Cases 2

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 170633 : October 17, 2007]
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES

CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SSANGYONG
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 and its Resolution 2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office

at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products.3 One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong
Corporation (Ssangyong),4 an international trading company5 with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.6 The two corporations conducted business through telephone
calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send
the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature
on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.8
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter 9 addressed
to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the President of Sanyo Seiki
Stainless Steel Corporation], to confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order
of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential rate
of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations, assented and
affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.11
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice

No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms and conditions of the
transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the
conformity signature13 of Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment
for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter
of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong.14 Following their usual
practice, delivery of the goods was to be made after the L/C had been
opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC,

Ssangyong placed the order with its steel manufacturer, Pohang Iron and
Steel Corporation (POSCO), in South Korea15 and paid the same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT
of steel was split into two,16 one for 110MT covered by Pro Forma Invoice
No. ST2-POSTS0401-117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2-
POSTS0401-2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office, informed Sanyo
Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal, that it was ready to ship
193.597MT of stainless steel from Korea to the Philippines. It requested that
the opening of the L/C be facilitated. 19 Chan affixed his signature on the
fax transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong.20
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office informed Sanyo
Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to secure a US$30/MT
price adjustment on the contracted price of US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT
stainless steel, and that the goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the
first 100MT on that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000.
Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the L/C's opening. 21
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on June 26, 2000, to
the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it was looking forward to receiving
the L/C details and a cable copy thereof that day. 22 Ssangyong sent a
separate letter of the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of
the L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than June 28,
2000.23 Similar letters were transmitted by Ssangyong Manila Office on June
27, 2000.24 On June 28, 2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to
MCC stating that its principal in Korea was already in a difficult
situation25 because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to open the L/C's.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by fax, a letter
signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time to open the L/C because
MCC's credit line with the bank had been fully availed of in connection
with another transaction, and MCC was waiting for an additional credit
line.26 On the same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed
of the date when the L/C would be opened, preferably at the earliest
possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was having problems and
Ssangyong was incurring warehousing costs.27 To maintain their good
business relationship and to support MCC in its financial predicament,
Ssangyong offered to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO,
another US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel ordered. This
was intimated in Ssangyong's June 30, 2000 letter to MCC.28 On July 6, 2000,
another follow-up letter29 for the opening of the L/C was sent by
Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of

credit.30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000, Ssangyong, through counsel,
wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be
compelled to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for
breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of warehouse
expenses, related interests and charges.31
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-

233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to
MCC. The invoices slightly varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices
(ST2-POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2), in that the
quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and the price was reduced
to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be gleaned from the photocopies of the said
August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the
conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for
US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2.34 The goods covered by the said
invoice were then shipped to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000 signed by
Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1, considering that the prevailing price of
steel at that time was US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money
due to a recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000, sent a demand
letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C of US$170,000.00
with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26,
2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold
MCC liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference, warehousing
expenses, interests and charges as of August 15, 2000) and other damages
for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on

September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-
1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37
representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due
to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory
Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its
complaint,39 Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract
when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to

Evidence40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of
the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order
dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the
documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the
December 16, 2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds support in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial and
documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in
the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima
facie case.42
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 43 on March 24, 2004,
in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled that when plaintiff agreed to
sell and defendants agreed to buy the 220MT of steel products for the price
of US$1,860 per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction
was evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401 - 1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in terms of reduction of
volume as well as the price per MT, following Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo
Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered

ordering defendants MCC Industrial Sales Corporation and Gregory Chan,
to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally the following:
1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the outstanding principal

claim plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from March 30, 2001.
2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per counsel's

appearance in court, the same being deemed just and equitable considering
that by reason of defendants' breach of their obligation under the subject
contract, plaintiff was constrained to litigate to enforce its rights and
recover for the damages it sustained, and therefore had to engage the
services of a lawyer.
3) Costs of suit.
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.
SO ORDERED.44
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of record, Atty.
Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law
office of Castillo Zamora & Poblador entered its appearance as their
collaborating counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005, 46 MCC and Chan raised before
the CA the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT APPELLANTS VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACT WITH APPELLEE
A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT APPELLANTS AGREED TO PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS OF
STEEL PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE, INSTEAD OF ONLY 100 METRIC
TONS.
1. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE THE PRO FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE NOS.
ST2 - POSTS0401-1 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING

ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN

AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO APPELLEE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH APPELLANT MCC.47
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision48 affirming the ruling of

the trial court, but absolving Chan of any liability. The appellate court
ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible in
evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel
orders.49 The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest, attorney's fees and costs
ordered by the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from any liability.
SO ORDERED.50
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC's and Chan's principal
counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on September 14, 2005. 51 Their
collaborating counsel, Castillo Zamora & Poblador,52 likewise, received a
copy of the CA decision on September 19, 2005.53
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf of MCC, filed a

motion for reconsideration of the said decision.54 Ssangyong opposed the
motion contending that the decision of the CA had become final and
executory on account of the failure of MCC to file the said motion within
the reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on November 22,
2005, to deny the motion on its merits, 55 without, however, ruling on the
procedural issue raised.
Aggrieved, MCC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 56 before this

Court, imputing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION NOT IN

ACCORDANCE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND SANCTIONED A
DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND ACCEPTED COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY REVERSING THE COURT A
QUO'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02-124
CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THE PRO-FORMA INVOICES WITH
REFERENCE NOS. ST2-POSTSO401-1 AND ST2-POSTSO401-2, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF
FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS

FACT THAT, EVEN ASSUMING PETITIONER BREACHED THE
SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO
PROVE THAT IT SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT
THEREOF.
III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF

US$93,493.87 IS SIMPLY UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN AT LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS.57
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the petition, raising the
following arguments: that the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already
final and executory, because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed
beyond the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof,
and that, in any case, it was a pro forma motion; that MCC breached the
contract for the purchase of the steel products when it failed to open the
required letter of credit; that the printout copies and/or photocopies of
facsimile or telecopy transmissions were properly admitted by the trial
court because they are considered original documents under R.A. No. 8792;
and that MCC is liable for actual damages and attorney's fees because of its
breach, thus, compelling Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the
following:
I - Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and

executory;
II - Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions

are electronic evidence and admissible as such;
III - Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and
Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative, whether MCC breached the said
contract; andcralawlibrary
IV - Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of

Ssangyong is proper and justified.
-I-
It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that receipt

of a copy of the decision by one of several counsels on record is notice to
all, and the period to appeal commences on such date even if the other
counsel has not yet received a copy of the decision. In this case, when Atty.
Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14, 2005, MCC
had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
conformably with Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45. The
period should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when Castillo
Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the decision) because notice to
Atty. Samson is deemed notice to collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was Castillo Zamora
& Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed both MCC's and Chan's Brief
and Reply Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels
was for the collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal brief
and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why it was Castillo
Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for the reconsideration of the
CA decision, and they did so on October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day
period from September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA
decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not find it
necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed

the records and found that strong concerns of substantial justice warrant
the relaxation of this rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and Development

Corporation,59 we ruled that:
In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that where strong

considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, this Court
may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of
its legal jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a
petition usually embodies justifying circumstance which warrants our
heeding to the petitioner's cry for justice in spite of the earlier negligence of
counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of Appeals:
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of action which would place the
administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a
poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Verily, judicial orders,
such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed, nonetheless
a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the principle that a
party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override or frustrate
justice. A six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal, as in this case, does
not warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we gave due course to the petitioner's appeal
despite the late filing of its brief in the appellate court because such appeal
involved public interest. We stated in the said case that the Court may
exempt a particular case from a strict application of the rules of procedure
where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary
period, resulting in the appellate court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over
the case. In Republic v. Imperial, Jr., we also held that there is more leeway to
exempt a case from the strictness of procedural rules when the appellate
court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. We
emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment
of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules
must always be eschewed when it would subvert the rule's primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set

guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle the hand
that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere
slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities
must take a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is circumspect
leniency in this respect that will give the parties the fullest opportunity to
ventilate the merits of their respective causes, rather than have them lose
life, liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities.61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the alleged pro

forma nature of MCC's motion for reconsideration, ostensibly because it
merely restated the arguments previously raised and passed upon by the
CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments

in a motion for reconsideration does not per se result in a pro forma motion.
In Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a motion
for reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it reiterates the
arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A
movant may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the court that
its ruling was erroneous. Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if
the arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered in the
decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II -
The second issue poses a novel question that the Court welcomes. It
provides the occasion for this Court to pronounce a definitive
interpretation of the equally innovative provisions of the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis - Ã -vis the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the
petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the
said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A.
No. 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by
the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go beyond the
pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public
policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to support its
conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented

by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed
contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the
ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence
the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from
a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original
facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since
it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law
and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax
transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent
sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:
Admissibility of Pro Forma

Invoices; Breach of Contract
by Appellants
Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the
Pro Forma Invoices with Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218, Records), appellants
argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the
best evidence rule.
The argument is untenable.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are
admissible in evidence, although they are mere electronic facsimile
printouts of appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered
Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
came into effect on August 1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-
SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of

information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of
these Rules, the term 'electronic document' may be used interchangeably
with 'electronic data message'.
An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original

document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or
output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data
accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, 64 otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic
data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document for evidentiary purposes. 65 The Rules on Electronic
Evidence66 regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it
complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules.67 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.68
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be

considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message"
or an "electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and
electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following
terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received

or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of

produced electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792, 69 which
was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then Secretaries of the Department of
Trade and Industry, the Department of Budget and Management, and then
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act and these Rules,
the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent,

received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic data message" shall be equivalent to
and be used interchangeably with "electronic document."
xxx
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of

produced electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic
document" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic
data message."
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR's definition of "electronic data message"
is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792
70
were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic

Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by
Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal, as discussed
hereunder.
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message"

and "electronic document" was the result of the Senate of the Philippines'
adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase "electronic data message" and
the House of Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term
"electronic document."72 In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two
versions, the technical working group of the Bicameral Conference
Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of
each one.73 Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between the two
terms. While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent,
stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right
or extinguish an obligation,74 unlike an electronic document. Evident from the
law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same
construction.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the
said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of these Rules, the following

terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received

or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of

produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or
output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original

printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic
document?cra lawlibrary
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression
that facsimile transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic
documents because they are sent by electronic means. The expanded
definition of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent with
the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory considering that
the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." And to telecopy is to send a
document from one place to another via a fax machine.75
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section
37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that
Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the interpretation of this Act shall
give due regard to its international origin and the need to promote uniformity
in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade
relations. The generally accepted principles of international law and
convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be considered.
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only

refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL's definition of
"data message":
"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by

electronic, optical or similar means including, but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.76
is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data

message."
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy," and replaced the
term "data message" (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with
"electronic data message." This legislative divergence from what is
assumed as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and now
impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of
the law. Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law.77 A construction should be rejected that gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose
for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which
are sought to be attained by the enactment.78
Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author

of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of R.A. No. 8792), sponsored the bill on
second reading, he proposed to adopt the term "data message" as
formulated and defined in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 79 During the period
of amendments, however, the term evolved into "electronic data message,"
and the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was deleted.
Furthermore, the term "electronic data message," though maintaining its
description under the UNCITRAL Model Law, except for the aforesaid
deleted phrase, conveyed a different meaning, as revealed in the following
proceedings:
xxx
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a copy together with the
explanation of this proposed amendment.
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please be allowed to go
back to Section 5; the Definition of Terms. In light of the acceptance by the
good Senator of my proposed amendments, it will then become necessary
to add certain terms in our list of terms to be defined. I would like to add a
definition on what is "data," what is "electronic record" and what is an
"electronic record system."
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will proceed with the proposed
amendment on Definition of Terms, Section 5.
Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator Santiago.
Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the Declaration of Policy,

Section 5, Definition of Terms.
At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms that have to be

defined since these are arranged alphabetically, Mr. President, I would like
to insert the term DATA and its definition. So, the amendment will read:
"DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM, OF
INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or "data" as it is now

fashionably pronounced in America - - the definition of "data" ensures that
our bill applies to any form of information in an electronic record, whether
these are figures, facts or ideas.
So again, the proposed amendment is this: "DATA" MEANS

REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION OR
CONCEPTS.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the definition of "Data
Message" which encompasses electronic records, electronic writings and
electronic documents?cra lawlibrary
Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent with each other. These
are compatible. When we define "data," we are simply reinforcing the
definition of what is a data message.
Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is "ELECTRONIC RECORD."

The proposed amendment is as follows:
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" MEANS DATA THAT IS RECORDED OR

STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR
OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE, THAT CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY A
PERSON OR A COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT
INCLUDES A DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT OF THAT
DATA.
The explanation for this term and its definition is as follows: The term
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the scope of our bill. The record is the data.
The record may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is recorded or
stored in or by a computer system or a similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic

strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations
model law on electronic commerce. It would also not apply to regular
digital telephone conversations since the information is not recorded. It
would apply to voice mail since the information has been recorded in or by
a device similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not covered.
Though when the video is transferred to a website, it would be covered
because of the involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a
computer system on a compact disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a
similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar
device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data in digital form.
Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are
omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible under other rules of law. This
provision focuses on replacing the search for originality proving the reliability of
systems instead of that of individual records and using standards to show systems
reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts
are themselves electronic records being just the means of intelligible display of the
contents of the record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record subject to
the usual rules about copies, but the original printout would be subject to the rules
of admissibility of this bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records and whose
computer origin is never again called on are treated as paper records. In
that case, the reliability of the computer system that produces the record is
irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory does not fail me, earlier,
the lady Senator accepted that we use the term "Data Message" rather than
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" in being consistent with the UNCITRAL term of
"Data Message." So with the new amendment of defining "ELECTRONIC
RECORD," will this affect her accepting of the use of "Data Message" instead of
"ELECTRONIC RECORD"?cra lawlibrary
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for reminding me. The term I
would like to insert is ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE in lieu of
"ELECTRONIC RECORD."
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect, amending the term of the

definition of "Data Message" on page 2A, line 31, to which we have no
objection.
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.
xxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all the amendments that I
desire to, including the amendment on the effect of error or change. I will
provide the language of the amendment together with the explanation
supporting that amendment to the distinguished sponsor and then he can
feel free to take it up in any session without any further intervention.
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr. President, I understand from the

proponent of these amendments that these are based on the Canadian E-
commerce Law of 1998. Is that not right?cra lawlibrary
Senator Santiago. That is correct.80
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term "electronic
data message," it was consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic
commerce." In explaining the term "electronic record" patterned after the E-
Commerce Law of Canada, Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the
term "electronic data message." This term then, while maintaining part of
the UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has assumed
a different context, this time, consonant with the term "electronic record" in
the law of Canada. It accounts for the addition of the word "electronic" and
the deletion of the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is that the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada, explains the term "electronic record," as
drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly
similar to Sen. Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations:
"Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The
record may be any medium. It is "electronic" because it is recorded or
stored in or by a computer system or similar device. The Act is intended to
apply, for example, to data on magnetic strips on cards, or in smart cards.
As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated
faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce. It would
also not apply to regular digital telephone conversations, since the
information is not recorded. It would apply to voice mail, since the
information has been recorded in or by a device similar to a computer.
Likewise video records are not covered, though when the video is
transferred to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement of the
computer. Music recorded by a computer system on a compact disk would
be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A
computer or similar device has to be involved in its creation or storage. The
term "similar device" does not extend to all devices that create or store data
in digital form. Although things that are not recorded or preserved by or in
a computer system are omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible
under other rules of law. This Act focuses on replacing the search for
originality, proving the reliability of systems instead of that of individual
records, and using standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as

printouts, are themselves electronic records, being just the means of
intelligible display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of the
printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about copies,
but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of
this Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records, and whose
computer origin is never again called on, are treated as paper records. See
subsection 4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system that
produced the record is relevant to its reliability.81
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term

"electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the term
"electronic record" in the Canada law. This construction of the term
"electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-
generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on
"paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent
approach" that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are
82
replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are
paper-based.
A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by Alexander

Bain,83 is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a
telephone line. It works by digitizing an image dividing it into a grid of
dots. Each dot is either on or off, depending on whether it is black or white.
Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has a value of either 0
(off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine translates a picture into a series
of zeros and ones (called a bit map) that can be transmitted like normal
computer data. On the receiving side, a fax machine reads the incoming
data, translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and reprints the
picture.84 A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a
computer printer combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner
converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the
modem sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at the other
end makes a duplicate of the original document.85 Thus, in Garvida v. Sales,
Jr.,86 where we explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax
machines, we ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and

reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy,
one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each
area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as
a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by
the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper
position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an

exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his
counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.87
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an

original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a
phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal
function as paper-based documents.88 Further, in a virtual or paperless
environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are
considered as originals.89 Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data
message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic
document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have
an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as
received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different
legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in
communications and computer technology90 when it drafted the law, it
excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy
(except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as
compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when
it defined the term "electronic data message."
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it
adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data
message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter
deleted the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this phrase in the
IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of
administrative agencies. After all, the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited
to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules
and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as
the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. 91 Thus,
if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be
broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.92 Had the Legislature really
wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of
tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task Force on the

Measurement of E-Commerce,93 on November 22, 2006, recommended a
working definition of "electronic commerce," as "[a]ny commercial
transaction conducted through electronic, optical and similar medium,
mode, instrumentality and technology. The transaction includes the sale or
purchase of goods and services, between individuals, households,
businesses and governments conducted over computer-mediated networks
through the Internet, mobile phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and
other channels through open and closed networks." The Task Force's
proposed definition is similar to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as it covers
transactions made over any network, and, in addition, it adopted the
following provisions of the OECD definition: (1) for transactions, it covers
sale or purchase of goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it
considers any computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet
alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using fax, telephone or
non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments done online or offline; and
(5) it considers delivery made online (like downloading of purchased
books, music or software programs) or offline (deliveries of goods).94
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and
"electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do
not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an

"electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by
the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401 - 2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"),
which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
- III -
Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence,

this Court finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence
the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the

claimant proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach
thereof by the other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she
sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi. The burden of
proof rests on the party who advances a proposition affirmatively. 95 In
other words, a plaintiff in a civil action must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.96
In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent, 97 which is manifested

by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause
which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever form
they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present.99 Sale, being a consensual contract, follows the
general rule that it is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand
performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts.100
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent or meeting of the
minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, (2) object
certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the
obligation which is established.101
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract of sale

between the parties, respondent Ssangyong formally offered in evidence
the testimonies of its witnesses and the following exhibits:
Exhibit Description Purpose

E Pro forma Invoice dated To show that defendants
17 April 2000 with contracted with plaintiff for
Contract No. ST2- the delivery of 110 MT of
POSTS0401-1, photocopy stainless steel from Korea
payable by way of an
irrevocable letter of credit in
favor of plaintiff, among other
conditions.
E-1 Pro forma Invoice dated To show that defendants sent
17 April 2000 with their confirmation of the (i)
Contract No. ST2- delivery to it of the specified
POSTS0401, contained stainless steel products, (ii)
in facsimile/thermal paper defendants' payment thereof
faxed by defendants to by way of an irrevocable letter
plaintiff showing the of credit in favor of plaintiff,
printed transmission among other conditions.
details on the upper
portion of said paper as
coming from defendant
MCC on 26 Apr 00
08:41AM
E-2 Conforme signature of To show that defendants sent
Mr. Gregory their confirmation of the (i)
Chan, contained in delivery to it of the total of
facsimile/thermal paper 220MT specified stainless steel
faxed by defendants to products, (ii) defendants'
plaintiff showing the payment thereof by way of an
printed transmission irrevocable letter of credit in
details on the upper favor of plaintiff, among other
portion of said paper as conditions.
MCC on 26 Apr 00
08:41AM
F Pro forma Invoice dated To show that defendants
17 April 2000 with contracted with plaintiff for
Contract No. ST2- delivery of another 110 MT of
POSTSO401-2, photocop stainless steel from Korea
y payable by way of an
irrevocable letter of credit in
favor of plaintiff, among other
conditions.
G Letter to defendant To prove that defendants were
SANYO SEIKE dated 20 informed of the date of L/C
June 2000, contained in opening and
facsimile/thermal paper defendant's conforme/approval
G-1 Signature of defendant thereof.
Gregory Chan, contained
in facsimile/thermal paper.
H Letter to defendants To prove that defendants were
dated 22 June informed of the successful
2000, original price adjustments secured by
plaintiff in favor of former and
were advised of the schedules
of its L/C opening.
I Letter to defendants To prove that plaintiff
dated 26 June repeatedly requested
2000, original defendants for the agreed
J Letter to defendants opening of the Letters of
dated 26 June Credit, defendants' failure and
2000, original refusal to comply with their
K Letter to defendants obligations and the problems
dated 27 June of plaintiff is incurring by
2000, original reason of defendants' failure
and refusal to open the L/Cs.
L Facsimile message to
defendants dated 28
June 2000, photocopy
M Letter from defendants To prove that defendants
dated 29 June admit of their liabilities to
2000, contained in plaintiff, that they requested
facsimile/thermal paper for "more extension" of time
faxed by defendants to for the opening of the Letter of
plaintiff showing the Credit, and begging for
printed transmission favorable understanding and
details on the upper consideration.
MCC on 29 June 00 11:12
AM
M-1 Signature of defendant
Gregory Chan, contained
in facsimile/thermal paper
faxed by defendants to
plaintiff showing the
printed transmission
details on the upper
MCC on June 00 11:12
AM
N Letter to defendants
dated 29 June
2000, original
O Letter to defendants To prove that plaintiff
dated 30 June reiterated its request for
2000, photocopy defendants to L/C opening
after the latter's request for
extension of time was granted,
defendants' failure and refusal
to comply therewith extension
of time notwithstanding.
P Letter to defendants
dated 06 July
2000, original
Q Demand letter to To prove that plaintiff was
defendants dated 15 constrained to engaged
Aug 2000, original services of a lawyer for
collection efforts.
R Demand letter to To prove that defendants
defendants dated 23 opened the first L/C in favor
Aug 2000, original of plaintiff, requested for
further postponement of the
final L/C and for minimal
amounts, were urged to open
the final L/C on time, and
were informed that failure to
comply will cancel the
contract.
S Demand letter to To show defendants' refusal
defendants dated 11 and failure to open the final
Sept 2000, original L/C on time, the cancellation
of the contract as a
consequence thereof, and final
demand upon defendants to
remit its obligations.
W Letter from plaintiff To prove that there was a
SSANGYONG to perfected sale and purchase
defendant SANYO agreement between the parties
SEIKI dated 13 April for 220 metric tons of steel
2000, with fax back from products at the price of
defendants SANYO US$1,860/ton.
SEIKI/MCC to plaintiff
SSANGYONG, containe
d in facsimile/thermal
paper with back-up
photocopy
W-1 Conforme signature of To prove that defendants,
defendant Gregory acting through Gregory Chan,
Chan, contained in agreed to the sale and
facsimile/thermal paper purchase of 220 metric tons of
with back-up photocopy steel products at the price of
US$1,860/ton.
W-2 Name of sender MCC To prove that defendants sent
Industrial Sales their conformity to the sale
Corporation and purchase agreement by
facsimile transmission.
X Pro forma Invoice dated To prove that defendant MCC
16 August agreed to adjust and split the
2000, photocopy confirmed purchase order
into 2 shipments at 100 metric
tons each at the discounted
price of US$1,700/ton.
X-1 Notation To prove that the present Pro
"1/2", photocopy forma Invoice was the first of 2
pro forma invoices.
X-2 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080- To prove that the present Pro
1, photocopy forma Invoice was the first of
2 pro forma invoices.
X-3 Conforme signature of To prove that defendant
defendant Gregory MCC, acting through Gregory
Chan, photocopy Chan, agreed to the sale and
purchase of the balance of 100
metric tons at the discounted
price of US$1,700/ton, apart
from the other order and
shipment of 100 metric tons
which was delivered by
plaintiff SSANGYONG and
paid for by defendant MCC.
DD Letter from defendant To prove that there was a
MCC to plaintiff perfected sale and purchase
SSANGYONG dated 22 agreement between plaintiff
August 2000, contained SSANGYONG and defendant
in facsimile/thermal paper MCC for the balance of 100
with back-up photocopy metric tons, apart from the
other order and shipment of
100 metric tons which was
delivered by plaintiff
SSANGYONG and paid for
by defendant MCC.
DD-1 Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080- To prove that there was a
1, contained in perfected sale and purchase
facsimile/thermal paper agreement between plaintiff
with back-up photocopy SSANGYONG and defendant
MCC for the balance of 100
metric tons, apart from the
SSANGYONG and paid for
by defendant MCC.
DD-2 Signature of defendant To prove that defendant
Gregory Chan, MCC, acting through Gregory
contained in Chan, agreed to the sale and
facsimile/thermal paper purchase of the balance of 100
with back-up photocopy metric tons, apart from the
Ssangyong and paid for by
defendant MCC.102
Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented by

respondent, MCC, in its petition before this Court, assails the admissibility
only of Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-
2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"). After sifting through the records, the Court found
that these invoices are mere photocopies of their original fax transmittals.
Ssangyong avers that these documents were prepared after MCC asked for
the splitting of the original order into two, so that the latter can apply for
an L/C with greater facility. It, however, failed to explain why the originals
of these documents were not presented.
To determine whether these documents are admissible in evidence, we

apply the ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as discussed above we cannot
apply the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary
evidence, admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which
states, "[w]hen the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated."
Furthermore, the offeror of secondary evidence must prove the predicates
thereof, namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith
on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the
proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c)
it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or places. It has been held
that where the missing document is the foundation of the action, more
strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally
involved.103
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove the existence of
the original fax transmissions of Exhibits E and F, and likewise did not
sufficiently prove the loss or destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E
and F cannot be admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on

Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected contract. It also introduced in
evidence a variety of other documents, as enumerated above, together with
the testimonies of its witnesses. Notable among them are Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2 which were issued by
Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. As already mentioned, these invoices
slightly varied the terms of the earlier invoices such that the quantity was
now officially 100MT per invoice and the price reduced to US$1,700.00 per
MT. The copies of the said August 16, 2000 invoices submitted to the court
bear the conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit "X"), however, is a mere

photocopy of its original. But then again, petitioner MCC does not assail
the admissibility of this document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence
not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment.104 Issues not raised on appeal are deemed
abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1-A" and "2-C"),

which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy of its original, 105 it was, in
fact, petitioner MCC which introduced this document in evidence.
Petitioner MCC paid for the order stated in this invoice. Its admissibility,
therefore, is not open to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS080-2),

along with the other unchallenged documentary evidence of respondent
Ssangyong, preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was
perfected by the parties.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of the trial court:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits "1", "1-A" to "1-R") referring

to Pro Forma Invoice for Contract No. ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of
US$170,000.00, and which bears the signature of Gregory Chan, General
Manager of MCC. Plaintiff, on the other hand, presented Pro Forma Invoice
referring to Contract No. ST2-POSTS080-1, in the amount of US$170,000.00,
which likewise bears the signature of Gregory Chan, MCC. Plaintiff
accounted for the notation "1/2" on the right upper portion of the Invoice,
that is, that it was the first of two (2) pro forma invoices covering the
subject contract between plaintiff and the defendants. Defendants, on the
other hand, failed to account for the notation "2/2" in its Pro Forma Invoice
(Exhibit "1-A"). Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear the same
date and details, which logically mean that they both apply to one and the
same transaction.106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half of the
transaction if there was no first half to speak of?cra lawlibrary
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of both parties,
started with the petitioner and the respondent agreeing on the sale and
purchase of 220MT of stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial
contract was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several extensions to
pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and discounts in the price as
originally agreed, the parties slightly varied the terms of their contract,
without necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order was
reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted to
US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and
failed to open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both
parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale, even if the
writings of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as
explicit in establishing a contract.107 Appropriate conduct by the parties
may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and while there may be
instances where the exchange of correspondence does not disclose the exact
point at which the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may indicate
that a binding obligation has been undertaken.108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when
petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the transaction (100MT),
despite numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner
breached its contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the
contract between buyer and seller. Indeed, where the buyer fails to open a
letter of credit as stipulated, the seller or exporter is entitled to claim
damages for such breach. Damages for failure to open a commercial credit
may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the seller would
reasonably have made had the transaction been carried out.109
- IV -
This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages is not in
accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic that actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty.110 In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,111 we
explained that:
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to

compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a
sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. Except
as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. It is
hornbook doctrine that to be able to recover actual damages, the claimant
bears the onus of presenting before the court actual proof of the damages
alleged to have been suffered, thus:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss

actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that
these damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must
point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.112
In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent Ssangyong

US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the
appellate court. Noticeably, however, the trial and the appellate courts, in
making the said award, relied on the following documents submitted in
evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit "U," the Statement of Account
dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit "U-1," the details of the said Statement of
Account); (3) Exhibit "V," the contract of the alleged resale of the goods to a
Korean corporation; and (4) Exhibit "V-1," the authentication of the resale
contract from the Korean Embassy and certification from the Philippine
Consular Office.
The statement of account and the details of the losses sustained by

respondent due to the said breach are, at best, self-serving. It was
respondent Ssangyong itself which prepared the said documents. The
items therein are not even substantiated by official receipts. In the absence
of corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is not sufficient
basis to award actual damages. The court cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages,
but must depend on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on
evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication certificates, Exhibits

"V" and "V-1," allegedly evidencing the resale at a loss of the stainless steel
subject of the parties' breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the
veracity of its contents. The steel items indicated in the sales
contract114 with a Korean corporation are different in all respects from the
items ordered by petitioner MCC, even in size and quantity. We observed
the following discrepancies:
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "V":
COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in

Coil, Slit Edge
SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1
SIZE/Q'TY:
2.8MM X 1,219MM X C 8.193MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.736MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.885MT
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.629MT
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.307MT
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.247MT
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.450MT
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C 8.870MT
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.391MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 6.589MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 7.878MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C 8.397MT
TOTAL: 95.562MT115
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the invoice that was not paid):
DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304

SIZE AND QUANTITY:
2.6 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT
3.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT
4.0 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT
4.5 MM X 4' X C 15.0MT
5.0 MM X 4' X C 10.0MT
6.0 MM X 4' X C 25.0MT
TOTAL: 100MT116
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that

Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items resold at a loss were the
same items ordered by the petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual
damages was not proven, the Court cannot sanction the award.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its

contractual obligation and obstinately refused to pay despite repeated
demands from respondent. Petitioner even asked for several extensions of
time for it to make good its obligation. But in spite of respondent's
continuous accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its
contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC must be held
liable for nominal damages. "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where
there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.'" 117 Accordingly, the
Court awards nominal damages of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well settled that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate and not every winning party is entitled to
an automatic grant of attorney's fees. The party must show that he falls
under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the award of
attorney's fees proper, considering that petitioner MCC's unjustified refusal
to pay has compelled respondent Ssangyong to litigate and to incur
expenses to protect its rights.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
82983 is MODIFIED in that the award of actual damages is DELETED.
However, petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL
DAMAGES in the amount of P200,000.00, and the ATTORNEY'S FEES as
awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario,

Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 170491 April 4, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005, which dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation seeking to
set aside the Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu,
Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying admission and excluding
from the records plaintiff’s (herein petitioner) Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E",
"H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q"
and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and
operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped
and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the
Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the
Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai
Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996

impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional
defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping
Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss
which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order
issued on 24 January 2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a
formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004
consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions
thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and
Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal
offer of evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order

denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits
"A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings,
"K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and
its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-
markings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out
filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has
been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals.
The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by
contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of
the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to
Defendant Wallem Philippines’ Objections and Motion to Strike). But as
rightly pointed out in defendant Wallem’s Reply to the Comment of
Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined
in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of

information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded,

retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence
must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic
Evidence), which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to
prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic
evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not executed, much less presented in
evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the

record. Aside from their being not properly identified by any competent
witness, the loss of the principals thereof was not established by any
competent proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-
markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings,
"N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-
markings, and "R" are hereby DENIED admission and excluded from the
records. However, these excluded evidence should be attached to the
records of this case to enable the appellate court to pass upon them should
an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to be rendered upon the
termination of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission for lack of
proper identification since the witness who brought these pictures
expressly admitted that he was not present when the photos were taken
and had not knowledge when the same where taken.3
Upon denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated

20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals maintaining that
public respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its Exhibits "A",
"C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K",
"L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R", and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision dismissing

petitioner’s petition for certiorari, the pertinent portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand, together with
the rules and jurisprudence which are applicable in the premises, we have
come up with a finding that the petition for certiorari filed in this case is
not meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the petitioner that the

respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed orders in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. As what our jurisprudence
tells us, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary by the totality of
the record on hand is that the respondent judge acted correctly and within
the pale of his sound discretion in issuing the assailed order, dated
November 16, 2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioner’s documentary evidence
which were denied admission by the respondent judge were not properly
identified by any competent witness. As pointed out by the respondent
Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the petition filed in this case
which reproduces some excerpts of the testimonies in the court a quo of
Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo
I. Pagaling, the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and
participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary
evidence denied admission by respondent judge x x x. In other words,
there was lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary
evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioner’s Exhibits A, C,

D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the respondent judge is that
said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of
purported documents or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
respondent judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied
admission of said documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when the
subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain
cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown
that the non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary
pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. As aptly pointed out by the
respondent judge in the order issued by him on November 16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has been given
every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of
the documents it offered. It never produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judge’s denial
of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of documents

offered by it are equivalent to the original documents that it sought to offer
in evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence which were in force
and effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a contention is devoid of
merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in
Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied admission by the respondent
judge do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. The informations therein were not received,
retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has not adequately
established that its documentary evidence were electronic evidence. it has
not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents,
assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly
established by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary
evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent judge did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying admission of the
aforementioned documentary evidence of petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the respondent
judge committed an error in denying the aforementioned documentary
evidence of the petitioner, still the petition for certiorari filed in this case
must fail. Such error would at most be only an error of law and not an error
of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by respondent judge in Civil Case
No. CEB-18662.4
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioner’s obstinate contention

that the photocopies it offered as formal evidence before the trial court are
the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the
appellate court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence
actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an
"electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an
"electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression
that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the
section’s catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or
other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are
indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act,
as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the
following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain

Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of

petitioner’s power barges 207 and 209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile
Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain

Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together
with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form

which was filled up and accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his
own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were
handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr.

Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together
with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy

loss allegedly suffered by petitioner which was manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of
the cost estimate, manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.,
with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten
notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad

Testificandum written using a manual typewriter, signed manually
by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when
it was received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and

operation and maintenance agreement between petitioner and
Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page
containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with

attachments addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed by
Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received. The sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with

attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and manually signed by
Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex

C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed

by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and by the Notary Public, with
other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio

Asprer and by a Notary Public, together with other handwritten
notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the

representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.5 It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document

received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant
only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.7 However, what differentiates an electronic document from a
paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by

petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the
signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved
or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of
the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not
tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed
in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying

admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C",
"D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L",
"M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-
markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in
rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of
electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and
the withholding of the originals.8 But the modern justification for the rule
has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings
occupy a central position in the law.9 The importance of the precise terms
of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human
memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or
incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence
rule.10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can

be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry,
other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of

a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a

certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other

documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.11 The
offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of
routine practices of destruction of documents;12 (b) the proponent must
prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that
a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places.13 However, in the case at bar,
though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with
the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly,
we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of
the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately

disregard the opportunities given by the trial court for it to present the
originals of the photocopies it presented yet comes before us now praying
that it be allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were denied
admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the predicate for the
admission of secondary evidence. Had petitioner presented the originals of
the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered
as evidence, or at the very least laid the predicate for the admission of said
photocopies, this controversy would not have unnecessarily been brought
before the appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it
not been for petitioner’s intransigence, the merits of petitioner’s complaint
for damages would have been decided upon by the trial court long ago. As
aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has only itself to
blame for the respondent judge’s denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer to be
given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that
were denied admission nor to lay the predicate for the admission of
secondary evidence in case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
EN BANC
[A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P : April 12, 2005]
ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, v. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring
court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that
decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the
public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad
eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the
supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.1
The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza v. Tiongson2 is

applicable to the case at bar.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct3 against Elvira

Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of
the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of
respondent's solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez
(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter's pending
case in the CA,4 more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460 entitled "PAGCOR v. Zaldy
Nuez."5 Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television
program Imbestigador of GMA Network,6 the crew of which had accompanied him to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission'Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in
MalacaÃ±ang where he filed a complaint for extortion7 against respondent. This led to
the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2 nd Floor,
Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, 8 the place where the
supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place.
Respondent's apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment

operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme
Court Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG9 (Order) which created an ad-hoc
investigating committee (Committee).10 The Committee was specifically tasked among
others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondent's case and to
recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may
warrant.11
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an

investigation of the case and issued a Resolution12 dated 18 October 2004 where it
concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against
respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondent's preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against
her.13 On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report14 to the new CA
Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be
dismissed from service.
Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the
antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant's case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two
years.15 Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainant's reinstatement but a writ
of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in
favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending
adjudication of the case.16 Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant
sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter's
employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone
conversation17 and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via
SMS,18 complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case.
Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to
achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told
complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the
person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).19
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been
jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied, "Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran
dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na."20 Complainant then tried to ask for a
reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set,
not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision.21 Respondent even
admonished complainant with the words "Wala tayo sa palengke iho!"22 when the latter
bargained for a lower amount.23
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in
exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance
of Imbestigador.24 The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where
he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion.25 Thereafter, he communicated
with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money26 and to set
up a meeting with her.27 Upon learning that respondent's offer of a favorable decision
in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at
the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,28 the place where the entrapment operation
was later conducted. Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador,
accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law.29 During the meeting,
complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter
together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come
out.30 Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court
should the case be appealed later.31
When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a
male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a
lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was pending.32 She also
claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to
give her some.33
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but
respondent asserted that the amount was fixed. She even explained that this was
their second transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount
had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,300,000.00).34 Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been released. 35 However,
respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their
lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.36
Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the
first meeting. After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, "Ah, panalo
ka."37 The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it
was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent
then.38
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo
Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena
(Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes39 arrived at around 11:30 in
the morning at Jollibee.40 Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated
themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and
Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10)
bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. 41 The
envelope did not actually contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by
respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00),
as well as newspaper cut-outs.42 There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso
(P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the
PAOCTF.43 The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away44 and there
were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini
DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction.45
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.46 She appeared very nervous and suspicious
during the meeting.47 Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her,
precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador.48 She thus refused to receive the
money then and there. What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel
with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money.49
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen
around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant
proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed. 50 At one point, she even
said, "Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?,"51 referring to Banay
and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent's suspicion, the two agents stood up
after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was
going on.52
Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour.53 Complainant
and Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When
respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the
PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD)
Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. 54 Respondent became
hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.55
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she
went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00).56
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested
and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money. 57
She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
At seven o'clock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia
Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the
latter's house.58 She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that "she asked for money for a
case and was entrapped by police officers and the media." 59 Enraged at the news, Atty.
Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent replied, "Wala lang
ma'am, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot."60 Respondent claimed that she was
ashamed of what she did and repented the same. She also asked for Atty. Gepty's
forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when
she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings never to
commit such offenses.61
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report62 of her conversation with their division's
chairman, Justice Martin S. Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and
submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004. 63 She also later
testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case
of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange
for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her
contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly
offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise
claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt.
Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the
money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.
This Court is not persuaded by respondent's version. Based on the evidence on record,
what happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent
would like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and
capturing the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand,
in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the
commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-principal.64
In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely
because respondent demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from
complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latter's pending case.
Complainant's narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are
more in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more credible
than respondent's version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages
from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former's
pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the
Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence65 which provides:
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text

messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained."
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was
the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified
on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number
reflected in complainant's cellphone from which the messages originated was
hers.66 Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the
text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to
the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. 67 It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied.68 We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages
as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
Complainant's testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the

latter's demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the
testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was
present when the parties met in person. Siringan was privy to the parties' actual
conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28
of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondent's evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as
well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first
met. Respondent's own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims
that she did not remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of
the messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent
when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant's
cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that
were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she
was transacting with complainant. Thus, during the 17 November 2004 hearing, where
respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following transpired:
Q: After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text
messages? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Respondent)
A: Only some of these, your honors.
Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your
Honors.
Q: What else? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa
kanya si Len David.
Q: Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309
which was around 1:09 in the afternoon and you said "di me pwede punta na lang kayo
dito sa office Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107 Centennial Building.
A: Yes, your Honors.
Q: And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon
you again texted Zaldy Nuez and you said "Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza,
Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama mo si
Len David.
A: Opo, your Honors.
Q: How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said "Di pwede
kelan mo gusto fixed price na iyon."
A: I don't remember that, your Honors.
Q: Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said "Alam mo di ko iyon price and

nagbigay noon yung gagawa. Wala ako doon." You don't also remember this? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes, your Honors.
Q: September 27 at 1:42 p.m. "Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera".
You also don't remember that? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes Your Honors.
Q: September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, "Di na pwede sabi sa akin.

Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit iyon." You don't remember that? chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: No, your Honors.69
Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of
committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from
complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the
whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop
calling and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-
arranged.
This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million
pesos really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from
corrupting her, she could have simply refused to answer the latter's messages and
calls. This she did not do. She answered those calls and messages though she later
claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to complainant. She
could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which
respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the
circumstances.70 But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because
she never expected things to end this way.71
While claiming that she was not interested in complainant's offer of a million pesos, she
met with him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her.
If respondent felt that telling complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective
if she did it in person, the same would have been accomplished with a single meeting.
There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004
unless there was really an understanding between them that the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then. Respondent even claimed that she
became afraid of complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by
PAGCOR for using illegal drugs.72 This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28
September 2004.
Anent complainant's narration of respondent's refusal to reduce the amount of One

Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction,
while admitting that she actually said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe
that she said it merely to have something to talk about.73 If indeed, respondent had no
intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she had to make up
stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast that he could
come up with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for
an honest government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants
believe that court decisions may be bought and sold. Time and again this Court has
declared, thus:
"Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper
discharge of his duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which
the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part,
whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of
justice."74
Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen
(19) of which have been in the CA,75 should have known very well that court employees
are held to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. Their conduct should at all
times be above suspicion. As held by this Court in a number of cases, "The conduct or
behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility."76 Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among
others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the
public for the judiciary.77
Respondent's actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in
July 2004 until the entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the
moral fiber demanded from court employees. Respondent's avowals of innocence
notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she solicited the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision. The
testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondent's confession immediately after the
entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did
voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being accused of.
Respondent's solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable

decision violates Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect
on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly provide:
"SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves or for others."
"SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions." (Underscoring supplied) Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel specifically provides:
INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

"SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme
Court governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary
are deemed incorporated into this Code."
By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant,

respondent committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and the people's confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras v. Abalos,78 complainant charged respondent, an employee

of the Records Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for
allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two
Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal
before the Supreme Court. It turned out that respondent's representation was false
because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court.79
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and

ordered her dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus:
"In Mirano v. Saavedra,80 this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must

exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of
justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all
those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle
that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution."81
Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Shari
a Circuit Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,82 this Court stated:
"No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant
than the judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy
burden of responsibility. Court employees in particular, must be individuals of
competence, honesty and probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of
the court . . . . The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in the
administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and
integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial dealings which would
interfere with the efficient performance of his duties.83 The conduct required of court
personnel must always be beyond reproach."84
The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. v. Latiza, Court
Aide, RTC Branch 14 Cebu City85 is also worth remembering:
"Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and
morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who
are part of the machinery dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to the presiding
judge must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the
public's faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only a
paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court
itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official
and employee."86
In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Committee in their Report87 recommended that respondent be
dismissed from government service for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1
and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.88
Finding the Committee's recommendation to be supported by more than substantial

evidence and in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation
is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of

GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Her retirement
and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented by ATTY. CARLOS R.
BAUTISTA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner Ellery March G. Torres seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated April 22, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110302, which dismissed his petition seeking reversal
of the Resolutions dated June 23, 2008 2 and July 28, 20093 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Also assailed is the CA Resolution 4 dated July 30, 2010 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the
Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-
Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent
PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The
CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit
of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a
slot machine with an actual CMR of ₱5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of
either ₱50,000.00 or ₱35,000.00. 5 Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot
machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU
identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which
included herein petitioner.6
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges 7 for dishonesty, serious
misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses
where the penalty imposable is dismissal. The summary description of the charges stated:
Sometime between November 2006 and March 2007, you facilitated and actively participated in the
fraudulent scheme with respect to irregular manipulation of Credit Meter Reading (CMR) which, in
turn, led to the misappropriation of money earmarked for the slot machine jackpot at CF Hyatt
Manila. These anomalous transactions were consummated through your direct participation and
active cooperation of your co-employees and customers. With malice afterthought, you embezzled
and stole monies from PAGCOR, thereby resulting in substantial losses to the proprietary interest of
PAGCOR.8
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges 9 signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior
Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of
dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in
writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be sanctioned or
dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until further
orders.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation 10 of the charges
against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR
or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations
against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter 11 dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel,
Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from
the service. The letter reads in part, to wit:
Please be informed that the Board of Directors, in its meeting on July 31, 2007, approved the
recommendation of the Adjudication Committee to dismiss you from the service effective upon
approval due to the following offense:
Dishonesty, gross misconduct, serious violations of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial
to the best interests of the company and loss of trust and confidence, committed as follows: For
actively and directly participating in a scheme to defraud the company in conspiracy with co-
employees and SM customers by padding slot machine Credit Meter Reading (CMR) receipts in
favor of co-conspirator customers who had said (sic) CMR receipts paid at the teller's booth on
numerous occasions which caused substantial losses to the proprietary interests of PAGCOR. 12
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint 13 against PAGCOR and its
Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The
complaint alleged among others: (1) that he denied all the charges against him; (2) that he did ask
for a formal investigation of the accusations against him and for PAGCOR to produce evidence and
proofs to substantiate the charges, but respondent PAGCOR did not call for any formal
administrative hearing; (3) that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its
decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the
members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; and (4) that no
resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration, thus, the filing of the complaint. Petitioner
claimed that as a result of his unlawful, unjustified and illegal termination/dismissal, he was
compelled to hire the services of a counsel in order to protect his rights.
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to
perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service Law.
On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's
decision dismissing petitioner from the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's
appeal. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Ellery March G. Torres is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
decision contained in a letter dated August 2, 2007 of Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head, Human
Resource and Development Department (HRDD), PAGCOR, finding him guilty of Dishonesty, Gross
Misconduct, Serious Violation of Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Loss of Trust and Confidence and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service, is hereby AFFIRMED. The penalty of dismissal carries with it the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility, perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service, and bar from taking future Civil
Service Examination.14
In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether petitioner's appeal had already
prescribed which the former answered in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's
claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed
by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It found PAGCOR's denial of
having received petitioner's letter more credible as it was supported by certifications issued by its
employees. It found that a verification of one of the telephone numbers where petitioner allegedly
sent his letter reconsideration disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCOR's Office of
the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile
transmission at the first instance when he filed his complaint and not only when respondent
PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its Comment.
Petitioner's motion for a reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution No. 09-1105 dated July 28,
2009.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC.
On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
In dismissing the petition, the CA found that petitioner failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he had filed a motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit consideration
petitioner's claim that he had sent through a facsimile transmission a letter/reconsideration dated
August 13, 2007 addressed to PAGCOR's Chairman, members of the Board of Directors and the
Merit Systems Protection Board; that assuming arguendo that a letter reconsideration was indeed
sent through a facsimile transmission, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic
evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed
resolution revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the recipient of the
faxed document sent was not that of PAGCOR's Office of Board of Directors. The CA found
baseless and conjectural petitioner's claim that PAGCOR can easily deny having received the letter
by giving orders to their employees to execute an affidavit of denial under pain and threat of
administrative sanction or termination from service.
The CA then concluded that PAGCOR's decision which was contained in a letter dated August 4,
2007 dismissing petitioner from the service had already attained finality since there was no motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the manner and within the period provided for under the
Revised Uniform Rules on the Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 30, 2010.
Hence, this petition where petitioner states the errors committed by the CA in this wise:
The first issue that should be resolved is:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner based
merely on technicality without considering the allegations on summary and arbitrary dismissal based
on fabricated and unfounded accusations.
Next to be raised were the issues propounded in petitioner's Memorandum dated 29 January 2010
but were not tackled upon by the Court of Appeals, thus:
A. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling that there was no valid
letter/motion for reconsideration submitted to reconsider petitioner's dismissal from the
service;
B. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in giving more weight to PAGCOR's
denial of having received petitioner's letter of reconsideration;
C. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in not acting/resolving the Ex-Parte
Motion to Issue Subpoena Duces Tecum;
D. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in ruling that petitioner's failure to send
his letter reconsideration through mail or by personal service as set forth in the Rules of
Court, he forfeited his right to appeal; and
E. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in favoring PAGCOR"s dismissal of
petitioner from employment based on hearsay, imaginary and non-existent evidence. 15
The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of
the appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner contends that he filed his letter reconsideration of his dismissal 16 on August 13, 2007,
which was within the 15-day period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a facsimile
transmission sent to the PAGCOR's Office of the Board of Directors. He claims that the sending of
documents thru electronic data message, which includes facsimile, is sanctioned under Republic Act
No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter
reconsideration was not acted upon by PAGCOR, he then filed his complaint before the CSC.
We are not persuaded.
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 43 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which are applicable to this case, respectively provide, to wit:
Section 37. Finality of Decisions - A decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of
suspension for not more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary
is imposed, shall be final and executory. However, if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, the same shall be final and executory
after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no
such pleading has been filed.
Section 38. Filing of motion for reconsideration. - The party adversely affected by the decision may
file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen
days from receipt thereof.
Section 39. When deemed filed. - A motion for reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed filed on
the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case
and in case of personal delivery, the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. - Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension
or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, maybe appealed to the Commission Proper
within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion
for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the
postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in
case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper
office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for
reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before
August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for
reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was
duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims
was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to
appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for
reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,17 we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax
machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed
and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the
shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce
an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is
equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all
the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the
facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It
may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x181avvphi1
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 19 We determined
the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or
"electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence. (Italics ours.)20
We, therefore, found no reversible error committed by the CA when it affirmed the CSC in dismissing
petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits on September 14, 2007. The CSC
treated the complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's dismissal of petitioner. Under Section 43
which we earlier quoted, petitioner had 15 days from receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his
appeal. However, at the time petitioner filed his complaint with the CSC, which was considered as
petitioner's appeal, 41 days had already elapsed from the time he received his letter of dismissal on
August 4, 2007; hence, the CSC correctly found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
since petitioner's dismissal had already attained finality. Petitioner's dismissal from the service
became final and executory after he failed to file his motion for reconsideration or appeal in the
manner and within the period provided for under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service.
In Peña v. Government Service and Insurance System, 21 We said:
Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except
where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional
origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more important that a
case be settled than it be settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated
July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152392 May 26, 2005

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and
Tours, Inc. (ETI).
The Antecedents
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim,
while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against ETI with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus
attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The verification and certification against forum shopping
was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent and legal
counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to
execute the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion, contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and
was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as required by the
Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the
corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty.
Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file
the complaint through a resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting
held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was given a period of 10 days within which to submit a
copy of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo subsequently filed
other similar motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit3 of even date, executed by its general manager
Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25,
1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that same teleconference,
the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of
non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to
the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a
teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted
affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the
court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court
denied the motion in its Order5 dated August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. In its comment
on the petition, KAL appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000,
worded as follows:
SECRETARY’S/RESIDENT AGENT’S CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and appointed Corporate
Secretary and Resident Agent of KOREAN AIRLINES, a foreign corporation duly organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Korea and also duly
registered and authorized to do business in the Philippines, with office address at Ground
Floor, LPL Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY
that during a special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Corporation held on June 25,
1999 at which a quorum was present, the said Board unanimously passed, voted upon and
approved the following resolution which is now in full force and effect, to wit:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates
or any of its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal
action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel &
Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and
execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim
in Court, attend the Pre-Trial Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement
relative to the above-mentioned claim.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10 th day of January,

1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Resident Agent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January, 1999, Atty. Mario A.
Aguinaldo exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 14914545, issued on January
7, 2000 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 119; (Sgd.)

Page No. 25; ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Book No. XXIV Notary Public
Series of 2000. Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006
On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification
and certificate of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the
Rules of Court. According to the appellate court, Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the
board resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of KAL. As such, the RTC
could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of
Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus, ETI, now the
petitioner, comes to the Court by way of petition for review on certiorari and raises the following
issue:
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B
OF THE INSTANT PETITION?7
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court can be
determined only from the contents of the complaint and not by documents or pleadings outside
thereof. Hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, and the CA erred in considering the affidavit of the respondent’s general manager, as
well as the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certification and the resolution of the board of directors
contained therein, as proof of compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioner also maintains that the RTC cannot take judicial notice of the said
teleconference without prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner reiterates its
submission that the teleconference and the resolution adverted to by the respondent was a mere
fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern technology is used in the field of
business is a factual issue; hence, cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. On the merits of the petition, it insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident
agent and corporate secretary, is authorized to sign and execute the certificate of non-forum
shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top of the board resolution
approved during the teleconference of June 25, 1999. The respondent insists that "technological
advances in this time and age are as commonplace as daybreak." Hence, the courts may take
judicial notice that the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. had provided a record of
corporate conferences and meetings through FiberNet using fiber-optic transmission technology,
and that such technology facilitates voice and image transmission with ease; this makes constant
communication between a foreign-based office and its Philippine-based branches faster and easier,
allowing for cost-cutting in terms of travel concerns. It points out that even the E-Commerce Law has
recognized this modern technology. The respondent posits that the courts are aware of this
development in technology; hence, may take judicial notice thereof without need of hearings. Even if
such hearing is required, the requirement is nevertheless satisfied if a party is allowed to file
pleadings by way of comment or opposition thereto.
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of teleconferencing as a
means of conducting meetings of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; until and
after teleconferencing is recognized as a legitimate means of gathering a quorum of board of
directors, such cannot be taken judicial notice of by the court. It asserts that safeguards must first be
set up to prevent any mischief on the public or to protect the general public from any possible fraud.
It further proposes possible amendments to the Corporation Code to give recognition to such
manner of board meetings to transact business for the corporation, or other related corporate
matters; until then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing cannot be the subject of judicial notice.
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting on June 25, 1999
through teleconferencing where Atty. Aguinaldo was supposedly given such an authority is a farce,
considering that there was no mention of where it was held, whether in this country or elsewhere. It
insists that the Corporation Code requires board resolutions of corporations to be submitted to the
SEC. Even assuming that there was such a teleconference, it would be against the provisions of the
Corporation Code not to have any record thereof.
The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by the respondent in its
pleadings were mere fabrications foisted by the respondent and its counsel on the RTC, the CA and
this Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.— The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment
of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory 8 and that the
failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and
personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are
no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence,
the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of
whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his
counsel may be unaware of such facts.9 Hence, the requisite certification executed by the plaintiff’s
counsel will not suffice.10
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on
behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who
has personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents. The reason was
explained by the Court in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 as follows:
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly
delegated individuals; namely, its officers and/or agents.
…
The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on
it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In
turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly-
authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly-authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or
by specific act of the board of directors. "All acts within the powers of a corporation may be
performed by agents of its selection; and except so far as limitations or restrictions which
may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the officer
or agent of a corporation, of whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the
corporation; and agents once appointed, or members acting in their stead, are subject to the
same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private persons."
… For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its own retained
counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and president, may not even know the
details required therein.
Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the complaint or appended
thereto as an integral part of the complaint. The rule is that compliance with the rule after the filing of
the complaint, or the dismissal of a complaint based on its non-compliance with the rule, is
impermissible. However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow subsequent compliance
with the rule.12 If the authority of a party’s counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is
disputed by the adverse party, the former is required to show proof of such authority or
representation.
In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to
execute the requisite verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and
counsel of the respondent. It was, thus, incumbent upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege
and establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such authority to execute the requisite verification and
certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to do so.
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which was incorporated in the complaint and
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo reads:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Suite 210 Gedisco Centre,
1564 A. Mabini cor. P. Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila, after having sworn to in accordance with law
hereby deposes and say: THAT -
1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the above entitled case and
have caused the preparation of the above complaint;
2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained therein are true and
correct based on the records on files;
3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If I subsequently learned that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
different divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or agency
within five (5) days from such notice/knowledge.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 1999, affiant exhibiting
to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 00671047 issued on January 7, 1999 at Manila,
Philippines.
Doc. No. 1005; (Sgd.)

Page No. 198;
Book No. XXI ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Series of 1999. Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913
As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that Atty. Aguinaldo had been
authorized to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping by the respondent’s Board of Directors;
moreover, no such board resolution was appended thereto or incorporated therein.
While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines, this does not mean
that he is authorized to execute the requisite certification against forum shopping. Under Section
127, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code, the authority of the resident agent of a
foreign corporation with license to do business in the Philippines is to receive, for and in behalf of the
foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in all actions and other legal proceedings
against such corporation, thus:
SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. – A resident agent may either be an individual
residing in the Philippines or a domestic corporation lawfully transacting business in the
Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an individual, he must be of good moral character
and of sound financial standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. – The Securities and Exchange Commission
shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in
the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some persons who must be a
resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served
in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that
service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the
duly-authorized officers of the foreign corporation as its home office. 14
Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a certificate of non-forum
shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. This is because while a resident
agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal (a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its principal, whether in the
Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country where such
corporation was organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino
citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent, was not specifically
authorized to execute the said certification. It attempted to show its compliance with the rule
subsequent to the filing of its complaint by submitting, on March 6, 2000, a resolution purporting to
have been approved by its Board of Directors during a teleconference held on June 25, 1999,
allegedly with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance. However, such attempt of the
respondent casts veritable doubt not only on its claim that such a teleconference was held, but also
on the approval by the Board of Directors of the resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern
technology, persons in one location may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on
the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and Atty. Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the
respondent’s Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise, gave credence
to the respondent’s claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk
Kyoo Kim, as well as Atty. Aguinaldo’s certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of
men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts
have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial
notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which
the court has no constructive knowledge.17
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may
be made by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group
communication (three or more people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In
general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they are
separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may be used in a number of
ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented
with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through keyboard terminals, and (3)
audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity for telewriting or
telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first

introduced in the 1960’s with American Telephone and Telegraph’s Picturephone. At that time,
however, no demand existed for the new technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers
were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for using the picturephone, which was regarded as
more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication. 20 In time, people found it
advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate governance,
because of the money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldn’t normally attend a distant FTF
meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and
more oriented to the primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any
location equipped with a telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and

procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF

meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the
following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that aren’t made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or

bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the
meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible. 22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of
group communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also
be easier to miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of
meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of

private corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange
Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the
guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences. 24 Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC
that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea
relating to business transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference
along with the respondent’s Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted;
even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly
passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
respondent failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed
the motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly
authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty.
Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the identification card 25 of Atty. Aguinaldo
which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the
respondent’s Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during
the hearing of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000,
within which to submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and
execute the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. 26 The
respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said
resolution, contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its
Order27 dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed for an extension within which to
submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. 28 It was on the said date that the respondent
submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors
supposedly approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of
its lawyers are hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action
necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are
hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute any document
or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial
Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned
claim.29
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent "do[es] not keep a written
copy of the aforesaid Resolution" because no records of board resolutions approved during
teleconferences were kept. This belied the respondent’s earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000
motion for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main
office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a
copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had
no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was
embodied in the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo. However, no
such resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The respondent’s allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999
and approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the
additional fact that no such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been
approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have
incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so.
It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a
meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a
copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later that no written copy
existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting
of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a
Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on
June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6,
1999. More importantly, the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000);
it also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its
Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its
comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretary’s/Resident Agent’s Certificate 30 dated January 10,
2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never
took place, and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondent’s Board of Directors during
the said teleconference was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this
Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice, the complaint of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 170633 : October 17, 2007]

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office

On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice

In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with MCC,

However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a letter of

Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2-POSTS080-

Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered

1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the outstanding principal

2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per counsel's

No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.

I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN AWARDING

III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN FINDING

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision48 affirming the ruling of

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:

(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from any liability.

On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf of MCC, filed a

Aggrieved, MCC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 56 before this

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION NOT IN

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS

III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF

I - Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and

II - Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions

IV - Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of

It cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we held that receipt

Independent of this consideration though, this Court assiduously reviewed

In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and Development

In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that where strong

Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set

The other technical issue posed by respondent is the alleged pro

In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement of arguments

Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented

In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:

Admissibility of Pro Forma

The argument is untenable.

"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of

An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be

c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received

f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of

(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent,

(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of

were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic

The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic data message"

SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of these Rules, the following

(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of

Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original

Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section can only

"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by

is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an "electronic data

Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the principal author

Senator Magsaysay. Please go ahead, Senator Santiago.

Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the Declaration of Policy,

At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms that have to be

The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or "data" as it is now