NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION vs.

CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO,

and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR

G.R. No. 174191               January 30, 2013

Facts:

The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102, the
former Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City. The respondents are the heirs of Donato
Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in
Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation. Donato and
the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916 to
1920. A resurvey was conducted. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when
Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 722 in 1953, Lot No. 102 was not included.
The respondents, however, continue to possess, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102. When NENITA
QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late
1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined. Years later, the respondents
received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot No. 102. Santos claimed
ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights in 1972, which the respondents and their
mother allegedly executed in Santos’ favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that
they had been occupying Lot No. 102, which the BOL itself recognized confirming Donato as the
long- time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for
free patent over Lot No. 102 in 2000. In 2001, NQFCs workers, with armed policemen entered by
force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. Crisostomo
received a letter from NQFCs counsel demanding that he remove his house from Lot No. 102.
NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees that the respondents
had planted on the property. NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied and
possessed Lot No. 102 after he purchased it from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under his
name for taxation purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau
of Lands, and obtained Original Certificate of Title No. In 1974. In 2000, the heirs of Santos
conveyed Lot No. 102 to NQFCvia the Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondents filed a complaint for
forcible entry with damages before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in
prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession through force,
intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth.MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint. RTC denied
the appeal.CA granted respondents’ petition and ordered NQFC to vacate.

Issue:
Whether or not NQFC had prior possession over the subject property?

Ruling:

The NQFC has no prior possession over the subject property. To prove prior physical possession of
Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer, Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute
Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ free patent application. NQFC is
apparently mistaken as it may have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership
to actual possession. While these documents are material in contests over ownership of Lot No.
102, they do not show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.Ownership carries the right of
possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same
as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to
possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not possession flowing out of
ownership.In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he
has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. He cannot be ejected by force,
violence or terror -- not even by its owners. For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is
summary in nature aimed only at providing an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession.Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the
plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful
deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any
civil case, the burden of proof lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must
establish their case by preponderance of evidence. Respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the
required elements. Although the law allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his
predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law,
this pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time
required for acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. Possession in forcible entry suits
refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession. The issue of ownership can
be material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if
the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an
exception and is allowed only in this limited instance – to determine the issue of possession and
only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Save
for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case.

The decision of the CA is affirmed.

SPOUSES AURORA TOJONG SU AND AMADOR SU, PETITIONERS, VS. EDA BONTILAO,
PABLITA BONTILAO, AND MARICEL DAYANDAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 238892, September 04, 2019

Facts

Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, damages, and attorney's fees against
respondents before the MCTC alleging that respondents had constructed their houses on the
subject property and had been occupying the same by petitioners' mere tolerance, with the
understanding that they will peacefully vacate the premises upon proper demand. Unfortunately,
when petitioners informed respondents of their need of the subject property and requested them to
voluntarily vacate the same, respondents refused. Petitioners' formal demand for them to do so
likewise went unheeded. Thus, after efforts for an amicable settlement before the barangay similarly
failed, petitioners instituted the present complaint for unlawful detainer. In defense, respondents
claimed that petitioners had no cause of action against them, not being the real owners of the
subject property. They averred that petitioners obtained their title through fraud, having bought the
subject property from one Gerardo Dungog despite full knowledge that it was their predecessor,
Mariano Ybañez who owned the same as evidenced by a tax declaration issued under his name. As
the legitimate heirs of Mariano, respondents claimed to be the true owners of the subject property
who were in continuous possession thereof since their youth. Consequently, they could not have
been occupying the subject property by the mere tolerance of petitioners. MTCC: In favor of
petitioners and against respondents. Being the registered owners of the subject property covered by
TCT No. 29490, petitioners have the right of possession over the same, being one of the attributes
of ownership. Moreover, the actual possession and occupation of respondents was by mere
tolerance of petitioners, hence, respondents were bound to peacefully vacate upon demand. The
MTCC noted that respondents failed to present any countervailing evidence to support their claim of
ownership or, at the least, possession of the subject property. Their allegation that they are the
legitimate heirs of Mariano, who they averred was the original owner of the subject property, cannot
be given credence as the same would amount to a collateral attack on the title of petitioners.
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the RTC.
The RTC affirmed the MTCC Decision in toto finding that respondents' occupation of the subject
property was by mere tolerance of petitioners, who were the registered owners thereof and
therefore, entitled to its possession as an attribute of ownership upon demand. The CA reversed
and set aside the RTC issuances and instead, dismissed the complaint altogether. It was held that it
was grossly erroneous for the RTC to affirm the MTCC's recall of its June 14, 2013 Order
dismissing the case for failure of petitioners and their former counsel to appear during the first
scheduled preliminary conference. The summary nature of the proceedings in ejectment cases
expressly prohibits dilatory motions for postponements without justifiable cause and makes the
appearance of the parties and their counsel during the preliminary conference mandatory.Hence
this, petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents' occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance of
petitioners.

Ruling:

The court ruled in negative. The Court ruled that CA erred in completely dismissing petitioners'
petition before it on purely procedural grounds however dismissed the petition based on
substanstive grounds.Unlawful detainer involves the defendant's withholding of the possession of
the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to
hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of
action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon
the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of
such lawful possession must then be established. The Court has meticulously examined the records
and finds that petitioners failed to adduce evidence to establish that the respondents' occupation of
the subject property was actually effected through their tolerance or permission. There is dearth of
evidence to show how and when the respondents entered the subject lot, as well as how and when
the permission to occupy was purportedly given by petitioners. Hence, there was no basis for the
MTCC and RTC to conclude that respondents' occupation of the subject property was by mere
tolerance of petitioners. In an action for unlawful detainer based on tolerance, the acts of tolerance
must be proved; bare allegations are insufficient. There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts
which are merely tolerated. The fact of tolerance is of utmost importance in an action for unlawful
detainer. Without proof that the possession was legal at the outset, the logical conclusion would be
that the defendant's possession of the subject property will be deemed illegal from the very
beginning, for which, the action for unlawful detainer shall be dismissed. Thus, an action for
unlawful detainer fails in the absence of proof of tolerance, coupled with evidence of how the entry
of the respondents was effected, or how and when the dispossession started. Finally, it was error
for the courts a quo to rule in favor of petitioners merely on the basis of the Torrens title registered
in their names. There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the rightful owner of the
property thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the fact alone does not give
them unbridled authority to immediately wrest possession from its current possessor in the absence
of evidence proving the allegations in their unlawful detainer claim. Indeed, even the legal owner of
the property cannot conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary action
for ejectment, without proving the essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner
choose to file an action for unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove
that the occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would
be in a better position by pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.