Fatal Hyperbaric Treatment Explosion Investigation Incorporating
Engineering Simulations with Verification & Validation
Presentation D8
Eng. & Applied Sci.
A kick, a fire, an explosion
A horse was undergoing hyperbaric therapy
to accelerate healing. It had been in the
chamber before without incident. The horse
was shod with steel shoes and had been
rubbed down with a liniment (added fuel).
The horse became upset and started kicking.
It knocked over an equipment item and
exposed uncoated metal. Sparks started a
fire, and after a short time 2 explosions
detonated. Technician and horse died.
Key aspects
•Initial due diligence is examining the
system for compliance with applicable
codes. This establishes a baseline. [1,2]
•PVHO chambers have a long, established
history for safety despite having people in
confined space in hazardous conditions.[3]
•Compliance with code, in and of itself, does
not establish whether the design was
defective nor establishes failure modes. The
engineer needs to look beyond the letter of
the code. [4]
•Engineering methods rely on established
data more than the Scientific Method [5]
Engineering Issues
Design Code: ASME Pressure Vessels for
Human Occupancy (PVHO-1), which refers to
Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, NFPA 99, etc.
Enhanced oxygen and pressure creates
atypical combustion rates. Significant
research occurred following Apollo program
fire and was used in this project.
A key forensic question was regarding
liability. What contribution was design vs
maintenance vs operations?
PVHO code assumes human as patients.
Were any assumptions regarding the various
codes not accounted for when applying to
large animals?
Bart Kemper, BSME, PE
Kemper Engineering Services
Fatalities: Whose fault?
Florida hyperbaric facility for
horses. The horse started kicking,
starting a fire. Chamber exploded,
killing the technician and horse.
CODE REVIEW: The pressure vessel structure was
properly designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Section VIII (Div. 1). The PVHO rules were properly
applied. The size of the door, wall coating, and bottom
head design were for horses and outside of either code.
x
VERIFICATION & VALIDATION: V&V procedures included
using verified software based on meeting benchmarks.
The validation was through a combination of conventional
calculations and progressive increase in mesh resolution
to achieve required solution convergence.
CFD: The simulation modeled an approximate shape of a
downed horse and the heat of enhanced hair and skin
combustion to assess if fire alone could have raised
internal temperatures as quick as reported. The results
and literature [8, 9] indicated it could
not have, therefore the explosion
occurred prior to breaching
the pressure boundary.
FEA: A series of FEA models
with increasing mesh density and detail were developed. A
one-quarter model (shown) examined the stress of the
head/shell interface and the doorway/shell interface. The
nonlinear analysis indicated plastic failure at about 3x max
allowable pressure, which is consistent with the design code.
AAFS 2021
Abstract 211476
Verification and Validation
V&V procedures for engineering simulations
are comparable to Design of Experiment
procedures for experiments.
Verification is addressed in this project by
using Solidworks Professional, with Finite
Element Analysis and Computational packages
passing industry benchmarks. [6, 7]
Validation is done by using model & mesh
checks, conventional, and established
literature to independently check simulation
results. [6, 7]
Conclusions / Recommendations
The CFD results showed heat generated by the
fire was insufficient to overpressure the
chamber in the manner observed or calculated
using FEA. Hair and skin takes longer than the
reported incident to generate heat, even
considering enhanced oxygen. [8, 9]
Operations specify horses to be unshod. No
standard protocols in place. Allowing a shod
horse was operator error.
Interior protection did not withstand multiple
kicks, an operations single point of failure.
No fire “red button.” Adding burst disc or fire
suppression could mitigate fire but not an
explosion, but might prevent an explosion.
V&V techniques were key in establishing
credibility. Engineering work must be
repeatable. Results must not be sensitive to
control settings like mesh geometry. [5,6,7]
References
[1] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII (2010)
[2] ASME PVHO-1 Safety Code for PVHO (2009)
[3] Sheffield PJ. Hyperbaric & hypobaric chamber fires: a 73-year analysis
[4] DOI: 10.51501/jotnafe.v37i1.67 (Pressure Vessel Code in Forensics)
[5] DOI: 10.51501/jotnafe.v26i1.711 (Engineering & the Sci. Method)
[6] ASME V&V 10 (Solid Mechanics) (2006)
[7] ASME V&V 20 (Computational Fluid Dynamics) (2009)
[8] DOI: 10.1520/JFS15101J (Sustained Combustion of Carcass)
[9] DOI: 10.1016/S1355-0306(99)72011-3 (Combustion of Animal Fat)