Deification of Science & Its Disastrous Consequences

Dr. Asad Zaman

IIIE, IIUI
May 2012, revised April 2013, Substantially revised May 2015, minor edits June 2015
Pre-publication draft: International Journal of Pluralism in Economics Education

Abstract: Our goal is to show that production of knowledge requires

different approaches in different areas. In particular, radically different
methodologies are suitable for mathematics, science, and humanities.
Mathematics requires an axiomatic and deductive approach, while science
requires an inductive and empirical approach. Historical events in Europe
led to a conflict between science and religion, and a consequent attempt to
use science to replace religion. The attempt to prove that science leads to
certainty led to the mistaken understanding that scientific methodology is
mathematical. The assumption that science is the only valid body of
knowledge led to the mistaken attempt to apply this wrong understanding
of scientific methodology to the social sciences. These two mistakes have
crippled the development of our understanding of human beings and
societies. The failure to understand the basic realities of human experience
has led to many disasters, and needs to be rectified by correcting this double
mistake.

Keywords: Logical Positivism, Axiomatic-Deductive method, Induction, scientific

methodology, pluralism

JEL Classification Code: B4

Contents
Deification of Science & Its Disastrous Consequences ...................................................... 1
1. The Axiomatic and the Scientific Method ...................................................................... 2
2. Brief History of Emergence of European Science .......................................................... 4
3. Substitution of Science for Religion ............................................................................... 4
4. The Quest for Certainty and Logical Positivism............................................................. 6
5. The Double Mistake in Development of Social Science ................................................ 8
6. A methodology which requires ‘feigning anesthesia’ .................................................... 9
6.1 Psychology ......................................................................................................... 10
6.2 Spirituality .......................................................................................................... 11
6.3 Economics .......................................................................................................... 11
7: Proposal For A New Methodology .............................................................................. 12
7.1 Retracing Our Steps ................................................................................................ 13
7.2 Learning from Our Past .......................................................................................... 14
7.3 Multiple Pluralisms ................................................................................................. 15
8. Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 16
9. References ..................................................................................................................... 17

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260052

1. The Axiomatic and the Scientific Method
The first intellectual discipline built on rigorous foundations was that of mathematics.
Euclid’s twenty four centuries old methodology of taking a set of axioms and deriving
logical conclusions is still taught in modern times. When early Greek (Hellenistic)
philosophers started inquiries into natural science, they naturally followed the axiomatic
methodology used in Geometry. They started with self-evident truths, and use logical
deductions to discover truths about the universe. The brilliance of the early Greek
philosophers like Euclid, Plato, Aristotle, and others is demonstrated by the fact that their
books are still studied at leading universities. Nonetheless, the axiomatic and
hypothetico-deductive methodology, which is eminently suitable for mathematics, is not
suitable for science. The main reason for this is that, contrary to the case of mathematics,
there are no “self-evident” truths about nature. Many statements believed to be self-
evident by the early Greeks, later turned out to be wrong. This inappropriate
methodology led these eminent Greek philosophers to the many erroneous conclusions,
including the following:

1. The Earth is the center of the universe

2. Heavier bodies will fall faster than lighter ones.
3. Men have more teeth than woman.
4. Human beings see objects because light rays emanating from the eye strike the
object making it visible.
5. Matter consists of indivisible atoms (Democritus).

So far, it is not known whether or not Assertion 5 is true; particles identified as the basic
building blocks of matter have proven to be divisible. Of greater importance to us is the
fact that this proposition was derived from purely philosophical and logical premises
which made no reference to any observed or observable properties of matter. It was
derived on the basis of an axiomatic methodology. Thus, it was an “un-scientific” claim.
In the case of assertions 2 and 3, it is a mystery why these intelligent people did not make
the observations necessary to verify them, when it is so easy to do. Why did not Aristotle,
who was one of the brightest men in his time, pick up two stones of different weight, and
drop them from a high place to check whether or not his theory was valid?

It is important to understand the solution to this mystery. The “scientific method,” which
is based upon using data, observations, and empirical findings to arrive at truth, was not
considered reliable by the ancients. The objections to such methods were strong, and
they continue to have validity:

1. Suppose we observe some regularity or pattern in our observations. How can we

tell if this is the effect of a law, or merely an accident?
2. Without a logical and axiomatic basis, it is impossible to derive a law – thousands
of observations of white swans can be contradicted by a single black swan.
3. Exceptions to laws can occur due to accidents, without contradicting the law – for
example, a man whose natural teeth were accidentally removed might have the

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260052

 same number of teeth as a woman, without violating the theory of Aristotle in
item 3 above.

For all these reasons and more, use of observational techniques in formulation and
assessment of natural laws was not considered as valid by the early philosophers. This is
why historian Richard Powers (1999) writes that the idea of using observations to settle
theoretical disputes, which is due to Abu Ali al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham (ca. 1000 AD), is
the most important idea of the past millennium. The following quote from Powers
illustrates the nature of this accomplishment:

Ibn al-Haytham resolved a scientific dispute that had remained deadlocked for more than
800 years. Two inimical theories vied to explain the mystery of vision. Euclid, Ptolemy and
other mathematicians demonstrated that light necessarily traveled from the eye to the
observed object. Aristotle and the atomists assumed the reverse. Both theories were
complete and internally consistent, with no way to arbitrate between them.
Then Ibn al-Haytham made several remarkable observations. His most remarkable was also
the simplest. He invited observers to stare at the sun, which proved the point: when you
looked at a sufficiently bright object, it burned the eye. He made no appeal to geometry or
theoretical necessity. Instead, he demolished a whole mountain of systematic theory with a
single appeal to data. Light started outside the eye and reflected into it. No other explanation
was consistent with the evidence.

This single incident demonstrates the power of the scientific method. Despite the
spectacular, world changing advances brought about by science, historical circumstances
surrounding the emergence of science in Europe led to the creation of certain myths
which must be understood to acquire a perspective on the dominant methodology in use
in Social Sciences, and especially Economics.

To tie in this section to future developments in the paper, it is important to note two
points which became clear much later, after deeper investigation of the power and
limitation of the scientific method.

First, Ibn al-Haytham did not actually prove that vision is caused by light emanations
from the object reaching the eye. Rather, he disproved the rival theory of the light
emanations from the eye reaching the object. This is a fundamental limitation of
empirical methods. While they can disprove theories, they cannot ever prove any theory,
since there are always variant hypothesis all of which are a compatible with a set of
empirical observations. This is called the under-determination of scientific theories by
evidence; see Kyle (2013) for a detailed discussion.

Second, this is a general feature of the empirical method. The logic of the ancients was
entirely correct: empirical methods can never lead to certainty. However, this means that
instead of abandoning empirical methods like the ancients, we must abandon the quest for
certainty. Scientific method is pragmatic. Learning to live with good guesses which may
be in some neighborhood of the truth leads to excellent practical results.

3
2. Brief History of Emergence of European Science
The advanced civilization of Islamic Spain brought the light of learning which ended the
dark ages of Europe. However the advances to Enlightenment were not peaceful, but
marked by several violent battles which transformed the mindscape of Europe. One of
these was the battle between Science and Christianity, which has been documented in
extensive detail by Hans Kung (2006). Only one minor aspect of this is important for our
current purposes. The Church had absorbed several elements of Greek philosophy into its
theology. Scientific discoveries in conflict with these ancient Greek ideas threatened the
authority of the Church and led to ill-advised attempts to suppress these findings. From
the trial of Galileo to the controversies about evolution, many bitter conflicts took place
between scientific findings and accepted religious dogmas. There were many factors
which led to the eventual victory of Science over Christianity in Europe. However the
hostility generated by the battle persists to this day, and has been tremendously influential
in shaping European attitudes and ideas about science, scientific methodology and
religion.

Both to provide a contrast, and also because it has some relevance to our subject, it is
important to note that Islam was only saved by a hairbreadth from suffering a similar fate.
Rising to world dominance from a semi-savage and illiterate background in Arabia,
Muslim intellectuals were extremely impressed when sophisticated and complex Greek
philosophies were first translated into Arabic. The Mu’tazila movement argued that these
philosophies should be treated on par with the revelation, and incorporated into religious
teachings. They succeeded in convincing the Khalifa Haroun-ul Rasheed who utilized the
coercive powers of the state to enforce this theological position. It was only the heroic
resistance of a small number of religious scholars which prevented this from happening.
As a result, Islamic teachings were saved from being encumbered and overlaid by
defective Greek natural philosophy based on the axiomatic method. Because of this, no
conflict between science and theology occurred in Islamic history. Rather there was
peaceful co-existence as each side recognized its limits as well as the complementarity of
the two spheres of knowledge.

In contrast, the victory of Science over Christianity in Europe led to the attempt by
Science to take over all spheres of knowledge. In a process termed the “Deification of
Science” by Olson (1995), the attempt was made to promote the idea that scientific
knowledge is certain, and that there is no knowledge outside of science. These wrong
ideas continue to be widely believed, and have led to several distortions and myths. We
restrict attention to a few key ideas which have dramatically impacted adversely the
development of social sciences in the west. These failures of social science have led to
loss of understanding about the nature of human beings, communities, and society, and
caused massive harm to the quality of human life on this planet.

3. Substitution of Science for Religion

4
Tuchman (1985) refers to the extravagant follies of a sequence of Popes as one of the
most consequential events in European history. The loss of faith that occurred in Europe
as a result of the corruption of religious leaders was a deeply traumatic event. Nietzsche
(The Gay Science) has expressed the enormity of the event with characteristic style in the
parable of the Madman:

The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. ‘Where is God?’ he
cried; ‘I’ll tell you! We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers. But how
did we do this?... Is the magnitude of this deed not too great for us? do we not ourselves
have to become gods merely to appear worthy of it? There was never a greater deed –
and whoever is born after us will on account of this deed belong to a higher history than
all history up to now!’ Here the madman fell silent... he threw his lantern on the ground
so that it broke into pieces and went out. ‘I come too early’, he then said, ‘my time is not
yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears
of men.’

Among crises on many other fronts – spiritual, moral, political, etc. -- rejection of
religion led to an epistemological crisis. If the universal consensus of leaders of society
was not a trustworthy source of knowledge, then what was a suitable alternative?
European Enlightenment philosophers decided to trust only what they could touch or see,
and conclusions that could be reached by reason on the basis of observable and verifiable
facts. It was assumed that scientific knowledge had this characteristic, and was therefore
a good alternative to religion. The following quote from David Hume illustrates the spirit
of the effort to promote science as the only valid source of knowledge:

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us
ask, ‘Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?’ No. ‘Does
it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?’ No.
Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”

In his zeal to burn religious books, Hume did not notice that his own statement, like many
others in his influential books of philosophy, did not contain any abstract, experimental
or quantitative reasoning. Applying the dictum to itself would consign it to the flames.
This illustrates a fundamental difficulty that follows the rejection of faith as a basis for
belief. Knowledge cannot be constructed without a metaphysical scaffolding, a collection
of commonly accepted shared beliefs. Nonetheless, this is precisely what was attempted
in the Enlightenment project. The antipathy to metaphysics led to the concealment of
metaphysical assumptions within apparently objective and neutral frameworks; for an
example of this process, see Zaman (2012), “ The Normative Foundations of Scarcity”.

Religion provides an answer to many fundamental questions that we face as inhabitants

of this universe. Who created the universe, the stars, animals, plants, and especially us
human beings? What is the purpose of our existence? How should we behave, both as
individuals and within different social spheres of family, community, nationally and
internationally? Previously, religion had provided the basis for answers to all of these
questions. Rejection of religion meant that answers to all of these deep and difficult

5
questions had to be worked out from scratch, using limited human faculties of
observation and reason. In Zaman (2009, Origins of Western Social Sciences), I have
explained how social sciences originated in the attempt to find answers to all of these
questions.

The trauma caused by loss of faith led to the Enlightenment Project, a concerted effort
spanning centuries, to prove the science would provide an answer to all human problems.
It was taken as an article of faith that science would lead to certainty, and that eventually
scientific knowledge would encompass all knowledge that was possible for human beings
to achieve. In particular, it was thought that science would provide the basis for a
superior morality, an enlightened way of living. This hope was dashed in the early
twentieth century with the emergence of logical positivism, as we shall soon discuss.

The key point of our story is that the effort to make science serve as a substitute for
religion led to a deep misunderstanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. This
misunderstanding also impacted heavily on the methodology used for development of the
social sciences. Our goal is to explain why this methodology is wrong, and how we might
construct a better approach to the study of human beings and society.

4. The Quest for Certainty and Logical Positivism

Several daunting obstacles arose during the quest to prove the certainty of scientific
knowledge. The empiricists who believed that observations and logic were the sole
source of knowledge saw that clearly there were two types of knowledge 1. One was
analytical statements, which were true by the virtue of definitions and logic, like
mathematics. The other category was synthetic truths, famously exemplified by the
statement that “All swans are white”. Discovery of black swans in Australia showed that
experience was not a reliable guide to truth. Tremendous efforts were made to establish a
valid mode of induction: a way of generalizing from experience to arrive at a universal
law. However, it was eventually realized that all such efforts were doomed to failure.
There was no way to rule out black swans – after billions of years of sunrise every day,
the sun might go nova.

The research on methodology of science led to three clear conclusions, which were all
recognized to some partial extent by a few, but not generally accepted. We will refer to
these as the three limitations on scientific knowledge:

1. Science is not useful for the study of subjective, internal human experience.
Thus, it cannot answer the most significant questions that face us, like the
meaning of life, and the pathways to developing our human capabilities in all
dimensions, including moral and spiritual. This means that scientific knowledge
is NOT the most important type of knowledge we need as human beings.

1
Quine has shown that the analytic/synthetic distinction is a false dogma of empiricism. As Putnam
clarifies, there are analytic and synthetic statements, but there is a large category which cannot be classified
into either of the two categories – the two types are inextricably entangled. This issue is of no relevance to
our arguments, and hence ignored in the discussion.

6
 2. Science is limited in scope – there is a range of questions that it can answer, and
a huge range of important questions that it cannot. For example, science cannot
inform us about the best types of social, economic and political systems. This
because methods of analyzing dead matter subject to physical laws are not
suitable for the study of human beings. Humans are free to choose, think and act
in out-of-the-box ways, and live in unique historical contexts which limits the
possibilities of utilizing past patterns to predict behavior.
3. Even within its limited domain, science cannot lead to certainty. All scientific
knowledge is uncertain, because of the under-determination of theories by facts.
There is always an infinite number of theories compatible with all currently
observable facts, and there no logical way to select from among them.

These limitations explain why, even if we correct the first mistake, and recognize of
diversity of methodologies currently in use in science, we cannot use these
methodologies for the study of human experience and societies. Unfortunately, the
European trauma from loss of faith ran deep. The depth of the trauma is well illustrated
by Descartes’ argument that “I think therefore I am.” We directly experience our own
existence as the most fundamental and basic fact on which all else that we do is built. The
replacement of God by reason means that even the most fundamental fact of our
experience and existence must be established by reason in order to credible. I am alive
because I sense the blood rushing in veins, I hear the singing of the birds, I love, I smile, I
cry; how can I doubt my existence? To deny the validity of this rich smorgasbord of life
experience, and to reduce my existence to my limited ability to reason can only be caused
by the deep trauma resulting from the loss of faith. The trauma even impacts on our
ability to think – after all, do we blink out of existence and cease to be when we fall
asleep? This denial of the validity of our experienced reality is one of the fundamental
causes of the blindness of modern social science.

None of the three limitations on scientific knowledge listed above were acceptable to
secular philosophers who sought to replace religion by science. Efforts continued to
prove all three false, and to show that science is complete, certain and provides answers
to all our questions, including the most important ones. These efforts came to an
apparently successful conclusion in the early twentieth century with the emergence of the
philosophy of Logical Positivism. It had been established that inductive methods on
which science is based can never lead to certainty. Therefore positivists sought to revert
to ancient Greek methodology of science, the axiomatic deductive methods of
mathematics, which do lead to certainty. New developments in philosophy and logic in
the early twentieth century created the possibility of a new approach to scientific
methodology. The details are complex, and a sketch of these developments is given in
Zaman (2013, Logical Positivism and Islamic Economics). Very roughly, it was argued
that observations were facts, and science was based on logical deductions from these
facts. It followed that there was no room for error or uncertainty in science. Furthermore,
no other types of knowledge were available to human beings. One of the key arguments
was that even though science seemed to appeal to unobservable entities and forces, all of
these references could be translated into a language based purely on facts and logic.

7
Some of most brilliant minds of the twentieth century engaged in all seriousness with the
positivist project of showing that all valid human knowledge is based on observations and
reason. Von Fraasen (1980), a staunch empiricist, writes “Today, however, no one can
adhere to any of these philosophical positions to any large extent. Logical positivism, …
even if one is quite charitable … had a rather spectacular crash.” Most of the central
propositions of logical positivism have been proven wrong. Even ardent advocates like A.
J. Ayer (interview) were forced to admit that “it was all wrong.” No reasonable
alternative to positivism has emerged as a dominant view, and the foundations of the
philosophy of science are in substantial disarray. Philosophers of science have not
abandoned the idea of establishing the superiority of scientific knowledge. The editors of
the Handbook of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences set out to establish the
distinguishing characteristics of scientific knowledge. In a review of this Handbook,
Agassi (2009) writes that “it reflects fairly well the gloomy state of affairs in this
subfield.” Agassi (2009) writes, “there is neither need nor possibility to justify science
and forbid dissent from it.” Effectively Agassi argues that we should learn to live with
the limitations on scientific knowledge. Nonetheless, the dominant views among social
scientists continue to assume the unique validity of scientific knowledge. Furthermore
more than a half century of the intellectual stranglehold of this view has led to the
widespread diffusion, absorption and acceptance of this view by the general public.

5. The Double Mistake in Development of Social Science

As we have discussed briefly, the axiomatic method of mathematics is radically different
from the methodology of science, which is based on observations. The attempt to prove
that science is certain led to the appropriation of mathematical methodology for science,
in the guise of logical positivism. Conflating the two separate domains of knowledge
(mathematics and science) led to several misunderstandings concerning the nature of
science. Even though the physical sciences have a diverse set of realist methodologies,
the positivists reduced all scientific methodology to a unified nominalist and axiomatic
methodology. This misunderstanding of scientific methodology was then applied to
create a methodology for social sciences. A clear illustration of this process is provide by
Lionel Robbins (1935) who laid the foundations of modern economic theory. He claims
that:

“The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are obviously
deductions from a series of postulates. And the chief of these postulates are all
assumptions involving in some way simple and indisputable facts of experience….”

In effect there was double mistake in creating the foundations of modern social science.
The Robbins quote illustrates the first mistake, that scientific methodology is the same as
the hypothetico-deductive methodology of mathematics. Reading any contemporary
textbook of any science would show that this is false; none of the sciences use an
axiomatic-deductive methodology. Science emerged after the replacement of the
axiomatic methodology by an inductive and empirical methodology, which often requires
making unverifiable assumptions about unobservable entities and forces. This

8
methodology cannot lead to certainty, but works quite well practically, as is demonstrated
by the astonishing triumphs of science. Thus, there is no reason to be dis-satisfied with
the inherent uncertainties of scientific knowledge. However, the project of deification of
science made grander claims for science, and argued that science was based on logical
positivist methodology and was immune from errors. This misunderstanding of the
methodology of science did not have much effect on the physical sciences, which
continued to use an inductive and realist methodology, ignoring the positivist analysis.
Manicas (1981) has provided a detailed discussion of the mistaken understanding of
methodology of science, and how it led to deeply distorted development of social science.

However, the second mistake resulted from the struggle of social sciences to achieve
greater respectability by imitating the physical sciences; this is well documented by
Mirowski (1991) in the case of economics. Social scientists seized upon the mistaken
understanding of scientific methodology offered by logical positivism, and used this
methodology as the basis for social science. Our argument is that mathematics, physical
science, and humanities are three different disciplines and each has a distinct and unique
methodology suitable for its subject area. Just as it is a mistake to apply mathematical
methodology to the study of physical science, so it is a mistake to apply the methodology
of physical science to the study of human beings. It is a double mistake to apply a
misunderstanding of the methodology of physical science to social science. The term
“social science” reflects the idea that the best way to study human beings and societies is
via an application of scientific methodology. If our argument is accepted, then we should
replace this term by the older “humanities” since scientific methods are not appropriate
for the study of human beings. Winch (1990) has also taken this view that the idea of
social science is mistaken, since scientific methodology cannot be applied for this
purpose. Instead he argues for the use of philosophical methodology.

6. A methodology which requires ‘feigning anesthesia’

To recapitulate, the tremendous prestige of science, and the widely accepted idea the
scientific knowledge was the only valid form of knowledge, led to the attempt by
humanities to become scientific by adopting “scientific methodology”. This was a big
mistake. Just as mathematical methodology is eminently unsuitable for the needs of
science, so scientific methodology is eminently unsuitable for the needs of humanities.
The error was compounded by a massive misunderstanding of scientific methodology
generated by the ideas of logical positivism. In the next section, we will sketch the
outlines of a potential new approach to the subject. Ultimately, if our suggestion is
accepted, we will see that the term “Social Science” itself is a misnomer. The attempt to
emulate science and utilize the scientific method is bound to fail within humanities, and
the older term for this body of knowledge is the better one.

A long list of problems arises from the attempt to impose “scientific methodology” on a
discipline for which it is fundamentally unsuited. In the interests of brevity, we list only
one problem, which is at the root, and causes many others.

9
Fundamental Problem: Scientific Methodology requires discarding human experience
as a valid source of knowledge

An important goal of the secular drive to deify science was to discredit religious
knowledge. If human experience is admitted as a valid source of knowledge, then my
experience of God must be given weight as evidence for the existence of God. Because it
was psychologically necessary to deny this, it became necessary to deny the validity of
human experience as a source of knowledge across the board. But this led to increasing
ignorance in many domains of knowledge as collective wisdom of the ancients was
discarded as unscientific superstitions.

My personal and subjective internal experience is clearly observable by myself, but is not
visible to anyone else. This created a strange paradox for the positivists. If I acknowledge
the validity of my personal experience, then consistency requires me to affirm the same
for others, which leads to the acknowledgement of un-observables as a valid source of
knowledge. Positivists rejected unobservables, and hence rejected the unobservable
subjective experiences of others, and to maintain consistency, were forced to deny the
validity of our own internal personal experience, which is tantamount to “feigning
anesthesia”.

6.1 Psychology

The drive to make humanities “scientific” led to the emergence of the behaviorist school
of psychology, which basically treats human beings as robots which can be programmed
by stimulus-response conditioning. The founder of the school, Skinner, argued that we
should move “Beyond Freedom and Dignity.” To accept this idea requires me to deny my
life experience of freely making choices, both trivial and consequential, every day. Only
the worship of science and reason can lead human beings to override personal experience
and accept such propositions, which block all pathways to self-knowledge.

Behavioral psychology became dominant in the post-war era, and continues to be

influential. Because science emphasized the measurable and the observable,
psychologists focused on observable behaviors, and attempted to measure and quantify
human characteristics. In doing so, they lost sight of the most important aspects of what it
means to be human, including freedom and dignity. Although the collapse of logical
positivism has allowed the emergence of alternatives, like cognitive psychology and
humanistic psychology, the damage is deep and not easily repaired.

A philosophical position related to behavioral psychology is “physicalism” which

maintains that all statements which ostensibly refer to mental states or processes are
translatable into statements about physical occurrences. A summary of arguments pro and
con and variant theses spans more than twenty five pages of Ayer (1964). As Ayer
himself recognizes towards the end of this discussion, considering the thesis of
physicalism seriously requires “feigning anesthesia.” Our own experience flatly
contradicts the thesis.

10
6.2 Spirituality

Scientific stress on observability, and denial of human experience, has led to a virtual ban
on serious discussions of spirituality in the academia. In a volume of readings devoted to
this issue, the editors Hoppe & Speck (2007) state that “religion has been such a staple of
human existence that the attempt to eliminate it from the academy in any meaningful way
is to commit intellectual lobotomy.” They consider it intellectually dishonest to “deify
reason” and to take it as the opposite of religion – a widespread academic attitude
encouraged by logical positivism.

Chittick (2007) has studied the deep and sophisticated Islamic intellectual tradition
relating to the exploration of the inner spiritual world, that developed over the centuries.
He has pointed out that it is in danger of vanishing as even Muslims do not devote their
lives to quest for knowledge and virtue required for the mastery of this tradition. The
replacement of this quest by the pursuit of pecuniary advantage has created a crisis for
humanity as a whole, and Muslims in particular. Two essential elements in this tradition
are the erasure of the subject/object distinction which is of primary significance in
western epistemology. Understanding requires simultaneous comprehension of the one
who seeks knowledge as well as the object of that knowledge. As Chittick (2007) states:

the quest for self-knowledge provides the key to the profound difference between the Islamic
and the modern understandings of “science.” ... The human self is the key issue because it
alone can come to know God and the cosmos. … You cannot know yourself by asking the
experts to tell you who you are. You do not reach knowledge of yourself from outside, only
from inside. Until you know yourself from within, your self-knowledge will be based on
imitation, not realization.

The rejection of human experience as a valid source of knowledge has imperiled many
traditions of training which provide guidance regarding spiritual development. This has
impoverished human lives and constricted our imagination and vision.

6.3 Economics

Economic theory teaches students to deny the validity of their personal experience, and
accept the incredible lie that the cold, calculating and callous homo economicus provides
a good model for human behavior. This theory is internalized, leading economists to
behave selfishly. Julie Nelson (2012) has argued that our economic theories have
poisoned the well from which we get our ideas about human behavior, and made us
accept and normalize greed, opportunism, and un-ethical behavior. The assumption that
pursuit of wealth will solve all human problems has become deeply embedded into
foundations of economic thinking. Nearly all cultural and religious traditions warn
against this. The Bible says that “the love of money is the root of all evil”. Lao Tzu
taught us “do not race after riches, or you will let slip the heaven within you.” In
opposition to this traditional wisdom, among the fundamental teaching of economic
theory is that “participants in a market economy are motivated by self-interest,” and that

11
this self-interest works better than “love and kindness” at promoting social welfare; see
Amir-ud-Din and Zaman (2015) for a discussion and refutation.

Because economic models of behavior are far removed from reality, they create obstacles
to understanding the actual behavior of human beings in the real world. Thus economists
are shocked and surprised to learn that human beings cooperate, trust each other, and
prefer fairness and justice to the maximization of wealth. Karacuka and Zaman (2013)
provide many examples where economic theories systematically mis-predict behavior.
Fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of human beings and human welfare has led
to disastrous economic outcomes. Even though existing planetary resources are far
beyond what is necessary to allow all human beings comfortable lives, economists insist
on seeing scarcity where none exists, and insist on further accumulation of wealth as the
solution to economic problems, even though this strategy has been a demonstrable failure
in the past. Zaman (2012) makes explicit the many hidden normative judgements within
economic theory which are required to make scarcity the central economic problem.
Zaman (2014) shows how a blind pursuit of wealth has led to incalculable damage to
human lives and the planet we live on.

In response to dramatic failures of economic theories on several fronts, some correctives

to the tyranny of “scientific methodology” have recently emerged. Many authors, like
Sen (2001), have emphasized that we should be concerned with human development,
rather than the accumulation of wealth. Furthermore, the field of happiness studies has
confirmed the traditional wisdom that the race for riches does not lead to increases in
happiness, welfare or human satisfaction with life. The Easterlin paradox (see Easterlin
et. al. 2010) poses a serious challenge to conventional economic theory. Resolution is
only possible with a deeper understanding of the human experience, which necessarily
requires use of non-scientific methods. Qualitative and unmeasurable characteristics like
compassion, trust, freedom and dignity are central to economics, but cannot be studied by
the scientific method.

7: Proposal For A New Methodology

Abandonment of the study of human experience as being outside the scope of scientific
knowledge has led to a disaster. Catastrophic losses to the quality of human lives created
by deterioration of society, environment, and depletion of internal psychic and spiritual
resources have gone largely un-noticed within mainstream writings, since analysis of the
human experience is not easily carried out within a scientific discourse; see Zaman
(2014) for a brief summary. There is a desperate need to revisit and reclaim the study of
human beings and societies from the reaches of a social science which does not
acknowledge the validity of human experience.
In this context, it is important to note that different domains within the Social Sciences
have made adjustments to their methodologies to accommodate the failure of logical
positivism. Anthropology has been a leader in the field, developing a new methodology
based heavily on analysis of individual and social experiences. Economics has been the
most backwards, making almost no adjustments. But our arguments dispute the validity

12
of the idea of "Social Science" – namely the application of scientific methods to the study
of human beings and societies. This has been clearly expressed by Winch (1990).

7.1 Retracing Our Steps

Facing us is the daunting and massive task of reconstructing humanities from scratch.
One way to start the process is to re-trace our steps, to see the forks at which our
ancestors went astray. Manicas (1981) has provided a detailed history of the first mistake
– how scientific methodology was misunderstood. He notes how both logical Empiricists
and Kantians attempt to organize scientific knowledge on the basis of appearances alone,
putting the hidden realities outside the scope of science. Application of this
misconception about science to create a methodology for social science has meant that
“the very genesis and articulation of the social science has been powerfully distorted by a
series of ideas which follows from this initial misconception.” He provides a detailed
history of it came to pass that the wrong nominalist methodology became the accepted
description for the methodology of science. He suggests that this needs to be replaced by
a realist methodology, and argues in favor of a realist methodology for social science as
well. I have argued that even if we have a correct methodology for physical sciences, we
cannot apply this to the study of human experiences.

A second important juncture at which the wrong path was taken was the battle of the
methodologies – Methodenstreit – in the late nineteenth century. Here a historical and
contextual approach to economics was replaced by the mathematical and scientific
approach currently dominant. This story has been told effectively and in detail by
Hodgson (2001) in How Economics Forgot History. Modern economists search for
universal laws of economics, which would be universal invariants across time and space.
The scientific method allows for no recognition of the fact that economics must be
different for the Amish, the Incas, the Islamicate societies – that is culture, time,
historical context are all relevant factors.

Winch (1991) focuses on the second mistake. He argues that the methodology of science
is not applicable to the study of humans and societies and proposes that we should use the
methodology of philosophy instead. He argues that the analysis of human experience is
fundamentally different from the analysis of interactions between dead objects, as done in
science. Thus the very idea of social science, considered as an application of scientific
methods to the study of society, is wrong. He starts by clarifying misunderstandings
regarding philosophy and explains how philosophy, properly understood, would provide
a suitable methodology for study of human behavior. Philosophy, re-interpreted in the
manner suggested by Winch, is far more capable of addressing human concerns than
science, especially mis-understood science. Considerations of fairness, equity, justice,
whether or not laborers are exploited, have been taken out of the realm on economic
discourse, because these concepts are meaningless according to positivist principles.
Philosophy offers a solid framework and a rich history which allows us to deal with these
issues. Thus, Winch’s approach offers many useful ideas which may be incorporated in a
fresh start on the problem of understanding human and social behavior. Nonetheless, I
would suggest that the range of human experience is broader than can be covered by a

13
purely philosophical approach. Thus philosophy would provide an important component
of a new approach to humanities, but may not be a complete solution.

7.2 Learning from Our Past

As Kuhn has shown, scientists retro-fit the past, re-writing history to emphasize those
elements in consonance with the latest theories and ignoring discordant aspects as
mistakes. There is a large amount of interesting material in pre-positivist writings which
takes historical contexts, social and political aspects, and ethical and moral concerns into
account in the study of economics. A striking example is Adam Smith, whose theory of
the invisible hand has been turned into the centerpiece of modern economic theory. Many
authors, cited in Amir-ud-Din and Zaman (2015, Section 6) have shown the current
interpretation foisted onto Adam Smith radically mis-represents his views. Ashraf,
Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005) make a detailed analysis of Smith’s pioneering work
The Theory of Moral Sentiments to conclude that “For Adam Smith, a mixture of concern
about fairness . . . and altruism played an essential role in market interactions, allowing
trust, repeated transactions and material gains to occur.” Similarly, as shown by Rafaelli
(2004) and Opocher and Steedman(2008) among others, Marshall’s views of supply and
demand and partial equilibrium were substantially more sophisticated than the later over-
simplified mathematicisation in current textbooks. Also, real and deep Keynesian insights
were lost in the mathematics of the IS-LM curve created by Hicks and Samuelson. A
large number of insights into the political economy (some of which are now being
rediscovered) have been lost by a methodology which treats these domains as separate.
The economic analyses of the German Historical school, as well as the old school
institutional economists, offer insights not available within the scientific and
mathematical framework of neoclassical economics.

The positivist assumption that scientific method is based on matching appearances, and
the underlying realities can safely be ignored, led to the development of a sterile
mathematical methodology which completely ignores human behavior. As Krugman said,
echoing the sentiments of many other leading economists, the profession as a whole went
astray because they mistook the beauty of mathematics for truth. While mathematics is an
indispensable aid to thinking about complex situations, it is not a substitute for thought.

Cooter and Rapaport (1984) identify the turning point in economic methodology as
Robbins (1932), where the “scarcity” definition based on positivist ideas replaced an
earlier methodology which was more concerned with material welfare of human beings.
Most economists before the positivist era, and a few afterwards as well, have valuable
insights which could be incorporated into a fresh start for economic methodology.
Especially important and fundamental is the work of Karl Polanyi on the emergence of
markets and the capitalist economy. As summarized in Zaman (2014), Polanyi’s book on
the Great Transformation incorporates the following three methodological principles
dramatically at variance with current approaches to social science:

1: Economic history is formed as a result of the interactions of material circumstances as

well as human efforts to understand and improve their condition. Economic theories are

14
not universally invariant laws, but can only be understood within their historical context,
as elements of human agency.

2: Economic outcomes are the result of cooperation and conflict between communities,
and cannot be reduced to individual choices. Thus methodological individualism is
wrong.

3: The social, political, and economic spheres are entangled and cannot be analyzed
separately from each other.

The main point of this section is to suggest that if we remove neoclassical blinders, there
is a huge amount of deep and pertinent analyses which can be used to build the bases for
a radically different approach to the humanities.

7.3 Multiple Pluralisms

One distinguishing feature of any approach to humanities is that it will necessarily be
pluralistic. The dominance of scientific methodology has obscured this essential issue,
and pluralism continues to be treated with suspicion. Science is universal, and the law of
gravity operates in the same way in England and Brazil, as well as across the centuries.
The same is not true of human societies which are amazingly diverse geographically and
also evolve over time. It should be intuitively clear that the same social theory may not
apply to the Mayan, English, Chinese and Islamic civilizations. Indeed social theory is
constructed by the analysis of historical experience of a given society, and cannot readily
be generalized to others.

1. Human lives have many interlinked dimensions, including physical, spiritual,

moral, emotional and intellectual. Degrading human experience and privileging
reason leads to distortions like “I think therefore I am” which might be said by
dis-embodied brain floating in nutrients, but not by a full fledged human being.
One level of pluralism requires taking into consideration all of these dimensions
as constituents of human behavior.

2. The interactions of the macro spheres of political, social, and economic structures
with the micro spheres of family, neighborhood, community requires a pluralistic
approach.

3. Social Norms exercise a powerful influence on individual behavior. These are

created by the practice of communities. There is only a loose relation between
community practice and espoused ideals whether secular or religion based. A
pluralistic approach to humanities would vary substantially for the Amish
community, and the Nepalese Buddhists.

4. Each community has a shared definition of a good life, and often specifies the
methods to be used to achieve this life. The study of human lives and experiences
would be relative to this definition and vary with communities. Evolution and

15
 change in social norms is of vital interest – The Great Transformation of Polanyi
provides the tools for such a study.

5. Many thorny questions arise when we study the interactions of different

communities, especially in cases where political and power relations constrain
freedom. The elimination of communities via methodological individualism, and
the trivialization of individuals as homo economicus, has obscured these issues.
These are of vital importance today, in creating cooperative efforts to eliminate
injustice and save the planet. Studying interactions of communities while
respecting social norms within each community requires a pluralistic framework.

There is a vast range of vital questions which have been ignored because they fall outside
the scope of scientific inquiry. As an individual, buried within me are potentials for
excellence in many dimensions. How can I choose among them, and how can I develop
my capabilities to the fullest extent possible? What kind of a society can we create which
would nurture the growth of capabilities of all individuals? Such questions were posed
and discussed in the pre-positivist era, but have lost all meaning in modern social science.
A new approach to humanities would enable us to address these issues of central
importance today.

8. Conclusions
Human beings have a vast range of potential capabilities. Sen (2001) has argued
persuasively that material wealth is only a means to the development of these capabilities.
Learning how to develop these capabilities requires intimate self-knowledge, which
serves as a key to understanding human beings. Without acquiring self-knowledge, we
cannot understand others. We need to re-incorporate human experience into the
admissible body of knowledge to make progress in the humanities.

Science emerged as the victor of the battle between Church and Science that took place in
Europe. As a result, scientific knowledge took the place of sacred knowledge in the west.
Although only a tiny percentage of the population have more than a vague idea of what it
is, everyone reveres relativity theory as a holy object. Similarly, in the schools, students
read scriptures of chemistry, biology, physics, calculus, even though none of these
sciences provide them with any information about how to live a good life. Even though it
has manifestly failed to do so in the past, “Future World” of Disney depicts a dream
where science and technology has solved all human problems. It is assumed that a
vacuum cleaner and a washing machine can compensate for the heartbreak of a divorce,
and the resulting trauma to children. Repeated failures have not shaken the faith that
science will somehow provide solutions to all the problems we face.

To solve essential questions facing us as human beings, we need to study human

experience in the past. This is encapsulated in great literature, but not in the modern
fiction or the virtual reality which has become the modern substitute. What did the
ancients who struggled with the bigger problems have to say about how to lead a

16
meaningful life? These books are no longer studied. There is a wide range of options on
the menu, and the urgent problem facing us, is to choose wisely, for we have only one
chance at this life. The dilemma is that commitment to a path comes first and knowledge
comes later, so it is impossible to make a rational choice. One must trust the heart. The
training required to achieve wisdom is no longer part of any of the modern curricula of
education. Reuben (1996) writes that:

In 1884, Harvard University adopted a seal which represented the unity of knowledge:
Truth was “encyclopeadic”. It was all of one piece, embracing spiritual, moral, and
cognitive. By 1930’s this unity was shattered, with positivism driving a wedge between
factual cognitive knowledge and moral/spiritual knowledge. Science was value-free
(Weber), and distinct from morality. Late nineteenth century colleges had the explicit
goal to build character and promote morality (understanding of duties to family,
community, country and God) while at the same time contributing to the advancement of
knowledge. These two goals proved to be incompatible. Changing circumstances and
conception of the nature of science and knowledge ultimately forced universities to
(reluctantly) abandon the moral goal and embrace only the second goal: the promotion
of knowledge. The book documents this historical transition in life of US Universities
over the period 1880-1930 which has led to the creation of the modern university.

Although positivism has been rejected, universities continue to exclude moral and
spiritual dimensions from the realm of knowledge. To combat declining enrolment in
humanities, campaigns show that humanities graduates can also find good jobs. The idea
that humanities might lead to self-knowledge, which is infinitely precious, has been lost
from view. This essay outlines how we might free ourselves from the chains which bind
our thinking by the scientific method, and reach the sunlight outside Plato’s cave.

9. References
Agassi, Joseph (2009). ‘Current Philosophy of Science’, Philosophy of the Social
Sciences 20 (10), p. 1–17.
Amir-ud-Din, Rafi & Asad Zaman (2015): Failures of the “Invisible Hand”, Forum for
Social Economics, DOI: 10.1080/07360932.2015.1019536
Ashraf, N., Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (2005). Adam Smith, behavioral
economist.Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 131–145.
doi:10.1257/089533005774357897
Ayer. A. J. (1936) (1971). Language, Truth and Logic. Penguin Books: Harmondsworth.
Ayer, A.J. (Interview) “It was all wrong” www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cnRJGs08hE
A J Ayer (1964) “The Concept of A Person,” in The Concept of a Persons and Other
Essays, MacMillan p82-108. Ayer credits the concept of “feigning anesthesia” to C K
Ogden and I A Richards.

17
Chittick, William C (2007) Science of the cosmos, science of the soul: the pertinence of
Islamic cosmology in the modern world. Oneworld Publications Ltd.
Easterlin, R.A., L.A. McVey, M. Switek, O. Sawangfa, and J.S. Zweig (2010) The
Happiness Income Paradox Revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
107:52, 22463–22468.
Hodgson, Geoffrey Martin (2001) How economics forgot history: The problem of
historical specificity in social science. Vol. 17. Psychology Press.
Hoppe, Sherry L., and Bruce W. Speck. (eds.) Searching for spirituality in higher
education. (2007). Peter Lang Publishing.
Karacuka, M and A. Zaman (2013) “The Empirical evidence against neoclassical utility
theory: A review of the literature,” International Journal of Pluralism and Economics
Education
Kung, Hans (2006) Does God Exist? An Answer for Modern Times, Wipf & Stock
Publishers. translated from German.
Stanford, Kyle, "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/scientific-underdetermination/>.
Manicas, Peter T (1987) A history and philosophy of the social sciences. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Mirowski, Philip (1991) More heat than light: economics as social physics, physics as
nature's economics. Cambridge University Press.
Nelson, Julie A. (2012) Poisoning the Well, or How Economic Theory Damages Moral
Imagination. Global Development And Environment Institute Working Paper No. 12-07
Tufts University.
Olson, Richard. Science Deified & Science Defied: The Historical Significance of Science
in Western Culture. Vol. 2. University of California Press, 1995.
Opocher, Arrigo, and Ian Steedman. "The industry supply curve: Two different
traditions." The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 15.2 (2008): 247-
274.
Powers, Richard (1999) “Best Idea: Eyes Wide Open,” New York Time April 18, 1999.
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/magazine/best-idea-eyes-wide-open.html
Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard
University Press.
Raffaelli, Tiziano. "Whatever happened to Marshall's industrial economics?."The
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 11.2 (2004): 209-229.
Reuben, Julie A. (1996) The making of the modern university: Intellectual transformation
and the marginalization of morality. University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Robbins, Lionel (1935), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science.
2nd Edition, London: Macmillan and Co. [1952 printing].

18
Sen, Amartya. Development as freedom. Oxford University Press, 2001.
Tuchman, Barbara W (1985) The march of folly: From Troy to Vietnam. Ballantine
Books.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, USA, 1980.
Winch, Peter (1990) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd
edition. London: Routledge.
Zaman, A. (2009) “Origins of Western Social Science” Journal of Islamic Economics,
Banking and Finance, vol 5, number 2, May-August 2009, p. 9-22
Zaman, A. (2012) “The Normative Foundations of Scarcity,” Real-World Economics
Review, issue no. 61, 26 September 2012, pp. 22-39
Zaman, A. (2013) "Logical Positivism and Islamic Economics, International Journal of
Economics, Management and Accounting, Vol. 21, No. 2 (December 2013).p 1-18
Zaman, A. (2014) ""Evaluating the Costs of Growth," Real World Economics Review,
issue 67, 9 May 2014, page 41-51
Zaman, A (2015)“Islam Versus Economics” Chapter 2 in Handbook on Islam and
Economic Life, edited by Kabir Hassan and Mervyn Lewis, Edward Elgar Press.

19