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Authenticity as a eudaimonic construct: The

relationships among authenticity, values, and
valence

Oscar Smallenbroek, John M. Zelenski & Deanna C. Whelan

To cite this article: Oscar Smallenbroek, John M. Zelenski & Deanna C. Whelan (2016):
Authenticity as a eudaimonic construct: The relationships among authenticity, values, and
valence, The Journal of Positive Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/17439760.2016.1187198

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Published online: 18 Jul 2016.

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Download by: [Stephen F Austin State University] Date: 26 July 2016, At: 12:15
 The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2016.1187198

Authenticity as a eudaimonic construct: The relationships among authenticity,

values, and valence
Oscar Smallenbroek1, John M. Zelenski  and Deanna C. Whelan
Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The construct of authenticity is thought of as an expression of individuality and eudaimonic well- Received 20 July 2015
being. Yet, previous research has related state authenticity more to positive affect and pleasant Accepted 31 March 2016
behavior. We examine the extent to which feeling authentic is a reflection of personally held
KEYWORDS
standards of worth (values) and authenticity’s relationship with affective states. We also examine
Downloaded by [Stephen F Austin State University] at 12:15 26 July 2016

State authenticity; trait

whether feelings of authenticity are facilitated by dispositional authenticity. Study 1 had participants authenticity; values;
debate benevolent behavior (N  =  199). In study two (N  =  124) and three (N  =  146), participants eudaimonia; affect
described memories where they acted in concordance or against their values, in both pleasant and
unpleasant contexts. We found a relationship between acting in accordance with one’s values and
experiencing authenticity, thus demonstrating that authenticity is a form of eudaimonic well-being,
which is closely related to, but distinct from, affective states. We found less consistent associations
between dispositional authenticity and momentary authentic feelings.

The idea of authenticity has a long history in western Eudaimonic and hedonic well-being
thought (Harter, 2002) and is viewed as a healthy attribute
Eudaimonia refers to an ethical philosophy in which the,
in contemporary psychology. For example, self-determina-
‘… principle focus is on activity reflecting virtue, excel-
tion theory (SDT) (Kernis & Goldman, 2005) and notions of
lence, the best within us, and the full development of our
self-actualization (Maslow, 1971) and the fully functioning
potentials’ (Huta & Waterman, 2014, p. 1427). Eudaimonia is
person (Rogers, 1961) all include authentic functioning
often juxtaposed with a hedonic philosophy that stresses
as a central idea. Authenticity is a complex concept, but
presence of positive emotions and the absence of neg-
generally understood as acting in accordance with core
ative emotions as relevant criteria for evaluating one’s
aspects of the self. It is also seen as a hallmark of healthy
life. Positive psychologists draw on these philosophical
psychological functioning that contributes to well-being
traditions to conceptualize well-being in different ways
more broadly. Accordingly, research on the relationships
(Ryan & Deci, 2001). Psychologists who take a hedonic
among authenticity and various well-being indicators is
perspective focus on behavior that maximizes positive
extensive (see Schlegel & Hicks, 2011). However, the condi-
affect. They are therefore primarily concerned with the
tions that promote the momentary experience of authen-
outcome of feeling good, and assess people’s strategies
ticity remain understudied (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,
with regard to efficacy in producing this outcome. The
2000). We present research that takes a step forward in
eudaimonic perspective involves a broader view that dis-
clarifying the experience of authenticity as a eudaimonic
tinguishes between healthy and unhealthy patterns of
form of well-being. We explore the idea that authenticity
psychological functioning. The goal is to foster virtuous
is experienced when behavior reflects internal standards
personal growth and development, which, in turn, creates
(values), taking care to distinguish this from mere positive
well-being. This introduces an objective element where
affect or pleasant behavior. We also distinguish between
certain behaviors and functioning are considered con-
authenticity as a momentary experience and authentic-
ducive to personal development; these are distinguished
ity as a more chronic personal characteristic, investigat-
from those intended to maximize pleasant feelings. In con-
ing how these temporally distinct conceptualizations of
temporary psychology, eudaimonia also has a subjective
authenticity are related.

CONTACT  John M. Zelenski  john_zelenski@carleton.ca

1
Social and Political Science Department, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 2    O. Smallenbroek et al.
component, or experiences that accompany the pursuit of
virtue, growth, etc. Authenticity is theorized to be a central
aspect of eudaimonic well-being, describing functioning
that is consistent with core virtues (Huta & Waterman,
2014). Authenticity can be experienced when behaving in
accordance with internal standards and perceptions of the
real or true self (Harter, 2002).
State authenticity and value fulfillment
The contents of authentic experiences are difficult to
define because authentic states are the result of self-en-
dorsed behavior that reflects an individual’s self view,
and are therefore idiosyncratic. Consequently, definitions
of authenticity often include expressing the ‘true self’
(Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Harter, 2002; Lenton, Bruder,
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Slabu, & Sedikides, 2013; Schlegel & Hicks, 2011). In prac-
tice, defining the true self is usually left to the subject;
the reasoning is that authenticity is a state of self-expres-
sion and thus will be recognized by individuals as such.
However, by using subjects’ own implicit definitions of the
true self, psychologists are unable to independently assess
which behaviors are expressions of the true self. In other
words, we have no independent means of assessing the
authenticity of observable behavior. To further complicate
matters, the assumption that a single true self exists and
relates to a specific set of behaviors is suspect (Schlegel
& Hicks, 2011). Thus, measuring these things objectively
presents a significant challenge. For current assessments, it
is more important that individuals perceive their behavior
as autonomous and personally endorsed, and consciously
integrate external and internal influences (Harter, 2002;
Kernis & Goldman, 2005; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis,
& Joseph, 2008).
Although some degree of subjectivity is endemic to the
experience of authenticity, it also seems desirable to test
the links among self-concept, behavior, and authenticity
more directly. Such an approach will help verify that feel-
ings of authenticity are indeed an aspect of eudaimonic
living, and that authenticity is indeed a reflection of valued
aspects of the self. To do this, we need to assess the cri-
teria people use to decide that they are behaving as their
best selves. Previous research has asked participants to
identify behaviors that represent their true self and found
that these behaviors correlate positively with subjective
well-being, self-esteem, and meaning in life (Harter, 2002;
Heppner et al., 2008; Reich, Kessel, & Bernieri, 2012). This
establishes an association between incidences of ‚true self’
behavior and well-being. This research is important and
establishes criterion validity, but leaves open the funda-
mental question: whether or not self-reported authenticity
is in fact a reflection of living in accordance with personally
held beliefs of worth and fulfillment. To bridge this gap, we
draw on the psychological construct of values. Because
they, by definition, define personally valued behaviors,
values permit a more objective way to link aspects of the
self with behavior and experiences of authenticity.
Schwartz and his colleagues have defined human
values as trans-situational goals that are desirable, vary
in importance, and are used as guiding principles in life
(Schwartz et al., 2001). Schwartz and Bardi (2001) identified
ten value types which form a circumplex structure and
which each represent different goals. This value structure
is found across cultures and believed to include all basic
human values. The rank order or priority of each value is a
reflection of one’s needs, culture, internalized social insti-
tutions, and motivations. Schwartz and Bardi (2001) have
found that values relating to interpersonal relationships,
competence, relatedness, and autonomy are endorsed
across countries – there is more consensuses on the pri-
ority of these values than disagreement. However, other
values like conformity, tradition, hedonism, and power
show more individual and cultural differences. Crucial
for our research is that human values are standards by
which individuals evaluate behavior and that they trigger
affective responses. Determining the degree of congru-
ence between an individual’s behavior and values allows
us to assess whether self-rated authenticity is related to
personally held standards of evaluation. Theoretically, val-
ue-congruent behavior is eudaimonic, and it is expected to
produce the experience of authenticity. This proposition,
however, remains untested in the psychological literature.
Empirical research on the predictors of subjective
authenticity
Although the eudaimonic and hedonic conceptions of
well-being emphasize different standards and processes,
they are not mutually exclusive. In fact Waterman (2008)
noted that eudaimonic well-being is often accompanied
by positive affect. Establishing a measure as eudaimonic
is therefore difficult, empirically, as hedonic and eudai-
monic well-being tend to co-occur. Research on authen-
ticity has so far been unable to distinguish authenticity as
eudaimonic, and only established its relation to positive
affect and pleasant behavior. For example, Lenton, Slabu,
Sedikides, and Power (2013) induced feelings of state
authenticity using positive affect inductions (i.e. with
non-self-relevant video clips). If merely happy people feel
state authenticity, it may be a hedonic rather than a eudai-
monic manifestation of well-being.
Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, and Ilardi (1997) consid-
ered personality trait consistency as an operationalization
of self-consistency and theorized that this consistency
could also indicate authenticity. They had students rate
their big five traits and subjective authenticity ‘in general’,

as well as separately for several roles (e.g. as a student or
employee). Personality trait consistency was determined
by correlating each role-trait rating with the correspond-
ing general-trait rating within participants; felt authentic-
ity was examined within roles, and as an average across
them. Results indicated that roles in which participants
expressed conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness,
and extraversion, regardless of general dispositions, felt
(were rated as) more authentic. Employing experience
sampling and more momentary assessments, Fleeson and
Wilt (2010) also found that conscientious, open, agreeable,
and extraverted behaviors were perceived as authentic,
regardless of dispositions in these domains. In other words,
some behaviors seem to promote feelings of authenticity,
but it is not necessary to behave consistently with one’s
trait dispositions to experience authenticity. This is likely
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because the big five domains are not strongly or widely
valued in and of themselves. For example, lazy and intro-
verted people can better accomplish most valued goals
by behaving in ways that are more conscientious and
assertive than is their habit. Such findings are consistent
with theoretical notions of authenticity (if we assume that
one’s dispositions are not highly valued), yet further high-
light a gap in the literature. Subjective authenticity has
not been linked to behavior that comes from personally
valued aspects of the self.
Distinguishing ‘trait authenticity’ and its potential
role as a moderator
To this point, we have considered authenticity primarily as
a short-term experience, a state that accompanies self-rel-
evant behaviors. Drawing on the commonly understood
state-trait distinction, it is also possible to consider ‘trait
authenticity’ as a more long-term personal characteris-
tic. To be clear, our use of the term ‘trait’ in this context
is not intended to imply the heritability, extreme stabil-
ity, or deterministic features sometimes associated with
temperamental dispositions (cf. McCrae & Costa, 1994).
Rather, trait authenticity refers to a relatively chronic fea-
ture of people that is more an individual difference than a
momentary state. One way to understand trait authenticity
would be as the frequent experience of state authentic-
ity. That is, consistent with the density distribution model
(Fleeson, 2001), trait authenticity is merely individual dif-
ferences in average experience over time. However, this
approach is agnostic about the processes that produce
experiences of authenticity, and sidesteps more theoreti-
cally nuanced explanations. Frequent experiences of state
authenticity may describe trait authenticity, but are insuf-
ficient as an explanation.
A deeper understanding of trait authenticity will draw
on internal structures and processes. State authenticity is
The Journal of Positive Psychology   3
understood as the congruence between behavior, internal
processes, and representations of the self. Indeed, peo-
ple commonly associate their true selves with internal
features (thoughts and feelings) more strongly than out-
ward expressions or behaviors (Schlegel & Hicks, 2011).
Trait authenticity should therefore reflect stable patterns
of cognition that allow state authenticity to emerge.
In SDT, trait authenticity is conceptualized as the ability
to express authenticity when the situation permits (Kernis
& Goldman, 2006; Wood et al., 2008). SDT assumes that peo-
ple have a natural tendency towards becoming integrated
parts of a community and towards healthy psychological
functioning. This is motivated through three psychologi-
cal needs: autonomy, relatedness, and competence. These
needs are conceptually related to several human values
that are consistently prioritized (Kasser, 2002). SDT posits
that autonomous self-regulation will lead an individual to
decisions that fulfill their needs, which, in turn, promote
psychological health and happiness (Ryan & Deci, 2011).
Using this framework, Kernis and Goldman (2006) created
a trait measure of authenticity (AI3) which has four com-
ponents: awareness of one’s motivations, feelings, desires,
and self-relevant cognitions, unbiased processing, objectiv-
ity in assessing self-aspects, emotions, experiences, and
knowledge, behaving in accordance to one’s values, and an
open and honest relational orientation. Trait authentic indi-
viduals are conscious of their internal states and outward
behavior in a non-defensive fashion. This enables them
to access self-aspects, such as values, and to assess their
behavior according to these standards. Furthermore, trait
authenticity enables individuals to relate their affective
experiences to their self-conceptions. We build on previ-
ous work by associating the trait authenticity question-
naire with a more novel assessment of state authenticity.
The present research
Past research has linked measures of authenticity with
well-being and idiosyncratic notions of the true self.
However, a gap remains in linking the experience of
authenticity to more verifiable or nomothetic aspects of
the self. Such links are needed to confirm authenticity as
a eudaimonic (vs. purely hedonic) experience. To this end,
we conducted three studies that link values, mood, and
state and trait authenticity. In the first study, participants
were randomly assigned to debate for or against a widely
held value (benevolence) as a manipulation of value-con-
gruent behavior. In the second and third studies, partici-
pants were asked to recall a situation where they behaved
in accordance with a value (benevolence or achievement),
either in a pleasant or an unpleasant atmosphere, and then
rate their state authenticity. Participants were also given
questionnaires to measure their value priorities and trait
 4    O. Smallenbroek et al.
authenticity. This allowed us to compare the effects of
affect and behavior on state authenticity while taking into
account value priorities and trait authenticity. Our specific
hypotheses were:
Hypothesis 1: Because authenticity is a form of eudai-
monic well-being and theoretically related to value ful-
fillment, value congruent behavior will promote feelings
of state authenticity. Furthermore, we expect authen-
tic states to arise even in unpleasant situations if they
are value congruent. This follows from the assumption
that authenticity reflects judgments of valued out-
comes (eudaimonic) rather than merely affective states
(hedonic). This would establish state authenticity as dis-
tinct from hedonism.
Hypothesis 2: We also expect an interaction between
affect and value congruent behavior because hedonic
happiness often results from eudaimonic functioning,
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and previous studies show that positive affect induces
state authenticity (Lenton, Slabu et al., 2013). Value con-
gruence may be more essential to experiencing authen-
ticity in unpleasant circumstances, whereas feeling good
may signal authenticity on its own. (This hypothesis is
relevant to studies 2 and 3 only.)
Hypothesis 3: We hypothesize that people who score
high on trait authenticity will generally experience more
state authenticity.
Hypothesis 4: Qualifying hypothesis 3, we also hypothe-
size an interaction between trait authenticity and exper-
imental conditions. People high in trait authenticity will
be more sensitive to the link between their values and
behavior. That is, they will be more likely to report high
state authenticity when behavior is congruent with val-
ues, and less authenticity for value-incongruent behav-
ior. This is because trait authenticity is the capability of
people to act authentically, and their awareness of how
their behavior compares to their true selves.
Hypothesis 5: The extent to which a value is endorsed is
hypothesized to predict state authenticity with an inter-
active pattern. If a value is important to people, it follows
that their true selves will be closely tied to it, and they
will also be more sensitive to a match or mismatch with
relevant behaviors.
Our hypotheses contrast with a perspective that views
state authenticity as merely an outcome of hedonic pro-
cesses, a position highly plausible given extant research on
this new construct (e.g. Fleeson & Wilt, 2010; Lenton, Slabu
et al., 2013). If the experience of authenticity is merely the
act of claiming a state high in positive affect and posi-
tive behavior as one’s true self, then values should not be
related to authenticity, only positive affect would be.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Canadian students enrolled in first and second year psy-
chology courses were recruited via our department’s
online portal for a study titled ‘A Values Debate’. They
received course extra credit as compensation. Of 267 who
gave informed consent (online), 234 completed most of
the study. Primary analyses were further restricted to 199
(164 female) participants who correctly omitted answers
to at least 2 of 3 requests to ‘leave this item blank’, and
who appeared to generally follow instructions in their
open-ended debate responses. Median age was 20, rang-
ing from 17 to 55. Approximately 65% of participants
identified as Caucasian, with 5–9% selecting one of other
ethnicity descriptors (e.g. African, South Asian, East Asian,
and Arabic).
Materials
Values were assessed with the Portrait Value Questionnaire
(PVQ) developed by Schwartz and Bardi (2001), a brief
version of the earlier Schwartz Value Survey. The PVQ
asks participants to rate how similar they are to 40 brief
descriptions of hypothetical people using a 6-point scale
that ranges from ‘very much like me’ to ‘not like me at all’.
Although otherwise identical, items are phrased with
gendered pronouns that match participants’ genders,
for example ‘It’s very important to him to help the peo-
ple around him. He wants to care for their well-being,’ for
male participants. The PVQ assesses 10 values, and scale
scores are calculated as the mean of standardized item
scores – the relative importance of an item in relation to
all other values within participant. In this study we were
primarily interested in the 4-item benevolence scale, yet
the internal consistency was low (α  =  0.41). Combining
benevolence items with six similar universalism items
to create a broader self-transcendence score improved
alpha somewhat (0.64), and yielded similar results with
regard to hypotheses. Given this pattern, and the fact that
low alphas do not imply poor validity with short scales
(Schmitt, 1996), we used the more theoretically focused
benevolence scale in the analyses reported here.
Trait authenticity was assessed with the Authenticity
Inventory (AI3, Kernis & Goldman, 2006) developed by
drawing on SDT. It assesses people’s perceptions of their
capability to function authentically in contexts that allow
it. There are 45 items rated on a scale from ‘1- strongly dis-
agree’ to ‘5- strongly agree’. Participants are encouraged
to respond truthfully and told that there are no right or
wrong answers. Although the measure can be scored with
four subscales, we used a combined scoring (mean of all
items) to reflect an overall trait authenticity score across
domains (α = 0.88).
State authenticity and effort.  Because no standard state
authenticity scale existed, we used 10-items that were
developed in our lab for another project, and which drew
on items previously used by Fleeson and Wilt (2010). The

items are face valid and ask how authentic participants
feel ‘in the moment’ using questions like ‘I felt like I was
really being me during the last 20 minutes.’ Each item is
rated on a scale from 1, ‘Strongly Disagree,’ to 7, ‘Strongly
Agree,’ and four are reverse coded. Internal consistency for
the authenticity scale was good (α = 0.93). Due in part to
beginnings with another project, our questionnaire has
the authenticity items interspersed with 5 items adapted
from Gallagher, Fleeson, and Hoyle (2011) that assess
effort, for example ‘It took a lot of effort to behave the
way I did,’ (α = 0.81). Although the two scales correlated
strongly and negatively here (r = −0.72), we maintained
separate scoring due to their conceptual independence
(e.g. they may correlate positively in a context that
involves resisting temptation).
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Affect questionnaire.  Participants were asked to rate
how much they felt 28 mood adjectives ‘while you were
arguing your assigned side of the debate,’ using a 1, ‘very
slightly or not at all,’ to 7, ‘extremely or a lot,’ scale. Affect
items were selected to assess the high arousal pleasant
and unpleasant affects (cf. the PANAS, Watson et al., 1988)
as well as to represent other parts of the affect circumplex
(see Larsen & Diener, 1992) and some intuitively relevant
terms (e.g. embarrassed, self-conscious). As an ad hoc
assessment tool, various scorings are possible. For
consistency with the more established measure, we
report two 5-items scales of (aroused) positive affect
(α  =  0.84) and negative affect (α  =  0.83). Alternative
scorings revealed conceptually similar results.
Debate.  To create a situation where participants could
behave contrary to their values (while keeping the
potential for distress low), we developed a simulated
debate task. The debate focused on the value of
benevolence, and a web browser presented participants
with arguments for or against the resolution that, ‘It is
good and right to help and support the people around
you.’ Participants were randomly assigned to the pro or
con side of the debate, and saw only arguments opposing
their assigned position. Because benevolence is generally
valued, we assumed that arguing against it would
produce counter-value behavior. The debate began with
the resolution (above) and proceeded through six more
rounds. In each round a web page displayed an opposing
argument, a blank textbox for the participant’s refutation,
and submission button. For example, participants
arguing for benevolence saw, ‘You should not help and
support the people around you because it is arrogant
to assume that you can ever know what another person
really needs.’ Participants were asked to provide a couple
sentences for each response, and were given unlimited
time to complete their responses. The debate concluded
The Journal of Positive Psychology   5
with one final textbox and instructions to summarize and/
or add new, concluding arguments. Thus, participants
were given a total of eight textboxes to complete.
Debate questionnaire.  We included eight ad hoc items
to assess participants’ perceptions of the debate task. They
were rated on a 7-point scale of agreement and asked
about debate difficulty, effort, and whether participants’
randomly assigned positions matched their true beliefs.
We used three items in the latter category (e.g. ‘I agreed
with all the arguments I made in the debate’) to create a
manipulation check scale such that high scores indicated
agreement with participants’ assigned position (α = 0.93).
Procedure
Participants followed a link to the study, ‘A Values Debate,’
administered online via Qualtrics. After reading a brief
description of the study and participant rights, they pro-
vided informed consent, and then answered a few demo-
graphic questions (age, gender, ethnicity). The gender
response was used to select a male or female version
of the PVQ, which was followed by the trait authenticity
inventory. Next, participants received information about
the simulated values debate. All participants were told the
debate resolution, and that they were randomly assigned
to argue either for or against this position. (This was true.)
They were further informed that the simulated debate
would occur across seven rounds where they would type
responses to arguments presented serially, with an oppor-
tunity to write a concluding statement to sum up their
position. Immediately following submission of their con-
cluding statement, participants were asked to complete
the state authenticity and effort measure, the affect ques-
tionnaire, and a few ad hoc items to assess perceptions
of the debate which included the manipulation check. To
guard against any potential unpleasantness that might
have been caused by the debate task, participants were
given a brief positive mood induction (i.e. guided imagery
about getting a dream job), and reported their affect once
more before receiving debriefing information. The median
time to complete the study was 38 min.
Results
Table 1 reports means and t-test comparisons of key out-
comes across conditions. The experimental manipulation
(arguing for or against benevolence) appears to have
functioned as we intended with participants indicating
much more agreement when randomly assigned to the
pro condition. Our primary hypothesis (H1) was that argu-
ing for benevolence would produce greater feelings of
momentary authenticity. This hypothesis received strong
support. In addition, participants arguing for benevolence
 6    O. Smallenbroek et al.
Table 1. Agreement, authenticity, effort, and mood by condition (Study 1).
DV Argue for benevolence (n = 105) M (SD)
Agreement check 5.93 (1.13)
Authenticity 5.34 (1.05)
Effort 2.84 (1.29)
Positive affect 4.61 (1.24)
Negative affect 2.31 (1.22)
***p < 0.001.
also reported significantly better moods and less effort. All
comparisons produced substantial differences, but state
authenticity was the largest (baring the manipulation
check).
To further establish that the value manipulation influ-
enced authenticity beyond its associations with mood,
we regressed state authenticity on a condition dummy
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variable, positive affect, and negative affect (R2  =  0.61).
Each variable independently predicted authenticity (con-
dition b = 1.86, SE = 0.16, p < 0.01, positive affect b = 0.34,
SE = 0.06, p < 0.01, negative affect b = −0.22, SE = 0.05,
p < 0.01). Behaving in a value congruent way seemed to
cause feelings of authenticity, beyond the effects of mood.
We also predicted that the effect of arguing for or
against benevolence might further depend on individ-
ual differences in the importance of that value (H5). To
test this we centered benevolence scores, created a cross
product (interaction) term, and entered these and a con-
dition dummy variable in a linear regression predicting
state authenticity (final R2 = 0.51). Condition had a signifi-
cant effect (b = 2.25, SE = 0.16, p < 0.01; cf. the t-test), but
benevolence did not (b = 0.10, SE = 0.13, p = 0.43) until
we added the interaction term, which was significant
(ΔR2 = 0.023, b = 0.76, SE = 0.25, p = 0.003). Simple slopes
analysis revealed a pattern consistent with predictions.
When arguing for benevolence, the value score was posi-
tively associated with state authenticity (b = 0.43, SE = 0.16,
p  =  0.009), whereas when arguing against, high benev-
olence scores were (marginally significantly) negatively
associated with state authenticity (b = −0.33, SE = 0.19,
p = 0.08). Thus, it appears that value-congruent behavior
predicts state authenticity when examined from both an
individual differences perspective, as well as a more uni-
versal perspective (i.e. the condition difference).
We also predicted that people who report disposition-
ally high authenticity are likely to feel more authentic (H3)
and are sensitive to whether or not their behavior is value
congruent (H4). We tested this with regression, includ-
ing a condition x trait authenticity interaction term (final
R2 = 0.52). Both condition (b = 2.32, SE = 0.16, p = 0.001)
and trait authenticity (b = 0.61, SE = 0.19, p < 0.001) had
significant effects, but the interaction term was only mar-
ginally significant (ΔR2 = 0.007, b = 0.62, SE = 0.38, p = 0.10).
Nonetheless, simple slopes analyses were consistent with
predictions such that when arguing for benevolence, the
Argue against benevolence (n = 94) M (SD) t d
2.57 (1.67) 16.80*** 2.36
3.09 (1.25) 13.76*** 1.95
4.25 (1.26) 7.75*** 1.11
3.96 (1.43) 3.44*** 0.49
3.13 (1.51) 4.26*** 0.60
trait authenticity score was positively associated with state
authenticity (b = 0.87, SE = 0.25, p = 0.001), whereas when
arguing against, trait authenticity scores were weakly asso-
ciated with state authenticity (b = 0.25, SE = 0.29, p = 0.38).
Although the full pattern is not statistically significant, trait
authenticity appears to predict state authenticity more
when behavior is indeed authentic with regard to the value
of benevolence.
Discussion
This study supports our main hypothesis that state authen-
ticity is experienced when behaving according to one’s
values. Second, the link between affect and authenticity
is in line with previous findings. State authenticity co-­
occurred with high positive affect and low negative affect.
This study also supports the conceptual link between trait
and state authenticity. Trait authenticity appears to enable
participants to feel authentic, especially when behaving
in accordance with their values.
Study 2: Benevolence recall study
Study 2 extends our findings with regard to state
authenticity’s relationship with value priorities and trait
authenticity by asking participants to recall instances of
value-­congruent or value-incongruent behavior (manip-
ulated between subjects). It also addresses the covaria-
tion between state authenticity and positive affect by
dissociating pleasantness and value-congruence. That is,
­participants recalled two experiences, one pleasant and
one unpleasant, and reported on state authenticity and
mood for each. This tests our argument that state authen-
ticity is separate from positive affect, and therefore hedon-
ism, by demonstrating that participants can feel state
authentic while experiencing negative affect.
Method
Participants
All participants were recruited online through the uni-
versity’s research website and rewarded with 0.5% extra
credit. The experiment required participants to describe
a situation from memory; some described inappropriate
situations or left the textbox blank. Of the 208 participants,

Table 2. Mean (standard deviation) affect and authenticity by experimental condition (Study 2).
Experimental condition
Congruent (n = 70) Pleasant atmosphere
Unpleasant atmosphere
Incongruent (n = 54) Pleasant atmosphere
Unpleasant atmosphere
53 did not fill in a state authenticity score, 12 participants
were excluded for otherwise not following directions, and
19 participants spent less than 60 s on a questionnaire.
This left 124 participants for analysis. The majority of par-
ticipants were female (99) and identified as Caucasian
(72.6%), between 0.8 and 7.3% of the sample identified
with other ethnicities (e.g. African, South Asian, East Asian,
and Arabic). Age ranged between 18 and 48, the median
age was 19.
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Materials
This study used the PVQ (benevolence  =  0.62), AI3
(α = 0.76), affect (positive α = 0.71–0.82, negative α = 0.69–
0.74) and state authenticity questionnaires (α = 0.75–0.88)
used in study 1. Unlike study 1, we asked participants to
recall situations from their past and self-report on their
experience.
Four recall questions were included in this study.
Participants were randomly assigned (between subjects)
to recall contexts where their behavior fulfilled their values
(value congruent) or contexts where their behavior went
against their values (value incongruent). All participants
were asked to recall two instances, one that occurred in
a pleasant atmosphere, and another in an unpleasant
atmosphere. (Valence is manipulated within-subject.) The
value used was benevolence, and the order of the pleasant
versus unpleasant atmosphere was counterbalanced. The
two value congruent contexts were: ‘describe a time where
you were able to care for a friend or family member in a
pleasant atmosphere,’ and ‘describe a time where you were
able to care for a friend or family member in an unpleas-
ant atmosphere.’ The two incongruent questions were:
‘describe a time where you think you should have helped
a close other in a pleasant atmosphere, but did not,’ and
‘describe a time where you think you should have helped
a close other in an unpleasant atmosphere, but did not.’
Participants were asked to take three minutes to recall a
relevant memory, and then to type a detailed description.
An answer was coded as satisfactory when the participant
demonstrated that the person in need was close to them
and that the atmosphere was as requested.
Procedure
Participants started with demographic questions (age,
sex, gender, nationality), followed by the PVQ (Schwartz
& Bardi, 2001) and the AI3 (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). The
The Journal of Positive Psychology   7
State authenticity Positive affect Negative affect
5.52 (0.94) 5.15 (1.20) 2.36 (1.19)
5.08 (1.20) 3.83 (1.27) 3.82 (1.30)
4.34 (1.00) 3.22 (1.44) 3.35 (1.47)
4.33 (1.01) 2.95 (1.31) 4.00 (1.36)
context questions followed these questionnaires. Qualtrics
randomly assigned participants to the congruent or incon-
gruent condition. The state authenticity questionnaire
and affect scales followed each context question. One
item was added to this questionnaire, ‘leave blank,’ to
safeguard against random responding. The study closed
with a mood induction to counter any adverse effects of
recalling unpleasant situations.
Results
We ran three repeated measure ANOVAs using the atmos-
phere condition as within-subjects variable and congru-
ence condition as between subjects variable. The outcome
variables for the ANOVAs were positive affect, negative
affect, and state authenticity. Regression analysis was
employed to determine if trait authenticity and value
(benevolence) endorsement predicted state authenticity.
The analysis of self-reported affect showed that the
congruence and atmosphere manipulations had an effect
on positive affect (see Table 2). The pleasant atmosphere
condition was successful in its manipulation: participants
reported more positive affect in the pleasant atmosphere
(M = 4.31, SD = 1.36) than in the unpleasant atmosphere
condition (M = 3.44, SD = 1.36), F(1, 122) = 36.80, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.23. Furthermore, consistent with hints from previ-
ous research (e.g. Lenton, Slabu et al., 2013), the value-­
congruent behavior conditions were higher in positive
affect (M = 4.49, SD = 1.04) than the incongruent conditions
(M = 3.09, SD = 1.11), F(1, 122) = 54.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.31.
A similar pattern was found for self-reported negative
affect. Participants reported feeling more negative affect
in the unpleasant atmosphere conditions (M  =  3.88,
SD  =  1.32) than the pleasant atmosphere conditions
(M = 2.78, SD = 1.40), F(1, 122) = 51.76, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.30.
Participants reported feeling more negative affect in the
incongruent conditions (M = 3.65, SD = 1.41) than the con-
gruent conditions (M = 3.09, SD = 1.24), F(1, 122) = 8.91,
p = 0.003, η2 = 0.07. Overall, the atmosphere manipula-
tions were effective in inducing the positive or negative
affect, while the congruence manipulation also induced
the expected positive and negative affect.
To address our key hypothesis (H1), we tested the
effects of atmosphere and behavior condition on the
state authenticity participants reported. The main effect
for value congruent versus incongruent behavior on state
 8    O. Smallenbroek et al.

authenticity was significant, F(1, 122) = 38.03, p  <  0.001,
η2  =  0.24. As expected, participants in the congruent
behavior condition had a higher state authenticity score
(M = 5.30, SD = 0.87) than those in the incongruent behav-
ior condition (M = 4.34, SD = 0.87). This finding supports
our central hypothesis that value congruent behavior
promotes feelings of state authenticity. There was also a
significant, but much smaller, main effect for atmosphere
condition, F(1, 122) = 4.22, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.03. Participants
in the pleasant atmosphere (M = 5.00, SD = 1.13) felt more
state authentic than those in the unpleasant atmosphere
(M = 4.76, SD = 1.18). The interaction between behavior
and atmosphere condition was also significant, F(1, 122)
= 3.78, p  =  0.05, η2 = 0.03. Participants who behaved in
benevolent ways felt more state authentic, but a pleasant
atmosphere promoted state authenticity even further (H2).
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increased feelings of state authenticity in the congruent
behavior condition (b = 0.48, p < 0.001), but had no signifi-
cant effect in the incongruent behavior condition (b = −0.07,
p = 0.63). In the pleasant atmosphere conditions, the trait
authenticity score did not predict state authenticity signifi-
cantly. The interaction between the behavior condition and
trait authenticity was only marginally significant. In sum, the
hypothesis that trait authenticity enables state authenticity
is supported (H3), but only in unpleasant circumstances. The
expected interaction effect between trait authenticity and
condition was found (H4), and indicates a significant link
only in the congruent behavior condition.
Finally, we hypothesized that, because authenticity is
the fulfillment of one’s core self, individual differences in
value priorities would predict levels of state authenticity
(H5). The regression table below suggests that values do

Nonetheless, the pattern still supports our hypothesis that
participants would feel state authentic even in unpleasant,
but value congruent, situations.
Regression analysis showed partial support for the
hypothesized relationship between trait authenticity and
state authenticity: that higher trait authenticity enables par-
ticipants to feel state authentic (H3). Each atmosphere con-
dition was regressed separately because the atmosphere
manipulation was within-subjects. In the unpleasant atmos-
phere condition, trait authenticity positively predicted
state authenticity; the interaction term with the behavior
condition was also significant (see Table 3). Analyzing the
interaction with simple slopes showed that trait authenticity
play a role in state authenticity. In the pleasant atmosphere
conditions, the benevolence scores and behavior condi-
tion predict state authenticity. Higher benevolence scores
and value congruent behavior made participants feel more
authentic. However, the interaction term with the behavior
condition was not significant.
In the unpleasant atmospheres, only the behavior con-
dition was a significant predictor; the benevolence scores
were not. However, the interaction was significant (see
Table 4). Simple slopes analysis showed different signed,
but not individually significant, slopes. The slopes are in
the directions predicted; the more participants endorsed
benevolence the more state authentic they felt in the

Table 3.  Regression of behavior condition, trait authenticity and their interaction on state authenticity in pleasant and unpleasant
atmospheres (Study 2).
Pleasant atmosphere Unpleasant atmosphere
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictors B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 5.22 1.15 4.66 1.56 2.10 1.31 −1.18 1.72
Behaviour condition (ref. value congruent) −1.18* 0.18 0.07 2.32 −0.79*** 0.20 6.41* 2.56
Trait authenticity 0.09 0.35 0.26 0.47 0.90* 0.39 1.89*** 0.52
Trait authenticity × behaviour −0.37† 0.70 −2.17*** 0.77
R2 0.27 0.27 0.14 0.19
N 124 124

p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.

†

Table 4. Regression of behavior condition, benevolence and their interaction on state authenticity in pleasant and unpleasant atmos-
pheres (Study 2).
Pleasant atmosphere Unpleasant atmosphere
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictors B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 5.46 0.13 5.37 0.14 5.05 0.16 4.92 0.17
Behaviour condition (ref. value congruent) −1.17* 0.18 −0.96 0.22 −0.75*** 0.20 −0.44 0.25
Benevolence 0.11* 0.14 0.28* 0.17 0.07 0.16 0.33 0.20
Benevolence × behaviour −0.44 0.28 −0.66* 0.32
R2 0.27 0.29 0.10 0.13
N 124 124

*p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
 The Journal of Positive Psychology   9

Table 5. Mean (standard deviation) affect and authenticity by experimental condition (Study 3).
Experimental condition State authenticity Positive affect Negative affect
Congruent (n = 75) Pleasant atmosphere 5.67 (0.76) 5.73 (0.87) 2.15 (0.83)
Unpleasant atmosphere 4.47 (1.24) 4.01 (1.31) 4.19 (1.46)
Incongruent (n = 71) Pleasant atmosphere 4.64 (0.94) 4.15 (1.62) 3.88 (1.48)
Unpleasant atmosphere 4.21 (1.02) 3.15 (1.46) 4.67 (1.34)

Table 6.  Regression of behavior condition, trait authenticity and their interaction on state authenticity in pleasant and unpleasant
atmospheres (Study 3).
Pleasant atmosphere Unpleasant atmosphere
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictors B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 3.83 0.67 2.67 0.99 3.58 0.92 2.57 1.35
Behaviour condition (ref. value congruent) −0.99*** 0.14 1.12 1.32 0.26 0.27 0.56 0.39
Trait authenticity 0.53** 0.19 0.88** 0.29 −0.24 0.19 1.60 1.82
Trait authenticity × behaviour condition −0.63 0.39 −0.54 0.53
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R2 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.23

N 146 146

**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 7. Regression of behavior condition, achievement value and their interaction on state authenticity in pleasant and unpleasant
atmospheres (Study 3).
Pleasant atmosphere Unpleasant atmosphere
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictors B SE B SE B SE B SE
Intercept 5.66 0.10 5.67 0.11 4.51 0.14 4.56 0.14
Behaviour condition (ref. value congruent) −1.02*** 0.14 −1.04*** 0.15 −0.27 0.19 −0.34† 0.20
Achievement 0.03 0.11 −0.04 0.16 −0.16 0.15 −0.34 0.21
Achievement × behaviour condition 0.07 0.22 0.35 0.29
R2 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.01
N 146 146

p <  0.10, ***p < 0.001.

†

congruent condition (b  =  0.21, p  =  0.11) and less state
authentic in the incongruent condition (b = −0.21, p = 19).
Discussion
This study sought to dissociate pleasant contexts from
value-congruent behaviors. Although state authenticity
and pleasantness are expected to co-vary across con-
texts, it should be possible to experience relatively high
levels of authenticity even in unpleasant contexts, if
those situations also include behavior that is consistent
with one’s values. The results of study 2 support this idea.
Moreover, we tested individual differences as moderators
of these links, hypothesizing again that the link between
value-­congruent behavior and state authenticity would
be stronger for people who endorse the value more
strongly and those who score high in trait authenticity.
Although there was some variation across contexts and
not all ­predicted interactions were statistically significant,
the ­pattern of results was generally consistent with this
thinking.
Study 3: Achievement recall study
Study 3 extends our tests of these ideas to the value of
achievement. The methods and hypotheses were the same
as Study 2, excepting the value change.
Method
Participants
All 237 participants were recruited online through the
university’s research website during the summer semester
and rewarded 0.5% extra credit. Fifty-six participants were
excluded for missing data. Thirty participants spent less
than 60 s on a questionnaire, and five participants failed
to follow instructions. Of the remaining 146 participants,
the majority were female (106), the median age was 19
and ranged from 18 to 44. Most identified as Caucasian
(63.7%) while other ethnicities (e.g. African, South Asian,
East Asian, Arabic) comprised between 6.8 and 7.5% of
the sample.
 10    O. Smallenbroek et al.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to the benevo-
lence recall study except that the context questions ask for
an ‘achievement’ context. The alphas for the achievement
value (α = 0.80) and the AI3 (α = 0.87) were satisfactory. The
Cronbach’s alphas for the affect scales ranged from 0.78 to
0.90. The only alpha outside this range was the negative
affect scale in the value congruent pleasant atmosphere
condition (α = 0.57). The Cronbach’s alphas for the state
authenticity scale ranged from 0.71 to 0.86.
The value congruent context instructions now read,
‘Describe a time when you demonstrated your abilities in
a context that generally is pleasant’ and ‘Describe a time
when you demonstrated your abilities in a context that
generally is unpleasant.’ The value incongruent contexts
were ‘Describe a time you did not meet your ambitions in
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a context that generally is pleasant’ and ‘Describe a time
you did not meet your ambitions in a context that gener-
ally is unpleasant.’
Results
Given the similarity with study 2, our analytical approach
was the same, and this study conceptually replicated many
of the previous study’s results. The behavior and atmos-
phere manipulations had the same effects on positive
affect, negative affect, and state authenticity as tested by
ANOVAs (see means in Table 5). However, the trait authen-
ticity and achievement value did not significantly moder-
ate state authenticity felt in the recalled situations in the
regression analyses. Moreover, attempts at interpreting the
non-significant interactions often did not reveal a cohesive
or supportive pattern.
Testing the congruence and atmosphere manipulations
with an ANOVA showed they had an effect on positive
affect; the interaction was also significant. The pleasant
atmosphere conditions reported more positive affect
(M  =  4.96, SD  =  1.52) than the unpleasant atmosphere
(M = 3.60, SD = 1.44) conditions, F(1, 144) = 96.54, p < 0.001,
η2  =  0.40, and the congruent conditions were higher in
positive affect (M  =  4.87, SD  =  0.81) than the incongru-
ent condition (M  =  3.65, SD  =  1.24), F(1, 144) = 50.22,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26. The difference in positive affect was
smaller between congruent and incongruent pleasant
atmosphere conditions (0.62) than the difference between
congruent and incongruent unpleasant atmosphere con-
ditions (0.84), F(1, 144) = 6.91, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.05.
Participants also reported significantly less nega-
tive affect in the pleasant atmosphere and congru-
ent conditions. The pleasant atmosphere conditions
reported less negative affect (M  =  2.99, SD  =  1.47)
than the unpleasant atmosphere conditions (M  =  4.42,
SD = 1.42), F(1, 144) = 139.32, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.49, while the
congruent conditions (M = 3.17, SD = 0.95) were lower in
negative affect than the incongruent conditions (M = 4.27,
SD = 1.21), F(1, 144) = 37.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21. The inter-
action term between atmosphere and congruence condi-
tion was significant. The difference in negative affect was
greater between the congruent and incongruent pleasant
atmosphere conditions (1.73) than the difference between
congruent and incongruent unpleasant atmosphere con-
ditions (0.46), F(1, 144) = 28.11, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.16.
An ANOVA with state authenticity as the dependent
variable showed that the congruence and atmosphere
manipulations had the expected effects. Participants
in the congruent behavior condition felt more authen-
tic (M  =  5.07, SD  =  0.76) than those in the incongruent
behavior condition (M = 4.43, SD = 0.79), F(1, 144) = 25.06,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15 (H1). Participants in the pleasant con-
ditions felt more authentic (M = 5.17, SD = 0.99) than those
in the unpleasant conditions (M  =  4.35, SD  =  1.14), F(1,
144) = 58.27, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.29. There was also a signifi-
cant interaction effect, F(1, 144) = 13.05, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.08
(H2), the difference in state authenticity between congru-
ent and incongruent conditions was larger in the pleasant
atmosphere conditions (1.03) than the unpleasant atmos-
phere conditions (0.26).
The regression analyses testing whether achievement
value (H5) or trait authenticity (H3) moderated state
authenticity were less supportive of our hypotheses;
interactions were generally not significant (see Table 6 and
Table 7). Value endorsement did not predict state authen-
ticity in any condition. Trait authenticity and behavior con-
dition were both significant in the pleasant atmosphere.
Participants with higher trait authenticity experienced
more state authenticity, and those in the incongruent
behavior condition felt less state authentic.
General discussion
In the three studies presented here, we test the idea that
state authenticity is a form of eudaimonic well-being, and
results generally supported this view. When behaving in
accordance with one’s values, state authenticity was expe-
rienced, thus validating theoretical links with eudaimo-
nia in ways that previous research has not. Second, our
results suggest that state authenticity is distinct from, yet
closely related to, positive and negative affect. Third, we
also found evidence that trait authenticity, which can be
interpreted as a form of self-insight, is associated with par-
ticipants’ feelings of momentary authenticity.
All three studies show that state authenticity is elicited
when people behave in accordance with their values (H1).
The comparisons across experimental conditions provide
consistent evidence for this hypothesis. Study 1 showed
that arguing for benevolence increased state authenticity,

and arguing against benevolence decreased state authen-
ticity. Study 2 showed that participants, who were asked to
recall a memory where they helped others, felt more state
authentic. These results were conceptually replicated when
participants recalled a situation where they accomplished
a goal in study 3. Interestingly, because these results rest
on main effects, this part of the true self seems to be a
shared feature across people. This is perfectly consistent
with the notion of values as constructs that are univer-
sally positive (‘valued’), but it may contrast with intuitions
that experiencing the true self is an idiosyncratic process
(Schlegel & Hicks, 2011). Most participants feel authentic
when expressing benevolence. State authentic behavior
does not need to be idiosyncratic, and finding it need not
rely on an individual differences approach (cf. Fleeson &
Wilt, 2010).
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The relationship between affect and authenticity also
comes out clearly in these studies. The ANOVAs of stud-
ies 2 and 3 show that participants who behaved value-
congruently reported more positive, and less negative,
affect. However affect also seems to influence levels of
state authenticity. The pleasant atmospheres promoted
state authenticity, and unpleasant atmospheres reduced
state authenticity (H2), replicating Lenton, Slabu et al.’s
(2013) findings. It seems clear that state authenticity has
multiple causes; value-congruence, pleasant affect, and
circumstances are all important. In daily life, authenticity
and positive affect often co-occur and interact. This may
explain some of the lay theories that emphasize mental
states over behavior, or equate happiness with healthy liv-
ing. Nonetheless, these two are separable as the significant
main effects of atmosphere and behavior condition show.
Thus, although affect induces authenticity, data support
our hypothesis that authenticity is not only hedonism.
Value-congruent behavior induces state authenticity even
in unpleasant situations.
In our studies we also found some suggestive individual
differences, but the regression results were more ambig-
uous than the main effects. We found that participants
who endorsed benevolence as particularly important felt
more authentic when arguing for benevolence (study
1) and when recalling benevolent behavior (in study 2,
but only significant in the unpleasant atmosphere). Said
another way, feelings of state authenticity may not arise
for people who do not value benevolence strongly. Such
findings are consistent with the idea that acting according
to values promotes authenticity (H5). However results in
study 3 failed to support this hypothesis in terms of indi-
vidual differences in the achievement value. These results
might be attributed to a few possibilities. First, it is possible
that not all value fulfilling behavior strongly induces state
authenticity. The behavior component of trait authenticity
includes acting in accordance with intrinsic motivations
The Journal of Positive Psychology   11
which fulfil psychological needs (Goldman & Kernis, 2002;
Kernis & Goldman, 2006), however, some values reflect
externally motivated behavior (Kasser, 2002). Acting
benevolently fulfills the need to belong and – when inter-
nalized as a value – will induce state authenticity. In study
3 we asked participants to describe achievements. Some
participants described dealing with difficult customers at
their jobs. Although this behavior is an achievement, it
may be motived by extrinsic rewards and therefore is not
self-determined behavior and does not fulfill psychological
needs. Second, the achievement value was ranked fourth
or fifth in priority, on average in our samples, whereas
benevolence was ranked second in both samples. This indi-
cates that participants do not identify as closely with the
achievement value as they do with benevolence. Although
this might speak more to the weaker main effects in study
3, perhaps it also obscured interactions. Third, finding a
clear relationship between a trait and a single state can be
difficult. Perhaps future research will find such an associa-
tion for achievement; aggregating across multiple relevant
situations is likely to increase the chances of detecting the
effect if it exists.
We found some evidence for an association between
trait authenticity and state authenticity. Because our exper-
imental designs asked people to consider value-congruent
and value-incongruent behavior, the simple correlation (or
regression coefficient) between state and trait authentic-
ity is less informative than the interaction between trait
authenticity and congruence condition. We reasoned that
trait authenticity can boost state authenticity through
self-insight, i.e. that people are performing as their true-
selves (H3), and that this occurs with value-congruent
behavior more than value incongruent behavior (H4). Our
ideas were partly supported by the data. In study 1 there
was a main effect of trait authenticity and an interaction
effect with the experimental condition (although this was
marginally significant). In study 2, trait authenticity inter-
acted with behavior condition this way to predict state
authenticity in unpleasant atmosphere condition. In study
3, trait authenticity predicted state authenticity in the
pleasant atmosphere conditions but not the unpleasant
atmosphere conditions. Thus, we found limited evidence
that trait authenticity increases state authenticity. A pos-
sible cause is a misspecification in our conceptual model.
Trait authenticity may promote state authenticity by pro-
viding accurate affective feedback to situations and behav-
ior instead of directly contributing to state authenticity.
As with all research, our studies had some limitations
that must be considered when interpreting results. For
example, we are not able to draw definitive conclusions
about valence and value-congruence in studies 2 and
3 because the data is retrospective and cross-sectional.
Reports show how participants believe they experienced
 12    O. Smallenbroek et al.
the situations, and this may differ from what they actually
experienced. Fleeson and Wilt (2010), showed there is a
discrepancy between retrospective and experience sam-
pling data when measuring the relationship between big
five traits and authenticity. Study 1 partially addresses this
issue by asking participants to participate in a debate and
immediately report their states. Results were similar across
all three studies, supporting the hypothesis that there is
a relationship between authenticity and value congruent
behavior. This indicates that participants are able to judge
how their values and behavior influence state authentic-
ity, but future work might consider crossing momentarily
value-congruent behavior with pleasant versus unpleasant
circumstances.
The second limitation of these studies is the sam-
ples. The university participants are not fully developed.
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During the ages of 18–25 identity formation is ongoing.
Participants are struggling with ideological and normative
issues which can create ambiguous attachments to their
value priorities. This does not negate the validity of the
results as much as warrant a cautious note that the pat-
terns of association may be different in older populations.
With a stable identity and value priorities, the relationship
between value priorities and authenticity may strengthen.
A third limitation of the studies is the large number of
participants who were excluded. In studies 2 and 3, par-
ticipants often did not write down their memories despite
completing the questionnaires. These participants were
excluded because we could not verify they recalled an
appropriate situation. Second, these studies seemed to
require more time and concentration than many partic-
ipants were willing to devote online. Several participants
logged into the study two or three times, or stopped after
completing one recall prompt. This may be attributable
to the nature of the study. Introspection and deciding on
value priorities are potentially difficult and draining activi-
ties. There is also a difference in the dropout rates between
the behavior conditions in studies 2 and 3. Participants
seemed to struggle recalling incongruent behavior. This
may indicate a third variable problem1 or reflect selective
memory when it comes to remembering ‘inauthentic’
behavior.
Overall, we found encouraging results suggesting that
state authenticity is more than endorsing positive affec-
tive states as the true self. On the other hand, it is clear
that state authenticity and positive affect co-occur and
interact with each other. For participants, these conflicting
feelings may lead them to report varying levels of state
authenticity in ambiguous situations, such as in unpleas-
ant atmospheres. This also makes it difficult to gauge the
potential for authenticity to distinctly promote well-­being
because its relationship to experiencing meaning and
well-being is confounded with contextual affective states.
The current research reduces this ambiguity by showing
that authenticity can arise from meeting trans-situational
and personally meaningful goals. Nevertheless, the precise
relationship between positive affect and state authentic-
ity should be explored further, especially in relation to
trait authenticity and its cognitive mechanisms. This will
broaden our understanding of the true self and its psy-
chological functions.
Note
1. 
No significant differences were found between behavior
conditions in trait authenticity or value priorities.
Acknowledgements
We thank Renée Pelletier for assistance in creating the value
debate and data collection, and Zack van Allen for coding and
compiling data in study 1. All research was carried out by Oscar
Smallenbroek and Renée Pelletier in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the B.A. Honours program in Psychology at
Carleton University.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada [grant number 410-2009-1004].
ORCID
John M. Zelenski   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3668-5764
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