TAPUZ VS.

DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible
entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of
the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners –
armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons –
entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents’ permission
and against the objections of the private respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1)
they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim
for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents’ favor,
finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario
after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days
after the Sheriff’s written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow
the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction
and Order of Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
Issue:
W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper.
Ruling:
No. The supreme court found the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari
to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material
antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition
for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum
shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that
its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact.

Both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces
its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at
all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that
the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed
men bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the
supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of
the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum,
thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information
under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous
efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this Court – in the
course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ
of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.
CASTILLO VS. CRUZ

Facts:

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property),
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The
pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of
Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which
was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito
R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property,” entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that
the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they
shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct
assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Issue:

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,

WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

Ruling:

On the 1st issue:

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not
only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.”
Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not
suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or
detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.

On the 2nd issue:

Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been
barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in
flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data.

MERALCO VS. LIM

Facts:

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted at
the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel,
Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

“Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY

GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB…”

By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource

Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa
as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly
suspicious…” and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the
MERALCO Alabang Sector.

The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

Issues:

[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.

[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data?

Ruling:

[1] YES.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age
of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from
those provided under prevailing Rules.

[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment – are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns
is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

[2] YES.

There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they
existed at all.” And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the
real intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes
that the issue is labor-related.

VIVARES VS. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE

Facts:

Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned
from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.  Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne,
among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:

1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the

minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that
is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Issue:

Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to
informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)

Ruling:

NO, The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. The provision, when taken in its proper context,
as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful
acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in
gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data. To “engage” in something is different from
undertaking a business endeavor. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.”
It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in
the nature of a personal Endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity. to
agree with the argument of the petitioners, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a
great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

The respondents failed to established that the uploading or showing the photos to Tigol
constitute a violation of their privacy. the showing of the said photo to Tigol disproves
their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five of
them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able
to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. Considering that the default setting
for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. That the photos are viewable
by “friends only” does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends
with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when
a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,

honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect
a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business

endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether
such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and
is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at
all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.

Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control

information about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but
rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying
question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so
with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s
profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
 2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers
to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and
photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view
the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If
such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy.

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely

intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or
devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who
is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

LEE VS. ILAGAN

Facts:
Respondent Ilagan filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data and alleged that he
and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common-law partners. Sometime in July
2011, he visited Lee’s condominium, rested for a while, and thereafter, proceeded to his office.
Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee
confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she
discovered from Ilagan’s camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan
allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Subsequently,
Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a)
a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM
and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy
but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas detain his favor is
warranted.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas data is proper.
Ruling:
No. As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The Court finds
that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video. The petition for habeas data must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. Lee even
made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to
legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed
against Ilagan. Here, while Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of his video, he
failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life,
liberty or security that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data.

LAGMAN VS. BRILLANTES

Facts:
LEILA DE LIMA VS. DUTERTE
Facts:
1. Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected as the 16th President of the
Philippines with a key agenda of his Administration was the relentless national
crackdown on illegal drugs.
2. Sen. De Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling a stop to the
alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the crackdown.
 3. Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data seeking to enjoin President Rodrigo Roa
Dutete from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security
through his public statements.
4. public statement of President Duterte:
5. “I know I’m the favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But,
I have a special ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan
ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public.” Incidentally, in the same event,
President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping
surveillance of her. “Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the
time they were also listening to what I’ve done, I’ve also been busy, and with the help of
another country, listening to them.
6. The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17,
2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government office he
referred to earlier at the same time accused her of living an immortal life by having a
romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs.
“There’s one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his driver
as her lover… Paramour niya ang driver nya nagging hooked rin sa drugs because of the
close association. You know, when you are an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was
married. So you live with the driver, its concubinage.
7. The statements that described her an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and
personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades; that told of her
being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a
house for her driver/lover with financing from drug-money
8. Statements that threatened her (“De Lima, you are finished”) and demeaned her
womanhood and humanity. If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I’ll hang myself.
Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being
serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-resign. You resign. And “De Lima better hang
yourself… Hindi ka na naghiya sa sarili mo. Any other woman would have slashed her
throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang x-rated paglabas sa, paktapos ng
shooting, nakangiti…”
9. Sen. De Lima traces his animosity towards her when she 1st encountered President
Durterte while he was still the City Mayor of Davao and she the Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights investigating the existence of the so-called “Davao Death
Squad.”
Issue:
W/N Presidential’s immunity from suit can shield the President from being haled to court.
Ruling:
Dismissed even without the President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
Immunity can be classified either by: a. extent i.e. absolute or qualified or b. duration i.e.
permanent or temporary
Extent:
Absolute immunity is granted to a government official who has proven that his actions fell
within the scope of his duties, and that his actions are discretionary rather than ministerial –
conduct or the action performed must not involve insignificant or routinely office work but rather
the challenged action must involve personal judgment. It attaches to the function instead of the
office.
Qualified immunity was initially given to a government official who was able to prove that at the
time of commission of the act complained of, he possessed a good faith that his actions were
lawful – subjective element determined with the two-tier test:
If the statutory or constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff was clear at the time of the alleged
wrongful action
Whether the official should reasonably have known the action was contrary to law
Duration:
Permanent or the immunity for speech or debate – immunity from liability in law suits that arise
out of the performance of public duties of democratic deliberation
Temporary or congressional immunity from arrest – to legislators from litigating even private
suits while “at Session” of Congress as public officers
Estrada v. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001): Being a former President, President
Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006): Improper to implead President
Arroyo in a consolidated petition disputing the factual bases for Presidential Proclamation No.
1017 and General Order No. 5 declaring a state of national emergency and called out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief to maintain law and order
throughout the country and to suppress acts of lawless violence, insurrection or rebellion.
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. No. 183871, February 18, 2010): Court upheld the
exclusion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, maintaining that presidential immunity from
suit despite not being expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution and declared that the President
could not be sued during her tenure in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo against
military, police personnel and the Office of the Ombudsman and including President Arroyo.
Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011): Court ruled that RTC had
erred in holding that Presidential immunity could not be invoked in amparo proceedings
While the concept of immunity from suit originated elsewhere, the ratification of the 1981
constitutional amendments and the 1987 Constitution made our version of presidential immunity
unique. Section 15, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided for immunity at
two distinct points in time: 1. Immunity during the tenure of the President 2. Thereafter.
Framer’s intended during tenure.
Presidential immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. It is not intended to immunize the
President from liability or accountability.
Rationale for the grant of immunity stated in Soliven v. Makasiar (G.R. No. 82585, 82827,
83979, November 14, 1988): To assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions fee from
any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a
job that aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
Rationale expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: It will degrade the dignity of the high office
of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything
which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However,
this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.
Passage in Soliven was made only to point out that it was the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s
behalf and that it was the President who had gone to court as the complainant
If the Court were to first require the President to respond to each and every complaint brought
against him, and then avail himself of presidential immunity on a case to case basis, then the
rationale for the privilege – protecting the President from harassment, hindrance or distraction in
the discharge of his duties – would very well be defeated.
Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an
ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must 1st be allowed to end his tenure (not
his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.