IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO.
8, AUGUST 2022
Adaptive Formation for Multiagent Systems
Subject to Denial-of-Service Attacks
Kunpeng Pan , Graduate Student Member, IEEE, Yang Lyu , Member, IEEE, and Quan Pan , Member, IEEE
Abstract— The vulnerabilities of multi-agent-system (MAS)
become a critical issue for cybersecurity. The article investigates
the formation control problem for MASs under multi-channel
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. In this article, the attacks on
each channel are independent, while most of the existing results
show that DoS attacks are the same on all channels. Without loss
of generality, we consider multi-channel DoS attacks are imposed
on a leader-follower MAS. Firstly, we propose a distributed
formation control protocol to achieve the desired formation in
the presence of DoS attacks. A translation-adaptive method is
considered to adjust the interaction weights among neighboring
agents online. Furthermore, a performance guarantee is derived
based on the state information, and hereafter state errors among
all agents can be regulated. Moreover, we derive the sufficient
conditions for system stability w.r.t the controller gain and the
allowable attack duration in the form of linear matrix inequalities
(LMIs). Finally, simulation results are given to illustrate the
effectiveness of the proposed method.
Index Terms— Denial-of-service attack, multi-agent system,
adaptive formation, guaranteed-performance, linear matrix
inequality.
I. I NTRODUCTION
C OOPERATIVE control of multi-agent systems (MASs)
has been paid more and more attention because of
its wide applications over the past few years [1]–[3], such
as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) formation, multi-sensor
network filtering. MASs can accomplish more complex tasks
with higher efficiency than a single agent system by carrying
out the mission cooperatively with networked information-
sharing mechanisms. For example, UAVs achieve forma-
tion with the structure of leader-follower, carry out target
search, cooperative combat and other complex tasks, greatly
improving the efficiency of completing tasks. However, the
agents and the interconnections between them will inevitably
be exposed to malicious attacks which become an Achilles
heel for MASs. Research on security control of MAS under
cyber attack has become a hot topic [4]–[6]. Typical attacks
include DoS attacks, reply attacks, deception attacks, sensor
Manuscript received 24 December 2021; revised 27 March 2022; accepted
12 April 2022. Date of publication 8 June 2022; date of current version 28 July
2022. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China under Grant 61790552. This article was recommended by Associate
Editor Z. Li. (Corresponding author: Quan Pan.)
The authors are with the School of Automation, Northwestern Poly-
technical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710129, China (e-mail: pankunpeng@
mail.nwpu.edu.cn; lyu.yang0326@gmail.com; quanpan@nwpu.edu.cn).
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3391
attacks [7]–[9]. Among these attacks, Dos attacks often occur
in practical multi-agent applications such as formation control.
They block part or all of the transmission of information
by attacking communication channels, which will result in
formation failure [10].
There are many excellent results in MAS consensus research
[11]–[13]. Shen et al. [11] mainly focus on the distributed
consensus protocol design with considering the transmission
nonlinear problems. Based on neural network and some other
schemes, MAS consensus is studied [12]. Adaptive forma-
tion control for MASs has been explored in recent years.
By means of a model reference control approach, a robust
adaptive formation controller is used to steer the vehicles
into a formation pattern [13]. Different from the above, this
article considers that the weight of action between agents
can be adjusted adaptively. The adaptive weight adjustment
lays a foundation for task assignment and formation structure
optimization. However, these methods are not enough to deal
with the threat of DoS attacks.
Guarding the MASs against malicious DoS attacks becomes
a new research topic with related works [14]–[16]. Zhang
et al. [17] design a resilient state feedback controller for a
class of networked control systems under DoS attacks. A logic
processor is embedded in the controller and the closed-loop
system is modeled as an aperiodic sampling system according
to the upper and lower bounds of attack duration. A similar
attack scenario is also considered in [18], the closed sys-
tem is modeled as switched systems and the leader-follower
consensus problem is described. Inspired by the switched
system, a state feedback controller is designed in [16] under
the premise of attack intensity, and its upper bound is derived
with the aid of switching mechanism. [16] and [17] both
involve a state feedback controller to deal with DoS attacks,
while [19] designs an output feedback controller to handle the
same situation. Also against DoS attacks problems, [20] study
the secure control from the perspective of game theory, data
fusion, and networked predictive control, respectively.
In addition, a centralized event-triggered controller is pro-
posed in [21] to address energy-constrained periodic DoS
attacks on a single-agent system. Hu et al. [22] propose a
new observer state-based resilient event-triggering scheme and
establish a novel event-based switched system model in the
presence of DoS attacks. In addition, they also study the co-
design of dynamic event-triggered and resilient observer-based
control [23]. Feng et al. [24] further extend the work [21] to
study event-triggered secure average consensus problem for
3392 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO. 8, AUGUST 2022
MASs based on the analysis of frequency and duration of
DoS attacks. One step further than [21], a distributed secure
control protocol is proposed in [24], and the research object
is extended to MASs. Heritaging the results in [24], She et
al. design a resilient control protocol in [25] to maximize
attack frequency and duration. Although booming results [21],
[24], [25] are provided on the security consensus control
of MASs, from the perspective of the attacker, all channels
are considered as one channel. In this article, as the main
motivation, we focus on multi-channel DoS attacks which can
occur on any channel at any time.
For the multi-channel DoS attacks problems, Lu et al. [16],
[26], [27] study the resilient control problem of CPSs or MASs
based on the method of state feedback and state estimation.
Their results valid for not only periodic DoS attacks, but
also when each communication channel is attacked indepen-
dently. In [16], the research object is extended to MASs,
and they design security consensus controllers based on both
state feedback and state estimation for multi-channel attacks.
Resiliency is realized based on the method of average state
consensus. However, the weights between MASs are fixed
in their works. Different from [16], we consider an adaptive
formation for multi-channel DoS attacks, in which the weights
of interconnections between agents can be adjusted online.
Multi-channel DoS attacks are independent of each other, and
vary in frequency and duration.
In addition, the constraint problems should be given more
consideration for the secure consensus control of practi-
cal MASs. Several common constraint problems have been
studied including communication, input saturation, energy
constraints [28]–[31] and performance constraints [32]–[34].
Among the above constraints, the performance constraint as a
basic constraint problem is placed in the scope of our works.
When the formation is realized, the tracking error is guar-
anteed to be within limits, inspired by [35]. [36] studies the
unconstrained consensus problems based on a scaling-adaptive
strategy in the absence of attacks. They eliminate the influence
of non-zero eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix by adding
scaling factors. However, the exact value of the scaling factors
are difficult to determine. When we consider performance
constraints, a precise scaling factor must be derived for the
global cost function, which means the utilized in scaling factor
in [36] are no longer suitable.
Thus, it is still open to jointly considering the guaranteed
performance, adaptive formation problem under DoS attacks.
The following interesting and challenging problems need to
be studied.
1) How to achieve distributed formation under DoS
attacks, and to guarantee performance among all agents,
simultaneously.
2) How to deal with various attack models come from
attacks on multiple communication channels.
3) How to derive the controller gain, attack duration, and
the upper bound of performance guarantee.
In this article, we consider a leader-follower MAS under
DoS attacks. Firstly, a guaranteed performance formation
protocol with adaptively adjusting weights is proposed under
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DoS attacks. Then, a new translation-adaptive strategy is
designed to implement performance constraints. In addition,
the sufficient conditions of controller gain, an upper bound
of performance function, and attack intensity are converted
to LMIs. Finally, we consider the various attack models and
obtain the corresponding control gain and attack duration
under different decay rates. Based on the above elaboration,
we summarize the main contributions of this article as follows:
1) A guaranteed performance formation control protocol
with adaptive weights under DoS attack is proposed.
2) A translation-adaptive strategy is introduced in the con-
struction of the Lyapunov function to properly integrate
performance constraints.
3) Sufficient conditions for the controller gain, decay rate,
and attack intensity are given in the form of LMIs.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section II
presents the preliminaries and problem formulation. In section
III, the formation protocol is designed. Section IV gives the
stability analysis and gets the sufficient condition of DoS
attack duration. To demonstrate the feasibility of the adaptive
formation protocol, the simulation results and analysis are
given in section V, and Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Rn×n denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space.
The superscript T stands for matrix transposition, and S > 0,
S < 0 denote positive-definiteness and negative-definiteness.
H e(A) = A + A T , λmax (A) and λmin (A) denote the largest
and smallest eigenvalues of A, respectively. Given a vector
v i ∈ Rn , v i  is the Euclidean norm of v i . N is the
set of natural numbers. 0 and I denote a zero matrix and
unit matrix with appropriate dimensions. The N-dimensional
column vector with all components 1 is represented by 1 N . For
interval D(t1 , t2 ), |D(t1 , t2 )| is its length over [t1 , t2 ). Given
two sets 1 and 2 , 1 \2 is the relative complement of
2 in 1 . ⊗ and ∗ represent the Kronecker product and the
symmetric terms of symmetric matrices, respectively.
II. P RELIMINARIES AND P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
A. Graph Theory
A leader-follower graph is defined as G(V, E) where V and
E ⊆ V × V are the set of vertices that represents the local
agents, and the set of edges that stands for communication
links, respectively. An edge (i, j ) ∈ E denotes that j can
obtain information from i .
E f is the set of edges between follower -follower. The set
of edges between the leader and follower is denoted by El .
ωi j (i = j ) represents the action weight of ( j, i ), which is from
agent j to agent i . A MAS with one leader and N followers
are studied, where the leader is labeled 0, and the followers
are labeled 1, 2, 3 · · · , N. The index set Ni = { j : (i, j ) ∈ E}
represents the neighbor set of agent i .
We define 0 − 1 Laplacian matrix as L = [li j ] ∈
N
R(N+1)×(N+1) with lii = j =0, j  =i ωi j,0 , l i j = −ωi j,0 =
−1 if (v i , v j ) ∈ E and li j = 0, otherwise. A variable Laplace
matrix L(t) = [li j (t)] ∈ R(N+1)×(N+1) is defined with lii (t) =
N
j =0, j  =i l i j ωi j (t) and l i j (t) = −l i j ωi j (t) where ωi j (t) ≥ 1
is designed later. In addition, the nonzero eigenvalues of L
and L(t) are positive.
PAN et al.: ADAPTIVE FORMATION FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS 3393

B. System Description
Given a leader-follower MAS with a leader and N followers,
the dynamic model of the leader is presented as:
ṗ0 (t) = v 0 (t), v̇ 0 (t) = α p p0 (t) + αv v 0 (t),
where p0 ∈ Rn and v 0 ∈ Rn are the positions and velocity
vectors of the leader, respectively. α p and αv are known Fig. 1. Example of DoS signal. On and off mean zero and one, corresponding
to communication allow and disallow.
damping constants. The follower’s dynamic model is given
as:
ṗi (t) = v i (t), v̇ i (t) = α p pi (t) + αv v i (t) + u i (t), Example 1: Three DoS attacks occur within 0 to 15 sec-
onds, that is [s, t] = [0, 15] as shown in Fig. 1. Off-to-On
where i ∈ F = {1, 2, · · · N}. pi ∈ Rn and v i ∈ Rn transitions are represented as ↑. Similarly, ↓ stands for on-
represent the position vector and velocity vector of the i to-off transitions. Off/on transitions occur at t = 1s, 6s, 12.5s
agent, respectively. The formation structure for MAS is speci- and the corresponding time intervals are 3s, 4s, 2.5s, respec-
fied by a vector function f (t) = [ f 0T , f1T , · · · f NT ]T , where tively. This yields: D(0.5, 9) = [1, 4] ∪ [6, 9), D(11, 12) = ∅,
f 0 = 0 ∈ R2n×2n , fi = [ f ipT , fivT ]T ∈ R2n×2n (i ∈ F) D(9, 15) = [9, 10] ∪ [12.5, 15).
is the piecewise continuously differentiable formation vector For DoS attacks, the following Assumption is given.
for follower i with f ip and f iv being the components of Assumption 1: [16] (DoS Duration) There is ξi j > 0 and
f i corresponding to the position and velocity, respectively. 0 < μi j < 1 such that
Defining x 0 = [ p0T , v 0T ]T ∈ R2n , x i = [ piT , v iT ]T ∈ R2n ,
ψ0 = x 0 − f 0 , ψi = [ψipT , ψ T ]T = x − f , it has
iv i i |D(i, j ) (s, t)| ≤ ξi j + μi j (t − s), (4)

ψ˙0 = Aψ0 + A f 0 − f˙0 , where D(i, j ) (s, t) stands for channel (i, j ) suffers the union
of DoS attack over [s, t). μi j represent the attack intensity.
ψ̇i = Aψi + Bu i + A f i − ḟ i , (1)
    The set of channels attacked at time t is defined as
0 1 0
where A = ⊗ In ∈ R2n×2n and B = ⊗ In ∈ (t) = {(i, j ) ∈ E|t ∈ D(i, j ) (0, +∞)}. (5)
α p αv 1
R2n×m are system matrices. u i (t) ∈ Rm×2n is the formation The union of two times interval sets,where one is the set of
protocol to be designed. channels subjected to the DoS attack and the other is the set
The control target of adaptive formation of MASs is to of channels not subjected to the DoS attack, is described as
make limt →+∞ x i − fi − x 0 = 0 and Je ≤ Je∗ by designing
appropriate control protocol. Je and Je∗ are the performance
(t1 , t2 ) = (∪(i, j )∈D(i, j ) (t1 , t2 ))∪(∩(i, j )∈/(i, j ) (t1 , t2 )).
index and its upper bound, which will be introduced later. (6)
|E f |
C. Attack Description Remark 1: There are 2 2 +|El |
attack models from no chan-
In this paper, it is assumed that only the transmission nel attacked to all channels attacked. Interval [t1 , t2 ] contains
|E f |
channels are attacked, that is, the control scheme is not able 2 2 +|El | sub-intervals
(t1 , t2 ). Note that
to obtain relevant information from its neighbors. We consider
∪∈E f
(t1 , t2 ) = [t1 , t2 ],
that the communication between followers is undirected and
the communication between leader and followers is directed. D(i, j ) (t1 , t2 ) = ∪∈E f ,(i, j )∈
(t1 , t2 ).
Since the location and time of occurrence are arbitrary, and
|E f |
each channel is likely to be attacked, there are 2 2 +|El | D. Guaranteed Performance Formation Protocol
elements in the set composed of all attack models. We let When DoS attacks the communication channels of the MAS,
{h κ |h κ ≥ 0, κ ∈ N} denote the sequence of DoS off/on the communication is interrupted, and the information in this
transitions. The time instant h κ describes a transition from period is discarded. To ensure the performance of formation,
zero to one, which represents communication connectivity and the performance constraint problem is considered under DoS
communication interruption. Then, attacks. Inspired by [16], [37],a new guaranteed performance
formation protocol is proposed as follows:
Hκ := {h κ } ∪ [h κ , h κ + sκ ), (2)
u i (t) = K u ξi − α fi + f˙iv ,
stands for the κth time-interval, of a length sκ > 0, over which
DoS attack exists. Given t > s > 0, let ξi (t) = ωi0,0 ωi0 (t)(ψ0 − ψi )|(0,i)∈/ (t )

+ (ωi j,0 ωi j (t)(ψ j − ψi ))
D(s, t) = ∪n∈N Hκ ∩ [s, t],
j ∈Ni ,i =0,( j,i)∈
/ (t )
(s, t) = [s, t]\D(s, t). (3)
ω̇i j (t) = ω̇ j i (t) = (ψ j − ψi ))T K ω (ψ j − ψi )),
In other words, D(s, t) and (s, t) are the set of time instants N  +∞
where communication denied and allowed for time-interval Je (t) = ωi0 (ψ0 − ψi )T Q(ψ0 − ψi )dt
[s, t], respectively as illustrated in Example 1. i=1 0

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3394 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO. 8, AUGUST 2022


1 
N N +∞
one obtain
+ ωi j (ψ j − ψi )T Q(ψ j − ψi )dt,  
2 0
i=1 j =1 0 W −1
L(t)W = ,
(7) L f f (t) +  f l (t)
 
0
where i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N, α = [α p , αv ]. Q = Q T ∈ W −1 L (t)W = ff fl .
L  (t) +  (t)
R2n×2n > 0 is the gain matrix, and Je represents the practical
performance function of the whole MAS. K u ∈ Rm×2n and
K ω = K ωT ∈ Rn×2n are the controller gain matrix and adaptive Because at least there must be a transmission path from
weight gain matrix, which are to be designed. The core idea the leader to every follower, L f f (t) +  f l (t) is positive
ff fl
of formation control protocol with guaranteed performance is definite and symmetric. In addition, L  (t) +  (t) is also
to achieve formation while determining an upper bound Je∗ of a symmetric matrix. There exists an orthonormal matrix
performance index Je . The definition of ωi j,0 and ωi j (t) are W̃ such that W̃ T (L f f (t) +  f l (t))W̃ = f f (t) > 0.
ff fl ff
given as Definition 1. Similarly, ν T (L  (t) +  (t))ν =  (t) > 0, where
Definition 1: ωi j,0 is the 0 − 1 weight of agent j to agent i . ν = [ν1 , ν2 · · · ν N ]. νi is the orthogonal eigenvector of L
If agent i can receive information from agent j , ωi j,0 = 1(i = corresponding to λi . We define
j ); otherwise, ωi j,0 = 0. ωi j (t) is the adaptive change coef-  T
(W −1 ⊗ In )ψ(t) = ψ0 (t) ψ̂(t) ,
ficient, and its initial value is ωi j (0) = ω j i (0) = 1. ω̇i j (t) =
ω̇ j i (t) and ωi j (t) = ω j i (t) are obtained from (7). Due to where
ωi j (t) is bounded, a reasonable assumption ωi j (t)  γi j is  T
described. According to the definition of 0 − 1 action weight ψ̂(t) = ψ1 (t) − ψ0 (t) · · · ψ N (t) − ψ0 (t) .
ω j i,0 and its adaptive coefficient ω j i (t), the 0-1 Laplace matrix
If (I N+1 ⊗ H1 ) f (t) − (I N+1 ⊗ H2) f˙(t) = 0, there is
L and Laplace matrix L(t) are given as:
  ˙
ψ̂(t) = (I N ⊗ A − (L f f (t) +  f l
0 0
L = , ff fl
− L  (t) −  ) ⊗ B K u )ψ̂(t).
−L f l L f f +  f l (9)
 
0 0 Theorem 1 is given to get the sufficient conditions of the
L(t) = ,
−L f l (t) L f f (t) +  f l (t) formation protocol.
  T
L f l = ω10,0 ω20,0 ω30,0 · · · ω N0,0 , Theorem 1: For a connected graph with agents (1), given
 T decay rates β, if there are positive symmetric definite X, M
L f l (t) = ω10,0 ω10 (t) · · · · · · ω N0,0 ω N0 (t) such that
⎡ N ⎤  √ 
i=1 ω1i,0 −ω12,0 · · · −ω1N,0
 f f ⊗ XT
⎢ −ω21,0 N ⎥ < 0,
i=1 ω2i,0 · · · −ω2N,0 ⎥
(10)
Lff = ⎢ ⎣ ⎦ ∗ −I N ⊗ M
··· ··· ··· ···
N the inequality is guaranteed
−ω N1,0 −ω N2,0 · · · i=1 ω Ni,0
⎡ N ⎤
i=1 ω1i,0 ω1i (t) · · · −ω1N,0 ω1N (t) V̇ (t) < βV (t). (11)
⎢ .. ⎥
L f f (t) = ⎣ ··· . ··· ⎦ where
N
−ω N1,0 ω N1 (t) · · · i=1 ω Ni,0 ω Ni (t) 
N
V (t) = ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t) + 2γ (γ0i − ω0i (t))
where  f l = di ag(L f l ),  f l (t) = di ag(L f l (t)), L and L(t)
i=1
are symmetric matrices.

N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi j,0 )2
+ ,
III. A DAPTIVE F ORMATION P ROTOCOL D ESIGN 2
i=1 j =1
In this section, we will give the sufficient conditions of and γ ≥ γ0i ≥ ω0i (t),  = I N ⊗ H e(AX −β X)−2( f f −
the formation protocol design scheme. Substituting formation  + γ I ) ⊗ B R B T , X = P −1 , M = Q −1 , and  ∈ E, under
ff
protocol (7) into (1) yields
the distributed formation controller (7) with K u = R B T P
ψ̇(t) = (I N+1 ⊗ A − (L(t) − L (t)) ⊗ B K u )ψ(t) and adaptive weight gain K ω = P B R B T P. The performance
function upper bound satisfies
+ (I N+1 ⊗ H1 ) f (t) − (I N+1 ⊗ H2) f˙(t), (8)    +∞
    ∗ N −1TN
01 10 Je = ψ (0)
T
⊗ Pψ(0) + max(β) V (t)dt
where H1 = , H2 = . L(t) is given in Defini- −1 N I N 0
00 00  +∞  
tion 1 and L (t) is defined as L(t) with wi j,0 (( j, i ) ∈
/ (t)) N −1TN
+ 2γ ψ T (t)( ⊗ P B R B T P)ψ(t)dt,
replaced by 0. Furthermore, let 0 −1 N I N
(12)
 
1 0 where V (t) is given as (A.13).
W = ,
1N IN Proof: See Appendix A for details.

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PAN et al.: ADAPTIVE FORMATION FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS 3395

TABLE I
D ECAY RATES β

Fig. 2. Communication topology of leader-follower multi-agent systems.

IV. S TABILITY A NALYSIS

Theorem 1 analyzes the influence of decay rate on
closed-loop system controller under different attack models
(t) where (t) ∈ E, (i, j ) ∈  and ( j, i ) ∈  hold
simultaneously. In this section, we focus on the stability
analysis.
Inspired by switched systems and literature [16], the concept
ij ij
of the subsystem is introduced. π1 and π2 are defined as two
subsystems, corresponding to (i, j ) ∈  with and without DoS Fig. 3. DoS signal (DoS (i, j) = 1 means that channel (i, j) is under attack;
attack. Then, Theorem 2 is given for stability analysis. DoS (i, j) = 0 represents no attack).
Theorem 2: For a connected graph with system (1), given
ij
decay rates β in (10), if there exist scalars π1 , π2 and
ij √ √
2 (i − 1)π 2 (i − 1)π T
attack intensity μi j such that si n ), si n )] , i ∈ {1 · · · 3}.
2 3 2 3
ij ij
π1 − π2 ≥ 0, (13) Through the LMI (10) of Theorem 1, selecting translation
 ij  ij factor γ = 10, we get the controller gain and adaptive weight
β − ( π1 + π2 ) ≤ 0, (14)
gain of formation protocol as K u = [20.0799, 12.7594]T ⊗
(i, j )∈ (i, j )∈E \
 I3 and K ω = [35.175422.3516; 22.3516, 14.2530] ⊗ I3 ,
ij ij
μ̄ = (μi j π1 + (1 − μi j )π2 ) < 0, (15) respectively. By Theorem 2, we obtain the allowable attack
(i, j )∈E intensity μi j . For convenience, it is assumed that μi j are same
the MASs can still achieve formation control under DoS attack for all edge (i, j ). Then we get μ12 = μ13 = μ23 = 0.2808.
satisfying Assumption 1. It implies that for every edge, a maximum of 28.08% of
Proof: See Appendix B for details. communication denials on the average are permitted under the
adaptive formation control protocol. The DoS attack signal is
given as Fig. 3, where 1 indicates that the channel (i, j ) ∈ 
V. S IMULATION R ESULTS
is under attack and 0 indicates that the system is not under
In this section, the guaranteed performance formation for attack.
MASs with a leader and three followers is researched, whose Under various attack models, the performance index Je and
communication topology is shown in Fig. 2. The different Je corresponding to this paper and the [37] are shown in
attack models are considered, ( ∈ {(0, 1)(1, 2), (2, 1), (1, 3), TABLE II. The classification in the table is given according
(3,1), (2,3), (3, 2)}), and the different number of attack chan- to different channels under attack. The convergence values of
nels are given different decay rates in the TABLE I. The choice the performance index are calculated from no channel under
of decay rate requires that the LMI (10) has a viable solution. attack to all channels under attack. As can be seen from the
To illustrate the feasibility of the scheme, we consider two table, under the same attack and parameters, the performance
simulation scenarios and compare proposed scheme with an cost of the scheme we proposed is smaller, that is, Je < Je .
excellent paper without adaptive mechanisms [37]. In addition, due to the adaptive mechanism, the proposed
Case A : Here, we consider α = 0. The MASs is modeled as scheme is more robust and has less fluctuation of performance
x i = [ pi , v i ]T = [ pi X , piY , pi Z , v i X , v iY , v i Z ]T . To achieve indexes under the same attack.
time-varying formation, the following formation function is Here, we take all channels being attacked at the same time
given as: √ as an example to study the problem of formation with DoS
(i − 1)π π 2 (i − 1)π attack. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 describe the state trajectories ψi of
f i (t) = [tsi n( + ), tsi n ),
√ 3 2 2 3 the scheme in this paper and scheme in [37], respectively.
2 (i − 1)π (i − 1)π For Fig. 4, the states of all followers converge asymptotically
tsi n ), si n( ,
2 3 3 to the leader under adaptive formation protocol (7).

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3396 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO. 8, AUGUST 2022
TABLE II
G UARANTEED -P ERFORMANCE C OST
Fig. 4. Trajectories of (ψi ) with applying the proposed scheme. The states
corresponding to (a), (b) and (c) are ψip X , ψipY and ψip Z . The states
corresponding to (d), (e) and (f) are ψiv X , ψivY and ψiv Z , respectively.
Fig. 4 (a) − (c) show the position-related error trajectory
ψip in the X, Y, Z directions. Fig. 4 (d) − ( f ) describes the
error state trajectory related to velocity ψiv . Similarly, Fig. 5
has a similar meaning, describing the simulation results using
scheme in [37].
Comparing Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the scheme we proposed
achieved the consensus of leader-follower at t = 2s, but the
scheme in [37] achieved the consensus at t = 20s, which is
significantly longer than the scheme we proposed.
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of (ψi ) with applying the scheme of [37]. The states
corresponding to (a), (b) and (c) are ψip X , ψipY and ψip Z . The states
corresponding to (d), (e) and (f) are ψiv X , ψivY and ψiv Z , respectively.
Fig. 6. Position state snapshots of all the agents at different moments for
MASs under DoS attacks.
Fig. 6 shows the state snapshots of each agent at different
moments (t = 0, 3, 4, 8, 13, 15s), where the three followers
and a leader are marked by asterisks, squares, circles and
hexagons, respectively. In a time-varying triangle formation,
all followers stay in formation with the leader, which runs in a
straight line and is described. The red hexagons represent the
leader, and the trajectory follows the blue dotted line from
t = 0s to t = 15s. Starting from the initial point, after
the formation is realized by the agent, the followers move
in a straight line with the leader and keeps the formation
of equilateral triangle unchanged. It can be seen from Fig. 6
that the safe formation can still be realized despite the DoS
attack. When four edges are attacked, the upper bound of the
performance function is obtained as Je∗ = 5236.7. At t = 2s,
the performance index function converges to a finite value
and satisfy Je < Je∗ as shown in Fig. 7. The left vertical
axis represents the actual value of the performance indicator
function, and the right vertical axis represents the upper
bound of the performance indicator. Fig. 8 is the time-varying
curve of the adaptive weight change coefficient in the leader-
follower case, which converges to a finite value eventually.
PAN et al.: ADAPTIVE FORMATION FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS
Fig. 7. Performance function and guaranteed performance upper bound.
Fig. 8. Time-varying curve of the adaptive weight change coefficient.
Fig. 9. DoS signal (DoS (i, j)=1 means that channel (i, j) is under attack;
DoS (i, j)=0 represents no attack).
Therefore, for the leader-follower MASs under DoS attack, all
the agents achieve the desired adaptive formation with control
protocol (7), and the guaranteed performance index Je < Je∗
is satisfied. By comparison, it has advantages over the scheme
proposed in [37] in formation speed and robustness.
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3397
Fig. 10. Trajectories of (ψi ) with applying the proposed scheme. The
states corresponding to (a), (b) and (c) are ψip X , ψipY and ψip Z . The states
corresponding to (d), (e) and (f) are ψiv X , ψivY and ψiv Z , respectively.
Fig. 11. Trajectories of (ψi ) with applying the scheme of [37]. The states
corresponding to (a), (b) and (c) are ψip X , ψipY and ψip Z . The states
corresponding to (d), (e) and (f) are ψiv X , ψivY and ψiv Z , respectively.
Case B : In this case, we consider α = [−0.01, −0.012],
and x i = [ pi , v i ]T = [ pi X , piY , v i X , v iY ]T . The following
formation function is given as [38]:
⎡ ⎤
r cos(ωt + 2π(i − 1)/3)
⎢ r si n(ωt + 2π(i − 1)/3) ⎥
f i (t) = ⎢ ⎥
⎣ −r ωsi n(ωt + 2π(i − 1)/3) ⎦ , i ∈ {1 · · · 3}.
r ωcos(ωt + 2π(i − 1)/3)
We choose the same decay rate as shown in Table I and get
the same attack duration as case A. By giving parameter γ =
5, r = 10, ω = 0.1, we get the controller gain and adaptive
weight gain of formation protocol as K u = [26.2401, 17.3116]
⊗ I2 and K ω = [46.5732, 30.7262; 30.7262, 20.2713] ⊗ I2 ,
respectively.
Here, we take the example of all channels being attacked.
DoS attacks on each channel are shown in Fig.9. The perfor-
mance cost function Je finally converges to 0.3050 with the
proposed scheme, while Je finally converges to 1.8898 under
the scheme of [37]. By comparison, the performance cost
3398 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO. 8, AUGUST 2022
Fig. 12. Position state of all the agents under DoS attacks.
Fig. 13. Velocity state of all the agents under DoS attacks. The figures above
and below show the change in velocity in the X and Y directions, respectively.
index of the scheme we proposed is less than the scheme
of [37].
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 describe the state trajectories ψi of
the scheme in this paper and the scheme of [37], where
the meaning of the description is the same as Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5. In the case of the same attacks and parameters,
the proposed scheme only needs 3s to achieve consensus,
while the scheme of [37] needs close to 30s. The proposed
scheme can achieve consensus formation in less time. Fig. 12
and Fig. 13 show position and velocity trajectories of four
agents, where the initial positions of all agents are marked by
circles and the final positions are marked by hexagon, pluses,
hexagram, pentagram. Fig. 12 shows the position state change
trajectory of all agents. The three followers form an equilateral
triangle and can circle around the leader under DoS attacks.
All followers move in a circle around the leader with radius
r = 10. Fig. 13 is the velocity trajectories in the X and Y
direction. From the velocity trajectories changes, we can see
that the follower moves in a circle around the leader in a fixed
formation. The guaranteed performance cost Je∗ = 3581.7,
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Fig. 14. Performance function and guaranteed performance upper bound.
Fig. 15. Time-varying curve of the adaptive weight change coefficient.
that is, Je < Je∗ . The performance function and its upper
bound are described in Fig.14. The left vertical axis represents
the actual value of the performance function, and the right
vertical axis represents the upper bound of the performance
function. The performance function is far less than its upper
bound, and the performance guarantee is verified. Fig. 15 is the
time-varying curve of the adaptive weight change coefficient
in the case, which converges to a finite value eventually. Thus,
the formation can be formed with proposed scheme and it has
better performance and less time to achieve formation than the
scheme of [37].
VI. C ONCLUSION
A guaranteed performance adaptive formation protocol is
proposed for leader-follower MASs under DoS attacks based
on time-varying edge weights. Each channel is attacked inde-
pendently and randomly. Sufficient conditions for the control
protocol and DoS duration are given through LMIs. Two sim-
ulation scenarios are carried out and compared with existing
article to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
In the future, we will extend the existing results to issues such
as event-triggered formation.
PAN et al.: ADAPTIVE FORMATION FOR MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACKS 3399

A PPENDIX 
N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi j,0 )2
> 0, (A.7)
A. Proof of Theorem 1 2
i=1 j =1
Introducing translation factor γ > 0, the Lyapunov function we can obtain
is chosen as
ψ̂ T (I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ < V (t),

N
V (t) = ψ̂ (t)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t) + 2γ
T
(γ0i − ω0i (t)) that is,
i=1

N 
N V̇ (t) < βV (t). (A.8)
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi j,0 )2
+ , (A.1)
2 Next, consider an guaranteed-performance index such as (7),
i=1 j =1
N  +∞

where γ ≥ γ0i ≥ ω0i (t), that is V (t) > 0. It follows from (9)
Je (t) = ωi0 (ψ0 − ψi )T Q(ψ0 − ψi )dt
that 0
i=1
N N 
V̇ = ψ̂ (t)(I N ⊗ H e(P A)ψ̂(t) − ψ̂ (t)(L (t) +  (t) 1   +∞
T T ff fl
+ ωi j (ψ j − ψi )T Q(ψ j − ψi )dt
ff fl
N
2 0
− L  (t)− (t)) ⊗ H e(P B K u ))ψ̂(t)−2γ ω̇0i (t) i=1 j =1
 +∞
i=1
= ψ̂ T (t)((L f f +  f l ) ⊗ Q)ψ̂(t)dt,

N 
N
0
+ (ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi2j,0 )ω̇i j (t). (A.2)  h̄
i=1 j =1 Je,h̄ < ψ̂ T (t)((L f f +  f l ) ⊗ Q)ψ̂(t)dt
0
According to (7), it has  h̄  h̄
= dt − V (h̄) + V (0) + β V (t),

N 
N 0 0
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi2j,0 )ω̇i j (t) |( j,i)∈/(t )
where  = ψ̂ T (t)(L f f
+  f l)
⊗ Q ψ̂(t) + V̇ (t) − βV (t).
i=1 j =1
ff ff
Define (W̃ T ⊗ In )ψ̂(t) = ψ̃(t), that is, ψ̂(t) = (W̃ ⊗ In )ψ̃(t),
= 2ψ̂ T (t)((L f f (t) +  f f (t) − L  (t) −  (t)) and we get
ff fl
− (L f f +  f l − L  −  ) ⊗ K ω ψ̂(t),  = ψ̂ T (t)((L f f + f l ) ⊗ X Q X + I N ⊗ (H e(AX)
ff
and it has − β X) − 2(γ I N + L f f +  f l − L 
fl

N −  ) ⊗ B R B T )ψ̂(t).
2γ ω̇0i (t) = 2γ ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ K ω )ψ̂(t). (A.3)
(A.9)
i=1

Let K u = R B T P and K ω = P B R B T P, If ψ̃iT (t) ψ̃i (t) < 0, we obtain (10) and
 h̄
V̇ (t) ≤ ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P)(I N ⊗ H e(AX) − 2(γ I N + L f f Je,h̄ < −V (h̄) + V (0) + β V (t). (A.10)
ff fl 0
+  f l − L  −  ) ⊗ B R B T )(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t).
Applying the (A.1), we get
(A.4)

N
Subtract (I N ⊗ P)β F X (I N ⊗ P) from both sides of inequal- T
V (0) = ψ̂ (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂(0) + 2γ (γ0i − ω0i (0))
ity (A.4), and we get i=1

V̇ (t) − (I N ⊗ P)β F X (I N ⊗ P) 
N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (0) − ωi j,0 )2
+ |( j,i)∈/(0) ,
≤ ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P)(I N ⊗ H e(AX) − β F X − 2(γ I N i=1 j =1
2
ff fl
+ L f f +  f l − L  −  ) ⊗ B R B T )(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂(t). 
N
V (h̄) = ψ̂ (h̄)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (h̄) + 2γ
T
(γ0i − ω0i (h̄))
Thus, if the following inequality is guaranteed
i=1
I N ⊗ (H e(AX) − β X) − 2(γ I N + L f f 
N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (h̄) − ωi j,0 )2
ff fl + . (A.11)
+  f l − L  −  ) ⊗ B R B T < 0, (A.5) 2
i=1 j =1
it has Then, due to ωi j,0 = ωi j (0) = 1 and limh̄→∞ (ω0i (h̄)) = γ0i ,
V̇ (t) < βψ̂ (I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ .
T
(A.6) we get

Due to lim (V (0) − V (h̄))

h̄→∞

N 
N
2γ (γ0i − ω0i (t)) > 0, = ψ̂ T (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂(0) + 2γ (γ0i − ω0i (0))
i=1 i=1

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3400 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS—I: REGULAR PAPERS, VOL. 69, NO. 8, AUGUST 2022

− lim ψ̂ T (h̄)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (h̄) eD(0,t ) V (0),

= (B.2)
h̄→∞
k

N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (h̄) − ωi j,0 )2 where Dk = β(k ) (t − k ) + p=1 β( p ) ( p −  p−1 ),
− lim D(0, t) = ∈E β|
(0, t)|. Due to (14), one can obtain
h̄→∞ 2
i=1 j =1   ij  ij

N D(0, t) ≤ ( π1 + π2 )
(0, t)
< ψ̂ T (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (0) + 2γ (γ0i − ω0i (0)) ∈E (i, j )∈ (i, j )∈E \
i=1
 ij ij ij
= ((π1 − π2 )|D(i, j ) (0, t)| + π2 t)
N  +∞
(i, j )∈E
= ψ̂ T (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (0) + 2γ ω̇0i (t)dt
i=1 0 ≤ μ̄t + ξ̄ , (B.3)
T
= ψ̂ (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (0)  ij ij 
 +∞ where ξ̄ = (i, j )∈E (π1 −π2 )ξi j , ∈E ,(i, j )∈/ |
(0, t)| =
+ 2γ ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P B R B T P)ψ̂(t)dt, |[0, t]\D(i, j ) (0, t)| = t − |D(i, j ) (0, t)|. When μ̄ < 0 and
0 t → ∞, there is D(0, t) → −∞. Furthermore, we get
 h̄  +∞
limt →∞ eD(0,t ) = 0, that is limt →∞ V (t) = 0. Thus,
β V (t) < max(β) V (t) from (B.2)and (B.3), it has limt →+∞ V (t) = 0, that is,
0
0 +∞
= max(β) {ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t) 
N
0 lim (ψ̂ (t)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t) + 2γ
T
(γ0i − ω0i (t))
t →+∞

N i=1
+ 2γ (γ0i − ω0i (t)) 
N 
N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi j,0 )2
i=1 + = 0.
2

N  N
(ωi j,0 ωi j (t) − ωi j,0 )2 i=1 j =1
+ }dt
2
i=1 j =1 On the other hand, due to (A.7), we get
Thus, we get (10) and Je < Je∗ , where
lim ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (t) = 0,
t →+∞
Je∗ = ψ̂ (0)(I N ⊗ P)ψ̂ (0)
T
 +∞
which yields limt →+∞  ψ̂(t) = 0. Due to ψ̂i (t) = ψi (t) −
+ 2γ ψ̂ T (t)(I N ⊗ P B R B T P)ψ̂ (t)dt ψi (0), we obtain limt →+∞ (x i − f i − x 0 ) = 0, which is our
0
 +∞ control target.
+ max(β) V (t)dt. (A.12)
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Kunpeng Pan (Graduate Student Member, IEEE)
received the B.Sc. degree in automation from Dalian
Ocean University, China, in 2017, and the M.Sc.
degree in control theory and application from North-
east Electric Power University, China, in 2020. He is
currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in control theory
and applications with the School of Automation,
Northwestern Polytechnical University, China. His
research interests include switched systems, cyber-
physical systems, and secure control.
Yang Lyu (Member, IEEE) received the Ph.D.
degree in control theory and applications from
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an,
China, in 2019. He was a Research Fellow with
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore,
under the STE-NTU Corporate Laboratory
from 2019 to 2021. He is currently an Associate
Professor with Northwestern Polytechnical
University. His current research interests include
information fusion for robotic systems and resilient
robotic systems.
Quan Pan (Member, IEEE) was born in China in
1961. He received the bachelor’s degree in automatic
control from the Huazhong University of Science
and Technology, Wuhan, China, in 1982, and the
master’s and Ph.D. degrees in control science and
engineering from Northwestern Polytechnical Uni-
versity (NPU), Xi’an, China, in 1991 and 1997,
respectively. He has been a Professor with the
School of Automation, NPU, since 1998. His main
research interests include pattern recognition and
information fusion.