In the pursuit of the European Union’s Lisbon goal,

is social cohesion losing out to competitiveness?

Tom May
30 August 2007

MA in Comparative Education
(MMACOM_99 Dissertation)

Institute of Education
University of London

This dissertation may be made available to the general public for

borrowing, photocopying or consultation without the prior consent of the
author.

Words:
Abstract
The challenge of the European Union’s Lisbon goal for 2010: ‘to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
Cohesion’, is to increase economic competitiveness while implementing social
values, so that all may benefit from the prosperity that competitiveness should
bring. Increasing costs of providing social protection and declining labour-force
populations, in the face of global competition, make reaching this balance harder.
This dissertation considers the factors that influence both competitiveness and
social cohesion and the relating theories and seeks evidence of changing policy
emphases.

This is mainly done through critical textual analysis of the main policy
documents at European level from 2000 to 2007. One theme within the
dissertation is on the social model. National reports and Eurostat Structural
Indicators are used as evidence that there are different European social models
which achieve differing emphases between competitiveness and cohesion. As a
third strand of information, and to allow some limited triangulation between
sources, three semi-structured interviews have been conducted to gain the
personal perspectives of professional policymakers/ researchers.

The analysis finds that there has been a definite shift in emphasis towards
competitiveness. However this shift is conceptually blurred. This blurring starts
because social inclusion and social cohesion are not clearly distinguished
between each other within the policy literature and greater levels of social
inclusion are assumed to lead to greater levels of social cohesion. The main
method of increasing inclusion is through increasing employability. Increased
employment leads to both increased levels of competitiveness and social
inclusion. There is an emphasis on lifelong learning to achieve both within the
context of an ageing population. While competitiveness and social cohesion are
regarded as mutually supporting, economic growth is seen as a precondition for
greater social cohesion therefore there is a greater emphasis on the former.
Contents
European Union Abbreviations and Member States Country Codes..............5

SECTION 1: background....................................................................................6
Introduction........................................................................................................6
Approach and methodology................................................................................6
Research questions.........................................................................................7
Methodology...................................................................................................8
Definitions and concepts....................................................................................9
Europe...........................................................................................................10
Globalization.................................................................................................11
Competitiveness............................................................................................15
The knowledge economy and knowledge society........................................16
Social Cohesion............................................................................................17
The European Social Model.........................................................................19
Modernising the European Social Model: The European Social Agenda....22
Flexicurity.....................................................................................................23
Drivers and theories..........................................................................................24
Globalization................................................................................................24
Social Capital theory....................................................................................26
Capability theory..........................................................................................29
Emergence theory.........................................................................................31
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)..................................................32
Demographic change: ageing population and migration..............................34
The media and European public awareness of social cohesion....................41
Relationships between drivers, competitiveness, social cohesion and
education.......................................................................................................41

SECTION 2: the policy literature.....................................................................44

Lisbon is launched - 2000.............................................................................44
2001..............................................................................................................46
2002..............................................................................................................49
Risk factors for poverty and social exclusion...............................................50
2003..............................................................................................................51
Lisbon stalls and the Mid-term review - 2004..............................................51
Lisbon re-launched with a new emphasis – 2004.........................................55
2005..............................................................................................................55
2006..............................................................................................................59
2007..............................................................................................................60
Summary...........................................................................................................60

SECTION 3: alternative sources and perspectives on Lisbon ......................62

Emphasis within Lisbon below EU level.........................................................62
What does the data say?....................................................................................64
Conclusions from the Structural Indicators..................................................78
Individual perspectives on Lisbon....................................................................78
Respondent A:...............................................................................................79
Respondent B:...............................................................................................79
Respondent C:...............................................................................................80

3
SECTION 4:........................................................................................................82
Limitations of the study....................................................................................82
Discussion/Analysis..........................................................................................83
Ambiguous terminology and blurred concepts.............................................83
The causal relations between social cohesion and competitiveness.............84
Importance of employment...........................................................................85
The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at EU level.............85
The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at Member State level
......................................................................................................................86
The influence of the Open Method of Coordination....................................87
The role of education and training in increasing competitiveness and social
cohesion........................................................................................................87
Conclusion:.......................................................................................................89
The future for the Lisbon Agenda?...............................................................90

Bibliography........................................................................................................91

4
European Union Abbreviations and Member States
Country Codes

Belgium BE
Bulgaria BG
Czech Republic CZ
Denmark DK
Germany DE
Estonia EE
Ireland IE
Greece EL
Spain ES
France FR
Italy IT
Cyprus CY
Latvia LV
Lithuania LT
Luxembourg LU
Hungary HU
Malta MT
Netherlands NL
Austria AT
Poland PL
Portugal PT
Romania RO
Slovenia SI
Slovakia SK
Finland FI
Sweden SE
United Kingdom UK

EU27: All of the above countries.

EU15: BE, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK.
EU10: CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK,

Source: European Union Publications Office. 2007.

SECTION 1: background

Introduction

Of all European policy, the Conclusions of the 2000 European Spring Council in

Lisbon is the most ambitious and probably the most quoted, ‘to become the most

competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of

sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social

Cohesion’ (European Council. 2000, article five) by 2010. This, the Lisbon goal,

is pursued through the range of policies known as the Lisbon Agenda.

The challenge of the Lisbon goal is to increase economic competitiveness while

implementing social values, so that all may benefit from the prosperity that

competitiveness should bring. The two should be balanced. However, increasing

costs of providing social protection and declining labour-force populations, in the

face of global competition, make reaching this balance harder. This dissertation

considers the factors that influence both competitiveness and social cohesion. It

looks for evidence of changing policy emphases on the two and how they are

portrayed in the main policy literature.

Approach and methodology

Michael Crossley has observed that comparative research has tended to focus on

either theory or policy rather than achieving a balance (Crossley, M. 2001).

While this dissertation is about policy, it tries to draw from theory in order to

help provide the necessary context within with the policy operates. An initial
survey of the main and recent policy documents suggests that the emphasis is

economic rather than social. However, this dissertation seeks to confirm if this

view passes more detailed scrutiny. Patricia Broadfoot notes that, ‘…comparative

education is something of a cornucopia when it comes to methodologies…’

(Broadfoot, P. 2001. p. 101). The principle research method used here is a critical

textual analysis of the main policy documents. This is similar to the approach

used by David Phillips and Anastasia Economou (Phillips, D. and Economou, A.

2001.). This topic is subject to similar conceptual and linguistic problems, though

these have been reduced by concentrating at the European level. While this is

essentially an empirical approach, it tries to observe the basic argument of

Critical Realism: that our knowledge (model) of reality is imperfect and, while

we can update that model, its application changes the nature of reality and so the

model remains flawed (see for example, the Web Site for Critical Realism. 2007.

or Collier, A. 1994). Hence, while we can observe, remain with an imperfect

knowledge.

Research questions

In approaching and answering the title of this dissertation, this leads to a number

of questions:

 How is competitiveness and social cohesion conceptualised?

 How do they sit within the context of the EU, what drivers act on them

and what is the role of education and training?

 How do competitiveness and social cohesion relate to each other?

 What have been the relative policy emphases on competitiveness and

social cohesion within the Lisbon agenda?

7
 o How has this changed at European level?

o Is the emphasis the same at Member State level?

 Are there European models on the relations between the two and how do

they compare in terms of emphasis on competitiveness and social

cohesion?

Methodology

In order to answer these questions, most information is gathered through the

available literature, therefore there is no separate literature review. A combination

of literature from academic and policy sources is used to set out the definitions

and conceptualisations of the related terms. These look at how terms are defined

and conceptualised generally, at European Union level and for this dissertation.

The drivers on the Lisbon Agenda, competitiveness and social cohesion and the

theories relating to them are considered in a similar manner.

Having set out the context, the main European policy documents are considered

in chronological order, through a critical contextual analysis. This is not carried

out through a discourse analysis, principally because the scope and volume of the

documents considered is too great to carry out within the size of this dissertation.

This section forms the main analytical part of the project.

Two other sources of information are considered much more briefly. Though

short they provide a limited means to triangulate the conclusions drawn from the

previous section. They also give an insight into how the policy emphasis within

the Lisbon Agenda compares at the level below the EU level. The first source

8
considers the information that can be drawn from the European Union Structural

Indicators. It is not possible to consider countries individually so countries are

grouped in terms of social models. The second draws from the personal

perspectives of three individuals who have been involved over the duration of the

Lisbon Agenda.

Some limitations of this dissertation are considered before discussing the

conclusions from the three sources, (policy literature, quantitative indicators,

personal perspectives). It links these to the drivers discussed earlier and considers

the role of education and training. The conclusion covers also asks briefly what

the future of the Lisbon Agenda might be.

Definitions and concepts

The aim of this subsection is to sufficiently define and conceptualize terms in

order to address the title. It covers the following terms:

 Europe;

 Globalization (also covered later as a driver);

 Competitiveness;

o Knowledge Economy/ Knowledge Society;

 Social Cohesion;

 The European Social Model – the balance between economic and social

values;

o The European Social Policy Agenda – updating the European

Social Model; and,

9
 o Flexicurity.

Europe

The easiest way of defining Europe, from a political perspective, is as the

Member States that comprise the European Union (EU). However, such an

obvious definition excludes certain European countries, notably Switzerland.

There are also the: Candidate (Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav republic

of Macedonia); Acceding; and, European Economic Area Countries (Iceland,

Liechtenstein and Norway), who are neither in nor out of the EU and participate

in EU policies1. This blurring of EU membership is illustrated by Jarle Trondal’s

work, which compared Norway and EU policies on the subject of convergence

within research and higher education. He found that EU membership versus non-

membership is a continuum rather than a clear dichotomy (Trondal, J. 2002).

Since I am looking at progress towards the Lisbon goal, for the purpose of this

dissertation, Europe will be defined primarily as the EU Member States. These

have grown from the EU15 in 2000 to the EU27 today, which means that the EU

covered by the policy documents in 2000 is not the same as now.

The state is the default unit of comparison, in Comparative Education system

studies, as it is the level at which education policy is usually directed and

governed. However, as a unit of comparison, countries vary considerably in size,

type of governance and detail of involvement in the design and delivery of

education at the local level. For example, French-speaking Belgium and Wallonia

1
A list of all the countries in Europe and their status with the EU can be found on the Europa
website: http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm . Last accessed 11 06 07.

10
complete separate national reports to the European Commission. Similarly, much

of the responsibility for education is devolved to the Länder in Germany and to

the regions in Spain. However, while acknowledging the limitations of the nation

state as equating to the national education system, it will remain the unit of

choice (Green, A. 1997.). It remains the easiest unit of comparison when looking

at European issues. It is also the nation state, rather than its regions, that has

signed up to the Lisbon Agenda and sits on the EU’s Council of Ministers.

Globalization

While definitions of Globalization vary, their origins relate to increased flows of

financial capital at a supranational level, leading to increasing economic

integration (for example: Visco, I. 2001. Dollar, D. 2004). However, it is the

associated suite of secondary effects that makes it so pervasive. These include the

effects on the labour market, labour-force mobility and societies. Anthony

Giddens emphasizes the social aspects, he defines globalization as the: ‘Growing

interdependence between different peoples, regions and countries in the world as

social and economic relationships come to stretch worldwide’(Giddens, A. 2001.

p. 690.). In 2007 he had added that this increasing interdependence isn’t just

economic but, ‘involves accelerated and universal communication, and concerns

also political and cultural dimensions’ (Giddens, A. 2007. p. xii). He cites two

drivers, the first is communications technology which ‘compresses time and

space’, the second is the integration of the world economy – currently, often

referred to as the “knowledge economy” (ibid. p. 53).

11
The idea of globalization is not that new. Sceptics within the globalization debate

note that it is only the ‘intensity of interactions between nations’ (ibid. p. 58) that

differs from the flows and connections of the 19th Century. Perhaps this is why

Anthony Giddens explains the causes of ‘contemporary globalization’ which he

attributes to three factors: political changes; information flows; and, transnational

corporations. Within the first he picks out two things, the political change

associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the increasing numbers and

development of ‘international and regional mechanisms of government (ibid).

(This is picked up by David Held et al.) Examples of this are international

governmental organisations such as APEC or OECD. The strongest example of

this, cited by David Held et al (Held, D. et al.1999) and Anthony Giddens, is the

European Union. Another category consists of international non-governmental

organisations, such as Medicins San Frontiers or Green Peace. In terms of

information flows, it is not their volume and speed across the world that Anthony

Giddens highlights but attitudinal changes towards a global outlook. This global

outlook relates to a sense of community that is not primarily defined by physical

geography. He states that:

People increasingly perceive that social responsibility does not stop at

national borders…[and] …people are increasingly looking to sources
other than the nation state in formulating their own sense of identity.
(Giddens, A. 2001. p. 56)

Transnational corporations (TNCs) are an obvious and strong component of

globalisation, Anthony Giddens states: ‘Even when TNCs have a clear national

base, they are orientated towards global markets and global profits’ (ibid. p. 57).

12
Sceptics of globalization suggest that what we are experiencing is regionalization

rather than a truly integrated global economy, which is evidenced by uneven

levels of involvement between different countries. One sceptic is Justin

Rosenberg, who pronounces Globalization Theory as conceptually and

empirically flawed:

One can readily see how and why such an idea rose to the level of a
Zeitgeist. Yet as a causal process in its own right, ‘globalization’ had no
momentum of its own. In fact, if the conjunctural analysis developed in
this article is broadly correct, ‘globalization’ did not even exist.
(Rosenberg, J. 2005. p. 65)

He states that the ‘international system itself’ did undergo a major restructuring.

However, he argues the underlying belief that, ‘this restructuring was a

spatiotemporal transformation of human existence, ‘globalization’… …seems

now to be passing away.’ (ibid. p. 4). He cites the problems that international

agreements and organizations have experienced (from Kyoto to the International

Criminal Court and the UN, EU and NATO in the launch of the invasion of Iraq)

as being symptomatic of ‘a vigorous re-assertion of great power national

interests’ (ibid. p. 3). He argues that, ‘An entire academic literature - the

literature of Globalization Theory - has arguably been left high and dry by this

turn of events’ (ibid. p. 4). He explains that the conceptual ‘folly’ started:

…by attempting to transform this Zeitgeist into a social scientific

concept, the Globalization Theorists were led to do the opposite of what
social theorists are supposed to do. Instead of acting as interpreters to
the spirit of the age, they became its ideological amplifiers. Instead of
deconstructing the popular Zeitgeist, they elevated it to the role of an
intellectual Weltgeist.
(ibid. p. 7)

He argues that globalization is a descriptive term and that a

more basic social theory is required to explain how globalization

13
has become such a feature of today’s world – and it is that

explanation, which will match all that Globalization theorists

attribute to it, that is lacking (Rosenberg, J. 2000.).

This opposes the view of what Anthony Giddens calls the hyper-globalists who

describe a borderless world. This is based on the premise that nation states can no

longer control their own economies: they are constrained by the flows of capital

and information from below and by the controls imposed by supra national

organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the European Union. The

“middle way” is offered by the transformationalists. This stance suggests that,

‘the global order is becoming transformed, but many of the old patterns still

remain’ (ibid. p59). It portrays globalization as a dynamic system, where nation

states are both influenced and influencers, rather than as a one way process of

influence.

Whatever the status of Globalization as a true theory, it is the perception of

globalization as an influence on the wealth and well being of nations that is

important for this dissertation. For without that perception of globalization there

would be no emphasis on competitiveness to maintain strong national economies

or concern over levels of social cohesion: there would be no requirement to set

the Lisbon goal and no European Union (as we know it) within which the goal

would be set and progress to it monitored.

14
Competitiveness

As with many other terms in this dissertation “Competitiveness” does not have

an agreed definition, even within economic thinking, it has many aspects. This is

because competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity or profits and must

also include the economic consequences of non-economic factors such as

politics, value systems and of course education (Garrelli, S. 2006.). The World

Economic Forum defines competitiveness as:

…that collection of factors, policies and institutions which determine the

level of productivity of a country and that, therefore, determine the level
of prosperity that can be attained by an economy.
(World Economic Forum. 2005. p xiii.)

The Commission Staff Working Document on the 2006 European

Competitiveness Report uses the following working definition:

Competitiveness in this Report is understood to mean a sustained rise in

the standards of living of a nation or region and as a low a level of
involuntary unemployment.
(European Commission. 2006. p. 7.)

Competitiveness has to do with a nation’s ability to manage what it can to ensure

prosperity, which itself is assumed to be linked to well being. The role of

education is something that Stéphane Garrelli emphases:

The ability of a nation to develop an excellent education system and to

improve knowledge in the labor force through training is vital to
competitiveness… Knowledge is perhaps the most critical
competitiveness factor.
(Garrelli, S. 2006. p. 4.)

It is expected that competitiveness will be achieved within the “knowledge

economy”, where technology and knowledge replace labour and capital as the

key factors of production (ITAG. 1999.). The Economic and Social Research

Council (ESRC) notes that economic success is increasingly based upon the

15
effective utilization of intangible assets such as knowledge, skills and innovative

potential as the key resources for competitive advantage (ESRC. 2006.).

The knowledge economy and knowledge society

The knowledge economy is driven by increasing globalization and knowledge

intensity of economic activities: both have been powered through the rate of

technological progress in ICT. (Houghton, J. Sheehan, P. 2000.).

Peter Drucker developed the “knowledge economy” into the “knowledge

society” (Drucker, P. 1968). He predicted that, ‘The new economy may or may

not materialize, but there is no doubt that the next society will be with us shortly.’

(Drucker, P. 2001.). This society will be: borderless, because knowledge is even

more mobile than money; socio-economically mobile via “easily acquired formal

education”2; and, will be competitive, because anyone can acquire the means of

production, but not everyone can win.

Knowledge workers will dominate the labour market. Traditional knowledge

workers (such as accountants), will be joined by a growing group of what he

calls “knowledge technologists”. These people are as much manual workers as

knowledge workers; yet their manual work is based on the considerable

theoretical knowledge they have acquired.

Andy Green et al. have defined the knowledge economy and knowledge society

by tying them to overall productive and social outcomes. These can be indicated

2
He states that this can only be acquired through formal education and not through
apprenticeship – though doesn’t justify why.

16
and therefore measured in some way through labour productivity, employment

rates, wage equality, skills distribution and socialization. (Green, A. et al. 2006.).

In Sweden the knowledge society is now regarded by the National Board of

Education in Sweden (Skolverket) as a reality (Skolverket. 2000. p. 12).

However, while the knowledge society is generally seen as a positive

phenomenon, Carl Anders Säfström is far more pessimistic. He sees it as an

indication of the ‘…death of the Enlightenment as the prime motif for educating

the citizen’ (Säfström, C. A. 2005. p. 583.). As responsibility for education

moves from the state to the citizen, individuals’ freedom to exercise choice is

diminished: education understood only in economic terms. While this may be

good for competitiveness, it appears to go against the spirit of social cohesion.

Social Cohesion

Social cohesion has gained in prominence at national and European policy levels

over the past decade. Yet it is an ambiguous concept. It draws from various

societal traits and relations and is a proxy for collective quality of life. Its

elements may be mutually influencing but not in a transparent way.

Finding something that approaches a textbook definition is difficult, the closest is

provided by Andy Green et al.: ‘To most people it probably signifies, at the

minimum, a relatively harmonious society characterized by low rates of crime

and high levels of civic co-operation and trust’ (Green, A. Preston, J. Janmaat, G.

J. 2006. p. 5.). Anthony Giddens uses the term “social justice”: the reduction of

economic and social inequalities and the equalising of life chances to produce a

17
more socially just society (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 72.). Robert Putnam’s work on

social cohesion – Social Capital theory - is explained in a later section. This

concentrates on social cohesion at an individual to community level. Andy Green

et al. conclude that this does not aggregate up to a societal level. Instead they

explain that a societal approach to social cohesion assumes that there must be not

only bonding and trust within communities or groups but also between them.

This must then connect to shared values and a sense of citizenship. Also it must

concern the distribution of resources and power, the means of conflict resolution

and the institutions, cultures and ideologies that influence these shared values

and citizenship (Green, A. et al. 2006.). Another important point that they make

is that social cohesion might be viewed as a process rather than an end state, as it

has never been fully achieved.

There is not a clear operational definition of social cohesion available from the

European Commission or its agencies. The Europa website defines cohesion as

‘sticking together’ so that ‘everyone has a place in society’ (Eurojargon Europa

Website. 2007). While social cohesion forms half of the Lisbon goal and the term

cohesion is used frequently – what is actually covered in much of the European

Union literature pertains to inclusion. It is interesting that the more technical

version of the Eurojargon guide – the Europa glossary - does not include social

cohesion. While a clear definition may be lacking, a communication from the

Commission explains that: ‘A high level of social cohesion is based on the

principles of solidarity and social inclusion.’(European Commission. 2003. p.

17.).

18
Andy Green at al. state that unlike social capital (covered in the following

section), which appears to undergo large fluctuations within short timeframes,

changes in social cohesion can only be seen over much longer periods of time.

They explain that within the period they study and have data for (1960 - 1990)

might be, ‘thought to be insufficiently long’ (Green, A. et al. 2006. P55). If so,

then the achieving-greater-social-cohesion aspect of the Lisbon goal may be

fundamentally flawed. Even if sufficient changes are implemented, the impact on

social cohesion may not manifest itself in time, especially given the time lag

involved in data collection and analysis. The concept of social cohesion for the

European Union is encompassed by the European Social Model (ESM).

The European Social Model

The European Social Model ‘…is characterised by the indissoluble link between

economic performance and social progress.’ (European Commission. 2004. p.

108). It is defined by Anthony Giddens as depending ‘fundamentally upon

economic prosperity and redistribution… …a mixture of values,

accomplishments and aspirations, varying in form and degree of realisation

among European States’ (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 1.). The European Economic and

Social Committee (EESC) has published an opinion paper on this subject: Social

Cohesion: fleshing out a European social model (EESC. 2006.). They explain the

model as a set of values and visions as well as a reality state that its strength

comes from the dynamic interaction of competitiveness, solidarity and mutual

trust. Social policy is seen as a productive factor: within the model economic

(competitiveness) considerations cannot be divorced from social or

environmental considerations. This raises the question of whether social cohesion

19
and economic competitiveness must be in tension with each other, or whether

they are mutually beneficial. The EESC point towards the latter, citing the Nordic

countries.

An aspect of the relationship between social cohesion (social inclusion) and

competitiveness has been explored by Torben Iversen and David Soskice. They

use individual level and country level data to demonstrate that the nature of the

state social security helps to determine the form of the capitalism that operates

(and vice versa). Workers can earn income via skills that can be classed as

mainly general or specific (which can only be applied in a particular sector,

occupation or job). Workers with general skills will enjoy a greater probability of

gaining employment. Conversely, the risk of not finding a job is greater for

workers with specific skills. Therefore workers will choose to develop specific

skills over general skills if the levels of social protection (for unemployment,

early retirement etc) are sufficiently high enough to mitigate the risk of a longer

period of unemployment. At enterprise level, companies that extensively use

specific skills to compete will benefit from high levels of social protection.

Conversely, companies that rely on general skills will be harmed by the

associated costs of social protection and cannot benefit from the supply side

benefits of having high levels of social protection. As they summarize: ‘Whether

social protection undermines international competitiveness therefore depends

entirely on the position of countries in the international division of labor’

(Iversen, T. Soskice, D. 2001. p. 10). At the macro level they statistically

compare “specific skills” countries (Germany, Sweden, Norway, France, Italy)

20
with “general skills” countries (Ireland, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada,

USA). They state that, ‘What stands out from this comparison is that all the

specific skills countries have notably higher levels of protection than any of the

general skills countries’ (ibid. p. 17).

This leads to the observation that there must be more than one ESM. Anthony

Giddens states that there are many European Social Models and while some fare

better than others they are all mutually supportive (Giddens, A. 2007. P. xxi).

Andy Green et al. identify three: Anglo-saxon, Germanic and Nordic (Green, A.

2007 P16). There is very little in the literature on the nature of the ESM within

the newer Member States. A European think-tank essay points to an Eastern and

Central European Social Model, based on the observations that flat rate income

tax systems have been introduced and high levels of social protection are

provided (Barysch, K. 2006.).

The alternative argument is that the ESM does not exist because there is too

much variety between the Member States to allow for a significant level of

similarity. The EESC reject this by stating that the between-group differences (ie

between the EU and other advanced capitalist countries) are greater than the

within-group differences (between member states). They also say that the

Member States are more integrated, than other groups of countries. They also cite

the “European dimension” of national social policies, of which an established

“social acquis”3 is an artefact. The EESC have identified a set of core elements to

the ESM. These include:

3
A collection of directives in subjects such as individual employment conditions, parental leave,
working time etc.

21
  State responsibility for the promotion of social cohesion, including high

employment rates, high quality public services and, redistribution of

wealth;

 Social protection (social economic benefits, healthcare);

 Social partnership, in particular the role of employers and unions in

collective agreements;

 Social and employment legislation to ensure equal opportunities; and,

 A sustainable single European market.

(EESC. 2006.)

The achievements of the ESM include a path taken away from ‘belligerent

nationalism’ and the observation that European countries top the world rankings

on key welfare indicators. However, unemployment, particularly youth

unemployment, remains a real challenge to the ESM. (EESC. p.10).

Modernising the European Social Model: The European Social Agenda

The European Social Agenda is an acknowledgement that, in its current form, the

ESM is failing, too many remain unemployed and in poverty. National social

protection systems face common challenges. (European Commission. 2000.).

These include the changing nature of the workplace as traditional manufacturing

and agriculture have shrunk and service-based employment has grown, in

structural changes towards the knowledge economy. The nuclear family is no

longer the “default” assumption, yet gender inequalities remain persistent.

Demographic changes are changing the structure of the labour pool while

increasing demand on health and pensions.

22
The Agenda states that a key challenge is to change emphasis from reducing

social exclusion to fostering social inclusion as an integral part of all policy

making. Here, employment is highlighted as a major factor. This is partly

because of the strong association between unemployment, poverty and social

exclusion, and partly because increased employment reduces costs to the state

(ibid). This leads to the concept of “flexicurity”.

Flexicurity

This is the balance between flexible labour markets and a high level of

employment and income security thus maintaining both competitiveness and the

ESM (Directorate General Employment & Social Affairs. 2007.). Flexicurity has

four components:

 Flexible and secure contractual arrangements and work organisations –

from employer and employee perspectives;

 Effective active labour market policies – to help people cope with labour

market transitions, be that between jobs or unemployment;

 Modern social security arrangements – including provisions for people to

combine work and personal commitments (ie child care), it also aims to

increase labour market mobility; and,

 Reliable and responsive lifelong learning systems – to ensure adaptability

and employability at an individual level in the labour market and to

maintain productivity levels at an enterprise level.

(European Expert Group on Flexicurity. 2007. p. 15).

23
Drivers and theories

Having defined and conceptualised the terms within the title, this section

considers the drivers and their effects on social cohesion and competitiveness.

The first driver to be considered is globalization. This is followed by the theories

of: social capital; capability; and, emergence. The second driver considered is the

EU’s policy coordination and monitoring tool, the Open Method of Coordination

(OMC). Thirdly, the effects of demographic change, both of ageing population

and migration, are discussed. The influence of the media as a driver on the

awareness of social cohesion is introduced before discussing the relations of all

of these to Lisbon and education and training.

Globalization

The phenomenon of globalization has a wealth of literature on it (for example:

Kofman, E. Youngs, G. (eds). 2003; Shaw, M. 1997; Richardson, P. (ed) 1997;

and, Brahmbhatt, M. 1998.), ranging from the economic to sociological,

academic to policy. Though some have argued that its influence has been

overstated, it still has had a significant effect upon the emphasis on national

education as governments have sought to maximise their impact through

education and training as their influence and autonomy has diminished in other

policy areas, (Green, A. 1997.). Education and training is perhaps the one area of

policy where national governments are the most dominant and have the most

control.

This example raises the question of whether the power of the state has been

constrained by globalization, or if it is globalization that has been generated from

24
nation states. It seems to be logically more likely that the state lies between, the

national and the international, and mediates influence from one area to the other;

it both shapes globalization and is shaped by it (Clark, I. 1998.). The idea that

processes and actors are simultaneously influencing and being subject to the

influences of each other is a theme that runs through this dissertation. It also

makes attributing cause and separating it from effect very difficult.

Globalization is also the driver of international competitiveness. The OECD

asserts that globalization, ‘is without doubt a powerful motor of prosperity and

poverty reduction’ (Gurría, A. 2006.) though the management of globalization is

becoming more complex. In order to reap the benefits of globalization ‘a full

range of macro economic and structural policies’ as well as open markets are

needed, this includes ‘human capital development’. The ‘dark side’ of

globalisation is mentioned - bribery and corruption, tax evasion, money

laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human trafficking (ibid). However, the

dark side of globalization appears to the OECD to be very different (at least in

this example) to the dark side of globalisation highlighted by Antonia Juhasz who

contests the OECD’s assertions:

Globalisation rests on the theory that a ‘rising tide’ of wealth generated

by global corporations will ‘trickle down’ to the rest of society and ‘lift
all boats’… …However the wealth does not trickle down. Rather, the
globalisation model locks the wealth at the top, removing from
governments and communities the very tools necessary to ensure equity
and to protect workers, sustainable and traditional livelihoods, access to
food and vital social services and democracy. In these ways,
globalisation has increased poverty and inequality, both within and
between nations. (Juhasz, A. 2002. p. 412.)

Globalization emphasizes the need for social cohesion. This is because common

experiences, common culture etc that made high levels of social cohesion more

25
likely are reduced by increased global flows of information and people. One

mechanism by which Globalization can reduce levels of social cohesion is

explained by John Adams’s hypermobility theory. It observes that on average we

travel greater distances each day than we used to – we spread ourselves further.

However, time remains fixed therefore we spread ourselves more thinly in terms

of time and attention devoted to each person we interact with. (There is also a

strongly positive correlation with electronic mobility whose growth rate is much

higher) (Adams, J. 2001). The result is that we move from hypomobile to

hypermobile societies. He describes these as characterised by a “mobility

apartheid” between those who have cars and those who don’t and struggle in a

car-orientated world. The increasing gap between the haves and have-nots are

manifested in increasing levels of crime and even higher levels of fear of crime.

Globalization has also made societies that used to be homogenous more

heterogeneous. ‘How our societies should react to their new-found cultural and

ethnic diversity?’ Is what Anthony Giddens defines as the social problem of

today. (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 100). This contrasts with Andy Green’s observation

on the influence of Globalization as a force for inter-cultural blending. He points

out that while similar products and services can be found worldwide, this mixing

happens at only a superficial level. Global items are taken under more local

ownership and are adapted to meet the local context (Green, A. 1997).

Social Capital theory

Mentioned earlier under social cohesion, social capital can be divided into three

categories, economic, cultural and social (Bourdieu, P.1986). As with

26
globalization, there isn’t a universally agreed definition. It refers to the

institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a

society's social interactions (World Bank 2002.). While individuals may be able

to gain tangible benefits, social capital itself is intangible and cannot be held by

individuals. This is because, ‘social capital inheres in the structure of relations

between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves

or in physical implements of production’. (Coleman, J. S. 1988). The modern

economic perspective regards social capital as:

…primarily the accumulation of obligations from others according to the

norm of reciprocity. In this version, donors provide privileged access to
resources in the expectation that they will be fully repaid in the future.
(Portes, A. 1998. p. 7.)

Trust is an integral aspect of social capital. Robert Putman proposes: “thick trust”

- between members of a social network who know each other well; and, “thin

trust” – held for example, at community level. This is similar to Anthony

Giddens’ concept of “Active trust” and “Passive trust” (which he links to “Social

Solidarity”). The first has to be earned, involves two-way negotiation and must

be regularly renewed, the second is an acceptance of established systems and

status (Giddens, A. 2007). Social capital is also classified by Robert Putnam into:

 Bonding - strong relations within a homogenous group (“important for

getting by”);

 Bridging - between actors not in the same homogenous group (weaker

than bonding but “important for getting ahead”); and,

 Linking - between actors who are at different levels of social strata or

hierarchy.

(Portes, A. 1998. p. 9. Putnam, R. 2004. P5)

27
Social bonding is positively regarded, although Alejandro Portes points out that it

can ‘…restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access to [the

same] resources…’ (Portes, A. 1998. p. 22). It is interesting to see that the World

Bank claims Social Capital is equally important for economic and political well

being4:

Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to

prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. …Social
networks can increase productivity by reducing the costs of doing
business. Social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation.
(World Bank, 2002.)

But how is Social Capital related to competitiveness and social cohesion? The

knowledge economy relies on the collection, trading and exchanging of

knowledge therefore it needs social capital. (Putnam, R. 2004.). This suggests

that greater accumulation and better use of social capital will give a competitive

advantage. Robert Putnam explains that social capital, pertaining to a fair,

equitable and well-integrated society, is a constituent of social cohesion. He

states that in his ‘…view abundant social capital of the right sort can best be seen

as an intermediate policy target’ to social cohesion (ibid. p. 3). He also states that

the contribution of education in increasing social capital and social cohesion is,

‘the single most important and effective policy lever’ that any government can

use (ibid. 2004. p. 5).

Robert Putnam’s work on social cohesion has gained the attention of policy

makers in the UK and at European level (see for example, European

4
It should also be said that (to fairly represent the World Bank’s position) that it recognises
Social Capital as neutral – it can exert both economically and socially positive and negative
effects (cooperatives versus cartels).

28
Commission. 2005). However, Andy Green et al. note that Social Capital theory

has little to say about how whole societies operate (Green, A. et al. 2006. p. 4).

While it is an attractive theory at an individual level, the links between education

and social cohesion at the macro-societal level are missing. Working from

individual effects to societal effects may require more than aggregating

individual outcomes (ibid. p. 20) (see emergence theory below). They find strong

correlations between educational inequality and income equality and between

income equality and social cohesion. However, ‘average levels of skills show no

relationship with measures for social cohesion’ (ibid. p. 14).

Capability theory

While Social Capital refers to the opportunities available through social bonds

and reciprocity, Capability theory (developed by Amartya Sen) is more strongly

orientated towards social cohesion. It encompasses all opportunities available to

and achievements by people and centres on capability and functioning. A

capability is a potential functioning – an opportunity to achieve. A functioning is

an actual achievement. The range of capabilities and functionings is open ended

(Walker, M. 2006)

The sum of someone’s capabilities forms their capability set, which is that

individual’s real or substantive freedom to be and do what they want (Robeyns, I.

2003.). Therefore, capability is about more than attainment of skills, it is about

freedom to achieve well-being. Another central idea is substantive freedom,

which Sen calls agency, this is, ‘one’s ability to pursue goals that one values and

that are important for the life an individual wishes to lead’ (Walker, M. 2006. p.

29
3). Therefore, people are valued through the extent to which they are able to

achieve their goals, rather through their financial wealth. Similarly, resources are

not valued intrinsically but for of the opportunities they create (Saito, M. 2003.).

Likewise, capabilities need to be considered against both current and future

freedoms (Walker, M. 2005.).

Education, while not directly addressed by Sen, clearly cannot be separated from

capability theory (Walker, M. 2006. Saito, M. 2003). It is both a capability in its

own right and a combination of constituent capabilities. Rather than being very

dictatorial, education must be delivered in a way that makes people able to act

autonomously (Saito, M. 2003. p. 27). Also, developing an individual’s

capabilities requires capability and functioning in that person as a child, for that

capability to mature as an adult (Walker, M. 2006). ‘Lifelong education then

begins with the very young child…’ (Walker, M. 2006. p. 165). ‘In short,

education in the capability approach is an unqualified good for human

development freedom’ (ibid. p. 168).

Anthony Giddens notes that capability relates closely to individual performance

within the Knowledge Economy. Within the network labour market a minimum

level of social capital or capability is required to afford an individual with

enough self-reliance to cope with change. This involves taking advantage of the

possibilities offered and might even extend to engineering change (Giddens, A.

2007. p. 99).

30
Emergence theory

It is worth briefly introducing emergence theory as its core informs some of the

other theories and concepts. The basis of this theory is that properties or

behaviours that occur in systems at higher levels cannot be predicted from the

properties or patterns of interaction of lower levels. An example is the emergence

of the mind from neurons. Another characterisation of emergence is the idea of

downward causation (supervenience), where a higher-level emergent property

causes effects at a lower level – either within single components or in their

interaction (Sawyer, K. R. 2002. Corning, P. A. 2002.).

It has been adopted in various academic fields and while it has been recently

popularised (Johnson, S. 2002) its roots are not new. A sociology journal article

argues that Durkheim was an emergent theorist. While he did not use the term

“emergence” the phrase “sui generis” conveys the same meaning and the

constructs that he proposed, such as “social facts”, are emergent phenomena. For

example, in his Rules of Sociological Method, he states that society is not a mere

sum of individuals, yet he also maintains that social things are actualized only

through men – they are a product of human activity (Sawyer, K. R. 2002).

Sawyer argues that the idea of emergence or sui generis – individual actions

result in the independent existence of a social level of analysis - has been picked

up in contemporary sociological work (ibid).

The idea that new things will be identified at higher levels that are not apparent

from lower levels, has important implications for a comparative education. It

31
emphasises the need to compare between units of education at difference scales/

levels and the dangers of generalising.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

With the declaration of the Lisbon goal, European governance shifted from

traditional top-down methods using (agreed) directives to decentralised “soft

coordination” methods, with the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It is

described by the Lisbon European Council as a ‘means of spreading best practice

and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals’. (European

Council. 2000. article 37) The OMC has been used to coordinate Education &

Training since the 2000 Lisbon Spring Council. It consists of four stages:

1. Identifying priorities;

2. Benchmarking;

3. Identifying good/ next /best practice; and,

4. Policy/peer learning.

The OMC provides a means of monitoring the implementation of European

policy while respecting the sovereignty of Member States. This is enshrined in

the principle of subsidiarity, which states that EU decisions must be taken as

closely as possible to the citizen. In other words, the Union does not take action

(except on matters for which it alone is responsible) unless EU action is more

effective than action taken at national, regional or local level (Europa Glossary.

2007).

32
As a soft means of coordination, the OMC cannot be used to force Member

States into specific action, however it does exert a similar force to that of

international surveys (such as PISA): peer pressure - created by benchmarking.

Thus, while the OMC does not, at least in broad principle, break subsidiarity it

exerts a strong pressure on national policy makers. Antonio Novoa asserts that,

‘In fact, one needs to look at “benchmarking” not as technique or method, but as

a political position.’ (Novoa, A. Lawn, M. (eds). 2002. p. 136).

Stijn Smismans has argued (regarding employment policy) that the OMC could

be dubbed the ‘Open Method of Centralisation’. It radicalises subsidiarity: from a

static principle focussed on hierarchy of government, to a dynamic principle that

is decentred and not dominated by any single policy objective. The OMC does

not define the level of power most appropriate for decision making and therefore

does not priviledge lower decision-making levels: decision making has remained

top-down rather than bottom-up (Smismans, S. 2004).

In contrast, Roger Dale appears to take a more neutral line. While he concludes

that the process of governing is no longer the exclusive preserve of the state he

explains also that:

…the OMC processes seem likely to have a ‘depoliticising’effect… …This

also makes education policy making at the EU level a matter for
technical problem solving between stakeholders within the system, rather
than the result of the political resolution of the political conflicts between
different interests. Further, the process will tend to converge around the
economic interests of the already strong, rather than around their own or
anyone else’s political priorities. Finally the OMC will tend to operate on
the basis of proscription rather than prescription; that is to say, it will
tend to patrol the boundaries of the possible rather than defining
precisely what the territory thus defined should contain.
(Dale, R. 2005.)

33
The relationship of subsidiarity and European governance is paradoxical, the EU

reiterates the importance of national decision making and recognizes the need for

diversity, yet it simultaneously strives towards greater unity (Livingston, K.

2003).

It may be that the OMC has so far received slightly negative judgments because

the focus has been on the benchmarking stage - Anthony Giddens, for example,

describes the OMC as essentially a benchmarking process (Giddens, A. 2007.

P15). This in turn can be used to “name and shame” Member States whose

progress has been poor. This forms the “stick” part of the OMC which can then

exercise peer pressure on these Member States to follow EU prescribed policies

rather devise their own. Conversely, the latter two stages of the OMC, identifying

good practice and peer learning, which might form the “carrot” part of the OMC

has been slow in starting and thus, at least until recently, has not enjoyed the

same emphasis as the first two stages. Tom Leney et al note that the move from

the first two stages to the latter two, ‘seems predictably to be a difficult

transition’ (Leney T. et al. Forthcoming. p. 15).

Demographic change: ageing population and migration.

Demographic change is a major issue for Europe and this is emphasized by the

fact that in 2006 and 2007 the Commission announced biennial European reports

and major European Forums on the demographic situation, (European

Commission. 2005a. European Commission. 2006a.). There are three

components (drivers) of demographic change: mortality (life expectancy);

34
fertility; and, migration. Current projections to 2050 predict that the total

population size will remain approximately what it is today. However:

 Fertilty: women are having fewer children and they are having them at a

later age;

 Mortality: people are living longer; and so,

 Migration is a major determinant of European demographic change.

Fertility

The estimated fertility rate required to maintain a static population is 2.1 births

per woman. The European Commission categorizes the Member States’ total

fertility rates (TFRs) as either moderately low (1.6 – 1.9 births per woman) or

low (1.5 births or less). This averaged in 2005 to 1.5 for the EU25 (and 1.29 for

Romania and Bulgaria). It is interesting to note that the EU10 had, in 2005, an

even lower TFR of 1.25. This demonstrates that an ageing European population

cannot be changed simply through EU enlargement. (European Commission.

2007. Table 2.1.). However, while average fertility rates are below the population

replacement level, the increase in the other two factors (mortality and migration)

mean that the fertility rate would have to be even lower to cause population

decline. Also, the trend and therefore impact of fertility rates is not as clear as

might be assumed and this is to do with the indicator itself.

The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is based on age specific rates in a particular year.

It assumes future fertility rates of younger women based on the observed

probability of giving birth amongst older cohorts of women. If a cohort of

women have children at a later age the TFR will initially decrease – the tempo

35
effect. The TFR will then increase when these children are then born – the

quantum effect. The tempo effect is evidenced by the observation that since the

1970s the fertility rates of women aged 30 or younger have declined while since

the 1980s the fertility rates of women aged over 30 have increased. There are

indications that the declining TFR is not just through the tempo effect. In most

EU countries there appear to be more single children while there is a greater

incidence of women in their 30s and 40s who do not have children (ibid. p. 20.).

There are various hypotheses as to why women are having fewer children and at

a later age. These will not be covered here except to note that there is a drive to

encourage more female participation in higher education and in the labour

market.

Mortality

While fertility has reduced, mortality rates have decreased and so life expectancy

has increased. In 1969/64 life expectancy for men in the EU-25 countries was

67.3, for women this was 73.0. This increased in 2004 to 75.6 for men and for

81.8 women. and is projected in 2050 to be 81.8 for men and 86.9 for women. To

put this into context, at present a man of 60 still has 20% of his total lifespan and

a woman of 60 still has 25% of hers. The trend of increasing life span continues,

since 1980 there has been an annual increase of nearly two and a half months of

life expectancy at birth in the EU-25. This increase is mostly due to declining

mortality at higher ages, though there has also been a significant decline in

mortality from cardiovascular diseases in late middle age.

36
Migration

In 2005 the United Nations estimated there to be about 40 million migrants in the

EU27, out of a total population of about 728 million (ibid. p. 28.). Social and

labour market integration are the main factors that govern the impact of

migration on competitiveness and social cohesion. Educational attainment of

non-nationals within EU countries tends to be significantly lower than that of

nationals, though where high-skilled migrants have been attracted this is an

exception. However, migrants are often under-employed compared to the level of

skills they possess, this means that donor countries lose high-skilled workers

while EU countries fail to make use of these skills that could increase

productivity. Migrants also have lower employment rates than native workers.

(ibid. p. 109). With regards to social cohesion it is worth noting that these lower

employment rates may well act negatively on social cohesion. A Eurobarometer

survey in 2006 found that in only Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Portugal, Finland and Sweden did more than 50% of the respondents feel that

immigrants contribute a lot to their country (ibid. p. 109).

The baby boomers

One way to consider the impact of these three drivers is to consider one dominant

group of the population. This group is a large cohort that forms a “bulge” within

the population structure known as the baby boomers. The Commission defines

the baby boomers as those born between 1945 and 1965 (ibid. p. 32.). As this

group reaches retirement age it will cause the working age population (15 to 64)

to peak at a predicted 67% of the European population by 2010. This

demographic “dividend” means that at present the old-age dependency rate is

37
four (people of working age) to one (person aged 65 or over). However, after

2010 the effect of the baby boomers retiring will cause the working age

population to decrease annually by one million. The median age in the EU will

also increase by ten years from 39 in 2004 to 49 in 2050. This ageing population

will change the old-age dependency rate to two to one. In short, the baby

boomers will change from being net contributors (ie an asset) to the social

protection systems to being net receivers from social protection systems (ie a

burden). This effect will be so large that increased migration cannot prevent

population ageing; though it can help in reducing labour market bottlenecks. The

European Commission states that, ‘The changes in demography therefore

constitute a major challenge for public finances and social cohesion’ (ibid. p.

61.).

After 2010 the European population is also projected to decline from 331 million

to 268 million in 2050. This has important implications for the achievement of

the Lisbon goal because while the EU will remain the region with the third

biggest population (after China and India), it is the only one whose total

population is predicted to decline in the next four decades (ibid. 2007. p. 44). The

baby boomer retirement should reduce the employment rate. However, this is

expected to increase from 63% in 2004 to 70% in 2020 (ibid. p. 49.). This is due

to increasing female employment rates (from 55% in 2004 to nearly 65% in

2025) and employment rates for older workers (from 40% in 2004 to 59% in

2025).

38
To meet the challenges of demographic change the EU needs to increase the

labour market pool. Since most of the future members of this pool are already

here, much of this increase must come from higher levels of female (and older

worker) participation. In order to encourage both high rates of female

participation in the labour market and higher rates of fertility, flexible and

attractive child care and family-friendly measures are vital. Another issue that

reduces the attractiveness of employment for women is the gender gap in pay. In

2004 the difference across the EU equated to 15% lower gross hourly earnings

compared to men (though this ranged from 4% in Malta to 25% in Cyprus) (ibid.

p. 83). Anthony Giddens cites the promotion of family friendly policies as being

crucial for the adaption to change and part of the reason that the Nordic countries

have been as successful as they have. He also asserts that family friendly policies

do not have to be incompatible with business friendly policies, especially if part-

time work engenders much of the status and privileges of full time work. Women

he says, ‘emerge as the lynch pin of any new equilibrium between households

and the economy. The knowledge/ service economy has the household as its hub’

(Giddens, A. 2007. p 72.).

As they are the dominant population group, increasing the employment rates of

older workers is perhaps even more important. Recently, older workers have

accounted for three-quarters of all employment growth. This has come about

through making remaining in work more attractive, including pension reform and

reducing the attractiveness of early retirement.

39
While increasing employment is regarded as a means of increasing social

inclusion (and thus somehow social cohesion) it is also linked to economic

productivity (and hence competitiveness). It has been suggested that productivity

declines with age and that older workers are less likely to engage with innovation

and new ways of working. However, a joint European Commission and

Economic Policy Committee projection shows that a decline in productivity with

age is likely to be limited. Productivity is a system rather than an individual

attribute, hence stocks of human and social capital are more important than

individuals’ ages per se. Educational attainment is another important factor which

might effectively compensate for age-related reductions in productivity.

(European Commission. 2007. p. 55.). In fact the same source states that,

‘Instead of focussing on whether productivity declines with age, a more relevant

question is how to adapt education and lifelong learning policies in the context of

the ageing society.’ (ibid. p. 59). Yet, Tom Leney at al. conclude that:

With a few notable exceptions, little research and development activity

has asked seriously what skills older people will need to develop and how
work organisations can accommodate their needs.
(Leney, T. et al. Forthcoming. p. 59).

Another related issue is labour force matching to employment. The Commission

notes that young labour forces tend to have high job turnover, something that an

older workforce need not have. Therefore, industrial restructuring and matching

of labour to jobs are likely to be more important than the age profile of the labour

force for productivity. At the other end of the age scale, Tom Leney et al. point

out that for many young people the transition from education and initial training

into the labour market is difficult. This is evidenced by the fact that youth

unemployment has been more than double that of those aged over 25.

40
The media and European public awareness of social cohesion

This fourth driver will be introduced rather than considered as fully as the others,

but it is worth mentioning as it directly highlights the human costs when social

cohesion disintegrates. There have been, since 2000, graphic examples of the

break down of social cohesion. These grab the attention of citizens and the

concerns of their politicians who are obliged to do what they can to rectify the

situation. Examples of this are:

 The murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, stabbed while

shopping (September 2003);

 Social tensions within the Netherlands, including the murders of

politician Pim Fortuyn (May 2002) and the film maker Theo van Gogh

(November 2004);

 The July 7th suicide bombings in London carried out by British Citizens

(with British accents), 2005; and,

 Sustained rioting in French cities, including Paris and Marseilles (October

and November 2005).

Relationships between drivers, competitiveness, social cohesion and

education.

The preceding pages show that education and training has a key role in

increasing competitiveness and social cohesion. In turn, globalization requires

increased competitiveness in order to provide the prosperity to meet the

increasing costs on social protection systems caused by an ageing population.

41
Globalization and migration can lead to greater societal heterogeneity within

Member States – this places greater pressure on social cohesion.

All of the drivers and the subjects (competitiveness, social cohesion and

education) are dynamic and interlinked. An OECD published brief states that

countries that invest heavily in education and skills benefit most in both

economic and social terms (Schleicher, A. 2006.). Education plays a vital role in

preventing poverty but as Anthony Giddens states, ‘it does not automatically act

to equalise life chances’ (Giddens, Anthony. 2007. p. 78). Also the population in

poverty changes, therefore those who are at risk of poverty need to be targeted in

addition to those in it. The provision of second chances, to help individuals

benefit from, rather than loose out to, is increasingly important (ibid. P84.).

How education and training increases competitiveness is obvious; how it helps to

increase social cohesion isn’t quite so clear. Andy Green et al. state that while the

level of education may affect an individual’s attitudes:

…what matters most however, and what best explains the variations
countries in how education impacts on society, is how education and
skills are distributed and the values that children and adults learn in
education.
(Green, A. et al. 2006. p. 4)

They hypothesize firstly that education affects national levels of cohesion

through socialization. They state that, ‘those who are at the top of the

qualification distribution are increasingly active in political life, whereas those at

the bottom are increasingly disaffected and marginalized’ (ibid. p. 57). Secondly,

education exerts indirect effects on social cohesion. This is through the

distribution of educational outcomes and their effect on the distribution of

42
income. This means countries that have education systems that produce more

equal outcomes, compared to other countries - in terms of the distribution of

qualifications and skills - are more likely to have a more equal distribution of

income. It is this that will promote greater social cohesion at a societal level.

Conversely, while higher levels of migration would logically lead to lower levels

of social cohesion, they find that the ethno-linguistic composition of a country,

whatever the level of development, is not clearly supported by the data (ibid. p.

100).

43
SECTION 2: the policy literature

This section scrutinises the Lisbon policy literature to compare the emphasis on

social cohesion and competitiveness. It considers the links made to, and

expectations placed on, education and training. This section is organised into

three chronological parts: the launch and initial period (2000 - 2003); the point at

which Lisbon stalls (2004) including the Mid-term review; and, the latest period

- 2004 to 2007. References to the full titles of documents are italicised in order to

help the reader to distinguish more easily between them.

Lisbon is launched - 2000

The “launch” document for the Lisbon goal is the Presidency Conclusions from

the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 (European Council. 2000),

though much comes from the Commission’s contribution (European

Commission. 2000a). The Conclusions have an equal emphasis, declaring it is

right to ‘undertake both economic and social reforms as part of a positive

strategy which combines competitiveness and social cohesion’ (European

Council. 2000. p. 2). It is notable that the term “social cohesion” is used

generally or to refer to the overall goal. Details on the relationships between the

social aspects use the terms “inclusion” or “exclusion”. The three terms are not

explained and appear at times to be used almost interchangeably, for example,

under paragraphs 31 (Modernising social protection) and 32 (Promoting social

inclusion). Within these two paragraphs the role of employment is spelt out, ‘the

best safeguard against social exclusion is a job’(ibid. p. 10. Paragraph 32). The

Social Policy Agenda states that nearly two thirds of those unemployed are at
risk of poverty (European Commission. 2000. p. 12). This means that social

protection systems need to be reformed, ‘…as part of an active welfare state to

ensure that work pays’ (European Council. 2000. p. 9. Paragraph 31). As

mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the Social Policy Agenda sees social policy

as a productive factor and as a means to ‘…retain the European social values of

solidarity and justice while improving economic performance.’ (European

Commission. 2000. p. 6). This needs to happen because the labour force must be

enlarged to help make these social protection systems financially sustainable

(ibid. p. 7). This should involve the mainstreaming of inclusion within

employment, education and training, health and housing policies at Member

State level (European Council. 2000. p. 10. Paragraph 33).

An emphasis at European level on employment is not new to Lisbon, it was made

central to the economic policy agenda by the Amsterdam Treaty (Euopean Union.

1997.) which also addressed aspects of social exclusion and anti-discrimination

(ibid. p. 8). What appears to be new, though, is the linking of employment to

social inclusion.

Within this context, the 2000 Spring Presidency Conclusions firmly link the role

of education and training to increasing employability of the labour force,

‘Europe’s education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of

the knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality of

employment’ (European Council. 2000. p. 8. Paragraph 25). The logic is that

education and training will improve cohesion by improving the skills of the

labour force, which will lead to greater employment and therefore inclusion. The

45
assumption being that inclusion leads to cohesion – though how this works is not

explained. Within the context of globalization, where “employability” replaces

“employment”, and with an ageing population, lifelong learning becomes more

important. The Presidency Conclusions call for lifelong learning to be given

higher priority, ‘as a basic component of the European Social Model’ (ibid. p. 9.

Paragraph 29). The 2000 Commission memorandum on lifelong learning, which

argues that lifelong learning should equally promote active citizenship and

employability, goes further stating that, ‘it [lifelong learning] must become the

guiding principle [their emphasis] for provision and participation across the full

continuum of learning contexts’ (European Commission. 2000b. p. 3.). It also

notes that, ‘a noticeable shift towards more integrated policies that combine

social and cultural objectives with the economic rationale for lifelong learning is

taking place’ (ibid. p. 9), though the social side of what it discusses concerns

social inclusion rather than cohesion.

2001

This is followed in 2001 by the Commission’s Concrete Future Objectives of

Education Systems (European Commission. 2001.) whose message is echoed by

the report from the Education Council to the European Council (European

Council. 2001). In concluding, it follows a reiteration of the Lisbon goal with

rhetoric which concerns employability and social inclusion rather than social

cohesion. Even though it aims to, ‘reach out to everyone in society’ this is to be

done ‘with ways of developing their skills and making best use of them’

(European Commission. 2001. p. 15. Paragraph 36). This report states, albeit

briefly, that as well as reaching out to all individuals, the content must be adapted

46
to the requirements of different groups and that, ‘the picture of society which it

conveys…[through its curricula content and teaching materials] is that which

society itself would wish’ (ibid. p. 8. Paragraph 17). The emphasis however,

remains on education for employability for inclusion - rather than as a means to

inform individual social values. Within this literature, there appears to be a

“rising tide” approach to the provision of skills - providing more and better

qualifications will benefit all (presumably either directly, through better

employment, or indirectly, social protection financed from those with better

employment). In contrast there is little on equity of training other than to

emphasize greater gender equality. (This is also demonstrated in the 2000

Commission Communication on Social Inclusion, which talks of moving away

from redistribution of prosperity via passive benefits to, ‘fostering active

participation, ...to achieve a fair distribution of opportunities’ (European

Commission. 2000c. p. 8.))

The 2001 Commission Communication to the European Spring Council in

Stockholm (European Commission. 2001a) concentrates on the economic aspects

of Lisbon. Where it deals with social aspects it mainly concerns ageing

population and the sustainability of social protection systems, poverty and

exclusion – issues primarily of inclusion rather than cohesion. It also proposes a

social inclusion action programme and sets out a list of Structural Indicators. The

2001 Stockholm Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2001a) concentrate

on employment. Education and training is covered in terms of basic skills and

lifelong learning which are vital for employability and therefore inclusion.

47
The 2001 Draft Detailed Work Programme for the follow-up of the Report on the

Concrete Objectives of Education and Training Systems sets out the objectives,

indicators and benchmarks of the education and training component of the

Lisbon Agenda. In section 41 it raises the issue of equity within education and

training systems. In addition to reiterating the importance of training

establishments promoting a positive picture of society, it also states that Lisbon

obliges us to work towards, ‘integrating fully equity considerations in the

objectives and functioning of education and training systems and establishments’

(European Commission. 2001b. p. 12) Within the final version of the work

programme, adopted in 2002, this is changed to, ‘integrating fully equal

opportunity considerations in the objectives and functioning of education and

training’ the importance of equity appears to be slightly downplayed (European

Council. 2002. P13). This work programme became known as the Education &

Training 2010 Programme; the objectives are listed in the table below. Though

only objective 2.3 explicitly mentions social cohesion, the rest cannot be easily

classified as supporting either competitiveness or social cohesion (or inclusion).

Objectives of the Detailed work programme on the follow-up of the

objectives of Education and training systems in Europe.
1 IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION AND
TRAINING SYSTEMS IN THE EU
1.1 Improving education and training for teachers and trainers
1.2 Developing skills for the knowledge society
1.3 Ensuring access to ICT for everyone
1.4 Increasing recruitment to scientific and technical studies
1.5 Making the best use of resources

2 FACILITATING THE ACCESS OF ALL TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING

SYSTEMS
2.1 Open learning environment
2.2 Making learning more attractive
2.3 Supporting active citizenship, equal opportunities and social cohesion

3 OPENING UP EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS TO THE WIDER WORLD

3.1 Strengthening the links with working life and research and society at large
3.2 Developing the spirit of enterprise
3.3 Improving foreign language learning
3.4 Increasing mobility and exchange

48
3.5 Strengthening the European co-operation
Source: European Council. 2002.

2002

The Commission’s 2002 Communication to the Spring European Council in

Barcelona (European Commission. 2002), like the previous one, has a focus on

economic issues – though this is in part a reaction to the global economic

slowdown and an interruption to the four-year trend of falling unemployment. It

raises three priority areas: employment policies and active labour market

policies; reforms to integrate economic markets; and, increasing knowledge for

competitiveness and employment. Where it concerns cohesion, it states that

concrete measures have been agreed to fight poverty, discrimination and social

exclusion: the focus is on inclusion rather than cohesion. It is notable that

lifelong learning is raised under competitiveness and employment rather than

cohesion (this is in contrast to the Copenhagen Declaration which links lifelong

learning to employability, active citizenship, social inclusion and personal

development (Copenhagen Declaration. 2002.)). The assumed causal relations

between education, competitiveness and cohesion are also spelt out with the

communication:

Improved economic and social cohesion results from the combination of

stronger economic performance, the delivery of a knowledge-based
society and long-term structural support of investment in infrastructures
and people, notably in the least developed regions. It builds on the
strength and ambition of the European social model and the welfare
state.
(European Commission. 2002. p. 16)

It also contained an amended list of Structural Indicators, which was expanded to

include 76 different indicators. Much of these cover economic aspects, where it

covers the social aspects and only one (inequality of income distribution) details

49
equity of distribution, none cover equity of the distribution of educational

outcomes. (which as noted in section 1, Andy Green at al. described as the main

way in which education effects national levels of social cohesion). The 2002

Spring Council Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2002a), while

concentrating on economic aspects, including competitiveness, states the

importance of social cohesion. This includes the importance of employment to

protect against social exclusion, it also affirms that, ‘The European social model

is based on good economic performance, a high level of social protection and

education and social dialogue.’ And that. ‘The Lisbon goals can only be

brought about by balanced efforts on both the economic and

social fronts.’ (ibid. p. 8).

Also published in 2002 was the first Joint report on social inclusion, it identified,

in the national action plans against poverty and social exclusion, a number of risk

factors for poverty and social exclusion. Education and training clearly has a role

in reducing some of the risk factors shown in the table below, through raising

expectations and removing barriers or in engendering positive social values.

Risk factors for poverty and social exclusion

Primary risk factors
Unemployment (especially long term)
Secondary risk factors
low income discrimination and racism
low quality employment disability
homelessness, old age
weak health family break-ups
immigration drug abuse and
alcoholism
low qualifications and early school leaving living in an area of multiple disadvantage
gender inequality
Source: Directorate General Employment & Social Affairs. 2002. p. 10.

50
2003

The 2003 Commission communication to the Spring European Council

(European Commission. 2003a) retains a general emphasis seen in the two

previous years. It notes that a lack of data hampers the monitoring of progress for

the social cohesion aspects (something mentioned in the previous year). This

suggests that if there is little to benchmark - use of the OMC here must be

limited. The 2003 Spring Council Presidency Conclusions note that many

structural things have been achieved (such as agreeing a Community patent) but

much remains. They state that, ‘We reaffirm our strong personal commitment to

the timely and effective delivery of reforms across the three pillars of the Lisbon

strategy - economic, social, and environmental.’ (European Council. p. 2)

Though this is followed by the assertion that: ‘The promotion of sustainable

growth and the creation of more and better jobs must remain firmly at the top of

the Union’s agenda.’ (ibid. p. 3).

Lisbon stalls and the Mid-term review - 2004

The 2004 Commission communication to the European Spring Council, delivered

before enlargement on 1st May 2004, marks the formation of a watershed within

the Lisbon Agenda. It confirms that progress is not being made quickly enough.

This includes: employment and productivity rates; reform of the internal markets

to increase competitiveness; and, levels of investment in human capital

(education). It expresses concerns for increasing poverty rates because of the

continuing lack of sustainability of social protection and pensions systems. The

Commission recommends to the Council that investment, competitiveness and

employment should be priorities for 2004. (European Commission. 2004a. p. 18).

51
The March 2004 Presidency Conclusions agree with the Commission

Communication and, after acknowledging that there must be faster translation of

policy into concrete measures, state that, ‘The most important policy issues that

deliver higher growth and employment must be prioritised’ (European Council.

2004. p. 4). While it declares that ‘Social cohesion is central’ this is not until

page nine of a 23 page document (ibid. p. 9).

The Joint interim report of the Council and the Commission on the

implementation on the Education and Training 2010 programme (European

Council. 2004a) carries a similar tone on the rate of progress. It acknowledges

that transforming education and training systems is a medium or longer term

process and that it needs time for reforms to take effect (a point raised in the

previous section). Even so, it states that the available information leads to the

conclusion that the pace of reform must be accelerated for the objectives in

education and training to be achieved.

The report raises three priority areas. The first is for higher levels of investment

(both public and private – which is much lower compared to the United States).

This should be more efficiently and effectively spent in improving human

resources and involves mainly higher education and adult education/ Vocational

Education Training (VET). It states that higher education is, ‘at the crossroads of

research, education and innovation’ (ibid. p. 12) and is therefore integral to the

knowledge society and competitiveness. VET is quoted as being vital in

providing people with specific competences and qualifications for a labour

market whose demands for skills can quickly evolve. Complementing this is the

52
development of principles for the validation of non-formal and informal

learning.; while the emphasis of the report is on competitiveness, this clearly

supports inclusion as well as employability. The second priority is the

implementation of, ‘coherent and comprehensive national lifelong learning

strategies’ (ibid. p. 5). The third priority is recognition of qualifications and

certificates across Europe, which is, ‘essential for the development of a European

labour market and European citizenship’ (ibid. p. 5). The validation of non-

formal and informal learning and the third priority are important for both an

ageing workforce and for labour mobility.

The logical causal relationship is also restated within the report, namely that:

Investment in education and training is a key factor of the Union's

competitiveness, sustainable growth, and employment and therefore a
prerequisite for achieving the economic, social and environmental goals
set in Lisbon for the European Union. …For the Union to perform better
than its competitors in the knowledge-based economy, investing more and
more effectively in education and training is of paramount importance. …
At the same time, the knowledge-based society generates new needs in
terms of social cohesion, active citizenship and personal fulfilment to
which education and training can make a significant contribution.
(ibid. p. 4. p. 8)

The message here is clear, the social aims of Lisbon are important but cannot be

achieved without first achieving the economic aims; competitiveness must be

achieved in order to afford the means of achieving greater social cohesion (or

inclusion).

In November 2004 the independent, Mid-term review was published by the High

Level Group chaired by the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Wim Kok

– known as the “Kok” report (High Level Group. 2004). The Kok report offers a

53
blunt assessment of progress, while acknowledging the global events and trends

have not helped, it states that the European Union and Member States have failed

to act with, ‘sufficient urgency’ (ibid. p. 6). This is due to, ‘an overloaded

agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities. …[and] the lack of

determined political action’ (ibid. p. 6). Though they agree that the direction of

the Lisbon strategy is right, the report explains that:

The problem is, however, that the Lisbon strategy has become too broad
to be understood as an interconnected narrative. Lisbon is about
everything and thus about nothing. Everybody is responsible and thus no
one. The end result of the strategy has sometimes been lost.
(ibid. p. 16)

While there has been, ‘incoherence and inconsistency, both between participants

and policies’(ibid p. 40), the gap between the EU and the US and Asian

competitor economies has grown.

As has been stated elsewhere, economic growth and increased employment is

needed in order to provide the means to sustain the social aspects and the

European Social Model. As the report emphasizes, ‘Europe, in short, must focus

on growth and employment in order to achieve the Lisbon ambitions’ (ibid. p.

16). However, what is new about the Kok report is that it appears to be the first

time in a major policy document that the social aspects are explicitly described as

means to increase competitiveness: ‘In their turn, social cohesion and

environmental sustainability can contribute to a higher growth and employment’

(ibid. p. 6). This happens through helping to reduce levels of poverty and helping

to increase labour supply. Thus social cohesion can be, ‘a means of growth rather

than a claim on it’ (ibid. p. 39). The theme of economic growth coming first but

social cohesion contributing to it is summarized:

54
 It [Lisbon] wants to embed Europe’s commitment to social cohesion and
the environment in the core of the growth and jobs generation process so
they are part of Europe’s competitive advantage. This cannot be done
against a background of stagnating or slowly rising demand. The wider
macroeconomic framework, both the pursuit of monetary and fiscal
policy, must be as supportive of growth as possible.
(ibid. p. 16)

Lisbon re-launched with a new emphasis – 2004

Even prior to the Kok report there appears to be an increasing emphasis on

competitiveness and employment. The May 2004 Presidency Conclusions

(European Council. 2004b) state that:

The most important policy issues that deliver higher growth and
employment must be prioritised. Accordingly, this year's Spring European
Council focuses on two issues: sustainable growth and more and better
jobs.
(ibid. p. 4)

Yet, later within the same conclusions it states that, ‘social cohesion must be

central’ (ibid. p. 8) though much of what is described pertains primarily to social

inclusion rather than cohesion.

2005

The Council (Education, Youth and Culture) conclusions, submitted to the 2005

Spring European Council, maintains this emphasis, asserting that, ‘education and

training is therefore essential, as they provide the indispensable skills base and

creative potential’ (European Council. 2005. p. 3). With regard to helping to

increase levels of social cohesion, they conclude that this happens through

promoting understanding and tolerance. Early education can help children

develop social skills, while citizenship education, ‘…is a complementary means

of combating cultural and social exclusion and facilitating the integration of

55
young people as well as people with special needs into society’ (ibid. p. 4). This

articulates, for the first time at this level, how education increases social

cohesion.

In February 2005 the Commission issued a Communication on the second phase

of the Social Agenda to 2010 (European Commission. 2005). This reaffirms

social policy as an economically productive factor and conceptually binds them

together. It also notes that the Social Agenda should lead towards improving

human and social capital. Rather than “cohesion”, “solidarity” is the leading term

here, which in practical terms encompasses equal opportunities and inclusion.

The Communication also explicitly recognizes the ‘cost of the lack of social

policy’ (ibid. p. 2) and that intergenerational poverty which permanently

excludes from full participation in society, ‘…is socially and economically not

sustainable’ (ibid. p. 9).

The 2005 Commission Communication to the Spring European Council

(European Commission. 2005b) reiterates this position. Following the logic,

employment must come first in order to resource the social aspects. Yet it seems

almost contradictory to place growth and employment as the two priorities and

keep social cohesion as central to the strategy. The March 2005 Presidency

Conclusions of the European Council welcome the communication and reiterate

the role of employment as a vehicle for increased social cohesion (European

Council. 2005a. p. 9).

56
In July 2005 the Commission issued a communication on Cohesion Policy in

Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007 – 2013

(European Commission. 2005c). As the title suggests:

…the limited resources available to cohesion policy should be

concentrated on promoting sustainable growth, competitiveness and
employment as set out in the renewed Lisbon strategy. Clearly,
macroeconomic stability and structural reforms are a precondition for
the success of cohesion policy along with a range of other conditions
which favour investment (including effective implementation of the Single
Market, administrative reforms, good governance, a business-friendly
climate, and the availability of a highly skilled workforce.
(ibid. p. 4)

It sets out three priorities:

 Improving the attractiveness of Member States – by improving access,

services and preserving environmental potential;

 Encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship and the knowledge

economy – including an increase in research and innovation capacity;

and,

 Creating more and better jobs – through increasing investment in human

capital and adaptability of workers and enterprises.

(ibid. p. 12)

The November 2005 communication from the Commission on the Draft 2006

progress report on the implementation of the Education & Training 2010 work

programme (European Commission 2005d), as well as reiterating the jobs and

growth (and social cohesion) message, expands on how education and training

increases economic growth while increasing social cohesion. It states that the

progress of reforms made in the Lisbon agenda will be a major determinant of

the long-term sustainability of the European social model. Therefore, it observes

57
that, (with the exception of the increasing the numbers of mathematics, science

and technology graduates), there has been little progress against the benchmarks

most closely related to social cohesion (ibid. p. 10). It highlights equity and

governance of national education and training systems as a necessary condition

for Lisbon:

…due attention needs to be paid to the whole lifelong learning

continuum, and the efficiency, quality and equity objectives of the systems
must be given equal consideration. This is the sine qua non of achieving
the Lisbon goals while strengthening the European social model.
(ibid. p. 10)

According to the communication this, ‘…implies that the outcomes and benefits

of education and training should be independent of socio-economic background

and other factors that may lead to educational disadvantage’ (ibid. p. 11).

Therefore it should be accessible to all and differentiated according to learners’

specific needs. The communication then states that, ‘Investments should be

targeted on areas where the social and economic returns are highest, thereby

effectively combining efficiency and equity’ (ibid. p. 11). This is hugely

ambitious – it must be impossible to level the varying influences of socio-

economic background to ensure equity of education and training outcomes.

The communication also gives an insight into the progress of the Education &

Training 2010 work programme through the OMC process. For the first time peer

learning activities will be focussed on in lifelong learning and it marks a shift

from benchmarking.

58
2006

The 2006 Commission communication to the Spring European Council

(European Commission. 2006b) differs from previous versions. It is the first one

under the revamped Lisbon strategy – the “Lisbon Community programme”; it

consists of three volumes and it analyses the Member States’ national reform

programmes. Within this communication it concentrates on three areas: macro-

economic; micro-economic; and, employment. The emphasis is on economic and

competitiveness issues, where social aspects are mentioned, it is under the topic

of ageing population and the requirements for flexicurity and the European

Social Agenda. The role of education and training within this concerns research

and innovation – with a focus on higher education. These emphases are reiterated

by the March 2006 Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2006). The roots

of these emphases can be seen in the Hampton Court Agenda which was

launched in October 2005 and chose similar themes (work streams), to be main-

streamed in the Lisbon work programme (European Commission. 2005e).

The extremely ambitious nature of the aims of the Spring 2005 communication

from the Commission to the Council– to balance the varying influences of socio-

economic background to ensure equity of education and training outcomes –

appear to be recognised in 2006. The September 2006 communication, on the

efficiency and equity in European education and training systems (European

Commission. 2006c), calls on a coordinated approach with other policy areas

such as housing and social security. The document also notes that free access to

higher education alone is not sufficient to ensure equity, because earlier socio-

economic disadvantages can discourage participation. However, it does

59
demonstrate an emphasis (albeit a lesser one compared to employability) on

education and training to increase social cohesion.

2007

The Commission Communication to the 2007 Spring Council notes that the, ‘…

renewed Strategy for Growth and Jobs is beginning to deliver results’ (European

Commission. 2006d. p. 5). There is little on cohesion except to reference the

cohesion policy (European Commission. 2005c.). The March 2007 Presidency

Conclusions (European Commission. 2007.) are similar in emphasis; it is

competitiveness that has the focus, with social cohesion not addressed until

paragraphs 18 and 19. These concentrate on the European social model and

flexicurity.

Summary

From considering the policy literature covered in this section it is possible to

draw a small number of points these are expanded within the discussion that

follows in Section 4:

 The terms Social cohesion, social inclusion and social exclusion are used

ambiguously;

 Employment and employability are regarded as key for both increasing

social cohesion and competitiveness;

 Competitiveness and cohesion are seen as mutually reinforcing, but

economic growth is seen as a precondition and cohesion is seen as an

economically productive factor.

60
 Education and training – particularly lifelong learning – are seen as key to

improve employment rates as well as competitiveness and social cohesion

 The emphasis between competitiveness and social cohesion appears to

move towards competitiveness – however this is blurred by the emphasis

on employment, which is seen to serve both.

61
SECTION 3: alternative sources and perspectives on Lisbon

Emphasis within Lisbon below EU level

Having drawn some conclusions from the emphasis at European level this

section considers, more briefly, what may be happening below this level.

In 2002, Cedefop published a report on the national response to the

Commission’s memorandum on lifelong learning (Cedefop. 2002). It notes that

around half of the national responses (AT, BE(-Wallonia), DK, FI, FR, DE, EL,

IE, PT) agree with lifelong learning policies - equally favouring employability

and active citizenship. Interestingly, the majority of the remainder put greater

emphasis on active citizenship (BE (-French speaking), IS, IT, LU, NO, ES, SE).

The reports from The Netherlands and the United Kingdom appear to place a

stronger accent on employability issues, but this may be down to differences in

understanding of the relationship between active citizenship and employability.

There was also criticism that there wasn’t more explicit emphasis on social

cohesion and that there seemed to be too little social responsibility for provision

and access to, and outcomes of lifelong learning.

In 2005, the National Reform Programmes for Growth and Employment (NRPs)

were produced by the Member States5. The NRPs were produced to the

Commission integrated guidelines. These are economic in focus and do not

directly cover social cohesion6. However, some countries refer to the social
5
Available on the EU Growth and Jobs website. http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/key/nrp2005-
2008_en.htm
6
This is most likely because the social inclusion aspects of the Renewed Lisbon Agenda are
expected to be covered by the National Action Plans Against Poverty and Social Exclusion.
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/naps_en.htm . While these
dimension and the role of education. This can be used as an indication that

countries have varying priorities between social cohesion and competitiveness

and hence the priorities for education.

Lifelong learning features prominently as a means to increase levels of human

capital and therefore employment. This in turn should reform the labour market

and increase competitiveness (for example, PL, CZ, LV) (Poland. 2005. Czech

Republic. 2005. P30. Latvia. 2005.). Some countries describe employment as a

means to increase levels of inclusion (for example, CZ, LT, SK) (Slovak

Republic 2005). Spain describes increasing human capital levels not only to

increase competitiveness but to, ‘…achieve equality of opportunity…’ (Spain

2005. p. 73). Slovenia not only aims to increase levels of cohesion but regards

the role of cohesion policy as providing conditions for economic growth and

competitiveness (Slovenia. 2005).

While some countries emphasize competitiveness (for example, LT, LV, EE)

others appear to see competitiveness and cohesion almost in tension with each

other; and are trying to achieve economic reforms while maintaining social

protection and social cohesion (BE, PT) (Belgium. 2005. Portugal. 2005. Estonia.

2005.). Some countries are more positive. Germany sees knowledge and skills as

‘the backbone of Germany’s economic and social prosperity’ (Germany. 2005. p.

7). Austria aims to safeguard its prosperity, which will be done via education for

competitiveness (Austria. 2005.) .The Greek report sees that, ‘The effective

operation of the labour market - at individual and corporate level - is both the

are available via the Growth and Jobs website they are not as prominent as the NRPs.

63
outcome and a requirement for the success of all economic and social

development objectives’ (Greece. 2005. p. 37).

The specific messages from these reports should be considered tentatively – they

are only one source. However, they show that the Member States prioritise

competitiveness and cohesion differently and therefore have differing policy

emphases on competitiveness and cohesion. On one level this might be

surprising, all the Member States have signed up to the common aims of Lisbon,

all are subjected to the common drivers described earlier in this dissertation.

However, there are differences, perhaps the most obvious are their social models.

What does the data say?

The Structural Indicators provide possible evidence of the impact of policy

emphasis on social cohesion and competitiveness. However, their use in

comparisons over time is problematic. Enlargement means that the EU now

compared to the EU in 2000 is not the same and missing data is an issue. Also,

(drawing on the comments noted in Section 1) if the changes to be expected are

subtle, then it will be difficult to identify them amongst the “noise” caused by

other factors. However, they should capture the effect of the different European

social models. If we accept that the European social model(s) is central to the

Lisbon Agenda, then the indicators should reflect the priorities the different

models place on competitiveness and social cohesion.

The table below compares the EU27 using a selection of Structural Indicators,

some from the short-list of 14. Where the columns are shaded blue this indicates

64
that the lower the value the better the performance, conversely for those in green,

the higher the value the better the performance. Years have been chosen as a

compromise between latest data and reaching comparability between countries

and indicators, despite missing data. They are grouped into six models: Core;

Anglo; Nordic; Baltic; Mediterranean; and, Central. There are some countries

that do not appear to fit in any, and the Central and Mediterranean countries

exhibit more range than the others. Some are difficult to assign to just one group,

for example, the Netherlands shares characteristics with the Nordic Countries

(such as a low poverty rate) it has also followed some Anglo-Saxon ideas.

Similarly, Slovenia shares some characteristics of the Core European countries.

While these groups are orientated geographically, their groupings are based on

their social, economic and cultural characteristics. The indicators below show the

range and common characteristics between the groups. The Baltics, for example,

are characterised by a relatively high level of early school leavers, but also by

low long-term unemployment.

65
Selected structural indicators on competitiveness and cohesion grouped by social model
Inequality At risk-of- Long- Jobless Early Employm Youth Lifelong Science Real GDP Labour
of income poverty term household school ent rate – education Learnin and growth product
distributio rate after unemploy s – total4 leavers total6 attainment g– technolog rate10 ivity per
n1 social ment rate – total5 level – total7 total8 y hour
transfers – total3 graduates worked1
– total2 – total9 2

Code sc010 sc022 sc061 sc072 sc051 em011 ir091 em051 ir041 eb012 eb022
Year 2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2005 2006 2004
EU27 16 3.6 15.3 64.4 77.8 9.6 13.2 3
EU25 4.9 3.6 9.8 15.1 64.7 77.7 10.1 13.4 3 91.6

Core
Be 4.1 15 4.2 14.3 12.6 61 82.4 7.5 10.9 3.2 130
De 4.1 13 4.7 10.6 13.8 67.5 71.6 7.5 9.7 2.8 110.7
Fr 4 13 4 10.9 13.1 63 82.1 7.5 22.5 2 116.5
At 3.8 12 1.3 8.8 9.6 70.2 85.8 13.1 9.8 3.3 99.5
Lu 3.8 13 1.4 6.7 17.4 63.6 69.3 8.2 6.2 156
Nl 4 11 1.7 7.4 12.9 74.3 74.7 15.6 8.6 2.9 119.8
Mean 4.0 12.8 2.9 9.8 13.2 66.6 77.7 9.9 12.3 3.4 122.1

Anglo
Ie 5 20 1.4 7.9 12.3 68.6 85.4 7.5 24.5 6 119.3
Uk 5.5 18 1.2 10.7 13 71.5 78.8 26.6 18.4 2.8 92.2
Mean 5.3 19.0 1.3 9.3 12.7 70.1 82.1 17.1 21.5 4.4 105.8

Nordic
Dk 3.5 12 0.8 7.7 10.9 77.4 77.4 29.2 14.7 3.5 101.8
Fi 3.6 12 1.9 10.5 8.3 69.3 84.7 23.1 17.7 5.5 96.3
Se 3.3 9 1.1 12 73.1 86.5 : 14.4 4.2 102.7
Mean 3.5 11.0 1.3 9.1 10.4 73.3 82.9 26.2 15.6 4.4 100.3

Baltic
Lv 6.7 19 2.5 6.8 19 66.3 81 6.9 9.8 11.9 35.7
Lt 6.9 21 2.5 7 10.3 63.6 88.2 4.9 18.9 7.5 44.1
Ee 5.9 18 2.8 6 13.2 68.1 82 6.5 12.1 11.4 41.4
Mean 6.5 19.3 2.6 6.6 14.2 66.0 83.7 6.1 13.6 10.3 40.4

Mediterr
anean
Es 5.4 20 1.8 6.3 29.9 64.8 61.6 10.4 11.8 3.9 89.2
Pt 8.2 20 3.8 5.8 39.2 67.9 49.6 3.8 12 1.3 56.7
Gr 5.8 20 4.8 8.1 15.9 61 81 1.9 10.1 4.3 72.2
It 5.7 19 3.4 9.2 20.8 58.4 75.5 6.1 11.6 1.9 91.6
Mean 6.3 19.8 3.5 7.4 26.5 63.0 66.9 5.6 11.4 2.9 77.4

Mt 4.1 15 2.9 6.7 41.7 54.8 50.4 5.5 3.4 3.3 73.5
Cy 4.3 16 0.9 4.9 16 69.6 83.7 7.1 3.6 3.8 67.8

Central
Hu 4 13 3.4 11.6 12.4 57.3 82.9 3.8 5.1 3.9 54.1
Pl 6.6 21 7.8 13.5 5.6 54.5 91.7 4.7 11.1 6.1 46
Cz 3.7 10 3.9 7.3 5.5 65.3 91.8 5.6 8.2 6.1 52.2
Sk 3.9 13 10.2 9.6 6.4 59.4 91.5 4.3 10.2 8.3 56.3
Si 3.4 12 2.9 7.2 5.2 66.6 89.4 15 9.8 5.2 68.3
Mean 4.3 13.8 5.6 9.8 7.0 60.6 89.5 6.7 8.9 5.9 55.4

Bg : 5 11.6 18 58.6 80.5 1.3 8.6 6.1 29.9

Ro 4.9 18 4.2 9.7 19 58.8 77.2 1.3 10.3 7.7
Source: Eurostat Structural Indicators. 2007.
Notes:
Please refer to Eurostat for full details of the data above including caveats and on missing values.

67
1
Income quintile share ratio. Ratio of the total income of the highest earning 20% compared to the lowest earning 20%. The higher the ratio the greater the
inequality in income distribution.
2
The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised
disposable income (after social transfers).
3
Long-term unemployed (12 months and more) as a percentage of the total active population.
4
Share of persons aged 18 - 59 who are living in households where no-one works.
5
Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training.
6
The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total population of the same age group.
7
The number of young people aged 20-24 years having attained at least upper secondary education attainment level, i.e. with an education level ISCED 3a, 3b or
3c long minimum as a percentage of the total population of the same age group.
8
Persons aged 25 to 64 who stated that they received education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey as a percentage of the total population of the
same age group.
9
Tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1 000 of population aged 20-29 years.
10
Growth rate of GDP volume - percentage change on previous year.
11
GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) per hour worked relative to EU-15 (EU15 = 100)
12
Eurostat Structural Indicator code

68
The following tables compare the means between models, using independent

samples T-tests, for eight of the variables listed in the table above. The values

within the shaded cells are the P values. Those cells that are shaded a light grey

have p values which show that the means of the two groups compared are not

significantly different at 95% confidence. The cells shaded light yellow indicate

that the two groups compared have means that are significantly different at 95%

confidence.

Difference of means between social models for Labour productivity per hour
worked (GDP per hour in PPS)
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 114.40 105.75 100.27 40.40 77.43 52.15
Core 114.40
Anglo 105.75 0.69
Nordic 100.27 0.408 0.635
Baltic 40.40 0.002 0.009 0.000
Mediterranean 77.43 0.036 0.128 0.067 0.013
Central 52.15 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.17 0.024

Difference of means between social models for Real GDP growth rate
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 3.66 4.40 4.40 10.27 2.85 6.10
Core 3.66
Anglo 4.40 0.585
Nordic 4.40 0.459 1.000
Baltic 10.27 0.001 0.072 0.018
Mediterranean 2.85 0.407 0.353 0.183 0.004
Central 6.10 0.037 0.365 0.206 0.046 0.031

Difference of means between social models for Employment rate

Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 66.60 70.05 73.27 66.00 63.03 59.13
Core 66.60
Anglo 70.05 0.352
Nordic 73.27 0.062 0.390
Baltic 66.00 0.839 0.137 0.053
Mediterranean 63.03 0.233 0.097 0.023 0.321
Central 59.13 0.029 0.037 0.008 0.065 0.255

Difference of means between social models for long-term Unemployment

rate
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 2.9 1.3 1.3 2.6 3.5 5.6
Core 2.9
Anglo 1.3 0.181
Nordic 1.3 0.103 0.943
Baltic 2.6 0.748 0.003 0.018
Mediterranean 3.5 0.530 0.084 0.039 0.304
Central 5.6 0.035 0.108 0.048 0.110 0.149

Difference of means between social models for inequality of income

distribution
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 3.89 5.25 3.47 6.40 6.28 4.55
Core 3.89
Anglo 5.25 0.000
Nordic 3.47 0.029 0.004
Baltic 6.50 0.000 0.064 0.001
Mediterranean 6.28 0.001 0.356 0.015 0.792
Central 4.55 0.227 0.538 0.241 0.071 0.117

Difference of means between social models for Risk-of-poverty rate after

social transfers
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 12.71 19.00 11.00 19.33 19.75 14.25
Core 12.71
Anglo 19.00 0.000
Nordic 11.00 0.111 0.013
Baltic 19.33 0.000 0.822 0.003
Mediterranean 19.75 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.623
Central 14.25 0.422 0.256 0.315 0.139 0.060

Difference of means between social models for Lifelong Learning rates

Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 10.63 17.05 26.15 6.10 5.55 4.60
Core 10.63
Anglo 17.05 0.236
Nordic 26.15 0.002 0.460
Baltic 6.10 0.082 0.224 0.004
Mediterranean 5.55 0.058 0.150 0.003 0.815
Central 4.60 0.013 0.101 0.000 0.079 0.630

Difference of means between social models for early school leaving rates
Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central
Means 12.09 12.65 10.40 14.17 26.45 7.48
Core 12.09
Anglo 12.65 0.847
Nordic 10.40 0.496 0.216
Baltic 14.17 0.469 0.678 0.247
Mediterranean 26.45 0.008 0.148 0.048 0.115
Central 7.48 0.074 0.106 0.234 0.069 0.013

Rather than use prose, the best way to summarise the significant characteristics

of each group is in another table:

70
Relative characteristics of the six identified European social models
Core
 Low inequality of income distribution
 Relatively low real GDP growth rate
 High productivity per hour worked
 Low risk of poverty after social transfers
Anglo
 High risk of poverty after social transfers
 Relatively high productivity per hour worked
 High inequality of income distribution
Nordic
 Low inequality of income distribution
 Low risk of poverty after social transfers
 High employment rate
 Low long-term unemployment
 High lifelong learning rate
Source: table above.
Baltic
 High inequality of income distribution
 High real GDP growth rate
 Low productivity per hour worked
 High long term unemployment
Mediterranean
 High risk of poverty after social transfers
 High inequality of income distribution
 High number of early school leavers
Central
 High long term unemployment
 Relatively low rate of early school leavers
 Low employment rate
 High real GDP growth rate
 Low productivity per hour worked
 Low lifelong learning rate

The table above brings out some interesting points particularly, about the Baltic

and Central groups both of which have low productivity per employee but have

high growth rates.

The four charts below show the distribution of both Member States and these

typologies by the eight variables. These illustrate the relative characteristics, as

well as similarities and differences listed in the tables above. The Baltic countries

are closely clustered – often more so than the Nordics; who tend to score most

favourably (though they are not as productive as the Core countries). The Central

countries have a wide distribution; this might indicate that they form more than

one social model. It is notable that the distribution showing rates of poverty after

transfers (third chart) shows the six models are equally divided between low and

high rates, rather than intermediate. It also illustrates a positive correlation

between high risk of poverty and high income inequality. Data is from the table

above.

71
72
 Comparison between indicators for productivity and economic growth

LV
11.5 EE

Baltic

9.5
Real GDP growth rate

SK

7.5 LT

PL CZ LU
Central IE
5.5 FI
SI

EL Nordic Anglo
HU CY ES SE
3.5 DK Core
MT AT BE
Mediterranean UK DE NL

IT FR
1.5
30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170
GDP per hour in PPS
74
 Comparison between indicators for employment and long-term unemployment

10.5
SK

9.5

8.5

PL
7.5
Longterm unemployment rate

6.5

5.5 Central

BG
EL DE
4.5
RO BE
FR CZ PT
3.5 HU IT Mediterranean
SI
MT Core EE
2.5 LT Baltic
LV
ES FI
Anglo NL
1.5 LU IE SE
AT UK
CY Nordic DK
0.5
54 59 64 69 74
Employment rate

75
 Comparison between indicators for poverty and income inequality

PL LT
20.5
IE ES EL PT
Mediterranean
Anglo IT LV
Baltic
18.5
RO UK EE
Risk rate of poverty after social transfers

16.5
CY

BE MT
14.5
Central
AT HU
LU DE
12.5 DK SKFR
Core
SI FI

Nordic NL
10.5
CZ

SE
8.5
3 4 5 6 7 8
Income inequality

76
 Comparison between indicators for lifelong learning and early school leaving

MT
39.5 PT

34.5

29.5 ES
Early school leavers rate

Mediterranean
24.5

IT
19.5 RO LV
BG
LU
EL CY
14.5 Baltic Anglo
SE DE Core
EE FR NL UK
HU IE BE
DK
LT
9.5 AT
Nordic
FI
Central SI
SK
PL CZ
4.5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Lifelong learning rate

77
Conclusions from the Structural Indicators

The qualitative and quantitative information reviewed in this section considers

some of the evidence for the emphasis on social cohesion and competitiveness

below EU level. This shows that there are contrasts with the emphasis at

European level, it also shows that there are significant differences between

similar groups of Member States. This may illustrate variations in the European

social model followed by these groups.

Individual perspectives on Lisbon

I have collected a third source of information (in addition to the policy literature

and the structural indicators) by approaching policy makers or researchers who

have been either directly or indirectly involved in the Lisbon Agenda since 2000.

Three people, from the European Training Foundation (A), Cedefop (B) and

from the UK’s Joint International Unit7 (C) were asked from their personal

perspective:

Has the policy emphasis (mainly at European level) been equally placed,
from the beginning, on achieving greater levels of competitiveness and
social cohesion, or has one been favoured over the other? Has this
emphasis changed since 2000 and if so, when and why?

This was done through a combination of email and semi-structured interviews.

While these are personal, rather than official views, their perspectives provide a

third source of information. These three sources then allow for some

triangulation of information between them.

7
Until recent government reforms, in June 2007, the Joint International Unit reported to the
Department for Education and Skills and to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), it
now reports to DWP, the Department for Innovation Universities and Skills and the Department
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.
Respondent A:

Their view was that the emphasis has been economic since the start and that this

was increased after the Mid-term review. The emphasis on equity in the

distribution of educational outcomes has been triggered by the international

surveys of education such as PISA. Putting aside declarations on priorities within

the policy literature, their view was that the best means of identifying priorities is

through tracking where the money is spent, in particular the European Structural

Funds.

Respondent B:

From involvement in drafting the memorandum on lifelong learning, and its

accompanying Commission communication, they stated that, ‘it was an explicit

aim to balance competitiveness and social cohesion’ (Email. 07 August 2007).

They believe that this equal emphasis has had an impact in the “Objectives

process” from 2001 and the Copenhagen process. He notes that convergence into

the Education and Training 2010 programme, ‘…hasn’t really changed this

emphasis very much, you will see that there’s quite a lot of continuity in terms of

issues and objective’ (ibid). They confirm that since the mid-term review, there is

a stronger emphasis on competitiveness and growth. However, they note that:

..the direct impact on the internal Education and training 2010 agenda is
limited…In budgetary terms education and training has been
strengthened (LLL [Lifelong learning] Programme). This is probably the
most important indicator signalling that a balanced education and
training policy has not been sacrificed…

79
Respondent C:

They noted first that the Lisbon Agenda marks a huge change in the direction of

EU policy from structural issues towards policies that directly target, and appear

to recognise the value (both economically and socially) of EU citizens.

They confirmed that different countries have differing views on the relationship

between competitiveness and social cohesion. The UK takes an economic view

of social cohesion, ‘competitiveness equals cohesion’ (Interview. 14 August

2007). They contrasted this with some of the Core and Southern European

countries who see the two as being in tension. They confirmed that the UK and

Nordic countries had a big influence in the change in emphasis in the renewed

Lisbon Agenda.

Another aspect they raised related to coordination both at national level and at

European level. They noted that because Lisbon is so broad it often spans more

than one government department - usually the ministry for education and the

ministry for labour. In a few countries coordination between the two may not

only be poor but subject to active competition and rivalry between them. These

differences also extend to the European level. The Employment and the

Economic and Financial Affairs Committees have been dominated by the Anglo

and Nordic countries – who have an applied view of education and training. This

is in contrast to the Education Committee, who they described as being

dominated by Core and Mediterranean countries. They take a more traditional

view of the purpose of education (academic rather than economic). They

explained that this is the reason why the emphasis within the Education and

80
Training Programme has not changed to the jobs and growth mantra (as observed

by Respondent B).

They explained that a growing awareness of globalisation has led to an increased

emphasis on citizenship, though this has also been emphasised by concern about

levels of racism within the EU10.When asked about equity and efficiency within

education and training systems, they explained it as a matter of semantics:

‘equity and efficiency equals cohesion and competitiveness’ (ibid).

81
SECTION 4:

Limitations of the study

While the methodology and approach to answering the title of this dissertation

has been carefully considered it is inevitably confronted by the same challenges

that many studies in Comparative Education research face. The main difficulties

in tackling this project concern the size of the Lisbon Agenda. It is difficult to

balance breadth against depth and in many aspects of the study, such lifelong

learning, detail has been limited to maintain breadth. Each aspect of this topic is

broad: from the range of overlapping terms and concepts; to the number of

programmes, policies and groups, reports and indicators; and the number of

countries involved. One topic that deserves further attention is the European

Social Agenda and the different social models across the Member States. There is

not as much detail on education and training as could be provided in a longer

study– there is so much context.

While an effort to achieve some triangulation on the topic has been made, the

scope of the literature covered within Section 2 has necessitated a much more

limited use of both the available statistical information and other qualitative

sources. Sources such as the World Values Survey – which provides information

on aspects of social cohesion such as tolerance have been left out. In a larger

studies these would be used and the next logical step is to properly extent this

study to Member State level.

In addition to size, time is another factor. The period over which Lisbon has run

is a relatively short period over which to observe change. It is perhaps towards

the limit in which the policy-making-implementation-impact cycle can be

observed. Yet this cycle also appears to have been worked at a high rate and there

is much information through which to sort. For example, there are already three

cycles of PISA, though the wait for the results from PISA 2006 illustrates the

time lag between data collection and dissemination of analysis and results.

Discussion/Analysis

This subsection takes and builds on the conclusions drawn from Section 2 by

enriching from Sections 1 and 3.

Ambiguous terminology and blurred concepts

There is not a clear EU definition or concept of social cohesion demonstrated in

the literature. The terms “inclusion”, “cohesion” and “exclusion” are

conceptually blurred and appear to be used, at times, almost inter-changeably.

Most of the detail on the social aspects tends to concern inclusion rather than

cohesion. There is an assumption that greater social inclusion will lead to greater

social cohesion, though how this happens is not explained until later on in the

process – even then it is not clearly articulated. It is not until later on in the

process that more complex aspects of social cohesion, notably tolerance are

addressed. As has been discussed, in the first section, tolerance is a difficult

characteristic to qualify or quantify, since strong levels of tolerance at

community level can have negative or positive effects on social cohesion at

societal and national levels.

83
This blurring extends to the policymaking and coordination itself. In terms of

reporting, at EU level there has been a competitiveness report yet there is no

clear group on competitiveness within the structural indicators. Conversely, there

is a clear group of structural indicators on social cohesion and there are now

strategic guidelines on cohesion policy (2007 - 2013). Yet at national level there

are national inclusion and social protection strategies rather than cohesion

strategies.

The causal relations between social cohesion and competitiveness

As the policy literature progresses, the causal relationship from competitiveness

to social cohesion is developed. At its most basic, competitiveness is required in

order to generate the economic growth and therefore prosperity. This prosperity

is required in order to finance the social protection systems, these in turn help to

protect people from poverty (through redistribution of wealth) and therefore help

increase inclusion. However, it is the causal relationship from social cohesion to

competitiveness that is more interesting and which takes more time (until the

Kok report in 2004) to be developed through the literature. Greater levels of

social cohesion help to reduce levels of poverty and therefore reduce costs to

social protection systems, they also help to increase labour supply. The Kok

report appears to be the first major policy document to move from stating social

policy as a productive factor to describing social cohesion as actively

contributing to economic growth (rather than through just reducing the costs to

the state).

84
Importance of employment

A constant theme throughout the literature is that the most effective means of

inclusion is through employment. Therefore the primary role of education is to

increase peoples’ employability since getting a job:

 increases social inclusion (and therefore, somehow, social cohesion);

 improves the sustainability of social protection systems (and therefore the

European social model); and,

 increases competitiveness.

The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at EU level

At the beginning of the Lisbon Agenda, at EU level, there appears to be equal

emphasis between competitiveness and the social aspects of the Lisbon Agenda.

By 2003 this emphasis has started to shift towards the economic and

competitiveness side and is confirmed after the Kok report. This direction is

much closer to the Nordic and Anglo social models than to the Core and

Mediterranean ones. However, social cohesion and competitiveness are closely

linked and the distinction between them is not as clear as might be expected.

Within the policy literature this is mainly because employment is the principle

means to increase levels of both competitiveness and cohesion. There are also

two other considerations.

The first is that social policy has been, from the start, seen as a productive factor

- economically as well as socially. Indeed, the social policy side has been clearly

driven by the economic pressures on Member States, via ageing population and

globalisation. From this perspective, reforming social protection systems (as

85
outlined in the European Social Agenda) is an economic imperative. Secondly,

macro-economic stability, structural reforms and increased levels employment –

the foundations of competitiveness - are stated as a necessary condition for

modernising the European social model and hence increasing social cohesion. It

is also likely that there has been increased prominence of the economic side

because Lisbon was launched just as there was a global slowdown in economic

growth.

The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at Member State level

The review of a small amount of the policy literature at national level indicates

that Member States prioritise competitiveness and cohesion differently, within

the related policy making and implementation for Lisbon. Because they are all

subject to common drivers this suggests that one of the principle reasons must be

differences in social models. This is evidenced quantitatively by the statistically

significant differences, between the six social models. It is also indicated

qualitatively by the personal perspectives covered earlier.

Broadly, the Nordic and Anglo models view education (and training) as an

economic issue and see competitiveness and cohesion as mutually supportive.

This contrasts with a Mediterranean (and to an extent) a Core model view that

the two are in tension and social protection must support those who do not have a

job (rather than to get them into employment). The Central and Baltic models

require more consideration and evidence.

86
The influence of the Open Method of Coordination.

The OMC relies on metrics to compare, benchmark and therefore exert peer

pressure for change. This works better for factors relating to competitiveness,

which more naturally lend themselves to measurement. Economic indicators

have been available sooner than the social ones. This is because some aspects of

social cohesion are more difficult to measure in a comparable way across

Member States (such as equitable distribution of educational outcomes), while

others (such as tolerance) are hard to even quantify. Delays in the earlier stages

of the OMC may have slowed the start of the peer learning stage.

The role of education and training in increasing competitiveness and social

cohesion

Achieving the Lisbon goal is clearly impossible without the role of education and

training; which supports both the economic and social elements. For the social

side, the list of risk factors for poverty and social exclusion (listed in the previous

section) demonstrate the potential contribution of education and training in

reducing exclusion. This may be directly, such as early school leaving, or from

the indirect or wider benefits from learning such as improved health or increased

human and social capital. While it appears to be over-shadowed, there is some

emphasis on education to promote values as well as skills. One of the main

aspects of the education and training programme has been lifelong learning; with

an ageing population, this is the only way to re-skill an ageing labour market

pool. Though the commission suggests that lifelong learning can support social

objectives, beyond the inclusion achieved with increased employability.

87
With the re-launch of the Lisbon Agenda there is an increased emphasis on the

role of higher education, not only in producing skilled workers but as centres for

research and innovation and therefore competitiveness. This is notable because

much of the reform of HE lies within the domain of the Bologna process, which

predates 2000 and is outside the Education & Training 2010 programme.

A third strand of education highlighted for competitiveness relates to

qualifications, firstly making qualifications recognised across Europe and

secondly, recognising informal and non-formal learning. This is important for an

ageing population and helps to promote inclusion.

How education promotes social cohesion more directly is explained. This

happens through promoting understanding and tolerance – citizenship. The

emphasis on this is limited, perhaps because this is most likely to happen only in

initial education and training and because growth and jobs are confirmed as the

two priorities.

At the start of the process, and later on, the issue of equity within and efficiency

of education systems is raised. It is recognised that equity of educational

outcomes themselves influence levels of social cohesion. This is something that

is highlighted by Andy Green et al. and is one of the reasons why a Nordic

model, with comprehensive education, is more cohesive than an Anglo model

whose education provision is highly selective. While this issue is discussed later

on in the process it appears to be slow to ‘take off’; it is not until 2005 that its

importance is highlighted and interest in it may lie more on the efficiency side.

88
Conclusion:

The policy emphasis and relationship between social cohesion and

competitiveness can be framed through the European Social Agenda and the

European social models. The policy emphasis within the Lisbon Agenda at EU

level has changed since 2000; it has also blurred. It starts through the conceptual

blurring between cohesion and inclusion. Since inclusion is regarded as leading

to cohesion, employment is seen as critical. Greater employment leads to greater

inclusion, it also leads to greater productivity and therefore competitiveness. It is

through this dual role that employment plays within Lisbon that emphasis

between the two becomes blurred. There is not a clear distinction on increasing

employment rates for increased cohesion or increased competitiveness. From the

mid-term review onwards there has been a clear change, at least in terms of

presentation, of policy emphasis towards competitiveness and employment. This

is driven by the realisation that while social protection is seen as a productive

factor, Member States have to be “profitable” (ie competitive) enough to be able

to afford to provide social protection in the first place.

The limited considerations in this dissertation at Member State level indicate that

the pattern at EU level is not necessarily replicated. While the Nordic and Anglo

countries may have pushed for the growth and jobs direction the reality in the

Core and Mediterranean countries is significantly different. It is difficult to tell

the significant policy differences in the Central and Baltic models and while they

have higher unemployment and lower productivity their considerable growth

rates suggest that they are catching up. The Central model countries already have

a low average on early school leaving.

89
The future for the Lisbon Agenda?

The Lisbon Agenda will not meet its original goal by 2010 - but it does not mean

that it has failed. The Agenda marks a fundamental change in the orientation of

policy making at EU towards its citizens. Yet for what is hailed as such a vital

goal, if we take the advice two of the expert individuals to follow the funding,

then this does not compare favourably with the 33.75% of the 2007 EU budget to

be spent on agriculture and direct aids (European Commission. 2006). The

overall budget for 2007 – 2014 has already been agreed – but on the condition

that the entire EU budget spending (including the Common Agricultural Policy)

is reviewed for 2014 onwards. There have also been calls, that with enlargement

the EU15 should no longer be in receipt of ESF money but that it should be spent

on increasing the competitiveness and cohesion of the newer EU Member States.

If this happens then perhaps this is a more realistic indication of the success of

the Lisbon Agenda. Once this happens, the original goal may be within closer

reach.

90
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