1. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.

1606 December 10, 1978

REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS

"SANDIGANBAYAN" AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the new Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust and ordains that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all
times accountable to the people;

WHEREAS, to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, Section 5, Article
XIII of the New Constitution provides for the creation of a special court to be known as Sandiganbayan;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested
by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as follows:

Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal and composition. A special court, of the same
level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the
Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices who shall be
appointed by the President.

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan; unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record
or been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a pre-
requisite for a like period.

The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other Justices shall have precedence
according to the dates of their respective commissions, or, when the commissions of two or more of them shall bear
the same date, according to the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.

The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office except on impeachment upon the
grounds and in the manner provided for in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60,000.00 and each Associate Justice P55,000.00
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other
emoluments, be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirement and other
benefits as those provided for under existing laws of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals.

Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals are increased,
such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.

They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office.

Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro
Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the
place where they may have arisen; Provided, however, that the Presiding Justice may authorize any division or
divisions of court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila to hear and decide cases emanating
from any of the existing judicial districts. Whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the services of the
personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including the courts of first
instance of the province where any of the divisions is holding session, and those personnel of such agencies or
courts shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 3. Divisions of the Courts; Quorum. The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each.
The three divisions may sit at the same time.
Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for session in division; Provided, that when the required quorum cannot be
had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the
President shall, upon recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals or
Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit Criminal Court of the judicial district concerned to sit temporarily
therein.

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;

(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; and

(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.

The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional, or its equivalent, except as herein provided; in other offenses, it shall be concurrent
with the regular courts.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.

Where an accused is tried for any of the above offenses and the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense
charged, he may nevertheless be convicted and sentenced for the offense proved, included in that which is charged.

Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action
shall be recognized; Provided, however, that, in cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, where
the civil action had therefore been filed separately with a regular court but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the criminal action may
no longer be filed with the Sandiganbayan, its exclusive jurisdiction over the same notwithstanding, but may be filed
and prosecuted only in the regular courts of competent jurisdiction; Provided, further, that, in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts, where either the criminal or civil action is first
filed with the regular courts, the corresponding civil or criminal action, as the case may be, shall only be filed with the
regular courts of competent jurisdiction.

Excepted from the foregoing provisions, during martial law, are criminal cases against officers and members of the
armed forces in the active service.

Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required.  The unanimous vote of the three justices in a division shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment. In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous
vote, the Presiding Judge shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily
with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for
rendering judgment.

Section 6. Maximum period for termination of cases. As far as practicable, the trial of cases before the
Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuos until terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three
(3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.

Section 7. Form, finality and enforcement of decisions. Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall contain
complete findings of facts on all issues properly raised before it.
A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision maybe filed within (15) days from promulgation or notice of
the final order or judgment, and such petition for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
submission thereon.

Decisions and final orders shall be subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court shall decide any case on appeal promptly and without the necessity of
placing it upon the regular calendar. Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the
records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and
judgment, as law and justice shall dictate.

Final judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.

Section 8. Transfer of cases. As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to
the Sandiganbayan.

Section 9. Rule-making Power. The Sandiganbayan shall have the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure
and, pending such promulgation, the Rules of Court shall govern its proceedings.

Section 10. Authority over internal affairs. The Sandiganbayan shall administer its own internal affairs and may adopt
such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them, the rotation of justices and
other matters relating to its business.

Section 11. Proceeding free of charge. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan shall be conducted at no cost to the
complainant and/or his witnesses.

No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the
Investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation
conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor.

Section 12. Administrative personnel. The Sandiganbayan shall reelect and appoint such personnel as it may deem
necessary to discharge its functions under this Decree including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court
who shall be members of the Bar.

The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P36,000.00 and the Deputy Clerks of Court, P30,000.00.

All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law;
Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution en banc, remove any of them for cause.

Section 13. Report to the President. The Sandiganbayan shall submit an annual report to the President, including all
disbursements of funds entrusted to it, within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year.

Section 14. Funding. There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of Five Million Pesos (P5,000.00) out of any
funds in the National Treasury to carry out the provisions of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general
appropriations act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with a
schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan.

Section 15. Separability of Provisions. If for any reason, any section or provision of this Decree is declared to be
unconstitutional or invalid, other sections or provisions thereof which are not affected thereby, shall continue in full
force and effect.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. This Decree hereby repeals Presidential Decree No. 1486 and all other provisions of
law, General Orders, Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith.

Section 17. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight.

RULES OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, as implemented by
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan hereby adopts and promulgates the following rules to govern the
conduct of its business.

RULE I
TITLE AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. Title of the Rules. These Rules shall be known and cited as the Rules of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objectives and to achieve a
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding before the Sandiganbayan.

RULE II

CONTROL OF FUNCTIONS AND SUCCESSION

Section 1. Exclusive Control. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution and Presidential Decree No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive control, direction and supervision of all matters pertaining to its internal affairs
and the operation of its business.

Section 2. Succession in the Office of the Presiding Justice. In case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan or his temporary incapacity to exercise the powers and perform the duties of his office, the same
shall devolve upon the qualified most senior Associate Justices until such incapacity is removed or another Presiding
Justice is appointed and has duly qualified.

RULE III

COMPOSITION OF DIVISIONS

Section 1. How Divisions Constituted. The Sandiganbayan shall consist of three divisions which shall be known as
the First Division, Second Division, and Third Division, and shall each be composed of Presiding Justice and the first
two Associate Justices in the order of precedence as the respective Chairmen; the next three Associate Justices in
the order of precedence as the respective senior members; and the last three Associate Justices in the order of
precedence as the respective junior members. However, until the entire complement of the Sandiganbayan shall
have been appointed and qualified, the Presiding justice and the two Associate Justices first appointed and qualified
shall constitute the First Division.

Section 2. Vacancy; How Filled. In case of any vacancy in the composition of a division, whether permanent or
temporary, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation
on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and
prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of cases assigned thereto, unless the
operation of the other divisions of the Court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the procedure provided in
Section 3, Rule VIII of these Rules shall apply.

RULE IV
FILING OF CASES

Section 1. Proceedings Free of Charge. All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan be conducted at no cost to the
complainant and/or his witnesses.
Section 2. Preliminary Investigation Necessary. No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the
Sandiganbayan except upon a certification by the investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima facie case to
be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance with applicable laws and approved by the
Chief Special Prosecutor.

Section 3. Where Cases Filed. All cases to be filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Sandiganbayan which shall be open for the purpose of receiving complaints, information, motions and
the like from eight to twelve o'clock in the morning and twelve thirty to four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon, on Mondays
to Fridays, except on public or special holidays.

RULE V
DISTRIBUTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF CASES

Section 1. Distribution of Cases. All cases filed with the Sandiganbayan shall be allotted among the three divisions for
hearing and decision by raffle to be conducted by a Raffle Committee composed of the Presiding Justice and the two
most senior Associate Justices available, on such days as may hereafter be fixed by the Presiding Justice depending
upon the need for such raffle to be made in view of the number of cases filed, with notice to the interested parties
who may, if they so desire, be present therein by themselves or through counsel.

Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident on series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may, in the discretion of Sandiganbayan, be consolidated in only one division. Should the
propriety of such consolidation appear upon the filing of the cases concerned and before they are raffled, all such
cases shall be considered as one case for purposes of the raffle; but, should the propriety of such consolidation may
be affected upon motion of an interested party filed with the division taking cognizance of the case to be consolidated
and, if granted, consolidation shall be made in the division before which the case with the lowest number is pending.
In either case, the division in which consolidation is effected shall be entitled to be credited in the distribution of cases
with the same number of cases transferred to it to the end that all divisions shall, as much as possible, receive more
or less the same number of cases filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Section 3. Assignment of Cases Permanent. Cases assigned to a division of the Sandiganbayan in accordance with
these Rules shall remain with said division notwithstanding changes in the composition thereof and all matters raised
therein shall be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are
members of the division aforesaid at the time said matters are taken up, irrespective of whether they were or were not
members of the division at the time the case was first assigned thereto: Provided, however, That only Justices who
are members of the division at the time a case is submitted for decision shall take part in the consideration and
adjudication of said case, unless any such member thereafter ceases to be a member of the Sandiganbayan for any
reason whatsoever in which case any Justice chosen to fill the vacancy in accordance with the manner provided in
Section 2, Rule III, of these Rules shall participate in the consideration and adjudication of said case; Provided, lastly,
that the Sandiganbayan en banc may, for special or compelling reasons, transfer cases from one division thereof to
another.

RULE VI
PROCESSES

Processes and writs of the Sandiganbayan which by their nature or by provision of existing laws or the Rules of Court
are to be issued under the signature of a Judge or a Justice shall be signed by the Chairman of the division
concerned: Provided, That if there is an urgent necessity for the issuance thereof before the case is raffled to a
division, the same shall be signed by the Presiding Justice. In the absence of the Presiding Justice or the Chairman
aforesaid, the process or writ shall be signed by the senior Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan or in the divisions
concerned, respectively. All other processes or writs issued upon authority of the Sandiganbayan or a division thereof
shall be signed by the Clerk of Court or, in his absence, by the Deputy Clerk of Court of the division concerned.

RULE VII
BAIL

Section 1. How Amount Fixed; Approval. The amount of bail to be posted in cases in the Sandiganbayan shall be
fixed by the Chairman of the division thereof to which they are assigned; and such bail may be approved by any
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, but preferably by a Justice of the division concerned: Provided, however, That where
the accused is arrested, detained or otherwise placed in custody outside the Metropolitan Manila area, any judge of
the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court may accept and approve the bail for his appearance before the
division to which his case is assigned and release him, and shall inform the division issuing the order of arrest of his
action, forwarding thereto the papers in this case.

Section 2. Condition of the Bail. The condition of the bail is that the accused shall appear and answer the complaint
or information in the division of the Sandiganbayan to which it is assigned or transferred for trial and submit himself to
the orders and processes thereof and, after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Supreme Court, that he will
surrender himself for the execution of such judgment as the Supreme Court may render; or, that, in case the cause is
to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the division to which it may be remanded and submit
himself to the orders and processes thereof.

RULE VIII
SESSIONS AND TRIAL

Section 1. How Sessions Held. The Sandiganbayan shall for administrative purposes, sit en banc; and, for the trial
and determination of cases, sit in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.

Section 2. Presiding Officer. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc shall be presided by the Presiding Justice;
whereas sessions in division shall be presided by the respective Chairman of each division. In the absence of the
Presiding Justice or the Chairman of a division, as the case may be, the Associate Justice attending the session en
banc or in division who is first in the order of precedence and able to preside, shall do so.

Section 3. Quorum. Five Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and three Justices for sessions in
division: Provided, That when a quorum and/or the votes required for a resolution or decision of the Sandiganbayan,
either en banc or in division, or the trial or hearing of cases cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or
temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the President shall, upon recommendation of the
Presiding Justice, designate any Justice of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Court of First Instance or of the Circuit
Criminal Court to sit temporarily therein.

Section 4. Place of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or in division, shall be held in
the place of its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila area where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it
irrespective of the place where they may have arisen: Provided, however, That the Presiding Justice may authorize
any division or divisions of the Court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metropolitan Manila to hear and
decide cases emanating therefrom. For this purpose and whenever necessary, the Sandiganbayan may require the
services of the personnel and the use of the facilities of any agency of the Government, national or local, including
the Courts of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court of the province or city where any of the divisions is holding
session, and those personnel of such agencies or courts shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 5. Time of Holding Sessions. Sessions of the Sandiganbayan en banc may be called at any time by the
Presiding Justice or at the instance at least five Associate Justices. Sessions for the trial of cases cognizable by it
shall be held on such days and at such times as the divisions thereof may, by order and upon notice to the parties
concerned, fix.

Section 6. Pre-trial Inquest. After the arraignment of an accused who pleads not guilty, the division concerned shall,
without prejudice to the invocation by the accused of his constitutional rights, direct the prosecutor and the accused
and his counsel to appear before any of the Justices thereof for a conference to consider;

(a) Admissions of facts about which there can be no dispute;

(b) Marking for identification of documentary or real evidence of the parties;

(c) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(d) Procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel;

(e) Order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple accused;
 (f) Order of cross-examination where there are multiple accused; and

(g) Such other matter as will promote a fair and expeditious termination of the trial.

After the pre-trial inquest, a pre-trial order shall be issued by the Associate Justice presiding the conference reciting
the actions and/or proceedings taken thereat, the admissions of facts made, the documents and real evidence
marked, and the agreement entered into by the parties as to any of the matters taken up therein. Such order shall
limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by the admissions or agreements of the parties and when entered
shall blind the parties and control the course of the action during the trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction
proceedings, unless modified by the division concerned before trial to prevent manifest injustice.

RULE IX
MOTIONS

Section 1. Motion Day. The first hours of the morning session of the divisions every Friday shall be devoted to the
hearing of motions, unless, upon motion of an interested party and for special reasons, the division concerned shall
fix another day for the hearing of any particular motion.

Section 2. Resolution on Interlocutory or Incidental Motions. Rulings on all written motions submitted to the
Sandiganbayan or any division thereof for resolution shall be reached in consultation among the Justices participating
in the consideration thereof: Provided, however, That rulings on oral motions or on objections made in the course of
the trial or hearing shall be handed down by the Chairman of the division concerned.

RULE X
JUDGMENT

Section 1. Votes Necessary to Decide. The unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the
rendition of a judgment or order. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding
Justice shall designated by raffle two Justices from among the other members of the Sandiganbayan to sit
temporarily with them forming a special division of five Justices, and the vote of a majority of such special division
shall be necessary for the rendition of a judgment or order.

Section 2. Procedure in Deciding Cases. The conclusions of a division of the Sandiganbayan in any case submitted
to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Justice for the writing of the opinion
of the division. Any Justice dissenting from a judgment shall state the reasons for his dissent.

Section 3. Maximum Period to Decide Cases. The judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be
rendered within three (3) months from the date the case was submitted for decision.

Section 4. Form of judgment and final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of fact
and a statement of the law on all issues properly raised before it.

RULE XI
PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the
presence of the accused and any Justice of the division which rendered the same: Provided, That, if the accused is
confined or detained in a place outside Metropolitan Manila or of the city or province in which any division of the
Sandiganbayan is sitting at the time of such promulgation, the judgment may, upon delegation by the division
concerned be promulgated by any judge of the Court of First Instance or Circuit Criminal Court having jurisdiction
over the place of confinement or detention, in which event the Court so promulgating the judgment shall have
authority to accept and approve the appeal bond.

RULE XII
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of a judgment or final order of a division of the
Sandiganbayan, unless said judgment or order had in the meantime otherwise attained finality, a petition for the
reconsideration thereof may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for
new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, and such petition for reconsideration shall be
decided within thirty (30 days from submission thereof.

RULE XIII
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

Section 1. Method of Review. A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of a division of the Sandiganbayan
by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of Rules of Court and by serving a
copy thereof to the Sandiganbayan.

Whenever, in any case decided, the death penalty shall have been imposed, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court, whether the accused shall have appealed or not, for review and judgment, as law and justice shall
dictate.

Section 2. Bail Pending Appeal. An accused who has been released on bail shall not committed to jail upon
conviction pending the expiration of the period for appeal or pending an appeal seasonably taken, except when the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or death, in which case, the accused may forthwith be committed to jail after
promulgation of the sentence. The division of the Sandiganbayan concerned, however, may, for good cause, cancel
the bond or increase the amount of bail and commit the accused into custody pending appeal, unless he gives bail in
the increased amount. The surely shall also be responsible for the surrender or the accused after judgment shall
have become final.

RULE XIV
PUBLICATION OF DECISIONS

With the consent of the respective writers thereof, the decisions of the Sandiganbayan may be published in the
Official Gazette in the language in which they have been originally written. The syllabi for the decisions shall be
prepared by the Clerk of Court in consultation with writers thereof.

RULE XV
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF COURT

Except as otherwise herein provided or as may hereafter be modified from time to time by the Sandiganbayan and
insofar as practicable, the Rules of Court shall govern proceedings in the Sandiganbayan.

RULE XVI
SEAL OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

The seal of the Sandiganbayan shall be of standard size, circular in form, consisting of two concentric circles as its
margin, with the inscription, running from left to right, on the upper margin of the word "Sandiganbayan" and on the
lower margin of the words "Republika ng Pilipinas"; with 16 stars, representing the existing 16 judicial districts,
immediately along the outer edge of the inner circle; and with a design at the center of a triangle, with a trisected area
composed of the national colors of white on its upper part, blue on the left and red on the right, with the words
"KATAPATAN" on the right side, "KAPANAGUTAN" on the left side, and "KARANGALAN" on the base; a star in each
corner of the triangle representing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; and a bolo inside the triangle on which is
superimposed a balance.

RULE XVII
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

If, for any reason, any section or provision of these Rules shall be held to be unconstitutional or invalid, no other
section or provision thereof shall be effected thereby.

RULE XVIII
EFFECTIVITY
The Rules shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7975

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,

AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED

Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Executive Order No. 184, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) divisions of three justices each. The
five (5) may sit at the same time.

"The first three divisions shall be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth division shall be in Cebu City for cases
coming from the Visayas region, and the fifth division shall be in Cagayan de Oro City for cases coming from the
Mindanao region.

"Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the
particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy
occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict
rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights
and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned
thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the President shall, upon the
recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily
therein."

Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

 "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or
their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions
or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27", or not
otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the people of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Section 3. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case
or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and
the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or
notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from
submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case
decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the decision shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is
death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.

"Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under this Act shall be appealable to
the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice to the parties."

Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and
proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices
among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or
modified by the Supreme Court."

Section 5. Section 10 of the same Decree is hereby repealed.

Section 6. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1486, 1606 and 1861, Executive Orders Nos. 101 and 184 and all other laws,
decrees, orders and rules of which are inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall
be referred to the proper courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 30 March 1995

Sixteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand fourteen.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10660

AN ACT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE

SANDIGANBAYAN, FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Constitution of the Divisions; Quorum. –  The Sandiganbayan shall sit in seven (7) divisions of three (3)
members each.

"Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for
the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary incapacity of a member or a
vacancy therein, the Presiding Justice may designate a member of another division to be determined by strict rotation
on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and
prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto."

Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ’27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads:

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent and higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
 "c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

"Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does not
allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from
the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).

"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ’27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of
the writs  of mandamus,  prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,  arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in,
the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate
civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 3. Section 5 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 5. Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote. – All three (3) members of a division shall
deliberate on all matters submitted for judgment, decision, final order, or resolution.

"The concurrence of a majority of the members of a division shall be necessary to render a judgment, decision, or
final order, or to resolve interlocutory or incidental motions."

Section 4. Funding and Appropriations.  – The amount necessary to carry out the implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the current appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its
full implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 5. Transitory Provision. –  This Act shall apply to all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan over which trial has
not begun: Provided, That: (a) Section 2, amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, on
"Jurisdiction"; and (b) Section 3, amending Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, on "Proceedings,
How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote" shall apply to cases arising from offenses committed after the effectivity
of this Act.

Section 6. Separability Clause.  – Should any provision of this Act or part hereof be declared unconstitutional, the
other provisions or parts not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause. –  All laws, decrees, orders, and issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.

2. RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court,
the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." 1 It came into existence with the issuance in
1978 of a Presidential Decree. 2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was
passed, 3 to be supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the validity of which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a
1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of
1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued
commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded
such a remedial device." 6 It should occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full
awareness of the continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.

Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.  7 The
informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon
being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.  8 A week later. respondent
Court denied such motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. 10 Hence
this petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended,
creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the
Constitution. 14

The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively with dishonesty and abuse
of trust in the public service whether committed by government officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the
private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from or disregard of constitutional rights.
That is beyond question. With due recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner  15 in his
pleadings butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by
the exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No,
1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated.

The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create
the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution
contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made clear that he
as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. " 17 Thus,
there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in 1975. In the
language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by
the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to
legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
Martial Law. " 20

2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify Presidential Decree
No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration:  21 "The Ideal
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only
thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity
which is of the very essence of the Idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists
"cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the
realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what
does in fact exist .To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment
of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. " 23 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest." 24

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus: " 1.
The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law,
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to
the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a
matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter
to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by
this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. 27 To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention
of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such
court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that
a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of
the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
included among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific
provision, " in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities." 29 The
scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.

4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution
is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise ... ." 30 A
more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument. The Kay
Villegas Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of the
commission to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty."  32 Even the
most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an
accused "has become entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This
Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo  33 a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later
Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only
the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing
for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to
crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what is prohibited by the ex
post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided in 1903. Thus: "An ex post facto law has been defined as one
- (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next paragraph
of the opinion of Justice Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what
way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government,
the benefit of the appeal, and is intended

First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the
claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility. 36

6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States Supreme Court. Even the very
language as to what falls with the category of this provision is well-nigh Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I
consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action
done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and
oppressive." 38 The opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The
expressions 'ex post facto laws,' are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an
appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone in his
commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his
successor, Mr. Wooddeson and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and
accurate knowledge of the true principle of government. " 39

7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American Supreme Court in April of 1898 - the
very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired
- it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by
an author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring
unconstitutional the challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous
pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic appraisal: "The
difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular
modes of procedure as in determining whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right
that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and
which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision of the
American Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the then Chief Justice
Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically stated that "the prescribing of different modes
of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial
protections with which the existing laws surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the
constitutional inhibition." 43

8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is
a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of
Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the
language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was
regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital for the
protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the
negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent
Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices
from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. " 44 Then if convicted, this Court
has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the
facts. What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to
the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence 45 has been overcome. In
that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of
evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to
justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard,
this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the
state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely
by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on
the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty." 47 This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a
showing that this fundamental and basic right to De presumed innocent has been disregarded. 48 It does seem
farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results
in the loss "vital protection" of liberty.

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page
memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack
of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court
decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words,
Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges
so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice,
though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed
to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." 50 What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in
criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 51 this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with
"a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal proceedings then,
due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to
meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to
rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that
rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction." 53 The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided
by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during
the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: "This court has had frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an
accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law." 55

10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as
passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is
true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now,
however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way
as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too
plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by certiorari
of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr. and Ericta, JJ., took no part.

Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J.,  concuring:

I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and
I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane
than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely
should not be the case. I must say emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's
independence, it is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is unworthy of similar
protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in question is not
ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of
protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its
deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.

I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined
to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here
and abroad, that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient
persuavity.

It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the Sandiganbayan should be
designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan
as sui generis in the judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must
be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly "shall create", it is not under the Article on
the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it to
be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain
concomittants which compel that it should be treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it
exercises judicial power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this
respect, I agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional
necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved
by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of
those courts, "special" as it may be.

I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the Sandiganbayan and the special
procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the constitutional injunction against ex-post facto
laws. The creation of a special court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a
constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest
must be dealt with more expeditiously in order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals therefrom appealable to
another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the
Sandiganbayan's primary and primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in our public
officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the
early '70's particularly of the youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their
conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they demanded
and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was
conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.

It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the Sandiganbayan. At this point, I
must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not
insulated by the Charter against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme
Court that cannot modify or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.

Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the Sandiganbayan cannot be
unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the
People's Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted
as violative of the Charter.

True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with.
That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my
opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt,
as long as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.

Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over decisions of the former even in
criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed to
exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and
no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the
accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts
where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our
constant jurisprudence that the appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges,
except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule
apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an
appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its
findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the
review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses
as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever
be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.

MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring and dissenting:

Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due process as wen as equal
protection of the law and against the enactment of ex post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.

All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto  laws, have been cited by the
petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.

It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the ground that it
impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts.

It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No. 1606 which he does not
impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions,
which are separable from the valid provisions.

The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very beginning any attempt to assault his
constitutional liberties.
I

PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals,
and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and
corruption committed by public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one
appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination Three judges sitting on the
same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The
ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.

It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan
with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the
government, government instrumentalities and government-owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution
does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only
the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.

It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process clause of the Constitution,
because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under
Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also
already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555;
People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp.
674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition
against the passage of ex post facto laws.

2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can
only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court
only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of
the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact
and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater
guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they
are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.

3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely abused its
discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the
presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with
substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact
and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional
power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt - by
proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused
of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.

4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate Justices, sitting in three
divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in
a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach
a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to
sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall
be necessary for rendering judgment.

At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. Consequently, when
a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily
with the Division to constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members now
composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from
whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents.
This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the
petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as against those who will be
prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.

P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other defendants indicted before
other trial courts.

5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places expressly the
Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate
trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions,
special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity
between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.

6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being down-graded by Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14
expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with
the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan" (emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the.
annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the
Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the
Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such
discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified
parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive
and the Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be
jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or refusal on the part
of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of the courts.

II

P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -

1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one which alters the rules
of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed,
or deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment
against herein petitioner accused him of graft and corruption committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including
January 12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by
P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on
June 11, 1978.

As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all persons accused of
malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of
conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both
questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both
factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977.
This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein
petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to 1978.

2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal
conviction.

The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not so prior to its
promulgation.

The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying cases against national security
whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the
People's Court Act or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing
then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmena soon
after the Liberation. Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which
was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People's Court Act appeal to
the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The Supreme Court can review all judgments of the
People's Court both on questions of fact and of law.

III

SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE
SUPREME COURT -

Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of procedure without requiring
the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court. to pro- promulgate rules of court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).

IV

P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER INFERIOR COURTS
INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN -

Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules
governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its
business," without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of
supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an
inferior court.

2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select and appoint its
personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to remove them for cause without reserving
to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or disapprove such appointments and to review such removals,
aggravates the violation of the constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.

3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to supervise inferior
courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President
without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for review' and approval.

That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General Appropriations Act of 1982
which states that "all appropriations provided herein for the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the
Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This
particular provision impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme
Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same General
Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of Appeals,
Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the
approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).

The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the Sandiganbayan does not include
the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.

All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are separable from the
rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared unconstitutional
without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who
is to do it, and now to do it - the test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs.
Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability
although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily binding on, the Supreme
Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged portions are inseparable from the valid
portions.

Section—1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein the phrase "of the
same level as the Court of Appeals.

Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more members of the
Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.

Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting the completeness and
validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29
of the Judiciary Act of 1984, as amended,can apply.

However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid provided it is understood
that the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J.,  concuring:

I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and
I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane
than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely
should not be the case. I must say emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's
independence, it is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is unworthy of similar
protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in question is not
ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of
protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its
deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.

I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined
to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here
and abroad, that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient
persuavity.

It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the Sandiganbayan should be
designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan
as sui generis in the judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must
be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly "shall create", it is not under the Article on
the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it to
be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain
concomittants which compel that it should be treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it
exercises judicial power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this
respect, I agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional
necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved
by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of
those courts, "special" as it may be.

I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the Sandiganbayan and the special
procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the constitutional injunction against ex-post facto
laws. The creation of a special court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a
constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest
must be dealt with more expeditiously in order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.

Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals therefrom appealable to
another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the
Sandiganbayan's primary and primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in our public
officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the
early '70's particularly of the youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their
conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they demanded
and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was
conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.

It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the Sandiganbayan. At this point, I
must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not
insulated by the Charter against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme
Court that cannot modify or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.

Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the Sandiganbayan cannot be
unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the
People's Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted
as violative of the Charter.

True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with.
That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my
opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt,
as long as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.

Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over decisions of the former even in
criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed to
exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and
no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the
accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts
where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our
constant jurisprudence that the appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges,
except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule
apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an
appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its
findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the
review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses
as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever
be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.

MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring and dissenting:

Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due process as wen as equal
protection of the law and against the enactment of ex post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.

All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto  laws, have been cited by the
petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.

It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the ground that it
impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No. 1606 which he does not
impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions,
which are separable from the valid provisions.

The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very beginning any attempt to assault his
constitutional liberties.

PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals,
and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and
corruption committed by public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one
appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination Three judges sitting on the
same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The
ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.

It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan
with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the
government, government instrumentalities and government-owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution
does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only
the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the constitutional directive.

It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process clause of the Constitution,
because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under
Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also
already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555;
People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp.
674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition
against the passage of ex post facto laws.

2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can
only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court
only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of
the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact
and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater
guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals,
which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they
are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.

3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused,
which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely abused its
discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the
presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with
substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact
and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional
power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt - by
proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused
of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.

4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate Justices, sitting in three
divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in
a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach
a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to
sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall
be necessary for rendering judgment.

At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. Consequently, when
a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily
with the Division to constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members now
composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from
whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents.
This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the
petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as against those who will be
prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.

P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other defendants indicted before
other trial courts.

5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places expressly the
Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate
trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions,
special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity
between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.

6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being down-graded by Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14
expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with
the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan" (emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the.
annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the
Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the
Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such
discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified
parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive
and the Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be
jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or refusal on the part
of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of the courts.

II

P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -

1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one which alters the rules
of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed,
or deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment
against herein petitioner accused him of graft and corruption committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including
January 12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by
P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on
June 11, 1978.

As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all persons accused of
malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of
conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both
questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both
factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977.
This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein
petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to 1978.

2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal
conviction.

The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not so prior to its
promulgation.

The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying cases against national security
whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the
People's Court Act or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing
then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmena soon
after the Liberation. Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which
was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People's Court Act appeal to
the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The Supreme Court can review all judgments of the
People's Court both on questions of fact and of law.

III

SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE
SUPREME COURT -

Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of procedure without requiring
the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court. to pro- promulgate rules of court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).

IV

P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER INFERIOR COURTS
INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN -

Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules
governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its
business," without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of
supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an
inferior court.

2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select and appoint its
personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to remove them for cause without reserving
to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or disapprove such appointments and to review such removals,
aggravates the violation of the constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.

3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to supervise inferior
courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President
without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for review' and approval.

That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General Appropriations Act of 1982
which states that "all appropriations provided herein for the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the
Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This
particular provision impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme
Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same General
Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of Appeals,
Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the
approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).

The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the Sandiganbayan does not include
the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.

All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are separable from the
rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared unconstitutional
without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who
is to do it, and now to do it - the test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs.
Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability
although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily binding on, the Supreme
Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged portions are inseparable from the valid
portions.

Section- 1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein the phrase "of the same
level as the Court of Appeals.

Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more members of the
Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.

Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting the completeness and
validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29
of the Judiciary Act of 1984, as amended,can apply.

However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid provided it is understood
that the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court.

3. Republic Act No. 6670             August 4, 1988

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS AND TERMS USED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1177, AS AMENDED, IN ORDER TO INSTITUTE A MODIFIED PERFORMANCE BUDGET SYSTEM

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 13 of P.D. 1177 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 13. Submission of the Budget. — The President shall, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, submit to the Congress within thirty (30) days from the opening of every regular session, as the
basis of the General Appropriations Bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including
receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. Additional appropriations proposals may be
submitted which correspond to part of the expenditure estimates submitted as part of the budget proposal:
Provided, That continuing appropriations may be enacted for public works, highways and other infrastructure
projects which require more than one year for construction. In such cases, revenue estimates for the future
years shall be used in the evaluation of funding availability.

"The President may transmit to Congress, from time to time, such proposed supplemental or deficiency
appropriations as are, in his judgment, (a) necessary on account of laws enacted after the transmission of
the Budget, or (b) otherwise needed in the public interest."
Section 2. Section 24 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 24. Appropriations for Personal Services. — Appropriations for personal services shall be considered
as included in the amount specified for each budgetary program and project of each department, bureau,
office or agency, and shall be itemized. The itemization of personal services shall be prepared by the
Secretary for consideration and approval of the President as provided in Section 30 hereof: Provided, that
the itemization of personal services shall be prepared for all agencies of the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Branches and the Constitutional bodies down to the division chief level and in the case of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police down to the rank of second lieutenant, except
as may be otherwise approved by the President for positions concerned with national security matters:
Provided, further, That appropriations for casual and/ or temporary employees shall be in lump-sum based
on the number of man-hours to be rendered."

Section 3. Section 26 of the same decree is hereby repealed.

Section 4. Section 27 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 27. Infrastructure and Other Bills. — The public works, highways and other bills requiring
appropriations may be filed at any time during the sessions of the Congress and shall be considered by the
Congress upon their being reported out by the corresponding Committees."

Section 5. Sections 28 and 29 of the same decree are hereby repealed.

Section 6. Section 30 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 30. Content of the General Appropriations Act. — The General Appropriations Act shall be presented
in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding
appropriations for each program and project, including statutory provisions of specific agency or general
applicability. The General Appropriations Act shall contain an itemization of personal services which shall be
prepared by the Secretary before enactment of the General Appropriations Act."

Section 7. The following words, phrases or terms wherever they appear in Presidential Decree No. 1177, as
amended, are hereby amended to read:

(a) "Ministry of the Budget" shall read "Department of the Budget and Management";

(b) "Minister of Budget" shall read "Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management";

(c) "National Assembly" and "Batasan" shall read "Congress";

(d) "Ministry" and "Ministries" shall read "Department" and "Departments," respectively; and

(e) "Minister" shall read "Secretary."

Section 8. All laws, decrees, executive orders, and letters of instruction inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and
the Constitution are hereby repealed, superseded and/or modified.

Section 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: August 4, 1988.
 4. MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA
PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN
FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas), and JESUS RODRIGO T. TAGAAN, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

The present controversy involves the preventive suspension order issued June 25, 1999, by the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) in OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, against petitioner Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight
other city officials. Under the said order, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension without pay for the
maximum period of six months and told to cease and desist from holding office immediately.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of
asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998
when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City,
through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an
inquiry into the matter.1

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to
conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be
upgraded to criminal and administrative  cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent
Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.

In a memorandum dated June 22, 1999, respondent Allan Francisco S. Garciano, the graft investigating officer to
whom the case was raffled for investigation, recommended the preventive suspension of petitioner and the others.
Two days later, or on June 24, 1999, the affidavit-complaint against petitioner was filed. The following day, on June
25, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension order. On June 29, 1999,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, which motion was denied in an order dated July 5, 1999.

Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the validity of the said order. He pleads for immediate relief through the
present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner contends that:

THE RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452
AND ISSUING THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER, THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
BEING WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, CONSIDERING THAT
THE ALLEGED ACT CONSTITUTING THE CHARGE AGAINST PETITIONER HEREIN WAS
COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM, AND PETITIONER HAVING BEEN REELECTED
TO THE SAME POSITION.

II

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION

OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FOR SIX MONTHS
WAS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WHICH MANDATES THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF
 LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS BE ORDERED ONLY AFTER THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN JOINED,
AND ONLY FOR A PERIOD NOT IN EXCESS OF SIXTY (60) DAYS.

III

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION

OVER OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452, THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AND IN
GROSS VIOLATION OF SECTION 26(2) OF THE OMBUDSMAN LAW.

IV

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION,

THE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
PETITIONER WAS "STRONG", THE LITTLE EVIDENCE ON RECORD CONSISTING SOLELY
OF A HEARSAY AFFIDAVIT, AND INADMISSIBLE NEWSPAPER REPORTS.

On July 19, 1999, we directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court. It appears
that on the same day, petitioner issued a memorandum informing employees and officials of the Office of the City
Mayor that he was assuming the post of mayor effective immediately. On July 23, 1999, respondents filed a motion
seeking clarification of our status quo order. Respondents claimed that the status quo referred to in the order should
be that where petitioner is already and vice mayor Renato Osmeña is the acting city mayor.

Petitioner, in reply, argued that the status quo  refers to "the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded
the pending controversy." 2 Thus, status quo could not be that where petitioner is preventively suspended since the
suspension did not precede the present controversy; it is the controversy.

We agree with petitioner in this regard. As explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority on remedial law:

There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo  order which, as the
very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested
state of things which preceded the controversy. This was resorted to when the projected
proceedings in the case made the conservation of the status quo  desirable or essential, but the
affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make
out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu proprio on
equitable considerations. Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the
doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further
distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended rule on
restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting of a bond.3

On July 28, 1999, we heard the parties' oral arguments on the following issues:

1. What is the effect of the reelection of petitioner on the investigation of acts done before his
reelection? Did the Ombudsman for Visayas gravely abuse his discretion in conducting the
investigation of petitioner and ordering his preventive suspension?

2. Assuming that the Ombudsman properly took cognizance of the case, what law should apply to
the investigation being conducted by him, the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) or the
Ombudsman Law (R.A. 6770)? Was the procedure in the law properly observed?

3. Assuming further that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction, is the preventive suspension of petitioner
based on "strong evidence" as required by law?

We will now address these issues together, for the proper resolution on the merits of the present controversy.
Petitioner contends that, per our ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, 4 his reelection has rendered the administrative case
filed against him moot and academic. This is because reelection operates as a condonation by the electorate of the
misconduct committed by an elective official during his previous term. Petitioner further cites the ruling of this Court
in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,5 that

. . . When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that while the contract in question was signed during the previous term of
petitioner, it was to commence or be effective only on September 1998 or during his current term. It is the
respondents' submission that petitioner "went beyond the protective confines"6 of jurisprudence when he "agreed to
extend his act to his current term of
office." 7 Aguinaldo cannot apply, according to respondents, because what is involved in this case is a misconduct
committed during a previous term but to be effective during the current term.

Respondents maintain that,

. . . petitioner performed two acts with respect to the contract: he provided for a suspensive period
making the supply contract commence or be effective during his succeeding or current term and
during his current term of office he acceded to the suspensive period making the contract effective
during his current term by causing the implementation of the contract. 8

Hence, petitioner cannot take refuge in the fact of his reelection, according to respondents.

Further, respondents point out that the contract in question was signed just four days before the date of the 1998
election and so it could not be presumed that when the people of Cebu City voted petitioner to office, they did so with
full knowledge of petitioner's character.

On this point, petitioner responds that knowledge of an official's previous acts is presumed and the court need not
inquire whether, in reelecting him, the electorate was actually aware of his prior misdeeds.

Petitioner cites our ruling in Salalima v. Guingona,9 wherein we absolved Albay governor Romeo R. Salalima of his
administrative liability as regards a retainer agreement he signed in favor of a law firm during his previous term,
although disbursements of public funds to cover payments under the agreement were still being done during his
subsequent term. Petitioner argues that, following Salalima, the doctrine in Aguinaldo applies even where the effects
of the act complained of are still evident during the subsequent term of the reelected official. The implementation of
the contract is a mere incident of its execution. Besides, according to petitioner, the "sole act" for which he has been
administratively charged is the signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The charge, in his view, excludes the
contract's execution or implementation, or any act subsequent to the perfection of the contract.

In Salalima, we recall that the Solicitor General maintained that Aguinaldo did not apply to that case because the
administrative case against Governor Rodolfo Aguinaldo of Cagayan was already pending when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. Nevertheless, in Salalima, the Court applied the Aguinaldo doctrine,
even if the administrative case against Governor Salalima was filed after his reelection.

Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the
Ombudsman has the power to:

investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct
administrative investigations. Thus, Section 19 of said law provides:
 Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in
accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Sec. 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority:

Sec. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority;  Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty. 10 That the Office of the
Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from the
foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770.

However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular act or
omission, is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively
liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even as we must also take note that the power to investigation is
distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public officer.

Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its
administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770 —

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression
or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have previously interpreted the phrase "under his authority" to mean that the Ombudsman can preventively
suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are
employed,11 excepting of course those removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.

The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. This
is the clear import of Section 24 or R.A. 6770 abovecited.
There can be no question in this case as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman to issue an
order of preventive suspension against an official like the petitioner, to prevent that official from using his office to
intimidate or influence witnesses 12 or to tamper with records that might be vital to the prosecution of the case against
him. 13 In our view, the present controversy simply boils down to this pivotal question: Given the purpose of preventive
suspension and the circumstances of this case, did respondent Deputy Ombudsman commit a grave abuse of
discretion when he set the period of preventive suspension at six months?

Preventive suspension under Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, to repeat, may be imposed when, among other factors, the
evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively suspended must not exceed six
months. In this case, petitioner was preventively suspended and ordered to cease and desist from holding office for
the entire period of six months, which is the maximum provided by law.

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. —

x x x           x x x          x x x

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong as to warrant preventive suspension rests with the
Ombudsman. 14 The discretion as regards the period of such suspension also necessarily belongs to the
Ombudsman, except that he cannot extend the period of suspension beyond that provided by law. 15 But, in our view,
both the strength of the evidence to warrant said suspension and the propriety of the length or period of suspension
imposed on petitioner are properly raised in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. These equitable remedies under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court precisely exist to provide prompt relief where an "officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted . . . with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." (See Rule 65, Sec. 1).

It is pertinent to note here that the inquiry that preceded the filing of an administrative case against petitioner was
prompted by newspaper reports regarding the allegedly anomalous contract entered into by petitioner, on behalf of
Cebu City, with F.E. Zuellig. 16 In the memorandum to respondent Mojica, 17 respondent Garciano recommended that
petitioner be preventively suspended, based on an initial investigation purportedly showing: (1) the contract for supply
of asphalt to Cebu City was designed to favor F.E. Zuellig, (2) the amount quoted in the contract was too expensive
compared to the amount for which asphalt may be bought from local suppliers such as Shell and Petron, particularly
considering that the amount was fixed in dollars and was payable in pesos, thus exposing the city government to the
risks attendant to a fluctuating exchange rate, and (3) the interest of the city under the contract is not protected by
adequate security. These findings were based on the contract itself and on letters from Bitumex and Credit Lyonnais.
There were also letters from Shell and Petron that were replies to the Office of the Ombudsman's (Visayas) inquiry on
whether or not they could supply Cebu City with asphalt and on what terms.

Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of
preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its purpose and the circumstances in the case brought
before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is unwarranted.

On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral argument at the hearing that the documents
mentioned in respondents' comment (such as purchase orders, purchase requests, and disbursement vouchers),
documents that show petitioner's guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been suspended. Even if an afterthought,
he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents against petitioner. If the purpose of the preventive
suspension was to enable the investigating authority to gather documents without intervention from petitioner, then,
from respondents' submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was already achieved, during the nearly
month-long suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19, 1999. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner
is already strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period
is excessive and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner.
We must conclude that the period during which petitioner was already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for
the lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and
preventing witnesses who wish to appear against him.
We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioner's claim that the Local
Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local official, has been violated. True,
under said Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum
period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charges against
him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue,
administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local
Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is
intended to limit the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be
motivated by partisan political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of
preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid
but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive
suspension.

Respondents base their argument on the deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 155, which became the Local
Government Code. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., commenting on the preservation in the proposed Code of the
power of the Office of the President to suspend local officials, said:

Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee is ready to adopt a
more stringent rule regarding the power of removal and suspension by the Office of the President
over local government officials, Mr. President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent
section, we have provided for the power of suspension of local government officials to be limited
only to 60 days and not more than 90 days in any one year, regardless of the number of
administrative charges that may be filed against a local government official. We, in fact, had in mind
the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the Secretary of Local Government sort of serialized the
filing of charges against him so that he can be continuously suspended when one case is filed right
after the other, Mr. President.18

Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of preventive suspension imposable
under the Local Government Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local officials by
the mayor, governor, or President's office. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the constitutional origin of his
Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as respondents would have us believe.

In Hagad v. Gozo-Dagole, 19 on the matter of whether or not the Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to
investigate local elective officials by virtue of the Local Government Code, we said:

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other.20

It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the Ombudsman Law is "much too
repugnant" to the 60-day period that may be imposed under the Local Government Code. But per J. Vitug, "the two
provisions govern differently. 21

However, petitioner now contends that Hagad did not settle the question of whether a local elective official may be
preventively suspended even before the issues could be joined. Indeed it did not, but we have held in other cases
that there could be preventive suspension even before the charges against the official are heard, or before the official
is given an opportunity to prove his innocence.22 Preventive suspension is merely a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation and is not in any way the final determination of the guilt of the official concerned.

Petitioner also avers that the suspension order against him was issued in violation of Section 26(2) of the
Ombudsman Law, which provides:

Sec. 26. Inquiries. — . . .

(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the
same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal
citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish
 the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to
submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. . .

Petitioner argues that before an inquiry may be converted into a full-blown administrative investigation, the official
concerned must be given 72 hours to answer the charges against him. In his case, petitioner says the inquiry was
converted into an administrative investigation without him being given the required number of hours to answer.

Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner was given the requisite 72 hours to submit a written answer to the complaint
against him. This, however, does not make invalid the preventive suspension order issued against him. As we have
earlier stated, a preventive suspension order may be issued even before the charges against the official concerned is
heard.

Moreover, respondents state that petitioner was given 10 days to submit his counter-affidavit to the complaint filed by
respondent Tagaan. We find this 10-day period is in keeping with Section 5(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman,23 which provides:

Sec. 5. Administrative adjudication. How conducted. —

(a) If the complaint is not dismissed for any of the causes enumerated in Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6770, the respondent shall be furnished with copy of the affidavits and other evidences
submitted by the complainant, and shall be ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other
evidences in support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt from, together with proof of
service of the same on the complainant who may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days from
receipt of the counter-affidavits of the respondent.

We now come to the concluding inquiry. Granting that the Office of the Ombudsman may investigate, for purposes
provided for by law, the acts of petitioner committed prior to his present term of office; and that it may preventively
suspend him for a reasonable period, can that office hold him administratively liable for said acts?

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively
accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. 24 The rationale for this holding is that when the
electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including
his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was
signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the
electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and
character.

For his part, petitioner that "the only conclusive determining factor" 25 as regards the people's thinking on the matter is
an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his
character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge.
Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or
period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official's reelection, except that it must be
prior to said date.

As held in Salalima.

The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases are concerned, is still
a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the theory that an official's reelection expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term. We may add that sound
policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan
contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop hound the
former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been committed
during his previous term. His second term may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said
cases to the detriment of public service. . . . Emphasis added.26
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act
done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig.

The assailed retainer agreement in Salalima was executed sometime in 1990. Governor Salalima was reelected in
1992 and payments for the retainer continued to be made during his succeeding term. This situation is no different
from the one in the present case, wherein deliveries of the asphalt under the contract with F.E. Zuellig and the
payments therefor were supposed to have commenced on September 1998, during petitioner's second term.

However, respondents argue that the contract, although signed on May 7, 1998, during petitioner's prior term, is to be
made effective only during his present term.

We fail to see any difference to justify a valid distinction in the result. The agreement between petitioner (representing
Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner's prior term. At that
moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to
the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extent on the
day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made
months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig, however, this
should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling, in this case, may
not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed
in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be
held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to declare at respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in conducting an inquiry on complaints against petitioner, and ordering their investigation pursuant to
respondents' mandate under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar
as it seeks to declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of preventive
suspension imposed on petitioner, which is the maximum of six months, it appearing that 24 days — the number of
days from the date petitioner was suspended on June 25, 1999, to the date of our status quo order on July 19, 1999
— were sufficient for the purpose. Accordingly, petitioner's preventive suspension, embodied in the order of
respondent Deputy Ombudsman, dated June 25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.

SO ORDERED.

5. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-
NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed
against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having
been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it
referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated
26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May
1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were
filed on even date.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini
Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong
Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru
Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu
Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai
Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen
Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to
said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order
for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail
without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant
her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come
unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.

Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance.

On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and Preliminary Injunction
before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking
cognizance of the petition issued a temporary restraining order.

The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the consideration of her
motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.

On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.

On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship from the John
F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner
from leaving the country.

On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to
defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill
of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.

The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's arraignment not
later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two
amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993
resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases,
docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.

Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266,
assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice,
as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking the nullification
thereof.

Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist
from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter
of his disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.

On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate
the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were consolidated into one information
under Criminal Case No. 16698.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash
said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The
presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.

In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion of the
prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd August 1995
order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated
to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled "Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed
G.R. No. 123792.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January
1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this Court of the
action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension order
as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at that time." 2

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the
statute provides:
 "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."

In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:

"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

"xxx           xxx           xxx

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the
Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to
the career or non-career service." 4

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of
the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be " no ifs and buts about
it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan 6 observed:

"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension." 7

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands accused. 8

En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information
must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been
said that —

"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation;
that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019
or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'

"xxx           xxx           xxx

 "Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.

"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of
the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code." 9

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before trial
on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that
he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. 10

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the Sandiganbayan has
been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon to resolve several other matters on
the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12 petitioner sought the
nullification of the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan
from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 13 petitioner
sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the
resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4)
in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion
for reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases, 15 the
Court declared:

"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R.
Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the
delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-
meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section
3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Order
No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:

(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
 (3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions.'

"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019." 16

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —

"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in
its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the
court on the prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:

"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals with the power
of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a
Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension,
when imposed, should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the House of Representatives."

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court
to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing
the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has
evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that
of any of the other two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or
ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the
manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

6. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-
TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL
MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,
FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN
JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA
CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO
ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,
PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ,
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS,
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO
DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA,
MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO
TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING
OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN
OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC],
REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER
AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it
may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and
extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its
resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent
cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant
petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution
thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of
the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided
by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment  to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

 RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings
Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a
Member of the House files a verified
complaint of impeachment or a citizen
files a verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment
proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said Committee
that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as
impeachment proceedings shall be such, can be initiated against the same
initiated against the same official more official. (Italics in the original; emphasis
than once within the period of one (1) and underscoring supplied)
year.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
 Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William
B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he
"himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules
adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections
16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5)
of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of
the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as
it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint,
pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi  to
bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray
in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting,
approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and
Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the
Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted
as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate
President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a
writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or
to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which
does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House
of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections
16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that
this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same
or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely
without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the
alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law
they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was
spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2)
respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were
filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to
prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the
declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No.
260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the
second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which
were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
(Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3,
2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in
fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28,
2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying
for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion
for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion
for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors
Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in
an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues
and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the

Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the
myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and
determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of
the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of
our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike
the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to
be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to
specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for
a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota  presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
 pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in
all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was
first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which
shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock
of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for
which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for
the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or instrument of
intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and
rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief
Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with
it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it."  The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their  ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
 We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,
but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to
a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When
they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent
of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be

separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45 (Emphasis
supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
 While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof. 46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power
of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment
proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to
show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have
been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court
is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in
nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution,
is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the
power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole
power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the
manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on
the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion
of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial
review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that
the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of
petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the
exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section
18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review.
In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota  of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
 is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases
and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of
the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since
only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae  former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae  Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of
the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant
by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It
is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On
the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated
by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been
met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained
or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation
and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although
undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits  filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved
in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court. 89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing
as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while
Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that
the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi  of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of
such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege
any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions
to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction
as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court
once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his
Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal
disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture." 96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the
latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment
complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at
this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in
the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief
Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by
itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself,
obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2)
and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming
to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article
VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people  in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated
on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind
the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other cases,
however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever
it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 101 Even in the landmark
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain
cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the
sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and
appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without
exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with
it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it."  The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the
Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the
Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial
law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers
were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on
June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was
presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held
sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to
January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was
then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The
questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the
votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding
of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister
of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
 where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation
declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and
a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but
cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that
she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to
her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by
actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
 I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought
on the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of
judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as
to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the
new numerical need for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will
notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale
of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers
to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present
Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no
clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that
the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different
from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses
under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely,
other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a
non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be
avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very  lis
mota  or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly
be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon,
this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al.  argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment
complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which
Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules
and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers;
(c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue
of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the
validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion,
require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified
and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under
the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section
in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are
alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of
the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the
House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution, viz:
 Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment
complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong
likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution,
such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified
impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption
as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not
only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is
made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of
the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2)
whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that
the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to
not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But
this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal
to which the controversy may be referred." 126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art.
VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a
power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction
of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must
rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his] appointment to
the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to
pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong
enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v.
Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have
reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving
them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal
by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's
competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as
evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have
been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom
would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit
or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto  depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power
of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . .
'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there
is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument
by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility
of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all
impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not
precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the
Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails
to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure
to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at
least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted
which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws
of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of
the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws,
not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear
or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is,
therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually
became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained
by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions held on
November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going.
As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform
or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated
during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The
middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella
says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or
when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual initiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information of
the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation,
action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the
Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not
really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.  And what is actually done on the floor is
that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me  The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
 Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the
Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3
(3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will
now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United
States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach
always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment"
are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members
of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any
way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his  amicus curiae  brief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and
for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of
the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated
by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to
file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment
case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the
House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made
to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether
the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all
the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that
an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to
the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins,
when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the
floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to  initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House
does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was deleted and is
not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the
common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is
ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by
equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least
1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the
term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction
as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their
personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of
this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna.
Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not
simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined
the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that
it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the
assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase " to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by
any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held
that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same case
of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more
emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity
of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar.  Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before
the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as
one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to
make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the
journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do
the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method  are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a
different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1)
that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court
did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally  cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
 xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to
strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent
judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what
it  must do.  The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy,
orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by
undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners. 157 (Italics in the original emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun  is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not
decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the
U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution
of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as
they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of
our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many
of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both
sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or
view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered
suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to
obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by
the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the
present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was
made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint"
aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained,
the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power
and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which
only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of
powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the
Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set
up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately
turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members'
interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This
Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom,
unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the
law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules
on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this
entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one
of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of
all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because
he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of
every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment
case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a
blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went
through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of
force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

7. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER,

VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"[1]

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[2] filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
assailing: (a) the Resolution[3] dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order[4] dated March 10, 20,15 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution[5] dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt[6] in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution[7] dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction [8] (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the
Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition[9] on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit [10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr.,  et al), accusing them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, [12] otherwise known
as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). [13]

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators [14] to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).
[15]
 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint [16] (OMB
Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases [18] for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).[19]

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and
present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)[20]

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[21] for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract[22] on September 28, 2010,[23] without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,[24] and
approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010;[25] (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;[26] (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;[27] (4)
P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;[28] (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;[29] and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7,
2011;[30]

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award [31] for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[32] on August 18, 2011,[33] without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,[34] and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts
as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2011;[35] (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28, 2011;[36] (3)
P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;[37] (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;[38] and (5) P59,639,167.90
on October 1, 2012;[39]

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[40] for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project
to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[41] on September 13, 2012,[42] without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design, [43] and approved the release of the funds therefor in the
amounts of P32,398,220.05[44] and P30,582,629.30[45] on December 20, 2012;  and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)[46]

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P27,443,629.97;[47] and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract [48] with MANA
Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking
Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.[49]

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2 nd Special Panel).[50] Thereafter, on March 9, 2015,
the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders[51] for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their
respective counter-affidavits.[52]

Before Binay, Jr.,  et al.'s  filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the
2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al.  under
preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.[53] The
Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,[54] finding that: (a)
the evidence of Binay, Jr.,  et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and
Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2)
the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if
proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr.,  et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them
to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.[55] Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.[56]

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received
by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.[57]

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,[58] Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari[59] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,
seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to
enjoin its implementation.[60] Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any
anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and
II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first
term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability
therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. [61] In any event, Binay, Jr.
claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented
against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. [62] In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having
won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the
lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office. [63]

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension
order through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who
posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the
points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C.
Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon
assumed office as Acting Mayor.[64]

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution[65] (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a
TRO,[66] notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day. [67] Citing the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,[68] the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the
extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the
acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the
condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged. [69] The CA then
directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari. [70]

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested[71] that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that
since the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to
restrain.[72]

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, [73]  docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing
Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to
obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice. [74] The Ombudsman
and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon
Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt[75] (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.
[76]
 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously
ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order. [77]

In a Resolution[78] dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the
Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.[79] The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31,
2015.[80]

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present
petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.[81] The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770, [82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no
injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings. [84]

In his comment[85] filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the
Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he
asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him. [86] Binay, Jr.
posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would
have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive
suspension order.[87] In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could
not be held administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013
operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term. [88] As
regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the
Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of
impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in
removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its
inherent power to punish contempt.[89]

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held, [91] granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so
ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found
that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as
City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were
apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July
24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[96] wherein the
condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election. [97] To this,
the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July
3, 4, and 24, 2013.[98]

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a
supplemental petition[99] before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also
maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.[100]

On April 14 and 21, 2015,[101] the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they
were required to file their respective memoranda.[102] In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her
Memorandum[103] on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day. [104]

Pursuant to a Resolution[105] dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's
memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of
the notice.
 On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda. [106] Meanwhile, on July 16,
2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment, [107] simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the
Office of the Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional
position."[108] In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among
others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine. [109] In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the
main issues to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453;
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of
a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the
condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an
opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[110]

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of  certiorari [or prohibition]. A
remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x." [111]

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the
filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.[112] These are: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; ( g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.[113]

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on
the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits
of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature,
and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a
careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous
application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative
liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her
failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,[114] it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue
on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view
of the well-established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. [115] Hence, it should be preliminarily
determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the
same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay,
Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, [116] as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition
through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum. [117] That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable
objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her
corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,
[118]
 which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court [119]) from
issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally
speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action."[120] Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case
remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional
kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the
exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [121] Nonetheless, the Ombudsman
retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.[122] Note that the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public
officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. [123]

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy
may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure
questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole
jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what
the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural
remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task
then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words
employed to express it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be
of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the
legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken;
what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into
operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for
some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."[124]

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting
a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted,[125] albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.
[126]

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial
review of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:[127]

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word
"review" and in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the
Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision
under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman
would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the
docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.

x x x x

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to
a respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on
certiorari?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the
respondent, if there is f no certiorari  available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative
remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before
one can go to court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks
judicial review.

x x x x

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a
petition for review to a petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the  finding of
facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an
appeal by certiorari, the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the
court, whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari, the issue is limited  to whether or not the Ombudsman here has
acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not
the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a
judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and
a petition for certiorari; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the
COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said
that by this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we
will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of
whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of
discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

x x x x

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman
or should it be the Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme
Court to make the final determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an
appropriate change during the period of Individual Amendments.
xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of
"review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.[128]

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on
was Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of
Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert
the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a
petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on
the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to
make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review"
to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be
found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second
paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the
Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was
even commented upon during the oral arguments of this case[129] that there was no debate or clarification made on
the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate
deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain
the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act
provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's
suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to
this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the
Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within
five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1)
month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may
require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for  certiorari" should
be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned
that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989 [130] and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[131] At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,[132] consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to
the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari, thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at
least in the provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of
the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the
Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the
other principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law."    ;

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances
of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any
application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for
remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",
[133]
 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense. [134] By the same principle,
the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to
any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural
vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as
the only allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that
it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court
or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

x x x x

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the
assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it
should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of
the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the
date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been
filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the
Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order
or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on  certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of
procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of
judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and
law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition
on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said
to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would
render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility. [135] There
should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this
Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies
against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the
Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate
since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be
taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts,[136] and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will
be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining
the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction,
in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the
same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which
was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto[137] (Fabian).[138]

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the
effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. [139] Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of
the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being
a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,[140] the Court's ratiocinations and
ruling in Fabian  were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the
availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other
rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article
VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a
petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law." We pointedly
said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.[141] (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 [142] - attempts to
effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, [143] it is therefore
concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
posturing,[144] Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in
that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter," [145] that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero
motu  (on its own motion[146]). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case
law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and
the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body,
it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for
judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule
has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction
or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.[147] (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari  in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in
order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order, [148] hence,
unappealable.[149]

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable
issuances[150] of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong[151] (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for  certiorari filed by the
public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule
65."[152]

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman[153] (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a
final and unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that
"petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals."[154] In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of
Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.[155] (June
6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman
in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar[156] (September
16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
That being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to
issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that
main case.

III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue
any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution.
She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it
from judicial intervention,"[157] particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"[158] claiming
that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." [159]

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In  Gonzales III v. Office of the President[160] (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office
of the Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the
people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government.
Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence
necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to
give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution,
President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No.
1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on
complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in
the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and
control the prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in
the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce
the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.[161] (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III  explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus
behind its independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector
of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and
action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an
authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section
13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of
the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the
pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an
"independent" office, x x x.

x x x x

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers,
both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public
officers.[162] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares
certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution
itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result
in the impairment of their core functions"[163];

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based";[164] and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the
deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a
constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of
this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."[165]

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman,
as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive
Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent
from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are
concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference.

In  Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the
Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under
the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as
unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
[Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power
of the President.

x x x x

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in
degree and kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper
functioning.[166] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special
Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman, and after due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the
disciplinary authority of the President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8
(2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not
considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence
the latter enjoys under the Constitution.[167]

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers
three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified
functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an
amendment thereto is made;

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of
[its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions; [168] hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials
of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can
only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment
and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics." [169]

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension
order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any
investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued
by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court. [170] As
support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire
for the record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the
Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the
Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to
subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in
order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere.  We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the
Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural
Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.[171]

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the
Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a
corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power
of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the
CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.[172]

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman
investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In
fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings.
[173]
 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case. [174]

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),[175] the "Constitution has
blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial
departments of the government."[176] The constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government
is more commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of  Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.
(Belgica),[177] the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of
government unduly encroaches on the domain of another." [178] In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when
there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions." [179]

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such
lower courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws
passed by Congress.  Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, [180] known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,[181] the Regional Trial Courts,[182] and the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[183] were established. Later, through the passage of RA
1125,[184] and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486, [185] the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were
respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers
Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5[186] of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

xxxx

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,[187] subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to
the aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP
129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional
Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,[188] the doctrine was explained as
follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.[189]

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may
then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the
"totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."[190] Under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[191] the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.[192]

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular
case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words,
procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,
[193]
 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply
directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised.  To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not
exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."[194]

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design,
vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[195] (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority,
which, under the 1935[196] and 1973 Constitutions,[197] had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress.[198] As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent
power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers,  in line with the
Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."[199]

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show[200] that the Framers debated on
whether or not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to
insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with
the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his
proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby
leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their
inherent powers."[201]

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.[202] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the
current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable
exercise of every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of
during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo[203] until the merits of
the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and,
hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. [204] In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A
preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1,[205] Rule 58, while Section 3[206] of the same Rule enumerates the
grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5[207] thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary
writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by
law[208] or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to
the spirit of the said law or rules.

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,[209] which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of
Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"[210] over "decisions, orders or resolutions of
the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction,"[211] the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction
to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of
the latter:"[212]

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to
make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal.
It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The
court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the
efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending
before it.[213] (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act
effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the
court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t
defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

x x x x 

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction,
in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as
well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of
their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.[214] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated
way back in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred." [215]

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse
matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial
housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are
reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the
judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."[216]

In  Smothers v. Lewis[217] (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from
enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal, [218] the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power
and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts
by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration
of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's

inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was
constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am. Jur. 2d,
Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of
action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary
to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to
protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective,
may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the
constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor
is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power
may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to
inhibit the performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

x x x x

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action,
has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the
administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases
supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not
necessarily mean that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon
the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal
arises the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have
come into play and have preempted the field.[219] (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these
issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of
Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing
right[220] since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be
violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,[221] it was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may
be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend
the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/ Docket Fees;[222] (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees; [223] and (c)  Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes[224] While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government
owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules of procedure[225] solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice,
and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."[226]

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra,
does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure
under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally
separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and
delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it
promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman
misconceives,[227] because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP
129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a
provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also
practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the
court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of
judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate
what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded
by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial
power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should
therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in
whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole
prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting
Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is
called provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while.
So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.

x x x x

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy
of the Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would
you kindly read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the
power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you
by my other colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is
that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

x x x x

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading
called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by
Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all
procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure
and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a
court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx[228] (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, [229] the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are
distributed among the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that
laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. [230]

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar
import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and
authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other
than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive
writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the
point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under
Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO
and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of
said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting
Ombudsman Gervacio,[231] the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as

penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have
different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil
Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a
preventive measure. (Emphasis supplied)
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual
penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension
shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.
[232]
 (Emphases supplied)

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[233]

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-
compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA[234] (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in
the CA that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior
term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged." [235] Thus, the Court,
contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would
have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the
matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"[236] during the pendency
of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the
condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos[237] The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can
hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project
from 2007 to 2013.[238] Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013, [239] corresponding to the
services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases
of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[240] and  Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,[241] wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the
Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely
effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[242]

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it
was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative
disciplinary proceedings.[243] However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the
same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling
in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised
by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, [244] the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that
although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453,[245] it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient
to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as
remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative
complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no
longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an
exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt
against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds
to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."[246]

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein
elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959
case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935
Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November
1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the
Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for
grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No.
3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts
charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for
disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the
controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and
"found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional
provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election
or appointment condones the prior misconduct."[248] Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and
cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because
of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.[249] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight
of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes
that an official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact,
as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the
condonation doctrine.[250] The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature
published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions.
Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office
for misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or
constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council
Coppola).[251] As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed
during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior
to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).[252] On the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during
a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)[253] Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute
is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end,
the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in
office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word "office" must be
limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel.
Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)[254] Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the
grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of
the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)[255] The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which
took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once
rendered him unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge
the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).[256] Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division,
Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire
tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight
of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term
for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).[257]

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for
which he has been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as
an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken
as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a
previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak
of[258] (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;[259] State v. Welsh;[260] Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;[261] Territory
v. Sanches;[262] and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).[263]

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the
condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,[264] the public officer charged with
malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing
that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel.
Beck v. Harvey[265] the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation
doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to
restore this money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,
[266]
 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there
remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into
the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual  that there is a "weight of
authority" in the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had
accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this
jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are
not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation." [267] Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or
not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up
against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting
existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are
powerful countervailing considerations against its application.[268] In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable
rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. [269] As the Ombudsman correctly
points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and
devolves along with the society within which it thrives.[270] In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision,
"[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide." [271]

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape
has radically shifted. Again, Pascual  was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions
do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain
difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls
for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each
term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d.
418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P.
222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula,  147 A. 67;  State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.[272]

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to
remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50
L.R.A. (NS) 553.[273] (emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of
their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.[274] (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova[275] (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby
quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.[276] (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does
not apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the
former involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in
the latter, only the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the
President who may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos[277] (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the
condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election
merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.[278] (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by
stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective
official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he
has to defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability
condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith. [279]

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[280] (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended
to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous
contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court
ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the
petitioner's background and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed
a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in
applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the
contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a
succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman[281] (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the
doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica  reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied
even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged
misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing
of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise
timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public
official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.[282] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[283] also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have
been prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation
of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the
assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory
framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for
condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was
lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its
applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff
the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and
sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms.
As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating
jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal
basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; [284] thus, the unbending
rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution. [285] Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a
workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics
attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. [286]

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the
1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II
which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service." [287] Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as
well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in
adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change.
The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof
positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution,
which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[288] Learning
how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the
integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the
1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding
public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only
in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion
of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.[289] (Emphasis supplied)

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,
[290]
 and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[291]

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from
office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,[292] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed
from office on any of the r following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country;
and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

x x x x

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision.  - x x x.

x x x x

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long
as he meets the qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion
that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that
he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in  Llamas v. Orbos[293] to
apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in
criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage
of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot
anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office.
In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted
with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from
running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification
from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of
condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect,
that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,[294] or that the disqualification to
hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred. [295] In one case,[296] the
absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case,[297] it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy
under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on
public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only
invoked by a party as a ground;[298] while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux
of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore,
was deemed to be incompetent.[299] Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can
be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired
portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This
treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson[300] and Montgomery v. Novell[301] both cited
in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term.
However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is
extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election
pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this
jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there
any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the
same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or
at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists.
Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done
so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. [302] Besides, it is
contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The
Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.[303] At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton[304] decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of
office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation,
implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation.
One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As
can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus,
out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this
Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the
same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr.  which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed,
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. [305] Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what
the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial
Bar Council.[306]

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[307]

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good
law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark
case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,[308] wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,[309] it was further elaborated:

[P]ursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are
also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary
is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim  lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.[310]

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing
course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure
in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and
now abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion  when such
act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. [311] It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."[312]

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs
were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing
the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that
time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already
found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the
said CA petition appears to have been mooted.[313] As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an
ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It
therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation
in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the
preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly,
its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review."[314] All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon
the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which
explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all
times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective
officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought
to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the
doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local
officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law
principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987
Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came
about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the
administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for
the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central
Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."[315] Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade
review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on
whether or not the CA's Resolution[316] dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a
charge for indirect contempt[317] because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her
effective removal from office.[318] However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that
she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding
the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt
petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in
her capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to
file Comment on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an
inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her
objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its
sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss
the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would
then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce
denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as
follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy
against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective
until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor;

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint
Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts,
docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and
OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve
Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

8. MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or

controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative
view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court.

In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
issuance of a temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the
resolutions1 dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively.

On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C.
Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. The
information read:

That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod
City, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director,
of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR.
EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi
Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously release the claims
for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health Insurance Corp.,
prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and
64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear
provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale of West
Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the possession, operation and
management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc.
effective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000
shall be due to West Negros College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the
performance of her official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi
Medical Center, herein represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and
injury of West Negros College, Inc.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a
Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.

In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary
adjustment2 show that she was appointed as Department Manager A of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned and
controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act
of 1995.

Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;

xxx

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

The petition lacks merit.

The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not
occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1)
and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 are not applicable.

It is petitioner's appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the
classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.

Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however,
contends that the position of Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore
outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present assigned at the Philhealth Regional
Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.

Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged
disregard by respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.3

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was
the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the
time of the commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO was classified as
Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over his person.

In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the
commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section
4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 'Grade 27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations." (Underscoring supplied).

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first
part of the above quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade
27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions
may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private
individual charged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth,

is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary
grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.4 ruled:

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation
of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-
gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e)
other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing
the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a

government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in
paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was committed in
relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.