CRIMINAL MOOT

IX SEMESTER MOOT AND PRACTICAL TRAINING COMPULSORY MOOT

2022

BEFORE

THIS HON’BLE HIGH COURT

IN THE INSTANT MATTER OF

PYARELAL SINGH ...................................................................... Appellant

v.

STATE .................................................... Respondent

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON THE BEHALF OF STATE

Submitted by: Jyotnoor Kaur Sethi

Roll no. 16135

B.A. LL.B (Hons)

9th Semester
 TABLE OF CONTENT

SR. NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 7

5. ISSUES RAISED 8

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 9

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 10

8. PRAYER 16

2
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S.NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

1. UOI Union of India

2. Ors. Others

3. Anr. Another

4. Hon’ble Honourable

5. SC Supreme Court

6. SCC Supreme Court Cases

7. Art. Article

8. Sec. Section

9. u/a Under Article

10. u/s Under Section

11. IPC Indian Penal Code

12. CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

13. IEA Indian Evidence Act

14. AIR All India Reporter

15. Govt. Government

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS

1. Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis (2014).

2. K.I. Vibhute, Criminal Law, LexisNexis (2019).
3. K.D. Gaur, The Indian Penal Code, Universal Law Publishing (2013).
4. R.V. Kelkar, Criminal Procedure, Eastern Book Company (2019).
5. Avtar Singh, Principles of the Law of Evidence, Central Law Publications (2010).

STATUTES
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
3. Indian Evidence Act, 1872

WEBSITES
1. www.meity.gov.in
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.manupatra.com
4. www.shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in
5. www.cis-india.org
6. www.lawfinderlive.com

CASES

Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 ........................................................................... 10

Bharat Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (2004) CrLJ 1958 (Raj)..................................................... 12
Chacko @ Aniyan Kunju v. State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269 ............................................. 11
George Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 SC 1208 ............................................... 15
Gour Chandra v. State of Orissa, (1989) Cr LJ 1667 (Ori) ........................................................ 12
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1993 SC 72 ...................................................................... 11
Kashi Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 1172................................................................ 13
Kishan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 244 ............................................................. 13
M’Naughten (1843) 8 Eng Rep 718............................................................................................ 12
Munney Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh. AIR 1971 SC 1491 ............................................... 13
Nankaunaoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 317 ......................................................... 10

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Parapuzha Thamban v. State of Kerala, (1989) Cr LJ 1372 (Ker) ............................................. 12
Pulu Mura v. State of Assam, (2004) Cr LJ 458 (Gau) .............................................................. 12
Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1674 .................................................................. 14
Raj Pal v. State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678......................................................................... 11
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874 ............................................................... 11
Rameshar v. State (Delhi Administration), (1981) Cr LJ 1125 (Del)......................................... 14
Rizan v. State of Chattisgarh (2003) 2 SCC 661 ........................................................................ 15
Sekhar v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) Cr LJ 53 (SC) .................................................................. 14
Sidheshwari Bora v. State of Assam, (1981) Cr LJ 1005 (Gau) ............................................... 12
Srikant Anandrao Bhosale v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 7 SCC 748 ................................... 12
State of Punjab v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570 ................................................................. 15
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gajey Singh, (2009) 1 SCC 458 ......................................................... 15
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 .................................................................... 10
Vishvas Aba Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 414............................................. 14

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant has approached the Hon’ble Court under Section 374(2)1of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, whereas the State has filed the appeal under Section 377(1) 2of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

1
Section 374 (2): Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or
on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years 2 has been
passed against him or against any other person convicted at the same trial], may appeal to the High Court.
2
Section 377 (1): Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the State Government may, in any case of
conviction on a trial held by any Court other than a High Court, direct the Public Prosecutor to present 2 [an
appeal against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy

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 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Pyarelal Singh was shopkeeper in the big city. He lived with his wife and two children. His
relationship with his wife was not cordial and she was not having goodher. Pyarelal was also
suffering of mental health issues and was undergoing psychiatric treatment. Kartar Singh, a
sportsperson by profession, was his instant neighbour. Both Pyarelal Singh and Kartar Singh
did not have friendly terms with each other.

On one event, there was a function in house of Kartar Singh. A large number of guests came
to join the event. However, Pyarelal Singh was not invited to the function. On that day Kartar
Singh parked his car in front of the gate of the house of Pyarelal Singh. Since Pyarelal Singh
was not given invitation to the event, his ego was hurt and he was very irritated with Kartar
Singh and thus he warned Kartar Singh strictly not to park the car at that place, but Kartar
Singh also showed his arrogance by saying that the road was not the personal property of
Pyarelal, he further added that he would remove his car only after the function and after the
departure of the guests and scolded him also. On hearing such an arrogant statement, Pyarelal
Singh lost his balance of mind and slapped and pushed away Kartar Singh. Both started
grappling and fighting with each other, in the course of which Pyarelal gave a harsh blow at
the stomach of Kartar in order to free himself from the grip of him. On receiving the bloow,
appendicitis of Kartar Singh busted started bleeding and he fell down in severe pain in his
stomach and his chest bone also fractured. Pyarelal immediately threw Kartar Singh in the car
of Kartar Singh and drove the car towards the nearest hospital. At the same time, since a large
number of cars were parked in the street due to the visits of the guests in Kartar’s function,
Pyarelal had to face difficulty to take the car out of the street and in this course a lot of time
was wasted. In the hospital, Kartar Singh could not be saved. Doctors expressed their views
that Kartar Singh could have been saved had he beed brought to the hospital ten minutes
earlier. Besides in the medical report it was mentioned that one teeth of the deceased was also
found broken and interenal bleeding was there.

Pyarelal Singh was charged with the offence of murder. Trial court convicted Pyarelal Singh
under grievous hurt. Pyarelal Singh filed an appeal challenging the decision of the trial court.
State also filed an appeal on the ground that the decision of the trial court is erroneous.

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 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE INDIAN

PENAL CODE?

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE BENEFIT OF INSANITY BE GIVEN TO THE ACCUSED?

ISSUE 3: WHETHER ACCUSED CAN TAKE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE

INDIAN PENAL CODE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused, Pyarelal Singh, liable for
the offence of murder, as enshrined under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is
humbly submitted that as per the Third Clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the
intention of causing causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE BENEFIT OF INSANITY BE GIVEN TO THE

ACCUSED?

It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused will not given the benefit of the
general exception of insanity defined under Section 84 of IPC. It is humbly submitted before
the Hon’ble Court that in order to seek protection of Section 84, IPC, it is necessary for an
accused to prove that he, at the time of commission of the act was of unsound mind and he
because of the “unsoundness of mind”, was incapable of knowing the “nature” of the act; or
that the act was “contrary to law”; or that the act was “wrong”.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER ACCUSED CAN TAKE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE?

It is submitted that accused cannot take the benefit of private defence because (i) he was the
aggressor, (ii) Section 100 is not applicable in the present case, and (iii) accused exceeded the
doctrine of proportionality.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER ACCUSED IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE

INDIAN PENAL CODE?

1) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused, Pyarelal Singh, liable for
the offence of murder, as enshrined under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2) It is humbly submitted that as per the Third Clause of Section 300 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with
the intention of causing causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to
be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
3) The third clause views the matter from an objective standpoint. It consists of two parts. Under
the first part, it has to be shown that there was an intention to inflict the particular injury. The
second part requires that the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death.
4) In the case of Anda v. State of Rajasthan3, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the
essence of the third clause is the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death.
5) When the word “sufficiency” is used, it means where there is a high probability of the injury
resulting in death4.
6) In the locus classicus ofVirsa Singh v. State of Punjab5the Apex Court granted a four-point
test, which the prosecution must do to look into and prove the case so that the case can be
brought under Sec. They are:

i. First, it should establish, fairly objectively, that a physical injury exists.

ii. Second, the nature of the injury has to be proved. These are purely objective
investigations.
iii. Third, it must be proved that that particular bodily injury was intended to inflame, that
is to say, it was not accidental or unintentional, or that any other type of injury was
intended. Once these three elements are proven to exist, the investigation proceeds.
iv. Fourth, it must be proved that the type of inquiry made by the above three elements
stated above is enough to cause death in the normal course of nature. This part of

3
Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148.
4
Nankaunaoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 317.
5
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465.

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 the investigation is purely objective and impractical and has nothing to do with the
intent of the criminal.

7) In the aforementioned case, the Apex Court also stressed that: (i) the existence and nature of
bodily injury must be a matter of pure objective investigation and (ii) the sufficiency of injury
to cause death in ordinary course of nature is a matter of pure objective and inferential and it
has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
8) It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was
no intention even to cause injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind
will be likely to cause death6.
9) It is submitted that once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is
proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a
matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death7.
10) In the case of Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala8, the Supreme Court reiterated that for the
cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so
long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death
in the ordinary course of nature.
11) Furthermore, it submitted the site and the nature of the injuries are pointers for drawing the
inference that the accused had the requisite intention of causing the death. To buttress his
contention9.
12) It is submitted that in the present case Pyarelal gave a harsh blow to the stomach of
KartarSingh . On receiving the blow, appendicitis of Kartar Singh busted and started bleeding
and he fell down in severe pain in his stomach and his chest bone also fractured. Therefore,
there is no doubt in the fact that the injury caused was so sufficient to cause the death of a
sportsperson like Kartar Singh. In addition to it, the injury was caused to the deceased by the
accused with the requisite mensrea.

Therefore, the accused is liable for murder.

6
Chacko @ AniyanKunju v. State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269.
7
Raj Pal v. State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678.
8
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874
9
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1993 SC 72

11
 ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE BENEFIT OF INSANITY BE GIVEN TO THE
ACCUSED?

13) It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused will not given the benefit of the
general exception of insanity defined under Section 84 of IPC.
14) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in order to seek protection of Section
84, IPC, it is necessary for an accused to prove that he, at the time of commission of the act
was of unsound mind and he because of the “unsoundness of mind”, was incapable of
knowing the “nature” of the act; or that the act was “contrary to law”; or that the act was
“wrong”10.
15) According to the rule laid down in theM’Naghten’scase11, “The person is presumed to be
sane unless the contrary is proved and the act must be followed by the defect of reason
caused by the “disease of the mind” and the person was unaware of the nature and quality of
the crime”.
16) The Guhwati High Court has observed in the case of Pulu Mura v. State of Assam12 that
irresistable impulse, mental agitation, annoyance and fury—all merely indicate loss of control
and not indicative of unsoundness of mind.
17) Every minor mental aberration is not insanity and the circumstances indicating a mere
probability of legal insanity cannot, however, be sufficient to discharge the onus of the
accused to establish the plea of insanity13.
18) Irresistable impulse or impulsive insanity has never been accepted as defence under section
84 unless it is attributable to unsoundness of mind14.
19) Similarly, it has been held that a crime attended with a mere agitation of mind or an
uncommon fercoity or a moderate depression or an over-sensitiveness of mind or character
does not necessarily lead to an inference that it had affected mental capacity of a person 15.
20) It has been held in the case of SrikantAnandraoBhosale v. State of Maharashtra16 that an
act committed out of extreme anger (and not as a consequence of unsoundness of mind) does
not bring its doer within the ambit of Section 84.

10
Bharat Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (2004) CrLJ 1958 (Raj).
11
M’Naughten (1843) 8 Eng Rep 718.
12
Pulu Mura v. State of Assam, (2004) Cr LJ 458 (Gau).
13
ParapuzhaThamban v. State of Kerala, (1989) Cr LJ 1372 (Ker).
14
Sidheshwari Bora v. State of Assam, (1981) Cr LJ 1005 (Gau).
15
Gour Chandra v. State of Orissa, (1989) Cr LJ 1667 (Ori).
16
SrikantAnandraoBhosale v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 7 SCC 748.

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21) It is submitted that in the present case the accused was suffering of mental health issues and
was undergoing psychiatric treatment. However, there was nothing in the facts of the case to
show that he was suffering from unsoundness of mind at the time the incidence took place.
Furthermore, the facts mention that he slapped the deceased after losing his balance of mind
in consequence of the arrogant statement made by the accused. However, such situations are
not covered under the ambit of the general exception.

Therefore, the benefit of Section 84 will not be given to the accused.

ISSUE3: WHETHER ACCUSED CAN TAKE BENEFIT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE?

22) It is submitted that accused cannot take the benefit of private defence because (i) he was the
aggressor, (ii) Section 100 is not applicable in the present case, and (iii) accused exceeded the
doctrine of proportionality.

(i) Accused the Aggressor

23) It is submitted that the right of private defence is to repel any attack on the body or property
of a person. The right presupposes attack or aggression by the person against whom the right
is claimed. When the person who is attacked by the accused is not an aggressor, no right of
private defence can be claimed by the accused17.
24) The right is available against an offence and therefore, where an act is done is exercise of the
right of private defence, such act cannot give rise to any right of private defence in favour of
the aggressor in return. No aggressor can claim the right of private defence18.
25) The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Munney Khan v. State of Madhya
Pradesh19, that the courts have to be careful in seeing that no one on the mere pretext of the
exercise of the right of private defence takes sides in a quarrel between two or more persons
and inflicts injury on one or the other.

(ii) Section 100 NOT Applicable

26) According to Section 100, the right of private defence of the body extends, under the
restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of

17
Kishan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 244.
18
Kashi Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 1172.
19
Munney Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh.AIR 1971 SC 1491.

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 any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of
any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—
Firstly — Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that
death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Secondly —Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that
grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Thirdly — An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly —An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
Fifthly — An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
Sixthly — An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person,
under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he
will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
27) From the facts, it is clear that only Firstly is applicable in this case. For the purpose of
availing the exception to criminal liability under this clause, what is required to be
established is that there were reasonable circumstances giving rise to reasonable
apprehension of either death of grievous hurt20. It has been held in the case of Rameshar v.
State (Delhi Administration)21, that such an apprehension must be real or reasonable and
not illusory or imaginary. It must be present and imminent and not remote or distant one.
28) It is submitted that the question whether the apprehension was reasonable or not is a question
of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case at hand and no straight-jacket
formula can be laid down, as held in the case of Puran Singh v. State of Punjab22.
29) "Reasonable cause" as applied to human action is that which would constrain a person of
average intelligence and ordinary prudence. It can be described as a probable cause. It means
an honest belief founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of
circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent
and cautious man, placed in the position of the person concerned, to come to the conclusion
that same was the right thing to do.
30) It has been held in the case of Sekhar v. State of Rajasthan23, that a plea of private defence
cannot be based upon mere speculations and surmises. The accused must be under a bona fide
fear that death or grievous hurt would otherwise be the consequence of the assault is he does
not defend.

20
Vishvas Aba Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 414.
21
Rameshar v. State (Delhi Administration), (1981) Cr LJ 1125 (Del).
22
Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1674.
23
Sekhar v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) Cr LJ 53 (SC).

14
31) Further it has been held in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gajey Singh24, that the
weapon used, the manner and nature of the assault and other surrounding circumstances need
to be taken into account while evaluating whether the apprehension was justified or not.

(iii) Doctrine of Proportionality

32) It is submitted that according to the last para of the Section 99 the harm caused in exercise of
the right of private defence in no case should exceed the quantum of harm that may be
necessary for the purpose of defence. It has been held in State of Punjab v. Ram Swarup25,
that in no case more harm than necessary should be inflicted.
33) Further it has been held in the case of George Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerala26, that the
question whether the right of private defence exercised by an accused is in excess of his right
and the whether the accused has caused more harm than necessary, is entirely a question of
fact to be decided upon the circumstances of each case.
34) It is submitted that the violence a person is entitled to use in defending himself or his
property should not be duly proportionate to the injury which is to be averted, or which is
reasonably apprehended and should not exceed its legitimate purpose.
35) It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Rizan v. State of Chattisgarh27, Where
the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version
satisfying the Court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding off
the attack or for forestalling the further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused.
Further it is submitted that the litmus test for Section 99 is that: (i) Whether the act was
necessary; and (ii) To what extent was it necessary.
36) It is submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in the present case the litmus test of
proportionality is not fulfilled.

Therefore, the accused cannot take the benefit of private defence

24
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gajey Singh, (2009) 1 SCC 458.
25
State of Punjab v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570.
26
George Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerala, AIR 1971 SC 1208.
27
Rizan v. State of Chattisgarh (2003) 2 SCC 661.

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 PRAYER

In the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Counsel for the
Respondent most humbly prays that the Hon’bleCourt be pleased to adjudge, hold and
declare:
That the accused has committed the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860.

AND/OR

pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and good
conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

-Sd-
(Counsel on behalf of the Respondent)

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