Ruby Deanne G.

Turing, JD2 Legal Technique & Logic-Midterm

Procedural issue case 1

CESAR NAGUIT vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (G.R. No. 188839, June 22, 2015)

Facts:

Cesar Naguit was employed as a machine operator of San Miguel Corporation Metal Closure and
Lithography Plant.Petitioner and one Renato Regala (Regala), also an employee of respondent
corporation, got involved in an altercation in respondent corporation's Plant.Both parties exchanged
heated words and then petitioner elbowed Regala, hitting him in the face, causing him to lose his
balance and fall to the ground.San Miguel Corporation then conducted an administrative investigation
giving both parties the opportunity to defend themselves.San Miguel Corporation finds the petitioner
guilty of willful injury to another employee within company premises, which is an infraction of the
company's rules and regulations which resulted to serving Naguit a termination letter. Naguit then filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent corporation.The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a
Decision in favor of respondent corporation. Petitioner filed an Appeal with the NLRC but the latter
dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Decision of the LA. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it.Aggrieved, petitioner intended to file a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA to assail the NLRC Decision.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner
claimed that on December 10, 2008, his former counsel received a copy of the NLRC Resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated April 30, 2008; that he had until
February 9, 2009 to file a certiorari petition; and, that he just hired a new counsel who still had to study
the records of the case.On February 13, 2009, the CA promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. Citing the amended provisions of Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is non-
extendable. Subsequently, the CA issued another Resolution resolving to consider
petitioner's certiorari petition as filed out of time and declaring the questioned NLRC Decision as final
and executory.On even date, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Resolution which
denied his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari.On July 15, 2009, the CA
promulgated its Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion when it failed to decide this case on
the merits in accordance with Supreme Court jurisprudence afforded to labor cases?

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the CA should have
decided the case on its merits and not simply dismissed his certiorari petition by denying his motion for
extension to file the said petition.

The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for
extension to file a petition for certiorari exists. Under exceptional cases, however, the 60-day period
may be extended subject to the court's sound discretion. The Court also explained that the deletion of
the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading
absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been
reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a
prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion."

The Supreme Court, in this case, reiterated the laid-down exceptions to the strict application of the 60-
day period rule and the merits of the case being one. In the instant case, petitioner asserts that, due to
the unavailability of his former lawyer, he retained the services of a new counsel who has a heavy
workload and that the records were forwarded to the latter only a week before the expiration of the
period for filing of the petition with the CA.
The Court was not convinced as workload and resignation of the lawyer handling the case are
insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules.In addition, it is also the duty of
petitioner to monitor the status of his case and not simply rely on his former lawyer, whom he already
knew to be unable to attend to his duties as counsel. It is settled that litigants represented by counsel
should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. The Court
agrees with the CA that petitioner's failure to file his petition on time does not involve mere technicality
but is jurisdictional. Petitioner's failure to timely file his petition renders the questioned NLRC Decision
final and executory, thus, depriving the CA of its jurisdiction over the said petition.Furthermore, no one
has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari. These are statutory privileges which may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with by the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Procedural issue case 2

MARILOU PUNONGBAYAN-VISITACION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CARMELITA P.

PUNONGBAYAN (G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018)

FACTS:

Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion was the corporate secretary and assistant treasurer of St. Peter's
College of Iligan City. Acting on the advice of her counsel, she wrote a letter to private respondent
Carmelita P. Punongbayan which provides, among others that: “You KNOWINGLY COMMITTED
ACTS OF FALSIFICATION when you misrepresented to the bank that your signature is essentially
required in disbursements above P5,000.00. Your inordinate desire to poke into the school's finances
could be the by-product of an erroneous advice from some defrocked members of the committee.
Otherwise, there would have been need to calibrate amounts in the checks vis-a-vis the signatories
thereto.” Insulted, Punongbayan filed a Complaint for Libel against Visitacion. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution approving the filing of a case for libel against Visitacion.
RTC convicted Visitacion of libel and was adjudged to pay 300,000 moral damages.

Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary injunction before the CA.The CA dismissed Visitacion's petition. The appellate court
posited that the promulgation of the judgment despite Visitacion's absence was proper.In addition, the
CA expounded that Visitacion should have filed an appeal and not a petition for certiorari. The appellate
court opined that it should have been through an appeal where she could have raised the issues in the
present petition for certiorari. It noted that at the time Visitacion filed her petition, the period to file an
appeal had yet to expire. Thus, the CA elucidated that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause
for dismissal of the petition for certiorari because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Visitacion
moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.Hence, this present petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law in not treating petitioner's petition for
certiorari as appeal?

RULING:

Yes. Visitacion assails that her petition for certiorari should have been treated as an appeal. On the
other hand, both public and private respondents counter that the CA correctly dismissed Visitacion's
petition for certiorari because it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal and that a wrong mode of
appeal is dismissible.It is settled that appeal and certiorari are two different remedies, which are
generally not interchangeable, available to litigants. In Butuan Development Corporation v. CA, the
Court held that the special civil action of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal. Nevertheless, the
general rule that an appeal and a certiorari are not interchangeable admits exceptions. In Department
of Education v. Cuanan,  the Court exercised liberality and considered the petition for certiorari filed
therein as an appeal to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b)
when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the interest of substantial justice warrants the relaxation of the
rules and treats Visitacion's petition for certiorari as an appeal. This is especially true considering that
the same was filed within the reglementary period to file an appeal. It is noteworthy that in the litany of
cases where the Court did not consider certiorari as an appeal, the former remedy was filed beyond the
15-day period to interpose an appeal.
Substantial issue case 1

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION vs. CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO,

and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR (G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013)

Facts:

The respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a
portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other
Fibers Corporation. Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per
the original survey of 1916 to 1920. A resurvey was conducted and allegedly, the Lot No. 102 was not
included; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 722 in 1953, Lot No. 102
was not included. The respondents, however, continue to possess, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.
When Nenita Quality Foods Corp (NQFC) opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the
late 1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102 but Donato declined. Years later, the respondents
received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed
ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights in 1972, which the respondents and their
mother allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that
they had been occupying Lot No. 102, which the Bureau of Lands (BOL) itself recognized confirming
Donato as the long- time occupant and awardee of the property. In 2001, NQFCs workers, with armed
policemen entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the
authorities. Crisostomo received a letter from NQFCs counsel demanding that he remove his house
from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees that the
respondents had planted on the property. NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied
and possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under
his name for taxation purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by theBOL, and
obtained Original Certificate of Title No. In 1974. In 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102 to
NQFC via the Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages
before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No.
102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and
stealth.MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint. RTC denied the appeal.CA granted respondents’
petition and ordered NQFC to vacate.

Issue:
Whether or not NQFC had prior possession over the subject property?

Ruling:

No. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos’
OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ free
patent application. NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as
an attribute of ownership to actual possession. While these documents are material in contests over
ownership of Lot No. 102, they do not show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.Ownership
carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not
exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits
refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of
ownership.In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he
has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror --
not even by its owners. For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only
at providing an expeditious means of protecting actual possession.Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical
possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force,
intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof lies with the
complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by preponderance of
evidence. Respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements. Although the law allows
a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in
possession of the property for the period required by law, this pertains to possession de jure and the
tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership
through prescription. Possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession,
not legal possession. The issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving the issue of
possession. Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue
of ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance – to
determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership. Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as
in the present case.The decision of the CA is affirmed.

Substanstial issue case 2

SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, VS. EDA BONTILAO,
PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN (G.R. No. 238892, September 04, 2019)

Facts

Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and attorney's fees against respondents
before the MTCC alleging that respondents had constructed their houses on the subject property and
had been occupying the same by petitioners' mere tolerance, with the understanding that they will
peacefully vacate the premises upon proper demand. Unfortunately, when petitioners informed
respondents of their need of the subject property and requested them to voluntarily vacate the same,
respondents refused. Petitioners' formal demand for them to do so likewise went unheeded. Thus, after
efforts for an amicable settlement before the barangay similarly failed, petitioners instituted the present
complaint for unlawful detainer. In defense, respondents claimed that petitioners had no cause of action
against them, not being the real owners of the subject property. They averred that petitioners obtained
their title through fraud, having bought the subject property from one Gerardo Dungog despite full
knowledge that it was their predecessor, Mariano Ybañez who owned the same as evidenced by a tax
declaration issued under his name. As the legitimate heirs of Mariano, respondents claimed to be the
true owners of the subject property who were in continuous possession thereof since their youth.
Consequently, they could not have been occupying the subject property by the mere tolerance of
petitioners. The MTCC ruled favor of petitioners and against respondents. Being the registered owners
of the subject property covered by TCT No. 29490, petitioners have the right of possession over the
same, being one of the attributes of ownership. Moreover, the actual possession and occupation of
respondents was by mere tolerance of petitioners, hence, respondents were bound to peacefully vacate
upon demand. The MTCC noted that respondents failed to present any countervailing evidence to
support their claim of ownership or, at the least, possession of the subject property. Their allegation that
they are the legitimate heirs of Mariano, who they averred was the original owner of the subject
property, cannot be given credence as the same would amount to a collateral attack on the title of
petitioners. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the RTC.

The RTC affirmed the MTCC Decision in toto finding that respondents' occupation of the subject
property was by mere tolerance of petitioners, who were the registered owners thereof and therefore,
entitled to its possession as an attribute of ownership upon demand. The CA reversed and set aside
the RTC issuances and instead, dismissed the complaint altogether. It was held that it was grossly
erroneous for the RTC to affirm the MTCC's recall of its order dismissing the case for failure of
petitioners and their former counsel to appear during the first scheduled preliminary conference. The
summary nature of the proceedings in ejectment cases expressly prohibits dilatory motions for
postponements without justifiable cause and makes the appearance of the parties and their counsel
during the preliminary conference mandatory.Hence this, petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents' occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance of petitioners.

Ruling:

The court ruled in negative. The Court ruled that CA erred in completely dismissing petitioners' petition
before it on purely procedural grounds however dismissed the petition based on substantive
grounds.Unlawful detainer involves the defendant's withholding of the possession of the property to
which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession
under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful
detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession
must then be established. The Court has meticulously examined the records and finds that petitioners
failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' occupation of the subject property was
actually effected through their tolerance or permission. There is dearth of evidence to show how and
when the respondents entered the subject lot, as well as how and when the permission to occupy was
purportedly given by petitioners. Hence, there was no basis for the MTCC and RTC to conclude that
respondents' occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance of petitioners. In an action for
unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance must be proved; bare allegations are
insufficient. There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. The fact of
tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful detainer. Without proof that the possession
was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be that the defendant's possession of the subject
property will be deemed illegal from the very beginning, for which, the action for unlawful detainer shall
be dismissed. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer fails in the absence of proof of tolerance, coupled
with evidence of how the entry of the respondents was effected, or how and when the dispossession
started.
Finally, it was error for the courts a quo to rule in favor of petitioners merely on the basis of the Torrens
title registered in their names. There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner
of the property thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the fact alone does not give
them unbridled authority to immediately wrest possession from its current possessor in the absence of
evidence proving the allegations in their unlawful detainer claim. Indeed, even the legal owner of the
property cannot conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary action for
ejectment, without proving the essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file
an action for unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the
occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would be in a better
position by pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.