To what extent did Western influence in Afghanistan impede an Afghan national

identity in the first three decades of the 20th century?

Part 1:

Afghan nationalism vs

Part 2:

Focal Areas:

Stuck between two global powers, Modern Afghanistan was forged in the late 1800s to
separate British India and Russia. However, after British fears of Russian
influence in Afghanistan, Afghanistan was controlled by Britain, and hostility
brewed into three Anglo-Afghan wars, the third resulting in complete independence
from the British.[1] Considering modern day Afghanistan was forged out of
geopolitical strife between western powers, it is important to ask to what extent
did Western influence in Afghanistan impede an Afghan national identity in the
first three decades of the 20th century?

For the purposes of this question “national identity” can be defined by the
perception of the people, culture, and nationalism through the idea of an Afghan
state whereas nationalism is how people within Afghanistan express the idea of an
Afghan state and an Afghan peoples. For the purposes of this argument, national
identity includes how other nations perceive and denote an Afghan state and
peoples.

It is clear that far before the 1900s, Afghanistan was experiencing the groundwork
for nationalism, with the foundation of Afghanistan's capital as historic to Afghan
culture.[2] When Habibullah Khan took power in 1901, this nationalism blossomed.
Investment in modern technologies and western infrastructure such as electricity
and schools were created under Habibullah, with prominent nationalist Mauhmud Tarzi
helming the modernization[3] Tarzi’s desire for a modern Afghanistan was not
exactly popular among the common people as many regular Afghan citizens were
community-based, and had very little care for government intervention, and Tarzi’s
ideas were simply too Western to be understood and meant for the elite.[4] This
further entrenched dependence on western notions of national identity to create
Afghanistan.
Afghan nationalism flourished in education (caused by modernization).[5] However
explained further in the cited article, only a small elite of Afghani’s were
educated, especially to the extent nationalist formed. Afghan nationalism was not
of the people, but of the vocal elite. The framework of nationalism had found a
home in the educated class, a direct result of modernization. While Habibullah had
pushed for such a concept, his inability to get Afghanistan’s full independence
ultimately led to anti-british nationalist assassinating him.

These communities, whom had been suppressed by governments (foreign or domestic)

had been removed from the national identity. The British and Russians only cared
about Afghani’s who had political importance, as it defined their defense
priorities. And other nations only saw a glimpse of Afghanistan through the lens of
the elite and amir whom traveled (CITE), in which their ideals of what a ‘nation’
(influenced by the west) was transferred to other nations whom had the same idea of
a nation, and caused the removal of Afghans whom did not fit the western mold.

The Amir of Afghanistan (Habibullah) was assassinated due to neutrality in the

first world war when presented an opportunity by the axis powers to invade India,
in which Afghan-nationalist argued that Afghanistan should have independence in its
external affairs from the British.[6]
When the new amir took power, he did just that, starting the third anglo afghan
war, which eventually won Afghanistan full independence.[7]

Afghan nationalism from the elites kept gaining momentum, including the first
constitution proclaiming an Afghan national identity, one in which religion was
accepted, and where to be Afghan, is a reality.[8] These nationalist argued of a
Afghan history, dating back to 200 AD, even though it is clear modern Afghanistan
(in which they fain to refer to) was a 18th century construct of the Great Game[9]

It can be argued that the Amir’s heavy focus on a) modernization of Afghanistan

based on western definitions and b) spreading Afghanistan's international
influence, further entrenched Afghanistan into being a forged construct, focused on
establishing itself as a country, yet having no domestic culture that clearly
outlined an Afghan identity. Hans Kohn is argued to be the first to refer to
Afghanistan as a nation (even if in context to Persia as a whole) in his book A
History of Nationalism in the East (1929). Simply, Kohn believed Persia as a whole
(with references to Afghanistan), were ‘barbaric’ and ‘rural’, as if untouched by
the west, and exhibited nationalism to the fullest extent a ‘savage’ nation could.
And while clearly a very ethnocentric view to Afghan nationalism, not only did
Afghan elites seem to have a similar view to nationalism (seeing as modernization
and modeling after the west was aimed at increasing an Afghan image), but even
modern literary works seem to hold the belief that modernization is key to
nationalism (as shown in Part A).

Ironically, in an attempt to separate themselves from western control, they had

used western ideologies of national identity and prosperity to shape their beliefs
of what an Afghan state and identity meant.

During the British discovery of Afghanistan, and early colonization, stereotypes of

the typical Afghan had already formed. Some we see even today, as this quote from
George Cambell (1880s lieutenant governor of Bengal) highlights, “[W]e know by
painful experience that the Afghans are a people of a totally different character –
turbulent – bred from infancy to the use of arms… This love of independence is such
as to make them intolerant, not only of foreign rule, but almost of any national,
tribal or family rule.” The first line is still prevalent in the ‘terrorist’ and
‘resolving conflicts with violence’ myth we see today. This idea of independence is
interesting in the sense that the concept of people rejecting foreign intruders on
their land being so repugnant that ‘independence’ was viewed negatively.

The idea grew of a people who rejected colonial forces forged stereotypes of
Afghanistan as a nation of tribal people.[10] While this source glosses over the
important period after 1919, the other sources paint a clear picture of the impact
of this stereotype, as shown in a House of Commons meeting it was clear that
Afghanistan, under British eyes, was painted as the villain. Whether it be because
of heavy Soviet influence in the region, or heightened tensions between the two
countries.[11] The idea that Afghanistan was such a threat to the ‘harmless’
Britain, further perpetuated the ‘unruly’ Afghan, a stereotype that was not only
untrue, but harmed Afghanistan's ability to separate itself from that idea.

The effects of colonialism on Afghanistan's creation harmed its ability to form a

true national identity. Western ideology of modernization and civility influenced
many prominent Afghans to focus on creating a name for Afghanistan with not only an
extensive history predating colonialism, but one that made the average Afghan hold
up the values of Islam, modernization, and civility, all of which were
manufactured. Afghanistan’s need to fit in with western definitions of a nation
ultimately tanked its ability to form a true national identity after independence,
as the savage Afghani was still a popular stereotype, whether through being unable
to meet the ‘threshold’ of modernization to go from savage to civil, but also from
previous interactions with state-centric governments such as the British, forever
painted them as the ‘uncivil bad guys’ of a story in which they could never
rewrite.

https://www.loc.gov/ghe/cascade/index.html?appid=a0930b1f4e424987ba68c28880f088ea

USE FOR PART A:

https://www.jmu.edu/mecm/wm_library/Jawan_Shir_Rasikh_Nationalism_in_Afghanistan-
_A_Descriptive_Analysis.pdf, many studies, including sources in this very
investigation, focus heavily on modernization, usually referencing one or two
prominent figures in the modernization of Afghanistan and citing them as the
‘founders of Afghan nationalism.’ This fails to acknowledge key issues, namely that
many studies of Afghan nationalism and national identity are from western sources,
almost none from Afghans themselves. Yet it can be argued that even Afghans who
studied nationalism fall into a similar trap, as prominent modernization figures in
Afghanistan's history, including the educated elites, extended the same western
beliefs.
________________
[1] Library of Congress, “Story Map Cascade,” Home, accessed January 25, 2023,
https://www.loc.gov/ghe/cascade/index.html?appid=a0930b1f4e424987ba68c28880f088ea.

[2] Michael R. Rouland, “Origins of the Afghan State, the Great Game, and Afghan
Nationalism,” 2014, pg. 5-6

[3] Jawan Shir, "Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial knowledge, education,

symbols, and the World Tour of Amanullah Khan” Habibullah Khan 1901-1919, 2012,
Masters Theses 31-36
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1377&context=master201019.

[4] Transformative politics in 20th century Afghanistan: Lessons for today |

Conciliation Resources https://www.c-r.org/accord/afghanistan/transformative-
politics-20th-century-afghanistan-lessons-today
[5]
(https://www.jmu.edu/mecm/wm_library/Jawan_Shir_Rasikh_Nationalism_in_Afghanistan-
_A_Descriptive_Analysis.pdf).

[6] (https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/amir-of-afghanistan-is-
assassinated)
[7] (https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/third-afghan-war-and-revolt-waziristan)

[8] (https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1337&context=master201019)

[9] (https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1337&context=master201019) /
(https://media.defense.gov/2014/Apr/14/2001329862/-1/-1/0/Rouland--Great%20Game
%20to%209-11.pdf)

[10] (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0305829817741267)

[11] (https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1919/nov/04/afghanistan)