Governance and Hyper-Corruption in Resource-Rich African Countries

Author(s): Hazel M. McFerson

Source: Third World Quarterly , 2009, Vol. 30, No. 8 (2009), pp. 1529-1547
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40388333

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Governance and
Resource-rich African Countries

HAZEL M MCFERSON

Abstract Official corruption is frequently associated with the abu

valuable extractive resources. This article reviews the worst cases of
curse' in Africa - Angola, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria - in light of the most recen
ments. Despite its systematic association with public corruption,
mineral wealth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Corr
widespread in resource-poor countries as well - in Africa and elsewhe
some resource-rich African countries such as Botswana have a record
economic performance and high public integrity, suggesting specific
which transparency and accountability for the use of mineral resour
encouraged and corruption correspondingly reduced. Because corr
resource-rich African countries is heavily influenced by external
particularly the multinational extractive industries, recent initiatives
United States and the international community to foster transparenc
significant potential for reducing corruption and improving governan

We have corruption in the developed countries too but here it do

people - in Africa it does.1

A number of African countries evidence the 'paradox of plenty', by

poverty of the vast majority of the population coexists with abu
valuable mineral resources - oil, gas, gemstones and scarce industrial
The answer lies in the extreme corruption in these countries, where m
revenue from extractive industries has been and continues to be appr
by unaccountable ruling elites. In fact, it is precisely this large reven
allows the elite to buy control, keep the security apparatus happ
moves toward political participation, and preclude a minimal
distribution of resources - a syndrome known as 'the resource cu
article describes the instances in sub-Saharan Africa where the association
between patrimonial structures, corruption and mineral abundance is
strongest. These occur in Angola, Republic of Congo (Congo/Brazzaville),
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon and Nigeria. (Cameroon, Chad and Sudan are the remaining countries

Hazel M McFerson is in the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, 4400
University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA. Email: hmcferso@gmu.edu.

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/09/081529-20 © 2009 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/01436590903279257 1529

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 HAZEL M MCFERSON

in sub-Saharan Africa where substantial oil wealth coexists with sev

corruption. None is included in this article because their oil depend
as high as for the countries examined.) Botswana is not only t
exception but also shows the way out for the other African countr

The comparative picture

In general the hyper-corruption associated with abundance

resources also generates, and is enabled by, severe restrictions o
and civil rights, and leads to excessive and discretionary re
economic activity.
According to Freedom House, in the 30 years between 1977 an
number of politically 'free' countries in Africa rose from just four
Gambia, Mauritius, Seychelles) to 16, and the number of 'p
countries from 12 to 22, with 'not free' countries accordingly drop
25 (more than half of African countries) in 1977 to 14. Not coincide
but one of the resource-rich countries is found in the 'not free
Gabon has graduated from 'not free' in 1977 to 'partly free' in 2008
Congo Brazzaville, which was listed as 'partly free' in 1977, has
to the 'not free' group.3
Table 1 shows the Indicators of Political Rights and Civil Liber
selected countries, Table 2 the governmental restrictions on busines
and Table 3 the corruption indicators. Aside from the evident
Equatorial Guinea has the most oppressive and restrictive regim
and Botswana the least, the evidence reveals interesting pattern
association between political rights and civil freedoms is strong, wi
rank correlation coefficient of +0.86. Whether a restriction on civi

Table 1. Indicators of political rights and civil liberties, selected res

African countries, 2008*

Political rights Civil liberties

Country Overall ABC Overall D E F G

Angola 6 2 5 1 5 8 6 4 3
Botswana 2 11 11 9 2 14 10 13 11
Republic of Congo 6 143 5 9726
DRC 5 6 5 2 6 6 5 0 1
Equatorial Guinea 7 0 10 6 5 0 13
Gabon 6 253 4 10 665
Nigeria 4 396 4 11857

Notes: *A higher overall in

Conversely, higher indicator
Subcategories of political
functioning of government.
Subcategories of civil libert
rights; F: rule of law; G: per
Source: Freedom House, 'Cou

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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

TABLE 2. Economic regulation rank, selected resource-rich African countries

Indicator Angola Botswana Congo DRC Equatorial Guinea Gabon Nigeria

Starting a business 42 12 34 30 41 31 6
Dealing with licences 26 21 11 27 16 5 40
Employing workers 43 12 40 42 45 39 3
Registering property 41 3 43 26 6 30 46
Getting credit 7 2 15 39 27 15 7
Protecting investors 5 16 34 34 30 34 5
Paying tax 27 2 46 35 30 18 21
Cross-border trading 40 27 45 33 19 11 22
Enforcing contracts 46 17 28 45 9 32 16
Closing a business 28 1 31 32 34 24 13
Overall 37 4 43 46 35 20 10

Note: *Rank out of 46 African

greater potential opportunitie
Source: World Bank, Doing B

TABLE 3. Corruption per

2004-08*

2004 2008

Country Score Rank Score Rank

Angola 2.0 133 1.9 158

Botswana 6.0 31 5.8 36
Republic of Congo 2.3 114 1.9 158
DRC 1.9 152 1.7 171
Equatorial Guinea 1.9(2005) 152(2005) 1.7 171
Gabon 3.3 74 3.7 96
Nigeria 1.6 144 2.7 121

Note: *Low score (1-10) and high

The TI indicators are based on pe
a growing body of research poin
various state functions. Because
although improvements may hav
before 2005 for many of the cou
Source: Transparency Internati
policy_research/surveys_indices/

leads to curtailment of
reinforcing. Interestingl
is possible to have exte
political rights and libe
active pluralism and pa
civil restrictions. Clearly
participation are insuff
and protection of indivi
of international efforts
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 HAZEL M McFERSON

Concerning the quality of economic regulation, the clearest f

the divergence within each country between different types of r
Equatorial Guinea shows highly restrictive regulation in mos
but ranks well for property registration and contract enforcem
Angola - which is ranked even lower than Equatorial Guinea
economic regulation appears sound in the areas of credit acce
protection of investors. Both anomalies can be explained by the im
of making life easy for the multinational companies extracting t
is so critical for regime maintenance and rent seeking. Indeed,
probably make the case that severely restrictive internal regulation
in hand with flexibility and predictability vis-à-vis major foreign in
Finally, perceptions of corruption show that, with the exc
Botswana, public integrity remains extremely weak in resource-rich
countries, although the picture is beginning to change. In the past four
already extreme corruption in the two Congos and Equatorial G
increased even further, whereas a very slight improvement is noted in
more significant one in Gabon, and a substantial one seems to have o
Nigeria. The latter improvement is particularly noteworthy in v
importance and troubled history of this very important country in A
In general, the contemporary data clearly confirm the long-standin
that political and civil rights, regulatory efficiency and public integ
particularly weak in mineral-resource-rich African countries. Th
stances of each country are described below.

Country cases
Angola: moving glacially in the right direction

Background. After Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975 the country

was ravaged by a 27-year civil war, briefly interrupted by elections in 1991
which were unfortunately quickly followed by a resumption of the conflict
between the ruling MPLA and the opposition group UNITA. The legacy of the
war includes up to 300 000 people killed and millions maimed and displaced.4
The conflict has been partly associated with regional and ethnic differences
but was essentially a power struggle. After the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas
Savimbi, the MPLA government regained control of most of the country, and
resistance in the Cabinda enclave (where much of the oil lies) was much
reduced by a 2006 accord with the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue, a regional
umbrella of Cabinda organisations.
Although Angola is one of Africa's leading oil producers, a majority
of Angolans live on less than $1 a day, and the UNDP Human Develop-
ment Index (HDl) is 0.446, placing the country at 162 out of 177 countries.
Corruption has been substantial, with over US$1 billion per year of the
country's oil revenues - 25% of state revenue - unaccounted for since 1996. 5

Governance. As noted earlier, Angola is classified as 'not free'; has severe

restrictions on political rights as well as civil liberties; ranks 37th out of 46
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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

African countries for the quality of economic regulation, and 158 out of
countries in public integrity. Power is highly centralised around the pre
even more than elsewhere in Africa. Gatekeepers control access
president, who typically favours vertical relationships fostering depe
on him and discourages horizontal ones which may improve adminis
efficiency but would produce harder-to-control alliances. In turn, the ve
lines of power feed factionalism and competition for access, confu
institutional coherence.6
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has ruled Angola since 197
to face re-election in 2009, but the date was postponed to 2010 to give ti
finalise the new constitution. Angola had not held parliamentary ele
since 1992, allegedly because of political unrest and civil conflict, a
terms of members elected in 1992 were extended to July 2008.
parliamentary elections took place in 2008. The government is heavy-
and arbitrary, and thousands of Angolans remain vulnerable to
evictions caused by the government's failure to address widespread insecu
of land tenure. The majority of the capital city Luanda's estimated
million residents hold no formal title to their house or land, and there a
consistent procedures to determine compensation for evictions.7
In part using the long-standing civil conflict as an excuse, the An
government has denied due process, and has fared badly in terms of
and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
and control of corruption. In 2003 Angola ranked 124th out of 133 co
on corruption watchdog Transparency International's Corruption P
tion Index. A 2004 report cited resource governance issues as dominant in
conflict - including low transparency and underreporting of the oil reve
Furthermore, within the social sectors financial resource allocation h
biased to elite interests, eg funding for overseas scholarships and m
evacuation, at the expense of the most elementary primary health ca
basic education needs of the Angolan people.
A glimmer of hope, however, has emerged recently. With the de
Savimbi and the weakening of his unita movement, both the understa
reasons for restrictions on free political activity and the excu
unwarranted controls have disappeared. While Angola was the countr
the worst governance among the Portuguese-speaking nations, it al
shown the most improvement in recent years, according to the Worl
in 2006. The September 2008 election, too, although marred by
problems and due process violations, nevertheless had some meanin
political value. If future elections occur on schedule and their co
gradually improves, there are some prospects that Angola's future will b
corrupt than its past, and its people progressively better off.

Congo I Brazzaville: déjà vu all over again

Background. Upon independence in 1960 the former French colo
Middle Congo became the Republic of the Congo. After a long inter
of comparatively improving governance an extremely violent civil w
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 HAZEL M MCFERSON

1996-2002 restored to power the former Marxist President Deni

Nguesso (son-in-law of the late president of Gabon, Omar Bongo,
'the Pierre Cardin Marxist')· He was 'elected' in 2002 to a seven-y
and easily re-elected for another term in July 2009. (The expectat
another easy re-election by a huge margin.) Southern-based rebe
agreed to a final peace accord in March 2003, but the calm is ten
refugees continue to present a humanitarian crisis.
During the many resource-generated conflicts, including the wo
from 1997 to 2002, both the pro-government forces and armed reb
committed atrocities against civilian populations. At least 10%
country's population was displaced, including over 250 000 people
Brazzaville and sought refuge in the forests of the Pool region, w
became de facto hostages of the 'Ninja' militia allied to form
minister Bernard Kolelas. Those who managed to return to Br
became the victims of indiscriminate attacks from the regime arm
'Cobra' militia. Also dire is the predicament of the indigenous po
of the northwest (the Twa), living in forested areas, almost com
deprived of human rights and state protection - let alone access
social services.
The Republic of Congo is one of the petro-states most closely associated
with the legacy of influence peddling and dirty deals in Africa by the
notorious French state oil company Elf Aquitaine (Total).9 The company
reportedly financed both sides of the civil war, as it also did in Angola.

Governance. As noted earlier, after a hopeful interlude of some years in the

late 1970s and 1980s, Congo is again classified as politically 'not free'; it has
severe restrictions on political rights as well as civil liberties (notwithstanding
the comparatively high freedom of the press); ranks 43rd out of 46 African
countries for the quality of economic management; and 158th out of 171 for
public integrity.
Although Congo is one of sub-Saharan Africa's main oil producers, 70%
of the population lives below the poverty line; the 2007/2008 HDI ranking
for Congo is 139 out of 177 countries; and the country is regarded as one of
Africa's most corrupt. Education is low priority, with minimal government
investment, low enrollment and completion rates, and a very high pupil:
teacher ratio of 83 to 1 at primary level. The Economist Intelligence Unifs
business environment indicators are unfavourable, with lack of transparency
and administrative procedures particularly troublesome, along with other
governance indicators. Debt relief under the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was
delayed in 2006 following allegations of corruption, and appears highly
unlikely to reach the 'completion point'.
For the president, his family and cronies, oil revenue is a personal cash
cow, and an estimated one-third of Congo's $1 billion in oil revenue does not
show up in the country's budget.10 In 2004 the country was expelled from the
Kimberley Process (which is aimed at preventing the marketing of 'blood
diamonds'), although it was provisionally readmitted in 2007.
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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Some actual illustrations may give the flavour of corruption i

Brazzaville. In 2005 the Boston Globe reported on one of many u
deals in which a private company, Africa Oil & Gas, run by D
Gokana, head of Congo's national oil company and special adv
President Sassou-Nguesso, arranged for an oil shipment to the Uni
for $53 million through a middleman, Geneva-based Vitol SA. Th
government received $48.8 million, and Africa Oil & Gas pock
million. In August 2006 presidential son Denis, head of marketing
state oil company, spent $35 000 of his country's money on designer
Louis Vuitton and Robert Cavelli during one of his regular shopp
to Paris and Dubai. In 2007 the president took a 50-person entour
eight-day visit to New York to deliver a 15-minute speech to the U
group stayed at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, where the bill was almost
including presidential butler, personal photographer, and presiden
hairdresser. A presidential assistant paid in cash at check-out.
The extravagance is not limited to foreign trips. This writer was as
during a 2007 visit to see in the middle of downtown Brazzaville
mausoleum, of imported Italian granite and marble, dedicated to
century colonial explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza (1852-1905) -
monument to a colonialist anywhere in post-independence Af
remains and those of his wife and four children were exhumed i
and flown to Brazzaville for reburial; the ceremony was attended
African presidents and the French Foreign Minister. Origina
financed by the French government, its cost skyrocketed from €
to over €10 million - with the difference equivalent to about $10
cheerfully contributed by the Congo government. (Brazza wa
slavery, and his travel to Congo did spare the region north of the
unimaginable horrors of Belgian King Leopold H's 'Congo Free St
Meanwhile, basic human development indicators have deteriorat
majority of citizens, compared with 1990. Currently the under-five m
rate is 1 17 per 1000 live births and infant mortality 75 per 1000; ma
stands at 14%; immunisation coverage remains at a low 52%; and
mortality remains at a high eight deaths per 1000 live births.12
national treasurer Joseph Mandzoungou has despaired that oil mon
ever help most people in Congo: Oil has brought poverty among o
Oil has brought corruption, hate, arrogance. Oil is at the bas
misery.'13 Unlike in Angola, there is no sign of improvement - r
reverse.

Democratic Republic of Congo - -from kleptocracy to free-for-all

Background. Formerly known as the notorious patrimonial s

the DRC has the third largest population and the third larges
Africa (after Sudan and Algeria, which are, however, larg
almost one-third the size of the continental United States. T
UNDP HDI for the DRC is 0.411, which makes the country 16
countries in the world. It is rich in natural and human resour
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 HAZEL M McFERSON

have continuously played a role in its long conflict history - bo

and after the country's colonialisation by the Belgians. Among
resources are copper, oil, diamonds, gold, cobalt and coltan
virtually unknown to the general public, but critical for cell pho
other electronics).
During the past decade the country has been at the centre of what
termed 'Africa's World War'.14 The conflict, which began in August
was largely focused in the eastern regions, dramatically reduce
output and government revenue, and resulted in the deaths of an
four million people from violence, famine and disease. Foreign
curtailed operations because of uncertainty, lack of infrastructur
difficult operating environment.
A vast literature exists on the war in the Congo, relatively little o
is empirically based because of the extreme insecurity and lack o
data. In brief, the conflict in the eastern Congo originally b
spillover from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. When the successfu
of Tutsis from southern Uganda halted the mass killing of an e
800 000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the genocidal mil
Interahamwe - escaped the country into the eastern Congo, a
much of the Hutu population fearing retribution. When in C
militia controlled the Hutu refugee camps through terror and in
and, among other things, carried raids into Rwanda and att
Congolese Tutsis - known as the Bunyamelenge. In turn, bo
(whose President Yoweri Museveni is an ethnic Tutsi) and the n
How it
starte
dominated Rwanda government of President Paul Kagame in
d: eastern Congo to halt the cross-border attacks and protect the
genuin lenge. The original motivation was genuine, but the invasion quick
e into a profitable venture for the exploitation of Congolese
reason
resources. The situation was further complicated by the interv
Angola on the side of the DRC government. Official Rwandan tr
long since left, but a major Tutsi-led rebel group remains, more
and better trained than the Congolese Army. Complicated by the
and brutality of the official 'army' and by the activities of a variety
warlords and bandit groups, the conflict is today mainly centred
of valuable mineral resources. The entire tragic history of the
have been different had the genocidal Hutu militias been disarm
by the UN troops guarding the border - which at that time wo
been a comparatively easy measure involving defeated thugs the
for their lives.15
Conditions began to improve in late 2002 with the withdrawal
portion of the invading foreign troops and the hostilities have r
been abating ever since, but the situation remained extremely fragil
to the weakness of the central government and the attraction of the
resources. Just as the economy began to slowly recover from two
decline and its people from five centuries of oppression, the conf
east was rekindled in late October 2008, beginning yet another chapt
apparently endless violence of the region.
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 GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Governance. As noted earlier, the DRC is classified as 'not free'; re

on political rights and civil liberties are as severe as in neighbouring
of Congo; the country is last among 46 African countries in resp
business and regulatory climate; and ranks dead last in the world f
integrity.
Central government authority is virtually non-existent in large swaths of
the country. Much of the hinterland population, constantly threatened by
uniformed and non-uniformed bandits of different stripes, have abandoned
their towns and villages dangerously near roads and retreated into the
forest - a stunning reversal of a thousand years of human socialisation and
interchange.
Neo-patrimonialism in the DRC has been extensively examined in the
literature.16 The DRC has been and remains one of the most corrupt and
chaotic countries in Africa, mainly because of its immense economic
resources, absence of good governance and history of repression and
corruption during and after colonialism. The late dictator Mobutu Sese
Seko urged: 'If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way. But if you steal
too much to become rich overnight, you'll be caught'.17 And, playing on the
double meaning of the French verb 'voler' as both 'fly' and 'steal', a
notorious saying had it that 'in Zaire, only Air Zaire does not fly'.
After withdrawal of the foreign troops, the transitional government
reopened relations with international financial institutions and international
donors. In 2006 Joseph Kabila was elected president and began implementing
some reforms, including in governance. Actual progress has been very slow,
however; implementation capacity is almost non-existent and the continuing
violence and insecurity in the east preclude genuine and lasting progress
throughout the country. Improved security may lead to increased govern-
ment revenues, higher external assistance and foreign direct investment,
although the uncertain legal framework, widespread corruption, and lack of
transparency are continuing long-term problems.

Equatorial Guinea - mafia state

Background. Since independence in 1968 the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea - one of only two former Spanish colonies in Africa - has been ruled
by two men from the same family: Francisco Macias Nguema, who was
overthrown and executed by his nephew Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo
(Έ1 Libertador'), the current president of the country. At independence the
Fang people, the larger group, located in the mainland of Rio Muni, won the
elections and proceeded to dispossess the local population of the island of
Bioko (formerly Fernando Po). The Mongomo clan of the Fang has
dominated every aspect of the country ever since.18
The experience of Equatorial Guinea demonstrates that abundance
of mineral resources is not a necessary condition for repression and
malgovernance - both were extreme long before the discovery of massive
offshore oil reserves in 1995. However, 'oil has exacerbated already present
pathologies in Equatorial Guinea's political economy, paving the way for
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 HAZEL M McFERSON

future problems of underdevelopment, instability and authoritar

The IMF and the US Department of Energy have estimated that th
holds between 1.77 and 2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) an
1.3 and 4.4 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves. Tropical hardwoo
second major export, and as-yet undeveloped mineral resourc
titanium, iron ore, manganese, uranium and alluvial gold.
Equatorial Guinea is a glaring example of how to mismanage o
The country exports 420 000 barrels of oil per day, mainly to t
States, and earns over $7 billion per year from oil exports. In a coun
population of less than half a million (second smallest in Afr
revenue would be more than sufficient to produce substantial de
and human progress - even if the ruling elite were to take the li
However, the small elite in power have appropriated virtually t
revenue, in addition to perpetrating severe human rights ab
precluding all political freedoms. Although average per capita in
over $14 000 a year, 60% of the population have an income belo
year - under the absolute poverty line of $1 a day. Even in the major
Malabo and Bata, three of five households have no running water
to electricity. The country lacks a functioning healthcare system
educational system is decrepit. Not surprisingly Equatorial Guine
lowest HDI rating in the world in relation to its per capita GNP.

Governance. As noted earlier, Equatorial Guinea is classified as '

has near-absolute restrictions on political rights and civil liberties
out of 46 African countries for the quality of economic managem
perceived to be one of the world's most corrupt states, ranking last
integrity.
Peter Maas describes former President Francisco Macias Nguem
self-bestowed titles included Leader of Steel, Sole Miracle of
Guinea and, of course, President for Life, as 'a morph of Idi Am
Pot'.20 He continues: 'Equatorial Guinea sometimes seems a paro
oil kleptocracy - a Blazing Saddles of the world of petroleum. Y
emerged as an all-too-real example of how a dictator, awash in pe
enriches himself and his family while starving his people.'
The situation today remains as described by Klitgaard 19 years
programmes sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF were term
1993, because of corruption and mismanagement. No longer elig
concessional financing because of the large oil revenues, the gover
been trying to agree on a 'shadow' fiscal management programm
World Bank and IMF, but even this pretence was abandoned with
price of oil. In 2004 a US Senate investigation revealed that Obian
had transferred over $35 million from government accounts to
offshore corporations.22 The ruling elite and their family members
businesses - and potential competitors have progressively disappe
there are none. President Teodoro Nguema Obiang states that oi
are a state secret and, 'to protect the government revenue from corr
has placed them in a foreign bank account of which he is th
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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

signatory.23 The president is also the 'chief auditor' of the coun

personally signs off on any government expense over $1900.
The forestry sector is Equatorial Guinea's second foreign exchan
after hydrocarbons and is much less scrutinised than even the oi
despite the grave environmental damage from uncontrolled l
exotic hardwoods.24 The president's son 'Teodorin' (little Te
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; in 2006 he bought his thir
million dollar mansion abroad, in Malibu, California, paying $35 m
cash - presumably from savings from his official salary of $5000 per
Obiang has been aided by American companies, such as Riggs B
Washington, DC, to shuttle millions into offshore accounts. Oil c
payments to his regime were scrutinised by the Securities and E
Commission under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and a U
investigation into Riggs Bank revealed how oil companies pai
to Obiang's family, including nearly $500 000 paid by Amerad
a 14-year-old relative of the president.26 Companies also paid for the
of government officials to study in the United States, and oil money
luxury apartments in Paris, free flights, mansions in Corsica, bu
silence of French and foreign politicians and so protecting the sy
Prospects for better governance and less corruption in Equatori
are near zero.

Gabon - family business

Background. The Gabonese Republic is one of the most

West Africa, and has had only two presidents - Leon M
president in 1960, and his hand-picked successor Om
longest serving leader since 1967, who died in July 2009. W
$5000 in 1996, Gabon is one of the richest countries in Afr
revenue is spent to improve the living standards of average
depended on timber and manganese until oil was discove
early 1970s, and is now called the 'African Emirates
depending heavily on a single export, oil, which now a
GDP. However, the need for diversification is pressing, as o
to drop sharply in a few years.

Governance. As noted earlier, Gabon ranked as a 'partly fre

and, although it has severe restrictions on political rig
liberties, it ranks 20 out of 46 African countries for the qu
management - far better than the other resource-ri
significant is the improvement in public integrity, fr
International score of 3.3 in 2004 to 3.7 in 2008. If these init
followed by more sustained progress, Gabon might
only African country other than Botswana to escape th
Nevertheless, there is a wide gap between statistical w
poverty that shapes the lives of most Gabonese, despit
reliable data on poverty.30
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 HAZEL M MCFERSON

A tiny elite from the late president Bongo's family and cronies r
utilises oil revenues for personal consumption, and patronage is in
nalised in the political system. The best cabinet positions are held b
members, who are among the world's wealthiest individuals. Bon
Ali-Ben Bongo, is the former minister of defence, who succeede
father. Bongo's daughter, Pascaline, became High Personal Represen
the Head of State, October 2009. Ali Bongo's wife, Inge Alia,
appeared on the US reality television show Really Rich Real Estate
for a $25 million mansion in California. As Xan Rice noted: In Gabon,
government and business are one and same. If you want to do business
here, you must know a minister, or at least somebody with the surname
Bongo.'31
Most of the Bongo family wealth is hidden overseas. In the 1990s US
investigators found that more than $100 million had passed through US bank
accounts linked to Bongo, while in France he reportedly received tens of
millions of dollars in kickbacks from the oil company Elf Aquitaine. The
misappropriation of billions of dollars of oil money has negatively affected
the country's development, as reflected in the reality that, nearly 50 years
after independence, Gabon has fewer miles of paved road than of oil
pipelines.
Gabon's business environment is dominated by monopolies, resulting in a
poor Doing Business 2007 overall rank of 144 out of 178 countries. Strangely,
in the licensing of new businesses Gabon ranks fifth in efficiency in Africa.
This is illusory, however. The time required to obtain a business licence in
Gabon is indeed very short, because anyone who is 'connected' can get a
business licence quickly and painlessly, whereas others know better than to
waste time applying for one they will never get.
Overall, as noted, the corruption picture is mixed and not as dim as in the
other resource-rich countries. Although Gabon fares worse in perception of
corruption than a number of other countries in Africa, in the areas of
government effectiveness and rule of law it compares relatively well ('first
family' excepted). Also, while corruption remains high, it is also predictable
thanks to the stability of the system - allowing business and service users to
plan their activities.
Gabon's governance problems include a mainly weak civil society, lack
of transparency in the management of public resources, the low autonomy
of the judiciary, personalisation of institutions and a general climate of
impunity for the well connected. All these features are typical of a
patrimonial resource-rich state. Nonetheless, because the rest of the economy
outside the 'family business' is left more-or-less in peace, the regime has
managed to produce unusual political stability without excessive repression.

Nigeria - phoenix of African hopes

Background. Nigeria's population is roughly estimated at 148 million in 2008. 32

At independence in 1960 Nigeria was the hope of the continent - large,
prosperous, dynamic, with excellent public institutions, competent professionals
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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

and a vibrant civil society. After independence increasing et

regional tensions resulted in a series of military coups, beginning
and culminated in the Biafra civil war of the late 1960s. The subsequen
saw new hopes for good governance and development dashed by milit
and other interferences - only to rise again and be dashed once m
new century has seen some improvement, but still in the midst of un
ethnic and religious tensions. Poverty is still widespread, and in
between rich and poor is extreme. Two-thirds of the country's cit
in poverty, corruption is endemic and in 2006 Nigeria was p
as the third most corrupt country of 102 assessed by Transp
International.33 The economy depends heavily on the oil and gas secto
contribute 99% of export revenues, 85% of government revenues and m
half of GDP.
The People's Democratic Party (pdp) has dominated politics s
return to civilian rule in 1999. Umaaru Yaar'Adua, chosen by
President Olusegun Obsanjo as his successor, was elected president
elections which were condemned by local and foreign observ
widespread vote-rigging. Both the 2003 and 2007 presidential elect
marred by major irregularities and violence. Nevertheless, N
currently experiencing its longest period of civilian rule since indepe
and the elections of April 2007, as badly flawed as they were, marked
civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history.

Governance. As noted earlier, Nigeria is ranked by Freedom House

free'. This is the same designation as 30 years ago. In between, how
country first descended into repression and systematic plunder
successive military governments - touching bottom with the brutal d
ship of Sani Abacha (November 1993-June 1998), and has rec
earlier 'partly free' status only in the past few years.
Nigeria today still has widespread restrictions on political rights
liberties, but less severe than in other resource-rich countries a
improving in certain respects, with an especially active press and fre
expression. In economic regulation Nigeria ranks a relatively good
of 46 African countries - with opening a business, getting c
protecting investors as the most positive aspects, and registering
the worst (ranking last in Africa). Most noteworthy is the redu
corruption that has accompanied a move towards democratic ref
institutions, with a near-doubling of the Transparency Internatio
and a distinct improvement in public integrity rank in the four year
2004 and 2008.
Over the past four decades the issues confronting the Niger Delta region
have caused increasing national and international concern. The region
produces immense oil wealth but the vast revenues have barely touched the
region's own pervasive local poverty. As a recent UN report notes:

Its [the Delta's] rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed methodically into
the international economic system, in exchange for massive revenues that carry

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 HAZEL M McFERSON

the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the Delta it

reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrativ
crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment
deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.34

It is not surprising that conflict has arisen between the local commu
oil companies, along with sabotage of oil refineries by community gr
Until the return to civilian rule nine years ago the levels of corrup
Nigeria were staggering. The Anti-Corruption Commission estim
some $380 billion of oil money was stolen or squandered between
1999. 'It is as if America's leaders had walked off with, say, $50
Simply put, since politics is the quickest route to riches in Niger
crooks go into politics'.36
The complicity of the secretive Swiss banks in malgovernance in A
highlighted in 2000 with the discovery of some $800 million stashed
scores of numbered accounts held by Abacha.37 The total am
embezzled is estimated at $10 billion, most of it from oil reven
dealings with Shell Oil. Accounts were also located in Brazil, Sau
and Lebanon. Huge deposits in the name of Abacha, his family an
have been traced to a dozen banks in Geneva and Zurich, incl
prestigious Credit Suisse and UBS groups. Nigeria appointed
ambassador to locate 'Abacha's money' overseas. It took the coun
years to obtain a repatriation decision from the Swiss authorities
numerous appeals brought by the Abachas, who employed large n
lawyers to block or slow down the case. After a series of negotiation
led to the selection of the World Bank as a bona fide third par
monitoring of recovered assets, repatriation finally took place in
and November 2005 and in early 2006, for a total of $505.5 million, a
Abacha is estimated to have looted between $3 billion and $5 billion over the
five years of his rule.
Nigeria continues to face the daunting task of restructuring the petroleum-
based economy, whose revenues have been squandered through corruption
and mismanagement. In addition, the country continues to experience
periodic outbreaks of long-standing ethnic and religious tensions. President
Yaar'Adua's serious health problems have raised concerns about future
governance in the event of his demise. Thus, the immediate test of 'the new
Nigeria' will be whether the succession can be managed peacefully and in a
relatively democratic manner.

Botswana: the exception that proves the rule and points the way
Background
Botswana exports some $2 billion a year worth of diamonds, nickel, copper,
gold and other minerals - over 80% of its total exports.38 It is the 18th largest
resource exporter among the 161 countries for which data are available, and
ranks highest on resource governance in the region, largely because of sound
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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

institutions and good governance.39 An electoral democracy, the c

Africa's most stable, and is the exception to the repressive and corrup
and political scene characteristic of other mineral-rich countries exam
this article.40 Botswana has long been described as an island of san
ocean of political madness.
Botswana has a presidential system with an elected parliam
Previously known as Bechuanaland, the country became indepen
1966 under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama; he was succeeded
Masire, elected in 1984; then by Festus Mogae, elected in 1998
who in turn gave way to Seretse Khama's son Seretse Khami Ian
elected in April 2008 and re-elected in 2009, for a five-year ter
major parties, and several minor ones, vigorously contest parlia
elections, with a very respectable turnout of about 80%. This
democratic succession and active political participation, unbro
independence, is unique in sub-Saharan Africa (with the possible e
of Senegal and Tanzania). Not accidentally Botswana ranks 63r
108 developing countries in the HDI, and has maintained one of th
highest economic growth rates since independence, with per capi
rising from $80 to close to $7000 in 2008. According to Tran
International, Botswana is the least corrupt country in Africa.
In keeping with its political legitimacy, the government provid
array of basic social services. Public health facilities are distribut
the country, and are now close to providing antiretroviral therap
estimated 100 000 citizens infected with HIV and in need of treatment for
AIDS.41 Five thousand miles of paved and well maintained roads allow
travellers to move effortlessly throughout the large country. Free public
education is provided to all children up to age 13, after which only a small
tuition fee is required.42 Government finances almost the entire cost of the
education of 12 000 students to study at the University of Botswana,
established in 1982. Another 7000 young persons study overseas on full
government scholarships. High quality game parks and wildlife manage-
ment areas cover one-third of the country, generating substantial tourism
revenues.

Governance

As noted earlier, Botswana has been consistently ranked as 'free'; has the
second highest possible rating in terms of political rights and civil liberties;
and is fourth in Africa for regulatory effectiveness. It also has very low
corruption - at levels comparable to those of well managed developed
countries, with a Transparency International score of 5.8 and a world
integrity ranking of 36 - better than such countries as South Korea, Italy,
Hungary, Czech Republic, and many others.43
Botswana is the only country in Africa (along with Mauritius), which has
had substantial political freedom and regular democratic elections since
its independence, over 40 years ago, and has good governance indicators.
Botswana's pride as the least corrupt country in Africa is in evidence
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 HAZEL M MCFERSON

everywhere: A wall poster at the arrivals hall at Gaborone A

reads: 'Botswana has ZERO tolerance for corruption. It is illegal t
or ask for a bribe.'44 Botswana also rates high in terms of all other in
of governance, with strong accountability mechanisms, high
transparency (including in mineral resource revenue), good part
and widespread observance of the rule of law, with a profess
independent judiciary.45
Effective use of mineral revenues has followed a self-discipline fisca
the Sustainable Budget Index (SBl), under which any mineral rev
supposed to finance 'development expenditure', defined as inv
expenditure and recurrent spending on education and health.46 Th
the other resource-rich African countries, Botswana alone has ma
get its people to benefit from the production and export of diam
without any civil conflict or tension, and has developed a prospe
peaceful society. The question remains: why is Botswana such an excep
Africa?

The roots of Botswana exceptionalism

Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson attribute Botswana's political le

good public sector management, and protection of property right
factors:

• inheritance of pre-colonial political institutions;

• limited British colonialism;
• strong and accountable political leadership since independence;
• the political elite's motivation to reinforce institutions.47

The first two are enabling factors, but are hardly sufficient to
coexistence of good governance with resource abundance - as show
fact that several other African countries (notably Nigeria) inherited t
well functioning institutions and local autonomy and yet developed a
of corruption facilitated by resource rents.
More distinctive to Botswana are the latter two factors: political lea
and reinforcement of institutions.
However, there is an even more important fifth factor: the mono-ethnic/
mono-cultural nature of Botswana society - in sharp contrast to the ethnic
pluralism and internal tensions characteristic of most African states as a
result of the artificial colonial boundaries. This fifth dimension rounds out
the picture of why Botswana is the happy exception to the resource curse in
Africa. But, although an exception, Botswana also points the way for African
countries to follow in order to shake off the resource curse: support for
institution building; gradual strengthening of public management (especially
fiscal transparency and accountability organisations); and encouraging the
growth of 'bridging networks' that can partly defuse conflict and manage it
when it arises.

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GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

A concluding word

The history and current realities of the six country cases of

corruption demonstrate clearly the strong tendency for abu
mineral resource revenue to be associated with systemic malgov
This tendency is apparent elsewhere but is most evident and pre
Africa. The main reason is the heavy burden of colonial history
is manifested primarily in the artificial boundaries within w
ethnically plural African societies are constrained, and which en
rise of rapacious elites playing groups off against one another. Y
ever strong, the tendency is only that - a tendency. Abundance o
wealth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for publi
tion. On the one hand, corruption is unfortunately widespread
countries without abundant mineral resources - in Africa and elsewhere.
On the other hand, some resource-rich countries have a record of good
economic performance and high public integrity. In Botswana, as noted, the
export of diamonds has financed rapid development in a context of political
legitimacy and comparatively sound economic management. In South
Africa, too, since 1994 mineral resource revenue has been used for the
benefit of the broader population.
The resource-corruption link has operated in many non- African countries
as well, eg Burma and much of the Middle East - weakening governance in
those countries in much the same manner as in Africa - and in earlier times in
history. For example, a strong argument can be made that the precious
metals extracted by Spain from its South American colonies not only caused
the enslavement and death of millions of Aztecs, Aymarás and Incas, but
led to lax public administration, low domestic savings and investment,
inflation and, in time, irreversible economic decline in Spain itself. Public
corruption and misuse of natural resources are a world-wide phenomenon of
long standing, not a contemporary syndrome and certainly not an African
preserve.

Notes

1 Bob Geldof, 'Corruption', quoted in Bucharest Daily News, 14 July 2006. See also HM McFerson,
'Governance, resources and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa' (under review for publication), which
examines linkages among malgovernance, conflict and resource abundance.
2 A related aspect of the resource curse is Dutch Disease , named alter the Netherlands economic
experiences after the discovery of North Sea oil, ie the harmful effects of the exchange rate appreciation
resulting from a large inflow of revenue from mineral exports. See WM Corden & JP Neary, 'Booming
sector and de-industralisation in a small open economy', The Economic Journal, 92, 1983, pp 825-848.
The exchange rate appreciation makes other exports uncompetitive and imports cheaper, thus harming
domestic production.
3 It is highly questionable, however, whether the high index of freedom of expression in Congo
Brazzaville corresponds to current reality, although this was the case immediately after the 2002 peace
agreements. Cf Freedom House, 'Country Reports', at www.freedomhouse.org.
4 C Tshitereke, 'On the origins of war in Africa', African Security Review, 12 (2), 2003, at http://
www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No2/E3.pdf.
5 A Za vis, 'Angola's coffers missing $4 billion in oil money , Oakland Tribune, 14 January 2004, at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20040114/ai_n9722919/.

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 HAZEL M McFERSON

6 Ν Shaxson, J Neves & F Pacheco, Drivers of Change, Angola: Final Report, January 20
DFID, at httpV/mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/Drivers-of-Change-Angola.doc.
7 Human Rights Watch, "They pushed down the houses" - forced evictions and insecure
for Luanda's urban poor', 15 May 2007, at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/05/14/th
down-houses-0.
8 Τ Hodges, 'The role of resource management in building sustainable peace', 2008, at http://www.c-r.
org/our-work/accord/angola/resource-management.php, 21 July.
9 Global Witness, 'Time for transparency', 2004, at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/
gw-transparencv-24mar.Ddf.
10 According to 'Publish What You Pay'. The Publish What You Pay campaign was launched in 2002
primarily by George Soros, Chairman of the Open Society Institute, and a large group of international
NGOs, to get extractive companies to publish all payments they make to the host government. See
www.publishwhatyoupay.org.
11 Τ Allen-Miles, 'Congo leader's £169 000 hotel bill', 2006.
12 UNICEF, 'Republic of Congo (Brazzaville): core country data', 2008, at unicef.org/Spanish/har08/
filesOS/harOS^Congo^ountrychapter.
13 Quoted in J Donnelly, 'In oil-rich nation, charges of skimming', Bostom.com/news, 2005, at http://
www. boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2005/ ll/25/in_oil_rich_nation_charges_of_skimming/.
The exigencies of survival create entrepreneurial opportunities for a multitude of government 'services'.
This writer can attest to petty corruption, such as travel documents that require official stamps readily
available in the marketplace; medical supplies from state clinics sold in the original packaging on the
open market; on arrival at the airport in Brazzaville, a 'required' yellow fever vaccination certificate
obtained on the spot without vaccination for a $35 'vaccination fee', which the government will never
receive, etc. (What is curious is the surviving remnant of administrative responsibility, shown by the
insistence of the official concerned to provide a duly-stamped and signed official international
certificate of a non-existent vaccination.)
14 JF Clark (ed), The African Stakes of the Congo War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. See also C
Young, 'The heart of the African conflict zone: democratization, ethnicity, civil conflict, and the Great
Lakes crisis', Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 2006, pp 301-328.
1 5 This writer has tried for years to find from a variety of sources and personal accounts the reason
why the UN troops allowed the Interahamwe to cross into Congo with their weapons and
ammunition. Various explanations have been alleged but none with sufficient confirmation. The most
likely reason, as speculative as it is disheartening, is that the troops simply had no instruction to do
otherwise.
16 Cf C Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1965; KNF Emizet, 'Congo (Zaire): corruption, disintegration, and state failure', in
EW Nafziger, F Stewart & R Vayrynen (eds), Weak States and Vulnerable Economies: Humanitarian
Emergencies in the Third World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; and M Wrong, In The
Footsteps of Mr Kurtz, New York: Perennial, 2000. See also Ρ Englebert, 'Pre-colonial institutions,
post-colonial states, and economic development in tropical Africa', Political Research Quarterly, 53 (1),
2000, pp 7-36; and CG Thies, 'The political economy of state building in sub-Saharan Africa', Journal
of Politics, January 2007, at http://vanderbilt.edu/files/hJCd4Q/thies.pdf.
17 Quoted in J Stewart, Stewart's Quotable Africa, London: Penguin Books, 2004.
18 A Vines, 'Oil makes friends of us all', The Economist, 16 July 2009.
19 Β McSherry, 'The political economy of oil in Equatorial Guinea', African Studies Quarterly, 8 (3),
2006, at http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i3a2.htm, accessed 1 April 2008.
20 Peter Maas, Ά touch of crude', Mother Jones, January/February 2005.
21 R Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters, New York: Basic Books, 1990; I.B. Tauris, 1991.
22 Cf Lynn Fredriksson, 'US foreign policy saps human rights improvements in Ethiopia and Equatorial
Guinea', Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, Washington, DC, 2007.
23 Global Witness, 'Equatorial Guinea', 2007, at www.globalwitness.org/media_library_get.php/379/
us_briefing_paper_final.pdf, accessed 22 July 2008.
24 Sarah Wykes of Global Witness reports that 'US$718 million of Equatorial Guinea's oil money is still
held offshore'. 'Equatorial Guinea's leaders accused of pilfering oil revenues', 26 March 2004, at http://
www.afrol.com/articles/22462. According to the IMF, 76% of the country's recurrent expenditures are
still off-budget.
25 D Ljungaeus, 'Malibu bad neighbor', LA News, 18 January 2007, at http://www.laweekly.com/2007-
01-1 8/news/malibu-bad-neighbor/.
26 Maas, Ά touch of crude'.
27 Ν Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

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 GOVERNANCE AND HYPER-CORRUPTION IN RESOURCE-RICH AFRICAN COUNTRIES

28 'Gabon: poverty in a rent-based economy', at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE

TOPICS/EXTPA/O. The harsh living conditions have produced the saying that 'a Gabo
consider himself sick until he has four maladies at once: malaria, filarial, intestinal
tuberculosis'. C Darlington, African Betrayal, 1968, ρ 23, quoted in Stewart, Stewart's Qu
29 L Soderling, Escaping the Curse of Oil? The Case of Gabon, Washington, DC: Internation
Fund, 2002; and Soderling, 'After the oil: challenges ahead in Gabon', Journal of African
15 (1), 2006, pp 117-148.
30 'Gabon: poverty in a rent-based economy', at http^/www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet
Server/WDSP/IB/ 1997/06/27/000009265 27 June.
3 1 X Rice, 'Papa Bongo's 40 years in power: record-breaking rule thanks to oil cash, but c
corruption taint future', Guardian, 5 May 2008, at http:www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008,
32 CNBC, 'Dollars & danger: Africa, the final investing frontier, conflict risks - Niger
www.cnbc.com/id/3 1 0882 13.

33 US Agency for International Development, 'Nigeria', 2006, at http://www. usaid.gov/policy/budget/

cbi2006/afr/n2.html.
34 UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report, 2006, at http://78.136.31.142/en/reports/national
reports/africa/nigeria/name,3368,en.html.
35 In January 2006 the Movement for the Emancipation ol the Niger River Delta (MEND), emerged and
since then has demanded billions in compensation from Shell for polluting the area. A 25% decrease in
oil production has resulted. See 'Nigerian militants claim Shell attack', 5 July 2009, at http://
www.wdtn.com/dpp/news/international/international_ap_nigeria_shell_attack_claim_militant_200907
052200 revi 2608724.
36 R Guest, 'Nigeria's corruption price tag at $380 billion', The Economist, 3 May 2007.
37 Ρ Jacobson & C Lamb, 'Nigerian dictator has £400m in Swiss banks', The Telegraph, 20
Telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtmiïhtmUarchive^OOO/. . Vwswiss30.html. See also the World B
Stolen Asset Recover (StAR) Initiative, at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Star_Report.pdf, acce
July 2009.
3ö A limi, Did Botswana escape trom the resource curse/ , IMF working raper, zuuo, at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2OO6/wpO6138.pdf, accessed 15 July 2008.
39 In 2008 President Festus Mogae received the second Mo Ibrahim Award, worth $5 million dollars over
10 years, and an annual $200 000 dollars plus another $200 000 dollars a year for 10 years towards the
winner's public interest activities and good causes. The award is for achievement in African leadership
for good governance.
40 See JD Holm & PP Molutsi, Democracy in Botswana, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1989.
41 A negative aspect of Botswana society is the high incidence ot HI v/ AIDS, all the more surprising in view
of its extensive health facilities and communication and dissemination on this major health issue and its
prevention.
42 JD Holm, Diamonds and Distorted Development in Botswana, ζυυ/, at http://www.googie.com/
search?q=John+D.+Holm%2C+2007%2C+Diamonds+and+Distorted+Development+in+Botswana.
&rls=com.microsoft:en-us:IE-SearchBox&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&sourceid=ie7&rlz=H7GGLG,
accessed 18 July 2008.
43 However minor, the slight flex from a score of 6.0 in 2004 bears watching. Botswana would not be the
only country in history to slip from good public management and high integrity into inefficiency and
significant corruption. See httpV/www.transparency.org/policy^esearch/nis/regional/by^ountry.
44 Ρ Biles, Botswana: Africa s success story/ , 7 March 2UU!>, at httpv/news.bbc.co.uk/z/low/atnca/
4318777.stm, accessed 1 August 2008.
45 Holm & Molutsi, Democracy in Botswana.
46 This is similar to the 'Golden Rule' of several countries, eg Germany, by which borrowing is permitted
only for investment expenditure, thus requiring a balanced current budget. Indeed, it is more suited to
developing countries, where some current expenditure on priority sectors is just as important as
investment expenditure for development.
47 DS Acemoglu, S Johnson & J Robinson, 'An African success story: Botswana', cepr Discussion Paper
3219, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2002, at httpV/ideas.repec.org/r/fth/harvid/
517a.html.

Notes on Contributor

Hazel M McFerson is Associate Professor of Public and International

Affairs, George Mason University. Prior to joining George Mason University

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