UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES

PANJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

TOPIC- MISCHIEF RULE OR RULE OF PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Dr. Tanmeet Kaur Sahiwal Arshdeep Kaur (03/18)
Kritika (06/18)
Ekamjot Kaur (24/18)
Sakshi Arora (54/18)
[BA LLB, SECTION-A, SEMESTER 6]
[GROUP NO.-4]

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No. Contents Page

1. Acknowledgement 3

2. Table of Cases 4

3. Introduction 5

4. Mischief rule of interpretation 5,6

5. Relevant case laws 7-12

6. Advantages of mischief rule 12,13

7. Disadvantages of mischief rule 13

8. Conclusion 13,14

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude and warm regards to our Interpretation
of Statutes teacher Dr. Tanmeet Kaur Sahiwal for her exemplary guidance, support, monitoring
and constant encouragement in this research endeavour. We offer humble and sincere appreciation
for the learning opportunities provided to us through the medium of this project.
As a consequence of the above, we have learned a lot about the tools and techniques of research
methodology, how to go about successfully completing a research study and most importantly we
have been enlightened about the topic of “Mischief rule”
Completion of this project on the topic “Mischief rule” has been a rather intellectually stimulating
and enriching experience.

Arshdeep Kaur (03/18)

Kritika (06/18)
Ekamjot Kaur (24/18)
Sakshi Arora (54/18)

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 TABLE OF CASES

S. No. Case Citation Page No.

1. Alamgir v. State of Bihar AIR 1959 SC 436 9

[76 E.R. 637: (1854) 3

2. Heydon's case 5
CR 7]

3. Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1965 SC 871 10

4. Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 871 8

AIR 1974 SC 228

5. Pyarelal v. Mahadeo Ramachandra 11

6. Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881 7

Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v.

7. AIR 1962 SC 1536 11
Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Company

8. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628 8

9. Smith v. Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830 7,13

10. Subramaniam v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2009 SC 2684 10

11. Union of India v. Namit Sharma AIR 2014 SC 122 12

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 MISCHIEF RULE OR RULE OF PURPOSIVE CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION:
Enacted laws, especially the modern acts and rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be
expected that the language used will leave little room for interpretation or construction.
But the experience of all those who had to bear and share the task of application of the law has
been different.
It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are always clear, explicit and unambiguous and
thus, in such cases it is very essential for courts to determine a clear and explicit meaning of the
words or phrases used by the legislature and at the same time remove all the doubts if any. And
for this, over the years many rules of interpretation have evolved and are being used by the courts
for interpreting true meaning of the statutes. And one such rule is the focus of this project report,
that is, The Mischief Rule.

MISCHIEF RULE OF INTERPRETATION:

The mischief rule tells an interpreter to read a statute in light of the “mischief” or “evil”—the
problem that prompted the statute. The rule has two enduringly useful functions: guiding an
interpreter to a stopping point for statutory language that can be given a broader or narrower scope,
and helping the interpreter prevent clever evasions of the statute. The mischief rule raises
fundamental questions about the relationship of text and context, about the construction of
ambiguity, and about legal interpretation when we are no longer in “the age of statutes.”
The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydon's case1 in 1584. In this case the barons
of exchequer resolved “that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and
considered;
First, what was the common law before the making of the Act?
Second, what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

1
[76 E.R. 637: (1854) 3 CR 7]

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Third, what remedy the parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth2 ?
And fourth, the true reason for the remedy.
In the context of above propounding, it is the duty of Courts to construct the statute in such a way
to suppress the mischief and encourage the remedy according to the intention of the legislature.
Two important formulas related to mischief are—
Pro privato commodo, that is, to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief, And;
Pro bona publico, that is, to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act.3
This principle is also known as Rule of Purposive Construction.
Professor Dicey in his book ‘Jurisprudence’ says that the mischief rule can encroach upon the
literal and grammatical interpretation of the statute. The court should construe the statute, as far as
possible, in such a manner that mischief is suppressed and remedy is easily obtained.
This rule gives the court justification for going behind the actual wording of the statute in order to
consider the problem that a particular statute was aimed at remedying. At one level it is clearly the
most flexible rule of interpretation, but it is limited to using previous common law to determine
what mischief the Act in question was designed to remedy.
The scope of the rule in Heydon’s case was explained in Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas4 “In
construing an enactment and determining its true scope, it is permissible to have regard to all such
factors as can be legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature such
as history of the Act, the reasons which led to its being passed, the mischief which had to be cured
as well as the cure as also the other provisions of the Statute.”

2
“Disease of the Commonwealth” – it is important to bear in mind the meaning of this phrase used by
Lord Coke in the judgement. Its meaning should be understood in the sense that it made at the time of its
writing. From the 14th century to the end of the 17th, the meaning of disease was lack of ease, disquiet or
distress and Commonwealth, of course, meant the Country.

3
Quoted by Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, ed. 12 th, p.40.
4
AIR 1963 SC 1356

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RELEVANT CASE LAWS:

1. Smith v. Hughes5 - The defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony
being some 8–10 feet above street level). The defendant’s method of soliciting the men was
(i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object
and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and (ii) having so attracted
their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the premises. It was
contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not ‘in a street’
within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly
no offence had been committed. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances
the appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are
in this form: ‘It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street
or public place for the purpose of prostitution’. The defendants were not themselves
physically in the street but were in a house adjoining the street. The Court considered the
mischief aimed at by the Act. The Act was intended to clean up the streets, to enable
people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common
prostitutes. It matters little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is
standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut
or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody
walking in the street. The court applying the mischief rule held that the defendant had
solicited in a street, and was fined.

2. Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra6 - The appellant was convicted under

section 292, Indian Penal Code for selling an obscene book titled lady Chatterley's
lover. He contended that the prosecution had a duty to prove guilty mind against him
which in this case is the knowledge that the book contained obscene material.
Further, he argued that when there is a very large number of books in a book shop,
the shopkeeper is not expected to go through each book to see as to whether some

5
[1960] 1 WLR 830
6
AIR 1965 SC 881

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 books contain obscene literature. Rejecting these arguments, the Supreme Court held
that there was no ambiguity in the language of the enactment and that the meaning
of the section 292 is clear and precise. Further, the mischief of sale of obscene
literature was sought to be remedied by the provision and therefore the
interpretation given by the appellant was unacceptable.

3. Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal7 - The appellant at the time of filing

nominations was in arrears of payment of municipal taxes in excess of 1 year’s
demand. He, however, paid the taxes before the date of Poll and was elected. His
election was set aside on the ground that under section 13-D (g) of the UP
municipalities Act, 1916, a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for
being a member of municipal board if he's in arrears in payment of municipal tax or
other dues in excess of 1 year’s demand, provided at the disqualification shall cease
as soon as the arrears are paid. The contentions of the appellant that the relevant date
was the date of the Poll that no notice of demand had been served on him were
rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held that the relevant date was the date
of nomination and that even though the word demand may normally mean
something asked for or called for, such was not the intention of the legislature. In
the present context, the term means municipal taxes or other dues.

4. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India8 - The parliament enacted the Price

Competitions Act, 1955 under article 252 of the constitution. Questioning some of
the provisions of the act in the rules made thereunder the petitioners were engaged in
promoting and conducting price competitions in different states of India, contended
mainly that the conditions laid down in sections 4 and 5 of the act and rules 11 and
12 made thereunder encroached upon the fundamental rights to carry on the
business guaranteed by article 19 (6) of the constitution and that these amounted to
prohibition and not merely regulation of the business. Further, the phrase ‘prize
competition’ as defined in section 2(d) of the act would include not only
competitions in which success depends on chance but also those in which it would

7
AIR 1957 SC 871
8
AIR 1957 SC 628

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 depend to a substantial degree of skill and therefore as the impugned law
constituted a single inseverable enactment, it must fail in entirety and in respect of
both kinds of competitions. Rejecting the contentions, the Supreme Court held that
section 2 of the act should be construed keeping in mind the historical background
of the act and the mischief that was intended to be suppressed. Having taken
these factors into consideration there can be no doubt at the state legislatures moved
to the parliament to enact the legislation under Article 252 with the sole object of
regulating and controlling price competitions of a gambling nature. Therefore,
the Supreme Court held that the competition which were sought to be controlled
and regulated by the Act are only those in which the success does not depend on
any substantial degree of skill.

5. Alamgir v. State of Bihar9 - The appellant was charged under section 498 of Indian
Penal Code which reads “whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and
whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that
man, or from any other person having the care of her on behalf of that man, with the
intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person who conceals or detains
her with that intent that any such woman, shall be punished with……” In the present
instance, the married woman was living with the appellant voluntarily. The
question was whether he was detaining her. The Supreme Court observed in the
section contemplates four classes of cases viz. taking or enticement or concealment
or detention. Since the first three categories are inapplicable in the present instance,
the liability of the accused depending depended on whether the married woman was
being detained by him. It was held that the provision sought to remedy the mischief
of depriving the husband of the company of his wife and consequently it was
enacted with the object of protecting the rights of the husband. Therefore, consent
or willingness of the wife and depriving her husband of her company is irrelevant
and the appellant was responsible for the commission of the offence.

9
AIR 1959 SC 436

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 6. In the case of Subramaniam v. State of Andhra Pradesh10, the interpretation of the word
“husband” in Section 498A, 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and in Section 113B
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was in question. The Hon’ble SC held that the word
‘husband’ used in these Sections is not limited to cover only those persons who have
entered into a legally valid marriage but it would also include a person who enters into
a marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed status of husband subjects
the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for any purposes
enumerated in Sec 304B and 498A of IPC. This is because the purpose for which these
Sections were introduced cannot be lost sight of. The obvious objective of these
provisions was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship
with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. So, the person who
enters into a marital relation cannot be allowed to take a shelter behind a smoke screen and
contend that since there was no valid marriage, the question of dowry does not even arise.
Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of these provisions. Hence, if a
restrictive meaning is given to the term “husband” it would not further the legislative
intent.

7. In the case of Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration11, the officers of the respondents
while rounding up stray cattle, were beaten up by the owners of the cattle (the appellants).
When they were prosecuted for an offence under Section 332 of IPC (Voluntarily causing
hurt to deter public servant from his duty), the appellants pleaded right of private defence
of property. They also contended that the cattle were not ‘abandoned’ within the
meaning of Sec 418 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 because ‘abandoned’ means
completely leaving a thing as a final rejection of one’s responsibilities so that it becomes
ownerless as have been described in various dictionaries. The SC rejected this argument
and held that it is not necessary that the dictionary meaning of a word is to be always
adhered to even if the context of an enactment does not so warrant. In the present case, to
know the mind of the legislature, it is expedient to see what mischief was intended to be

10
AIR 2009 SC 2684
11
AIR 1965 SC 871

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 suppressed and what remedy advanced. So interpreted, the word ‘abandoned’ must mean
‘let loose or left unattended’.

8. In the case of Pyarelal v. Mahadeo Ramachandra12, a charge under the Prevention of

Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was brought against the appellant for selling and keeping
for sale supari which was sweetened with a banned artificial sweetener. The appellant
argued that ‘supari’ was not ‘food’ within the meaning of the Act. The SC rejected this
argument and held that supari is an article of food as the definition of food under the Act
is very wide and it covers all articles used as food as also every component entering into it
including flavouring and colouring matters and preservatives. The Court further held that
the dictionary meaning is not necessarily the correct meaning of a word which might have
been used in a particular context in a statute. It was emphasized by the Court that the word
food should be interpreted in the context of mischief which the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 intended to suppress and advance the remedy. Therefore,
supari has no other meaning except that it was food within the meaning of the Act.

9. In the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Shree Krishna Metal

Manufacturing Company13, the respondent factory which consisted of 4 separate units
for manufacturing brass and copper sheets and utensils therefrom, for milling paddy, a flour
mill and a saw mill, was asked to comply with the provisions of Employees’ Provident
Fund Act, 1952. The respondent contended that according to Section 1(3)(a), the Act
applied to an industry mentioned in Schedule I in which at-least 50 persons are employed
and since, in each of the 4 units (industries) less than that number were employed, it
was not obligatory to comply with the provisions of the Act. SC rejected this argument and
held that the respondent was bound by the terms of the Act because the expression ‘in
which’ qualifies the word ‘factory’ and not ‘industry’. If the contention of the
respondent was accepted, the object of the statute and the mischief sought to be remedied
would be defeated.

12
AIR 1974 SC 228
13
AIR 1962 SC 1536

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 10. In the case of Union of India v. Namit Sharma14, the interpretation of Sections 12(6)
and 15(6) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 was in question. These Sections
provided that the Chief Information Commissioner or an Information Commissioner shall
not be a member of Parliament or member of Legislature of any State or Union Territory
or hold any office of profit or connected with any political party or carry on any business
or pursue any profession. The SC observed that there could be two interpretations of these
provisions- one, that a person who falls under any of the above-mentioned categories will
not be eligible to be considered for appointment as Chief information Commissioner or
Information Commissioner. If this interpretation is accepted, then, it will offend the
equality clause in Article 14 as it debars such persons from being considered for such
appointments; two, that once a person is appointed for such posts, he cannot continue in
any of the positions mentioned. If this interpretation is given, it would effectuate the object
of the Act as these appointees would be able to perform their functions without being
influenced by their political, business, professional or other interests. Thus, it was the
second interpretation which was preferred.

ADVANTAGES OF MISCHIEF RULE:

• Mischief Rule avoids absurd outcomes by concentrating on 'filling in the gaps' in the law it
is much more likely that a 'just' result will occur. It will also mean that judges will be trying to
interpret the law in the way that Parliament intended it to work.
• Mischief Rule allows judges to consider technological and social changes as the Parliament
cannot foresee what will happen in the future. For example, in Royal College of Nursing v
DHSS 15 the court decision recognized that medical practice had changed since the passing of
the Act. The Parliament couldn't have anticipated the medical advances that would take place
but they would have wanted to allow doctors to adopt whatever practice was appropriate and
this would include allowing nurses to induce abortions under supervision.

14
AIR 2014 SC 122
15
(1981) 2 WLR 279

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• Mischief Rule gives flexibility to judges and is suited to specific, often ambiguous cases and
it is The Law Commission's preferred method of interpretation.
• The mischief rule promotes the purpose of the law as it does not just rely on the literal
meanings of the words contained within it. This allows judges to look back at the law and fill
in the gaps that the Act was created and what Parliament would have done if they'd had the
situation in mind. For example, in Smith v Hughes16 case the Parliament clearly intended to
stop prostitutes from being a nuisance to others, whether they were literally on the streets or
not.

DISADVANTAGES OF MISCHIEF RULE:

• There is a risk of judicial law making as the unelected judges are filling in the gaps in the law
with their own views on how the law should remedy particular situations. Royal College of
Nursing v DHSS shows that judges do not always agree on how to 'fill the gap' as the case was
decided on a majority of 3 judges with 2 judges dissenting.
• The use of the mischief rule could lead to uncertainty in the law. It is impossible to predict
when judges will use the rule and what the result of the interpretation will be
• The mischief rule is limited to looking back at the old law and filling in the gaps rather
than looking for a more general consideration of what the law actually is. The mischief
rule's scope is not as wide as the purposive approach's scope.
• The main disadvantage is that it creates a crime after the event has taken place, which can
be seen in the Smith v Hughes (1960) case.
• It gives judges a law-making role therefore infringing the separation of powers and Judges
can bring their own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case example Smith v Hughes,
DPP v Bull.

CONCLUSION;
Driedger, a renowned Canadian lawyer and leading authority on statutory interpretation, puts it
this way: "To this day, Heydon's Case is frequently cited. The courts still look for the 'mischief'

16
[1960] 1 WLR 830

13
and 'remedy', but now use what they find as aids to discover the meaning of what the legislature
has said rather than to change it"17
The Mischief Rule gives the most discretion to judges and is suited to specific, often ambiguous
cases. The rule allows statutes to be refined and developed. However, the increased role of the
judge means that his views and prejudices can influence the final decision. So modern courts apply
the rule in a more restricted manner, and generally with a greater regard for the integrity of the
statutes which they are interpreting.

17
Elmer Driedger, The Construction of Statutes. Second Edition. Toronto: Butterworths, 1983, p. 75.

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 REFERENCES

• The Interpretation of Statutes- T. Bhattacharyya, Central Law Agency, Allahabad (2009)

• Bray, Samuel L., The Mischief Rule (June 11, 2021). 109 Georgetown Law Journal 967
(2021), Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 19912, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3452037
• https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-interpretation/ visited on
13th June, 2021 at 6:30 pm.
• https://www.legalbites.in/rules-of-interpretation/ visited on 14th June, 2021 at 1:20 pm.
• https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/mischief-rule-statutory-
interpretation/#:~:text=The%20mischief%20rule%20was%20established,at%20and%20a
dvance%20the%20remedy . accessed on 11 June,2021 at 10:15 pm
• https://www.iilsindia.com/blogs/instances-of-the-application-of-the-mischief-rule/,
accessed on 11 June,2021 at 5:10 pm

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