ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

PD 1606 as amended by RA 7975 and RA 10660

REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL

COURT TO BE KNOWN AS “SANDIGANBAYAN” AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Sandiganbayan; composition; qualifications; tenure; removal; and

compensation. –– A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and
possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan
is hereby created composed of a Presiding Justice and fourteen Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)

No person shall be appointed Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the

Sandiganbayan; unless he is natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age
and for at least ten years has been a judge of a court of record or been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines or has held office requiring admission to the bar as a
pre-requisite for a like period.

The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his commission and the other
Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective of commission,
or, when the commission of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to
the order in which their commissions have been issued by the President.
The Presiding Justice and the Associate Justices shall not be removed from office
except on impeachment upon the grounds and in the manner provided for in Section 2, 3
and 4 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.

The Presiding Justice shall receive an annual compensation of P60, 000.00 and
each Associate Justice P 55, 000.00 which shall be diminished during their continuance
in office. They shall have the same rank, privileges and other emoluments, be subject to
the same inhibition and disqualifications, and enjoy the same retirement and other
benefits as those provided for under existing laws for the Presiding Justice and Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals.

Whenever the salaries of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals are increased, such increases in salaries shall be correspondingly extended to
and enjoyed by the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan.
They shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.

Section 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. The Sandiganbayan

shall have its principal office of the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for
the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating
from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas, or
Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the
greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling
considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one
geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall
authorize any division or divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place
outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial
boundaries of the Philippines. “The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the
personnel and use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the
divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject
to the orders of the Sandiganbayan. (As amended by R.A. NO. 8249)

Section 3. Division of the Court; Quorum –– The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five
(5) divisions of three Justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.

Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, that
when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal
qualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the
Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by
strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member
of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the
court will be prejudice thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the
recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of
Appeals to sit temporarily therein. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)

Section 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in

all cases involving:

(A) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional

director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27” and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurer, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

(B) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of
this section in relation to their office.

(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to

Salary Grade “27” or higher, as prescribe in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military
and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions
of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which
may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg 129, as well as the

implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines
except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall
at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized:
66
Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with
the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned. (As amended by R.A. No. 8249)

Section 5. Proceedings, how conducted; votes required. – The unanimous vote

of the three justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
In the event that the three justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice
shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a
majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.

Section 6. Maximum period of termination of cases. – As far as practicable,

the trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan once commenced shall be continuous until
terminated and the judgment shall be rendered within three (3) months from the date the
case was submitted for decision.

Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions – All decisions and

final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or
proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law
on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding
the case.
A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgement, and such
motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission
thereon.

Decisions and final orders for the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the
Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed,
the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the
Rules of Court.

Judgements and orders of the Sandiganbayan will be executed and enforced in the
manner provided by law.

Decisions and final order of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under
this decree as well as those rendered by them in exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial
court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdiction, is death, review by the
Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused files an appeal. (As
amended by R.A. No. 8249)

Section 8. Transfer of cases. – As of the date of the effectivity of this decree any
case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the
accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan.
Section 9. Rules of Procedure. – The Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except
to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the division, the rotation
of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court
which shall be enforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court. (As amended
by R.A. No. 7975)

Section 10. (Repealed by R.A. No. 7975)

Section 11. Proceeding free of charge. – All proceedings in the Sandiganbayan

shall be conducted at no cost to the complainant and/or his witnesses.
No criminal information or complaint shall be entertained by the Sandiganbayan
except upon a certification by the Investigating Prosecutor of the existence of a prima
facie case to be determined after a preliminary investigation conducted in accordance
with a applicable laws and approved by the Chief Special Prosecutor.

Section 12. Administrative personnel. – The Sandiganbayan shall select and

appoint such personnel as it may deem necessary to discharge its functions under this
Decree including a Clerk of Court and three (3) Deputy Clerks of Court who shall be
members of the Bar.

The Clerk of Court shall have an annual compensation of P36,000.00 and the
Deputy Clerks of Court P30,000.00.

All other subordinate employees of the Sandiganbayan shall be governed by the

provisions of the Civil Service Law; Provided, that the Sandiganbayan may, by resolution
en banc, remove any of them for cause.

Section 13. Report to the President. – The Sandiganbayan shall submit an

annual report to the President, including all disbursements of funds entrusted to it,
within two months from the end of the Fiscal Year.

Section 14. Funding. – There is hereby immediately appropriated the sum of

Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) out of any funds in the National Treasury to carry out
the provision of this Decree and thereafter to be included in the general appropriations
act. The appropriations for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in
accordance with a schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan.
Section 15. Separability of Provisions. – If for any reason, any section or
provision of this Decree is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid, other sections or
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby, shall continues in full force and effect.
Section 16. Repealing Clause – This Decree hereby repeals Presidential Decree
No. 1486 and all other provisions of law, General Orders, Presidential Decrees, Letters of
Instructions, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith.

Section 17. Effectivity – This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-eight
Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-50581-50617
January 30, 1982

FACTS: Petitioner was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial document committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
several cases.

He filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. A week later respondent Court
denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, it is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree
No. 1486 also known as “Creating A Special Court To Be Known As "Sandiganbayan" And For Other
Purposes As Amended”, creating the respondent Court is violative of the due process, equal protection,
and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
(1) Is Presidential Decree No. 1486 violative of the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
clauses of the Constituiton, thus declaring it unconstitutional?
(2) Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates
against the petitioner, in the light of the difference of the procedures in the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis
regular courts.

HELD:
(1) NO. To assure that general welfare be promoted, a regulatory measure may cut into rights and
liberty of the people, as is the end of law. Those adversely affected may only invoke this if such
classification was in the spirit of hostility and discrimination. Laws operate equally to all persons,
under the same circumstances, privileges and liabilities wise.

Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in term of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions
cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to
criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.” This Court
holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606.

(2) NO. Petition dismissed. The classification satisfies the that it “must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The
Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely
in response to a problem – dishonesty in the public service.

It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RA 6770 - An Act Providing For the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office Of
The Ombudsman, And For Other Purposes

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989".

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice and lead modest lives.

Section 3. Office of the Ombudsman. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall include the Office of the
Overall Deputy, the Office of the Deputy for Luzon, the Office of the Deputy for the Visayas, the
Office of the Deputy for Mindanao, the Office of the Deputy for the Armed Forces, and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. The President may appoint other Deputies as the necessity for it may arise, as
recommended by the Ombudsman.

Section 4. Appointment. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled
within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.

In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural
or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as
possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.

Section 5. Qualifications. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, at least forty (40) years old, of recognized probity and
independence, members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective
national or local office in the immediately preceding election whether regular or special. The
Ombudsman must have, for ten (10) years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines.

Section 6. Rank and Salary. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the same ranks, salaries
and privileges as the Chairman and members, respectively, of a Constitutional Commission. Their
salaries shall not be decreased during their term of office.

The members of the prosecution, investigation and legal staff of the Office of the Ombudsman shall
receive salaries which shall not be less than those given to comparable positions in any office in the
Government.

Section 7. Term of Office. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor,
shall serve for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

(1) In accordance with the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

(3) In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman due to death, resignation, removal or permanent
disability of the incumbent Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall serve as Acting Ombudsman in a
concurrent capacity until a new Ombudsman shall have been appointed for a full term.n case the
Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman, the President may designate any of the
Deputies, or the Special Prosecutor, as Acting Ombudsman.

(4) In case of temporary absence or disability of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy shall perform the
duties of the Ombudsman until the Ombudsman returns or is able to perform his duties.
Section 9. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. — The Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special
Prosecutor shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office or employment. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately following
their cessation from office. They shall not be allowed to appear or practice before the Ombudsman for
two (2) years following their cessation from office.

No spouse or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree and no law, business or
professional partner or associate of the Ombudsman, his Deputies or Special Prosecutor within one (1)
year preceding the appointment may appear as counsel or agent on any matter pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman or transact business directly or indirectly therewith.

This disqualification shall apply during the tenure of the official concerned. This disqualification
likewise extends to the law, business or professional firm for the same period.

Section 10. Disclosure of Relationship. — It shall be the duty of the Ombudsman, his Deputies,
including the Special Prosecutor to make under oath, to the best of their knowledge and/or information,
a public disclosure of the identities of, and their relationship with the persons referred to in the
preceding section.

The disclosure shall be filed with the Office of the President and the Office of the Ombudsman before
the appointee assumes office and every year thereafter. The disclosures made pursuant to this section
shall form part of the public records and shall be available to any person or entity upon request.

Section 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate
of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control of the said office.

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman may organize such directorates for administration and allied services
as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its functions. Those appointed as directors or heads
shall have the rank and salary of line bureau directors.

(2) The Office of the Overall Deputy shall oversee and administer the operations of the different offices
under the Office of Ombudsman.t shall likewise perform such other functions and duties assigned to it
by the Ombudsman.

(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his
prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.

(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon the authority
of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:

(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan;

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

The Special Prosecutor shall have the rank and salary of a Deputy Ombudsman.

(5) The position structure and staffing pattern of the Office of the Ombudsman, including the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, shall be approved and prescribed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman shall
appoint all officers and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, including those of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, in accordance with the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Section 12. Official Stations. — The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy, the Deputy for Luzon, and the
Deputy for the Armed Forces shall hold office in Metropolitan Manila; the Deputy for the Visayas, in
Cebu City; and the Deputy for Mindanao, in Davao City. The Ombudsman may transfer their stations
within their respective geographical regions, as public interest may require.
Section 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation
being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the
subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.t has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3)
and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman
under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: provided, further,
that any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency;

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with
the same penalties provided therein;

(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter
provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

Section 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in
Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

Section 17. Immunities. — In all hearings, inquiries, and proceedings of the Ombudsman, including
preliminary investigations of offenses, nor person subpoenaed to testify as a witness shall be excused
from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and/or
other records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him,
may tend to incriminate him or subject him to prosecution: provided, that no person shall be prosecuted
criminally for or on account of any matter concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify and produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person
whose testimony or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be
necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional
functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding
paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor
shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.

Any refusal to appear or testify pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall be subject to punishment for
contempt and removal of the immunity from criminal prosecution.

Section 18. Rules of Procedure. —

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties.

(2) The rules of procedure shall include a provision whereby the Rules of Court are made suppletory.

(3) The rules shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, one of which is
printed in the national language.

Section 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited to acts or omissions which:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation
of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:

(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;

(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;

(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or

(5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
of.

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the
purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the
Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation
and proceed against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the
private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.

Section 23. Formal Investigation. —

(1) Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance
with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.

(2) At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary
authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring public officers or
employees, which shall be determined within the period prescribed in the civil service law. Any delay
without just cause in acting on any referral made by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be a ground for
administrative action against the officers or employees to whom such referrals are addressed and shall
constitute a graft offense punishable by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

(3) In any investigation under this Act the Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises of any
office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine and have access to any book, record, file,
document or paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the complaining individual and the official
concerned.

Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of
guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman
but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Section 25. Penalties. —

(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided
therein shall be applied.

(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one (1)
year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to
twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking
into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or employee
found guilty of the complaint or charges.

Section 26. Inquiries. —

(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a public officer, employee,
office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has received, the Ombudsman or his Deputies
consider to be:

(a) contrary to law or regulation;

(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of the operations
and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;

(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or palpable error
in the appreciation of facts;

(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;

(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or

(f) inefficient performed or otherwise objectionable.

(2) The Officer of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission.t shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same
entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the
reasons therefor.f it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent
public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written
answer within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof.f the answer is found satisfactory, it shall
dismiss the case.

(3) When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required by law, or when urgent
action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the Ombudsman
shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee, office or agency
concerned to:

(a) expedite the performance of duty;

(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;

(c) correct the omission;

(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or

(e) take any other steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect and preserve the rights
of the complainant.

(4) Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his
Deputies, shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or
employee to whom it was addressed.

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: provided, that only one
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice
may require.

Section 28. Investigation in Municipalities, Cities and Provinces. — The Office of the Ombudsman
may establish offices in municipalities, cities and provinces outside Metropolitan Manila, under the
immediate supervision of the Deputies for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, where necessary as
determined by the Ombudsman. The investigation of complaints may be assigned to the regional or
sectoral deputy concerned or to a special investigator who shall proceed in accordance with the rules or
special instructions or directives of the Office of the Ombudsman. Pending investigation the deputy or
investigator may issue orders and provisional remedies which are immediately executory subject to
review by the Ombudsman. Within three (3) days after concluding the investigation, the deputy or
investigator shall transmit, together with the entire records of the case, his report and conclusions to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Within five (5) days after receipt of said report, the Ombudsman shall
render the appropriate order, directive or decision.

Section 29. Change of Unjust Laws. — If the Ombudsman believes that a law or regulation is unfair or
unjust, he shall recommend to the President and to Congress the necessary changes therein or the repeal
thereof.

Section 30. Transmittal/Publication of Decision. — In every case where the Ombudsman has reached a
decision, conclusion or recommendation adverse to a public official or agency, he shall transmit his
decision, conclusion, recommendation or suggestion to the head of the department, agency or
instrumentality, or of the province, city or municipality concerned for such immediate action as may be
necessary. When transmitting his adverse decision, conclusion or recommendation, he shall, unless
excused by the agency or official affected, include the substance of any statement the public agency or
official may have made to him by way of explaining past difficulties with or present rejection of the
Ombudsman's proposals.

Section 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him herein provided shall be under
his supervision and control.

The Ombudsman and his investigators and prosecutors, whether regular members of his staff or
designated by him as herein provided, shall have authority to administer oaths, to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum, to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify under oath before them
and/or bring books, documents and other things under their control, and to secure the attendance or
presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through application before the Sandiganbayan or before
any inferior or superior court having jurisdiction of the place where the witness or evidence is found.

Section 32. Rights and Duties of Witness. —

(1) A person required by the Ombudsman to provide the information shall be paid the same fees and
travel allowances as are extended to witnesses whose attendance has been required in the trial courts.
Upon request of the witness, the Ombudsman shall also furnish him such security for his person and his
family as may be warranted by the circumstances. For this purpose, the Ombudsman may, at its
expense, call upon any police or constabulary unit to provide the said security.

(2) A person who, with or without service or compulsory process, provides oral or documentary
information requested by the Ombudsman shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities as are
extended to witnesses in the courts, and shall likewise be entitled to the assistance of counsel while
being questioned.

(3) If a person refuses to respond to the Ombudsman's or his Deputy's subpoena, or refuses to be
examined, or engages in obstructive conduct, the Ombudsman or his Deputy shall issue an order
directing the person to appear before him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
The contempt proceedings shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 33. Duty to Render Assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman. — Any officer or employee of
any department, bureau or office, subdivision, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and local governments, when required by the
Ombudsman, his Deputy or the Special Prosecutor shall render assistance to the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Section 34. Annual Report. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall render an annual report of its
activities and performance to the President and to Congress to be submitted within thirty (30) days
from the start of the regular session of Congress.

Section 35. Malicious Prosecution. — Any person who, actuated by malice or gross bad faith, files a
completely unwarranted or false complaint against any government official or employee shall be
subject to a penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months imprisonment and a fine not
exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 36. Penalties for Obstruction. — Any person who willfully obstructs or hinders the proper
exercise of the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman or who willfully misleads or attempts to
mislead the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor in replying to their inquiries shall be
punished by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

Section 37. Franking Privilege. — All official mail matters and telegrams of the Ombudsman addressed
for delivery within the Philippines shall be received, transmitted, and delivered free of charge:
provided, that such mail matters when addressed to private persons or nongovernment offices shall not
exceed one hundred and twenty (120) grams. All mail matters and telegrams sent through government
telegraph facilities containing complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman shall be transmitted free of
charge, provided that the telegram shall contain not more than one hundred fifty (150) words.

Section 38. Fiscal Autonomy. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Office of the Ombudsman may not be reduced below the amount appropriated
for the previous years and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 39. Appropriations. — The appropriation for the Office of the Special Prosecutor in the current
General Appropriations Act is hereby transferred to the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 40. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional, other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.

Section 41. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, letters of instructions, executive
orders, rules and regulations insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or
amended as the case may be.

Section 42. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in three (3) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Approved: November 17, 1989.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives
GR 160261/415 SCRA 44
November 10, 2003

FACTS: On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint

against C.J. Davide, Jr., among others.2 The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has
not been sent to the House in plenary.

The following day and just nearly 5 months since the filing of the first
complaint, a second impeachment complaint3 was filed by respondents house representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents
House of Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const.
which provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”

The House argues: the one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint
has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which
has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean "to
file" because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.4
Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to
act on the first impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have
been “initiated.”

ISSUE: Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the Constitution?

HELD: YES. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the framers
intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. The vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating
impeachment proceedings,] no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment
complaint].

To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Sec. 3(1)
of Art. XI of the Const. says "The House x x x shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," this is a misreading and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding.”
Constitutional amendments may be submitted to the people for ratification simultaneously with the
general elections.
Garcia vs. Mojica
314 SCRA 207/ GR No. 139043
September 10, 1999

FACTS: Cebu City Mayor Garcia signed an alleged midnight deal (4 days prior to the May 1998
election) with FF Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city government. Garcia was re-elected mayor.
Newspaper reports on the matter surfaced, prompting the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas to
investigate. The OMB-VIS, after conducting an investigation, recommended the filing of
administrative and criminal charges against Garcia. A complaint against Garcia was filed before the
Ombudsman, and the OMB-VIS preventively suspended Garcia for 6 months starting June 1999.
Garcia assailed this before the SC, claiming that the period was too long; that the investigation and the
resulting suspension violated the LGC [which provided for a minimum period of 60 days]; and that his
liability (if any) for the asphalt deal had already been condoned by virtue of his reelection. SC upheld
the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate Garcia, but found that the imposition of 6 months preventive
suspension was improper, considering that the case against Garcia did not constitute the “strong
evidence” required by Ombudsman Law; and that the period for which Garcia was already suspended
served the purpose of preventing him from hiding evidence and influencing prospective witnesses. SC
held that there was no violation of the LGC since Garcia was being investigated under the Ombudsman
Law, and the two laws govern differently. It has been ruled in Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole that the LGC did
not divest the Ombudsman of investigatory authority over local officials; and that the LGC and the
Ombudsman are not irreconcilable on this point. While there is a distinction between preventive
suspension periods under LGC and the Ombudsman Law, SC held that such distinction was not
decisive in Garcia’s case. Finally, SC held that Garcia could no longer be held administratively liable
for the asphalt deal, because it was signed and perfected during his previous term. That the contract
was to be effective in Garcia’s current term is of no moment, as was held previously in Salalima v.
Guingona.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not OMB-VIS committed grave abuse of discretion in investigating Garcia and ordering
his preventive suspension for 6 months.
(2) What law should apply to the investigation – the LGC (RA 7160) or the Ombudsman Law (RA
6770)?
(3) What is the effect of Garcia’s reelection on the investigation of acts done before his reelection?

HELD:
(1) YES. Preventive suspension under Section 24, RA 6770 may be imposed when, among other
factors, the evidence of guilt is strong. The period for which an official may be preventively suspended
must not exceed 6 months. Such is the case at bar.

(2) Both laws are applicable. In the case of Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, on the matter of whether or not
the Ombudsman has been stripped of his power to investigate local elective officials by virtue of the
LGC: “Indeed, there is nothing in the [LGC] to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other.”

(3) It is deemed condoned. A elective local official who is reelected cannot be held administratively
liable for acts committed during the previous term, even if such acts were to be effective only during
the current term. What matters is that the act was committed or perfected during the previous term and
the official has been subsequently reelected. The only conclusive determining factor as regards the
people’s thinking on the character of an elective official is an election.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to
eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. SC decisions do not
distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date
of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001.]

Facts:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with
pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
upon petitioner’s request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991,
OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.Pursuant to the information filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner,
fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for
physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would
warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that
petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order
setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending
action on her motion to inhibit.

Issue:
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of
Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.

Ruling:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension
upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to
be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension." 7

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government
— the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance
within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the
internal affairs of either branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.
In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains
to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that
unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not
deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel
door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

FRANCISCO V HR
NOV. 10,2003

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same
on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect
has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment
complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could
not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to
act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the
complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no
impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

Issue:
petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.To
determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.There is
indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In
Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is
vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVAG.R.
No. L-55289 June 29, 1982

Facts:
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters
and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres
Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church. The said lots
were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are
inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The
lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land
had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor. On September 13, 1977,
the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Director of Lands, opposed the application on the grounds that applicant, as a
private corporation, is disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the land applied
for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land since
June 12, 1945.After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan
Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by
Executive Minister Eraño G. Manalo, with office at the corner of Central and Don Mariano Marcos
Avenues, Quezon City, From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under
Republic Act No. 5440.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the registration of two lots.

Ruling:
The appeal should be sustained.As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo,
as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public
domain, like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and
because the said church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only
to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole has no nationality. The contention in the
comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in
Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in
the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial. The lots
sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. "

In Uy Un vs. Perez, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical
incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni
Cristo is dismissed with costs against said applicant.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME
G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

Facts:
The Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than
sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in its application, prayed for the
confirmation of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters, located at
Tanay, Rizal with an assessed value of P3,270. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application
on the grounds that the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands
and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application. After the trial had commenced, the Province of rizal and the Municipality of
Tanay filed a joint opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots of the Tanay
cadastre, would be needed for the widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino
Streets in the town of Tanay. The land was possessed by Olimpia Ramos before the Pacific war which
broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947, Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and Minerva
Inocencio. The Piguing spouses constructed a house therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the
"anchor guy" of its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the Meralco on August 13,
1976. The land was declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to
1977. It is residential in character as distinguished from a strictly agricultural land. It is not included in
any military reservation. Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the public domain.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the
Meralco is not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since Meralco is a juridical person.
The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register is public land.

From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

Issue:
Meralco contends that the said land, after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia
Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had become private land in the hands of the
latter, and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from acquiring
alienable public land, is not applicable to the said land.

Ruling:
The lower court’s judgment dismissing Meralco's application is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner-
appellant.

The court hold that, as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would
cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming
it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed. The Meralco relies on the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands, 48 Phil. 424, that "an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers
an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be public" and becomes private
property.
.Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the
other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject
to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public"
(Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

note:
That ruling is based on the Cariño case which is about the possession of land by an Igorot and his
ancestors since time immemorial or even before the Spanish conquest. The land involved in the Susi
case was possessed before 1880 or since a period of time "beyond the reach of memory". That is not
the situation in this case. The Meralco does not pretend that the Piguing spouses and their predecessor
had been in possession of the land since time immemorial.That means that until the certificate of title is
issued, a pice of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land. For
that reason in the Uy Un case, it was held that if that land was attached by a judgment creditor of the
applicant, while his application for confirmation of his imperfect title was pending in the Bureau of
Lands, the levy and execution sold of the land were void.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC
146 SCRA 509

FACTS: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which
ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring
481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act), as amended. The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this,
he asserts that, the registration proceedings having been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since
section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands
of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels),
it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public
domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

HELD: In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the
right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the
land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.
CA, 123 Phil. 919)."[15]

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in
said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that
in the light of the undispute facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could
have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law
would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates
no constitutionalmandate.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered
in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time
the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the
new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by
a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S.
1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the
land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.
CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
Godines V. Pak Luen
120 SCRA 223

FACTS:
Jose Godinez married to Martina Alvarez Godinez has acquired a parcel of land in Jolo Townsite
during their marriage. Martina died in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs. In
November 1941 Jose Godinez sold the said land to Fong Pak Luen a chinese citizen without the
knowledge of the plaintiffs. On January 11, 1963, defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of
attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and sold the above
described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.The plaintiffs filed this case to seek the
recovery of said land on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates the
Constitution and the Civil Code because respondent is an alien not allowed to acquire property and
since Gidonez could not have legally conveyed theentire property being a conjugal property. Thus, the
alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said
property and defendant Navata. Defendant Navata responded that the complaint does not state a cause
of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez
so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same and that the cause of action has been barred by
the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27,
1941 and the action was brought only on on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10year period provided
for by law

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a
constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a
Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.

RULING:
The heirs cannot recover the property sold to an alien if it had been conveyed to a Filipino
citizen qualified to own and possess it. There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez to
Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in Hong kong, was violative of the Constitution which
provides that aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands."
Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. It
does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien
as the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It
is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Hon. Rafael L. Mendoza,

G.R. No. L-48304, September 11, 1985

Facts:

The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one organization the
responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. To implement its
policy of integration, PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides that it is necessary that
two or more contractors presently operating within the same port premises who desire to continue or
renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one organization. Accordingly, the eleven
port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United South Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI).
The latter corporation was recognized by PPA and granted a special permit to handle exclusively the
cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a
management contract.

Private respondents Pernito, et al. instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with
preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against PPA and USDI. They assail the
policy adopted by PPA to grant only one permit to only one group as violative of the constitutional and
statutory provision on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.

Issue: Whether or not PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and
void for being violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade.

Ruling: No.Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that “the state shall regulate or
prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed.”

Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the Constitution
indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed. Regulate means includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain, but regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress
or prohibit. "Competition can best regulate a free economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that
principle must accommodate hard practical experience. There are areas where for special reasons the
force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate too destructively to safeguard the public
interest. Public utilities are an instance of that consideration." By their very nature, certain public
services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc.
must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are not
violative of the law against monopolies (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, supra).

In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in the port of Cebu. The operations there,
particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City of Cebu, the principal port in the South,
but also the economy of the whole country as well. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being
rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and commerce. Operations in
said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the
public good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger may not even be in
this instance considered as promoting a monopoly because the fact of the matter is that while the sole
operator permitted by PPA to engage in the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is
only USDI, actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously
used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted themselves as USDI.But over and
above the platter of whether the monopoly has been created, the overriding and more significant
consideration is public interest. Accordingly, PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any
constitutional and legal provision on monopolies.
G.R. No. 167707 (Secretary of DENR vs Yap)
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect
title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al
alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified landof the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares
of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter
buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall
form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the
Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The
OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority
to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES:
Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al and
Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD:
Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case
at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for
the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private
ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the
legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.
141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that
the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of
the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be
unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give
them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented
and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply
for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and
issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land
shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The
District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding that
the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation
of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the
land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD:
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the
application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by
section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became
foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court
annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became
foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that
said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land
in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.
8. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT

FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter,
convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.)
security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were
held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government
and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The
MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the
land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain
and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With
regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central
Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the
formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order
No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence,
the filing of the petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed,
even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of
public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or
limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but
name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association –
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing
legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only
“Moros” as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be
respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he
failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No.
7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
9. NICASIO I. ALCANTARA vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES
FACTS:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio Lanton,
General Santos City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) for 25
years. Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel Esmael and Lasid
Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner questioned
COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. COSLAP went on with the hearing
and petitioner alleged that he was not given the opportunity to be present and participate in the field
investigations conducted. On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner
appealed to CA for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs
Legal Research Page 1
Alcantara v COSLAP, DENR and Paglangan 2001 to the B’laan indigenous cultural community
since they have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time
immemorial, a fact has not been disputed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive
in nature, for instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders. Active participation of a
respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to
recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore cannot question it later after the decision.
It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner
violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural
groups occupying the same, and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.
10. OROPORT CARGOHANDLING SERVICES, INC., represented by its President
FRANKLIN U. SIAO, vs. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY
FACTS:
In 2003, Oroport bid for the management and operation of MCT, a P3.24 billion government
infrastructure project. As no bidder won in the two public biddings, PIA took over MCT operations. On
April 19, 2004, Oroport sued PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and damages. It accused PIA
of illegally operating MCT without a license from PPA or a franchise from Congress. It also alleged
unfair competition since PIA handled cargoes of the general public. It further invoked unlawful
deprivation of property as it stands to incur investment losses with PIA’s take over of MCT operations
It prayed that PIA be stopped from handling cargoes not owned or consigned to its industrial estate
locators.
ISSUE:
WON PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with PPA sans a
franchise or a license?
RULING:
Yes. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was necessary,
temporary and beneficial to the public. Franchises from Congress are not required before each and
every public utility may operate because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power
to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. Article XII, Section 11 of
the Constitution does not necessarily imply that only Congress can grant such authorization. The
determination of whether the winning bidder is qualified to undertake the contracted service should be
left to the sound judgment of PPA or PIA as these agencies are in the best position to evaluate the
feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with the project’s
development plans. Neither the Court nor Congress has the time and the technical know-how to look
into this matter. Furthermore, Section 4(e) of Presidential Decree No. 538, gives PIA the legal authority
to construct, operate and maintain port facilities including stevedoring and port terminal services even
without PPA’s authority. The MOA granting PIA the exclusive control and supervision of all ports,
wharves, piers and services within the industrial area, recognizing its power to collect port fees, dues
and charges, makes PIA’s authority over MCT operations more secure.
 ESCTACS

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA

348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

Facts:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed
before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and
sexually explicit contents. Prior to the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to
submit a written statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but
the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they
alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the
Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants
filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue:
WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

Held:
The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and the Disciplinary
Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning ACADEMIC FREEDOM. This institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right
to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students
to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom
of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students.
Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts
class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled
that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel,
is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the
Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed
against respondent students.
UP and ALFREDO DE TORRES vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
196 SCRA 221

Facts:
Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los Baos
(UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30,
1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Governments official representative to the Centre
on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and Pacific (CIRDAP).

When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but was denied . UPLB Chancellor Raul P. de
Guzman apprised him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and warned of the possibility of being
considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and report for duty as
directed. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent
Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-UPLB. However, Chancellor
Villareal considered his absence to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.

Issues:
Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary for Dr. de Torres to resume his post at the
UNIVERSITY despite having remained continuously with the Civil Service, not having been dropped
from the rolls of the University, and after returning to fulfill his service contract as a government
scholar.

Held:
The issuance of a new appointment in favor of Petitioner De Torres is not needed, because he was not
formally dropped from the rolls of the University of the Philippines,the assailed CSC Resolutions were
issued in excess of authority, because the CSC had violated the Subido-Romulo Agreement and
disregarded the Universitys academic freedom, which includes the right to determine who may teach
and who may be dropped from the service. Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules --
based on which respondent justified Petitioner De Torres automatic separation from the service -- has
been repealed and superseded by PD 807, as well as EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which
decrees prior notice before actual dropping. Even assuming that the said provision was not repealed,
the issuance of the Rule was ultra vires because it was not related to or connected with to any specific
provision of the mother law, RA 2260; and the assailed CSC Resolutions violated petitioners right to
due process, because he had not been given prior notice of his actual separation.

“As part of its academic freedom, the University of the Philippines has the prerogative to determine
who may teach its students. The Civil Service Commission has no authority to force it to dismiss a
member of its faculty even in the guise of enforcing Civil Service Rules.”
Guingona v. Carague
GR 94571, 196 SCRA 221 [Apr 22, 1991]

Facts.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for foreign debt service in the
1990 budget. Petitioners contend that the presidential decrees authorizing such automatic appropriation
violate Sec29 (1), Art VI of the Constitution. It is asserted, among others, that it did not meet the
alleged required definiteness, certainty, and exactness in appropriation, and so it is an undue delegation
of legislative power as the President, by virtue of which, determines in advance the amount
appropriated for the debt service.

Issue.
Is the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget violative of Art VI, Sec 29 (1) of the
Constitution?

Held.
No. Our Constitution under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives does not require a definite, certain,
exact or “specific appropriation made by law” unlike the Nebraska Constitution invoked by petitioners.
Our Constitution simply states that moneys paid out of the treasury must be made pursuant to an
appropriation made by law. More significantly, our Constitution does not prescribe any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be “made by law” such as precisely the authorization under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words xxx an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress). The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional
 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8371

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL

COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES

The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:

1. recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;
2. protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being and
shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
3. recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
4. guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and
freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
5. take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for
their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; and
6. recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring
maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to
render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee
the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and
institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.

Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains

Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts of territories which cover not only the physical
environment but the total environment including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the areas which the ICCs/IPs
possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.

Indigenous Concept of Ownership.

Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found
therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership
generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional
resource rights.

Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains.

Refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves
or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall
include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which
they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs.

Consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due
recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights,
protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment
rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges available to every member of the
society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force or coercion against
ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution and
relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision in
this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of rights and privileges already recognized and
accorded to women under existing laws of general application.

Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).

 To carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs
(NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto

The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.
 5. Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion on Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR (GR No. 135385,
December 6, 2000)

1. These lands claimed by the IPs have long been theirs BY VIRTUE OF NATIVE TITLE; they have
lived there even before the Spanish colonization. “Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ pre‐conquest rights to
lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands
are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputable presumed to have been held that way
since before the Spanish Conquest.”

2. Native Title is an Exception to the Regalian Doctrine: As held in Oh Cho vs Director of Lands:
“This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors‐in‐interest since time immemorial”

3. Native Titles provide a different Type of Private Ownership:

“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership. ‐‐‐ Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed
or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.”

4. It complies with Regalian Doctrine: Natural Sources within ancestral domains are not owned by the
IPs
* The IPs claims are limited to “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;”
* IPRA did not mention that the IPs also own all the other natural resources found within the ancestral
domains

Discussion related to the topic of the Torrens System and Mode of Acquiring Ownership (land):
I. HISTORY ON THE MODE OF ACQUIRING LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES:
A. Laws of the Indies
“The Regalian Theory is a Western legal concept first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.”
 By virtue of Spain’s "discovery" and conquest of the Philippines, its lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown
 Back then, the Spanish Government distributed the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions
to Spaniards, both military and civilian

B. Valenton‐vs‐Murciano Case (1904, American Regime)

 Long‐time occupation will not necessarily lead to ownership of the land
 "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof
before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that
the State remained the absolute owner."

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

1903: 1st Public Land Act (Act No. 926)
3⁄4 Provides rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands
1919: 2nd Public Land Act (Act 2874)
3⁄4 more comprehensive but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos, Americans
and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges

1936: Present Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141)

3⁄4 Almost the same as Act 2874, except that it gave the Filipino citizens and corporations which
were previously only granted to Americans

**1903: Land Registration Law (Act 496)

3⁄4 It placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system
3⁄4 almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898

II. TORRENS SYSTEM

Origin: Patterned after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia by Sir Robert Torrens
Government’s Role:
The government must issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is
the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
the law warrants or reserves
Certificate of Title: The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the
parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate.

III. REGALIAN DOCTRINE

 Despite of several legal developments on land distribution, the Regalian doctrine is still retained
in our Constitution.
 Under this concept, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated
therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State.

(FOR REFERENCE inde ni part sang Digest, ang Separate Opinion lang ang nasulat sa List.)
Main Case: Isagani Cruz vs. Secretary of DENR et.al., (GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000)
Facts:
In 1997, RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act/IPRA) was passed. Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa
filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions of
IPRA, among others:
a) It allows the indigenous people/cultural community to OWN NATURAL RESOURCES;
b) It defines ancestral lands and ancestral domains in such a way that it may include private lands
owned by other individuals;
c) It categorizes ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land;
d) It violates due process in allowing NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to take
jurisdiction over IP land disputes and making customary law apply to these.

In the first deliberation of the Supreme Court, the votes were 7‐7, so the case was re‐deliberated upon.

Issue/s:
Did the IPRA violate the Regalian Theory?
A. IPRA: Under the IPRA law, lands which have not been registered before, if granted with a
CADT/CALT, will be recognized as privately owned by the IPs from the beginning‐ thus, has
never been part of public domain.
B. Regalian Theory: Lands which has not been recognized as privately owned belongs to the State

Held:
No Final Decision. Petition dismissed due to lack of votes; Law remained valid and constitutional (7 to
grant ‐7 to dismiss).
 GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Republic Act No. 6975: AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

2. Antonio M. Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, et.al. (GR No. 96409. February 14, 1992)

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill
No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463 with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

Republic Act No. 6975 allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution, which
provides that: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in
scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

Issues:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution Particularly Sec. 12 RA 6975 as it constitutes
an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and
commander-in-chief powers”

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that RA 6975 is constitutional.

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President. Supreme Court held that the President has control of
all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive
branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute thejudgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very
“heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Thus, “the President’s power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view,
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
3. Jesulito A. Manalo vs. Pedro Sistoza, et.al. (GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999)

Facts:

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by
former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the
rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner
brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject
appointment and disbursement thereof.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.

Held:

The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether
a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does
the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

 The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.–It is petitioner’s submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose rank
is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate
and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the
distinction.
 Directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

Facts:

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the
murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the
suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be
limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is
contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal
protection of laws.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

Ruling:

No. Discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the
PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment
and which suspension continues until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate
the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same class;
and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as
violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable
considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither
unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
 AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA

G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987

Facts:

In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B.
Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the
same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with
the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the
respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov.
Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall
serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

Issue:

Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Ruling:

NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the
Provisional Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:
―This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.‖

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor.
The memorandum dated February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any
legal force and effect.

The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is
merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date
of the plebiscite.
GONZALES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967

Facts:

The Congress passed 3 resolutions simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments to the
Constitution so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of
120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second, calling a convention to
propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections. And the third, proposing that the
same Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for approval by the people, at
the general elections. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said law contending that the
Congress cannot simultaneously propose amendments to the Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.

Issues:

1. Whether or not RA 4913 is constitutional.

2. Whether or not the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate
the spirit of the Constitution.

Ruling:

YES as to both issues. The constituent power or the power to amend or revise the Constitution,
is different from the law-making power of Congress. Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people —
as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours— to make, and, hence, to amend
their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because
the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements
of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their authority does not
emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that
they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by
the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. The Congress acting
as a constituent assembly, may propose amendments to the Constitution, and exercising its general
legislative power, provide for the details of the Constitutional Convention.
IMBONG vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970

Facts:

Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both interested in running as candidates in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, impugning the
constitutionality of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No.2 which called for the
Constitutional Convention to propose Constitutional amendments. After its adoption, Congress, acting
as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 4914 implementing said resolution, restating entirely the provisions
of said resolution.

Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
Resolution No. 2 by providing that ―xxx any other details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied
in an implementing legislation xxx‖ Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. 4914.

Issue:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the
parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

Ruling:

YES. The Court declared that while the authority to call a Constitutional Convention is vested
by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly, the power to
enact the implementing details or specifics of the general law does not exclusively pertain to Congress,
the Congress in exercising its comprehensive legislative power (not as a Constitutional Assembly) may
pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the Constitutional Conventions, such
as the number, qualification, and compensation of its member.

The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132
are as follows:

1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has

authority to propose constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by ¾ votes
of each house in joint session assembled but voting separately.
2. Such grant includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by
necessary implication.
3. Implementing details are within the authority of the Congress not only as a Constituent
Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power which encompasses all
matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action so long as it does not contravene any provision of the
Constitution; and
4. Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary implementing legislation to fill in the
gaps which Congress as a Constituent Assembly has omitted.
 SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-34150
APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the
validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with
1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by
a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is against the
constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE:

Whether the resolutions are constitutional?

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the Court succinctly
ruled that the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be
exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by
a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments
similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent
body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather
than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional
Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic
system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The
fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against
the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire
Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The
Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity,
only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the
agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as
follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision."
 TOLENTINO v COMELEC
41 SCRA 702

FACTS:

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the
proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18.This was even before the rest of the
draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had be en approved. Artu ro
T olentino then file d a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition will prosper.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be
an improper submission to the people. Such is not allowed. The proposed amendments shall
be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that t h e
e n t i r e c o n s t i t u t i o n m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n a t o n e plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision
because they had at the time n o i d e a y e t o f w h a t t h e r e s t o f t h e r e v i s e d
C o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the
proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission”
which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.
 SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS:

On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend
that the president has no power to propose amendments t o t h e n e w c o n s t i t u t i o n , a s s u c h ,
the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly
is a justiciable question.

2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:

1. Yes. The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a
justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of thepresident to
perform such act is in question.

2. Yes. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental
powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis.

3. Yes. The time for deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short
especially since the questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since
the proclamation of martial law.13
 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative

f o r R e f o r m s , Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this
petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and
of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco,
the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to
dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.
The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this
civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
on p e o p l e ’ s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y
l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court
granted the Motions for Intervention.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision
or an amendment of the Constitution.

HELD:

S e c . 2 , A r t X V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c u t o r y, t h u s , w i t h o u t i m p l e
m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the
right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatw h a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d , c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e d ( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a n o n d e l e g a r
i p o t e s t ) . T h e delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s
initiative. T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m l i m i t s w a s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t
w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the
constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s
decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.