HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO vs.

THE CIVIL REGISTER OF

MANILA
G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004

FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are siblings. In their respective
certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes
Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens. Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an
application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His
application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. Subsequently, they filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for
correction of entries in their certificates of birth. The petitioners prayed that,
after due proceedings, the trial court render judgment correcting and changing
the entries in their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their
father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese to Filipino. RTC Manila dismissed the
petition outright.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the petition outright on the
ground that the petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners father
Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No. 270 and was conferred
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.

HELD:
YES, In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently, then, the trial court erred in so
doing. The petitioners’ recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
appropriate. Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The petitioners recourse
to the procedure in Rule 108 being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to
do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which provides that
upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the person named in the petition.
MARCELO LEE, et. Al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001

FACTS:
Petitions were filed by private respondents seeking to cancel and/or
correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of KehShiok Cheng
as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who
is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother. The private respondents are the
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, KehShiok Cheng. The
petitioners, on the other hand, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.Unknown to KehShiok Cheng and private respondents,
every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common
father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners
by making it appear that petitioners mother was KehShiok Cheng.The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. One of the grounds of said motion is that
resort to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is improper where the ultimate
objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not resorting to Rule 108 by the private respondents was
improper considering that what private respondents seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek
Sheng’s legitimate wife

HELD:
No, It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one
outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private
respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for KehShiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the
petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners contention
that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of KehShiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the
latter’s children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between KehShiok Cheng and petitioners.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS vs. THE
ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. Petitioners Jacqueline and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born during
their marriage. In a notarized document, a certain Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Thereafter, Juan died intestate.
It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a
complaint for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent
Juan, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
and Carolina to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina and deceased
Juan. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are illegitimate children of Juan for the
purpose of inheriting from him

HELD:
NO, The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Juan cannot be adjudicated without an action having
been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo
and Carolina in a valid marriage. . The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINESvs.LEONOR VALENCIA
G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986

FACTS:
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children,
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed a petition for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil
Registry of the City of Cebu.
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the
petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere
clerical errors, those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction
of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not
changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which
are substantial and controversial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition seeking substantial changes involving the civil
status and nationality or citizenship may be allowed pursuant to Article 412 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

HELD:
YES, a petition seeking substantial changes in the civil registry records
involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to
support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same. The Court
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
DAYA MARIA TOL-NOQUERAvs.HON. ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR
G.R. No. 84250, July 20, 1992

FACTS:
Daya Maria Tol alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of
RemigioTol, who had been missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain
DiosdadoTol had fraudulently secured a free patent over Remigio's property
and had obtained title thereto in his name. She was seeking the administration
of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover the said
property.DiosdadoTol, on the other hand, argued that Daya Maria Tol was not
an acknowledged natural child of the absentee and that the property sought to
be administered was covered by an original certificate of title issued in his
name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a declaration of absence must be made in separate
proceeding prior to petition for administration.

HELD:
NO, It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a
proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. This was
the ruling in Reyes v. Alejandro, reiterating Pejer v. Martinez. In the latter case,
the court declared that the petition to declare the husband an absentee and
the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of
the wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same proceeding.
JOSE MODEQUILLOvs.HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA
G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:
In satisfaction of the judgment rendered against petitioner, the sheriff of
RTC Davao levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag,
Davao del Surregistered in the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Modequillo alleging therein
that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution under
Article 155 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the residential land should be exempt from execution
being the family home the petitioner since 1969.

HELD:
NO, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a
family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code, thus,it
became a family home by operation of law only upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code shall
have no retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
CARIDAD CRUZ VDA. DE SY-QUIAvs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE
PEDRO REYNALDO SY-QUIA
G.R. No. L-62283, November 25, 1983

FACTS:
Pedro M. Sy-Quia died and was survived by his wife, Caridad, and his
five legitimate children named Noel, Pedro, Jr., Asuncion, Mauricio and
Francisco. He left a holographic will, wherein he divided equally one-half of his
net estate among his widow and five children. The other half or free portion
was divided equally among Pedro, Jr., Asuncion, Mauricio and Francisco after
setting aside the amount necessary to allow Asuncion, Mauricio and Francisco
to complete their education on the same level as Pedro, Jr.'s.More than three
years later, Jose Pedro Reynaldo Sy-Quia filed a motion in the probate
proceeding wherein he alleged that he was an acknowledged natural child of
the testator,as shown in his birth certificate wherein he was represented to be
"legitimate", his parents being Pedro Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres. Being the
testator's voluntarily acknowledged natural child, his pretention nullified Pedro
M. Sy-Quia's will and, therefore, his estate should be settled under the rules of
intestacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to the provisions of the New Civil Code, even if the child was born
before itseffectivity.

HELD:
YES, the Supreme Court helld that whether Jose was a voluntarily
recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that "the voluntary recognition of a natural
child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before
the effectivity of this body of laws" or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article
278 may be given retroactive effect.
MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner gave birth to a baby boy, the third time that she delivered a
child. The presumed father, EleazarSiribanCalasan, signed the birth certificate
of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s last name as
Calasan. In addition, Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the
child. Due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to place the
presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificate of live
birth, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil
registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The registration was rejected on the
basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General,
providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of
their mother. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Courta petition for
mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the
certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname.

ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to
register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged
father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity.

HELD:
NO, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support. This is the rule regardless of whether
or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar
correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate
child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of
course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his
own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.
JUANITO RAMOS, SALVADOR RAMOS, ESPERIDION RAMOS, LYDIA
RAMOS and AGAPITA VDA. DE RAMOS vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE
G.R. No. L-49833, February 15, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased Manuel Ramos, namely, his
widow, Agapita Vda. de Ramos, and their children, Juanito, Salvador,
Esperidion and Lydia. They filed a complaint praying that the "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Properties" executed by Manuel Ramos in favor of respondent
spouses be declared null and void, but "only in connection with the alleged
participation therein of plaintiff Agapita Manisan Vda. de Ramos,". They also
prayed for the cancellation of title issued by virtue of the aforementioned deed,
and for them to be declared" to be the rightful owners of half of 46 hectares, as
the plaintiffs do not question the legal effect of such transactions of their late
father as the rightful owner of the one-half under consideration. Another
complaint was also filed likewise seeking the annulment of the same deed of
sale but focused the allegations of said amended complaint on the alleged
mistake and fraud that made the document defective. Petitioners alleged that
although the contract was designated as a sale, the intention was actually to
mortgage the properties. Petitioners claimed therein that they are in possession
of the properties and have been in possession of the same since time
immemorial. The motion to admit the second complaint was denied by the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial was correct in dismissing the second complaint on the
ground of litis pendentia

HELD:
NO, Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked
as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) The identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct.
Therefore, dismissal was not proper.
DANIEL MASAGKAY TAPUZ, et. al. vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO, et. Al.
G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008

FACTS:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T.
Sanson filed a complaintfor forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners,
alleging that they are the registered owners of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land
located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan, that they were the
disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners together with
unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the
objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa
and bamboo structure. After the MCTC ruled in favor of respondent, an appeal
was filed with the RTC. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondents
filed a motion for demolition. It was against this factual backdrop that the
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data; and the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo and a
writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD:
NO, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and
to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
requires the following material allegations, among others: (1) The manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (2) The actions and recourses taken
by the petitioner to secure the data or information; and (3) The location of the
files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known. The allegations of
the petition filed by the petitioners obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of
Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

FACTS:
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing
white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused
him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied
that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to
the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. The men forced
Raymond along with his brother Reynaldo into a white L300 van. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house, where he and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room, were beaten up and were
repeatedly interrogated. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their
guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had
killed, and how many NPA members he had helped.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by
existing laws.

HELD:
YES, While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse
Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to
resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions -
borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights
abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C.
ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et. Al.
G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United
States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the
group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America of which she is
a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various
provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to
join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La
Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission. After doing survey work on 19 May
2009 in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac, petitioners
along with other companions were ganged up and repeatedly interrogated by
several armed men who barged and forced themselves inside the house where
the petitioner and her companions were resting. What followed was five
straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in
favor of returning to "the fold." On May 25, 2009, petitioner was finally released
but continued to receive calls from her abductor via the cellular phone given to
her. Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety
of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Seeking
sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any
existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement,
petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.

ISSUE:
Whether or not invoking the doctrine of command responsibility in
impleading high-ranking civilian authorities such as the President is proper in
amparo proceedings

HELD:
NO, It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate. Since the application
of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it
is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather
than in a summary amparo proceeding. While the principal objective of an
amparo proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law.
DANTE VICENTE vs. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698, June 23, 2005

FACTS:
The RTC of General Santos City, found Evelyn Te guilty on four counts of
violation of BP 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her to two (2)
months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and
executory after the Supreme Court had denied Te’s petition for review from the
affirmance of the trial court’s decision by the Court of Appeals. Te filed a
motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition
for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. In connection with the said case,
complainant filed an administrative complaint against the trial court judge who
allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she
was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that
respondent judge approved Te’s application for bail as part of habeas
corpus proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is proper when a final
judgment is already rendered by reason of restrained liberty

HELD:
NO, The writ of habeas corpus is proper is the applicant is restrained by
virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where the applicant is serving
sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed, Section 4 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is ‘suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.’
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E.
RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and
TERESITA R. PABELLO
G.R. No. 169482, January 29, 2008

FACTS:
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a
poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living
with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian. In the
morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R.
Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands
for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents
were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for habeas corpus is proper on the allegation that
Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty.

HELD:
NO, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint
of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or
judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention
will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
In the present case, there is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and
restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being
Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE
vs. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR.
G.R. No. 190108, October 19, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner David E. So filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande, accused of
Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So
alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation
while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC
Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who
was being charged with a non-bailable offense. Eventually, claiming "life-
threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which
supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional
rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande
and her father simultaneously for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus
and amparo.

ISSUE:
WON the granting of motion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
was proper

HELD:
NO, the Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement
and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s
life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful. here
is no affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused
Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed
by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental
condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful.