G.R. No.

104235 November 18, 1993

SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New
York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the
trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with
petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found
that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because
under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it is allowed
to overbook flights.

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three
(3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los
Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said
flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight
at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them
had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while
the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first
22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two
others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-
fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare
ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted
tickets were denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was holding
his daughter's full-fare ticket.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it
was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from
American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air
carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower court ruled in
favor of petitioners in its decision   dated January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which states as follows:
1

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following
amounts:

(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets
bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
from New York City;

(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine
Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,

(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages for
all the plaintiffs'

(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees;
and

(6) The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.  2

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated
upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
1
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed
under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines.

Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked and that
even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it
ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount
to bad faith.

Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight (48) other
passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over discounted tickets.

The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals  dated October 25, 1991 states as follows:
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WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in that
the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-
appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:

(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Cesar
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;

(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

(4) The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 4

Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged the
following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:

I.

. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF

RESPONDENT TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.

II.

. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

III.

. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR
THE AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS. 5

That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their
flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.  Written law may be evidenced by an
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official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
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Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no
basis in fact.

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in
accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the

2
ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.  Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the
8

applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to
an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals,  where passengers with confirmed bookings
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were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger
confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for
breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive
some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral
damages.

Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,   where private respondent was not allowed to board the
10

plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even before the allowable period for
passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this
Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondent's rights under their contract of
carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.

In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to bad faith.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,   where a would-be passenger had the
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necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was,
in fact, included in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court
did not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding awarding her damages.

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. So ruled
this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.   This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation
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attended with public duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be
paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a
smaller Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be
accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for the sake of
economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled
to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages.  13

Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was
overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to
properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or
would have the choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written the name of the
passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An examination of Exhibit I does not
bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the existence of a notice of
overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los
Angeles.

Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority
to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only
one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was
holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.

It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of boarding priorities are
reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue raised in this case is not the
reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners'
contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present
any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or
that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely
upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented
confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily
have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad
faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of
carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter
breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for
exemplary damages, as well.

Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket because
the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with
certainty that the act of respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to
inadvertence or deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said agreement.
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The logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the course
of action taken.

The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets purchased and
used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to
take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use their TWA tickets on another
TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was
also fully booked.   The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the
14

consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In accordance
with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v.
Court of Appeals,   this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets
15

he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA
tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On this score, we
differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also
the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New
York to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.

The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code which allows
recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his
interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary damages by the trial court is excessive in the light
of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages
and another P50,000.00 exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay damages to petitioners in the following
amounts, to wit:

(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets bought by Suthira
and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York City;

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(5) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12105             January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,

vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the
objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted
by the executor and approving the said project.

On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last
will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made
the following findings:

According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that
state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This contention in
untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely
temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his
pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the
United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance
4
 with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust
Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a
bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it
may enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).

It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor filed a project of
partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining
companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M.
B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his
daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;

It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in
cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies
and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of
P12,000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that
the laws of the form concede to them.

The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to
received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued that it was error for the
trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
Querubin vs. Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose
of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada
Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:

Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her
estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.

Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had
already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records,
Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed
therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of
P20,000 from the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol.
I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no community property
owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena
C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no community property acquired
by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.

Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share
in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already
found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have
no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.

The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies
in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the
testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of
the forum valid?

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and
the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil
Code.)
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In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of
the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision
dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for
the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-
quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign
law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the
legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing
on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law,
especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as
Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on
January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of
the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by
the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator
is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in
accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO
ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents.

BARREDO, J.:p

Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of the respondent court in the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the
order of December 14, 1957 as null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the
respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent Avelina A. Magno to perform
or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated in the petition, and from exercising any authority or
power as Regular Administratrix of above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and
pleadings filed by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private respondent to
interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this
Court on August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against the orders of the
respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967
denying the motion for reconsideration of said order.

Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-three (33) appeals from
different orders of the same respondent court approving or otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the
respondent Magno on behalf of the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.

THE FACTS

On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on November 22, 1952 pertinently
providing as follows:

FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my estate.

6
 SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to
make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may
think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other
term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property
for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple
title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell
or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City
of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his
lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein. and
may sell unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath all
of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or
located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely:

Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy
Higdon.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, above, prior
to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and bequest that the heirs of
such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother
or sister had she or he survived.

SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be executor of this,
my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other security be required of him as such
executor.

SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in the administration
of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will and to return an inventory and
appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Petition.)

This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent court on June
28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions
thereof.

Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had been appointed Special
Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the same date as follows:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE

BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN
DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING

Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most
respectfully states:

1. — That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which is attached
to the petition for probate of the same.

2. — That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is directed to
have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in the
same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to
have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime."

3. — That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in the business
of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may think best.

4. — That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants, except
brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of
the decedent.

7
 5. — That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of petitioner and the
deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That proper accounting will be had also
in all these transactions.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles Newton Hodges)
be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts
which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was living.

which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:

It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the business in which
said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed, unless and until the Executor is
named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner is allowed or authorized to continue the
business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the
deceased was living.

Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE

EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE
EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE
JANE HODGES.

Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney, to the Hon.
Court, most respectfully states:

1. — That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, the executor
as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has the right to dispose of all
the properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted as follows:

Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both
personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime.

Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall have the right to
manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he is hereby given the right to
make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale or any part thereof which he may
think best, and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best; to execute
conveyances with or without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other
term or time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property
for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee simple
title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and
income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ...

2. — That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That during the lifetime of
herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the
Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is engaged in the buy and sell of real and
personal properties, even before the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N.
Hodges was filed in Court, to allow him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion was
favorably granted by the Honorable Court.

3. — That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and selling real
and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.

4. — That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to have all the
sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon. Court.

5. — That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages executed by
the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales conveyances, leases and
mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, and within the scope of
the terms of the last will and testament, also be approved;

6. — That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the properties
conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.

8
 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes of the deceased contained in
her last will and testament, be with authorization and approval of the Hon. Court.

which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as follows:

As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his motion
dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor
Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the
latter.

So ordered.

On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval, Hodges alleged:

Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased, renders the
following account of his administration covering the period from January 1, 1958 to December 31,
1958, which account may be found in detail in the individual income tax return filed for the estate of
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:

That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and expenses, copy of which is hereto
attached and made integral part of this statement of account as Annex "A".

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the
individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A", be approved
by the Honorable Court, as substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts
be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance
with the last will and testament already probated by the Honorable court.

The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order worded thus:

Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net worth of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as shown in the individual
income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as Annex "A" is approved.

His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1960
were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted
above; and the respective orders approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially
identical to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of account just mentioned,
the following assertions related thereto made by respondent-appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all
indications discernible in the record to be disputable:

Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his

9
 combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's
Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of
Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto,
C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94,
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an
"individual income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93,
Appellee's Brief.)

Likewise the following:

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie
Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C.N.
Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he
wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe
they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges. .

As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering under American
law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he
answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the
question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:

"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid."

Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an "affidavit" wherein he
ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his estate tax returns as to his having
renounced what was given him by his wife's will. 1

As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed all the assets
of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance sheet and then stated
expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as executor was "one-half of all the
items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Appellee's Brief.)

Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote wholly or at least, extensively
from some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive
and clearer view of the important and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their
respective positions in regard thereto.

The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings
No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty.
Leon P. Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's
estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the following:

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX

COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to the
Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (deceased), her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in an order issued by this
Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges was appointed Executor and had
performed the duties as such.

10
 2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill, and brought to
the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on December 25, 1962, as shown
by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and marked as Annex "A".

3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges,
whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death of her husband Charles Newton
Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs. That there are real and
personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges, which need to be administered and taken care
of.

4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles Newton Hodges, have
not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is necessity for the appointment of a general
administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both
spouses. That in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the
conjugal partnership of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the
testate proceedings of the wife.

5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence of the last will and
testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that contained in the last will and
testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges
is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office, and will be presented in due time before this
honorable Court.

6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix be appointed for
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to administer, collect, and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
Hodges, as provided for in Section 1 and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, because the last will and
testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in his safe or vault, and in the
meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time, a Special Administratrix is appointed,
the estate of both spouses are in danger of being lost, damaged or go to waste.

8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N. Hodges, who had
been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno, (should) be
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and at the same time Special
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges. That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal
age, a resident of the Philippines, the most fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to
serve the duties of Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such.

9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. Court believes
reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss AVELINA A.
MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as
Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with powers and duties provided for
by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A.
Magno.

which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: .

For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor dated
December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton
Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses
may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed.

Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00),
and after having done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." (Annex "P", Petition.)

On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno herself, thru
Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased Charles Newton Hodges
(who had) arrived from the United States of America to help in the administration of the estate of
said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33,
Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22,
1963 by Joe Hodges, who, according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the
deceased (who had) arrived from the United States with instructions from the other heirs of the
11
 deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the Philippines, (Pp.
47-50, id.)

Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special Proceedings 1672 a petition for
the probate of the will of Hodges,  with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges,
2

albeit the motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be
appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the court issued the corresponding
order of probate and letters of administration to Joe Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.

At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to
her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in
like manner, provided that "at the death of my said husband — I give devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue
and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my
brothers and sisters, share and share alike —". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his
wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that upon the
eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and correspondingly
distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done,
furthermore, there is the issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as already stated, Hodges
made official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating that as far as he was concerned no "property
interests passed to him as surviving spouse — "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes
and other legal charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in
the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid", that the
incidents and controversies now before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon
the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower court's actuations presently
under review are apparently wanting in consistency and seemingly lack proper orientation.

Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from which the trial court
proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of
valuable assistance in clearing up the matter.

To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as appellant in the appealed cases, one
with green cover and the other with a yellow cover, that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed
upon by the parties under which the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conjointly,
but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have no way of knowing when
exactly such agreement was entered into and under what specific terms. And while reference is made to
said modus operandi in the order of September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal,
reading thus:

The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in answer to the
charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September 3, 1964. In answer to the
said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. Rizal Quimpo, filed a written
manifestation.

After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the administratrix, Miss
Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened before September 3, 1964, which
was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction of parties, was simply due to a
misunderstanding between the representative of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and
Miss Magno and in order to restore the harmonious relations between the parties, the Court ordered
the parties to remain in status quo as to their modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until after
the Court can have a meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October 3, as formerly
agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol and Atty.
Rizal Quimpo.

In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be resolved by
this Court until October 3, 1964.

SO ORDERED.

there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except that again, reference thereto
was made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows:

On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges Office at 206-
208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and to place its
own locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol.
It is alleged in said urgent motion that Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges refused to open the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds
office and therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is
12
 prayed that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the said office, to
take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place thereon its own locks and keys for
security purposes; instructing the clerk of court or any available deputy to witness and supervise the
opening of all doors and locks and taking possession of the PCIB.

A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru counsel Rizal
Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the office for the reason that the PCIB failed
to comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11,
1964 to the effect that both estates should remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of
September 1, 1964.

To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation of the office of
both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent motion and opposition heard the
verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.

After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in the Hodges
Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized
representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later than 7:30 tomorrow morning
October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates could operate for business.

Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is hereby
ordered:

(a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;

(b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of either of the estates
should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;

(c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix
Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate
chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;

(d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect whatever records,
documents and papers she may have in her possession in the same manner that Administrator
PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and
papers it may have in its possession;

(e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records of the
transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like
manner the accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C.N. Hodges shall have
access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the
estate of C.N. Hodges.

Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the presence of the
PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his duly authorized
representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it without previous consent and
authority from this court.

SO ORDERED.

As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from the properties in the name of
Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-
called modus operandi was no longer operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation started.

Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages 188-201 of the Green Record
on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record on Appeal) it is alleged that:

3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting as
the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young
acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforementioned parties entered into an amicable
agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that
certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and
that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates would be administered jointly by the PCIB
as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of the estate of

13
 Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's
claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative,
seventy-five percent (75%) of all assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in
the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court
amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-described
basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to one hundred percent
(100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.

but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates exists in the record, and so, We
are not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues
herein.

On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the Green Record on Appeal,
authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her
lawyers, etc., as follows:

Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the Agreement dated June 6, 1964
which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their services to protect and defend the interest of
the said Administratrix in these proceedings and the same has been signed by and bears the
express conformity of the attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is
further prayed that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay
the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as expenses for the administration of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta dated July 11,
1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for
in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N.
Hodges; employment of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys.
Quimpo and Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the Manifestation and
Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied because no evidence has been
presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a reply to the opposition of counsel for the
Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration
include reasonable counsel or attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a
matter of fact the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees
for said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If payment of the
fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges will cause prejudice to
the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very agreement which provides for the payment of
attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the opposition to the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C. N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane
Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges
predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
formally entered their appearance in behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on
June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that Judge Bellosillo
issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support of their respective
contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June
10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5, 1965 asking
that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments and pleadings of the PCIB
in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo
be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307). Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4,
1965 approving the motion dated June 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges and agreement annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or
checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
is ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307).

14
 Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January 13, 1965
asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin be declared null and
void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and administrator in these special
proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce or comply with the provision of the aforesaid
order of January 4, 1965. In support of said manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of
January 4, 1965 is null and void because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk
Albis of Branch V (the sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the
late Judge Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death
of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence of Executive
Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. 6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp.
1307).

Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1965
asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that:

1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;

2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;

3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice of the other heirs not
represented by said attorneys;

4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate;

5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).

Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a motion to submit
dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 filed by
Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly appertaining thereto be considered
submitted for consideration and approval (pp. 6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).

Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the Administratrix and
the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court believes that the order of January
4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of
this court (Branch V) during the lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the
said manifestation and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and considered in this
instant order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163, Vol. V,
Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs and other
lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual services rendered. However, the fee agreement
dated February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs
which provides for retainer fee of P4,000 monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances,
reimbursement for expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said
lawyers have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V, Sp.
Proc. 1307).

WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.

The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for the
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the agreement annexed
thereto is hereby approved.

The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed to implement
the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or checks as the case may be.

SO ORDERED.

thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but simultaneous administrations.

Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion of petitioner for the
approval of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on
appeal herein:

Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB, Administrator of
the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-2245), dated July 16, 1965,
filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol
and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July
22, 1965 and considering the allegations and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the
15
 deeds of sale should be signed jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges and Avelina A. Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to
this effect the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could
sign the deeds of sale.

SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)

Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator of the Estate of Hodges,
involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed by respondent Magno.  And this was not an isolated
3

instance.

In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states:

After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds of sale
pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp. 45-46, Green
ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later
the appellant) were approved by the lower court upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty.
Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section 8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently,
the appellant, after it had taken over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting
these motions itself. The first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol,
counsel for the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations of
mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice-President and
Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694-1701). This motion was
approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed by another motion dated August 4,
1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale again signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R.
Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by the
lower court on August 7, 1964. The gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant
subsequently filed similar motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations
of mortgages signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant.

A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Cesar T. Tirol
as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties signed by both appellee
Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: (a) motion dated September 21, 1964
— 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, 1964 — 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated
December 1, 1964 — 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion dated February 3, 1965 — 8 deeds of sale; (f)
motion dated May 7, 1965 — 9 deeds of sale. In view of the very extensive landholdings of the
Hodges spouses and the many motions filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by
C. N. Hodges the lower court has had to constitute special separate expedientes in Special
Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the
conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.

As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, as
counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land and
Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the
allegations of which read:

"1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property, and the
prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and complied with the terms
and conditions thereof;

"2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already paid their debts
secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are now entitled to release
therefrom;

"3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307
and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of sale in favor —

Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros

Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City

and cancellations of mortgages in favor of —

16
 Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City

"4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the
estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
dividend."

And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, this
honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of mortgages." (Pp. 113-117,
Appellee's Brief.)

None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.

Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the respondent court and its hesitancy to
clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green
Record on Appeal, said respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western Institute
of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the parties with whom Hodges had
contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges
and/or respondent Magno, as Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus:

Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that payment to both the
administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the administratrix of the testate estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two estates is proper and legal.

WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them.

SO ORDERED.

(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)

On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was given authority to act alone.
For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, 1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the
respondent court approved payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped
in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows:

Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime pay dated
December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a proper charge of
administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, the said expenses
are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
The administrator of the testate estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to
countersign the check or checks necessary to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills
marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the motion.

SO ORDERED.

(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.)

Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno alone, as Administratrix of
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by
Hodges, irrespective of whether they were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this
nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:

1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving the deed of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed
by Hodges on June 17, 1958, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for
failure of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.

2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September
17
13, 1960, after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of failure
of said appellee to pay the installments on time.

3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28, 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August
14, 1961, after the death of his wife.

4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21,
1958, after the death of his wife.

5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959,
after the death of his wife.

6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26,
1961, after the death of his wife.

7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to
"contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his
wife.

8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in
favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17,
1966 and August 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April 18,
1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife.

9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of
appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954,
before the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of
appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.

10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor
of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950,
after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee
Pablico to pay the installments due on time.

11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed of sale executed by respondent
Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges
on February 5, 1951, before the death of his wife.

12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno,
one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966
and November 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on May
26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, after her death.

In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by petitioner
alone and without the concurrence of respondent Magno, and such approvals have not been the subject of any
appeal. No less than petitioner points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:

The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have already been
discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was general, and as already
explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself, superseded by the particular orders
approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject
of this appeal, as well as the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the
appellant, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee,
Avelina A. Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now therefore final.

Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all embracing significance
developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty. Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following
self-explanatory motion was filed:

URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES

18
 AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.

COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through his
undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
alleges:

(1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.

(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and appointed C. N. Hodges as
Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the Estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).

(4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following allegations in a Motion
dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:

"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."

issued the following order:

"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the reasons stated
in his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all the
sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of the latter."

(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C.
N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he alleged among other
things

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court."

(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of Account" submitted by
C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged among
other things:

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of
the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court."

(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of Account By The
Executor for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:

That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place of
examining the herein account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of
the deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.

(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died.

(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed only in Special
Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno

"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is
still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be
lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special Administratrix is appointed."
19
 (10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno pursuant to this
Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962

"With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or Special
Administratrix having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."

(11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of January 21, 1963
issued Letters of Administration to:

(a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

(b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges; and

(c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges.

(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by Leon P. Gellada as
legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as Administratrix of the Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307) issued the following order:

"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva de

propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado
Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este
totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de
cancelacion de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la
consideracion de cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.

"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la
aprobacion de este Juzgado."

(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges:

3. — That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for those "contracts to sell"
entered into by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been
demanding the execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.

4. — That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the
Administratrix and by the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with
the terms and conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties
thereto."

(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all registered in the
name of the deceased C. N. Hodges.

(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising in the newspaper
in Iloilo thusly:

For Sale

Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges.

All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis.

Avelina A. Magno
Administratrix

(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is paying sums of
money to sundry persons.

(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings before this
Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges was claiming all of the
assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in
Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges wherein he claimed and took

20
 possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the administration of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges on the ground that he was the sole devisee and legatee under her Last Will and Testament.

(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her administration as
Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges. However, from manifestations made by Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P.
Gellada, there is no question she will claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of
the deceased spouses and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon family
who are named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable Court, after due
hearing, order:

(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds, properties and assets
of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come
into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;

(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of
the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;

(3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A. Magno to stop,
unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly authorized representative, such as
the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the
beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:

(a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:

(b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.

(4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. (Annex
"T", Petition.)

Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator,
pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of
October 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs, petitioner filed the
following:

MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING

AND RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES
AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS,
EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER 5, 1963.

COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), the
administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings No. 1672, through its
undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:

1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An Accounting and Delivery To
Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The
Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The
Rents, Emoluments and Income Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672).

2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable agreement entered into
on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of
the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672), resolved the dispute over who should
act as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905-906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration
to the PCIB.

3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and Fernando P.
Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Avelina A. Magno acting
as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Messrs. William Brown and Ardel
Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the aforenamed parties entered into an

21
amicable agreement, which was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto
agreed that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two
estates and that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates would be administrated jointly
by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid October 5, 1963 Motion,
namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership of one-hundred percent (10017,)
(or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane
Hodges situated in the Philippines. On February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this
Honorable Court amended its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the
aforedescribed basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one
hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.

4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion of October 5,
1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion of October 5, 1963.

5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the United States, this
Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing of the Motion of October 5,
1963.

6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB has not been able
to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges
because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno and those who claim to act for her
as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:

(a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets
in the Philippines of both estates including those claimed by the estate of C. N.
Hodges as evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street,
Iloilo City on August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by
this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964.

(b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets
of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and
how much they may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks
issued by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee
agreement approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.

(c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the
records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon
Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal
checks.

(d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB drawn
to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check
drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes
reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.

7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of January 24 and
February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of Administration issued on January 24,
1964 to the PCIB, it has

"full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased

C. N. Hodges

"and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property." (p.
914, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)

8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the immediate
exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts receivables, court cases, bank
accounts and other assets, including the documentary records evidencing same, which existed in
the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges' death, December 25, 1962, and were in his possession
and registered in his name alone. The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the
name of Linnie Jane Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has
knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived therefrom since
his death on December 25, 1962.

9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, succeeded to all
of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:

22
 (a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable Court
appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:

(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed
Special Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).

(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1307).

(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co-
special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp.
108-111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).

(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies
resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon
was appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-
administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672)
along with Miss Magno who at that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of
the estate of C. N. Hodges.

(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this
Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-
administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No.
1672).

10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of December 25, 1962,
took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two estates. Legally, Miss Magno could
take possession of the assets registered in the name of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as
Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court
on February 22, 1963 of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate
of C.N. Hodges, they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on January 24,
1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in substitution of Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only party entitled to the sole and
exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.

11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court approved same,
to wit:

(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec.
S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:

(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie

Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges";

(ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N. Hodges;
and

(iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family who
claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No.
1672).

Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34, CFI Rec.,
S. P. No. 1672).

(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964,
filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848,
CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307).

Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.

(c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting
submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges or special administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the
accounting of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N.

23
 Hodges dated January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her conformity
(supra).

12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to receive P10,000.00

"for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"

and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at

"a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates."

24 ems.

13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this Honorable Court of
same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is entitled to the exclusive
possession of all records, properties and assets in the name of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his
death on December 25, 1962 which were in the possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that
date and which then passed to the possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol
as co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges.

14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB concerning the
assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as an employee of the estate
of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1, 1964 Miss Magno locked the premises
at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB
dated September 3, 1964, this Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to
reopen the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no
later than September 8, 1964.

15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in physical
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB is not in exclusive
control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss Magno continues to assert the
claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues to use her own locks to the doors of the
aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to
know the combinations to the doors of the vault and safes situated within the premises at 206-208
Guanco Street despite the fact that said combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his
lifetime.

16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of the assets of the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel at no time
have questioned the validity of the aforesaid assessment and the payment of the corresponding
Philippine death taxes.

17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except to resolve the
aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive possession and control of all
of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges.

18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were ordered by this
Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and delivered to C. N. Hodges
alone. He in fact took possession of them before his death and asserted and exercised the right of
exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable court:

(1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with notice to all
interested parties;

(2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as Administratrix of the Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds,
properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N.
Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has done with them;

(3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.
N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her possession;

24
 (4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order Avelina A. Magno and
her representatives to stop interferring with the administration of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the
PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;

(5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City as
an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal as such by the PCIB effective
August 31, 1964;

(6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others allegedly representing
Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City or any other properties
of C. N. Hodges without the express permission of the PCIB;

(7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the premises. (Annex
"U" Petition.)

On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges Estate"
alleging:

COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as PCIB), as administrator of the
estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges
that:

1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, American
citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and accumulated considerable assets
and properties in the Philippines and in the States of Texas and Oklahoma, United States of
America. All said properties constituted their conjugal estate.

2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this Honorable Court, in its
orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc.
No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically ruled that said spouses had lived and worked
for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city,
which they retained until the time of their respective deaths.

3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her Last Will and
Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests in said will pertinent to
the present issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions, which we quote in full hereunder.

SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my husband,
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband during his
natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate by sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other
or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time,
any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may
elect to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him,
and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
need or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise
dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the
City of Lubbock, Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy
the same during his lifetime, as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide
any farmland and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike, namely:

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimray Higdon."

25
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will and Testament, a
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N. Hodges designated his wife,
Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical language she used in the second and third
provisos of her Will, supra.

5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her husband by more than
five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or compulsory heir, except her husband,
C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra),
which, for convenience, we shall refer to as the HIGDONS.

6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges as executor of her estate
without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court
issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)

7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should be governed by Philippine
laws because:

(a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;

(b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix,
Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see
paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property
(also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regards
immovable (real properties). Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and
applied by our Supreme Court in the case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of
Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as
her movable and immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at
this stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located
in Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are those
within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special
Proceedings.

8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May
23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in
his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal
estate constituted the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal estate
capable of inheritance by her heirs.

9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges cannot, under
a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or
emoluments accruing after her death on May 23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all
rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3,
Annex "A".) Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and
income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining to C. N.
Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of inheritance by her heirs,
consisted exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the conjugal estate, computed as of the time
of her death on May 23, 1957.

10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way of
irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse. In fact,
her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886,
Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges
was the owner of at least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal
assets of the spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of

26
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal estate
from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra).

11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole and exclusive
heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner of all the assets
constituting her estate, except only with regards certain properties "owned by us, located at, in or
near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without relying on our laws of succession and legitime,
which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was
entitled to the entirely to his wife's estate in the Philippines.

12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are transmitted from
the death of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was transmitted to C. N.
Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. For the convenience of this Honorable Court,
we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should
be divided in accordance with Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges.

13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as above-stated,
C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated to himself the entirety of
her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection
with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating,
engaging and doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December
25, 1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered
in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.

14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and impliedly by
various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:

(a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges "is allowed or
authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to perform acts which he had
been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)

(b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact, alleged in the
verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N.
Hodges:

That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the
successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No.
1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)

issued the following order:

"As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in his motion
dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales, conveyances, leases
and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the
Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and
testament of the latter." (CFI Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)

24 ems

(c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and accounting
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein he
alleged among other things,

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.)

(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account"
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein he
alleged, among other things.

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament

27
 ofthe deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc.
No. 1307, pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.)

(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement of Account By
The Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein he
alleged:

"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of examining the
herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe deceased, already probated by this
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.)

15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not only by law, but
in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no need to liquidate the conjugal
estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate pertained to him exclusively, therefore this
Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and
control all the conjugal assets as owner.

16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the estate of his wife,
this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. Hodges as sole heir in accordance with
the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as
a legal and juridical personality, it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines registered in
its name whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.

17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as follows:

"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and
bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters,
share and share alike, namely:

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie

Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimray Higdon."

Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at least to the
extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS, assuming this proviso in
Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate of C. N. Hodges.

18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is
without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the Philippine assets. It should
not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges or his heirs to the properties, which C.
N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.

(a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership to
her estate. In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary provision, the
Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the
property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion
Florentino de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28,
1962.)

(b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge,
condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by a testator.
Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the
legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Consequently, the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is
clearly invalid insofar as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which
consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal
estate of the deceased.

(c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by
our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The
substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C.
N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute
heirs. (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
28
 L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that
a vulgar or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2)
should not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so.
None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution
provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code,
and, therefore, it is void. Manresa, commenting on these kisses of substitution,
meaningfully stated that: "... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por
fallecimiento de este nombra otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas
designaciones solo han de llegar a tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer
instituido muera antes que el testador, fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6
Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other words, when another heir is designated to
inherit upon the death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in
case the first instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true
intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges,
the provision for substitution contained in Linnie Jane Hodges' Willis void.

(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N. Hodges'
inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and final.

19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal estate appeared
and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption is that all said assets
constituted his estate. Therefore —

(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 of the conjugal
estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which can not be affected by any
testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their claim against the estate of C. N.
Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to full custody and control of all the conjugal
estate of the spouses.

(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate administration, where the
administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an officious right to object and intervene in
matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges estate, is anomalous.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, this Honorable
Court declare:

1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-half (1/2) share in
the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date of her death on May 23, 1957;

2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges as his share as
partner in the conjugal partnership;

3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after Linnie Jane Hodges'
death pertains to C. N. Hodges;

4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the Philippines, plus all the
"rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges,
capable of distribution to his heirs upon termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;

6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and exclusive custody,
control and management of all said properties; and

7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration of the C. N. Hodges estate.

PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises."

Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21, 1965, private respondent
Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:

COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through undersigned
counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:

29
1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were American citizens who
died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated extensive properties in the
Philippines;

2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and testament (the original
of this will now forms part of the records of these proceedings as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);

3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time survived by her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her last will and testament;

4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly heard, this Honorable
Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);

5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims against the
decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such claims has long ago lapsed and
expired without any claims having been asserted against the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;

6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to probate contains an
institution of heirs in the following words:

"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved husband,
Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his
natural lifetime.

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and,
he is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said
estate, by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any
other or additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or
without general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or
time, any property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real
property for oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass
the absolute fee simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he elect
to sell. All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and
he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need
or desire. It is provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of
any of the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of
Lubbock Texas, but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same
during his lifetime, above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land
and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots.

FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise
and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and
sisters, share and share alike, namely:

Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era
Boman and Nimroy Higdon.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item
Fourth, above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is
my will and bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly
the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."

7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted, Linnie Jane
Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband, Charles Newton Hodges,
and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate to her relatives named
therein;

8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate of her last will and
testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the said Charles Newton Hodges with
full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he
was then acting as Administrator of the estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane
Hodges, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public
30
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges;

9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges pursuant to her
last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma
Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son
respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal
ages, American citizens, with residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;

10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was the co-owner
(together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-half interest in their
conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which properties are now being
administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by the Administratrix of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under
the control and supervision of this Honorable Court;

11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of husband and wife in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or segregation up to the present,
both interests have continually earned exactly the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income",
the entire estate having been continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were
alive;

12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal estate was earning
"rents, emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957, when it ceased to be saddled with
any more charges or expenditures which are purely personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on
earning such "rents, emoluments and income" by virtue of their having been expressly renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under
the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;

13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the combined
conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly the same amount of
"rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to
be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other dispositions which are purely personal to him in
nature, until the death of Charles Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;

14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles
Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly entitled to a portion
more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion to which the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be exactly determined by the following manner:

a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they
existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 — one-half of these
assets belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all these
assets — again one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, disbursements

and other dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his own
personal account from May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other
charges, disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf since
December 25, 1962 up to the present;

15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate them from the conjugal
estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will and testament.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this Honorable
Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an order:

a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline
Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as the sole heirs under the
last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only persons entitled to her estate;

b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the system
enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion;

31
 c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal estate and its
delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for distribution to the heirs to whom
they properly belong and appertain.

(Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)

whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted, as it had been doing before,
petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a
motion on April 22, 1966 alleging in part that:

1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges";

2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending before this Honorable
Court, such as:

a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to

the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges "through ... written
declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';

b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N. Hodges
of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and
Income Therefrom";

c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;

d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina

Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;

which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein being matters
of record, and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;

3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be very easily threshed
out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;

4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two administrators only results in
confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges,
particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds
and property which she has inofficiously collected and held, as well as those which she continues to
inofficiously collect and hold;

5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences not only the
estate but also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.)

and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations of its earlier motion of
September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that:

1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of the Estate of
C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C.
N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom;

2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her
collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank;

3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;

4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)

On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent court denied the foregoing
motion, holding thus:

ORDER

32
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of administrator PCIB
praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the
consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the
administrator PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307)
closed; and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are resolved.

This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court such as (a) the
examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents relating to the allegation of
Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written declaration and sworn public statements
renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges (b) the urgent motion for accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the
assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing
as of May 23, 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to
resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of
interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges.

These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of facts and
only require the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October 5, 1963 it is alleged that
in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada as attorney for the executor C. N.
Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal but
also the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.

Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the wishes
contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.

That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges
thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating therein that executor C. N.
Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated by the Court.

That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by the
executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it is stated that the
executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges; that on
May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted by executor, C. N.
Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated
that executor Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;

That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed all the
assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges situated in the
Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the prejudice of the testate estate
of C. N. Hodges.

An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix Magno has
been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for presentation and reception of
evidence.

It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in the
possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion for the official
declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said hearing.

That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other motion) dated
September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of presentation and reception of
evidence with the hearing on the determination of the heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is
further alleged in the opposition that the motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges is the one that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5
and September 14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court, the
PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will become moot and academic since
they are premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N.
Hodges.

That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of heirs in the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January 8, 1965 which filed
a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that the claim of any heirs of Linnie
Jane Hodges can be determined only in the administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie
33
 Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her
estate and not the estate of C. N. Hodges.

A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed alleging
that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the hearing and
consideration of the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges but to declare the
testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for administratrix Magno to account for and deliver
to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to her
possession plus all rents and income.

A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, 1966 has been
filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the approval of all conveyances
made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority for all subsequent conveyances that will
be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order dated December 14, 1957 only approved the
conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any
claim in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir of
the said Linnie Jane Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of adjudication of
the estate unless there has been a prior express declaration of heirs and so far no declaration of
heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been made.

Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those in the
opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition and rejoinder to be
well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official declaration of heirs in the testate
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no disposition of her estate.

WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
(Annex "W", Petition)

In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner alleged inter alia that:

It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact that:

a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late
Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in the
Philippines are concerned;

b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges
rights over said properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee
simple;

c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of the
properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.

Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this Honorable Court
"for the reasons stated" therein.

Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales, conveyances, leases,
and mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also all "the subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and authorized. This Honorable Court, in its
order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and
not only approved all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all
subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)

and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had already been factually,
although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of
all the properties of the estate of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July
18, 1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court believes that there is no
justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion
of respondent Magno "for official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to
above, was set for hearing.

In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 1967 (albeit petitioner had to
pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the orders in question were issued in two separate testate
estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 and 1672, in the court below).

34
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein, appeals from the following:

1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of overtime pay, (pp.
221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-
232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15, 1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly
denying motions for reconsideration thereof.

2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by petitioner to be co-
signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 276-277) denying
reconsideration.

3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all collections in a joint
account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. 1 above which included the
denial of the reconsideration of this order of October 27, 1965.

4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of attorney's fees, fees of
the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, 1966 denying reconsideration
thereof.

5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western Institute of
Technology to make payments to either one or both of the administrators of the two estates as well
as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying reconsideration.

6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale executed by
respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, Coronado, Barrido,
Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this opinion), together with the two
separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on
Appeal) denying reconsideration of said approval.

7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, approving similar deeds
of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in favor of appellees Pacaonsis and
Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration was filed.

8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on Appeal, directing
petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito, Barrido, Catedral, Causing,
Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the lands involved in the approved sales, as
to which no motion for reconsideration was filed either.

Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just as they affect distinctly
different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are,
therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more
docket fees.

It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with these appeals, petitioner has
assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors, the respective discussions and arguments under all of
them covering also the fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus making
it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases together. 4

The assignments of error read thus:

I to IV

THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

V to VIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID
IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

IX to XII

35
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

XIII to XV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XVI to XVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER
PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.

XIX to XXI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.

XXII to XXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S.
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO
SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXVI to XXIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED
AND RESCINDED.

XXX to XXXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

XXXV to XXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXXVII to XXXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE
IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL
WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.

XXXIX to XL

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE INSTANT

36
 APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA
BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.

XLI to XLIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED
BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL
COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XLIV to XLVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER
COMPLIED WITH.

XLVII to XLIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO
CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE
SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS
LIFETIME.

LI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS
AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50.

LII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT.

LIII to LXI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION
CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO.

LXII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF
HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL
BANK.

LXIII

37
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE
APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON
NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS FOR
NOVEMBER 20, 1965.

LXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED
NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED
THEREIN.

LXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.

LXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.

LXVII

LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE

APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL
EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON OTHER
THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.

LXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXIX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF

LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES.

LXX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR
LAWYERS.

LXXI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE

ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES.

LXXII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES
NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF
HIS ESTATE.

LXXIII

38
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXXIV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF

LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES.

LXXV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE

ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES.

LXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE

PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE
JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.

LXXVII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE
APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.

LXXVIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE
GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID
ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)

To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual setting of these cases, it may
also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as
administratrix, with the proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent court did actually
order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of respondent court violative of its
injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1,
1973). Subsequently, Atty. Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26, 1972 informed the Court that a
motion had been filed with respondent court for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N.
Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N. Hodges
had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her husband. Further, in this
connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent Magno to have it declared in contempt for
disregarding the Court's resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner
annexed thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with respondent court, informing
said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N. Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining
cause with the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not possibly
untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION CASES

As to the Alleged Tardiness

of the Present Appeals

The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all the aforementioned thirty-
three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these appeals revolve around practically the same main issues
and that it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to be
stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders concerned have become final by the
lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of
said appeals.
39
II

The Propriety Here of Certiorari and

Prohibition instead of Appeal

The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before
Us. Such contention fails to take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will inevitably cause the proliferation of
more or less similar or closely related incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone,
and without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be involved
in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold, as We do hold, that
the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is
indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the interests of
justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work
attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues that can be
more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition, pursued by petitioner, preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of
them, despite the conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common fundamental issues would
naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties and render more simple the determination of the
secondary issues in each of them. Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy
of certiorari and prohibition must be overruled.

We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for
short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant.

III

On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate

Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.

In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its
discretion in further recognizing after December 14, 1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
and in sanctioning purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such posture is
that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was already allowed to assert and exercise
all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else
remains to be done in Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of PCIB
is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as sole and exclusive heir of his wife
and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close
Special Proceedings 1307, hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.

After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is patently untenable from whatever
angle it is examined.

To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the sense being read into it by
PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by
the probate court of the estate of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to
encourage judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making orders in such
regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the heirs, the creditors, and most of all the
government, the devisees and legatees, should know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and
obligations ensuing from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be, thereby
avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to those that have developed
unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of
a deceased person have already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the
satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are adversely affected, it would
naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the final order of declaration and distribution, still it is
inconceivable that the special proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective
rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or administrator thereof be
regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of all functions and responsibilities without the
corresponding definite orders of the probate court to such effect.

Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:

40
 SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.

These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution
or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order
shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances,
taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is
usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the
court.

... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court
should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil.,
726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) (JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86,
Appellee's Brief)

xxx xxx xxx

Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) what brings
an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution directing delivery of the
residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased.
(Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, 370.)

In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings and orders before Us that
the above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges
had already been complied with when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not
persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely of the motion of May 27,
1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all
aforequoted, are what the law contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied
upon by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages
of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after
the death of his wife and prior to the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said
"Executor — to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left the said
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter",
which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in
the law. In fact, the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question did not pray
for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not
only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to sell, convey,
lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines — during his lifetime", thereby indicating that what said motion
contemplated was nothing more than either the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the
dispositions of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his own share of the
conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other words, the authority referred to in said motions
and orders is in the nature of that contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases,
advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final adjudication or distribution when
the rights of third parties would not be adversely affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the
surviving spouse to dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it appears that
no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco,
Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant
to refer to the former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions read together
cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges'
brothers and sisters to whatever have not been disposed of by him up to his death.

Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted upon the premise suggested by
petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute

41
of Technology by its order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23, 1965, "in
both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of
properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way
of some kind of estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54-67 of this
decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957
was already the order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later withdrawn when
Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of what should correspond to the brothers and
sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.

It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole estate to her husband and
gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time
the condition that whatever should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect,
therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as he might possibly dispose
of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the
whole estate to himself, as suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain thereof upon his death, for
surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part
of the estate to himself as to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges'
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial court's orders granting said
motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, could not have had the effect of an absolute and
unconditional adjudication unto Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his
brothers and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact that no one
appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, to the failure of Hodges to send notices
to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they
could not have taken said motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely for him to
be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise during his lifetime rights of dominion over
his wife's estate in accordance with the bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the
broad terms of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any event, We do not
believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended by petitioner, not only because of the clear
language of the will but also because none of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing
thereof. Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really intended to be read in
the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy in declaring them null and void.

Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956, (unreported but a partial
digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957, the closure of Mrs. Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the
order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel attempted to be drawn
between that case and the present one does not hold. There the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and
express order of adjudication and distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed
their motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the order of the lower court in
that respect read as follows:

En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la condicion de

que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes de que estos presten la
fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art. 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos:
pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones.
Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun
el testamento. Creo que no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la
administradora no ha presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan
exentos de esta formalidad os administradores que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los
bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece en el
testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.

POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon
Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio Ventenilla son
su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y Ramon Ventenilla, Maria
Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano, Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla,
Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos
Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera
Alejandra Austria tiene derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de
deducir de ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta
mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba el pago
hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales del testador, de la
donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del Municipio de Mangatarem, y de
las misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una vez prestada la fianza mencionada al
principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el
testamento y se acaba de declarar en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion,
se dara por terminada la administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora, y
cancelando su fianza.
42
 ASI SE ORDENA.

Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person cannot be but perfunctory.

In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner do not appear ex-facie to
be of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and, what is more, the circumstances attendant to its
issuance do not suggest that such was the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the
will of Mrs. Hodges.

Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960,
A Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other)
person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice", an intent
to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent
interests of her brothers and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible,
much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known that, legally speaking, the
terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, there are enough circumstances extant in the records
of these cases indicating that he had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in
question, Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants and
ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the
decedent", and even promised that "proper accounting will be had — in all these transactions" which he had
submitted for approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his responsibilities vis-
a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as appellee:

Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined
conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
1958 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and that
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)

Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges
and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P270,623.32, divided evenly
between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income
tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the
said estate as having earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his
combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)

Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account by the
Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Net Worth of
Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1960 annexed thereto,
C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P314,857.94,
divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual evenly between him and the
estate income tax return" for calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting,
under oath, the said estate as having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net
income of his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-
93, id.)

In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters of Linnie
Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the will to probate
unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green ROA). Immediately, C. N.
Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name included as an heir, stating that he
wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges".

Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his own share of the conjugal
partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years after that of his wife. He never considered the whole
estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he
could have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof
as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her
expressed desire, as intimated in his tax return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And
assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being
sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. Without

43
purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view
that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges
had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her
other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any
such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.

It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 27, 1957 and December 11,
1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed
the motion of December 26, 1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of
Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was
Hodges' lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding of the situation,
implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of Hodges' own understanding thereof.

As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, 1957, a "Request for
Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made
in the above quotation from respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the motion.
Said allegations read:

1. — That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the will.

2. — That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges were
enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of Executor during the hearing, the
name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy
Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan,
Texas, U.S.A.

3. — That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the names of Aline Higdon and David
Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29,
1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's Answer — Record, p. 260)

As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Hodges in regard to the
testamentary dispositions of his wife.

In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, copies of which are annexed to
respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of
his co-heirs, such as the alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as
Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex 5. In said Schedule M,
Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:

2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the provisions made in his
or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No

2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take dower, curtesy,
or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No

3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the return, is any action
described under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X) No (Annex 4, Answer — Record,
p. 263)

and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to surviving spouse" the
following:

None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property
and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the devisees and legatees named in the
will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.
(Annex 4, Answer — Record, p. 263)

In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:

I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate Tax
Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed
any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate, as shown by the

44
 statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a copy of which schedule is attached
to this affidavit and made a part hereof.

The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the
declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right
on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased
wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the
payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since
the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer — Record, p. 264)

Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the court below, and We cannot,
therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence
in the record nor fail to note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances
related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, considering they are
supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of the governments of the United States and of the
Philippines, serve to lessen any possible apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges'
manifest intent vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact.

Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs of his wife, We find it very
hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that
her whole estate be adjudicated to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers
and sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us more factual and fairer to
assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the
following admonition made by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914:

Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal property in the
hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil Code that upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall immediately be made and this court in
construing this provision in connection with section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its
amendment by Act No. 3176 of November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the
death of the wife, the law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the
partnership without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7
Phil., 395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio vs.
Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, 31 Phil.,
153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.)

In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs. Arnold (66
Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the surviving spouse in the
administration of the community property. Attention was called to the fact that the surviving husband,
in the management of the conjugal property after the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique
character who is liable for any fraud committed by him with relation to the property while he is
charged with its administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as
the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands out more
clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal
estate which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no more acquire a title by
prescription against those for whom he was administering the conjugal estate than could a guardian
against his ward or a judicial administrator against the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the
Code of Civil Procedure, with relation to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in
the case of a continuing and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and
liquidation of the conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not
permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for whose benefit
the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No liquidation was ever made
by Lasam — hence, the conjugal property which came into his possession on the death of his wife in
September, 1908, still remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He should have
made a liquidation immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong. One of the conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure) is
possession "under a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make such a claim
would be a manifest fraud.

And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges arrogated everything unto
himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's brothers and sisters.

PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as adjudicatory, but merely as
approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would
necessarily render the said orders void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in
which such dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the probate court may
be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be that the said orders should be declared ineffective
either way they are understood, considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface, relative to PCIB's observations

45
based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-
jurisdictional technicalities of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of parties
interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the government on account of the taxes due it;
and since it is apparent here that none of such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the
unobservance by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience in nor
impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority contained in said orders. This solution is
definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the
deprivation of substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the other way will
not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind and stability of rights to the innocent parties
who relied on them in good faith, in the light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.

Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his wife as consisting of "One-
half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"."
Although, regrettably, no copy of said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the
basis of the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and other personal kinds of
properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with
full power and authority to dispose of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death,
such remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no pretension, much less any proof
that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he
had kept them more or less intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more
estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do exist which constitute such
estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be closed.

Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the Administratrix in said proceeding.
There is no showing that she has ever been legally removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito
Lopez without authority from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 8,
1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that it is not questioning said
respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection
thereto, considering it is a complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned.

It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' death, their conjugal
partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the properties composing the same were thus
commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not
yet identifiable, it is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer everything, and all
that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the properties constituting the remaining estate of
Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would
liken the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some properties included in
the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, (here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to
take part in the proceedings pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an
ordinary action should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass with finality on questions of title
between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against
the estate, on the other.

We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation obtaining herein cannot be
compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the
present cases what gave rise to the claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the
properties of the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, were the orders
of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings themselves, more specifically, the orders of
May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the
parties is something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And since in the ultimate
analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges
depends on the legal meaning and effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of the court to issue the root
orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare their true significance and intent, to the end that the
parties may know whether or not the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the
initiative of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her will?

At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems confronting the courts and the
parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure, as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to
the time of his death in December, 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and
the closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any effort towards the early
settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are enough indications, as already discuss that he had
intentions of leaving intact her share of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his
death, pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests in his own half of the
conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a
situation could not be conducive to ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his
co-heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium for such procrastination
and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the
properties in question, which would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership,
thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties should be considered as
46
constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit
equally among themselves.

To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are
deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent,
and from this point of view, it maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue
disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority
among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the
administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so
that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both of these
considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the
estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares
therein, it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their
segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted because the actuations so far of PCIB
evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance.
Besides, to allow PCIB, the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly provides that "The executor
of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision
refers also to the administrator of an executor like PCIB here.

We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, it is true that the last
sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be
settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or
permits that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it
should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such
liquidation was done away with by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just
cited.

Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the pending judicial settlement
proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will
who had, as such, failed for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was not
difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious obstacles on the way, the estate
not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent
attitude could only spell possible prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the
existence of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now faced with the
pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as early as possible the settlement of his wife's
estate, this problem would not arisen. All things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will
be better served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges exclusive
administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered opinion and so hold that what would be just
and proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been
segregated from each other.

At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's contention that, viewed as a
substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a
certain extent, this contention is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863
thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator
by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article
859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon
Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump
to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance
in default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such possible default is
contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they
are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to
his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them  only during his lifetime,
6

which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone
other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-
law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become

47
operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her
estate then.

Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of her estate, as contemplated in
Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof,
although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court sees no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the
legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had
no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)

But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal partnership properties may
be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code  should be
7

applied. On the one hand, petitioner claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the
time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth
being, as already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have disposed of
nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, respondent Magno denies that Mrs.
Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her
residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her
estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further maintains that, in any event,
Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner
seemingly questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas provide. In the
interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the
parties were determined in these proceedings. The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple
reason that neither the evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their respective
briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the pertinent legal issues, of grave importance
as they are, appear to Us to be adequate enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just
resolution. For one thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas
are.  * Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent Magno is disputed. And there are a
7

number of still other conceivable related issues which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to
mention here. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein for the purpose of ascertaining and
adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.

To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for certiorari and prohibition are:
(1) that regardless of which corresponding laws are applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for
granted either of the respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter,  and regardless also of
8

whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his inheritance in any degree, it is
easily and definitely discernible from the inventory submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate,
that there are properties which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or
distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) that, more specifically,
inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas applicable to the situation herein is basically one
of fact, and, considering that the sole difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has
reference to the supposed legitime of Hodges — it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a legitime
whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these proceedings that
whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least,
one-fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the laws of Texas, should only be
one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in
estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might
be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3) that Special Proceedings 1307 for
the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical
conclusion, there having been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved; and
(4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein. Hence, nothing in the foregoing
opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely,
(1) whether or not Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges, in whole or
in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by the application of Article 16 of the Civil
Code, and in the light of what might be the applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is
more than the one-fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence of
properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal of the size and extent of the
conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto by both parties in their briefs as well as in their
pleadings included in the records on appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties
are, to the more concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in support of their
respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual issues. In the interest of justice, the parties
48
should be allowed to present such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate
proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for
all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.

Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the
conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to
whether or not said holding might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable
evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are
controlling in the instant cases, in view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these
cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for
Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the testamentary dispositions herein involved or the
amount of inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are
of the considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared inconsistency is more
apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of
Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in any event be less than that We have fixed above.

It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matters
herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken
judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the
rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when
they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
parties concerned do not claim otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer
vs. Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held:

It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by
Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was
submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles
E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union.
Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law
were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under
the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed."

No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of the cases at bar. Quite to the
contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda
regarding the matter. And even if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to
certain provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates of that case and the
present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said provisions have not been
amended or changed in the meantime.

On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held:

Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the
State of Illinois — we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transcription of the testimony
adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the
subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of
Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could
take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he
was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among
other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have
reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts
can, under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States.
Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same
section, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge
"similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any
action litigated in the Philippine courts.

Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law
of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the
petition does not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from
what the court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error and argument for the
appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may

49
 have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could
not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The
petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass
real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits
by which the petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no
authority in the appellant's brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
moment.

It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties
in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for
the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the
need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence on the point. Thus, in the
instant cases wherein it results from the respective contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of
Texas were known and to be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as We
have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, under said laws, it could be
otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words,
since PCIB, the petitioner-appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent
laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and respondent-
appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently.

To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB states categorically:

Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary successions both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being
nationals of U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in
this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over
movables or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also Philippine law with
respect to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs with respect to immovable
properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as enunciated and applied by this Honorable
Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no
question that Philippine law governs the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate,
both with respect to movables, as well as to immovables situated in the Philippines.

In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts:

The law governing successional rights.

As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an American
citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State of Texas, U.S.A. Again, there
is likewise no question that she had her domicile of choice in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, as this
has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the lower court, pronouncements which
are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156).

Article 16 of the Civil Code provides:

"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the
domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables or
personal property, while the law of the situs governs with respect to immovable property. Such that
with respect to both movable property, as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the
law of Texas points to the law of the Philippines.

50
 Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this Honorable
Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question
that Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to
movables, as well as immovables situated in the Philippines.

The subject of successional rights.

Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property of the
spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the latter, is to be
divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her own property. Thus, upon
the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal partnership property immediately
pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own share, and not by virtue of any successional rights.
There can be no question about this.

Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:

If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of
the other half.

If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized
in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of
the hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for
more than five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be
that specified in the preceding paragraph.

This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary substitution (Art. 864,
Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, Civil code). It is clear, therefore,
that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership property as his own conjugal share, Charles
Newton Hodges was also immediately entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased,
Linnie Jane Hodges, or one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime.

One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue.

In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following appears:

Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is:

a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, petition). This is
now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition).

b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law governs the
successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 20-21,
petition).

c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties pertains to the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not questioned by the respondents.

d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, automatically inherited one-
half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as his legitime (p. 21, petition).

e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, petition). Upon the death of Charles
Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not
operate because the same is void (pp. 23-25, petition).

f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the Hodges
properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, petition). He in fact assumed
such ownership and such was the status of the properties as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34,
petition).

Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier part of this option.

On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas, there is no system of legitime,
hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all the conjugal properties.

51
It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases of Article 16 of the Civil
Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result in that the Philippine laws on succession should
control. On that basis, as We have already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-
fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no legal impediment to
the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the
contention of PCIB that the same constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be
recalled, PCIB's position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on two propositions,
namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament violates the rules on substitution of heirs under
the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial
court had already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her estate to the
exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and
memoranda does PCIB maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs.
Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas
virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act upon,
PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them."
(5 Moran, id, p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 1018).

Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the
court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1)
whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime
provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.

In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least,
minimize further protracted legal controversies between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative
to elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass
of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to whether his intention is
to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those
made by PCIB after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any
such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his
wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general
authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include his own
share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to
dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges,
shall be considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will
expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should remain with the estate at the
time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death
of Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being
only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to the estate
of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that
the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the peculiar provision of her will,
under discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of
Mrs. Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition
of the two estates in question.

THE APPEALS

A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief would readily reveal that
all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself
all the properties constituting his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court
per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which
appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are
not in accordance with law. Such being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be untenable
in fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two estates should be
administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two estates, it should follow that said assignments of
error have lost their fundamental reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the
respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further clarification. For instance,
some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many
of said orders, PCIB further claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction
of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. Hence, the necessity of dealing
separately with the merits of each of the appeals.

Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-indiviso, due to the failure of
Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any
qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts complained of in these appeals,
sanctioned though they might have been by the trial court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of
52
the two estates that should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority to act independently from her.
And considering that the lower court failed to adhere consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two
administrators to act independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of facts
above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the appealed orders to be able to
determine whether any of them has to be set aside or they may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure
of the court a quo to observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the
substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable proliferation of incidents in the subject
proceedings may be forestalled. In other words, We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual
circumstances extant in the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox approach,
so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by numerous innocent third parties, even if to
do so may not appear to be strictly in accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the confusion that might result
later from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the
existence of the separate estate of Mrs. Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a
relative degree of regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the modification of the
injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4 and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which
respondent Magno was completely barred from any participation in the administration of the properties herein
involved. In the September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings 1307 and
1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein "act conjointly — none of them to act
singly and independently of each other for any purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to
continue managing or administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs. Hodges'
estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position which could result in considerable, if not
irreparable, damage or injury to the other parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this
date, more than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be gleaned from the
fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a motion to declare PCIB in contempt for
alleged failure to abide therewith, notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been
denied soon after they were filed. 9

Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our mind to be the simplest, and
then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, without regard to the numerical sequence of the
assignments of error in appellant's brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel.

Assignments of error numbers

LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII.

These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 providing that "the deeds of
sale (therein referred to involving properties in the name of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as
Administrator of Testate Estate of C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A.
Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965
enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash collections (that) had been deposited in the account of
either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno — allow the PCIB to inspect
whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession, in the same manner that Administrator
PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have
in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all records
of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the
accountant or any authorized representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.)
and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of
October 27, 1965 last referred to. (pp. 455-456, id.)

As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Court's above-mentioned
resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more
importantly, with what We have said the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement We are ordering, by this
decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the questioned orders provide for joint action by the two
administrators, and that is precisely what We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two
estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly the foregoing assignments of
error must be, as they are hereby overruled.

Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII

to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.

53
The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with expenditures made by appellee
Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, in connection with her administration thereof, albeit
additionally, assignments of error Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided
for in the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges.

More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay paid to six employees of the
court and three other persons for services in copying the court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to
be fully informed of all the incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal expenses
of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and repeated motions for reconsideration
thereof were denied by the orders of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and
February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV
question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June 6, 1964 between
Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part,
and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for
said counsel who had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in certain
cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo —, more specifically in Special Proceedings 1307
and 1672 —" (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks
maybe needed to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the "administrator of
the estate of C. N. Hodges — to countersign the said check or checks as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.),
reconsideration of which order of approval was denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment
Number LXXVI imputes error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar as it
orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of Administratrix Avelina A. Magno
as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)

Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that there is no such estate as
the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in
effect expenditures from the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the
petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way the remaining issues
between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved,   the final result will surely be that there are properties
10

constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said
appellee had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay and to be paid for
her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and is not collecting amounts as substantial as
that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her credit.

Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority to enter into contracts for
attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the
reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the
probate court in determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious size of the
estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well as the professional standing of counsel,
We cannot say that the fees agreed upon require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it.

PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the estate but to the heirs of
Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels'
services would redound to the benefit of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a
premature distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail.

Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. Hodges, it results that juridically
and factually the interests involved in her estate are distinct and different from those involved in her estate of
Hodges and vice versa. Insofar as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as
administrator of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question the actuations
of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously
considerable size of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two
estates are segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement in question will
prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate.

And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should have a say on the attorney's
fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly
represented in the agreement itself by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed
any objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these appeals. As a matter of fact,
as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting
the determination and segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges.

Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is that at this stage of the
controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs.
Hodges. In this respect, the interest of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to
maintain that it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the interest of the brothers
and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why both Magno and these heirs have seemingly
agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact, such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both.

54
The possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be, at this stage, quite
remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any substantial conflict of interest between them
arise in the future, the same would be a matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the
independent proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject estates. We
cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be
represented by a common counsel.

Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to the heirs constitutes
premature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of
Hodges have any interest. In any event, since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the
corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, have already
been paid,   no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively small amount of attorney's fees in question.
11

And in this connection, it may be added that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an
administrator is in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in the final
analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has given his conformity thereto, it would
be idle effort to inquire whether or not the sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.

For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should be as they are hereby
overruled.

Assignments of error I to IV,

XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.

These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of sale of real properties
registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
purportedly in implementation of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges
during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962, the day he died. As stated
on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the, contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on April 20, 1960; the contract
to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April
18, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa,
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the
appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on February 21, 1958; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed
on August 14, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Graciano Lucero, executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton
Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on
February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. 13815."

Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband was to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties
respectively covered by said sales that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon
his death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the administrator of his estate and not by
the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference to five
other sales, in which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by Hodges before
the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico,
Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa Premaylon.

Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges after the death of his wife,
those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention
cannot be sustained. As already explained earlier, 1 * all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions made by
1

Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts of her estate and, therefore, subject
to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such
proceeds, whether in cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges to
any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong to him anymore at the time of his
death, they automatically became part of the inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question
involve transactions which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees should be
considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be distributed and partitioned among her heirs
specified in the will.

The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the lifetime of his wife, present a
different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility.

55
Considering, however, that the adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and
would bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued already in favor of
innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of
the legal situation involving them by overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which
would not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and all of the parties
concerned.

To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved; as much as possible, they
should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of judicial controversies not of their own making. What is
more, the transactions they rely on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already
known and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had authority to act on their
motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her
capacity as administratrix of one of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question
were executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously authorized or otherwise
sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving expenditures from the estate made by her either
conjointly with or independently from PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said
buyers-appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly, unless the impugned
orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.

It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are equivalent only to a fraction of what
should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-
fourth of the conjugal properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of her
estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In none of its numerous, varied and
voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the
case, to avoid any conflict with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale
executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, which
would have been actually under her control and administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the
conjugal partnership. Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced by the
appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who could, therefore, have the
requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB.

It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death of his wife. Even if he had
acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to submit those contracts to the court nor follow the
provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for
the simple reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of May 27, 1957 and
December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial court "to continue the business in which he
was engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which
according to the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real properties", and "to
execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of
December 14) In other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do so by
virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such grant of authority; on the contrary, it
is relying on the terms of the order itself for its main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB
contends, he acted as heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would still suffice.

As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which the deeds in question were
based were executed by Hodges before or after the death of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already
stated, that the properties covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the trial court may be invoked
only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not objecting, and the defects pointed out not being
strictly jurisdictional in nature, all things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already
created in favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed.

In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of error under discussion.

Assignments of error V to VIII,

XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI.

All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the respective vendees, appellees
herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just
discussed. It is claimed that some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to
sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral and Salvador S. Guzman,
the contracts with them had already been unilaterally cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses
contained in them, in view of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again
premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could not pertain to the estate of
Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal
properties, much more than the properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs.
Hodges, to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form part of such estate.

56
From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions, whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to
have disregarded the cancellations made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees,
and, whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were strictly followed, may not
be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps
the government because of the still unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any
objections were raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of PCIB under
the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.

Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX

to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.

PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are fundamental, namely: (1) that in
approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of
its functions as administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the right to invoke
such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a
probate court, the power to determine the contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real
property," since it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective contracts to
sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were complied with by the latter. What is
worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate
as determinative of the issue".

Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's having agreed to ignore the
cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is
decisive. Since We have already held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to
be portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete stranger in these
incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and her heirs who are the real parties in interest
having the right to oppose the consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones
who are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under discussion have no basis
and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled.

With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court requiring PCIB to surrender
the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the properties covered by the sales in question and
otherwise directing the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of
title in favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, the trial court was
within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give way, by withholding said owners' duplicate
certificates, of the corresponding registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court.

Assignments of error LXII to LXVII

All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellee Western Institute of
Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell
executed by Hodges prior to the death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of
P92,691.00 in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under date of October 4,
1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in
their respective capacities as administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case
of PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all your past due account", on
the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate very much if you can make some remittance to bring this
account up-to-date and to reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November 3,
1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing to pay P20,000 on account of its
overdue installments but uncertain whether it should pay PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the
aforesaid amount with the court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this
motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the narration of facts in this
opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant — can
pay to both estates or either of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is
as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."

The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From the procedural standpoint, it
is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered
and resolved on November 23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what
the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive aspect, it is contended that
the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court and that the order authorized payment
to a person other than the administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.

The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must assume, absent any clear proof to
the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other
hand, there is nothing irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for hearing the
same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for reconsideration wherein it raised the same points

57
was denied by the trial court on March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief
granted is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.

Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that they are mere reiterations
of contentions We have already resolved above adversely to appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add,
perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales
questioned in all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey property
executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being implemented by the executor or
administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8 of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to
be taken up in a separate action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein
involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect
to the supposed automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of
herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the said contracts, despite the
nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of
being mere unilateral accepted "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph)
the pactum commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of public policy,
unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of
which have been shown to have been made in connection with the transactions herein involved.

Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error

Number LXII to LXVII.

SUMMARY

Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein taken up and resolved are
rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than
thirty separate orders of the court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our
rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole situation be made together with
our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal aspects. .

The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane
Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a half. In their respective wills which were executed on
different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest,
residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and
personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) — during
(his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the
remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and
sisters of the latter.

Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was appointed special administrator
of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in
which he was engaged, (buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been
doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. Hodges' will had been
probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he
asserted that he was "not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the
properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his motion
dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, conveyances, leases and
mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton
Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales,
conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter."

Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of account of his administration,
with the particularity that in all his motions, he always made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the
Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for.

Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until December 25, 1962. Importantly
to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her
husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of my
said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal,
wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which
provision naturally made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest,
residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own death, may be readily known and
identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission,
although relatedly, it appears therein:

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 1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N. Hodges and the
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently reported the combined income of
the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the same equally between himself and the estate
of the deceased wife, and, more importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate
income tax returns for each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus
reporting that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.

2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order probating the will of Mrs.
Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then already deceased, Hodges lost no time
in asking for the proper correction "in order that the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or
believe they were omitted, and that they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges".

3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated that "deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except brothers and sisters and
herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", thereby
indicating that he was not excluding his wife's brothers and sisters from the inheritance.

4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United States inheritance tax
authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other heirs,
which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and
sworn to here in the Philippines and in which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so
disclaiming and renouncing his rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from
any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges", his wife, since her death.

On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of herein respondent and
appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No. 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, "in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe
and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless Special
Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962, p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on
December 29, 1962, a certain Harold K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special
Proceedings No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next of kin of the
deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to
replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone.

At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with each administrator acting
together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and
signature of Magno in transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval as their
joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to have arisen, for which reason, each
of them began acting later on separately and independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court.
Thus, PCIB had its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of the estate
independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties appearing in the name of Charles Newton
Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without
considering whether or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal partnership
pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made her own expenditures, hired her own
lawyers, on the premise that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties,
appearing in the name of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. All
of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators were invariably approved by the trial court
upon submission. Eventually, the differences reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than
anyone else about the ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her long
and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally its functions as administrator
separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and the present judicial controversies came about.

Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as well as the approval by the
court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges
has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to
Hodges, and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such
theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders
allowing respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in Special Proceedings
1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that
the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature
of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any
event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court
in Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than
one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in

59
accordance with Article 16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary
injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.

At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving individual acts of appellee
Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees
and incurring expenses of administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-
appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges, purportedly pursuant to
corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and
procedural grounds directly or indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the
two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.

On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of May 27 and December 14,
1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more
than the court's general sanction of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course
of administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was given by Mrs. Hodges to her
husband under the provision in question was a lifetime usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the
naked ownership passing directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code,
she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which, she alleges, there is no
system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal
partnership properties. She further maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law
renounced his inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her brothers and sisters
effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.

In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized, We overrule PCIB's
contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957 amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the
estate of his wife, and We recognize the present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties,
which, while registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share of Mrs.
Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent provisions of her will, any portion of
said share still existing and undisposed of by her husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and
sisters share and share alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do not
warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final adjudication. Legally, We hold that
the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were
issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made.
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the estate would be done. At best,
therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final
adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third
parties, inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid.

More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the record, and on the assumption
that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters consists of one-fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever
Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, when she died, to December
25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to remunerative dispositions made by him during the same
period, the proceeds thereof, whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's
estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously.

At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the
estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in
regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the
free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be
less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference
solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of
one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words,
hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the
matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party related to the effects of
foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.

In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in favor of her brothers and
sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's
pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously
instituted her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would
have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former would be
only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case
of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the
essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional
simultaneous institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the
operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the institution of his brothers
and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by law.

60
We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just
stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended
by Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance
from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,
the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage,
Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband
could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugal
partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges,
of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of
therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB,
under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable,
such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband
under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that in predicating its orders on
the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her
brothers and sisters and that respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and
within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be denied. The Court feels
however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and the determination of the specific properties
constituting her estate, the two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of
September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.

Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee Magno, as administratrix, of
expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of
Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do
on the assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by appellant PCIB, that the
size and value of the properties that should correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the
attorney's fees and administration expenses in question.

With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee Magno, as administratrix,
covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the details of which are related earlier above, a distinction
must be made between those predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on
the one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. As regards the latter, We
hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges, as may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected in the relevant provisions of
her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges
would exceed the total value of all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said
properties may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being no showing that thus
viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, including the government, the Court also holds that,
disregarding procedural technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the
assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB has no personality to raise
the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs
of Mrs. Hodges or the government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, there
exists no reason for said orders to be set aside.

DISPOSITIVE PART

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R.
Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder
ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal
enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie
Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared
that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issue of whether or not Charles
Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said
estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife
on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall
continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband,
and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are to
be made from said estate; in consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4
and December 6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB,
as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-
appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings
1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is
61
reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their
respective estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the
partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges
may be properly and clearly identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-
fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her
exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint
administration of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672,
whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special
Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as
administrator ; and this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and
12

renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation
and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.

Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their
actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing
opinion.

Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one additional appeal docket fees,
but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the
respective notices to them hereof in accordance with the rules. Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.

G.R. No. L-12767             November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,

STREET, J.:

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the
city of Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as
estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own
handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section
618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could
properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:

Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state
or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or
subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to
the laws of these Islands.

The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered in the
"Manila Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses
were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the document was declared to
be legal and was admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T.
Pickett as administrators of the estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to
serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.

By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the
Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba
Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to
Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five
children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto.

The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an understanding of the case are these: Emil H.
Johnson was born in Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United States and lived in
Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898, at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and
immediately thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States. As a result
of relations between Johnson and Rosalie Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after
their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16,
1898.

62
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the
Philippine Islands, and on November 20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce from him
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of desertion. A little later Johnson appeared in the United
States on a visit and on January 10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago. From Chicago he
appears to have gone to Sweden, where a photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which he
appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, who was then living with her
grandparents in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he prospered in
business and continued to live until his death.

In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children,
to wit, Mercedes, baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor, baptized December 9,
1907. The other two children mentioned in the will were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibañez.

On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson
entered an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On October
31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the
case. On February 20, 1917, this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has
been perfected.

As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and
put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner
as the sole legitimate heir of her father.

The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are four in number and may be stated, in the
same sequence in which they are set forth in the petition, as follows:

(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will
in question was executed;

(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois;

(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and

(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills.
The fourth proposition above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third and must be
considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover, both the third and fourth grounds stated take
precedence, by reason of their more fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical exposition of the
contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two following propositions:

(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because made
without notice to the petitioner;

(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a
resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.

In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising in this cae in the order last above
indicated. Upon the question, then, of the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record of
the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law as prerequisites to the probate of a will were
complied with in every respect and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all legal requirements.
This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at
the time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the petitioner lived in the United
States and that as daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit
the petitioner to be present either in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to
postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
property shall not be taken without due process of law.

On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.

As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially
one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the
constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be
an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due

63
process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."

In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at the time of the testator's death; and it was
impossible, in view of the distance and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to appear and
oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in California. It was nevertheless held that publication in the
manner prescribed by statute constituted due process of law. (See Estate of Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir,
151 Cal., 363.)

In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that, under the laws of California, the petitioner
had a full year within which she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was stated as one of
the reasons for holding that publication in the manner provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance
was commented upon in O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in the Supreme Court of the United
States. This case arose under the laws of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been given as required by law. It was insisted that this
was an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This contention was,
however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right to contest the will within a year was a complete refutation of
the argument founded on the idea of a violation of the due process provision.

The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all of the States of the American Union,
contain no special provision, other than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which relief of any
sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do,
however, have a provision of a general nature authorizing a court under certain circumstances to set aside any
judgment, order, or other proceeding whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:

Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect; Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.

The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the part of the
Legislature to give a wide latitude to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be restricted
to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings
him into court by personal service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is not limited to actions
proper but extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings.

In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that the provisions of this Code shall be liberally
construed to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that the intention thus
exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of section 113; and we hold that the word "party," used in this
section, means any person having an interest in the subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.

The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited, at any time within six months for
March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by
conditions over which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously
entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been
authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest
the probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although
the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the possibility
of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her
attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.

It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis case, above cited, the proceedings in the court
below were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a remedy by which the
petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have obtained relief from the order by which she is supposed to have
been injured; and though the period within which the application should have been made was short, the remedy was
both possible and practicable.

From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate
cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the
original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question. Whether the result would have been the same
if our system of procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in section 113 is a matter which we
need not here consider.

Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is another matter which may be properly
discussed at this juncture. This relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is applicable only to wills of liens; and in this
64
connection attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an
alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued
that section 636 is not applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these Islands.lawphil.net

We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that, by the most reasonable interpretation of
the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the United States and the States of
the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics
that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never
control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section,
being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the
operative words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the
Philippine Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the
State of Illinois.

We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated at the outset of this discussion, which raises
the question whether the order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the
petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in
conformity with the laws of that State.

The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate recites, among other things:

That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil H. Johnson was a citizen of the United
States, naturalized in the State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was executed in
conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State of Illinois.

We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the execution of the will the testator was a citizen of
the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon the last point the
finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that the testator was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in
the State of Illinois, should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of Illinois, as well as of the United
States.

The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition precedent to the granting of the certificate of
naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least five years in the United States and for one year within
the State or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to
the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen
of that State as well as of the United States.

In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
declares, in its opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.

It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert that the testator
was not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is he was
"never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of Manila,"
etc. But residence in the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that
the allegations of the petition on this point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in
Illinois, wholly insufficient.

As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was
executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate. And
how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?

In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or
personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity
of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of
the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to
attest the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate
is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep.,
676.)

Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law, and
without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or defect
in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This
court has never been called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief
could be granted in some other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is readily seen that if
65
fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor in the cae. In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil.
Rep., 180, 184), it was suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case the probate of a will were
procured by fraud.

The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will was executed in conformity with the law of
Illinois and also, in effect, that the testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an unassailable
basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact of the judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable
that even if the judgment had not contained these recitals, there would have been a presumption from the admission
of the will to probate as the will of a citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.

As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no
principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general
jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered
in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank,
10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have established before
the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."

The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its faculties in
this respect whether exercised in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial court
therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon which the propriety of admitting the will to probate
depended; and the recital of those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its validity. No express ruling
is, however, necessary on this point.

What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon the order of
probate for error apparent on the face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment reviewed, it being
asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially on the question of the citizenship of the testator — are not
supported by the evidence. It needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in such a proceeding as this it
is not possible to reverse the original order on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by the
proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in which a review of the evidence can be secured is by
appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The present
proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the order denying this relief.
It is obvious that on appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not possible to review the evidence
upon which the original judgment was based. To permit this would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.

However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from the point of view of the petitioner, we
propose to examine the evidence submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of the
petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court was sufficient to justify its findings,
and, secondly, whether the petition contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the judgment, aside.
In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of the
six months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The evidence adduced upon this point in the trial
court consists of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, in connection with certain biographical facts contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization
supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the United States, and
inferentially also a citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when Johnson
first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these Islands for
sometime after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United
States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his permanent domicile, and on the
contrary the certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois.

Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, how
has he lost the character of citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of
which any person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore,
impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from the United States and change his
political status from a citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be presumed
that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would
be novel doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their citizenship
in the State of their naturalization or nativity.

We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State
with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in
accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says
that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of this provision
necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of
his original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State
citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a citizen of

66
an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the
mere change of domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.

The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will was executed,
the testator was, as stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in connection with the
circumstance that the petition does not even so much as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the testator was
a resident of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the probate aside for lack of the
necessary citizenship on the part of the testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is
wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.

Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the statutes of the State of Illinois —
we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any
witness was examined with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no
doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois,
as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed
that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was
in our opinion mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice, among other things, of the
acts of the legislative department of the United States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial notice of
the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be derived from
the broader language, used in the same action, where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of
public knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of the statutes of
the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in
the Philippine courts.

Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the
point in question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact
from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the
assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question based on such supposed error.
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its
judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of
Civil procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong. The petitioner, it is
true, states in general terms that the will in question is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in
the State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied
contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tent to raise
a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be
urged as of serious moment.

But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was not properly admissible to probate because
it contains provisions which cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands; and it is
suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which
she is entitled under the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point it is sufficient to
say that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being
conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil.
Rep., 393, 395.)

If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any legacy given by the will or other disposition
made therein is contrary to the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the
law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must
be determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the general provisions here
applicable in such matters; for in the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be situate."

From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916,
was entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether said petition
be considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an
application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition.
And in this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time
allowed by law.

It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly
affirmed with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

67
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs. ANDRE
BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed.  lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection
with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

68
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all
their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law. Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-32636             March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance
Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is
not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving
party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First
Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix
who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E.,
vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance
with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under
the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the
testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to
the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some
other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish
this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning
administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to
have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.

While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition
asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents
discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and
Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by
another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,
appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix,
deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was
filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West
69
Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West
Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.

Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from
Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of
this alleged divorce.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088             July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant, vs. In re:
Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee..

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and testament
executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China,
on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased is more than P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien
province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion,
Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage
had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to
Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15
October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last
will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose
B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the
hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken
from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to
prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings
(63 Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the
taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a
motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the
petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files,
records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the
deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the
will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4
January 1931 (Exhibit N).

There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are
estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or assignment of
their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses
Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual
and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in
this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on
November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been
probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar to the filing of
this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.

As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is
shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his
knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.
When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under
the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.

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The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro
and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of
this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting
of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting
witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd
interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that
he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language (answers to the
22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost
will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4
and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of
the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office
of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th
interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you
want any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B. Suntay
put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to
X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he
read the translation (answers to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it
(check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).

Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that
her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing along with him certain
document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from
Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the
document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate,
to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio,
Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned
over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she
read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on
redirect she testifies that she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t.
s. n., Id.).

Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948), before the
last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De los Reyes Building
and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he
checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s.
n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by the latter to the
former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office straight from the
boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery
took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her
brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948),
must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still the fact
remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw
only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s.
n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with
her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to
Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).

If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was
signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said:
"You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his
pocket and had the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of
the will, because it must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must
have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the
draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go
Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he
learned to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit
B) into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed will or the
alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p.
229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the appointment of a co-administrator
of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her
deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the
original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all
71
the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second marriage in the estate
of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds
of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro.
According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino,
Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it
was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone
falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two mills for Jose
B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez
for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and
returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449,
t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the
former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the
second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as
witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the
handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the
final draft of the first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three
months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland
Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman
who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A)
where the following words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the
signing of the will it was placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B.
Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401,
441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later part of
August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the
following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same
condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that
Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh
said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).

The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the complaint for estafa
filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of
Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto
Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified
before the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n.,
Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on
fees) was signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78.
Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed,
and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance
in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as
if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a
valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The
unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic
of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart
from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the
72
Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his
right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it
appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the
testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not
purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on
the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and
for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made.
The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up
to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings
were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:

ORDER:

SEE BELOW

The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that there are no
errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.

Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the Republic of China
in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.

HUANG KUANG CHENG

Clerk of Court

CHIANG TENG HWA

Judge

(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).

does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and
the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein
cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-11622             January 28, 1961

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G.
Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of
British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson another British
subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and
established their permanent residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947,
and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife
Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in
the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed as follows:

On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court

73
and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary
estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at
their values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in
order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting
upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared
therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value
in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary
administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the
sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or
inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6, 1952.

On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in pursuance
f his reservation made at the time of filing of the preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right
granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was
reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to
P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by the ancillary administrator on the market notation
of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that
is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the following deductions:

In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the
estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.

On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return (Exh.
"M-N"). This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952,
except that it contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction in the amount of
P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal
Revenue Code which the ancillary administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled
"Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the reciprocity proviso of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for
the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had overpaid
the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the
estate. The Collector denied the claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to
Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the surviving spouse in the
conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property should
be deducted from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the
National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said
Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an
exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance
taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall
be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.

From this decision, both parties appealed.

The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, while the assignees, Douglas and Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made six assignments of
error. Together, the assigned errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this Court:

(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half (½) of the net estate should be
deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in
relation to section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;

(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares
of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;

(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. Internal
Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code;

74
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000 shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court;

(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and administration
expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the amount
of indebtedness allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; and

(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it claims to have overpaid the
government and to be refundable to it.

In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of any
ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership
as to the properties acquired during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case is being
disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New
Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but by
the national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged by petitioner that English
laws do not recognize legal partnership between spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another
regime of property relation, wherein all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the
husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the
effect that in testate and intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is to be
determined by the national law of the decedent.

In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took place in 1909, the
applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective
only in 1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of determining the property relation
of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and they have made no prior agreement as to the administration
disposition, and ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the husband becomes the
dominant law in determining the property relation of the spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two
articles in that Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless of whether
the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article 1325 2 of the old Civil Code is limited to
marriages contracted in a foreign land.

It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa, 3 in his
Commentaries, has this to say on this point:

La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en Espana y entre espanoles.
El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la regla
procedente cuando dos extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que atender
en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas
generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)

If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of the Stevensons, married in 1909,
would be the English law even if the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But,
as correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the decedent husband full
ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere
allegation in his answer, which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law says on
the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls "processual
presumption," in presuming that the law of England on this matter is the same as our law. 4

Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to bolster his
stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not
encompass or contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said article distinctly
speaks of amount of successional rights and this term, in speaks in our opinion, properly refers to the extent or
amount of property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be
pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their successional rights, is governed
differently by the specific and express provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of
the old Civil Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of the conjugal property in
determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.

On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the respondents from paying
inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity
proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California
Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code
has not been duly proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the
United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while
the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible personal properties, the latter only
exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
75
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an
active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible
personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue
Code as published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of
his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6

Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals.
However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the
case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we considered the
testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code
and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.

We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death taxes, between the State of
California and the Philippines.F

Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides:

... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of
his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal
property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied).

On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.

"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property is exempt from the tax
imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a territory or another State of
the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in
respect to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.

(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible personal
property of residents of this State, or

(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-resident was
exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other State of the
United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in
respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United States or foreign
state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.)

It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to transfer or
death taxes of any and every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes
of any and every character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or imposes
and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties therein, there are
imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California, only
inheritance tax is imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on non-
residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity.
Applying these laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a
Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the
payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a
Filipino, non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be entitled to the exemption clause
of the California law, since the Californian has not been exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or
death tax because he is, under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt
the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax
in California because under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the same,
there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a
disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our
76
own government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred in exempting the estate in
question from payment of the inheritance tax.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481,
prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from payment of the
inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of reciprocity
between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and
the ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that in view
of the express provisions of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of
the other grants an exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there could not be partial
reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.

With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Estate
Tax Law which is also being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case (supra)
that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an
exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal
Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .

On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it is contended
that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought to have been
considered by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It
should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with said proviso the properties are required to be appraised at
their fair market value and the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when
evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are satisfied that such evidence
exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax court aptly
observed:

"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the administrator of the estate in
the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said
properties. On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge,
and this Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation purposes are very much
lower than the true and fair market value of the properties at a given time and place. In fact one year after
decedent's death or in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no showing
that special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the price of P43,500.00, if we
were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs
himself admitted in open court that he was willing to purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter.
In the light of these facts we believe and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in
Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the premises." (Decision, p. 19).

In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic
corporation), respondents contend that their value should be fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at
the San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were then held in that
place and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the
shares of stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede
and considering that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's
taxing authority, their fair market value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country.

Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said shares of stock commanded a
lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs,
respondents have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.).
Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either
before this court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to
reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining company on August 22,
1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as claimed by respondents..

It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the basis of the
declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return. Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the
fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of the estate
declared at their fair market value as of six months from the time the decedent died..

On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or disallowance of which by the Tax
Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..

Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the allowance of the sum of
P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.

An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were considered deductible by the Tax
Court on the basis of their approval by the probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had also been
presented for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate court would not have approved said items were
77
they not supported by evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before
it the pertinent order of the probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2", p. 100,
record). As the Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the findings of the probate court, as it must have
been satisfied that those expenses were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse
this finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National Association, which it would appear, that while still
living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the
additional amount of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack of evidence.

In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's
two parcels of land in Baguio City, which respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find that this claim
has in fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful review of the record will reveal, was that the Tax
Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz:

added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and administration
expenses approved by the court, making a total of P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at by the
Tax Court for judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of P9,256.98 allowed by
the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount
allowed for realty taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral
expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the lower court and there is no
reason why it should not be. .

We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E)
and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have been allowed the estate
as a deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support
thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of
California National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained a loan of
$5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-
Q4", pp. 53-59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local probate court had not
approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to
intangible personal property which the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.

For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the deduction.

Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular indebtedness of the decedent is
necessary. This is so although the same, it is averred has been already admitted and approved by the
corresponding probate court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that we have
here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it has been held, the distinction between
domiciliary or principal administration and ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from
the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. 8 The reason for the ancillary administration is that,
a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it was
granted. Hence, we have the requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can have effect
here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the same manner as wills originally presented
for allowance therein.9 And the estate shall be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration
granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as probated, after payment of just debts and expenses of
administration.10 In other words, there is a regular administration under the control of the court, where claims must
be presented and approved, and expenses of administration allowed before deductions from the estate can be
authorized. Otherwise, we would have the actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and distribution of
the estate situated here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our courts have no control.
We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the Rules of Court.

Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the provisions of Section 89,
letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal Revenue Code which reads:

(d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a non-resident not a citizen
of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in
the return required to be filed under section ninety-three the value at the time of his death of that part of the
gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."

In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Stevenson not situated in the
Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to determine how much of the
indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same section 89 of the Internal
Revenue Code which provides:

(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the case of a non-resident not a citizen of the
Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross estate which at the time of his death is
situated in the Philippines —

78
 (1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That proportion of the deductions specified in paragraph
(1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the value of such part bears the value of his entire gross estate
wherever situated;"

In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the indebtedness which is equivalent to
the proportion that the estate in the Philippines bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated differently, if the
properties in the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the
indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to, there is no statement of the value of the
estate situated outside the Philippines, no part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to
Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the deduction of the alleged
indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.

In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:

(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal partnership property constitutes
his hereditary estate subject to the estate and inheritance taxes;

(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no complete total
reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;

(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother
Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and

(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of the net asset of the
deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a recomputation on the
basis of this decision is hereby denied in line with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's
Hospital (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a statutory provision clearly or
expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and none has been cited by respondents, the National
Government cannot be required to pay interest."

WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in
all other respects not inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL
SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national. died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind
real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: (a) Yao
Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China; (b) the other oppositors are the
legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is
competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13;
Rollo, p. 107.] After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:

(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]

(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy
Mat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,

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 (3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64- 65.]

held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 105-106.]

On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:

(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy- Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman
with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many years:

(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the
laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic);

(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy
(Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be
valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat;
and

(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of the
estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36- 37.]

From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by respondent court.
They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.

Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel
Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun
Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme
Court however resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of
judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. **

The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the
petitioners the Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due
course to this petition. Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:

I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE

OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-

GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL
CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]

I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was
conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial and documentary evidence.

First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or
entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and
Sy Mat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that the said
agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that
those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook
Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and
her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on
several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is
exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that
matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go- between, a sort of marriage broker who is
80
 known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-
to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement
day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the
parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which
in her case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the
bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the
parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed
by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the
wedding day, the document is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then
be placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before
departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the
bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to
said Chinese custom), there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the
carriage, two old ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Mat;
that during her wedding, Sy Chick, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her
mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Mat were married for 46 years
already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now;
that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a
certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went
to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to
the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines
and lived with Sy Mat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat during the
several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]

Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the many people
who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese
government, a document signed by the parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16;
Rollo, pp.
52-53.]

Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect that (a) Sy Mat
was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese
wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]

Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following
entries are found: "Marital status—Married"; "If married give name of spouses—Yao Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of
marriage—1931"; and "Place of marriage—China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]

Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the following entries are
likewise found: "Civil status—Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address of spouse—Yao Kee Chingkang,
China" [Exhibit "4".]

And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China
to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs.
Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
[Exhibit "5".]

These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not
suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta,
Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil.
Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules
of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source
of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.)  ***

81
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law,
Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence
of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing
Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on
marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on
marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance
with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on
marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137
(1910).]

This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of
Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]

Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li
Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential
requisite for a marriage to be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the
issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy
Quia, supra., at p. 160.]

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China
on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom
obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage
of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.

Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being applicable to the instant
case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the
contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.

The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a foreign marriage
and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as
ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no
solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo,
p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]

II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.

Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:

82
 (1) Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if any: give
number of children—Four"; and, "Name—All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1";]

(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat, only
three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December
12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,

(3) an affidavit executed on March 22,1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly
stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3".]

Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three daughters with his
Chinese wife, two of whom—Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho—she knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December
6,1977, pp. 87-88.]

However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Mat according to the laws of China, they
cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are
natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased
because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen
who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]

Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with Asuncion
Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their
favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their
parents and approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged
them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of such
relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on
July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December
14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.

3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY ... , the parties mutually
agree and covenant that—

(a) The stocks and merchandize and the furniture and equipments ..., shall be
divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own
one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the
same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.

(b) the business name and premises ... shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall
be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand
Pesos ( Pl,000.00 ) monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same
building now occupied by Everett Construction.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the

common-law husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties
registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego ... , the parties mutually agree and
covenant that the said real estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their
children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by
Asuncion Gillego during her lifetime ... [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily
acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]

Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Mat's marriage to Yao Kee and the paternity and
filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

83
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act Revising Rep. Act
No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan', with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court:

SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court.—

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;

(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations, legal separation of spouses, and actions
for support;

(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three of the
civil code;

xxx xxx xxx

and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324] reiterated in Divinagracia v.
Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the
Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12,
1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by
petitioners.

Moreover, even without the exactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502 sec. 91-A last
paragraph that:

xxx xxx xxx

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in
the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.

xxx xxx xxx

As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA 307]:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a case involving paternity
and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot
vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976).  But that legal provision presupposes that such an
administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for ths rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of
First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July
13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits. Accordingly, this Court finds no
reversible error committed by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 95122-23             May 31, 1991

84
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.

On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with
prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five
(5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex
"D", petition).

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting
to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William
and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory (Annex "F",
petition).

The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20,
1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the
reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).

85
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest
issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54214.

On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge
has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent
judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for
injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent
Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.

The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129
with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo
vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-
90 for forum-shopping.

In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until
the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly
resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and
prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.

For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.

Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank
with Regional Trial Courts.

Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested
with the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those

86
 falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-
judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:

. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same
is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment
of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under
Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under
the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory,
but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.

Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,
and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)

There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the
RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.

However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to
judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as
follows:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

87
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter,
provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court
specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).

True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals,
180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).

However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings
are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding?
In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and
We quote:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a
writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen
and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]).
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only
on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.

In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec.
21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.

Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.  Considering
1âwphi1

the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the
controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs.
Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).

In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp.,
et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).

Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:

88
 Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia,
92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent.
In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already
settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being
expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).

According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was
the actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the
decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and
over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period
from July 6, 1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of
citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated
from a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian.
Well settled is the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim
to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make
any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation
Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).

In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:

(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.

An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:

We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof
of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.

Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based
on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the
Court finds the same devoid of merit.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)
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From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa,
24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua
To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of
an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of
the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;

x x x           x x x          x x x

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was
issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent
Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing
before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which
was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens."
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s)
of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain
in the country."

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as
Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a
matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:

90
 The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July
12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).

Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).

In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the
Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate
child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25,
1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry
which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.

The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing
to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in
issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20,
1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It
is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in
this case.

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years
after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:

There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained
entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of
her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for
the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the
minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which
gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not
serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented
preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the
immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings
against the minor.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would be
condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed
the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the
period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be
to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of
insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in
favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28
long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37
(b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be

91
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.

The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should
be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses
therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and
deportation if he is an alien." Thus:

Penal Provisions

Sec. 45. Any individual who—

(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or

(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to receive
such document; or

(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or

(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or

(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or

(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or

(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than
two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)

Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional
penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."

Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.

The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion
based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the
final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).

"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it
is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse
of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an
action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:

92
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or
exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a)
of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the
prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision
dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).

Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the
Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor
children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in
business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that
the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and
approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.

"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped
the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident
Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an
alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out that
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William)
Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-
serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.

After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.

In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being
no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine
law.

The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree
(Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of
the Civil Code provides:

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)

Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not
self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).

93
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And
any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be
extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property
during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated
in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate
child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV
of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling
arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to
have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs

HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity
as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in
Manila two (2) separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C.
Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:

5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY

This agreement is for a period of three (3) years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the
parties.

xxx xxx xxx

6. TERMINATION

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the

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 intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's
salary.

xxx xxx xxx

10. APPLICABLE LAW:

This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the
Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under
this agreement.

Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they began discharging their job
functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East
and Europe.

On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment,
PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1
August 1980 to private respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses
would be terminated "effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they
had) executed with [PIA]."2

On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, docketed as NCR-
STF-95151-80, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at conciliation, the MOLE hearing
officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence supporting their
respective positions. The PIA submitted its position paper,   but no evidence, and there claimed that both private
3

respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of
"personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both
private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.

In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella ordered the reinstatement of private
respondents with full backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the amounts equivalent to their
salaries for the remainder of the fixed three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to private
respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of
a bonus to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month salary.   The Order stated that private
4

respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued
service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and void as
violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual
employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was
illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.

On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the
findings of fact and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's award save for the portion thereof
giving PIA the option, in lieu of reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private respondents] their salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 
5

In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the award of the Regional Director and the Order of the
Deputy Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having been rendered without support in the
evidence of record since, allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty. Jose M. Pascual; and for
having been issued in disregard and in violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts with private
respondents.

1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction over the same being lodged in the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us beyond dispute, however,
that both at the time the complaint was initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed were
rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L. Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente
Leogardo, Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.

Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the termination of the services of employees with at least one
(1) year of service without prior clearance from the Department of Labor and Employment:

Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions — . . .

(b) With or without a collective agreement, no employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss
or terminate the employment of employees with at least one year of service during the last two (2)
years, whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in

95
 accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may promulgate . . . (emphasis
supplied)

Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case
of a termination without the necessary clearance, the Regional Director was authorized to order the
reinstatement of the employee concerned and the payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the
Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over such termination cases:

Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without clearance. — Any shutdown or dismissal without prior
clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a just cause. The
Regional Director shall, in such case order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the
payment of his wages from the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the time of reinstatement.
(emphasis supplied)

Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly very explicit
about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over termination of employment cases:

Under PD 850, termination cases — with or without CBA — are now placed under the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Director. Preventive suspension cases, now made cognizable for the first
time, are also placed under the Regional Director. Before PD 850, termination cases where there
was a CBA were under the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, while
termination cases where there was no CBA were under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section.

In more details, the major innovations introduced by PD 850 and its implementing rules and
regulations with respect to termination and preventive suspension cases are:

1. The Regional Director is now required to rule on every application for clearance, whether there is
opposition or not, within ten days from receipt thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction, still his order was
null and void because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process .  This claim,
6

however, cannot be given serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional Director to submit not only
its position paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position
paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing was
conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case
to the Ministry of Labor and Employment.  7

There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due process must be rejected. At the time the complaint
was filed by private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the Regional Director issued his questioned
order on 22 January 1981, applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal without prior clearance
shall be conclusively presumed to be termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional Director was
required in such case to" order the immediate reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages from the
time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement." In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional
Director did not even have to require submission of position papers by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et
de jure) character of the presumption created by such applicable law and regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology
v. Minister of Labor and Employment,   the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14, Section 2, of the Implementing
8

Rules and Regulations, the termination of [an employee] which was without previous clearance from the Ministry of
Labor is conclusively presumed to be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be overturned by any
contrary proof however strong."

3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and 6 of its contract of employment with private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was governed by the provisions of its
contract rather than by the general provisions of the Labor Code.  9

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