these amendments to SOLAS are set out in this publication, as are other resolutions
(relating to the work that will need to be completed before the Code can be implemented in
2004 and the revision of the Code, technical co-operation, and co-operative work with the
International Labour Organization and the World Customs Organization) that were adopted
by the Conference.
The objectives of this Code are to establish an international framework involving co-operation
between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the
shipping and port industries to detect/assess security threats and take preventive measures
against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade; to
establish the respective roles and responsibilities of all these parties concerned, at the
national and international level, for ensuring maritime security; to ensure the early and
efficient collation and exchange of security-related information; to provide a methodology for
security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures to react to changing
security levels; and to ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security
measures are in place. The objectives are to be achieved by the designation of appropriate
officers/personnel on each ship, in each port facility and in each shipping company to prepare
and to put into effect the security plans that will be approved for each ship and port facility.
Parts A and B of the Code are, respectively, the mandatory requirements regarding the
provisions of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, 1974 as amended, and guidance regarding the
provisions of chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, 1974, as amended, and part A of the Code.
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Ship and port operations and conditions
Characterizes the intermodal nature of transportation and the interfaces between Ships and
other modes
• Contracting Governments, Government local administrations and the shipping and port
industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents
ships or port facilities used in international trade;
• To establish the respective roles and responsibilities of the Contracting Governments,
Threats to the maritime transport industry include those given below.
TERRORISM:
Looking at the past the main danger to merchant ships was due to war between
states. However, today’s maritime challenges go beyond the narrow conception of defense in
a scenario of interstate conflict. They are more diverse, complex, unpredictable, and
intertwined. First, since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the threat posed by international
terrorism has gained a new dimension. Incidents such as the USS Cole and Limburg attacks
have demonstrated that terrorists are interested in and capable of using the maritime domain
to achieve their objectives. Preventing terrorists from attacking at or from the sea and from
crossing maritime borders has thus become a major preoccupation for European and North
American governments. Particular attention has been given to addressing the vulnerability to
terrorist attacks of sea-based critical energy infrastructure and of maritime flows of energy
resources. One should also mention the threat that “terror mining” in large harbors such as
Rotterdam, Antwerp or New York, could pose to maritime trade. A second and related threat
is the use of maritime routes by terrorists or state actors for the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction material and technology. Third, the increase in the illegal movement of
drugs, human beings and arms as well as the growing flow of illegal immigrants, particularly
from Africa to Europe, has raised the problem of effective maritime governance and border
control, In particular on the porous maritime borders.
PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

Historically the sea has been the hunting ground for armed robbers or pirates as they came
to be called for as long as merchant ships have been sailing in them. After the second half of
the last century the world saw modern day pirates using powered craft and automatic
weapons hijacking and robbing ships. The Far Eastern waters like Malacca and China Sea
were very much in the news for a considerable period of time. Incidents also took place in
other areas worldwide. The dramatic upsurge in incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the
coast of Somalia and the Arabian Sea in recent years have shown that this “old” threat is far
from extinct. Especially where one finds extreme state weakness and attacks take place
along vital maritime trade routes, piracy can pose a threat not only in terms of local
or regional security, but also international security. The situation in Somalia has also raised
the specter of a possible collusion of interests between terrorists and pirates. Other unstable
regions, such as the Niger Delta, also continue to face significant piracy problems.
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COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Collateral damage is damage to things that are incidental to the intended target. It is
frequently used as a military term where it can refer to the incidental destruction of civilian
property and non-combatant casualties. The use of military means to free hijacked ships in
the Gulf of Aden off the Somalia coast, though successful, has resulted in “retaliative” action.
According to one expert a comprehensive approach is required to deal with the piracy
problem. Military action has been lauded by the media, but there has been collateral damage.
For instance, the master of “MV Samho Jewelry” was shot in the process of rescue and the
deaths of the American civilians onboard the yacht “Quest” was also caught up in a military
response.
CONTRABAND SMUGGLING
In the past the ships were usually carrying narcotics as part of the criminal activities of
organized crime. Now also these drugs are carried by maritime transport units but with
increased sophisticated methods, except that now weapons and explosives can also be
included. The financial gains can be astronomical and so there is now an increase of
organized crime gangs linked with terrorists, who use these finances. The links between
pirates and terrorists/organized crime gangs is also suspected.
CARGO THEFT
This has been a problem for the maritime industry since the ships evolved. It can be
small scale pilferage to stealing the whole cargo. Even though containerization has reduced
the quantity yet it occurs in all segments of the marine cargo carriage trade. Thieves
can range from the corporate type using modern day information technology to the poorly
clad fisherman turned robber climbing up from the anchor cable in some third world port.
STOWAWAYS AND REFUGEES

Extreme economic disparity between the rich and poor states and the hope of a better life
force the people to migrate and many will resort to illegal ways like stowing away on board a
ship. The others are who fear for their life due to conflict or persecution and want to get away
from their country. This is a worldwide phenomena and no particular region can be singled
out.
Ship and Port operations and conditions

When we talk about the carriage of goods by ships sailing on the world’s waterways then we
mustbe aware that like other forms of transport vehicles using land or air there are at
present direct links between these different modes. A cargo package during its journey from
the shipper to consignee can use all modes of transport. Ships will interface with the
sea/river port and usually the land transport truck or rail will also interface with them, as well
as with the air port. Sometime you will also have an intervening Dry Port. Therefore this
inter-modal nature of transportation makes the security solution much more complex, due
to the many more vulnerable entry points
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2. MARITIME SECURITY POLICY:
ACTIVITIES AT THE IMO SINCE “September 11”:

In the wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America,
Assembly resolution A.924(22) (November 2001) called for a review of the existing
international legal and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against
ships at sea and in port, and to improve security aboard and ashore. The aim was to reduce
risks to passengers, crews and port personnel on board ships and in port areas and to the
vessels and their cargoes and to enhance ship and port security and avert shipping from
becoming a target of international terrorism.
The Assembly also agreed to a significant boost to the Organization’s technical co-operation
programme of GB £1.5 million, to help developing countries address maritime security issues.
Subsequently a large number of regional and national seminars and workshops on the
enhancement of maritime and port security were held around the world in 2002, 2003 and
2004, with more initiatives launched in 2005. In addition fact-finding and assessment
missions and advisory services have been and will continue to be conducted upon request of
the countries concerned.
As a result of the adoption of resolution A.924 (22), a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime

Security, held at the London headquarters of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
from 9 to 13 December 2002 (the 2002 SOLAS Conference), was attended by 109
Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, observers from two IMO Member
States and observers from the two IMO Associate Members. United Nations specialized
agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental international organizations
also sent observers to the Conference.
The 2002 SOLAS Conference adopted a number of amendments to the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended, the most far-reaching
of which enshrined the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
The Code contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities
and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines
about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B). The
Conference also adopted a series of resolutions designed to add weight to the amendments,
encourage the application of the measures to ships and port facilities not covered by the
Code and pave the way for future work on the subject.
CO-OPERATION WITH ILO AND WCO:

The Organization has also undertaken activities for co-operation with other organizations. A
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with the World Customs Organization
(WCO) in July 2001 to strengthen co-operation in the fields of container examination,
integrity of the multi modal transport chain and matters relating to the ship/port interface.
The ensuing work by a WCO Task Force led to the unanimous adoption, by the Directors
General of 166 Customs Administrations in June 2005, of the Framework of Standards to
secure and facilitate global trade (WCO SAFE Framework of Standards).
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The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards has four principles in mind, namely that Customs
services would undertake to harmonize advance electronic information; to use a consistent
risk management approach; to use non-intrusive detection equipment; and to lead to the
accrual of benefits to customs, business and ultimately nations. At the heart of the
Framework of Standards are two ‘pillars’, the Customs-to-Customs pillar and the Customs-to-
Business pillar which together comprise seventeen standards. The SAFE Framework of
standards also includes a seal integrity programme.
In addition to the work which has been carried out in co-operation with the International
Labour Organization (ILO) in developing and adopting a new seafarer’s Identity Document
through the adoption of the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003, (No.
185), the ILO/IMO Code of practice on security in ports was developed by a Joint ILO/IMO
Working Group. This was finalized in December 2003, adopted by the ILO Governing Body in
March 2004, and adopted by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2004.
2.1 FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, CODES,

AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME SECURITY – General:
The 2002 SOLAS Conference amended SOLAS chapter XI to include special measures for
maritime security. Specifically, SOLAS Chapter XI was divided into two parts: Chapter XI-1:
Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety; and Chapter XI-2: Special Measures to
Enhance Maritime Security. In principle chapter XI-2 incorporated new regulations regarding
definitions and the requirements for ships and port facilities. These regulations are supported
by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) which has a
mandatory section (Part A) and a recommendatory section (Part B).
The guidance given in Part B of the ISPS Code is to be taken into account when implementing
the SOLAS chapter XI-2 regulations and the provisions of Part A. However, it is recognized
that the extent to which the guidance on ships applies depends on the type of ship, its
cargoes and/or passengers, its trading pattern and the characteristics of the Port Facilities
visited by the ship. Similarly, in relation to the guidance on Port Facilities, the extent to which
this guidance applies depends on the types of cargoes and/or passengers and the trading
patterns of visiting vessels.
THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE NEW REQUIREMENTS:

In essence, the new SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code were developed under the basic
understanding that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities was a risk management
activity and that to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the
risks must be made in each particular case. The purpose of the ISPS Code is to provide a
standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset
changes in threat levels with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities.
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This risk management concept is embodied in the ISPS Code through a number of minimum
functional security requirements for ships and port facilities. For ships, such requirements
include:
.1 ship security plans;
.2 ship security officers;
.3 company security officers; and
.4 certain onboard equipment
For port facilities, the requirements include:

.1 port facility security plans; and
.2 port facility security officers
In addition the requirements for ships and for port facilities include:
.1 monitoring and controlling access;
.2 monitoring the activities of people and cargo; and
.3 ensuring that security communications are readily available
To ensure implementation of all these requirements, training and drills will obviously play an
important role.
The mariner must be aware that IMO has making efforts towards maritime security through
relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations. It will worth mentioning
here that previous efforts towards maritime security were by promulgation of such
documents as the MSC/Circ.443, SUA Act, etc. In November 2001 (After the 9/11 USA
incident), the IMO Assembly adopted ResolutionA.924 (22), on the review of measures and
procedures to prevent acts of terrorism, which threaten the security of passengers and crew
and the safety of ships.
Then IMO‟s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and its Maritime Security Working Group did
intensive work for ONE YEAR and came out with the ISPS CODE. The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) Diplomatic Conference of December 2002adopted new Regulations to
enhance maritime security through amendments to SOLAS Chapters V and XI. Chapter XI,
previously covering ship safety has been split into two new chapters, XI-1 andXI-2.Chapter
XI-1, Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety, has been enhanced to include additional
requirements covering ship identification numbers and carriage of a Continuous Synopsis
Record.
Chapter XI-2, Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, has been created and includes
a requirement for ships and companies to comply with the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code. The ISPS Code contains two parts. Part A is mandatory, while Part B is
recommendatory and contains guidance for implementation of the Code. The USCG
has decreed that sections of Part B of the Code will also be taken into consideration. Chapter
XI-2 also sets out requirements for ship security alert systems and control and compliance
measures for port states and contracting governments. As well as the new Regulations in
SOLAS Chapter XI-2, the Diplomatic Conference has adopted amendments to extant SOLAS
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Regulations accelerating the implementation of the requirement to fit automatic identification

systems (AIS) (Chapter V). The Diplomatic Conference has also adopted a number of
Conference Resolutions including technical co-operation,
and the co-operative work with the International Labor Organization and World Customs
Organization.
Review and amendment of certain of the new provisions regarding maritime security may be
required on completion of the work of these two organizations. These requirements form a
framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts
which pose a threat to maritime security. The regulatory provisions do not extend to the
actual response to security incidents or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an
incident.
In summary the ISPS Code:

 enables the detection and deterrence of security threats within an international
framework
 establishes roles and responsibilities
 enables collection and exchange of security information
 provides a methodology for assessing security
 ensures that adequate security measures are in place
It requires ship and port facility staff to:

 gather and assess information
 maintain communication protocols
 restrict access; prevent the introduction of unauthorized weapons, etc
 provide the means to raise alarms put in place vessel and port security plans; and
ensure training and drills are conducted
The STCW Code as amended (2010 Manila amendments) has also added security related
provisions wherein all persons employed on ships as well as persons on ship having
designated security duties are to undergo training and attain competencies as per regulation
VI/6 and section A-VI/6.IMO has issued from time to time.
Guidance to Ship-owners, Companies, Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing

and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
2.2 FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION AND

REGULATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTRACTING GOVERNMENTS
Under SOLAS chapter XI-2 and Part A of the Code Contracting Governments can establish
Designated Authorities within Government to undertake their security responsibilities under
the Code. Governments or Designated Authorities may also delegate the undertaking of
certain responsibilities to Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs) outside Government.
Additional guidance is provided in MSC/Circ.1074 on Interim Guidelines for the authorization
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of RSOs. The setting of the security level applying at any particular time is the responsibility
of Contracting Governments and will apply to their ships and Port Facilities.
The Code defines three security levels for international use:

 Security Level 1, normal;
 Security Level 2, lasting for the period of time when there is a heightened risk of a
security incident; and
 Security Level 3, lasting for the period of time when there is the probable or imminent
risk of a security incident.
SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code require certain information to be provided to the IMO
and information to be made available to allow effective communication between
Company/Ship Security Officers and the Port Facility Security Officers responsible for the Port
Facility their ships serve.
THE COMPANY AND THE SHIP

Any shipping company operating ships to which the Code applies shall appoint a Company
Security Officer (CSO) for the company and a Ship Security Officer (SSO) for each of its
ships. The responsibilities of these officers are defined, as are the requirements for their
training and drills. The training needs and requirements of the SSO are being developed in
the context of the STCW Convention. The CSO’s responsibilities include ensuring that a Ship
Security Assessment (SSA) is undertaken and that a Ship Security Plan (SSP) is
prepared for each ship to which the Code applies.
The Ship Security Plan indicates the minimum operational and physical security measures the
ship shall take at all times, i.e. while operating at security level 1. The plan will also indicate
the additional, or intensified, security measures the ship itself can take to move to security
level 2. Furthermore, the Plan will indicate the possible preparatory actions the ship could
take to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued to the ship by the
authorities responding at security level 3 to a security incident or threat. The need for these
plans to be ultimately incorporated in the ISM Code has been acknowledged. The Ship
Security Plan must be approved by, or on behalf of, the ship’s Administration. The Company
and Ship Security Officer are required to monitor the continuing relevance and effectiveness
of the Plan, including the undertaking of independent internal audits. Any amendments to
specified elements of an approved Plan will have to be resubmitted for approval.
SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code include provisions relating to the verification and
certification of the ship’s compliance with the requirements of the Code on an initial, renewal
and intermediate basis. The ship must carry an International Ship Security Certificate
(ISSC) indicating that it complies with the Code. The ISSC is subject to Port State Control
(PSC) / maritime security control and compliance inspections but such inspections will not
extend to examination of the Ship Security Plan itself. The ship may be subject to additional
control measures if there is reason to believe that the security of the ship has, or the port
facilities it has served have, been compromised. The ship may be required to provide
information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers and crew prior to port entry and it is
the responsibility of the company that up to date information relating to the ownership and
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control of the vessel is available on board. There may be circumstances in which entry into
port could be denied, if the ship itself, or the port facility it served before, or another ship it
interfaced with previously, are considered to be in violation with the provisions of SOLAS
chapter XI-2 or part A of the ISPS Code.
Further guidance on control and compliance measures and reporting requirements are given
in:
Annex 2 to MSC/Circ.1111 on Guidance relating to the Implementation of SOLAS
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code (also adopted as Resolution MSC.159(78) on Interim
Guidance on Control and Compliance Measures to Enhance Maritime Security);
MSC/Circ.1113 on Guidance to Port State Control Officers on the non-security related

elements of the 2002 SOLAS Amendments;
MSC/Circ.1130 on Guidance to masters, Companies and duly authorized officers on

the requirements relating to the submission of security-related information prior to
the entry of a ship into port;
MSC/Circ.1156 on Guidance on the access of public authorities, emergency response

services and pilots on board ships to which SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
apply; and
MSC.1/Circ.1191 on Reminder of the obligation to notify flag States when exercising

control and compliance measures.
REVISION OF THE SUA CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
Two new protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, 1988 and its Protocol relating to Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf, 1988 (the SUA Treaties) were adopted on 14 October 2005. The original
1988 SUA treaties provided the legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing
unlawful acts against ships, including the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against
persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board which are likely to destroy or
damage the ship. Contracting Governments are obliged either to extradite or prosecute
alleged offenders.
The two new Protocols expand the scope of the original Convention and protocol to address
terrorism by including a substantial broadening of the range of offences and introducing
boarding provisions for suspect vessels. The revision took into account developments in the
UN system relating to countering terrorism. The relevant UN Security Council resolutions and
other instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings (1997), and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999) are directly linked to the new SUA protocol. Drafted to criminalize the use
of a ship “when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing
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any act”, these new instruments represent another significant contribution to the
international framework to combat terrorism.
LONG RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING OF SHIPS

Early implementation of long range identification and tracking of ships (LRIT) was required by
2002 SOLAS Conference resolution 10. The scope, carriage requirements and specifications
for LRIT, developed by COMSAR 8 and MSC 78 and further reviewed by COMSAR 9, MSC 80
and COMSAR 10, and by sub-groups of these bodies meeting between sessions, resulted in
the agreement of a draft amendment to SOLAS chapter V on Safety of Navigation by MSC 81
in May 2006, namely the new SOLAS regulation V/19.1.
The new regulation, which if adopted through the IMO’s tacit acceptance procedure,
established a multilateral agreement for sharing LRIT information amongst SOLAS
Contracting Governments. Such an agreement should meet the maritime security needs and
other concerns of the SOLAS Contracting Governments. It maintained the right of flag States
to protect information about the ships entitled to fly their flag where appropriate, while
allowing coastal States’ access to information about ships navigating off their coasts.
In addition to the proposed new SOLAS regulation V/19.1, MSC 81 also adopted resolution
MSC.210 (81) on Performance standards and functional requirement for the long-range
identification and tracking of ships; resolution MSC.211 (81) on Arrangements for the timely
establishment of the long-range identification and tracking system and agreed to approve the
establishment of an ad hoc Working Group on engineering aspects of LRIT with the
arrangements.
CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY

Following initial consideration of the SAFE Framework of Standards by the IMO’s Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) and Facilitation Committee (FAL), it was agreed to establish a joint
MSC/FAL Working Group to progress the work on the enhancement of security of container
traffic and to facilitate maritime trade.
The joint MSC/FAL Working Group addressed a range of issues on the facilitation aspects of
maritime trade, in the context of the new security requirements. This included continuing
close co-operation with the WCO to enhance security in the multi modal movement of CTUs;
through the application of the standards and implementation strategies envisaged by the
WCO SAFE Framework of standards, and the provisions of SOLAS and the ISPS Code insofar
as they relate to ship and port facility port security and relevant aspects of facilitation of
maritime traffic, for example, port arrivals and departures, standardized forms of reporting
and electronic data interchange. Pursuant to this work the Maritime Safety Committee and
the Facilitation Committee jointly issued MSC/FAL.1/Circ.1 on Securing and facilitating
international trade.
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ISO:.

The International Organization on Standardization (ISO) has during recent years, undertaken
various activities in the area of security. In 2004, the ISO Technical Committee on Ships and
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marine technology (ISO/TC8), developed a publicly available specification (PAS), ISO/PAS

20858:2004, on Maritime port facility security assessments and security plan development.
ISO/PAS 20858:2004 established a framework to assist port facilities in specifying the
necessary competences of personnel tasked with conducting port facility security assessments
and developing port facility security plans as required by the ISPS Code; conducting the port
facility security assessment; and drafting the port facility security plan. In addition, it
established certain documentary requirements designed to ensure that the process used in
performing the duties described above was recorded in a manner that would permit
independent verification by a qualified and authorized agency, if the port facility had agreed
to the review. ISO PAS 20858 is now a full ISO standard.
ISO/TC8 also developed the ISO 28000 series of standards on supply chain security which
are now published as full ISO standards and numerous ports, terminals and organizations are
being certified by third party independent accredited auditors. ISO standards can be applied
to all ships, irrespective of size, type, purpose and whether operated internationally,
domestically or within internal waters.
PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SMUGGLING OF DRUGS:

Assembly resolution A.872(20) on Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the
Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in
International Maritime Traffic, has been reviewed and updated by the MSC and FAL
Committee and has been issued as a resolution of each of those bodies.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Since the entry into force of chapter XI-2 and of the ISPS Code on 1 July 2004, a number of
ports have reported a marked reduction in both the incidence of thefts and the number of
accidents in security restricted areas. In addition, it has been reported that, during the first
six months since the introduction of the ISPS Code, there was a 50 percent drop in stowaway
cases in US ports. A review of the statistics published by the Paris and Tokyo MOUs on port
State control also suggests a positive picture. However, at the same time, other information
suggests that the level of stringency of implementation, adherence to and enforcement of the
provisions of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code seems to have been relaxed in some instances,
which, if correct, is a worrying development.
It is vitally important that all concerned maintain as high standards of implementation as

possible and exercise vigilance at all times. Reports that not all Contracting Governments
have given full effect to all of the applicable provisions of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
cause considerable concern and the States concerned should seriously examine their level of
implementation and take any necessary corrective action without delay.
As with all other aspects of shipping regulated through multilateral treaty instruments the
effectiveness of the requirements is dependent on how the relevant provisions are
implemented and enforced. Thus, the matter is in the hands of Contracting Governments and
the shipping and port industries. If the Special measures to enhance maritime security are
implemented and enforced wisely and effectively they may be successful in protecting ships
and port facilities from unlawful acts. However, although the measures came into effect on 1
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July 2004, it may still be some time before the entire security net is in place and the actual
security of ships and of port facilities has been enhanced quantifiably.
THE TASK FOR THOSE INVOLVED

Although individual ships or port facilities may operate in accordance with an approved
security plan, unless all Contracting Governments put in place and maintain the necessary
arrangements to address all the objectives and the functional requirements of the ISPS Code,
the actual level of security will not be enhanced.
The ISPS Code requires, amongst others, Contracting Governments to gather and assess
information with respect to security threats and exchange such information with other
Contracting Governments. Shipboard and port facility personnel need to be aware of security
threats and need to report security concerns to the appropriate authorities for their
assessment.
Governments need to communicate security-related information to ships and port facilities.

Therefore, in effect we are talking about establishing an entirely new culture amongst those
involved in the day-to-day running of the shipping and port industry.
2.3 DEFINITIONS:
The implementation of the mandatory fitting of ship-borne Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) for all ships of 500 gross tonnage and above, on international voyages was
accelerated, through amendments to Regulation 19 of SOLAS Chapter V, to 31 December
2004, at the latest.
There is also a requirement for fitting ships with a ship security alert system (SSAS) for
seafarers to use to notify authorities and other ships of a terrorist hijacking, and appropriate
performance standards and procedures for fitting such systems on board ships have been
developed. Further guidance on SSAS is given in MSC/Circ.1072 on “Guidance on provision of
ship security alert systems”, MSC/Circ.1073 on “Directives for maritime rescue co-ordination
centres (MRCCs) on acts of violence against ships”, MSC/Circ.1109 on “False security alerts
and distress/security double alerts”, MSC/Circ.1155 on Guidance on the message priority and
the testing of ship security alert systems, and MSC.1/Circ.1189 Guidance on the provision of
information for identifying ships when transmitting ship security alerts.
IMO considered the issue of maritime security equipment and measures to prevent
unauthorized boarding in ports and at sea. It is recognized that the type of equipment to be
used on board would depend largely on risk assessment (e.g. ship types, trading areas). The
section of the ISPS Code addressing the Ship Security Plan includes the consideration of such
equipment and measures. It was recognized that urgent action on an up-to-date seafarer
identification document was needed. In this regard, new specifications for seafarer
identification have been agreed as the Seafarers Identity Documents (Revised) Convention
(No. 185), which was adopted by ILO in June 2003, and which revises ILO Convention No.
108.
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THE PORT FACILITY

Contracting Governments are required to undertake Port Facility Security Assessments
(PFSA) of their Port Facilities. These assessments shall be undertaken by the Contracting
Government, a Designated Authority, or the Recognized Security Organization. Port Facility
Security Assessments will need to be reviewed periodically. The results of the Port Facility
Security Assessment have to be approved by the Government or Designated Authority and
are to be used to help determine which Port Facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility
Security Officer (PFSO). The responsibilities of the Port Facility Security Officers are
defined in the ISPS Code, as are the requirements for the training they require and the drills
they are responsible for undertaking. The Port Facility Security Officer is responsible for the
preparation of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP).
Like the Ship Security Plan, the Port Facility Security Plan shall indicate the minimum
operational and physical security measures the Port Facility shall take at all times, i.e. while
operating at security level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified,
security measures the Port Facility can take to move to security level 2. Furthermore the plan
should indicate the possible preparatory actions the Port Facility could take to allow prompt
response to the instructions that may be issued by the authorities responding at security
level 3 to a security incident or threat. The Port Facility Security Plan has to be approved by
the port facility’s Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority.
The Port Facility Security Officer must ensure that its provisions are implemented and
monitor the continuing effectiveness and relevance of the approved plan, including
commissioning independent internal audits of the application of the plan. The effectiveness of
the plan may also be tested by the relevant Authorities. The Port Facility Security Assessment
covering the Port Facility may also be reviewed. All these activities may lead to amendments
to the approved plan. Major amendments to an approved plan will have to be submitted to
the approving authority for re-approval.
Ship Security Plan

Ship security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures on board
the ship designed to protect persons on board, cargo, cargo transport units, ship’s stores or
the ship from the risks of a security incident.
Company Security Officer

Company security officer means the person designated by the Company for ensuring that a
ship security assessment is carried out; that a ship security plan is developed, submitted for
approval, and thereafter implemented and maintained and for liaison with port facility
security officers and the ship security officer.
Ship Security Officer

Ship security officer means the person on board the ship, accountable to the master,
designated by the Company as responsible for the security of the ship, including
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the company
security officer and port facility security officers.
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Port facility
Port facility security plan means a plan developed to ensure the application of measures
designed to protect the port facility and ships, persons, cargo, cargo transport units and
ships stores within the port facility from the risks of a security incident.
Ship-to-facility interface
The Cargoes and Ship-Port Interface division is responsible for managing and contributing to
a variety of Marine Safety programs related to the following main operational areas:
 Cargoes, safety-related aspects for marine carriage of all types of cargo including bulk
liquid cargoes, bulk solid cargoes, dangerous goods, general cargoes, containers, as
well as standards and operations concerning cargo lifting gear (tackle).
 Operational and regulatory aspects of all the above.
 Emergency preparedness activities related to Marine Safety's area of responsibility.
One of the main functions of the Cargoes and Ship-Port Interface division is to serve as a
contact point for the Marine Safety Regional offices and the marine industry for questions
related to the application and interpretation of regulations and standards related to the above
subjects.
This division is also responsible for amendments to and the development of new regulations
and standards related to cargoes and ship-port interface. As a result of this, the division
serves as one of the focal points for the consultative process related to the Navigation and
Operations Standing Committee, as well as the Canadian Marine Advisory Council (CMAC)
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Working Group and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) Sub Committees on Dangerous Goods, Bulk Cargoes and Containers
(DSC), Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG), and the Facilitation Committee (FAL)
Ship-to-Ship activity
It means any activity not related to a port facility that involves the transfer of goods or
persons from one to another ship.
Facility Security Officer

Port facility security officer means the person designated as responsible for the development,
implementation, revision and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison
with the ship security officers and company security officers.
Designated Authority
The governmental organization(s) or the administration(s) identified within the Member State
responsible for the security of ports.
Designated authority means the organization(s) or the administration(s) identified, by or

within the Contracting Government, as responsible for ensuring the implementation of this
chapter pertaining to port facility security and ship/port interface.
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Recognized Security Organization

Recognized security organization means an organization with expertise in security and anti-
terrorism matters recognized by the Administration or the designated authority and
authorized by it to carry out survey, assessment, verification and certification activities,
required by this chapter or the ISPS Code, on its behalf.
Declaration of Security
Contracting Governments shall determine when a Declaration of Security is required by
assessing the risk the ship/port interface or ship to ship activity poses to people, property or
the environment.
A ship can request completion of a Declaration of Security when:
1. The ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility or another ship it
is interfacing with;
2. There is an agreement on Declaration of Security between Contracting Governments
covering certain international voyages or specific ships on those voyages;
3. There has been a security threat or a security incident involving the ship or involving
the port facility, as applicable;
4. The ship is at a port which is not required to have and implement an approved port
facility security plan; or
5. The ship is conducting ship to ship activities with another ship not required to have and
implement an approved ship security plan.
Requests for the completion of a Declaration of Security, under this section, shall be
acknowledged by the applicable port facility or ship.
The Declaration of Security shall be completed by:
1. The master or the ship security officer on behalf of the ship(s); and, if appropriate,
2. The port facility security officer or if the Contracting Government determines otherwise
by any other body .The Declaration of Security shall address the security requirements
that could be shared between a port facility and a ship (or between ships) and shall
state the responsibility for each.
Contracting Governments shall specify, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-
2/9.2.3, the minimum period for which Declarations of Security shall be kept by the port
facilities located within their territory.
Administrations shall specify, bearing in mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3, the
minimum period for which Declarations of Security shall be kept by ships entitled to fly their
flag
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Security incident: Any act or circumstance affecting the security of a port.
Security Level
The qualification of the degree of risk that a security incident will be attempted or will occur
The appropriate security level is determined by member States. The security measures to be
adopted appropriate to the security level should be outlined in the port security plan.
Changes in the security level should be quickly communicated to those with a need to know
in response to a perceived or actual change in threat information. In the event of a change in
security level, the PSO should act in accordance with the PSP, and verify that the
requirements of the PSP and any additional or special security procedures appropriate to the
particular threat are auctioned.
The three security levels
Security level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security
measures shall be maintained at all times.
Security level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security
measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a security
incident.
Security level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures
shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is probable or
imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
Terms relating to piracy and armed robbery Introduction

Acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships are of tremendous concern to IMO and to
shipping in general. The fight to prevent and suppress these acts is linked to the measures to
improve security on ships and in port facilities, adopted in December 2002.
The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): “Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
 Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
 On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
 Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
 Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
 Any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or
(b).”
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Initiatives to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea

IMO is implementing an anti-piracy project, a long-term project which began in 1998. Phase
one consisted of a number of regional seminars and workshops attended by Government
representatives from countries in piracy-infested areas of the world; while phase two
consisted of a number of evaluation and assessment missions to different regions. IMO's aim
has been to foster the development of regional agreements on implementation of counter
piracy measures.
Regional cooperation among States has an important role to play in solving the problem of
piracy and armed robbery against ships, as evidenced by the success of the regional anti-
piracy operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Regional Cooperation
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (RECAAP), which
was concluded in November 2004 by 16 countries in Asia, and includes the RECAAP
Information Sharing Centre (ISC) for facilitating the sharing of piracy-related information, is
a good example of successful regional cooperation which IMO seeks to replicate elsewhere.
Today, the deteriorating security situations in the seas off war-torn Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden (and in the increasingly volatile Gulf of Guinea) are at the heart of the problem.
In January 2009, an important regional agreement was adopted in Djibouti by States in the
region, at a high-level meeting convened by IMO. The Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning
the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and
the Gulf of Aden recognizes the extent of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in the region and, in it, the signatories declare their intention to co operate to the
fullest possible extent, and in a manner consistent with international law, in the repression of
piracy and armed robbery against ships.
The signatories commit themselves towards sharing and reporting relevant information
through a system of national focal points and information centres; interdicting ships
suspected of engaging in acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships; ensuring that
persons committing or attempting to commit acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships
are apprehended and prosecuted; and facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for
seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel and passengers subject to acts of piracy or
armed robbery against ships, particularly those who have been subjected to violence.
To assist in anti-piracy measures, IMO issues reports on piracy and armed robbery against
ships submitted by Member Governments and international organizations. The reports, which
include names and descriptions of ships attacked, position and time of attack, consequences
to the crew, ship or cargo and actions taken by the crew and coastal authorities, are now
circulated monthly, with quarterly and annual summaries.
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2.4 HANDLING SENSITIVE SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS
Types of Sensitive Information
Given the number of potential threats to information security, it follows that there must be
something of interest in the information held onboard your ship. Imagine that a terrorist
group is looking for a means to transport weapons from one country to another and is
considering hijacking your ship. What types of information do you think might be of interest
to them? Information about your ship's timings, locations, routes, design and procedures are
all of interest to terrorists and other groups planning illegal activities. This information
is described as sensitive information and must be protected to prevent unauthorized people
and groups from accessing it.
Threats to Information Security

Before you can maintain the security of the Information on board your ship, you need to be
aware of the numerous threats to information security! These threats come under four main
categories subversion, espionage, sabotage and terrorism.
Subversion:- The threat of subversion can come from hostile intelligence services or
extremist groups. These groups will often try to persuade you to help them in their cause and
divulge classified information. They may also try to exploit your weaknesses and change your
beliefs so that you become sympathetic to their cause.
Espionage:- Attempts by groups to acquire information covertly or illegally in order to

assist a foreign power or a political or commercial competitor are forms of espionage.
Information is considered compromised if any or all of it gets into the hands of someone not
authorized to have it. Communication systems are particularly vulnerable to espionage from
eavesdropping or phone taps. Some intelligence agencies also recruit individuals to
obtain information for them through spying or undercover surveillance.
Sabotage:- An act or a failure to act that has the intent to cause physical damage with the
goal of assisting a foreign power, furthering a subversive aim, or reducing or destroying a
commercial operation is characterized as sabotage. Communication systems are always at
high risk when sabotage is used to further a political cause. Green Peace attacks on
whaling vessels are a good example.
Terrorism:- Bombings and hostage takings by groups like Al Qaeda are acts of
terrorism. They are unlawful uses of force against individuals or property to achieve political,
religious or ideological goals. Unlawful threats of force are also considered acts of terrorism.
There are many other threats to information security, such as the ones listed below!
 Investigative journalists from tabloids or newspapers.
 Criminals such as drug cartels.
 Disaffected or dishonest staff.
 Computer hackers that obtain or manipulate information stored in computers.
 Computer viruses that damage computer systems and information. The most common
ways in which information security is unintentionally revealed are:
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 Incorrect document handling such as leaving documents unattended in inappropriate

places.
 Insufficient document control or security.
 Discussions of information in public places such as pubs and restaurants.
 Insufficient control over document access.
Safeguarding Your Ship's Sensitive Information

There are three aspects to information security - personnel security, physical security, and
cryptographic and computer security - and each one has methods for protecting your
ship's sensitive information.
Personnel Security
Your ship's personnel include the crew, officers, subcontractors, shore personnel, suppliers,
inspectors and others working or visiting your ship at any given time. Personnel security aims
to ensure that only those, whose reliability, trustworthiness and circumstances that are not
in doubt have access to sensitive material. And, that the necessary permission or clearance
needed to access information is limited to those who require it to do their jobs. This need to
know approach makes it harder for subversive individuals to obtain information about your
ship's operations. There are many methods of personnel security.
There are different levels of security checks from basic checks to counter terrorist checks.
The level of security check required depends on the individual's responsibilities and the
extent to which he or she has access to sensitive information-individuals in a higher position
of trust should be checked to a higher standard. Individuals' circumstances can change - they
may get into debt, befriend criminals or move to a high-risk area - and this may make them
more susceptible to criminal activities. It's a good idea to maintain close and continuous
supervision and to conduct periodic reassessments of security clearances.
Physical Security
The physical measures that need to be in place to protect your ship's information will vary
according to the threat, the value of the information to be protected and the sensitivity or
value of the information to terrorist, subversive, or criminal groups. The measures may
also vary according to your ship's location and the level of detail and strategic importance of
the information.
Cryptographic and Computer Security

Employing methods to safeguard the electronic storage and communication of your ship's
sensitive information helps to prevent hacking, the interception of information and the
exposure and analysis of information useful to terrorists. There are various methods
of cryptographic and computer security.
1 Defines security-sensitive information and the importance of keeping it confidential security
sensitive information.
Information, the disclosure of which would compromise the security of the port (including,
but not limited to, information contained in any personnel-related file or privileged or
confidential information that would compromise any person or organization)
Contracts of employment or organizational rules should contain provisions requiring
personnel not to divulge security-related information on the port, security training, access
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control systems, locations of security or communications equipment and routines or business

of the port to persons who do not have a direct need to know Sensitive Security Information
(SSI) is a category of sensitive but unclassified information under the United States
government's information sharing and control rules. SSI is information obtained in the
conduct of security activities whose public disclosure would, in the judgment of specified
government agencies, harm transportation security, be an unwarranted invasion of privacy,
or reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information. SSI is governed by Title 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 15 and 1520.
SSI was created to help share transportation-related information deemed too revealing for
public disclosure between Federal government agencies; State, local, tribal, and foreign
governments; U.S. and foreign air carriers; and others.
SSI is not a form of classification under Executive Order 12958 as amended; that is, it is not
classified national security information in the sense of Top Secret, Secret or Confidential.
• Security responsibilities:
As per the requirements of SOLAS, the ISPS code and STCW code (ships personnel training)
there are defined requirements for compliance by ships and the ports that service them.
Below we give them as set out in the above mentioned documents.
Contracting Governments
Administrations shall set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships
entitled to fly their flag. When changes in security level occur, security-level information shall be
updated as the circumstance dictates. Contracting Governments shall set security levels and ensure
the provision of security-level information to port facilities within their territory, and to ships prior to
entering a port or whilst in a port within their territory. When changes in security level occur, security-
level information shall be updated as the circumstance dictates. With regards to STCW Code as
amended the States must ensure that compliance with the new requirements of Security
Familiarization training for persons working on ships as well as Security Awareness Training for All
Seafarers and Security Training for Seafarers with Designated Security Duties plus the upgrading of
Ship Security Officer training are implemented as per the IMO agreements.
The Company
Companies shall comply with the relevant requirements of SOLAS chapter XI and of part A of
the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code. The
Company shall ensure that the Master has available on board, at all times, information
through which officers duly authorized by a Contracting Government can establish:
 Who is responsible for appointing the members of the crew or other persons currently
employed or engaged on board the ship in any capacity on the business of that ship?
 Who is responsible for deciding the employment of the ship; and
 In cases where the ship is employed under the terms of charter party, who are the
parties to such charter party.
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The ship
Ships shall comply with the relevant requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and of part A of the
ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code, and such
compliance shall be verified and certified as provided for in part A of the ISPS Code.
 Prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within the territory of a Contracting
Government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the security level set by
that Contracting Government, if such security level is higher than the security level set
by the Administration for that ship.
 Ships shall respond without undue delay to any change to a higher security level.
 Where a ship is not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter or of part A of
the ISPS Code, or cannot comply with the requirements of the security level set by the
Administration or by another Contracting Government and applicable to that ship, then
the ship shall notify the appropriate competent authority prior to conducting any
ship/port interface or prior to entry into port, whichever occurs earlier.
The port facility

Port facilities will comply with the relevant requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code.
A port facility is required to act upon the security levels set by the Contracting Government
within whose territory it is located. Security measures and procedures shall be applied at the
port facility in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to,
passengers, ship, ship's personnel and visitors, goods and services.
Ship security officer

A ship security officer shall be designated on each ship. The duties and responsibilities of the
ship security officer shall include, but are not limited to:
 Undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate security
measures are maintained;
 Maintaining and supervising the implementation of the ship security plan, including any
amendments to the plan;
 Coordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship's stores with other
shipboard personnel and with the relevant port facility security officers;
 Proposing modifications to the ship security plan;
 Reporting to the company security officer any deficiencies and non-conformities
identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications
of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;
 Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;
 Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as
appropriate;
 Reporting all security incidents;
Company Security Officer

The Company shall designate a company security officer. A person designated as the
company security officer may act as the company security officer for one or more ships,
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depending on the number or types of ships the Company operates, provided it is clearly
identified for which ships this person is responsible. A Company may, depending on the
number or types of ships they operate, designate several persons as company security
officers provided it is clearly identified for which ships each person is responsible. In addition
to those specified elsewhere in this Part of the Code, the duties and responsibilities of the
company security officer shall include, but are not limited to:
 advising the level of threats likely to be encountered by the ship, using appropriate
security assessments and other relevant intonation;
 ensuring that ship security assessments are carried out;
 ensuring the development, the submission for approval, and thereafter the
implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan;
 ensuring that the ship security plan is modified, as appropriate, to correct deficiencies
and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;
 arranging for internal audits and reviews of security activities;
 arranging for the initial and subsequent verifications of the ship by the Administration
or the recognized security organization;
 ensuring that deficiencies and non-conformities identified during internal audits,
periodic reviews, security inspections and verifications of compliance are promptly
addressed and dealt with;
 enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
 Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the ship;
 Ensuring effective communication and co-operation between the ship security officer
and the relevant port facility security officers;
 Ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
 ensuring that, if sister-ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each
ship reflects the ship-specific information accurately; and
 Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular
ship or group of ships are implemented and maintained.
Port facility security officer

A port facility security officer shall be designated for each port facility. A person may be
designated as the port facility security officer for one or more port facilities. The duties and
responsibilities of the port facility security officer shall include, but are not limited to:
• conducting an initial comprehensive security survey of the port facility, taking into
account the relevant port facility security assessment;
• ensuring the development and maintenance of the port facility security plan;
• implementing and exercising the port facility security plan;
• undertaking regular security inspections of the port facility to ensure the
continuation of appropriate security measures;
• recommending and incorporating, as appropriate, modifications to the port facility
security plan in order to correct deficiencies and to update the plan to take into
account relevant changes to the port facility;
• enhancing security awareness and vigilance of the port facility Personnel
• ensuring adequate training has been provided to personnel responsible for
the security of the port facility;
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• reporting to the relevant authorities and maintaining records of occurrences which

threaten the security of the port facility;
• coordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the appropriate
Company and ship security officer(s);
• coordinating with security services as appropriate;
• ensuring that standards for personnel responsible for security of the port facility are
met;
• ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and
maintained, if any; and
• assisting ship security officers in confirming the identify of those seeking to board
the ship when requested
Seafarers with Designated Security Duties

In addition to the Ship Security Officer other members of the crew on a ship may have
Designated Security Duties in support of the Ship Security Plan. These security duties include
anti-piracy and anti-armed-robbery activities. These seafarers will have received training as
per regulation VI/6 -4and to attain competency to the level as given in section A-VI/6 Para 6-
8 of STCW as amended.
Port Facility Personnel with designated security duties.

In addition to the Port facility security officer other personnel at the port facility may be
having designated security duties in support of the Port facility security plan.
Declaration of Security (DOS)

It is an agreement reached between a ship, and either a port facility or another ship with
which it interfaces, which provides a means for ensuring that the critical security concerns
are properly addressed and security will remain in place throughout the ships’ interface with
the port facility or the other ship.. Security for the ship is properly addressed by delineating
the responsibilities for security arrangements and procedures between a ship and waterfront
facility.
Other Personnel
Maritime security can be enhanced further by allowing flexibility according to circumstances,
of using other personnel who may be or may not be from the ships or ports industry.
Similarly for prevention, suppression and reporting of piracy and armed robbery against ships
the military, industry and other government entities can have a role.
4. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT:
Risk Assessment methodology:

A thorough security risk assessment is the basis for appropriate and cost-effective security
measures aboard ships and in companies.
Risk Intelligence has carried out numerous risk assessment and consultancy projects for
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vessels preparing their transit through the Gulf of Aden, for deployments to West African the
Middle East.
Most of these projects consisted of a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and a Ship Security
Survey (SSS) for shipping and offshore customers. The reports generated from these
activities have resulted in specific and plausible risk mitigation and avoidance
recommendations, including the improvement or adaptation of training, procedures, and
management and physical security measures.
Comprehensive security risk assessments for high-risk areas include a detailed survey of the
vessel by two consultants to determine the ship’s vulnerabilities and gaps in its defensive
posture.
Desktop studies involve the review of the anticipated threat and vessel/asset characteristics
based on general arrangement plans, photos and knowledge of similar vessels or assets.
Desktop studies are usually carried out for medium risk areas, if the vessel cannot be
accessed in the time frame or within a budget, or in order to determine the risk exposure
prior to a commitment, e.g. during a tender phase.
The security risk assessment process is based on an established industry risk assessment
methodology based on the Australian/New Zealand AS/NZS 4360 Risk Management
Standard. It maps a specific threat assessment - focused on the most likely threat scenarios,
e.g. a hijacking near Somalia - against the vessels (or operation’s) vulnerabilities and
weaknesses. The outcome is then presented qualitatively and semi-quantitatively in a matrix,
which can be adapted to the owner’s, operator’s or customer’s risk acceptance criteria.
The recommendations provided on how to reduce the risks are developed for each
assessment report and are focused on specific threats (and threat scenarios), assets and
consequence criteria. Recommendations are given to a sufficient level of detail to enable the
company or ship to implement specific training, procedures or exercises, and to procure
accurately specified material – if necessary - with guidance on its installation for best risk
mitigation effect.
Security Risk Assessment content

The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) consists of the overall process of security risk
identification, security risk analysis, and security risk evaluation. Depending on the desired
depth of the assessment, a SRA report by Risk Intelligence may include the following
information and analysis:
Threat assessment
• Description and assessment of political climate
• Description of relevant maritime security incidents in the area
• Evaluation of attacker modus operandi
• Maritime security outlook
Vulnerability assessment
• Desktop review of ship or asset
• Ship security survey and report
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• Physical security vulnerabilities

• Organisational vulnerabilities
• Operational vulnerabilities
• Evaluation of ship’s vulnerabilities
Security risk analysis

• Semi-qualitative or based on the methodology provided by the customer
Security risk evaluation

• Risk priorities
• Risk evaluation against customer acceptance criteria
Risk Assessment Methodology

Many different approaches to risk assessment have been developed. These following
guidelines provide a simple step-by-step process. Additional resources and methodologies are
linked under Resources to help you establish an approach appropriate to your business
environment.
General Guidelines for a Risk Assessment

Establish the risk assessment team. The risk assessment team will be responsible for the
collection, analysis, and reporting of the assessment results to management. It is important
that all aspects of the activity work flow be represented on the team, including human
resources, administrative processes, automated systems, and physical security.
• Set the scope of the project. The assessment team should identify at the outset
the objective of the assessment project, department, or functional area to be
assessed, the responsibilities of the members of the team, the personnel to be
interviewed, the standards to be used, documentation to be reviewed, and operations
to be observed.
• Identify assets covered by the assessment. Assets may include, but are not limited
to, personnel, hardware, software, data (including classification of sensitivity and
criticality), facilities, and current controls that safeguard those assets. It is key to
identify all assets associated with the assessment project determined in the scope.
• Categorize potential losses. Identify the losses that could result from any type of
damage to an asset. Losses may result from physical damage, denial of service,
modification, unauthorized access, or disclosure. Losses may be intangible, such as the
loss of the organizations' credibility.
• Identify threats and vulnerabilities. A threat is an event, process, activity, or action
that exploits a vulnerability to attack an asset. Include natural threats, accidental
threats, human accidental threats, and human malicious threats. These could include
power failure, biological contamination or hazardous chemical spills, acts of nature, or
hardware/software failure, data destruction or loss of integrity, sabotage, or theft or
vandalism. A vulnerability is a weakness which a threat will exploit to attack the
assets. Vulnerabilities can be identified by addressing the following in your data
collection process: physical security, environment, system security, communications
security, personnel security, plans, policies, procedures, management, support, etc.
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• Identify existing controls. Controls are safeguards that reduce the probability that
a threat will exploit a vulnerability to successfully attack an asset. Identify those
safeguards that are currently implemented, and determine their effectiveness in the
context of the current analysis.
• Analyze the data. In this phase, all the collected information will be used to
determine the actual risks to the assets under consideration. A technique to analyze
data includes preparing a list of assets and showing corresponding threats, type of
loss, and vulnerability. Analysis of this data should include an assessment of the
possible frequency of the potential loss.
• Determine cost-effective safeguards. Include in this assessment the
implementation cost of the safeguard, the annual cost to operate the safeguard, and
the life cycle of the safeguard.
• Report. The type of report to make depends on the audience to whom it is
submitted. Typically, a simple report that is easy to read, and supported by detailed
analysis, is more easily understood by individuals who may not be familiar with your
organization. The report should include findings; a list of assets, threats, and
vulnerabilities; a risk determination, recommended safeguards, and a cost benefit
analysis.
Assessment tools:
USE OF CHECKLISTS IN CONDUCTING SECURITY ASSESSMENTS:
The Ship Security Assessment (SSA) is to be carried out before developing the Ship
Security Plan (SSP), and is a major element in the process of developing or updating
the SSP. It is the responsibility of the Company Security Officer (CSO) to ensure that
the SSA is carried out by persons with appropriate skills, for each ship in the
company fleet.
Under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), every shipping
company must take certain steps into consideration to ensure security of the crew,
ship and environment.
Several plans and procedures have been introduced to ensure utmost security of the
ship and its crew.
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A ship security plan (SSP) is a must for every ship under the ISPS Code. Moreover, in order
to ensure that every ship follows all the protective measures specified in the SSP, a Ship
Security Assessment is carried out by the concerned authority.
The ship security assessment (SSA) is generally carried out before making the ship security
plan (SSP). The chief security officer (CSO) checks that the people with the necessary skills
carry out the ship security assessment. The SSA is an essential and integral part of the
process of developing and updating the Ship Security Plan (SSP). The relation between this
SSA and the SSP can be illustrated in the following way.
Prior to commencing the SSA, the Company Security Officer (CSO) shall ensure that
advantage is taken of information available on threat assessment for the voyage pattern and
the ports at which the ship is calling. For ships trading between two (or more) fixed ports,
these ports must be taken into account in the SSA. For ships on the spot market, however,
ports of call may be difficult to envisage, and for such situations your company should select
typical and representative voyage pattern and ports you want to use in the SSA
IMO requirements to SSA:

The SSA is an essential part of the process of developing and updating the SSP, and the
Company Security Officer (CSO) shall ensure that the SSA gives answers to the following
questions:
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In the ISPS Code language, Part A of the Code stipulates that the SSA shall include an on-
scene security survey where, at least, the following elements are included.
• Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations.

• Identification and evaluation of key ship board operations that are important to
protect.
• Identification of possible threats to the key ship board operations and the
likelihood of their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures.
• Identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies
and procedures
Part B of the ISPS Code, gives further guidance as to how a SSA shall be carried out. The
CSO shall also ensure that the assessment is carried out by competent persons with skills to
evaluate the security of the ship. Importantly, the SSA shall be documented (electronic
format is accepted too), reviewed, accepted, and retained by the Company.
Ship Security Assessment Process:

The ship security assessment (SSA) process is divided into 8 steps as described
below:
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Initial screening, Step 1-3:
Step 1: Identify any particular motives that may exist to threat or harm your ship, persons,
cargo, or operations.
Step 2: Identify critical operations, activities, and persons that are important to protect.
Step 3: Get an overview of security measures in place. This is an in-office screening and not
a Comprehensive review. Prioritize operations areas, systems, and personnel for threat
assessment; focus on those found most critical and with a low level of protective security
measures.
Threat assessment, Step 4-5:

Step 4: Identify threat scenarios or security incident scenarios that reflect the motives and
prioritized operations, areas, systems and personnel. If no particular motives are identified
and no prioritization can be made, use a standard list of possible threat scenarios.
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Step 5: Access likelihood and potential consequences of the scenarios. Do it roughly and
qualitatively. Likelihood may be classified as “unlikely and Not” unlikely”, and consequences
as “moderate”, “high” and “extreme”. Prioritize scenarios found “not unlikely” in combination
with consequence severity “high” or “extreme”.
Onboard audit, Step 6-7:

Step 6: Develop a ship security survey checklist that reflects the prioritized scenarios,
existing measures assumed to be in place, and critical operations.
Step 7: Survey your ship with the checklist. Identify measures in place and comment on
deficiencies, training needs, safety conflicts, manning constraints, security equipment
Identification of needs, Step 8:

Step 8: Evaluate identified improvement needs through the ship security survey in terms of
required security measures and weaknesses of existing measures.( and of possible remedial
actions?)
After these 8 steps, the SSA is complete. The steps should be documented and is a basis for
the development of a SSP. Remember also to document the limitations/assumptions of the
SSA (trading area, onboard systems, etc.) The remainder of this SSA Guideline gives detailed
descriptions for each step (1-8) including related checklists and other tools.
ON-SCENE SECURITY SURVEY

The ship security assessment (SSA) includes an on-scene security survey which includes:
1. Identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations which require

additional care while carrying out
Under key shipboard operations, critical processes such as cargo handling, navigation,
machinery handling etc. is taken into consideration for evaluation. Along with that, critical
spaces such as stores, bridges, machinery spaces, and steering control system are also taken
into consideration.
2. Identification of existing security measures and procedures

Under security measures, procedures such as response to emergency conditions, security
patrol, security communication systems, handling of surveillance equipment, including door
barriers and lightings are taken into account.
3. Identification of weakness in policies, procedures, and infrastructure
On the basis of identification of various other aspects, a list of objective would be detailed
such as new security measures to be implemented, determination of mitigation strategy etc.
4. Identification of human factors that can be a threat to safety and security

of the ship
Shipboard protective measures, procedures, and operations are evaluated to identify possible
weakness pertaining to human factors.
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Aspects such as monitoring of restricted areas to ensure only authorized persons are allowed,
ensuring performance of security duties, supervising and handling of cargo etc. are taken into
consideration to identify such factors.
5. Identification of potential threads and likelihood of their occurrence

Under this, the company identifies various threat scenarios to a ship under specific
circumstances. Threat scenarios would be considered keeping in mind various aspects of the
ship such as types of ship, crew, type of cargo etc.
Security Survey is Confidential
The Master and Security officer should be the only persons on board with knowledge of the
contents of this document and where it is maintained.
The Security assessment survey is a confidential document and will be available as

stipulated by the Master in accordance with company policy. It will be located
separate from the remainder of the plan by the Company and Ship Security officers.
4.4 Security Assessment Documentation:
The SSA must be:

1. Documented by the assessor;
2. Reviewed, accepted and retained by Company management.
SHIP SECURITY EQUIPMENTS:
5.1 Security equipment and systems

All seafarers should be familiar with the types of security equipment and systems that are
useful in enhancing maritime security, both ashore and afloat. Examples of such equipment
include:
• AIS
• Ship Security Alert System
• Locks
• Lighting
• Handheld radios
• GMDSS equipment
• Closed Circuit Televisions
• Automatic Intrusion Detection Device (Burglar Alarm)
• Metal detectors
• Explosive detectors
• Baggage screening equipment
• Container X-ray devices
• General alarm
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• Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)

• Razor wire
• Electric fencing
• Yacht radar
• Netting
• Slippery foam
• Security glass film
• Water and foam monitors
• Other anti-piracy devices
Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached and
long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway. Physical barriers
should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to vessels by increasing the
height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate.
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS)

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a vessel tracking system that automatically
provides updates on a vessel’s position and other relevant ship voyage data to a marine
vessel traffic operator. The federal Navigation Safety Regulations came into force on May 10,
2005 and states: “Every ship, other than a fishing vessel, of 500 tons or more that is not
engaged on an international voyage shall be fitted with an AIS….”
The purpose of the AIS project is to enhance the Coast Guard’s ability in identifying and
monitoring maritime traffic to enhance awareness of vessels approaching and operating in
Canadian waters. The Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for the construction and operation
of the shore-based component of the national AIS network, which consists of the installation
of AIS shore-based stations at specific locations to track vessels within 40 to 50 nautical
miles of the shore.
AIS shore infrastructure is integrated within Marine Communication and Traffic Services
(MCTS) centres and has resulted in 19 MCTS centres and 113 remote sites fitted with AIS
systems. Operating in the Very High Frequency maritime band, AIS is capable of sending
such ship information as identification, position, heading, ship length, beam, type, and
draught, hazardous cargo information, to other ships as well as to AIS Base Stations
operated by a competent authority. It is capable of handling over 2,000 reports per minute
and updates as often as every two seconds.
In addition to the management of shipping traffic in general, MCTS centres provide an AIS
data feed to other Government Departments such as the Department of National Defence, as
well as to the Marine Security Operations Centres, to further contribute to maritime domain
awareness and assist in the identification of anomalies within Canada’s waters.
SHIP SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM (SSAS):

The IMO International Maritime Organization’s ISPS Code has introduced new maritime
regulations to protect ports and international shipping against terrorism, by improving early
detection and monitoring of potential threats.
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All ships over 500 gross tones are required to be equipped with a Ship Security Alert
System (SSAS), which is capable of discreetly raising the alarm to the relevant authorities
and tracking the vessel if the security of the vessel is compromised.
Summary of the IMO ISPS Code / SOLAS XI-2/6

The International Maritime Organization’s SOLAS Regulation XI-2/6 defines the mandatory
requirements and guidance for SSAS Systems:
• Provide a minimum of two alert activation points, one of which must be on the bridge.
• Allow covert activation which transmits an alert signal from ship to shore, indicating to
a competent authority that the security of the ship is under threat or has been compromised.
• Not raise the alert on board ship, nor alert any other ships.
In addition the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should comply with defined
performance standards:
• The radio system used for the ship security alert systems should comply with relevant
international standards.
• The ship security alert system should be powered from the ship's main source of
electrical power. It should, in addition, be possible to operate the system from an alternative
source of power.
• Activation points should be capable of being used on the navigation bridge and in other
locations. They should be protected against inadvertent operation. It should not be necessary
for the user to remove seals or to break any lid or cover in order to operate any control.
• The activation points should operate a radio system such that transmission of the
security alert does not require any adjustment of the radio system, i.e. tuning of channels,
setting of modes or menu options. Operation of the activation point should not cause any
alarm or indication to be raised on the ship. The operation of the ship security alert system
should not impair the functionality of the GMDSS installation.
• In all cases, transmission initiated by security alert system activation points should
include a unique code/identifier indicating that the alert has not been generated in
accordance with GMDSS distress procedures. The transmission should include the ship
identity and current position. (Footnote: a position should normally be associated with time).
The transmission should be addressed to a shore station and should not be addressed to ship
stations.
Exact requirements for the proposed future LRIT Long Range Ships' Identification
and Tracking system have yet to be finalized, but regulations are due to follow
COMSAR and MSC meetings scheduled in 2004
• LIGHTING
It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:

• Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the
poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the International Regulations for Preventing Collision
at Sea.
• Search lights for immediate use when required.
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• It is, however, recommended that ships proceed with just their navigation lights
illuminated, with the lighting described above extinguished. Once pirates have been identified
or an attack commences, illuminating the lighting described above demonstrates to the
pirates that they have been observed.
• Navigation lights should not be switched off at night.
The primary purpose for any security lighting is to provide the means to detect and deter
intruders. Adequate perimeter such as the ship’s hull or a determinate distance from the ship
therefore: - The perimeter must be lit - The perimeter must be observed - Lighting will be
such that it will not cause a glare that hinders vision of security personnel or navigability of
water traffic - Light sources should be directed towards likely avenues of approach and / or
waterline to a minimum of 100 feet out from the hull - Light implementation should provide
an overlap so not to have any dark spaces and be continuous around the ship - Security
lighting will be activated during all hours of darkness - Use of spotlight for long ranges if
required -Temporary additional lighting will be established, if any areas are not lit (security
level) - All deficiencies or needed repairs will be logged in and immediately reported to the
DWO.
The following have been considered when establishing the appropriate level and location of
lighting: o Ship personnel should be able to detect activities on and around the ship on both
shore- and water-side o Coverage should facilitate personnel identification at access points o
Coverage may be provided through coordination with the port facility o Lighting effects (such
as glare) and their impact on safety, navigation and other security activities.
HANDHELD RADIO
A handheld radio is a compact and portable radio unit that can be carried anywhere and can
be used at any time, even while the operator is in motion. Handheld radios are convenient for
communication exchanges in a number of situations, including emergency alerts, rescue
operations, adventure expeditions, marine explorations, and military maneuvers. The radios
are regularly used to relay traffic conditions, route directions, weather alerts and other public
service information.
The standard features of a handheld radio include an LCD screen, a built-in microphone, a
built-in speaker, a flexible antenna and a rechargeable battery pack. Emergency radios have
easy-to-use operational tools that can be easily worked in risky situations or in bulky
protective gear. A marine radio is a waterproof radio that has a case preventing sea water
from destroying the interior mechanism. Handheld radios are used in the same way as a cell
phone, but the handheld aspect may not be ideal in some circumstances and so we have
speaker-mikes and headsets that allow for a hands-free operation.
The battery pack can be a series of connected and rechargeable cells, or disposable AAA or
AA batteries; there are various types of chargers to power the rechargeable battery pack. It
is a good idea to get a handheld CB radio that allows for both types of batteries in case of
situations where there is no power supply to recharge the battery pack. The antenna, also
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known as a rubber duck, is detachable and the handheld radio can be fitted with a stronger
external antenna if necessary.
There are two main types of handheld radios, the ones that operate on two-band frequencies
and the ones that operate on multi-band frequencies. Some handheld radios, particularly the
ones meant to be used in emergencies, are usually able to transmit only on channel 16; this
is the international emergency channel. Using this channel for non-emergency broadcast is
considered an offense in many countries and violators can receive stiff monetary fines.
It is important to consider why the radio is being purchased before acquiring it. If it is
intended for other communication purposes, it is wise to get a two way handheld radio that
can transmit on other channels as well. Handheld radios normally have less communication
ability than fixed radios, but improvements in technology have produced some very decent
models that are quite on par with mid-range fixed radios. It is also important to select a
handheld radio with enough power to communicate from whenever the users are going to be.
BINOCULARS
All binoculars are described by using a pair of numbers, such as 7×50 or 8×30. The first
number, including the x, represents magnification or “power”. This tells the degree to which
the object observed is enlarged. For example, a 7x binocular makes an object appear seven
times closer than when viewed by the naked eye.
There are some models of binoculars that offer variable magnification, usually in the range of
5x to 8x. They are called zoom binoculars, and in most cases are not very suited for
astronomical observations because of the inferior optical quality and fragile mechanics. The
best thing to do is to avoid them and stick with the usual fixed-power binoculars.
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS):

The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is an internationally agreed-
upon set of safety procedures, types of equipment, and communication protocols used to
increase safety and make it easier to rescue distressed ships, boats and aircraft.
GMDSS consists of several systems, some of which are new, but many of which have been in
operation for many years. The system is intended to perform the following functions: alerting
(including position determination of the unit in distress), search and rescue coordination,
locating (homing), maritime safety information broadcasts, general communications, and
bridge-to-bridge communications. Specific radio carriage requirements depend upon the
ship's area of operation, rather than its tonnage. The system also provides redundant means
of distress alerting, and emergency sources of power.
Recreational vessels do not need to comply with GMDSS radio carriage requirements, but will
increasingly use the Digital Selective Calling (DSC) VHF radios. Offshore vessels may elect to
equip themselves further. Vessels under 300 Gross tonnages (GT) are not subject to GMDSS
requirements.
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Emergency position-indicating radio beacon (EPIRB)

Cospas-Sarsat is an international satellite-based search and rescue system, established by
Canada, France, the United States, and Russia. These four countries jointly helped develop
the 406 MHz Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), an element of the GMDSS
designed to operate with Cospas-Sarsat system.
These automatic-activating EPIRBs, now required on SOLAS ships, commercial fishing

vessels, and all passenger ships, are designed to transmit to alert rescue coordination centers
via the satellite system from anywhere in the world. The original COSPAS/SARSAT system
used polar orbiting satellites but in recent years the system has been expanded to also
include 4 geostationary satellites. Newest designs incorporate GPS receivers to transmit
highly accurate positions (within about 20 meters) of the distress position.
The original COSPAS/SARSAT satellites could calculate EPIRB position to within about 3
nautical miles (5.6 km) by using Doppler techniques. By the end of 2010 EPIRB
manufacturers may be offering AIS (automatic identification system) enabled beacons. The
serviceability of these items is checked monthly and annually and they have limited battery
shelf life, between two and five years using mostly lithium-type batteries. 406 MHz EPIRB's
transmit a registration number which is linked to a database of information about the vessel.
NAVTEX
Navtex is an international, automated system for instantly distributing maritime safety
information (MSI) which includes navigational warnings, weather forecasts and weather
warnings, search and rescue notices and similar information to ships. A small, low-cost and
self-contained "smart" printing radio receiver is installed on the bridge, or the place from
where the ship is navigated, and checks each incoming message to see if it has been
received during an earlier transmission, or if it is of a category of no interest to the ship's
master.
The frequency of transmission of these messages is 518 kHz in English, while 490 kHz is
sometime used to broadcast in a local language. The messages are coded with a header code
identified by the using single letters of the alphabet to represent broadcasting stations, type
of messages, and followed by two figures indicating the serial number of the message. For
example: FA56 where F is the ID of the transmitting station, A indicates the message
category navigational warning, and 56 is the consecutive message number.
Inmarsat
Satellite systems operated by the Inmarsat company, International HYPERLINK
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Mobile_Satellite_Organization" Mobile Satellite
Organization (IMSO) are also important elements of the GMDSS. The types of Inmarsat ship
earth station terminals recognized by the GMDSS are: Inmarsat B, C and F77. Inmarsat B
and F77, an updated version of the now redundant Inmarsat A, provide ship/shore, ship/ship
and shore/ship telephone, telex and high-speed data services, including a distress priority
telephone and telex service to and from rescue coordination centers.
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Fleet 77 fully supports the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) and includes
advanced features such as emergency call prioritization. The Inmarsat C provides ship/shore,
shore/ship and ship/ship store-and-forward data and email messaging, the capability for
sending preformatted distress messages to a rescue coordination center, and the Inmarsat C
Safety NET service.
The Inmarsat C Safety NET service is a satellite-based worldwide maritime safety

information broadcast service of high seas weather warnings, NAVAREA navigational
warnings, radio navigation warnings, ice reports and warnings generated by the USCG-
conducted International Ice Patrol, and other similar information not provided by NAVTEX.
Safety NET works similarly to NAVTEX in areas outside NAVTEX coverage.
High frequency
A GMDSS system may include high-frequency (HF) radiotelephone and radio telex (narrow-
band direct printing) equipment, with calls initiated by digital selective calling (DSC).
Worldwide broadcasts of maritime safety information can also be made on HF narrow-band
direct printing channels.
Search and rescue locating device

The GMDSS installation on ships include one (two on vessels over 500 GT) Search and
Rescue Locating device(s) called Search and Rescue Radar Transponders (SART) which are
used to locate survival craft or distressed vessels by creating a series of twelve dots on a
rescuing ship's 3 cm radar display.
The detection range between these devices and ships, dependent upon the height of the
ship's radar mast and the height of the Search and Rescue Locating device, is normally about
15 km (8 nautical miles). Once detected by radar, the Search and Rescue Locating device will
produce a visual and aural indication to the persons in distress.
Digital selective calling

The IMO also introduced digital selective calling (DSC) on MF, HF and VHF maritime radios as
part of the GMDSS system. DSC is primarily intended to initiate ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore
and shore-to-ship radiotelephone and MF/HF radio telex calls. DSC calls can also be made to
individual stations, groups of stations, or "all stations" in one's radio range. Each DSC-
equipped ship, shore station and group is assigned a unique 9-digit Maritime Mobile Service
Identity.
DSC distress alerts, which consist of a preformatted distress message, are used to initiate
emergency communications with ships and rescue coordination centers. DSC was intended to
eliminate the need for persons on a ship's bridge or on shore to continuously guard radio
receivers on voice radio channels, including VHF channel 16 (156.8 MHz) and 2182 kHz now
used for distress, safety and calling. A listening watch aboard GMDSS-equipped ships on
2182 kHz ended on February 1, 1999. In May 2002, IMO decided to postpone cessation of a
VHF listening watch aboard ships. That watch keeping requirement had been scheduled to
end on February 1, 2005.
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IMO and ITU both require that the DSC-equipped MF/HF and VHF radios be externally
connected to a satellite navigation receiver (GPS). That connection will ensure accurate
location information is sent to a rescue coordination center if a distress alert is transmitted.
The FCC requires that all new VHF and MF/HF maritime radiotelephones type accepted after
June 1999 have at least a basic DSC capability.
VHF digital selective calling also has other capabilities beyond those required for the GMDSS.
The US Coast Guard uses this system to track vessels in Prince William Sound, Alaska, Vessel
Traffic Service. IMO and the USCG also plan to require ships carry a Universal Ship
borne automatic identification system, which will be DSC-compatible.
Countries having a GMDSS A1 Area should be able to identify and track AIS-equipped vessels
in its waters without any additional radio equipment. A DSC-equipped radio cannot be
interrogated and tracked unless that option was included by the manufacturer, and unless
the user configures it to allow tracking.
GMDSS telecommunications equipment should not be reserved for emergency use only. The
International Maritime Organization encourages mariners to use GMDSS equipment for
routine as well as safety telecommunications.
Power supply requirements:

GMDSS equipment is required to be powered from three sources of supply:
• ship's normal alternators/generators;
• ship's emergency alternator/generator (if fitted); and
• a dedicated radio battery supply.
The batteries are required to have a capacity to power the equipment for 1 hour on ships
with an emergency generator or built prior to February 1995, and 6 hours on ships not fitted
with an emergency generator or built after February 1995 in order to comply with SOLAS.
The batteries must be charged by an automatic charger, which is also required to be powered
from the main and emergency generators. Changeover from AC to battery supply must be
automatic, and effected in such a way that any data held by the equipment is not corrupted
("no break").
During Coast Guard inspections, the batteries must be able to go from 100% discharge to
fully charged in no longer than 10 hours in order to pass certification. The charger too must
be obtainable at all times during vessel operation and should be inspected to make sure it
functions properly. When the reserve source of energy consists of batteries, the battery
capacity must be checked at intervals not exceeding 12 months. If not completed within past
12 months, this must be done during inspection.
Storage batteries provided as a reserve source of energy must be installed in accordance with
applicable electrical codes and good engineering practice. They must be protected from
adverse weather and physical damage. They must be readily accessible for maintenance and
replacement.
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GMDSS sea areas

GMDSS sea areas serve two purposes: to describe areas where GMDSS services are
available, and to define what radio equipment GMDSS ships must carry (carriage
requirements). Prior to the GMDSS, the number and type of radio safety equipment ships had
to carry depended upon its tonnage. With GMDSS, the number and type of radio safety
equipment ships have to carry depends upon the GMDSS areas in which they travel. GMDSS
sea areas are classified into four areas: area1, area2,area3 and area 4.
In addition to equipment listed below, all GMDSS-regulated ships must carry a satellite
EPIRB, a NAVTEX receiver (if they travel in any areas served by NAVTEX), an Inmarsat-C
Safety NET receiver (if they travel in any areas not served by NAVTEX), a DSC-equipped VHF
radiotelephone, two (if between 300 and less than 500 GRT) or three VHF handhelds (if 500
GRT or more), and two 9 GHz search and rescue radar transponders (SART).
Sea Area A1
An area within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one VHF coast station in which
continuous digital selective calling (Ch.70/156.525 MHz) alerting and radiotelephony services
are available. Such an area could extend typically 30 to 40 nautical miles (56 to 74 km) from
the Coast Station.
Sea Area A2
An area, excluding Sea Area A1, within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one MF coast
station in which continuous DSC (2187.5 kHz) alerting and radiotelephony services are
available. For planning purposes, this area typically extends to up to 180 nautical miles
(330 km) offshore during daylight hours, but would exclude any A1 designated areas. In
practice, satisfactory coverage may often be achieved out to around 150 nautical miles
(280 km) offshore during night time.
Sea Area A3
An area, excluding sea areas A1 and A2, within the coverage of an Inmarsat geostationary
satellite. This area lies between about latitude 76 Degrees North and South, but excludes A1
and/or A2 designated areas. Inmarsat guarantees their system will work between 70 South
and 70 North though it will often work to 76 degrees South or North.
Sea Area A4
An area outside Sea Areas A1, A2 and A3 is called Sea Area A4. This is essentially the polar
regions, north and south of about 76 degrees of latitude, excluding any A1, A2 and A3 areas.
GMDSS radio equipment required for U.S. coastal voyages:

Presently, until an A1 or A2 Sea Area is established, GMDSS-mandated ships operating off
the U.S. coast must fit to Sea Areas A3 (or A4) regardless of where they operate. U.S. ships
whose voyage allows them to always remain within VHF channel 16 coverage of U.S. Coast
Guard stations may apply to the Federal Communications Commission for an individual
waiver to fit to Sea Area A1 requirements. Similarly, those who remain within 2182 kHz
coverage of U.S. Coast Guard stations may apply for a waiver to fit to Sea Area A2
requirements.
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As of August 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard provides a Sea Area A1 service through its Rescue
21 system.
Closed-circuit television(CCTV):
Closed-circuit television (CCTV), also known as video surveillance, is the use of
video to transmit a signal to a specific place, on a limited set of monitors. It differs
from broadcast television in that the signal is not openly transmitted, though it may employ
point to point (P2P), point to multipoint (P2MP), or mesh wired or wireless links.
Though almost all video cameras fit this definition, the term is most often applied to those
used for surveillance in areas that may need monitoring such as bars, banks, casinos,
schools, hotels, airports, hospitals, restaurants, military installations, convenience stores and
other areas where security is needed. Though Video telephony is seldom called "CCTV" one
exception is the use of video in distance education, where it is an important tool.
Surveillance of the public using CCTV is common in many areas around the world. In recent
years, the use of body worn video cameras has been introduced as a new form of
surveillance, often used in law enforcement, with cameras located on a police officer's chest
or head. Video surveillance has generated significant debate about balancing its use with
individuals' right to privacy even when in public.
In industrial plants, CCTV equipment may be used to observe parts of a process from a
central control room, for example when the environment is not suitable for humans. CCTV
systems may operate continuously or only as required to monitor a particular event.
A more advanced form of CCTV, utilizing digital video recorders (DVRs), provides recording
for possibly many years, with a variety of quality and performance options and extra features
(such as motion detection and email alerts). More recently, decentralized IP cameras, some
equipped with megapixel sensors, support recording directly to storage devices, or internal
flash for completely stand-alone operation.
There are about 350 million surveillance cameras worldwide as of 2016. About 65% of these
cameras are installed in Asia. The growth of CCTV has been slowing in recent years.
Material collected by surveillance cameras has been used as a tool in post-event forensics to
identify tactics, techniques and perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, there are
various projects − such as INDECT − that aim to detect suspicious behaviours of individuals
and crowds.
It has been argued that terrorists won't be deterred by cameras, that terror attacks aren't
really the subject of the current use of video surveillance and that terrorists might even see it
as an extra channel for propaganda and publication of their acts. In Germany calls for
extended video surveillance by the country's main political parties, SPD, CDU and CSU have
been dismissed as "little more than a placebo for a subjective feeling of security.
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AUTOMATIC INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS)

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device or software application that monitors
a network or systems for malicious activity or policy violations. Any detected activity or
violation is typically reported either to an administrator or collected centrally using a security
information and event management (SIEM) system. A SIEM system combines outputs from
multiple sources, and uses alarm techniques to distinguish malicious activity from false
alarms.
There is a wide spectrum of IDS, varying from antivirus to hierarchical systems that monitor
the traffic of an entire backbone network. The most common classifications are network
intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS). A
system that monitors important operating system files is an example of a HIDS, while a
system that analyzes incoming network traffic is an example of a NIDS.
It is also possible to classify IDS by detection approach: the most well-known variants are
signature-based detection (recognizing bad patterns, such as malware) and anomaly-based
detection (detecting deviations from a model of "good" traffic, which often relies on machine
learning). Some IDS have the ability to respond to detected intrusions. Systems with
response capabilities are typically referred to as an intrusion prevention system.
Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), also known as intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPS), are security appliances that monitor network or system
activities for malicious activity. The main functions of intrusion prevention systems are to
identify malicious activity, log information about this activity, report it and attempt to block
or stop it.
Intrusion prevention systems are considered extensions of intrusion detection systems

because they both monitor network traffic and/or system activities for malicious activity. The
main differences are, unlike intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems are
placed in-line and are able to actively prevent or block intrusions that are detected.
IPS can take such actions as sending an alarm, dropping detected malicious packets,
resetting a connection or blocking traffic from the offending IP address. An IPS also can
correct cyclic redundancy check (CRC) errors, defragment packet streams, mitigate TCP
sequencing issues, and clean up unwanted transport and network layer options.
Classification
Intrusion prevention systems can be classified into four different types:
• Network-based intrusion prevention system (NIPS): monitors the entire
network for suspicious traffic by analyzing protocol activity.
• Wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS): monitor a wireless network
for suspicious traffic by analyzing wireless networking protocols.
• Network behavior analysis (NBA): examines network traffic to identify
threats that generate unusual traffic flows, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks, certain forms of malware and policy violations.
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• Host-based intrusion prevention system (HIPS): an installed software

package which monitors a single host for suspicious activity by analyzing events
occurring within that host.
Detection methods
The majority of intrusion prevention systems utilize one of three detection methods:
signature-based, statistical anomaly-based and Stateful protocol analysis.
• Signature-Based Detection: Signature based IDS monitor’s packets in the
Network and compares with pre-configured and pre-determined attack patterns known
as signatures.
• Statistical anomaly-based detection: An IDS which is anomaly based will
monitor network traffic and compare it against an established baseline. The baseline
will identify what is "normal" for that network – what sort of bandwidth is generally
used and what protocols are used. It may however, raise a False Positive alarm for
legitimate use of bandwidth if the baselines are not intelligently configured.
• Stateful Protocol Analysis Detection: This method identifies deviations of
protocol states by comparing observed events with "predetermined profiles ofgenerally
accepted definitions of benign activity.
METAL DETECTOR
A metal detector is an electronic instrument which detects the presence of metal nearby.
Metal detectors are useful for finding metal inclusions hidden within objects, or metal objects
buried underground. They often consist of a handheld unit with a sensor probe which can be
swept over the ground or other objects.
If the sensor comes near a piece of metal this is indicated by a changing tone in earphones,
or a needle moving on an indicator. Usually the device gives some indication of distance; the
closer the metal is, the higher the tone in the earphone or the higher the needle goes.
Another common type are stationary "walk through" metal detectors used for security
screening at access points in prisons, courthouses, and airports to detect concealed metal
weapons on a person's body.
The simplest form of a metal detector consists of an oscillator producing an alternating

current that passes through a coil producing an alternating magnetic field. If a piece of
electrically conductive metal is close to the coil, eddy currents will be induced in the metal,
and this produces a magnetic field of its own. The first industrial metal detectors were
developed in the 1960s and were used extensively for mineral prospecting and other
industrial applications. Uses include detecting land mines, the detection of weapons such as
knives and guns (especially in airport
security),geophysical prospecting, archaeology and treasure hunting. Metal detectors are also
used to detect foreign bodies in food, and in the construction to detect steel reinforcing
bars in concrete and pipes and wires buried in walls and floors.
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Security screening
A series of hijackings led the United States in 1972 to adopt metal detector technology to screen
airline passengers, initially using magnetometers that were originally designed for logging
operations to detect spikes in trees. The Finnish company Outokumpu adapted mining metal
detectors in the 1970s, still housed in a large cylindrical pipe, to make a commercial walk-
through security detector. The development of these systems continued in a spin-off
company and systems branded as Metor Metal Detectors evolved in the form of the
rectangular gantry now standard in airports.
In common with the developments in other uses of metal detectors both alternating current
and pulse systems are used, and the design of the coils and the electronics has moved
forward to improve the discrimination of these systems. In 1995 systems such as the Metor
200 appeared with the ability to indicate the approximate height of the metal object above
the ground, enabling security personnel to more rapidly locate the source of the signal.
Smaller hand held metal detectors is also used to locate a metal object on a person more
precisely.
GENERAL ALARM
Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel’s crew that a piracy attack has
commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the
attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous sounding of the vessel’s
foghorn/whistle distracts the pirates and as above lets them know that they have been seen.
It is important to ensure that:
• The piracy alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms, potentially
leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the accommodation.
• Crew members are familiar with each alarm, including the signal warning of an
attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it.
• Exercises are carried out prior to entering the High Risk Area.
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The general alarm on the ship is recognized by 7 short ringing of bell followed by a long ring
or 7 short blasts on the ship’s horn followed by one long blast. The general alarm is sounded
to make aware the crew on board that an emergency has occurred and is usually given in a
distress situation such as a collision, fire on board, abandon ship, etc.
According to the occurring disaster, every crewmember must strictly follow the instructions
as they appear on the boat muster or fire muster or as they are given by the master or the
officer in charge.
LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE (LRAD)

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is an acoustic hailing device developed by LRAD
Corporation to send messages and warning tones over longer distances or at higher volume
than normal loudspeakers. LRAD systems are used for long range communications in a
variety of applications including as a means of non-lethal, non-kinetic crowd control. They
have been called "sonic weapons".
According to the manufacturer's specifications, the systems weigh from 15 to 320 pounds
(6.8 to 145.1 kg) and can emit sound in a 30°- 60° beam at 2.5 kHz.[The manufacturer also
produces systems for public address and mass notification use that broadcast 360°.
LRAD systems are used by law enforcement, government and defense agencies, as well as
maritime and commercial security companies to broadcast audible notifications and warnings
over distance. LRAD systems are also used to deter wildlife from airport runways, wind and
solar farms, nuclear power facilities, gas and oil platforms, mining and agricultural
operations, and industrial plants.
Mass Notification
LRAD emergency communication systems were demonstrated to city and county officials in
Muskogee, Oklahoma in February 2015. "A warning system doesn't do much good if there's
devastation and you can't communicate after that warning," said Muskogee Mayor Bob
Coburn. "If your cell phone is down, your land line phone is down, [and] your power is out
then you still have access to communicate and this [LRAD] has that potential."
An LRAD mobile mass notification system was demonstrated near Wimberley, Texas in
January 2016. Severe flooding in the area claimed several lives and destroyed hundreds of
homes in May 2015.
For its multi-week March 2016 event, the Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo had an LRAD
mass notification system on the grounds in case attendees needed to be warned of
emergencies or extreme weather events.
San Jose, CA city officials ordered three long range acoustic hailing devices after complaints
that the city did not adequately notify neighborhood residents of rapidly rising floodwaters in
February 2017.
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Pirates
On November 5, 2005, the luxury cruise ship Seabourn Spirit employed an LRAD to
repel pirates who attacked the vessel with rocket-propelled grenades about 115 km off the
coast of Somalia. The effectiveness of this device during the attack is not completely clear,
but the pirates did not succeed in boarding the vessel and eventually fled.
The Liberian vessel MV HYPERLINK

"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Biscaglia"Biscaglia was attacked on November 28, 2008.
The security detachment aboard Biscaglia claimed to have used an LRAD device in an effort
to repel attackers armed with assault HYPERLINK
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assault_rifle"riflesand rocket-propelled grenades. Following a
one-sided shootout, the ship was seized and the unarmed security contractors abandoned
ship leaving the ship and crew to the pirates.
The incident caused the usefulness of LRADs to be called into question by Lloyd's List. In
August 2013, Carl "Rocky" Mason, one of the three members of the security attachment
aboard the Biscaglia during the incident, stated that an LRAD was aboard, but that he and
the security attachment only had time to open the water cannons before gunfire and an RPG
round forced them to abandon ship. No attempt was made to use the LRAD device during the
incident.
In January 2011, the Spirit of Adventure, a cruise ship sailing through the Indian Ocean,
deployed an LRAD system as part of its defensive measures when being pursued by pirates.
S/Y Hideaway used an LRAD in 2016 to deter suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden.
RAZOR WIRE
Vessel Protection System (VPS) has developed an anti-boarding device (ABD) that uses
canisters with razor wires to prevent pirates from boarding or coming near to the ship. This is
one of the newest technologies to fight maritime piracy at high seas.
Several canisters are fastened outside of the ship’s rail or bulwark on both port and starboard
sides. Using stainless steel hooks, the canisters are hung at a distance of 15-18 meters
apart throughout the periphery of the ship.
When activated, each of the canister jettison 20 meters of razor wires which is swept aft by
the speed of the ship to form a barrier, stretching from the main deck to the waterline. The
pirates find it difficult to cross these multiple razor sharp wires to reach to the ship. Even if
they do reach the ship, the wires alongside the ship, makes it extremely difficult for sea
pirates to climb the ship.
Apart from razor wires, the canisters also carry orange smoke flares, and can also hold small
tear gas canisters along with them. The canisters can be easily removed from the hooks and
stored in bosun’s locker when the ship is in safe waters.
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It is said that razor wires have been used in the past to fight sea pirates and have provided
good results. However, this system is yet to be tried and tested on ships crossing areas with
piracy activities.
Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only when carefully
deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have a piercing and gripping action. Care
should be taken when selecting appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and
frequency of barbs) and type will vary considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be
effective. Three main types of razor wire are commonly available:
• Unclipped (straight strand),
• Spiral (like a telephone cord) and
• Concertina (linked spirals).
Concertina razor wire is recommended as the linked spirals make it the most effective
barrier. Razor wire should be constructed of high tensile wire, which is difficult to cut with
hand tools. Concertina razor wire coil diameters of approximately 730 mm or 980 mm are
recommended. When deploying razor wire personal protective equipment to protect hands,
arms and faces must be used.
Moving razor wire using wire hooks (like meat hooks) rather than by gloved hand reduces the
risk of injury. It is recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10
meter section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which can be
very heavy and unwieldy. A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:
• Constructed outboard of the ship’s structure (i.e. overhanging) to make it more
difficult for pirates to hook on their boarding ladder/grappling hooks to the ship’s
structure.
• Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire - some vessels use a treble roll of
concertina razor wire which is even more effective.
• Properly secured to the vessel to prevent pirates pulling off the razor wire, with
for example the hook of a boarding ladder. Consideration should also be given to
further securing the razor wire with a wire strop through the razor wire to prevent it
being dislodged.
ELECTRIC FENCING
Piracy at sea is not restricted to stories and legends now centuries old – it is very much a
real-life problem in today’s world.
The first, traceable documents which refer to piracy at sea are believed to date back to the
13th century BC when it was a problem for people living in the Mediterranean areas. Read
more about the history of piracy.
Returning to the modern world, the media abounds with stories of piracy at sea in different
parts of the world and the problem is likely to continue.
So far it appears that no security system has been developed that is 100% effective in this
context, coming up against well organized, well equipped and armed attackers.
Page 49 of 95
However, ship owners and operators nevertheless have to implement whatever measures are
available in an attempt to detect and deter piracy of their vessels and cargos.
Here at Advanced Perimeter Systems Ltd we came up with a possible anti-piracy security
system after being asked by an international logistics operations company if we could help
them detect and deter intruders from being able to board a ship on the high seas or indeed in
a harbour.
We feel that the principles involved in our Electro-Fence ™ system could be used in an
“Electro-Net” system to repel unauthorized persons from gaining access to the deck of a
ship. The system would be similar to that of the 5-strand wire outrigger used on the top of
perimeter fencing. The Electro-Net would be attached to the foot-well or rail of the deck at an
angle of 45 degrees and extend outwards for approx 50cm which would make climbing
aboard from below without touching the Electro-Net impossible – they would have to climb
up, out and over without touching the Electro-Net.
The Electro-Net would give a short, sharp shock similar to Electro-Fence ™ which has been
proved to deter anyone from having a second attempt. Full monitoring facilities would be
installed producing an alarm if the system were interfered with by shorting, cutting or
reducing the voltage. Detection of intruders is also the same as our Electro-Fence
™ system. The Electro-Net could be rolled up and stowed until next required. Easy
installation fixing for different ship decks would need further investigation and development
but should not be a problem.
YACHT RADAR
Marine radars are usually short range radars that are used by ships to pinpoint locations
about other ships and land in the area. The frequencies with which these radars are operated
are known as x-band or s-band frequencies. The x stands for secret, as the ship radar was
mainly a hidden frequency while used for the purpose of tracking ship during the Second
World War. The s stands for small range in the second type.
Tracking ship devices are compulsory as per COLREGS (International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea). COLREGS is a publication that is published regularly by
the International Maritime HYPERLINK "http://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-
is-international-maritime-organization-imo/"Organisation HYPERLINK
"http://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-is-international-maritime-organization-
imo/" (IMO) to help make marine travel safe.
With the help of ship radar, accidents can be prevented in the oceanic area. However, even
while the ships are docked in the port, with the help of these radars, the coast guard and the
other authorities can use them to monitor the traffic in the small radar range.
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The ship radar has a screen that displays all the objects that are present in the immediate
range of the radar. Since all the objects are clearly visible on the screen, navigating and
monitoring the position of the ship becomes really feasible.
Operation of the Marine Radars

The operation of the marine radars can be explained as follows:
• There is an antenna on the top of the radar that continuously rotates and flashes
• The flashes actually are frequency beams that are transmitted from the radar to
find out whether there any objects present in the path of the ship
• The frequency and the time taken by the flashes to return (reflections) to the
radar receiver of the ship helps to find out whether the route of the boat can be
continued with or not
• On the display screen, the reflections can be seen so that identifying the actual
distance of the objects can be even more easy
The most important point about marine radars is that the screens used to view the position of
the objects are either LED screens or monochrome screens. With such perfect screens, the
clarity of the objects is highlighted even further. Also since these screens are water-proof
there is no threat of interruption to the ship radar system in times of rough weather.
The tracking ship system has further been developed to include even boats. This means that
even boat owners can be assured of their vessel’s safety while on the water.
One major advantage of the marine radars is that the power and electricity consumption by
them is far too less. This means that the marine radars are not just user-friendly but also
help the ship owner to regulate the cost of power and electricity.
Radar has been a major instrument to help marine navigation since the past six decades.
Over the years, the radar technology has developed to include not just aircrafts but ships as
well. Marine travel and safety, thus has become very feasible. It can be hoped, that in the
future more such tracking devices will be developed so that more number of marine accidents
and casualties can be prevented.
NETTING
Boat trap is a type of ballistic net which can be used to stop pirates’ boats when they come
near to a merchant ship. When in water, the net ensnares the propellers of the boats which
disable the vessel, preventing it from moving forward.
SLIPPERY FOAM
Slippery foam or Anti-traction material is a non-lethal substance which can be used to make
the deck or sides of a ship slippery to avoid pirates from climbing it. The highly viscous
substance substantially reduces traction of anything that comes in contact with it, making it
difficult to walk or stand.
Pirates circumvent defensive measures, says the current newsletter from the NATO Shipping
Centre.
Page 51 of 95
Recent observations of Somali pirate tactics indicate that they are employing a new technique
to board merchant vessels that are using razor wire as a defensive measure to prevent
unauthorized boardings. The pirates are throwing blankets and ladders over the wire to
circumvent this security measure.
Simultaneously, pirates in skiffs shoot at the vessel to facilitate the boarding attempt.
Mariners are advised to incorporate this information into their practices using all suitable
tools described in “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy”.
SECURITY GLASS FILM
While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying glass can be
provided by the application of security glass film, often called Blast Resistant Film.
WATER AND FOAM MONITORS

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in deterring or
delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can make it difficult for a
pirate skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult for a pirate to try to
climb onboard. Options include:
• Fire hoses and foam monitors – Manual operation of hoses and foam monitors is
not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a particularly exposed
position and therefore it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors (delivering
water) should be fixed in position to cover likely pirate access routes. Improved water
coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode but by utilising baffle plates
fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.
• Water cannons – These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc
thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been developed from
tank cleaning machines.
• Ballast pumps – Where possible to do so ships may utilise their ballast pumps to
flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water curtain over the ship’s
side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks to over-flow on to the deck, by
using existing pipe work when in ballast condition, or 33 by retrofitting pipe work to
allow flooding of the decks whilst in loaded condition. Care must be taken to ensure
that ballast tanks are not over-pressurised causing damage to the hull and tanks, or
vessel stability compromised. If in doubt it is recommended that the relevant
Classification Society be contacted for advice.
• Steam – Hot water or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam has also been
found to be very effective in deterring attacks.
• Water spray rails - Some ships have installed spray rails using a Glass
Reinforced Plastic (GRP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water curtain to
cover larger areas.
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• Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel’s standard Fire Fighting
Equipment (FFE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorientating and very slippery
making it difficult to climb through.
The following points are also worthy of note:

• Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended that hoses and foam
monitors are in a ready state, requiring just the remote activation of fire pumps to
commence delivery of water.
• Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel’s sea water
systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to utilise all pumps
additional power may be required and therefore these systems should also be ready
for immediate use.
• Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the
results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable areas.
OTHER ANTI-PIRACY DEVICES
n April 2009, when Israeli based cargo ship MV Africa Star was attacked by nine pirates, the
ship’s crew used coils of barbed wire to prevent pirates from climbing the ship. A major
piracy attempt was thus avoided using non-lethal anti-piracy method, a technique used to
protect ships in piracy affected areas.
Anti-piracy technology has come a long way since then, with several powerful non-lethal
weapons introduced on ships to prevent piracy attacks. Merchant ships now plying in high
piracy affected areas such as Gulf of Aden (GOA) carry Armed Guards along with a series of
non-lethal weaponry to thwart any kind of piracy attempt.
Mentioned herein under / above is a list of non-lethal anti-piracy weapons that are used or
can be used to fight piracy at high seas.
ANTI-PIRACY LASER DEVICE

The anti-piracy laser device uses non-lethal laser beam to provide a visual warning to pirates
and distract them temporarily. The laser device can be used during both day and night, and
can be easily operated by the ship’s crew.
WATER CANNON
Water cannon are another non-lethal weapon which is extensively used on merchant vessels.
As an anti-piracy method, the device delivers powerful and impenetrable stream of water that
blows away pirates trying to board the ship. The cannon can also quickly fill the pirates’ boats
to slow them down and hinder their maneuverability.
FOUL SMELLING LIQUID – LIQUID DETERRENT SYSTEM ( OR USING STUN

GUN)
An anti-piracy technology by the International Maritime Security Network of US involves
showering approaching pirates with slick, foul-smelling green liquid, which stinks and burns.
Page 53 of 95
The burning sensation and the nasty stink forces pirates to jump into the water, thus
stopping a possible pirate attack
Compressed Air – Ship Bourne Shore Launcher

The Ship Bourne Shore Launcher is a product of a UK based company. The Buccaneer Ship
Bourne Shore Launcher is a cannon shaped device which uses compressed air to fire a variety
of projectiles. The power and lethality of the projectiles used can vary according to the
distance of the pirates from the ship.
P Trap Anti Piracy

P-trap concept is a non-lethal system which helps prevent pirates from boarding ships. The
system carries thin lines which float at the water level around the sides of the vessel. When
pirate skiffs/boats come in contact with the lines, the later gets entangled with the engine
and disable the vessel.
Anti Piracy Curtain

Designed by a division of Japan’s NYK group along with hose manufacturer Yokoi, anti-piracy
curtain is a unique method to keep pirates from climbing the ships. The system consists of a
series of hoses which are dangled on the port and starboard sides of the vessel. Sea water is
passed through the nozzles at a force of 0.2 Mega Pascal, which makes the hoses go in
unpredictable whirling motion, generating enough force to seriously hurt anyone who gets in
the way.
Non-lethal / Stun Grenade

Stun grenade or flash grenade is a non-lethal anti-piracy device which produces a blinding
flash of light and loud noise. Stun grenades are used to temporary disorient pirates senses
without causing any kind of permanent injury
Dazzle Gun
Dazzle gun is a type of laser weapon which uses green light to disorient and temporary blind
the pirates. The concentrated blast of green light can be used during both day and night.
Rubber Ball Grenade

Rubber ball grenade as a non-lethal weapon sprays rubber bullets on detonation. The anti-
piracy grenade also produces light and sound which can be used to deter pirates from coming
towards the ship.
Active Denial System – Pain Ray (Electromagnetic wave)

Officially known as the Active Denial System (ADS), the Pain Ray is a non-lethal weapon
which transmits a narrow beam of electromagnetic energy to heat the skin without causing
permanent damage. The wave penetrates beneath the skin which causes unbearable burning
sensation, forcing pirates to run away or jump overboard.
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Anti-Piracy Fire Hoses

Ship’s fire hoses or special Anti-piracy fire hoses are often used to fight pirates trying to
board the ships. These high pressure water hoses are extremely powerful and effective to
fight pirates. Special anti-piracy fire hoses also come with semi-automatic and remote control
system.
Molotov cocktail
Technically not a hi-tech anti-piracy weapon, Molotov cocktail has been used by crew of a few
merchant ships which were not provided with anti-piracy weapons or armed guards. Molotov
cocktail can be made on ships using empty glass bottles, flammable substance such as
gasoline, and source of ignition such as burning cloth wick. It can be thrown on an
approaching pirate boat to set it ablaze and disturb their maneuverability.
Tasers – Electric Shock

If pirates do get on board ships, crew and ship’s cargo can be protected using tasers – a non-
lethal weapon which delivers an electric shock that temporarily causes the pirates to lose
neuro muscular control. The device can definitely used as the last resort to protect the ship’s
crew from pirates
This is not an exhaustive list of anti-piracy weapons which are or have been used against
pirates at high seas. In fact, many of them have not yet been used or implemented on ships.
However, if situation demands, they can potentially be used as non-lethal weapons to keep
pirates away from merchant vessels.
MARITIME PIRACY AFFECTED AREAS AROUND THE WORLD

The threat of maritime piracy has mushroomed enormously in the past few years. The news
channels on a daily basis have a new incident to report about pirates attacking a crew and
looting the vessel or hijacking a ship, and even causing harm to the crew when their ransom
demands are not met by the authorities.
The spread of sea piracy, in contemporary times is not restricted to one particular sea area or
zone. It has become rampant in almost each and every part of the world. Below are few
piracy affected areas where the terror and threat of sea pirates has reached looming
proportions:
Malacca Straits: Located in the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca has been a very
prominent area affected by marine piracy. Since the Strait forms a commercial getaway for
the Suez Canal, Egypt and Europe, in addition to being one of the most important Indo-Sino
marine navigation routes; the area is susceptible to high incidences of maritime piracy.
However collaborated efforts amongst the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean authorities
are being carried out to reduce the piracy incidents in this part of the world.
2. South China Sea: Mostly Malaysians or Indonesians, the marine pirates in the South
China Sea are regarded to be amongst the most dangerous pirates who ply their nefarious
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activities. The South China Sea piracy occurs in the Malaysian water area leading to a cause
of concern for authorities in the country.
3. Gulf of Aden: The entrance to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden is another affected piracy
sea area. The Gulf forms an important trading route leading into the Suez Canal and
geographically well-positioned with the anarchic Somalia.
The Somali sea pirates wreck havoc in this navigational route causing a lot of problems for
authorities and shipping conglomerates across the world.
4. Gulf of Guinea: An emerging area of piracy activities, the Gulf of Guinea spans a major
portion of North-Western and Southern Africa (Angola). It is a very important trade route
for crude oil tankers to the European and American continents, making it an appropriate
target for the wrongdoers.
As per the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) statistics, so far there have been reported 27
attacks, though in the absence of a proper definition of the term ‘piracy’, it has been
speculated that many attacks may gone unreported.
5. Benin: Benin in Africa is yet another geographic area infested with marine pirates. The
area has been listed as one of the high risk areas in terms of marine shipping. The IMO has
taken various steps to counter maritime piracy in this piracy affected area, though positive
results are yet to be seen.
6. Nigeria: Nigeria in the Western part of Africa is regarded to be a hive of piracy

activities. The threat of piracy is so high in the region that it has been rated as being one of
the most risky areas for marine cargo transportation. The factor of the security cover
provided by the Nigerian naval authorities is also lacking, leading to increase in sea piracy in
this area.
It has also been reported that due to extensive piracy threat, shipping through the entire
marine belt of West Africa requires a heavy high insurance cover for the goods thus being
transported.
One of the major points of distinction between the incidents of marine piracy occurring in the
Western part of Africa and the Somalia is that the pirates operating in West-Africa operate at
a much lower level when compared to their Somali counter-parts.
7. Somalia: The main reason for marine piracy occurring at mammoth proportions in
Somalia is because of extreme poverty in the region caused due to civil war, government
ineffectuality and vast dumps of marine wastes – toxic in nature – existing in the Somali sea-
waters. Because of piracy, there have been other problems in the form of fast-increasing
premium rates for insurance policies.
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Maritime piracy in Somalia is a cause of international concern as the people of the country
have come to believe that piracy is the only option available to them to ward off poverty and
other constraints plaguing them.
8. Indonesia: Indonesia is also amongst the highly affected piracy areas in the world.
Some of the areas that are targeted by the sea pirates are the Anambas, Natuna and the
Merundung Islands, where pirates have been reported to attack ships during night-time as
opposed to in the daylight. The Indonesian authorities’ punitive response to the captured
pirates in the country is also very lackadaisical raising major concerns across the world.
9. Arabian Sea: The Gulf of Oman is one of the areas in the Arabian Sea which has been
targeted repeatedly by the sea pirates. However, international organisations and authorities
have downplayed the extent of security cover to be provided by them in these areas, as
compared to the ones offered in piracy infected areas like the Gulf of Aden and the Somali
coasts.
This is mainly because of limitation in the available naval resources to act as an effective
cover and because of the position of the area geographically.
10. Indian Ocean: The waters of the Indian Ocean are also falling prey to the acts of sea
pirates. These pirates hail from the ravaged nation of Somalia and have been causing
problems to Indian as well as ships hailing from other countries. The Indian Ocean is an
unavoidable marine navigation route, thereby highlighting the nature of the problem far more
starkly.
Marine piracy is a crime that needs to be addressed to without any delay. The international
maritime committees and organizations are doing their share of shouldering the
responsibility, but in the absence of a positive and responsible internal government,
executing justice becomes quite difficult. This leads to a greater spread of piracy sea
activities. In the best interests of not just the trading community but also of the lives
involved – both the crew as well as the circumstance-turned-pirates – proactive action needs
to be taken.
Participants are not expected to acquire detailed technical or scientific knowledge

concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the operation of security equipment.
The objective is to ensure familiarity with the capabilities of such devices and
systems. Instructors should stress the need for familiarization training involving
the specific security equipment aboard each vessel.
Operational limitations of security equipment and systems:
The intent of this course segment is to communicate to trainees the functional limitations and
operating constraints of security equipment that they may encounter or be called upon to
use. Issues such as effective range, environmental sensitivities, and operator (human) error
should be addressed as appropriate.
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6.SHIP SECURITY PLAN

6.1 Purpose of SSP:
Every ship which is subject to the ISPS code must carry a ship security plan (SSP), approved
by the administration. The SSP describes, inter alia, the procedures to be followed and
measures to be taken in case of security levels 1 to 3.
The company security officer (CSO) is responsible for the development and maintenance of
the SSP. The ship security officer (SSO) is responsible for implementation of the measures
and procedures described with that plan. In case of deficiencies in the implementation
sanctions may be imposed on the SSO or the ship.
The SSP is a confidential document which must be protected against unauthorized access and
kept safely locked.
Ship Security Plans should be provided in accordance with the International Ship and Port
Security Code.
The plan is intended to prevent illegal acts against a ship and its crew, and must identify the
responsibilities of the master, the ship security officer and the shipping company security
officer.
The plan should identify the required security levels:

Security Level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security
measures shall be maintained at all times.
Security Level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security
measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a
transportation security incident.
Security Level 3 means the level for which further specific protective security measures shall
be maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security incident is probable
or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target.
6.2 Contents of SSP:

Minimum requirements for a ship security plan (SSP)
The minimum requirements for the content of a SSP for seagoing ships flying in the
international sea are made mandatory with the ISPS code (section 9 of part A and
part B), in combination with article 3 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Regulation (EC) no
725/2004. In addition, national German requirements for SSPs must be complied
with and the following pages from the BSH must be inserted.
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SHIP SECURITY PLAN

IMO – XX XXX XX
RSO - Examination Flag State -

Approval
Ship Details
Maiden Name "xxxxx" * "current name" = "see valid CSR"
IMO Number
International Call Sign
Flag State
Port of Registry
Type
Gross Tonnage
Trading Area
Communication to ship Mobile:
Phone:
Fax:
e-mail:
SSAS (Manufacturer & Type)
Addressee
Addressee poc.germany@point-of-contact.de
Addressee
Ship Security Officer(rank)
Deputy SSO – if appointed
(rank)
Working language on board
Classification Society
RSO
Company Details
Name and address of owner "see valid CSR"
Registered owner
identification number "see valid CSR"
Name and address of company
Company identification
number
Name and address of
bareboat- charterer
responsible for employment
responsible for manning
Company Security Officer Phone:
Fax:
Contact Details Mobile:
e-mail:
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24-hrs-emergency-No.:
Deputy Company Security Phone:
Officer – if appointed Fax:
Mobile:
Contact Details e-mail:
24-hrs-emergency-No.:
Contact Details
• National Point of Contact
Zentrale Kontaktstelle (PoC)
Gemeinsames Lagezentrum See
Maritimes Sicherheitszentrum
Am Alten Hafen 2
27472 Cuxhaven
Tel.: 0049 (0)4721 - 393957 and - 394785
Fax: 0049 (0)4721 - 394852
E-Mail: poc.germany@point-of-contact.de
In all matters pertaining maritime security, inter alia

• provision of security information,
• requests for advice or assistance,
• report of security concerns or incidents,
• security communication,
• etc.
Refer to the above mentioned point of contact.
International registration offices
Register the vessel’s movements prior to entering the High Risk Area.
MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa):
To register via Website : www.mschoa.org

Telephone: +44 (0) 1923 958547
+44 (0) 1923 958700
+44 (0) 1923 958545
Fax: +44 (0) 1923 958520

E-Mail: postmaster@mschoa.org
UKMTO (UK Maritime Trade Operations):
E-Mail: UKMTO@eim.ae
Telephone (24hrs): +971 50 552 3215
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6.3 CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES

To meet the requirements of SOLAS 1974 Chapter XI-2
The contents of this part of the Plan are confidential and should be kept in a
secure place when not in use and should not be disclosed to anyone other
than officials duly authorised by the flag state.
If the Plan is kept in electronic form it should be protected by a

password.________
CONFIDENTIAL PART
DUTIES OF SHIPBOARD PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED SECURITY

RESPONSIBILITIES
THE SHIP SECURITY ALERT SYSTEM, SHIP ALARMS AND OTHER SECURITY
RELATED SYSTEMS
Appendix A – The Ship Security Alert System
Appendix B – Ship Alarm Systems
Appendix C – Ship Security Systems
Restricted areas
SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT
PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO SECURITY THREATS OR BREACHES OF

SECURITY, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR MAINTAINING CRITICAL
OPERATIONS OF THE SHIP OR THE SHIP/PORT INTERFACE
• Activating the Ship Security Alert System

• Calling emergency stations
• Emergency shut-down of main engines
• Evacuating the ship
• Informing contracting governments (flag state and/or port state) of a
security incident
• Acting on instructions given by governments at MARSEC Level 3
Bomb threats and responses
• Searching
• Hijacking
• Actual or attempted attacks on ships - guidance
• Stowaways
Implementation of SSP
Unless implemented with diligence, the SSP will be a worthless piece of paper! The SSO must
ensure that the SSP is implemented to the best possible extent to maintain its effectiveness.
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From carrying out training and drills to specifying to personnel about their respective duties
as per the SSP, the SSO is a vital entity in the implementation of the SSP. Along with
briefings and debriefings, an appraisal must also be carried out to check the level of
contribution of the personnel.
With the dynamic nature of shipping, the SSO under the auspices of the Master must identify
any shortcomings in the plan. Remedial measures and a review of the same must be sent to
the CSO as suggestions to keep the SSP updated as well as to ensure that the security aspect
is upheld without any compromise. Any such suggestions to bring about a change in the
existing plan must be backed up by a thorough security assessment of the vessel.
Damage to shipping from entities that intending to pose threat is ever-changing. The security
of the vessel is not just for namesake but for the very protection of the ship and its
resources, the most valuable resource being the manpower. It is therefore imperative to
always assign due importance to the SSP and its implementation.
6.5 MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION IN SHIP SECURITY PLAN
The Recognized Organisation for approving the ship security plan should make the
procedures for the required necessary amendments in the previously approved ship security
plan. Once all the procedures are completed to amend the ship security plan, the same to be
forwarded for approval to the recognized agency of the concerned nation.
THREAT IDENTIFICATION, RECOGNITION AND RESPONSE:
Types of weapons used are ranging from knives, machetes, spears etc to firearms of many
kinds like pistols, guns, machine guns, grenades etc. Some images of which are shown
during the lectures. Look at the pictures and recognize them. The use of these can cause
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injuries of varying degrees as well as death. They can also cause damage to assets either
directly or indirectly like causing an explosion or a fire.
Explosives are also used and basically it is a very fast chemical reaction of substances
producing as at high temperature and pressure with such velocity to cause damage. They
kill by pressure blast, high temperature and shrapnel used to fill the device in which it is
used. Some explosives examples are black powder, nitro glycerin, ammonium nitrate, C4,
etc. The device is consisting of the explosive, the detonator and the triggering mechanism.
Some of the very common devices are improvised from ordinary everyday use things and
are called I.E.D (improvised explosive device).
These will always be in disguise. Few other criminal acts raise as much fear and concern as
bombings, so it's no coincidence that crime and terrorist groups routinely use them as a
means to achieve their goals whether they are loss of life, intimidation, extortion or
government or commercial disruption.
Most terrorist and crime groups use Improvised Explosive Devices or IED's. Detonated
onboard a ship, an IED can create a serious hull break or start a dangerous fire, both of
which can lead to injury and loss of life. So what does an IED look like? During the lecture
have a look at some images shown to you.
Let's see if you can recognize one! Pictured on the screen are various images. All of these
images are clever disguises of IED's! IED's are homemade weapons that are easily
manufactured and limited in their form only by the imagination of their creator! Because they
often take the shape of everyday items, it's critical to always be on the look-out for objects
that seem out of place or out of context and to be able to recognize the components of and
IED.
Common Components
Despite their differences in appearance, all IED's have four components in common - a timer,
a power source, a detonator and an explosive.
Sometimes a timer power unit (TPU) is used and consists of a homemade unit that contains
the timer and a power source and is connected to a detonator and an explosive. Power
sources are usually batteries.
Detonators are usually commercially available electric or blasting cap detonators that contain
very small quantities of a very sensitive explosive.
Industrial explosives may be commercial or military grade. Commercial explosives are readily
available to license holders and are commonly used in the quarrying and construction
industries.
High power military explosives are available from eastern bloc countries and states
supporting terrorism. Liquid explosives are available, but difficult to find. Terrorist and
criminal groups have devised ways to make homemade explosives because other types of
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explosives are not always readily available. These explosives are usually derived from
chemicals found in fertilizer or other industrial products
Incendiary Devices
Incendiary Devices are a commonly used type of IED. They consist of a small amount of
explosives supplemented by a flammable liquid. These small, but effective devices use
the destructive power of fire to cause massive damage.
Vehicle Borne Devices

Car bombs are another common type if IED. They are designed to carry large quantities
of explosives and use vehicles as weapons. Under car booby traps are another common IED
designed to kill or maim the occupants of a vehicle. Used as assassination weapons, they
usually contain small amounts of a high grade explosive and may be triggered by a timer, a
remote control device or a mercury tilt switch.
Letter and Parcel Bombs

Terrorists sometimes use letter and parcel bombs as methods of intimidation
or assassination. There are many indications that a letter or a parcel is suspicious, some of
which can be recognized!
Listed are all of the indications to watch-out for. It may not be obvious at first glance that a
letter or package is suspicious, so it's always a good idea for crew to wear protective clothing
and rubber gloves when handling mail and to use a letter opener to open envelopes.
Whenever possible have all parcels x-rayed or scanned before opening them.
If there are signs that a package or parcel is suspicious, crew should take these immediate
actions:
• Make no attempt to open the envelope or package Place it in plain view on a

flat surface or move it to an open space on the ship's deck.
• If it is left in a confined space ensure all doors and windows are left open.
• Clear the area.
• Cordon off the area and, if possible, allow nobody to within 50m or 2 bulkheads
of the line of sight of the package.
• Notify the Duty Watch Officer.
• Other dangerous substances can be gases of explosive /flammable or
toxic nature which can be in liquefied form or compressed. Some flammable gases are
natural gas (methane/ethane), LPG (propane /butane), hydrogen and acetylene.
Toxic gases are Ammonia, H2S, SO2, Cyanide, Phosgene etc.
Dangerous liquids, solids, can be so due to being flammable, toxic or having properties to
cause damage to human body like corrosion burns or cancer/mutation of cells. Substances
having radioactive properties are an example. Also we have seen that some powders used by
terrorists caused anthrax or lung problems to people
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Since Sept 11 2001, the world in which ships trade has changed, perhaps forever. We must
all contribute to the effort – contending with new rules governing, security, customs and
immigration; recognizing the legal and insurance responsibilities we have; and adjusting to
the shifting economic and trade environment.
Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices

• Physical search
• X-Ray screening
• Low powered radar sensors
• Walk through detectors
• Trace detectors
• Screening containers
• Dirty bombs
• Not as easy as it sounds, within the military and civilian field there numerous
cases to attend from using different weapons to identifying foreign equipment and
weapons of various sizes, designs, makes , models etc. And the experience gained
cannot be passed on overnight.
• It requires experts in the relevant fields to be able to recognise and detect
weapons, dangerous substances and devices. What we are concerned with is the
prevention of such materials entering the ports and on board vessels. To achieve this
we require controls similar to airport security systems.
• X-Ray screening to detect weapons made of metal, plastic, ceramics etc.
• Low powered radar sensors to detect weapons
• Walk through detectors
• Trace detectors for dangerous substances and confirming cargos, illegal
immigrants etc.
• Screening containers for chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear cargo
• Dirty bombs - Radioactive material surrounded by explosive. Detonation spreads
the radioactivity over a wide area, killing potentially hundreds of people and leaving
whole areas uninhabitable for decades. As reported in the press Feb 1 2003 British
Intelligence services have uncovered a plot by Al Qaeda to build a nuclear dirty bomb
after discovering documents in Heart in Afghanistan indicating that the bomb had been
assembled. The whereabouts are unknown and it is feared it could have been moved
along the smuggling routes which spread west from Heart close to the Iranian border.
• To make ourselves less vulnerable by the use of education, awareness and the
introduction of security procedures coupled with important intelligence will enable
crews and personnel to identify suspicious materials and report them to the correct
authorities for identification.
BEHAVIOURAL CHARACTERISTICS
What type of people carry out such crimes and what type of character are they? I do not
profess to be a trained Trick cyclist, so we will look at specifically the piracy/terrorist hijack
scenario.
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Individual pirates/hijackers
• Criminal seeking to extort money
• Refugees seeking political asylum
• Mentally disturbed – the mentally abnormal have a marked inferiority complex,
nervousness, hijacking provides an opportunity for the insecure to prove themselves
and achieve personal publicity. They could be armed with a hoax weapon or have a
bomb in a contained package or wired to devices as suicide bombers, they do not have
to be mentally disturbed just a believer in their faith!
Groups
• The politically motivated groups of terrorists operate in groups of 2-5, but can
be larger dependent on the task in hand, It will possibly be only the leader who will
know the overall plan
• They will possibly know the layout of the vessel, the security and crew
procedures and have a fundamental understanding of navigation. They will be well
equipped with communications, modern weapons and explosives, which could have
been prepositioned on board in advance. They will primarily attempt to access the
bridge and using the shock of an armed assault as part of their technique will
inevitable gain control of the ship. They will then try to locate the crew/passengers into
one part of the ship to ease guarding and control. Initially ruthless, irrational and
heavy handed, the elation of their success may ebb away and concern for their own
safety and security will be of concern. Unless suicide bombers etc. their aggressive
tendencies will reappear as the vessel approaches land or set deadlines.
• Person(s) seen in area for no obvious reason
• Person(s) not dressed for that particular area or function
• Person(s) seen in area more than once or is necessary
• Person(s) being nervous, sweaty when coming aboard ship
• Person(s) having litritature or paperwork that seem to be of a suspicious nature
(incl. Electronic items)
• Person(s) being in possession of large sums of money
• Person(s) meeting other personnel not associated with that party or crew
• Person(s) being in areas of the ship that they have no reason to be there or are
taking a particular interest in a part of the ship.
SEARCH SYSTEM AND METHODS

• A search of unlocked spaces
• A search locked spaces
• Personal search locations
• Physical searching
• Metal detection
• Baggage screening
• Heavy baggage
• Vehicles
• Other freight
• Deliveries to ship
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TECHNIQUES TO CIRCUMVENT SECURITY MEASURES

• Surveillance and reconnaissance
• Target reconnaissance
• Rehearsals
• Attack
• Individual
• Information Technology
• Access
• Airborne
• Subsurface
HOW CAN WE GET AROUND THESE SECURITY MEASURES?

• The criminal or terrorist as an individual or as a group should be treated with the
up most respect. The modern terrorist at the height of his profession in some cases is
on par with military and civil forces.
• He conducts surveillance and reconnaissance collating timely, accurate and
critical information to contribute to the overall political objectives which their group or
faith are trying to achieve.
• Target reconnaissance, plans, procedures, patterns, lapses in security, lack of
checks etc.
• Rehearsals – support from sympathetic countries and funding
• These are obliviously on the large scale, to bring it down to a basic level;
• Information Technology – fraud, hackers, gaining vital info on cargos and
shipping movements and security plans etc.
• Access – there are numerous ways to enter the ship whether it is alongside, at
anchor or underway
• Craft marry up together then split, losing radar signature, using local conditions
• Aboard a ship amidships or stern by the use of poles and ladders and adapted
climbing equipment whilst underway
• Access ladders, gangways, ramps, doors, side scuttles, windows and ports whilst
at anchor or alongside.
• And of course stealing a ship by hijacking gaining access by smaller craft or
even helicopter and roping down terrorists let alone flying an aircraft into the side of a
vessel
• And lets not forget Subsurface attack whilst at anchor or in port, placement of
explosives or boarding etc.
• The list is endless and a terrorist or criminal will allow their imagination run wild
to achieve their objectives.
RECOGNITION, ON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS, OF PERSONS POSING

POTENTIAL SECURITY RISKS
Appearance vs. Reality

As the saying goes, you cannot judge a book by its cover. Likewise, people are not always what they
appear to be and judgments based solely on appearances are often in accurate. For all appearances,
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a person seems easy-going, pleasant, friendly, fun and successful. Perhaps, they look just
like someone you know. But they could be a heinous criminal. Someone is successful,
intelligent, kind and good-humored. This man appears to have it all! Would you have guessed
that he is a spy? A young man has the appearance of a good natured, fun-loving, well-adjusted
teenager. Instead, this confused and mixed up teenager who dreamed of a world where
he could fit in, became the 24-yearold assassin of legendary Beatles musician John Lennon.
This famous assassin is Mark Chapman.
Profiling
Profiling helps we get beneath the outer shell of an individual to obtain a more complete
picture. It has many applications. In the context of ship security, profiling will help you
identify whether and to what extent the crew and visitors to your ship pose a security risk.
Profiling techniques like document checks, questioning and observation ensure that
judgments are based on more than just appearances.
Random selection of individuals for profiling ensures that patterns are not established. It
also prevents allegations that individuals are being picked on? Whenever behaviors or items
arouse suspicion, action should always be taken to respond to the perceived threat whether
that means additional checks, searches or the cordoning off and containing of an explosive
device. Averting a security incident is worth the extra time and effort!
Using Profiling Onboard Your Ship

Onboard your ship, you can profile both crew and visitors at all access points to identify their
level of security risk and what, if any, additional checks or measures need to be implemented
before they are allowed to board. Detection equipment can also be used, but only in tandem
with profiling. It cannot select for itself and only works on facts. You may spot things that the
equipment won't and it's important to not ignore these gut feelings or hunches. They're an
essential part of profiling! When establishing your ship's profiling program, it's vital that you
maintain a random selection process. This ensures that a pattern is not established and
prevents allegations that individuals are being picked on. This is especially important
when checking or searching crew. One approach you can use with crew is to take a number
at random between 5 and 9, say for this example 8, and search every 8th crewmember
coming onboard.
Tasks of the Profiler

Profilers need to gather the maximum amount of information in a limited period of time.
According to Rafael, the former chief in charge of security at the German Airport Authority, a
profiling interview can take as little as 90 seconds or as long as 20 minutes. It ends when the
profiler is satisfied that all of the relevant areas have been addressed.
To obtain the information needed to determine an individual's potential security threat,

profilers need to:
• Check documentation;
• Pose questions in a discreet manner; and
• Observe body language and behavior.
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Checking Documentation
Checking documentation may seem obvious, but it is important. All documents related to the
purpose of a shipboard visit should be examined and the ID of all visitors and crew verified.
Tips on Questioning
Use a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions.
Open questions are usually preceded with "what, when, who, where, how and why" and
that require a person to give more than a “yes" or "no" answer. Examples include:
• Where have you travelled from?
• When did you leave your last stop?
• Who packed your bag?
• Why are you carrying this?
• How did you obtain this?
• What is the nature of your journey?
Closed questions can only be answered with a "yes" or "no". They can be used to
establish factor obtain statements that may be used in evidence later. Some examples are:
• Is this your bag?
• Is this your passport?
• Are you the person named in this document?
• Did you apply for this visa in person?
• Has anyone asked you to carry any thing for _.him or her?
• Is this the item you were asked to carry? Check to see that the answers to your
questions match up with what you already know about a crewmember or the purpose
of a shipboard visit. And, ensure that the answers tie in with any items being carried or
transported.
Asking Good Questions

Questioning is an important part of profiling. Questions draw out important information and
should be asked in such a manner as to not arouse the suspicion of the person selected.
There are many questions you could ask! Remember, your goal is to ask questions and get
answers that will help you determine whether an individual poses a potential risk to your
ship's security.
Examples of questions to crew
• Are you coming directly from another ship or were you on _leave?
• Where did you travel to while on leave?
• Did you bring any mementos from your travels?
Examples of questions to visitors

• What is the purpose of your visit?
• Are you bringing onboard any tools or equipment?
• Were you on another service call before joining us today?
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Recognizing Suspicious Behavior

When asking questions, paying attention to the body language and behavior of individuals
being questioned is just as important as listening to their answers.
• Are they nervous?
• Do they react when you go near their equipment or baggage?
• Are they sweating or restless?
• Are they becoming aggressive?
• Are they overly happy or trying to be overly friendly?
• Are they trying to avoid eye contact?
If you are suspicious of a person's behavior, stay calm and inform someone else of your
suspicions. Do some additional checks or perform a search of the individual's belongings
or equipment. Allow them onboard only after you are satisfied they do not pose a security
risk.
Dealing with Suspicious Items

If during profiling you suspect that an individual is carrying a suspicious object or package -
such as drugs or an explosive device - be careful that you don't let the person know that you
suspect something. You never know how he or she will react! Never touch or pick anything
up. If a suspicious object is an explosive it may be fitted with an anti-handling device. Inform
someone of your suspicions, discreetly, so that they can summon assistance.
• Never use a radio within 25 meters of a suspicious object.
• If it is an explosive with a radio-controlled device, a transmission by your radio
may activate it.
• If you suspect that the package is a bomb, take these additional steps:
• Confirm that a device actually exists;
• Clear the immediate area;
• Cordon off the area around the suspicious object and Control the area so
that only authorized persons have access
TECHNIQUES USED TO CIRCUMVENT SECURITY MEASURES

Having a good plan is essential to your ship’s security, but a plan alone is not enough!
Diligence on the part of crew in implementing the plan is just as important. Terrorists and
criminals will constantly search for ways to circumvent your security measures, procedures
and equipment. They will often be extremely clever and may take many months to observe
you and research your equipment in order to find a way to successfully attack you. The best
defense is good security awareness and observation on the part of all crew and passengers.
If you get the sense that something is not right? Then it probably isn’t!
Investigate until you are satisfied that all is well! Some other indicators to watch out for are:
• Interference or jamming and monitoring of your ship’s communications system.
Efforts made to broadcast over the system, damage your radio transmitter or antenna,
or cut telephone lines are often the first indication that an attack is imminent.
• Damage to locks and doors such as scratches around the locks.
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• Lost or stolen keys.

• Normally locked doors being found open for no reason.
• Dirty finger marks on clean doors or windows, or clean marks on dirty doors.
• False alarms on security systems. The criminal or terrorist may be testing your
response time and reaction procedures, or trying to incapacitate your alarm system.
• Apparently wanton or accidental damage to essential equipment. This may be an
indicator that an attempt is about to be made to attack you.
• Never rule out the possibility of collusion between the terrorists and members of
the crew
Methods used by pirates and armed robbers to undertake attacks against

ships
• Commonly, two small high speed (up to 25 knots) open boats or „skiffs‟ are
used in attacks, often approaching from either quarter or the stern. Skiffs are
frequently fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single 60hp engine.
• Pirate Action Groups operate in a number of different boat configurations. To
date whatever the configuration the attack phase is carried out by skiffs. Pirate Action
Group boat configurations include:
• Skiffs only – usually two.
• Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing 2 or more
attack skiffs.
• Mother ships which have included the very largest of merchant ships, fishing
vessels and dhows.
These Mother ships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their own crew onboard
as hostages. Mother ships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable
pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather.
Attack skiffs are often towed behind the Mother ships. Where the size of the Mother ship
allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of
interdiction by Naval/ Military forces.
• Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs)
in an effort to intimidate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates
to board. The use of these weapons is generally focused on the bridge and
accommodation area. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important
to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible, and using careful
maneuvering to resist the attack.
• Pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked to enable one
or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight
ladders and ropes, or a long hooked pole with a knotted climbing rope to climb up the
side of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard the pirate (or pirates) will generally
make their way to the bridge to try to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge
the pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable further pirates to
board.
• Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many
pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have
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occurred at night, particularly clear moonlit nights, but night time attacks are less
common.
• The majority of piracy attacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have
planned and trained in advance of the passage and applied the Best Management
Practices contained within the various guidance books published by various concerned
sources
CROWD MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES

There are numerous techniques designed to provide the commander with flexibility of action
in accomplishing crowd control. The commander must select a combination of techniques that
will produce the desired results within the framework of the selected crowd control option.
The most common techniques are discussed in the following paragraphs.
OBSERVATION
Observation consists of the deployment of individuals or teams to the outermost region of a
crowd for the purpose of monitoring the crowd's activity. It includes gathering information on
crowd size, location, and mood, and reporting on the developing situation.
COMMUNICATION OF INTEREST AND INTENT

In certain situations, effective communication with crowd leaders and participants may
enable the force to control the situation without resorting to more severe actions. When
planned and organized demonstrations, marches, or rallies within the disturbed area are
announced, the control force commander, in coordination with local authorities, should meet
with the activity organizers to communicate the interest of the control forces.
The installation commanding officer and local authorities should communicate to the activity
organizers their intent to cope with violence, unlawful actions, and violations of restrictions
imposed on the activity. It is intended that, by this communication between activity
organizers and control force personnel, the demonstration, rally, or parade will occur without
incident through the mutual cooperation of all concerned. The intentions of control forces will
not be effective if delivered as an ultimatum. A limited, begrudging dialogue with activity
organizers reduces the opportunity for authorities to learn the plans of the demonstrators. It
must be remembered that if this communication is not effective, the activity organizers might
well hold the demonstration in defiance of local authorities.
CHANNELIZATION
Where communications have been established with the dissident leadership and the intent
and nature of the crowd activity is known in advance, pressure may be brought to bear on
the leaders. This will channel the crowd into an area that will minimize the disruption that the
crowd might have on the community, and that will facilitate the operations of the control
force.
DIVERSION
Consideration may be given to efforts to divert the leadership of the crowd itself from its
stated or apparent objective. This effort is greatly facilitated if communications exist with the
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leadership of the crowd. This technique may be either direct, denying access to an area, or
indirect, promoting an alternate site or activity of greater interest to the crowd. The diversion
should support the objectives of the control force either by reducing the intensity of the
crowd situation or by motivating the crowd to seek an area more easily controlled by the
control force.
COOPERATION
The control force must seek to obtain the cooperation of the dissident leadership, which will
decrease the potential for disruption. Also, when crowd leadership seeks permission and
cooperation from the local government, officials should maximize this opportunity. This may
be accomplished by talking the leadership into a cooperative planning effort designed to
facilitate the protestor's opportunity to peacefully demonstrate. This will also establish
guidelines that will minimize the impact of the demonstration on the community.
PROCLAMATION
The installation commanding officer's representative at the scene, in the Name of the
President of the United States, will call upon members of the group to disperse to their
homes immediately. This is known as the Presidential proclamation. Another proclamation
will be issued by the military commander to advise the people residing within the community
of the rules and orders they are to obey and the reasons for such rules. This proclamation by
the military is not to be confused with the Presidential proclamation. A proclamation
establishes the illegal nature of the crowd's actions, and is an excellent medium to make
known to a crowd the intentions of the control force.
SHOW OF FORCE
A show of force may be effective in various situations in civil disturbance control operations.
Marching a well-equipped and highly disciplined control force into view of an assembled
crowd maybe all that is needed to persuade dissidents to disperse and retire peaceably from
the scene. In other situations, however, a show of force may have a counterproductive effect.
It may cause more persons to be attracted to the "show" and provoke a nonviolent crowd
into a violent confrontation. When personnel are scattered throughout the disturbance area in
small groups, a show of force may take the form of motor marches throughout the area
saturation patrolling, and the manning of static posts.
APPREHENSION OF CROWD MEMBERS

The apprehension of an individual can only be justified if that person is in violation of the law.
Situations may arise in a crowd control mission where large numbers of persons are
participating in unlawful activities. The dispersal of such groups might result in greater
violence or militant acts. Factors may exist that preclude the use of water or riot control
agents, thus necessitating the containment of the crowd in a given area or the apprehension
and removal of those crowd members committing unlawful acts. Where possible, military
forces should allow civil police officers to perform the actual apprehension, processing, and
detention of civilian law violators. However, conditions of necessity may require these
functions to be performed by military personnel.
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USE OF BARRIERS
On a pier or wharf, barriers can be effectively used to channel intruders and prevent
vehicles from being driven near the ship.
For a ship, lining off or lifting the brow will help in reducing access to the ship. Additionally,
extra camels can be requested to increase the distance between the ship (especially those
with a low freeboard) and the shore structure.
Secure and lock as many weather deck accesses as possible to limit entry by boarders and as
a prevention measure from weapons fire and thrown incendiary devices.
EMPLOYMENT OF WATER
Water from a fire hose may be effective in moving small groups on a narrow front, such as a
street or in defending a barricade or roadblock Personnel applying water should be protected
by the control force, and in some instances, by shields.
A water-dispersing system specifically designed for use in civil disturbance operations is not
included in the Navy supply inventory, but may be improvised from existing items of
equipment. Water may be employed in a flat trajectory (solid-stream) or as a high trajectory
weapon (employing water as rainfall). The latter is highly effective during cold weather.
The use of a large water tank (750-1,000 gallons) and a mounted "water cannon" will enable
the force to employ water as they advance. By having at least two such trucks, one can be
held in reserve.
Aboard ship, water hoses can be laid out in advance. The fire stations to be used will usually
be indicated by their location, including the availability of cover for hose teams. Past actual
experience has shown that foam
(AFFF) has had a disorienting effect on crowds, and has increased the effectiveness of
firefighting from the ship when objects on or to the pier, including vehicles and mooring lines,
were set afire by the crowds.
In the use of water, as with other measures of force, certain restraints must be applied.
Avoid using water on innocent bystanders. Provide avenues of escape and use the more
severe, flat trajectory application only when necessary.
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The use of riot control agents is an effective method of dispersing crowds. Remember,
however, that effects of not control agents are only temporary and will not prevent the
reformation of a crowd in either the same or a different location.
Riot control agents have many advantages over other techniques in that they have an
immediate effect on large groups of people without causing any permanent harm. Riot control
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agents, when properly used by the control force, will disperse large crowds without actual
contact with rioters. An understanding of riot control agents, their capabilities and limitations,
is mandatory for safe and efficient use. The authority to order the use of riot control agents
rests with the installation commander.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Filming or photographing persons engaged in lawful dissent (picketing, peaceful protest, etc.)
is not warranted and should be avoided. However, filming persons engaged in unlawful
conduct is recommend as a future record for court proceedings to show that crimes were
being committed and/or the identity of the persons committing those crimes. Additionally,
filming of events can quickly resolve complaints of excessive force by force personnel.
8.SHIP SECURITY ACTIONS
8.1 Actions required by different security levels
The 3 security levels are LEVELS 1,2 & 3. These are described in this handout earlier. The
actions that have to be taken in case of application of each level are given here.
Security level 1:
At security level 1, the SSP should establish the security measures to control access to the
ship, where the following may be applied:
• checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming
their reasons for doing so by checking, for example, joining instructions, passenger
tickets, boarding passes, work orders, etc.;
• in liaison with the port facility, the ship should ensure that designated secure
areas are established in which inspections and searching of persons, baggage
(including carry-on items), personal effects, vehicles and their contents can take place;
• in liaison with the port Facility, the ship should ensure that vehicles destined to
be loaded onboard car carriers; ro-ro and other passenger ships are subjected to
search prior to loading, in accordance with the frequency required in the SSP.
• segregating checked persons and their personal effects from unchecked persons
and their personal effects;
• segregating embarking from disembarking passengers;
• identifying access points that should be secured or attended to prevent
unauthorized access;
• securing, b y locking or other means, access to unattended spaces adjoining
areas to which passenger and visitors have access and
• providing security briefings to all ship personnel on possible threats, the
procedures for reporting suspicious persons, objects or activities and the need
for vigilance
At security level 1, all those seeking to board a ship should be liable to search. The frequency
of such searches including random searches should be specified in the approved SSP
and should be specifically approved by the Administration.
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Such searches may best be under taken by the port facility in close cooperation with the ship
and in close proximity to it. Unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of
the ship's personnel should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal
effects. Any such search shal1 be undertaken in a manner which fully takes into account the
human rights of the individual and preserves their basic human dignity.
Security level 2:
At security level 2, the SSP should establish the security measures to be applied to protect
against a heightened risk of a security incident to ensure higher vigilance and tighter control,
which may include:
• assigning additional personnel to patrol deck areas during silent
• limiting the number of access points to the ship, identifying those to be closed
and the means of adequately securing them;
• deterring waterside access to the ship, including, for example, in liaison with the
port facility, provision of boat patrols
• establishing a restricted area on the shore side of the ship, in close co-operation
with the port facility;
• increasing the frequency and detail of searches of persons, personal effects, and
vehicles being embarked or loaded onto the ship;
• escorting visitors on the ship;
• providing additional specific security briefings to all ship personnel on any
identified threats, re-emphasizing the procedures for reporting suspicious persons,
objects, or activities and stressing the need for increased vigilance; and
• carrying out a full or partial search of the ship
Security level 3.
At security level 3, the ship should comply with the instructions issued by those responding
to the security incident or threat thereof, The SSP should detail the security measures which
could be taken by the ship. In close co-operation with those responding and the port facility,
which may include:
• limiting access to a single, controlled, access point;
• granting access only to those responding to the security incident or threat
thereof;
• directing persons on board;
• suspension of embarkation or disembarkation;
• suspension of cargo handling operations, deliveries, etc.;
• evacuation of the ship;
• movement of the ship; and
• preparing for a full or partial search of the ship
MAINTAINING SECURITY OF THE VESSEL/PORT INTERFACE

Piracy and Armed Attacks:
Most piracy attacks occur at port. At sea, ships are most vulnerable to attack while sailing
near land and passing through narrow channels where maneuverability is limited.
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Pirates might steal any valuable item on a ship or even the ship itself. Carrying large sums of
money on board should be avoided if possible. If pirates learn about such funds, it may invite
an attack. Pirates have been known to monitor communications, so discussing information
about a ship’s cargo or valuables should be avoided. Crewmembers going ashore should also
be advised to not discuss details about a Ship’s cargo or itinerary.
Smaller ships and ships with fewer crewmembers are more vulnerable to attack. To
compensate, ship owners may want to consider implementing additional security measures
and/or installing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment, such as closed circuit
surveillance systems, which may be monitored from a central location.
Early detection provides an opportunity to sound alarms, implement security procedures,

contact authorities for assistance, illuminate a suspect craft, and take evasive maneuvers.
Maintaining vigilance and enhancing security measures and procedures are the best
deterrence to avoid an attack.
Pirates may feign distress as a trick to get close to a Ship. As a consequence, any ship –
including junks, fishing boats, pleasure boats, and dhows – should be considered as a
potential threat.
If a Master determines it is necessary to invite people onboard, only one person should be
transferred at a time. The individual should be carefully searched. Security should be at a
high level of alert with lookouts maintained on all sides of the ship.
Following are additional security guidelines for consideration:

• Brief crewmembers on the risks of being attacked by pirates or armed bandits.
• Secure the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins,
and crew accommodations.
• Carefully plan any response to an apparent attack and ensure the crew is
appropriately trained.
• If possible, avoid high-risk areas and bottlenecks.
• Consider delaying ship arrival if there is a high threat from piracy at port and if a
berth is not immediately available to minimize the Ship’s vulnerability while in queue.
Piracy Security Measures in Port:

• Minimize access points preferably to a single controlled gangway or ship’s side
companion way.
• Keep emergency ladders clear of the water; raise and stow pilot ladders
immediately after use.
• Provide two security officers at access points if a threat warrants the response.
• Establish perimeter security measures, such as weather deck and ship side
lighting, deck and jetty patrols, and secure rat guards on mooring lines.
• Search all deliveries when possible; conduct frequent, random, and overt
searches if all materials cannot be examined.
• Search all visitors and escort them while on board.
• Keep small craft in the vicinity under constant surveillance.
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• Carefully control documents containing information about the cargo or ship’s

itinerary.
• Conduct a search of the ship before sailing and secure all doors and other access
points.
SECURITY MEASURES AT SEA:

When approaching or sailing through high-risk areas:
• Augment bridge watches and lookouts.
• Establish additional watches on the stern and where there are visual and radar
“blind spots.”
• Equip watches with low-light binoculars and/or night-vision goggles.
• When monitoring nearby ships, give additional attention to small craft matching
the speed of the ship or traveling parallel to the ship.
• Ensure someone responsible for communications remains on duty.
• Maintain radio communications with appropriate shore and naval authorities.
• If a suspicious ship at sea approaches in a threatening manner:
• Increase speed and alter course if safe to do so.
• Do not allow the ship to come alongside; do not respond to messages by radio,
light, or hailing.
• Note details of the threatening ship and video or photograph the ship if possible.
• At night, switch off the weather deck lighting; direct searchlights at the
approaching ship.
• Keep personnel clear of the weather deck.
If Hijacked:
During a hijacking, generally the more time that passes without incident, the better:
• Remain calm and direct others to do the same; do not resist armed pirates
unless there is a clear life-threatening situation.
• Ensure the safety of the ship and personnel according to maritime practice.
• Initiate Security Alarm, if possible,
• Broadcast a distress message, if possible.
• Offer reasonable cooperation; try to establish a reasonable rapport.
• Try to identify the number of attackers.
• Attempt to increase the number of egress points.
• Attempt to determine the demands of the hijackers, as well as potential
deadlines.
• Use secure communications if available for negotiators to talk with the hijackers.
• The Master and crew should not attempt to negotiate with the hijackers unless
directed by authorities.
Following an attack, the International Maritime Organization recommends sending a report to

the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). Provide in the report information on the identity and
location of the ship, any injuries or damage, and descriptions of the attackers. See
MSC/Circ.597 for additional reporting recommendations.
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Terrorism:
The face of terrorism has changed over time. Attacks in the past were designed to primarily
attract publicity, not kill a lot of people. In 1985, four terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro, an
Italian cruise ship with more than 400 passengers. The event attracted worldwide attention.
One person was killed before the terrorists surrendered after a two day standoff.
Terrorist attacks are becoming increasingly more lethal. In 1998, suicide truck bombs
detonated outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, capital of Tanzania, killing 11 people,
and the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 and injuring thousands.
In October 2000, terrorists tied to al Qaeda mounted a suicide bombing against the USS Cole
in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing 17 sailors.
In June 2001, seven terrorists were arrested for plotting to attack American and British ships
in the Strait of Gibraltar with explosive-packed boats.
On October 6, 2002, terrorists linked to al Qaeda attacked a French oil tanker in the Gulf of
Aden causing the release of 50,000 barrels of oil.
The attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) represents the first mass destruction terrorism
strike. Officials fear it may not be long before a terrorist group mounts an attack using
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials (weapons of mass destruction).
Prior to September 11, 2001, maritime security measures to counter terrorism focused on
hijacking and bombing threats. As a result of the WTC attack, security measures are being
implemented worldwide.
Authorities are concerned a ship might be turned into a weapon not unlike the jetliners that
were crashed into the WTC. A ship could also be used to smuggle a weapon of mass
destruction to a port, then detonated.
A suspected member of the al Qaeda terrorist network attempted to illegally enter Canada
using a container that had been modified with a bed, battery-powered heater, toilet, and
enough water for the three-week voyage to Toronto.
Terrorists may attempt to gain access to a ship by infiltration or assault. In preparation for an
attack involving the maritime industry, terrorists are likely to conduct surveillance of
potential targets.
USAGE WITH THE DECLARATION OF SECURITY

An agreement reached between a ship and either a port facility or another ship with which it
interfaces specifying the security measures each will implement.
(SOLAS reg. XI-1/1) A Declaration of Security identifies the security activities or measures
that each party will undertake or implement in specified circumstances to ensure compliance
with Part A of the ISPS Code. It provides a means for ensuring that all shared security
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concerns are fully addressed throughout the ship/port interface. The Declaration of Security
must contain the information set out in the form in Appendix 1 of Part B of the ISPS Code.
• When the ship is operating at a higher security level than the port facility it has
notified of its intention to enter;
• When the ship intends to enter a port facility that is not required to have a Port
Facility Security Plan or appoint a Port Facility Security Officer;
• When the ship is at a higher security level than the port facility (where the port
facility is at a higher security level than the ship, it is for the port facility to initiate the
DoS);
• In all cases where the ship is operating at security level 3;
• When a ship/ship interface takes place outside the harbour area, whether or not
the other ship is required to have a ship security plan, or at what security level the
other ship is operating at;
• Following a security incident or security threat to the ship, or the port facility or
ship it is interfacing with;
• When the security level is increased while the ship is in port or ship/ship
interface is taking place;
• When so requested by a duly authorized Government officer;
• When carrying or intending to load or discharge cargoes of dangerous goods
Class 1 (explosives), 6 (toxic and infectious substances) or 7 (radioactive materials).
Specific requirements may also be given to individual ships, ship types and for specific
ports.
9. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, DRILLS, AND EXERCISES
9.1 CONTINGENCY PLANS

Duties and Responsibilities
When a ship suffers a casualty, or is otherwise in a position of peril, the Master must decide
as a matter of urgency whether assistance, including salvage assistance, is needed or if the
situation can be handled using the ship’s own resources.
Authority of the Master

The Master has absolute authority to summon salvage assistance on his own assessment of
the situation, and his exercising of this authority should not be unreasonably delayed while
seeking advice from company.
He remains in command of the vessel despite the presence of a Salvage Master and he
should therefore ensure that he is fully aware of the action taken in the rendering of salvage
services. Even though services have been accepted and assistance is being rendered.
• If salvage assistance is required it is preferable that this should be rendered by
another company ship. The master must therefore establish whether any such ships
are in the vicinity and if they are in a position to assist. The Master must not hesitate;
however, to accept earlier assistance from other ships if this is necessary.
• The authority of the Master is not altered by engaging salvor.
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• The salvor must cease his services if requested to do so by the Master.

• The Master should, however, co-operate fully with the Salvor and should take
account of any advice given by the Salvage Master or other person in charge or
rendering or advising on salvage services.
• The Salvor may not be experts in the safety and handling of cargo. If the Master
is in doubt about the advisability of any action suggested by the Salvor, he should not
hesitate to challenge the advice given, bearing in mind his overriding responsibility for
the safety of the vessel and those on board.
Assessment of Urgency
The Master should immediately assess the dangers to which the vessel is exposed and the
urgency with which assistance may be required from outside sources. It is better to over-
react on the side of safety and pollution prevention than to delay action in the hope
that the situation may improve. It should be assumed that it will not improve.
Evaluation of Situation
When a casualty causes any loss of the operational capability of the ship, however slight, the
Master must evaluate the situation that could arise if no corrective action were to be taken.
He must assess how long the present situation can be permitted to continue, taking into
account possible changes in the weather or circumstances such as a drift towards the shore.
The Master must take into account the risk of pollution when deciding upon appropriate
action.
Plan of Action
The Master should take whatever action is possible to remedy the situation, initially making
best use of the ship’s own resources before outside assistance can be obtained.
Obtaining Assistance
Once the Master has decided that assistance is necessary, he should act promptly to request
it from any available source using any means at his disposal. When a suitable assisting ship
arrives at the scene, the Master should immediately request it to undertake action as
necessary.
Terms upon Which Salvage Assistance is to be accepted

When salvage assistance is required the Master should Endeavour to agree with the Salvor
that the assistance shall be rendered subject to the terms of Lloyd’s Standard Form of
Salvage Agreement (1980).
When assistance is rendered by port tugs an effort should be made, if the circumstances
permit, to employ the tugs and any barges, etc. which may be used, on a contract basis. This
can be arranged through the Agents and is usually much cheaper than salvage under Lloyd’s
Form. In these circumstances of course, Lloyd’s Form will not be used.
If the Safety of the ship is likely to be prejudiced the Master must on no account delay
getting assistance merely to source any particular form of agreement.
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If the Master accepts Lloyd’s Form of Salvage Agreement (LOF) but is unable to sign the
Form, company will always honour his agreement and will sign the form on his behalf when it
is presented by the Salvor.
Terms upon Which Salvage Assistance is to be rendered

Where ANY assistance is rendered to other than company ships, the Master should Endeavour
to obtain agreement to this being under the conditions of Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage
Agreement (LOF). Until it is possible for written confirmation to be obtained the Master
should endeavor to agree to have the following terms accepted: –
“It is agreed that the assistance rendered by my ship M.V. ………………………….. To your ship
S.S/M.V ………………….. . is on the Terms and conditions of Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage
Agreement (1980)”.
These terms may be agreed by radio or other convenient means, although where reasonably
possible they should be confirmed in writing.
If possible Lloyd’s Form (with the amount of remuneration left blank) should be signed before
finally parting company from the ship assisted. In this event the Master shall sign as follows:
“For and on behalf of the Owners, Master and Crew of S.S/M.V……………….Master”
Amount of Remuneration
Under the terms of Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage Agreement (1980) the remuneration, if
it cannot be agreed between the parties, is determined by an arbitrator. Lloyd’s arbitrators
are barristers practicing at the Admiralty Bar in London.
Government Intervention
The Government of a country whose interests are threatened has a right to take action within
its territorial waters in respect of a ship that has suffered a maritime casualty. In port or
estuarial waters the local Port or Harbour Authority may have jurisdiction.
Rendering Salvage Assistance – Vessel on Charter

In the event of the vessel being on charter when an opportunity for rendering salvage
services occurs, permission to deviate must first be obtained from the Charterer of the
vessel, UNLESS
THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA IS INVOLVED.

Permission to deviate will normally be arranged through shore operating management. If this
is not possible, the Master should seek authority from the senior Charterer’s representative
available. If all attempts to obtain authority through the proper channels fail, the Master
must use his own initiative, always bearing in mind the vessel’s primary function, and the
charterer’s operational circumstances and requirements as they may be known to him.
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Definition of Emergency
STAFF ONLY EMERGENCY
Loss of life or serious injury to Contract Staff either on board or travelling to/from their
vessel
GENERAL EMERGENCY
An incident which has involved or may involve a company operated vessel and where there is
a strong possibility of danger, death or serious injury to Contract Staff and/or damage to
plant.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of these emergency procedures are to ensure that any major incident is rapidly
brought to the attention of company Offshore Operations, Aberdeen (hereafter referred to as
company), so that a system is put into place to correlate information, keep records etc., and
thereby avoid a situation where families and friends are placed in a state of undue anxiety
through lack of information.
Although it is not the position of company to give personnel information to next of kin etc.,
lists of names and addresses of main contract staff are held in the company Aberdeen office
to enable the contacting of back-up personnel etc.
Procedure for Liaison Between company/NMM (And Other Agency)

GENERAL
Although major oil companies have comprehensive emergency and contingency plans for
major incidents, it should never be assumed that company will be informed under these
plans. The Master of any vessel involved in a major incident/accident whether alongside or
nearby an installation/base or whether in open water should as a priority informs company by
the most appropriate means.
Outside of working hours contact should be made Emergency Number who will alert the
Operations Superintendent, Operations Manager as appropriate. It should be noted that
although there are separate operations involved in company, if difficulty exists in contacting
the designated personnel all company personnel will assist. It will then be the duty of the
Operations Manager, or his deputy to make contact with charterers/owners as deemed
necessary.
At this stage it may well be that an oil company’s emergency procedures have been
activated. It can be anticipated that other oil companies will operate similar procedures and it
may well be expedient for the Operations Manager, or his deputy to be present at such
location
DURING WORKING HOURS
The Operations Manager or his deputy will direct and execute his responsibilities from the
company Aberdeen Office.
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In either case, the Operations Manager, will contact the relevant Contracted Companies and
inform them of the incident and identify one person within their Company with whom he will
liaise throughout the situation.
The Operations Manager, his liaison within the Contracted Companies will identify one direct
telephone number in each office to be used throughout the emergency.
Should news of the incident reach the media, it would be expected that family and friends of
Contract staff may phone the company Aberdeen office. In general, these callers will be
briefly advised of the incident that has occurred. They will not be given details about
personnel involved but will be advised to phone the Contracted Company switchboard
number for such details.
OUTSIDE WORKING HOURS

During any major incident the company Aberdeen office will be manned regardless.
In all cases, the Operations Manager, will contact the Contracted Company at one of the
Company home numbers and inform them of the situation. He will expect to be advised of
the action the Contracted Company will be taking.
If Contracted Company staff decides to proceed to their office, the Operations Manager
Company will identify one person with whom he will liaise.
Should news of the incident reach the media, then the company Aberdeen office should be
manned. It can be expected that family and friends of Contract staff may phone this office. In
general these callers should be briefly advised of
• the incident that has occurred
• not be given details about personnel involved
• advised to phone the Contracted Company switchboard number for details
DEPUTIES
Should the Operations Manager Company be unavailable, his deputy will be nominated to
liaise with the Contracted Companies.
9.2 SECURITY DRILLS AND EXERCISES
Programme for Drills and Exercises

Notwithstanding any of the requirements given below an on board drill must be held at
least once every 14 days and an entry is to be made into the Deck Log book and Official
Log book when such exercises are held.
LIFEBOAT/LIFERAFT DRILLS
Abandon Ship Drills must be carried out at least once a month. Whenever 25% of the crew is
changed, such drill must be carried out within 24 hours of leaving port.
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The crew will be given instruction in all aspects of launch, recovery, and operation of
equipment. Simple instruction will be given in abandon ship procedures, and all equipment
will be checked for any defects. Should any such defects be found, then they must be
reported immediately to the Chief Engineer so that repair or replacement can be carried out.
FIRE DRILLS
Fire drills and exercises will be held at least once per month; duties will be allocated to the
ship’s company in accordance with the ships Muster List.
Lifeboat and Emergency exercises may be conducted separately or together in sequence as
decided by the Master.
SECURITY DRILLS
Security drills should be conducted at least once every 3 months. In addition, in cases where
more than 25% of the ship’s personnel has been changed, at any one time, with personnel
that has not previously participated in any drill on that ship within the last 3 months, a drill
should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test the various
elements of the Ship security Plan.
OTHER EXERCISES
Onboard drills and contingency scenarios shall also include the following:
• Rescue Boat Launch
• Man Overboard
• SOPEP/SMPEP
• Enclosed Space Rescue
• Emergency Steering
• Medical Emergency
• Collision/Flooding/Ground
The requirements for frequency of drills are given on form company005 “Onboard Emergency
Drills & Training Programme”. This form is to be completed by all vessels as drills are carried
out. The method of completion should permit the identification of what crew has carried out
each drill.
For details of responsibilities at ship based emergency scenarios see procedure “Ship
Emergency Actions”.
SHIP / SHORE EMERGENCY EXERCISES

Ship / Shore Emergency Exercises are to be held at intervals of at least once per Year. The
Company will stipulate a time period (+/- 7 days) in which the ship shall perform the
exercise.
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10. SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

When the ship is at sea, Security level is set by the flag state of the vessel. Flag state may
not instruct the ship directly but may do so through CSO.
CSO will forward the message from the flag state to the applicable ships to change the
security level. SSO need to acknowledge the mail for instructions to change the security level
and confirm to CSO when the security level is changed.
At port, vessel needs to have same security level as the port. Before arrival, agent gives all
the security details of the port and also advises the security level of the ship.
If the security level of the port is higher than the ship, the ship must increase the security
level to same as the port.
Now there may be instances where security level of ship is higher than the port it is calling.
In this case, SSO should consult CSO. CSO may advise to decrease the level of the ship
without downgrading the security measures.
This means that in this case, the ship will have lower security level but will have same
security measures that are required as per higher security level in SSP.
CSO after consultation with flag may advise to keep the higher security level. In this case,
vessel must inform the port of its higher security level.
10.1 DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS

Trainees should be aware of the required vessel and facility security documentation including
the validity and verification requirements of the vessel International Ship Security Certificate
and Continuous Synopsis Record as well as the Statement of Compliance of a Facility.
Every vessel shall carry on board

(1) Every vessel shall carry on board
(a) The original of the certificate described in subsection (2);
(b) A vessel security plan approved
(i) In the case of a vessel entitled to fly the Canadian flag, by the Minister, and
(ii) In the case of a vessel entitled to fly the flag of a foreign state, by a contracting
government or by a security organization referred to in section 9.2 of Part A of the ISPS
Code;
(c) A continuous synopsis record issued by a contracting government, if the vessel is a

SOLAS ship;
(d) A record of the last 10 calls at marine facilities;
(e) A copy of the last 10 declarations of security; and
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(f) If the vessel is a SOLAS ship, the original of every certificate of proficiency required by
this Part for the vessel security officer and for vessel personnel with or without security
responsibilities.
(2) The certificate referred to in paragraph (1) (a) is

(a) In the case of a SOLAS ship that is entitled to fly the Canadian flag, a certificate issued
under subsection 202(1) or (3);
(b) In the case of a non-SOLAS ship that is entitled to fly the Canadian flag, a certificate
issued under subsection 202(2) or (3);
(c) in the case of a SOLAS ship that is entitled to fly the flag of a foreign state, an
international ship security certificate, or an interim international ship security certificate,
issued by the contracting government of that state; and
(d) In the case of a non-SOLAS ship that is entitled to fly the flag of a foreign state, a ship
security compliance document, or an interim ship security compliance document, issued or
approved by the contracting government of that state.
(3) The vessel security officer on a SOLAS ship and a member of the vessel personnel with
or without security responsibilities on a SOLAS ship shall, if they hold a certificate of
proficiency, ensure that their certificate is carried on board.
Documents with vessel security officer

(1) A vessel security officer shall keep the following records:
(a) Details of security training, including the date, duration and description and the names of
the participants;
(b) Details of security drills and exercises, including the date and description, the names of
the participants and any best practices or lessons learned that might improve the vessel
security plan;
(c) details of security threats, security breaches and security incidents, including the date,
time, location and description, the response to them and the person to whom they were
reported;
(d) Records of changes in the MARSEC level, including the date, the time that notification
was received and the time of compliance with the requirements of the new level;
(d.1) a record of the date on which, and the time at which, the vessel becomes subject to
this Part and of the date on which, and the time at which, it ceases to be subject to this Part;
(e) records of maintenance, calibration and testing of equipment used for security, including
the date and time of the activity and the equipment involved;
(f) The last 10 declarations of security and of each continuing declaration of security for at
least 90 days after the end of its effective period;
(g) In the case of a SOLAS ship, a continuous synopsis record issued by the Minister;
(h) a record of the last 10 calls at marine facilities;
(i) a record of each annual audit of the vessel security plan that includes, for each annual
audit, a letter from the company security officer or the vessel security officer that certifies
the day on which the audit was completed;
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(j) A copy of the vessel security assessment and details of each periodic review of the vessel
security assessment, including the date on which it was conducted and the findings of the
review;
(k) the approved vessel security plan and details of each periodic review of the vessel
security plan, including the date on which it was conducted, the findings of the review and
any amendments to the plan that are recommended;
(l) Details of each amendment to the vessel security plan, including the date of its approval
and of its implementation;
(m) A list, by name or position, of the vessel personnel who have security responsibilities;
(n) An up-to-date list containing the names of screening officers; and
(o) Records of inspections, including the date on which they are conducted.
(2) If records respecting equipment that is not used exclusively for security are kept
separately from records respecting equipment that is used exclusively for security, the vessel
security officer shall
(a) document, in written or electronic form, their existence, location and the name or
position of the person responsible for keeping them; and
(b) Ensure that the records are accessible.
(3) The vessel security officer shall ensure that the records set out in subsection (1) are
kept for at least two years after they are made and shall make them available to the Minister
on request, but shall ensure that the copy of the vessel security assessment and the
approved vessel security plan are kept for at least two years after the expiry of the plan.
(4) The vessel security officer shall ensure that the records are protected from unauthorized
access or disclosure.
(5) The vessel security officer shall ensure that any records kept in electronic format are
protected from deletion, destruction and revision.
(6) No person shall disclose security information contained in the records, unless the
disclosure is for the purpose of complying with these Regulations.
(1) A marine facility security officer shall keep

(a) Records of security training, including the date, the duration and description and the
names of the participants;
(b) Records of security drills and exercises, including the date and description, the names of
the participants and any best practices or lessons learned that might improve the marine
facility security plan;
(c) records of security threats, security breaches and security incidents, including the date,
time, location and description, the response to them and the person to whom they were
reported;
(d) Records of changes in the MARSEC level, including the date, the time that notification
was received and the time of compliance with the requirements of the new level;
(e) records of maintenance, calibration and testing of equipment used for security, including
the date and time of the activity and the equipment involved;
(f) Declarations of security in respect of the marine facility;
(g) Internal audits and reviews of security activities;
(h) Security assessment information;
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(i) The marine facility security assessment and each periodic review of the assessment,
including the date on which the review was conducted and its findings;
(j) The marine facility security plan and each periodic review of the plan, including the date
on which the review was conducted, its findings and any recommended amendments to the
plan;
(k) Each amendment to the marine facility security plan, including the date of its approval
and implementation;
(l) Records of inspections and patrols;
(m) A list, by name or position, of the persons who have security responsibilities;
(n) An up-to-date list containing the names of screening officers; and
(o) An up-to-date list, by name and position, of the holders of transportation security
clearances, except in a case where a port administration keeps the list.
(2) If records respecting equipment that is not used exclusively for security are kept
separately from records respecting equipment that is used exclusively for security, the
marine facility security officer shall
(a) document, in written or electronic form, their existence, location and the name or
position of the person responsible for keeping them; and
(b) Ensure that the records are accessible.
(3) The marine facility security officer shall ensure that the records or documents listed in
subsection (1) are kept for at least two years after the day on which they are made and shall
make them available to the Minister on request, but shall ensure that the marine facility
security plan, and the assessment on which it was based, are kept for at least two years after
the day on which the plan expires.
(4) The marine facility security officer shall ensure that the records are protected from
unauthorized access or disclosure.
(5) The marine facility security officer shall ensure that any records kept in electronic format
are protected from deletion, destruction and revision.
Port Record Keeping

(1) The port security officer shall, in respect of the port, keep records of
(a) Security training, including the date, the duration and description and the names of the
participants;
(b) Security drills and exercises, including the date and description, the names of the
participating marine facilities and any best practices or lessons learned that might improve
the port security plan;
(c) Security threats, security breaches and security incidents, including the date, time,
location and description, the response to them and the person to whom they were reported;
(d) Changes in the MARSEC level, including the date, the time that notification was received
and the time of compliance with the security requirements of the new level;
(e) Maintenance, calibration and testing of equipment used in security, including the date
and time of the activity and the equipment involved;
(f) Internal audits and reviews of security activities;
(g) Security assessment information;
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(h) The port security assessment and each periodic review of the port security assessment,
including the date on which it was conducted and the findings of the review;
(i) the port security plan and each periodic review of the port security plan, including the
date on which it was conducted, the findings of the review and any amendments to the plan
that are recommended;
(j) Each amendment to the port security plan, including the date of its approval and
implementation;
(k) A list of the persons in the port administration who have security responsibilities;
(l) An up-to-date list containing the names of screening officers; and
(m) An up-to-date list, by name and position, of the holders of transportation security
clearances.
(2) Records respecting equipment that is not used exclusively for security may be kept
separately from the records respecting equipment that is used exclusively for security if
(a) The port security officer documents, in written or electronic form, their existence and
location and the name of the person responsible for their maintenance; and
(b) They are accessible to the port security officer.
(3) The port security officer shall ensure that the records are kept for at least two years
after the day on which they are made and make them available to the Minister on request.
(4) The records shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure.
(5) The records may be kept in electronic format if they are protected from deletion,
destruction and revision.
10.2 SECURITY AUDIT & INSPECTIONS
The threat of piracy in the Indian Ocean underlines the necessity for vessels operating in the
region to have well-established, proactive and robust security plans
Online maritime intelligence systems are the cornerstone of all comprehensive security plans.
They provide:
• An initial insight into the threat picture;
• The first component to route selections and risk analyses; and
• Continual security updates with real time live data.
Preliminary insight into the threat picture

Anti-piracy security plans require an initial risk assessment to ensure that they are fit for
purpose and proportionate to the current threat level. If they are not adequate for the threat,
the vessel is vulnerable to attack and even hijack. Conversely, security plans that are
excessive for the threat or that is not dynamic or responsive can prove cost-prohibitive.
Successful anti-piracy security plans use layered solutions. These require the ability to
escalate for heightened threats and decrease for lowered threats. Decision-making as to the
necessary security operating level is critical to managing security, financial and reputational
risks. Such decisions require an accurate and dynamic insight into the current threat picture,
which increasingly comes from online intelligence systems.
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Route selection and analysis

Depending on their risk tolerance, the vessel owner and operator can choose whether to
avoid, transfer, mitigate or even accept the risks associated with operating in the region.
While vessel hardening and the employment of vessel protection teams are risk mitigation
measures, online maritime intelligence systems help vessel owners to avoid the risk in the
first instance.
“The first aim of any vessel should be to avoid encountering pirates.” - Andy Nicholson, Drum
Cussac
Dynamic risk assessments provided by online systems help vessel owners to plot a route
away from areas of high threat, based upon latest incidents, historical trends and seasonal
patterns. Therefore, the intelligent route planning and risk analysis produced by online
systems should be the foundation of all security plans.
Continuing security updates

The value of online maritime intelligence systems goes beyond the initial threat picture and
transit planning phase. They provide vessels with continual maritime security updates using
real-time data. In accordance with BMP4, the ship should act immediately on information
regarding the latest known pirate operating locations along the entirety of its transit.
Online threat assessment systems should be monitored throughout the vessel’s

proposed route; this will allow operators and owners to amend transit plans in
accordance with emerging threats and in line with real-time data.
Furthermore, online systems will give the vessel owners and operators the opportunity of
escalating their security plans in association with a dynamic threat picture. In this instance
the provision of accurate and timely security information, through online maritime
intelligence systems, is central to all security
CREW ADVANCE PREPARATIONS
Preparing the crew in advance can significantly reduce the trauma they suffer if they are
captured
A ship owner should convey to the crew before a voyage commences that it is very unlikely
they will be physically harmed or killed if they are captured, whatever the pirates threaten.
The pirates want to be paid as much ransom as possible, and in most cases they understand
this means treating the crew reasonably.
“Information on how to behave appears to have played a large part in initial responses and
aided their ability to manage the situation.”
Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Good Practice Guide The briefing should include:
Page 91 of 95
• Confirmation that the owner will continue to pay the crew’s wages and look after
their families’ welfare and finances if the crew is held;
• Assurance of the company’s compliance with the latest version of BMP;
• Arrangements for communication with the company and security services in
case of attack;
• Familiarization with the protective measures adopted by the ship and other
security resources;
• Reassurance that, if they are captured, the owner and agents will do everything
possible to negotiate their release; and
• Information that the owner will use consultants who are experienced and
successful in such negotiations.
The company should emphasize that once pirates are on board, seafarers generally must
comply with their instructions. Compliant behavior is a survival technique.
If they are captured, the crew should resign themselves for a long wait. Boredom becomes
an important issue, but the crew is not likely to be separated.
ACTIONS AFTER A SHIP IS HIJACKED

Following the correct procedures after a ship is hijacked can accelerate the release of the
crew and reduce the ransom demand from the hijackers
“Negotiations with Somali pirates are similar to a ride on a roller coaster.” Leslie Edwards,
Compass Risk Management
The hours and days immediately following the taking of a ship will be very stressful for any
owner. The company will be under a great deal of pressure from a number of different
sources. Families of crew members, authorities, media and other interested parties, usually
in several different countries, will demand information and reassurance. The owner or its
representative may have to take calls from the master of the hijacked vessel and even the
pirates.
The owner or agent will need to put into immediate effect a prepared and practised
emergency response plan, and assemble and brief the previously nominated and
trained crisis management team. All will need an understanding of the dynamics and
timescale of a ship hijack.
One of the first priorities will be to activate experienced response consultants who will steer
and guide the owner through the first critical days. Without professional guidance, serious
mistakes in the first few days can add weeks or months to the hijack.
In the first few hours an owner should:
• Activate response consultants experienced in piracy cases;

• Inform and assemble the crisis management team;
Page 92 of 95
• Brief maritime authorities;

• Get advice from a lawyer with experience of the legal issues in piracy;
• Notify insurers;
• Inform the crewing agent, so that the families of crew can be briefed by
telephone;
• Prepare for the first call from the pirates;
• Inform other interested parties, including charterers and cargo;
• Nominate a company officer to take calls from the pirates using wording
prepared by the response consultants;
• Inform other employees of the situation and give instructions; and
• Agree a media contact person.
The owner should not:
• Talk to the press without advice from consultants; and

• Agree to any demands made by the pirates.
In one case in 2011, an owner spoke to the press without taking advice from response
consultants. The press published details of the owner’s financial and insurance circumstances
on the internet, which raised the pirates’ financial expectations and probably added months
to the hijack. It is known with absolute certainty that pirates use the internet to research the
company and the owner prior to making ransom demands.
Ransom negotiations and payment

In more than 160 hijack cases since 2008, no merchant ship without local Somali connections
has been deliberately freed by Somali pirates without the payment of a ransom. The pirates
are businessmen conducting a criminal extortion against owners in which the safety of the
crew, ship and cargo are the leverage. Their sole motivation is money. A negotiation followed
by a ransom payment remains the lowest risk and safest method of securing the safe release
of the crew and ship.
Negotiations with Somali pirates are similar to a ride on a roller coaster, ranging from
extreme stress one moment to elation and relief the next, and then back to sheer terror. It is
a true challenge to achieve a safe resolution of the situation in a reasonable amount of time
for a reasonable amount of money in an agreement that the pirates will honor without messy
or high-risk complications. Owners will need professional help to steer and guide them
through this difficult process.
The pirates will normally appoint an English-speaking Somali as their negotiator, who will
almost certainly be working on a freelance basis. He will likely be practiced at his trade,
having already acted for several different pirate groups.
“The pirates are adept at putting maximum emotional pressure on the owners to agree to a
high ransom.”
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Peter Dobbs, Catlin Asset Protection
The pirates will use a whole menu of direct and indirect threats and tactics, including
attempting to turn the families of the hostage crew and the press against the owner. Threats
of violence against the crew, including torture, are common. The pirates often use misleading
and confusing demands to trick owners. They employ a whole range of ruses and deceptions.
Advice from response consultants who are familiar with pirates tactics can neutralize many of
these the owners’ reaction and negotiation strategy may affect the pirates’ actions and
treatment and welfare of the crew:
• Experience shows that early agreement to a high ransom demand can result in
the negotiation being further drawn out - not shortened. The pirates may simply want
more.
• Consultants who have actually visited Somalia and have an understanding of the
Somali mind-set and way of thinking bring invaluable experience to the owner’s team.
• The negotiation phase may last six months or more. During this time the
response consultant will steer and guide the owner until there is an agreement that the
pirates will honor.
• Throughout this phase it is essential that families of crew are correctly and
regularly briefed. They will be valuable allies if kept on side, but can create serious
problems for the negotiation if alienated. Response consultants will greatly assist
owners in working with the families.
Ransom payment
The vast majority of ransom deliveries to Somali pirates are conducted by parachute drop
from light aircraft. This method is relatively low-risk, fast and straightforward. However,
cashing and moving large amounts of money to a forward airfield is often much more difficult
and problematic and carries higher risks.
The response consultancy will assist the owner in planning the ransom delivery well in
advance of agreement with the pirates, so that there is the minimum of delay between final
agreement and delivery of the ransom. Some or all of the following will be required:
• Evidence of compliance with current regulations on the prohibition of delivery of

ransoms, directly or indirectly, to terrorist groups and other proscribed and listed
persons;
• A facility for cashing and collection of the ransom money in cash;
• Approval for the release of cash from the authorities in the releasing jurisdiction;
• The selection and appointment of a delivery company;
• A risk assessment of every phase of the delivery plan by the owner, insurers and
response consultancy, with the owner retaining the right to veto any part of the plan
deemed too high-risk;
• Loss in transit insurance coverage for the ransom;
• Written instructions to the pirates on how they should prepare to receive the
ransom money, in terms of positioning of the ship, etc.; and
• Written or other instructions to the crew for their conduct during the delivery.
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Owners should not underestimate the time required to have all these measures in place,
particularly a cashing facility. The banking system has an unfortunate habit of taking its time
irrespective of urgency, and owners should allow at least three weeks’ lead time. The delivery
operation will have to be planned in parallel with the negotiation and, in most cases, before
the negotiation is complete. A flexible plan based on a movable delivery day is required.
10.4 REPORTING SECURITY INCIDENTS

For each Maritime Security Level, the vessel owner or operator must ensure the Vessel
Security Officer (VSO) and vessel security personnel are able to:
(a) Respond to security threats or breaches of security and maintain
critical vessel and vessel-to-facility interface operations, to include:
(1) Prohibiting entry into affected area;
(2) Denying access to the vessel, except to those responding to the emergency;
(3) Implementing MARSEC Level 3 security measures throughout the vessel;
(4) Stopping cargo-handling operations; and
(5) Notifying shore side authorities or other vessels of the emergency;
(b) Evacuating the vessel in case of security threats or breaches of security;

(c) Reporting security incidents as required.
(d) Briefing all vessel personnel on possible threats and the need for vigilance, soliciting their
assistance in reporting suspicious persons, objects, or activities; and
(e) Securing non-critical operations in order to focus response on critical operations.
11. Security Training Requirements:

The course focuses on:
• The meaning and the consequential requirements of the different security levels
• Knowledge of emergency procedures and contingency plans
• Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances, and devices
• Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioral
patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security
• Techniques used to circumvent security measures
Page 95 of 95

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“Learning Together, Leading Together”

Institute is managed by Victory Charitable & Educational Trust

2. MARITIME SECURITY POLICIES ………………………………...........................06

3. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES ……………………………….…………................23

4. SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT ………………...............................................26

6. SHIP SECURITY PLAN..….........................................................................57

7. THREAT IDENTIFICATIONS, RECOGNITION & RESPONSE……..................62

8. SHIP SECURITY ACTIONS..……………….....................................................74

9. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, DRILLS AND EXERCISES.…………….………..79

10. SECURITY ADMINISTRATION……………….............................................84

11. SECURITY TRAINING………………….......................................................94

Course overview and History

1.2 COMPETENCES TO BE ACHIEVED

 Every candidate for certification shall be required to provide evidence of having

1.3. Current security threats and patterns

Ship and port operations and conditions

Threats to the maritime transport industry include those given below.

PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

STOWAWAYS AND REFUGEES

Ship and Port operations and conditions

2. MARITIME SECURITY POLICY:

ACTIVITIES AT THE IMO SINCE “September 11”:

As a result of the adoption of resolution A.924 (22), a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime

The 2002 SOLAS Conference adopted a number of amendments to the International

CO-OPERATION WITH ILO AND WCO:

2.1 FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, CODES,

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE NEW REQUIREMENTS:

For port facilities, the requirements include:

Regulations accelerating the implementation of the requirement to fit automatic identification

In summary the ISPS Code:

It requires ship and port facility staff to:

Guidance to Ship-owners, Companies, Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing

2.2 FAMILIARITY WITH RELEVANT GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION AND

The Code defines three security levels for international use:

THE COMPANY AND THE SHIP

MSC/Circ.1113 on Guidance to Port State Control Officers on the non-security related

MSC/Circ.1130 on Guidance to masters, Companies and duly authorized officers on

MSC/Circ.1156 on Guidance on the access of public authorities, emergency response

MSC.1/Circ.1191 on Reminder of the obligation to notify flag States when exercising

REVISION OF THE SUA CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL

LONG RANGE IDENTIFICATION AND TRACKING OF SHIPS

CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ISO:.

marine technology (ISO/TC8), developed a publicly available specification (PAS), ISO/PAS

PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE SMUGGLING OF DRUGS:

THE CURRENT STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

It is vitally important that all concerned maintain as high standards of implementation as

THE TASK FOR THOSE INVOLVED

Governments need to communicate security-related information to ships and port facilities.

THE PORT FACILITY

Ship Security Plan

Company Security Officer

Ship Security Officer

Facility Security Officer

Designated authority means the organization(s) or the administration(s) identified, by or

Recognized Security Organization

The Declaration of Security shall be completed by:

Security incident: Any act or circumstance affecting the security of a port.

The three security levels

Terms relating to piracy and armed robbery Introduction

Initiatives to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea

2.4 HANDLING SENSITIVE SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION AND

Threats to Information Security