Berlin Wall Legitimacy Divided Germany

Berghahn Books
The Berlin Wall and the Battle for Legitimacy in Divided Germany
Author(s): Pertti Ahonen
Source: German Politics & Society, Vol. 29, No. 2 (99), Special Issue: The Berlin Wall after
Fifty Years: 1961-2011 (Summer 2011), pp. 40-56
Published by: Berghahn Books
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The Berlin Wall and the Battle for Legitimacy
in Divided Germany
Pertti Ahonen
History, University of Edinburgh
Abstract
The Berlin Wall was a key site of contestation between the Federal Republic
and the German Democratic Republic in their Cold War struggle over polit
ical legitimacy. On both sides, the Wall became a tool in intense publicity
batdes aimed at building legitimacy and collective identity at home, and
undermining them in the other Germany. The public perceptions and politi
cized uses of the barrier evolved through stages that reflected the relative
fortunes of the two German states, moving gradually from extensive East
West parallels in the early 1960s toward a growing divergence by the 1970s
and 1980s, which became increasingly indicative of East Germany's weak
ness.
Keywords
Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic (gdr); Federal Republic of Ger

many (frg); propaganda; border guards; Cold War; West Berlin
C^he Berlin Wall took on multiple meanings between 1961 and 1989/
1990. At the most concrete level, it was a physical barrier that artificially
split one of Europe's great cities and made unauthorized passage, particu
larly in the East-West direction, highly hazardous and nearly impossible.
Equally evidently, the Wall formed a central component of the front line
Cold War fortifications of Europe, sealing the division of Germany-and o
the entire continent. Because of its strategic location and dramatic visage,
the Wall also assumed more universal significance. Particularly in the
West, it became the foremost, iconic symbol of the European Cold Wa
and its divisive consequences.
German Politics and Society, Issue 99 Vol. 29, No. 2 Summer 2011
doi: 10.3167/gps.2011.290204 t
But the Berlin Wall also played a much more immediate role in the
Cold War confrontation between the two Germanys. It was a key site of
contestation between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic
Republic (gdr) in their ongoing competition over the most fundamental
asset necessary for these bitter rivals, as indeed for any state: political legit
imacy. On both sides, the Wall became a tool in intense publicity battles
aimed at building legitimacy and collective identity at home and under
mining them in the other Germany. Competing public discourses about
the broader significance of the Wall and its victims-particularly the 136
people killed at it-functioned as a kind of barometer of Cold War tensions
between the two Germanys.1 The public perceptions and politicized uses
of the barrier evolved through stages that reflected the relative fortunes of
the two states. Ultimately, the Wall and the wider repression it embodied
highlighted the GDR's fundamental weakness vis-a-vis its Western rival.
But the phases through which the Wall's public representations evolved by
no means foreshadowed a predictable collapse of the East German
regime. Particularly in the Wall's early years, extensive East-West parallels
were evident in its politicized uses. A growing divergence that eventually
became increasingly indicative of the GDR's weakness emerged only grad
ually, during the 1970s and 1980s, and even then the implications of such
ongoing developments were far from self-evident.
In the first few years following its construction, the Wall was a fiercely
contested site, eagerly instrumentalized by both Germanys in their efforts
to boost their own legitimacy and to undermine that of their arch rival.
West and East Germany both developed aggressive public discourses
about the Wall and its victims, discourses that displayed many rhetorical
similarities despite their mutually incompatible specific content.
The Early West German Portrayal of the Wall
The Western public narrative, propagated primarily by political elites and

the mass media in the Federal Republic and West Berlin, proceeded from
the well-established assumption that West Germany constituted the only
legitimate successor to the German Reich, thanks to its democratic system,
in contrast to the forcibly imposed, totalitarian Communist regime in the
other part of postwar Germany. West German elites seized the chance
offered by the Wall's erection to reject, yet again, the GDR's claims to be a
normal state, with solid backing from its population. Chancellor Adenauer
and his ministerial colleagues denounced their rivals as a "puppet regime"
' 41
Pertti Ahonen
controlled by the Kremlin, in which "a narrow layer of functionaries

rulefd] over sixteen million Germans by means of terror." According to
them, a regime compelled to install a "dividing line of barbed wire, con
crete walls and bayonets" within a nation possessed "no legitimacy"—in
obvious contrast to the democratic Federal Republic.2
To reinforce this message, the West German interpretation of the Wall
reached eagerly for the heaviest cudgel available to post 1945 Germans
set on discrediting their enemies: Nazi analogies. West Berlin Mayor
Willy Brandt, for example, compared the barrier to a "concentration
camp," and similar descriptions of East Berlin as the "biggest concentra
tion camp of all time" soon became standard in the West German media.3
Politicians and journalists also equated the Third Reich and the GDR in
more sweeping ways, proclaiming, for instance, that "Hitler liv[ed] on in
the [Soviet] zone."4
Although Nazi analogies gave one key motif for the West German pub
licity offensive against the Wall and its architects, the human costs of the
city's division provided an even more potent trope. As the boundary
across Berlin grew increasingly impenetrable, with families, lovers, and
friends painfully torn apart, the human suffering caused by the Wall
increasingly became the focal point of Western campaigns against the
Schandmauer, or "Wall of shame," as the barrier was frequently called.
According to a West German government declaration of November 1961,
the GDR's actions had caused "indescribable human distress" and exposed
the "brutal inhumanity" of the underlying system.5 Other political procla
mations and media reports promulgated a similar message, presenting
escapes across the barrier as evidence of a resounding popular rejection of
the GDR. Arrests and other crackdowns in East Germany also received
extensive coverage. But the highest level of attention was devoted to
unsuccessful escape attempts in which violence deployed by East German
border guards stopped people from reaching West Berlin. The cases that
ended with the escapees losing their lives assumed particular prominence.
These dead victims of the Wall—martyrs for the cause of freedom in the
Western interpretation—became the key components of Western rhetorical
attacks against the Wall and the Communist system behind it.
The Western media and the Bonn and West Berlin governments chroni
cled and condemned every violent episode at the Wall that came to their
attention, with the strongest reactions reserved for lethal incidents. Some
individual tragedies assumed far-ranging significance, and one in particu
lar stood out as the paradigmatic narrative of suffering at the Wall: the
shooting of eighteen-year-old Peter Fechter on 17 August 1962. Fechter's
• 42 •
bold attempt to run through the GDR border strip near the Checkpoint
Charlie border-crossing ended in tragedy as a border guard's bullet
pierced his body as he was about to reach the final barrier vis-a-vis West
Berlin. He fell to the ground just short of the Wall and then lay in no
man's land, groaning in pain and pleading for help. West Berlin authori
ties were unable to reach him, and East German border guards also failed
to react, partly because of disorganization and partly because they feared
possible retaliatory action from the West. By the time GDR officials
emerged to carry the young man away, fifty minutes later, it was too late:
Fechter had already died.
The timing and the location made Fechter's death uniquely suited for
politicized use by West Germans. The shooting occurred just a few days
after the first anniversary of the Wall's construction. It took place in the
very center of Berlin, in a relatively open area that gave numerous people
the opportunity to witness the events first-hand. Even more importantly,
the media presence was exceptionally high: by coincidence, a West Ger
man television team was filming a Wall documentary in the immediate
vicinity, and various other reporters also happened to be present.6
As a result, Peter Fechter's death became an instant cause celebre in the
West. In part, the reaction was one of spontaneous popular outrage, evident
in the chants of "murderers, murderers" aimed at the East German guards
by the large crowds of West Berliners that took to the streets over the next
few days.7 But media representatives and politicians were instrumental in
lending broader political significance to the tragedy. The press launched
immediate broadsides against the GDR, while Brandt expressed "profound
indignation" at "the horrible violation of human rights at the Wall."8 The
pithiest crystallization of the prevailing political sentiment came from a
West German labor union leader who argued that "a system that needs
these methods to maintain control of the people is inhumane and does not
have the right to rule over a population of seventeen million."9
This politicized portrayal of individual suffering quickly became institu
tionalized as Peter Fechter's death grew into a key Western symbol of vic
timization at the Berlin Wall. The Bonn government kept the case in the
domestic and international limelight through various means, including a
1962 "Yellow Book" distributed by its Foreign Office, in which written and
photographic evidence of Fechter's death highlighted the suffering caused
by East Berlin's illegitimate pseudo-regime.10 A similar message reverber
ated in the print and electronic media throughout the Federal Republic
and beyond, while in West Berlin the most important development was
the emergence of enduring commemorative rituals. Within hours of the
... 43..
Pertti Ahonen
shooting, passers-by began bringing flowers to a spot at the Wall directly

across from where Fechter had died, and over the next few days a wooden
cross was erected at the same location. The cross drew a steady stream of
visitors and subsequently became West Berlin's leading venue for com
memorating the Wall's victims and reiterating the political implications
of their suffering. Even more importantly, Fechter's dramatic demise
remained in the limelight because of the availability of exceptionally strik
ing visual evidence of it. The photographers present at the site ensured
that several images of Fechter's agonizing death acquired iconic status as
widely propagated and instantly recognizable symbols of the senseless suf
fering caused by the Wall.11
The Early East German Portrayal of the Wall
The Western public narrative about the Wall and its victims was chal
lenged head-on by a competing discourse with which the East German
authorities sought to portray their measures—and themselves—as some
thing normal, necessary and, above all, legitimate. In their view, the build
ing of the Wall had been a defensive measure of last resort, imposed upon
them by persistent Western aggression. Post 1945 West Berlin had purport
edly become the world's leading haven for subversive activity, organized
by sinister fascistoid groups. 12 Espionage, subversion, sabotage, and vio
lent attacks featured prominently on the list of alleged transgressions, but
the most pernicious activity bore the label of "Menschenhandel," or "human
trafficking." To quote the ruling Socialist Unity Party's (sed) official news
paper, Neues Deutschland, "spy headquarters in West Germany and West
Berlin" had been conducting "systematic recruitment of citizens of the
German Democratic Republic and organizing downright 'human traffick
ing.'"13 In other words, the massive westward emigration of East Germans
had been primarily the result of sinister machinations by Western agents,
who had lured GDR citizens away under false pretenses, sometimes even
kidnapping them, all of which had ultimately forced the East German gov
ernment to act.
The evil plans of Western imperialists had not stopped there, how
The GDR narrative also claimed that the building of the Wall had thw
Western preparations for a war of aggression. As Walter Ulbricht, th
East German leader, explained in a televised speech a few days afte
Wall's erection, the West's sabotage activities, including the pernici
MenschenhandeL, had aimed to "create the conditions in which ... it
44
have been possible to launch an open attack against the GDR" by early
autumn 1961.14
The East German proclamations placed the West's putative aggressive

intent in a broader historical framework that had characterized the GDR's
propaganda campaigns for years: the presumed far-reaching continuities

between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic. Bonn was portrayed
as pursuing an "imperialist policy masquerading as anticommunism,"
which amounted to a "continuation of the aggressive goals of fascist Ger
man imperialism from the Third Reich."15 According to Neues Deutschland,
the West Germany of 1962 closely paralleled the Third Reich of 1939,
albeit with the difference that the intended launching pad for war was no
longer the German-Polish boundary but the East-West divide in Berlin.
Under such ominous conditions, only "the anti-fascist protection rampart"
[antifaschistischer Schutzwalt)-the official East German euphemism for the
Berlin Wall—could guarantee the security of the East German people.16
According to the East German government, the building of the Wall
had ended a highly anomalous situation in the GDR's capital and enabled
East Berlin to institute what was common practice "on the borders of
every sovereign state:" an effective "control and supervision of our state
boundary."17 With such procedures now in place, East Germany was in a
position to provide proper protection for its people. The broader result
had allegedly been a major gain in East Germany's overall stature. As
Neues Deutschland boasted on 22 August, the GDR's actions had "strength
ened our peaceful state," boosting "the self-confidence of its citizens" and
"above all improving the authority of our state beyond its borders."18
The threat from the West had not disappeared on 13 August 1961, how
ever. Revanchist, reactionary elements in the West continued to try to sub
vert the GDR. The primary target of their aggression was purportedly the
foremost symbol of their recent humiliation: Berlin's Schutzjuoall. Accord
ingly, the East German authorities gave heavy publicity to any "attacks"
and "provocations" at the barrier, portraying them in the most incriminat
ing light possible. Underground tunnels from West to East Berlin dug by
private groups for the primary purpose of helping East Germans flee, for
instance, were portrayed as the work of "secret agents" intent on "break
ing into the GDR" and "provoking international conflicts."19 But, much as
in the West, in East Berlin, too, violent deaths at the Wall became the cen
terpieces of rhetorical charges thrown at the Cold War enemy. Neverthe
less, the deaths played up by the East German publicity machine were
very different from those headlined in the West. Escapees shot down in
the border strip received little or no public attention in the GDR, and when
... 45 ..
Pertti Ahonen
they did, the accompanying commentary was typically dismissive or even

abusive. Peter Fechter, for example, was described by the official Commu
nist Party newspaper as a "provocateur caught in the act," who had only
himself to blame for his death.20 By contrast, in the East German view, the
Wall's true victims were GDR border guards killed in the line of duty, while
defending the socialist motherland.
According to the official East German count, twenty-five GDR guards
lost their lives at the inter-German border between 1949 and 1989, mostly
in connection with East-West escape attempts. Seven of the victims died at
the Berlin Wall. Each case received extensive publicity in East Germany.
Politicians, other public figures, and the mass media extolled the dead
men as victims and heroes at once—victims of the perfidious Western
forces that had allegedly caused their deaths and heroes who had made
the ultimate sacrifice for peace and socialism. The immediate publicity
barrage surrounding each death was followed by further waves of politi
cally instrumentalized attention: highly publicized funeral rites, frequent
media commentary, prominent memory sites, commemorative ceremonies
on key anniversaries, etc. A good example of this process was the death
and public afterlife of the first GDR guard to be killed at the Wall: the
twenty-one-year-old Peter Goring, shot on 23 May 1962.
Goring lost his life during an escape attempt in which a fourteen-year
old East German boy, Wilfried T., tried to swim to the West through a
canal in central Berlin. His detection by GDR guards unleashed a dramatic
shootout involving nearly a dozen East German guards and several West
Berlin police officers, at the end of which the young escapee reached the
West, severely injured, while Goring lay dead, killed by West Berlin offi
cials' bullets. A massive GDR publicity offensive ensued immediately.
While Wilfried T. remained peripheral in this commentary, Goring was
portrayed as the victim of a targeted Western assassination plot. Banner
headlines about the "murderous attack" dominated the press, while politi
cal and military leaders demanded punishment for his killers.21
Within days of his death, Goring also became the object of a systematic
publicity campaign that built him into a martyr of the socialist cause, an
East German hero-victim and a potential identification figure for the coun
try's population. He was portrayed as a socialist everyman who had risen
to an extreme challenge in an extraordinary way, sacrificing himself for
the common good, thereby becoming a victim, hero, and paragon all at
once. The publicity campaign transformed Goring into one of the secular
deities in a wider pantheon of socialist heroes that the East German elites
had created for purposes of popular mobilization and legitimization, draw
46 *
ing on models initially introduced in the Soviet Union. Alongside other,

previously established hero types—including those of the anti-fascist
resister and the pioneer of postwar reconstruction—Goring became the
prototype of another category, best labeled the hero-victim of the socialist
frontier, whose deaths and selectively narrated life stories assumed great
importance in East German efforts to use the barrier and its victims for
wider campaigns of popular mobilization and political legitimization.22
One official comment after another stressed that the young man had not
died in vain. His exemplary life and supreme sacrifice had been directed
toward the "triumph ... of the great, just cause" of socialism.23 His death
had bequeathed a "legacy," which the rest of the population needed to ful
fill by "strengthening our Fatherland, the GDR, politically, economically,
and militarily."24 As everyone was summoned to contribute to this enter
prise, the hero-victim cult around Peter Goring became a tool of popular
mobilization and political legitimization, which the East German elites
employed very consciously.
The mobilization of the population began right after the shooting with
assemblies organized in workplaces around the country issuing protest
proclamations about the killing. It continued with the carefully orches
trated funeral ceremonies for Goring held in East Berlin and in the small
Saxon town of Glasshiitte, the residence of his mother. Both were lavish,
thoroughly publicized affairs rich in symbolism, stressing the unity be
tween the deceased, the society he had served, and the East German citi
zens who were supposed to be inspired by his example. The people were
admonished to identify with the system in a spirit of constructive patrio
tism, rejecting the capitalist menace looming in the West, just as Goring
had done, and devoting their energies to the construction of socialism in
the GDR, preferably also through active engagement in the party or its
mass organizations.23
Nor did the East German publicity blitz fade away once the tragedy's
immediate dust had settled. The instrumentalized use of Peter Goring's life
and death continued as an extensive campaign of commemoration that
was to endure throughout the GDR's existence. Predictably, the East Ger
man military in general and its border guard units in particular occupied a
prominent place in this endeavor. Special publications aimed at currendy
serving colleagues reiterated the official narrative of Goring's exemplary
life and death. Particular memory sites within military installations, such
as a tailor-made Peter Goring "commemoration room" (Gedachtniszimmer)
within his former barracks in East Berlin, served as shrines to the young
man's memory and legacy. The military used such memorial sites for
47 ■
Pertti Ahonen
political indoctrination. Impressionable new recruits were given pro

longed exposure to them. The facilities also served as staging grounds for
regular rituals, especially on key anniversaries, including those of a partic
ular guard's death and the building of the Wall. Such occasions were rich
in somber ceremonies involving the laying of wreaths, opulent displays of
national symbols, formulaic speeches, and military spectacles. Again and
again, the dead guards were portrayed as an example and inspiration for
the border troops.
The memory of the Wall's most important victims was also cultivated
intensively beyond the gates of military installations, through a variety of
civic monuments. Although special memorials were set up in the East
German provinces, the focal point for the maintenance of the GDR's offi
cial public memory of the dead border guards remained East Berlin.
Goring received an individualized memorial near the site of his death, and
his name featured prominently in the collective "Monument for Murdered
Border Guards" that was subsequently unveiled in central East Berlin. The
various civic monuments were unveiled with great fanfare, and they, too,
served as venues for carefully choreographed public ceremonies on key
anniversaries. 13 August became the pinnacle of the annual commemora
tive cycle, once the authorities had overcome their initial hesitations about
using it for public mobilization. By the fifth anniversary of the barrier's
erection in 1966, early caution had been replaced by vigorous engage
ment, which set strong precedents for the future. Amidst a variety of pub
lic processions that included a large-scale military parade, workers and
youngsters laid wreaths at border guard memorials under the watchful eye
of sub-machine gun-toting guards of honor. High-ranking political and
military leaders urged the living to honor the memory of the fallen guards
by continuing the struggle "for the protection and consolidation of the
power of the workers and peasants in our socialist Fatherland."26
Another major contribution to the long-term cultivation of the dead
border guards' public memory came from the East German mass media.
The print and electronic media reported extensively on the various mem
ory sites and ceremonies, thereby relaying the message of popular mobi
lization and presumed socialist unity throughout the land. They also made
more independent contributions to the culture of commemoration by run
ning idealized biographical stories about the dead guards, again primarily
around key anniversaries. In addition, the authorities showed great zeal in
appropriating the hero-victims' names for various purposes. Numerous
streets came to bear their names, partly in their hometowns and other
provincial communities, but most prominently in the capital. A wide array
48 •
of other entities also took on the names of the hero victims. Peter Goring,
for example, eventually had at least thirty-three different entities through
out the GDR named after him, ranging from military installations to work
place collectives and sporting facilities.27
In the early 1960s, then, extensive parallels existed in the public por
trayal and instrumentalization of the Berlin Wall and its victims on both
sides of the barrier. West and East Germany both used the Wall to try to
bolster their own legitimacy and to undermine that of their arch rival
through selective and highly politicized public discourses that drew heav
ily on particular deaths at the barrier, frequently employing Nazi analogies
and displaying many rhetorical similarities despite their mutually incom
patible specific content. There were differences between the two sides, of
course, such as the much more centralized and authoritarian character of
the East German polity, which enabled the East Berlin authorities to con
duct more regimented and sustained publicity campaigns than their West
ern rivals. But, at this stage, the parallels in the two sides' uses of the Wall
and its victims were in many ways more striking than the differences.
Detente and the Wall
From the late 1960s and particularly the early 1970s onwards, however,
the dynamics of the inter-German confrontation at the Berlin Wall
changed significantly. The gradual rise of East-West detente was the key
background factor underpinning this development, but although it mani
fested itself on both sides of the barrier, its respective effects were very
uneven. In the West, attitudinal shifts about the Wall, the GDR, and the
entire East-West struggle became increasingly evident. In East Germany,
by contrast, continuities from the early Cold War prevailed to a much
higher degree. These uneven developments reflected underlying structural
differences between the two Germanys, and they were to have far-reach
ing long-term consequences over the ensuing two decades.
In the West, the Wall's negative connotations became much dimin
ished, particularly after West Berliners' established rights to leave their city
in the westerly direction had been complemented by the added privilege
of crossing into the GDR with relative ease, facilitated by the Ostpolitik and
Deutschlandpolitik treaties of the early 1970s. Under these conditions,
accommodation with the barrier was no longer a particularly painful
proposition. Gradually the Wall grew into a feature of daily normalcy in
West Berlin. The no-man's land along its Western side increasingly pro
... 49.
Pertti Ahonen
vided a venue for various free-time activities. The Wall also solidified its
position as West Berlin's leading tourist sight, as tour buses came and went
and graffiti artists transformed much of the Wall's westward-facing facade
into a constantly evolving experiment in public art. The Wall, as seen
from the West, had seemingly become an everyday urban institution
rather than a symbol of the GDR's illegitimacy.
The broader political and commemorative attention devoted to the
Wall and its victims also slid down the scale of public priorities in the Fed
eral Republic and West Berlin from the 1970s onwards. Western political
rhetoric about the Wall grew increasingly formulaic and staid, far
removed from the vehement oratory sprinkled with Nazi analogies that
had characterized the early 1960s. A few hackneyed attacks against the
barrier were repeated again and again, but even they were increasingly
laced with countervailing tones of restraint. A case in point was a radio
address by Egon Franke, Bonn's Minister for All-German affairs, on the
eleventh anniversary of the Wall's erection, in which he denounced the
barrier as an "unnatural" entity that exposed the gdr's lack of popular
legitimacy but then went on to insist that "protests and proclamations" no
longer sufficed vis-a-vis East Germany. Practical contacts and agreements
were essential to maintain some semblance of German unity and to allevi
ate human suffering caused by national division.28
The public commemoration of the Wall's victims in the West became
similarly ritualistic. By the 1970s, relevant official ceremonies normally
took place only in West Berlin, nearly exclusively on anniversaries of the
Wall's erection. Representatives of the West Berlin government, the main
stream political parties, and some other organizations would lay wreaths at
select memory sites—including Peter Fechter's memorial—and make brief
formulaic speeches that typically condemned the barrier while acknowl
edging that some level of contact with the GDR remained necessary.
Beyond such anniversary events, the Wall's victims received relatively little
official attention, even in West Berlin. To be sure, spectacular violent inci
dents at the border—particularly deaths of East German escapees—still
elicited extensive coverage and commentary. But the bursts of attention
that such fatalities attracted were typically short-lived, and they did not
alter the fact that in the era of detente the Wall had become an increasingly
accepted part of everyday reality in the West, even at the political level.
In East Germany, by contrast, much greater continuities prevailed from
the early 1960s into the 1970s and beyond. The Wall remained a stark,
militarized barrier that was well-nigh impossible to traverse in the East
West direction, particularly as the authorities kept upgrading and fine-tun
• 50'
ing the fortifications. In the 1970s and 1980s, the system foiled at least 95
percent of attempted escapes, in most cases well before escapees even
reached the border strip visible to West Berlin. A line of continuity stretch
ing from the early 1960s to the 1980s highlighted the GDR's growing
ability to control its Western border and to reduce the amount of embar
rassing publicity that violent incidents at the Wall could generate.
Continuity was also highly evident in East Berlin's attempts to justify
the existence of the Berlin Wall. Although some of the most aggressive
accents characteristic of the 1960s-including the frequent Nazi analogies
gradually diminished, the basic rhetorical strategies employed in the pub
lic discourses remained broadly unchanged. According to the official line,
"the open border to West Berlin" had been "brought under control" to
defend East Germany and the rest of the socialist world against Western
subversion and aggression. East Berlin's actions had dealt a severe blow to
Western "revanchists" and rescued "peace in Europe." But, they had not
removed the imperialist threat. The Western "Saul had not been trans
formed into Paul," to quote one Biblically well-versed commentator.29
Multiple dangers persisted, and vigilance remained essential.
Similar continuities also prevailed in the ongoing public commemora
tion of the Wall and its hero-victims. The main date for celebrating the Wall
remained 13 August, and the high-profile example set on the fifth anniver
sary in 1966 found close imitation on the next key anniversaries in 1971
and 1976. On both occasions, paramilitary units again marched through
central East Berlin while large crowds lined the streets. Speeches delivered
by top political and military leaders underscored the importance of 13
August 1961 for the GDR's "revolutionary tradition" and for "peace and
security" more generally, and the media covered the festivities in depth.30
Commemoration of border guards who had died at the Wall was
another key feature of these particular anniversaries—as of every 13 August.
Carefully choreographed ceremonies honoring these hero-victims of the
socialist frontier took place in East Berlin and at many other locations, with
reverent media coverage magnifying the message of the "unforgotten vic
tims" as role models for GDR citizens. Nor was commemoration of the
fallen border guards restricted just to the Berlin Wall's anniversaries. The
dead guards remained a steady background presence in East German soci
ety as idealized examples for all citizens, not only through media reports
and the various memorials and other institutions dedicated to them, but
also through the widely publicized celebratory rituals that were still regu
larly held in their honor, much more consistently and prominently than
any equivalent ceremonies in the West.
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Pertti Ahonen
Festivities in honor of Peter Goring were a case in point. The anniver

sary of his death was marked with extensive commemorative rituals every
year, particularly at his monument in East Berlin. On the fifteenth
anniversary in 1977, for example, a wide variety of societal groups-rang
ing from border guards to representatives of schools and other institutions
named after Goring—came to pay their respects to "the young revolution
ary" and to learn from his sacrifice. Significantly, the fallen guard's mother
was present too.31 She also played a prominent role at numerous other
events aimed at using his son's legacy to mobilize people. At the third
Peter Goring memorial run for youths in the town of Geier in November
1978, for example, she fired the starting gun and handed out the trophies
to the winners, all in the spirit of "honoring [her son's] example."32
In the contemporary perspective of the 1970s or even the mid 1980s,
many ongoing developments at the Berlin Wall and in the surrounding
social and political context appeared to favor the gdr's rulers more than
their Western rivals. The barrier itself was increasingly impregnable and
accepted as an immutable fact of life. Successful escapes across it and the
bad publicity that they entailed had decreased dramatically since the early
1960s, largely because of improved controls further back in East Berlin. In
addition, the East German authorities, spearheaded by the Stasi, had
grown highly adept at suppressing information about any potentially
embarrassing border incidents that still did occur, particularly those of the
lethal variety. On top of all this, detente had brought much broader gains
for the GDR. Widespread international recognition and apparent economic
advances had given the country a fa9ade of respectability that it had previ
ously lacked, bolstering East Berlin's thesis of the permanent existence of
two separate and sovereign German states. According to World Bank sta
tistics, East Germany had reached a living standard higher than that of the
UK by the late 1970s, and the wider contemporary perception of its stand
ing was captured well by a left-liberal West German newspaper: "The GDR
has come a long way .... It is recognized diplomatically by almost all
countries of the world; it is nearly an economic great power; and although
it has not quite achieved [popular] sympathy ... it has at least managed to
scrape together reluctant respect of sorts."33
Countdown to the End of the Wall and the gdr
Nevertheless, these appearances were ultimately deceptive. From the

early 1970s onwards, the East German government was caught in a grow
52'
ing contradiction: how to balance its desire for the anticipated gains from
closer links with the West with its fear of the threatening, potentially
destabilizing influences that those links might bring. After all, growing
Western ties spelled greater interaction across the inter-German border
and increasingly open competition with the Federal Republic in the
world arena, particularly after the GDR had tied itself rather closely to the
international community and its prevailing human rights norms by the
mid 1970s.
The policy through which the GDR's rulers sought to reconcile these
seemingly incompatible imperatives became known as Abgrenzung— or
"warding off." It was a multidimensional effort that stressed the GDR's sov
ereignty and separateness from the Federal Republic; aimed to shield the
country from unwanted external influences; and maintained authoritarian
controls on the people. Its most blatant manifestation was the brutal and
arbitrary restriction of the population's freedom of movement embodied
by the country's border regime vis-a-vis the West. As the highest-profile
segment of the border system, the Berlin Wall in particular came to repre
sent the potential pitfalls inherent in the East German government's con
tradictory responses to the challenges posed by the broad political
changes that emerged from East-West detente.
Cumulatively and in the longer term the behavior of the GDR's authori
ties harmed their prestige and standing. With their frequent inflexibility
and narrow fixation on points of supposed national sovereignty, the East
Germans often unwittingly played into the West's hand, even in circum
stances where they appeared to have scored short-term victories. A good
example of this dynamic was the political fallout that ensued from the
death of Cetin Mert—the four-year-old son of Turkish "guest workers"— at
Berlin's East-West border in May 1975. While playing on the Western
bank of the Spree River in an area in which the waterway itself belonged
to East Berlin, the boy fell into the water and drowned while West Berlin's
rescue services struggled in vain to secure East German authorization for a
salvage operation. His death became the catalyst for negotiations that cul
minated in an October 1975 agreement between the West Berlin Senate
and the GDR about the provision of assistance to accident victims along
Berlin's border waterways. Superficially, the deal appeared to herald a vic
tory for the East Germans, as it removed a sensitive issue from the public
agenda and contained many details that seemed to promote the GDR's
broader political objectives, including phraseology that the East German
rulers construed as an enhancement of their sovereign credentials. But, in
the longer term, such gains were outweighed by the bad publicity that the
53 ■
Pertti Ahonen
gdr's behavior provoked in the West. With their fixation on obscure

points of protocol and on strict restrictions on the kinds of rescue opera
tions that West Berliners would be allowed to launch in East Berlin waters,
the East Germans looked unnecessarily petty and heartless in a negotia
tion process whose broader objective was supposed to be saving innocent
lives.34 As a result, the Federal Republic's most influential newspaper
labeled the entire agreement "absurd" because of the assumption that
"governmental organs" had to issue "long-winded and detailed regula
tions" about "who, when, where, under what circumstances, and for how
long is allowed to provide assistance to drowning children ... in the mid
dle of Berlin." 35
The full costs of the continued repression at the border became evident
over a decade later, at the end of the 1980s, as several long-term trends
came to a head, plunging the GDR into a severe, systemic crisis and gener
ating powerful pressure for fundamental change. As the country's down
ward economic spiral coincided with the new, radical policies pursued by
Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union, East Berlin came under escalating
pressure to reform its repressive system. At the same time, the GDR's lead
ers also faced growing challenges from their own people, who grew
increasingly bold and defiant. In many ways, the country's Western bor
der in general and the Berlin Wall in particular again became the testing
ground for the regime's viability, as demands for radically liberalized
travel and emigration policies emerged as a major rallying call for the
GDR's internal protest movements. In the transformed circumstances of
1989, the government's controls on its own population could no longer
hold, and the collapse of the border patrols ultimately pulled down the
entire socialist system.
Conclusion
In objective terms, the Berlin Wall was always a sign of the GDR's relative
weakness vis-a-vis its Western rival, given its ultimate purpose of prevent
ing the East German population from decamping to the West. But, once
erected, it became a key site of East-West legitimacy battles, which exhib
ited many parallels, particularly in the Wall's early years. Both sides
instrumentalized the Wall in general and its victims in particular in a con
centrated effort to boost their own credentials and to undermine those of
their arch rival, employing selective and very politicized public discourses
that displayed many rhetorical similarities despite their mutually incom
54
patible specific contents. A growing divergence in West and East German

public uses of the barrier became apparent only later, in the period of
detente, and even then many contemporary developments seemed to
favor the East Germans, at least at first sight. The Wall was increasingly-if
rather grudgingly—accepted as a fact of life; the East German authorities
grew ever more skilled at pre-empting and foiling escape attempts and at
suppressing information about violent incidents at the border; and the
GDR as a whole gained in stature and prestige as a result of East-West
detente. Detente, however, also caused problems for East Berlin, as the
country's rulers worried about the possibly destabilizing consequences of
greater interaction and more open competition with the West. Their
attempts to address these concerns through the multi-faceted policy of
Abgrenzung appeared to work in the short term, but over the longer haul
they caused cumulating damage to East Germany's standing and prestige.
As the gdr's underlying weaknesses gradually grew ever more severe dur
ing the late 1980s, the country's general legitimacy deficit was again
exposed most glaringly at the foremost symbol of Germany's national
division. In the end, the socialist half of Germany proved to be a "Wall
state," a polity whose very existence depended on "external and internal
Abgrenzung," epitomized by the heavy line of border fortifications that
traversed Berlin.36
Pertti Ahonen is Senior Lecturer in History in the School of History,

Classics, and Archaeology at the University of Edinburgh. He received his
PhD in European history from Yale University in 1999. He is the author of
After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 (Oxford,
2003); Death at the Berlin Wall (Oxford, 2011); and co-author of People on
the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and
Its Aftermath (Oxford, 2008).
Notes
Hans-Hermann Hertle and Maria Nooke, eds., Die Todesofifer an der Berliner Mauer 1961
1989. (Berlin, 2009).
"Antwort auf den Gewaltakt von Berlin," Das Parlament, 23 August 1961, 1; Ernst Lem
mer's foreword in Der Bau der Mauer durch Berlin (Bonn, 1961).
Willy Brandt's speech, 13 August 1961, available at www.chronik-der-mauer.de; "Das
grosste Konzentrationslager der Welt," Die Rheinfpalz, 16 June 1962.
- 55 ■
Pertti Ahonen
4. Es begann am 13. August (West Berlin, 1961), 4.

5. Zur Situation in der Sowjetzone nach dem 13. August 1961 (Bonn, 1961), 7.
6. Pertti Ahonen, Death at the Berlin Wall (Oxford, 2011), 51-60.
7. West Berlin Senate, Ereignismeldungen to the Dienststelle Berlin in Bonn, 18, 19, 20,
21, 22 August 1962, Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (hereafter PA/AA), B 12,
189.
8. "Appell des Regierenden Biirgermeisters Willy Brandt," 20 August 1962, Landesarchiv

Berlin, B Rep. 002, Nr. 13330, 11.
9. "Bonn verurteilt den Mord an der Mauer," Deutsche Zeitung, 21 August 1962.
10. "Verletzungen der Menschenrechte, Unrechtshandlungen und Zwischenfalle an der
Berliner Sektorengrenze seit Errichtung der Mauer," pa/aa: B 38 - IIA1, 158, 388-432.
11. Christoph Hamann, "Schnappschuss und Ikone: Das Foto von Peter Fechters Fluchtver
such 1962," Zeithistorische Forschungen, Online-Ausgabe 2 (2005); available at
http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/site/40208419/default/aspx.
12. "Hauptkampfmittel des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes: Menschenhandel," Neues
Deutschland 14 August 1961.
13. "Beschluss des Ministerrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," 12 August
1961, Neues Deutschland, 13 August 1961; "DDR-Patrioten enthiillen Methoden der Men
schenhandler," Neues Deutschland, 13 August 1961.
14. "Ansprache des Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
Walter Ulbricht," Neues Deutschland, 19 August 1961.
"Beschluss" (see note 13).
"Kein neues 1939," Neues Deutschland, 1 September 1962.
"Klare Verhaltnisse," Neues Deutschland 14 August 1961.
Editorial, Neues Deutschland 22 August 1961.
"Agentenstollen unter dem Gleiskorper," Neues Deutschland 2 February 1962.
"Wir warnen Provokateure," Neues Deutschland 19 August 1962.
"Mordiiberfall der Frontstadt-OAS," Neues Deutschland 25 May 1962.
Silke Satjukow and Rainer Grieds, eds., Sozialistische Helden, (Berlin, 2002).
Lieutenant Tschitschke's radio address, SBZ-Spiegel, 26 May 1962, Generalstaatsan
waltschaft Berlin Archive, 27 2Js 102/91, Duplikatsakte 5.
"Wir erflillen das Vermachtnis von Peter Goring," Sachsische Zeitung, 28 May 1962.
Ahonen (see note 6), Chapters 3 and 4.
"Dank an alle, die unsere Grenze sicher schiitzen," Neues Deutschland 13 August 1966.
Ahonen (see note 6), Chapters 3 and 4.
"Elf Jahre Mauer in Berlin," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 14 August 1972.
"Zehnjahre danach," Berliner Zeitung, 13 August 1971; "Zum 13. August," Neues Deutsch
land 13 August 1976.
"Parade unserer Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse in Berlin," Berliner Zeitung, 14
August 1971; "13. August 1961-eine Tat fur Frieden und Sicherheit," Neues Deutschland
14/15 August 1976.
"Feierliche Ehrung zum Todestag von Peter Goring," Neues Deutschland 24 May 1977.
"Sportier ehren Vorbild," Neues Deutschland 30 November 1978.
"Hasenjagd," Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 July 1976.
Ahonen (see note 6), 195-203.
"Wenn in Berlin jemand in die Spree fallt," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 October
1975.
Hans-Jiirgen Fischbeck, Ludwig Mehlhorn and Stephan Bickhardt, "Das Mauersyn

drom," Enquete-Kommission. Band V/2. Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und
internationale Rahmenbedingungen, Deutscher Bundestag, ed. (Baden-Baden, 1995), 1211.
' 56 •

Berlin Wall Legitimacy Divided Germany

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Berghahn Books

Berlin Wall; German Democratic Republic (gdr); Federal Republic of Ger

The Early West German Portrayal of the Wall

The Western public narrative, propagated primarily by political elites and

controlled by the Kremlin, in which "a narrow layer of functionaries

shooting, passers-by began bringing flowers to a spot at the Wall directly

The Early East German Portrayal of the Wall

The East German proclamations placed the West's putative aggressive

propaganda campaigns for years: the presumed far-reaching continuities

they did, the accompanying commentary was typically dismissive or even

ing on models initially introduced in the Soviet Union. Alongside other,

political indoctrination. Impressionable new recruits were given pro

Detente and the Wall

Festivities in honor of Peter Goring were a case in point. The anniver

Countdown to the End of the Wall and the gdr

Nevertheless, these appearances were ultimately deceptive. From the

gdr's behavior provoked in the West. With their fixation on obscure

patible specific contents. A growing divergence in West and East German

Pertti Ahonen is Senior Lecturer in History in the School of History,

4. Es begann am 13. August (West Berlin, 1961), 4.

8. "Appell des Regierenden Biirgermeisters Willy Brandt," 20 August 1962, Landesarchiv

Hans-Jiirgen Fischbeck, Ludwig Mehlhorn and Stephan Bickhardt, "Das Mauersyn

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