Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

The Synergy between Neoliberalism and

Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”

Marcie J. Patton

ince the 1980s and early 1990s neoliberalism has replaced Keynesianism and the belief
in a socially regulated form of capitalism. The global diffusion of neoliberalism by the
major developed capitalist countries and through the international agencies they influ-
ence is credited to the Washington Consensus, which projected this new orthodoxy onto Ford-
ist welfare states and deeply entrenched import-substitution industrialization (ISI) regimes
via economic reform measures that include trade and financial liberalization, privatization,
and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision. By the dawn of the new
century neoliberalism had become hegemonic as a mode of discourse.
The triumph of neoliberalism, however, has been overstated, for in terms of practical
application it has been subject to political contestation and setbacks. Although there is con-
sensus on the basic tenets of neoliberalism, specific neoliberal policy reform programs are not
“initiated and rationalized through a relatively coherent theoretical and ideological frame-
work” but, rather, display “messy actualities.”1 Politicians from both right- and left-leaning
parties have led initiatives to embed neoliberalism in different ways, all the while articulating
a matching discourse of the virtues of market rationality.
Wrestling with the thorny problem of widening inequalities in the distribution of wealth
and income that two decades of macroeconomic populist policies have fueled, yet without
o f 
d ies abandoning a commitment to market-based solutions to economic growth, Turkish prime
e St u minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has provided the political entrepreneurship for marrying neo-
ra ti v d 
pa an
ca liberalism with communitarian ideas. His Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) government has
Co
m fri
  ,A
  A si a assigned priority to projects that focus on enhancing economic efficiency and international
 
  u th st  competitiveness coupled with a social policy agenda directed at making citizens less reliant on
  So Ea
le
M idd the state for welfare protection and more employable.
th e 9
My article explores how the neoliberal project is being embedded in Turkey through the
 
00 0
. 3, 2 9 - 03 adoption of “neoliberal communitarian policies,” or Erdoğan’s Third Way. My objective is to
, No -2 00
29 0 1x s 
ol. 92 res explain Erdoğan’s “way” of deepening the neoliberal project and the important social justice
   V 1 0 8 i t yP
  15 / rs implications that come with it. First, I define communitarianism in a neoliberal setting.2 Sec-
 
  .12 i ve
  o i 10 e Un
k
    d yD
u I thank Ümit Cizre and two anonymous readers for their com- so citizens will be more willing to accept social responsibility. Al-
    0 9b ments and criticisms. though the AKP is well known for relying on both formal and in-
20
 © formal community networks for social welfare provision, I have
  1.  Wendy Larner, “Neo-liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmen-
not focused on this neocommunitarian dimension of the Third
tality,” Studies in Political Economy 63 (2000): 7, 14.
Way, which promotes engaging community organizations and
2.  It should be noted that the parameters within which commu- empowering marginal communities. Rather than focus on artic-
nitarianism is used in this article are defined quite narrowly. My ulating the distributional networks that link the AKP to commu-
argument is derived from the new communitarianism and Third nities, in this article I attempt to show how economy and culture

438 Way literatures whose interpretation of neoliberal communitar-

ianism emphasizes the need to promote individual well-being
intersect in the process of embedding neoliberalism.

Published by Duke University Press

 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
ond, I trace separately the roots of Erdoğan’s
communitarian and neoliberal approach and
explain why Erdoğan’s policies represent a new
threshold in embedding neoliberalism in Tur-
key. 3 Third, I examine the substance of this
vision by analyzing neoliberal communitarian
features of the Erdoğan government’s social
policy. And, fourth, I question the credibility of
the AKP’s claims for social justice and suggest
some challenges to the viability of Erdoğan’s
Third Way of politics.
The Synthesis of Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism
Neoliberalism and communitarianism at first
glance appear to be unlikely partners because
liberals and communitarians make competing
claims. Liberals consider individuals to be ratio-
nal and capable of making self-benefiting deci-
sions. By contrast, communitarians regard indi-
viduals as socially constructed beings embedded
in community. The liberal tradition on the one
hand values individual freedom, personal au-
tonomy, and individual self-fulfillment.4 Com-
munitarians on the other hand are concerned
with the relationship between the self and com-
munity. 5 A core communitarian belief is that
the individual is part of a community and can
maximize self-fulfillment through membership
in a community. 6 Acceptance of responsibil-
ity and moral obligation to community are key
values in a communitarian worldview. Whereas
liberals focus on individual self-determination
and self-interest, communitarians are more con-
cerned with character development and argue
3.  What I mean by new threshold is that whereas in
the early phase of neoliberalism individuals were told
to sink or swim in the global market, the project of
deepening neoliberalism involves swimming lessons
to enable individuals to take their place in markets.
This clever metaphor comes from David Craig and
Doug Porter, Development beyond Neoliberalism?
Governance, Poverty Reduction, and Political Economy
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 91.
4.  For a useful survey of liberalism, including its con-
tinuities and discontinuities over time, see Stephen
Holmes, “The Liberal Idea,” in Passions and Constraint:
On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1995), 13–41.
5.  Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Jus-
tice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
6.  Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sci-
ences, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985).
Published by Duke University Press
that individuals are not self-sufficient outside of 439
society.7
Many have sought to bridge the gap between
liberalism and communitarianism, among them
contemporary communitarians, who, while not
opposed to individualism, argue that individual
rights should be balanced with social respon-
sibilities. 8 In their view individuals are part of
Marcie J. Patton 
The Synergy between Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”
something larger than the self and thus have a
responsibility to contribute to the common good
and to act in socially responsible ways.9 As con-
temporary communitarian theorist Robert Bel-
lah states, they believe that “individuals are real-
ized only in and through communities, and that
strong, healthy, morally rigorous communities
are the prerequisite for strong, healthy, morally
vigorous individuals.”10
In the 1990s European and American
proponents of a third way borrowed heavily
from this new communitarian perspective extol-
ling the virtues of personal responsibility and
the obligations of citizens. New Labour guru
Anthony Giddens hailed the Third Way as a
renewal of European social democracy; others
referred to it mockingly as rebranded social de-
mocracy.11 Critics said that the Third Way was
a potent recipe for gaining power and that its
pragmatism reeked of expediency.12 A frequent
complaint about the Third Way was that it was
too loose, too vague, and too elastic. Defenders
retorted that it was a work in progress.
These debates overlook the genesis of this
ideological shift. The search for a third way was
a response to the neoliberal transformation of
capitalism that began in the 1980s, and third
7.  Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral 11.  Anthony Giddens, The Third Way and Its Critics
Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The
Dame Press, 1984). “Third Way,” or neoliberalism with a human touch,
was popularized in the 1990s by Giddens, the British
8.  Amitai Etzioni formed the Communitarian Net-
sociologist credited with influencing former British
work, which publishes the journal Responsive Com-
prime minister Tony Blair.
munity, and is the best-known advocate of the new
communitarianism. 12.  Moreover, although Third Wayism was publicized
by social democratic politicians as opposed to the
9.  See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, “The Responsive Commu-
harshness of neoliberalism, in terms of policy mak-
nity: A Communitarian Perspective,” American Soci-
ing, it was nonetheless in harmony with the antiwel-
ological Review 61 (1996): 1–11; and Etzioni, “Positive
fare, antistatism of the Right. See James Petras, “The
Aspects of Community and Dangers of Fragmenta-
Third Way: Myth and Reality,” Monthly Review 51, no.
tion,” Development and Change 27 (2008): 301–14.
10 (2000): 19–35.
Other communitarian scholars who fit this mold
are Robert Bellah, William A. Galston, and Jean Beth
Elshtain
10.  Robert Bellah, “A Defense of ‘Democratic Com­
munitarianism,’” Responsive Community 6 (1995–
96), www.gwu.edu/~icps/bellah.html // acs-EE2001
(accessed December 1 2008).
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
440 way seekers have been strong backers of neo-
liberal market-led reforms. Not mincing words,
Hans-Jürgen Bieling states, “Specifically the
conception of a ‘new third way’ aims at synthe-
sizing the neoliberal view and communitarian
ideas.”13 The Third Way takes new communitar-
ian values and gives them a neoliberal content.
e  These values (solidarity, responsibility, commu-
ra ti v
m pa nity, and inclusion) are fused with neoliberal
Co
f  economic policy needs to ameliorate the most
ie so
tu d
harmful effects of neoliberal restructuring and
S , 
A si a to push beyond the initial dismantling phase to
u th  
So t he the consolidation phase of neoliberalism.14 The
a nd policy content of a neoliberal communitarian
frica
A st Third Way approach gives emphasis to accept-
Ea
d le ing fiscal and market discipline, providing equal
d
Mi
opportunities to participate in the market, and
supporting conditionality in welfare by replac-
ing entitlement with obligation.15
The AKP’s 2002 program offers a good il-
lustration of a discourse consonant with a neo-
liberal communitarian perspective (responsible
individualism, self-help, market-based inclusion,
and the ethics of community combined with the
dynamics of the free market) and is an informa-
tive source for evidence of the party’s ambition
to reembed the market-based neoliberal project
in society. For example, the document under-
scores the party’s intention to take on the na-
tion’s “serious problems” of economic develop-
ment, skewed income distribution, and poverty,
which are characterized as “chronic problems”
rather than attributed to the consequences of
neoliberal restructuring.16
The text acknowledges that globalization is
increasingly important and admits that it incurs
costs. However, the recommended social and
economic policy remedies are aimed at mak-
ing the neoliberal transformation sustainable.
Globalization is treated as an economic chal-
lenge that requires improvements in efficiency
and competitiveness. This is to be accomplished
by adopting economic policies that “increase
13.  Hans-Jürgen Bieling, “Neoliberalism and Commu- www.dystopiaofindividualism.co.uk/sandy_brian_
nitarianism: Social Conditions, Discourses, and Poli- hager_the_lisbon_agenda_neoliberal_communitarian
tics,” in Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique, ed. _citizenship.html.
Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela Neun-
15.  Of course, within this general framework, policy
höffer (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006), 146.
differences exist among countries.
14.  Sandy Brian Hager, “The Lisbon Agenda and ‘Neo­
16.  AKP, Party Program, 2002, sec. 1, www.akparti.org
liberal Communitarian’ Citizenship,” March 2007,
.tr/program.asp?dizin=0&hangisi=0.
Published by Duke University Press
our nation’s competitive strength” internation-
ally by turning people into assets; for “societies
which do not make use of their social capital in
the most effective manner are doomed to lose
their chances of competition.”17 The party pro-
gram supports the “structural transformations
brought about by globalization” and does not
propose to eliminate inequality. Instead its ambi-
tion is to “increase the welfare and happiness of
our people” through improved employability.18
The AKP has often stated its ambition to
make things better for people through a prag-
matic, problem-solving approach to policy. Con-
cerning social policy, the AKP maintains that
the state has an obligation to spend public mon-
ies for the “unemployed, poor, needy, ill and
handicapped”; however, social spending is qual-
ified, in that it “will not be allowed to interrupt
the functioning of the economy,” that is, by un-
dermining macroeconomic stability.19 Emphasis
is placed on the primacy of embedding neolib-
eralism while offering assurance that some com-
promises will be made. The party combines a
social protectionist assurance with a productiv-
ist approach, one that seeks to optimize people’s
capacity to be productive citizens.20
The main objective of social policy is to lay
the basis for more rapid and steady economic
growth. This will be realized by the state supply-
ing human skills to the market to achieve effec-
tive global economic competition. The program
expresses concern about mitigating social vul-
nerability and risk; however, in this regard the
center of attention is focused on formulating
social policies to combat poverty and unemploy-
ment. The program reasons along neoliberal
communitarian lines that the public interest
is best served by “providing equal advantages”
that will enable individuals and families to be
in control of their lives. Social cohesion and in-
dividual well-being are thus achieved through
the redistribution of opportunity rather than
income.
17.  Ibid., sec. 5, pt. 2.
 
18.  Ibid., sec. 3, pt. 1.
19.  Ibid., sec. 5, pt. 1.
20.  Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Wel-
fare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
 
Press, 1990).
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
The AKP’s Islamist Roots
Whereas neoliberalism and communitarianism
were synthesized by the social democratic left
in Europe and the United States, in Turkey this
marriage took place in the context of the rise
of religious politics. The neoliberal communi-
tarian synthesis produced by social democratic
parties emerged out of a worldwide reform of
the center-left, which had been losing ground
to its adversaries on the right throughout the
1980s and had to come to terms with neoliberal
hegemony. The roots of the AKP’s identity for-
mation, however, lie not in the crisis of postwar
social democracy but in the struggle for politi-
cal survival, and that led to the transformation
of Turkish political Islam.
The Milli Görüş (MG, National Outlook)
movement refers to a succession of pro-Islamic
parties that were led or indirectly steered by
Necmettin Erbakan dating back to 1970.21 Er-
bakan has remained the acknowledged leader
of the MG throughout the twists and turns of
one party closure after another for antisecular
activities. The MG parties assumed an explicitly
Islamic identity and campaigned for a revival
of Islamic moral and family values. Three de-
cades after the first MG party appeared a new
generation of Islamic political activists referred
to as the Yenicilikler (reformists) founded the
AKP. They formally set themselves apart from
the MG movement, insisting that their intention
was to establish a political party not defined by
religion.22 Still, most of the AKP’s leadership, in-
cluding Prime Minister Erdoğan and President
Abdullah Gül, had been activists in Erbakan’s
Islamist parties in the past and had been strong
21.  The Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP, National Order
Party) opened in 1970 and was closed by military
intervention in 1971. It was followed by the Milli Se-
lamet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party) from
1972 to the 1980 military intervention and then by the
Refah Party (RP, Welfare Party) from 1983 to the 1997
“soft” military coup that forced Erbakan’s resigna-
tion. The Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party), which lasted
from 1998 to 2000, was established on the heels of
Refah’s closure, and it too was shut down. Fifth in this
sequence is today’s Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party,
2001– ). The FP broke with the traditional MG agenda
and is considered a transitional party. Writing about
the FP, Ahmet Yıldız notes, “It seems as if it cut its ties
with the National Outlook on the one hand, while it
continued its existence under the tutelage of the Na-
tional Outlook cadres on the other.” Yıldız, “Politico-
­religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The
Parties of the National Outlook,” Muslim World 93
Published by Duke University Press
exponents of MG ideas when they served in may- 441
oral, parliamentary, and ministerial positions.
The MG movement was mainstream in the
sense that it was formed by system-supporting
political parties that contested elections and
participated in coalition governments; however,
it was also radical in that many of its ideas were
system challenging, notably its anti-Western,
Marcie J. Patton 
The Synergy between Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”
antiglobalization, and antisecular views.23 Erba-
kan, for example, opposed economic integra-
tion with Europe, which he warned would lead
to the de-Islamization of Turkey. Although from
the outset the MG movement was interested in
realizing both spiritual and material develop-
ment, its emphasis on these dimensions shifted
over time. In its earlier incarnation during the
1970s it placed emphasis on the importance of
protecting religious values from the vicissitudes
of modernization, whereas under Refah its main
concern was to meet the material needs of the
victims of the post-1980 neoliberal economic
reforms.24
Political Islam became a formidable force
in the 1990s as a result of a dramatic increase
in the public visibility of Islam precipitated by
the emergence of a welter of well-financed Is-
lamic print and broadcast media sources, the
Islamicizing education policies of the state’s
Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and the grassroots
mobilizing skills of the Refah Party.25 Party ac-
tivists established an extensive welfare network
that delivered food, fuel, and clothing to fami-
lies in dire straits; helped family members find
jobs; and often paid school fees and hospital
bills for those with insufficient income. 26 The
1994 local elections brought Refah mayors to
(2003): 199; see also Yıldız, “Problematizing the Intel- 23.  Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Re-
lectual and Political Vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Jus- surgence in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 18 (1997):
tice and Development,’” in Secular and Islamic Poli- 743–66.
tics in Turkey, ed. Ümit Cizre (New York: Routledge,
24.  Yıldız, “Intellectual and Political Vestiges.”
2008), 41–61.
25.  M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey
22.  The schism between the radical traditionalists
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
tied to Erbakan and the younger generation of re-
formists played out in the contest for leadership of 26.  Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey:
the FP, which replaced Refah. Although the reform- A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of
ists’ candidate, Abdullah Gül, lost the election for Washington Press, 2002).
party leader, Fazilet’s platform marked the ascen-
dency of a more moderate Islam that refrained from
radical statements, abandoned an anti-Western
stance, urged compliance with the Copenhagen crite-
ria for candidacy to the European Union (EU), and ad-
opted a new liberal discourse of democracy, human
rights, and rule of law. See Menderes Çınar, “Turkey’s
Transformation under the AKP Rule,” Muslim World
96 (2006): 469–86.
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

442 office in more than two dozen cities, and the
party won control of more than three hundred
city and town municipalities. Refah surpassed
this success in the 1995 general election when it
won more seats than any other party elected to
Parliament. It then formed the Refahyol coali-
tion with Tansu Ciller’s center-right Doğru Yol
e  Partisi (DYP, True Path Party), and Erbakan be-
ra ti v
m pa came Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister.27
Co
f  Refah’s communitarian vision was laid
ie so
tu d
out in its appealing sounding Just Order (Adil
S , 
A si a Düzen) economic program. 28 The Just Order
u th  
So t he promised to restore social solidarity by reinvigo-
a nd rating Islamic spiritual and moral values, to se-
frica
A st cure social welfare and justice in income distri-
Ea
d le bution, and to endeavor to bring about greater
d
Mi
unity of the Muslim umma (e.g., by creation of an
Islamic common market).29 Erbakan’s Just Order
was a utopian construction of an alternative eco-
nomic order that would take the best of capital-
ism (private property, individual initiative) and
the best of socialism (a leading role for the state
in planning the economy). 30 Although key ele-
ments in this Islamic imagining were coincident
with neoliberalism (defense of private property
rights and individual entrepreneurship), the
intention was to step back from neoliberalism
and return to a more statist-developmentalist
agenda. Erbakan’s religious discourse appealed
to poor, marginalized sectors of society and an
emergent, upwardly mobile, religiously conser-
vative Anatolian middle class. However, his anti-
capitalist rhetoric and repeated confrontations
with the secular establishment, especially the
military, eventually alienated the pro-global-
ization, liberalizing Muslim bourgeoisie, whose
green capital had contributed considerable fi-
nancial backing for the Islamist movement.
The AKP leadership has vigorously re-
jected claims that it remains part of the MG
movement and has not expressed any interest
in establishing an alternative economic order
based on distinctively Islamic principles. 31 In-
stead it has enthusiastically embraced an inte-
grationist neoliberal project. The leadership
turned the party in a pro-EU, pro-individual
rights, pro-globalization direction after having
undergone in a “learning process” that head-
on challenges to Kemalist secularism were fu-
tile as demonstrated by the fate of its banned
pro-­I slamist predecessors and the retribution
enacted by the 28 February process, otherwise
known as the postmodern coup in 1997.32 Its de-
sire to avoid repression and ambition to change
the status quo led to the party’s strategic mod-
eration. Not only did this include the adoption
of “a language of human rights and democracy
as a discursive shield,”33 but with respect to
the economy it produced a discourse that con-
formed to the Washington Consensus.
The AKP’s departure from its MG roots
is not as complete as it claims. Although it
has moved away from support for an Islamist
agenda, it still makes use of a communitarian
discourse that references values from an Is-
lamic moral universe, especially social solidar-
ity and mutual social responsibility. The party
claims, for example, that “the qualities of social
solidarity and mutual assistance, which are ex-
pressions of our public’s national and religious
character, are very significant assets.”34 And like
the MG movement, which embraced the religio-
­communitarian view that people have a duty to
aid others and that the community has an ob-
ligation to secure the basic necessities of their
lives and dignity, the AKP articulates a congru-
ent vision, saying it is concerned that people be
“healthy, happy, educated” and “attain a living
standard with human dignity.”35
However, the AKP has neoliberalized Re-
fah’s religio-communitarian outlook. Refah was
harshly critical of neoliberal capitalism and at-

27.  Nilüfer Narlı, “The Rise of the Islamist Move-
ment in Turkey,” Middle East Review of International
Affairs 3 (1999), biu.ac.il/SOS.besameria.biu.ac.il/  key and Its ‘Difference,’” in Cizre, Secular and Islamic
journal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a4.html.
28.  Necmettin Erbakan, Adil ekonomik düzen (The Just
Economic Order) (Ankara: Milsan Tesisleri, 1991).
29.  Yıldız, “Politico-religious Discourse.”
30.  Atila Yayla, “Turkey’s Leaders—Erbakan’s Goals,”
Middle East Quarterly 4 (1997), www.meforum.org/ 
358/turkeys-leaders-erkabans-goals .
31.  Menderes Çınar and Burhanettin Duran, “The Spe-
cific Evolution of Contemporary Political Islam in Tur-
Politics, 17–40.
32.  Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey between
Secularism and Islam: The Justice and Development
Party Experience,” Working Paper 12 (Isituto per gli
Studi de Politica Internazionale, ISIP; 2007), 1–24.
33.  İhsan Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party:
Identity, Politics, and Human Rights Discourse in the
Search for Security and Legitimacy,” in The Emergence
of a New Turkey, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 2006), 89.
34.  AKP, Party Program, sec. 1.
35.  Ibid., sec. 7.

Published by Duke University Press

 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
tributed the unjust social and economic order
to its globalizing processes. In its view global-
ization threatened moral-spiritual and material
development. Rather than find fault with free-
market capitalism, the AKP is enthusiastic about
the virtues of capital accumulation and does not
see a contradiction between faith and profit.
Cihan Tuğal argues that some Islamists whose
ideology she terms “alternative capitalism” put
economic growth and prosperity first and that
they instrumentalize the language of social
solidarity. 36 The AKP shares this vision of the
economy, and although spiritually influenced
by Islam it has “rationalized religion.” It has in-
troduced a construct of “the people,” different
from Refah’s religio-communitarian outlook,
which comprised the exploited faithful and the
faithless oppressors. In the AKP’s neoliberal
communitarian imaginary, the people are the
socially included and the socially excluded.
Moreover, while Refah championed an
activist social state that would ensure a more
equal distribution of economic outcomes, the
AKP program likens the state to an “orchestra
conductor” whose responsibility is to “provide
equal advantages” and ensure the conditions for
free competition in the market. 37 In the latter
view, the task of the state should be to educate
and develop a responsible citizenry that would
rely less on the state. In short, the MG parties
promised a better life, while the AKP promises
the opportunity for a better life.
Finally, instead of the religio-moral soli-
darity of Erbakan’s umma of believers who look
to the paternal state to redress inequalities cre-
ated by the market,38 the AKP’s lexicon of social
solidarity envisions a capitalist economic order
in which the state steps aside. Thus for the AKP
the family is vital for religious and economic
reasons, more so the latter. The AKP considers
the family to be seminal partly because, in line
36.  Cihan Tuğal, “Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instru-
ment and Meaning,” Economy and Society 31 (2002):
85–111.
37.  AKP, Party Program, sec. 7.
38.  Cengiz Dinç, “The Welfare Party, Turkish Nation-
alism, and Its Vision of a New World Order,” Alterna-
tives 5 (2006): 1–17.
39.  AKP, Party Program, sec. 5, pt. 8.
40.  Ibid.
Published by Duke University Press
with the MG view, it is viewed as a repository 443
of spiritual and moral values, but more impor-
tant because the family is regarded as a support
structure for survival and for instilling a strong
work ethic. 39 The party program deems the
family a significant economic entity: “It is clear
that we owe to a large extent our strong family
structure [to] the fact that we are still standing
Marcie J. Patton 
The Synergy between Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”
despite all the economic troubles.” 40
The AKP rejects the kind of activist state
envisioned by the MG parties on the grounds
that this turns people into clients (both rent
seekers and supplicants). It believes that the
state should be limited to playing an enabling
role, to help the individual make the most of
him- or herself as homo economicus. Individual
self-sufficiency is understood not as “me-first”
selfish individualism but, rather, as a means to
strengthen social cohesion and solidarity. Thus
the principal source of social protection for the
individual is understood to be the family, after
which comes local community.
The AKP’s Neoliberal Roots
Perry Anderson describes Third Wayism as “the
best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today.” 41
Like all Third Wayists, Erdoğan is a staunch
supporter of neoliberal capitalist restructuring.
Erdoğan’s AKP shares much in common with
the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party)
under Turgut Özal’s leadership, in particular a
commitment to neoliberal reforms, champion-
ship of Turkey’s integration into global markets,
religious conservatism, and identification with
center-right politics.42 The parallelism between
the two parties is especially noteworthy in terms
of their perspective on how to remedy inequali-
ties resulting from the economic sphere.43 Both
have emphasized the belief that human welfare
is a moral concern and have depended heavily
on the spheres of private-sector philanthropy
41.  Perry Anderson, “Renewals,” New Left Review 11 43.  For a discerning comparison of the identities of
(2000): 11. the AKP and the ANAP in relation to neoliberalism,
see Simten Coşan and Aylin Özman, “Center-Right
42.  Özal was a visibly practicing Muslim, and he fa-
Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General
cilitated the expression of Islam in the public sphere.
Election: Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face,” Con-
Also under his leadership, the ANAP government
temporary Politics 10 (2004): 57–74.
passed legislation permitting charitable donations
to religious institutions. But a crucial distinction
between the ANAP and Refah is that Özal’s poli-
cies favored the mobilization of an Islamic identity,
whereas Refah purposively represented the Islami-
cally oriented periphery and offered a platform for
Islamic political activism.
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

444 and traditional social solidarities (especially
the family) for the provision of social welfare
services. Both agree that social justice should
be the provenance of civil society. A key dif-
ference is that in the Özal period neoliberal
restructuring was focused on the dismantling
of state regulations and retreat from control of
e  resources, and consequently the state’s response
ra ti v
m pa to economic dislocation and distress was ad hoc;
Co
f  whereas two decades later, the AKP seeks to in-
ie so
tu d
stitute a regulatory state in economic matters
S , 
A si a and to bring human welfare into the domain
u th  
So t he of the market, that is to say, apply market rules
a nd to achieve collective well-being. It is only under
frica
A st AKP rule that one sees the crystallization of a
Ea
d le Third Way politics that combines elements of
d
Mi
the MG’s religio-communitarian view with a de-
termination to deepen the neoliberal project.
Özal initiated the state “rollback” phase
of neoliberal reforms in 1980. 44 An admirer
of Ronald Reagan, Özal was keen to open up
new economic spaces and implant neoliberal-
ism. 45 In the International Monetary Fund’s
(IMF) neoliberal opinion the results were quite
impressive, but what the IMF overlooked when
praising Turkey’s remarkable economic perfor-
mance was the widespread economic disloca-
tion that attended the sink-or-swim neoliberal
policies. From 1980 to 2002 inequalities in in-
come distribution grew wider and wider, and
traditional mechanisms of welfare and social
security, consisting predominately of informal
social networks, proved inadequate for coping
with the rising levels of poverty.
In 1986 Özal’s ANAP government estab-
lished the extra-budgetary Social Solidarity
Fund (Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Teşvik
Fonu) to distribute relief to those in extreme
poverty, primarily through in-kind transfers of
food and fuel.46 Assistance, however, was limited
and disbursed in an ad hoc manner based on
subjectively applied means criteria. In addition,
use of the fund was discretionary, which meant
that resources tended to be distributed along
partisan lines for electoral gain. Although gov-
ernments in the 1980s and 1990s did attempt to
mitigate the social and economic repercussions
of market liberalizing reforms, like Özal’s, their
policy emphasis was on social assistance pro-
grams oriented to providing emergency relief.
Prime Minister Erdoğan broke new ground
with the adoption of a set of policy priorities ori-
ented toward the social and economic inclusion
of the poor and marginalized by offering them
a stake in the neoliberal order.47 His Third Way
politics fused a neoliberal emphasis on promot-
ing economic growth and competition with a
normative communitarian commitment to pro-
viding individuals with opportunities to move
beyond consumption support and communities
with the resources to develop, in the belief that
this approach would benefit society and the econ-
omy as a whole. Two developments helped pave
the way for Erdoğan to successfully articulate his
Third Way: the pursuit of egregious fiscal popu-
lism by the AKP’s predecessors, which necessi-
tated a renewed commitment to neoliberalism,
and the absence of either a credible social demo-
cratic platform from the left-of-center political
parties or a plausible alternative capitalism.
Reining in Fiscal Populism
After the deregulation phase in the 1980s there
was no consistent or sustained effort to move
beyond rollback neoliberalism. Özal simultane-
ously liberalized the economy and engaged in
profligate government borrowing from banks,
increasing the fiscal deficit. Inflation, which had

44.  To explain how neoliberal policy developed,
Jamie Peck and Adam Ticknell identify two phases
or processes. In the first phase, termed rollback, the
government dismantles state regulations and re-
treats from control of resources. See Peck and Tickell,
“Neoliberalizing Space,” in Spaces of Neoliberalism:
Urban Restructuring in North America and Western
Europe, ed. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (Malden,
MA: Blackwell, 2002), 33–57.
45.  Özal held the posts of minister of the economy
(1980–83), prime minister (1983–89), and president
(1989–93). The Özal era was a watershed period in
Turkey marked by measures to transition from import
substitution industrialization to export-led manufac-
turing and shift from Keynesian macroeconomic de-
mand management to a more market-oriented ap-
proach to fiscal and monetary policy. The Turkish lira
was devalued, price controls on state economic enter-
prises were for the most part lifted, trade was liberal-
ized, the banking sector was deregulated, and steps
were taken to lower the fiscal deficit. In addition to
pursuing economic liberalization, Özal initiated the
establishment of a customs union agreement with
the EU that deepened Turkish integration into global
markets. After Parliament elected him president and
until his untimely death, he transferred his attention
from the economy to foreign affairs.
46.  The fund is colloquially referred to as the Fakir
Fukara Fonu (Poor Fund), or Fak-Fuk Fon for short.
Filiz Zabcı, “A Poverty Alleviation Programme in Tur-
key: The Social Risk Mitigation Project,” South-East
Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs 1 (2006):
109–25, www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx 
?logid=5&id=935d5d8f-7078–4b65–8ada-d29fa405 
a5d0.
47.  According to Peck and Tickell, rollout refers to the
second phase in the neoliberal policy process in which
efforts are made by the government to impose mar-
ket rules on all aspects of social life. Peck and Tick-
ell, “Neoliberalizing Space”; see also Tickell and Peck,
“Making Global Rules: Globalisation or Neoliberali-
sation?” in Remaking the Global Economy: Economic-
Geographical Perspectives, ed. Jamie Peck and Henry
Wai-chung Yeung (London: Sage, 2003), 163–81.

Published by Duke University Press

 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
been falling, reversed direction and climbed to
over 70 percent by the end of the decade. Both
Özal and his successors deviated from neolib-
eral orthodoxy, most notably by running bud-
getary deficits to sustain spending binges. The
use of public resources to generate political sup-
port was standard practice in Turkish politics.
Increases in government spending in the run-
up to elections had long been one of the main
instruments by which political parties would try
to gain advantage over competitors, and resort
to this traditional practice by fragile coalition
governments in the 1990s only magnified fiscal
imbalances. Thus the first phase of Turkey’s neo-
liberalism lost traction in the 1990s as coalition
governments ignored problems in the banking
and financial sector and racked up huge fiscal
deficits. Looking back from the vantage point
of 2004, IMF spokesperson Anne Krueger ex-
pressed her exasperation that the “stop-go
pattern of economic management during the
1990s meant that the main problems were not
permanently addressed.” 48
As the standard of  living fell sharply, so too
did the popularity of each succeeding govern-
ment. Labor, salaried employees, and farmers
were hit hard by the decline in real wages, spiral-
ing inflation, and the decreases in agricultural
subsidies. The 1994 financial crisis and then
the calamitous 1999 earthquake (to which the
state was slow to respond) magnified the pub-
lic’s frustration with the ruling parties. Exter-
nal pressure to end populist spending practices
intensified. The Helsinki decision in late 1999,
which recognized Turkey’s candidate status for
EU membership, included economic condition-
alities that would be difficult to meet if the debt-
financed growth strategy continued. The IMF
also cautioned Turkey of the unsustainability of
its reckless borrowing and mounting debt load.
The devastating 2001 economic crisis was the
tipping point. By the time early elections were
called for in late 2002 the credibility of the es-
tablished political elites was shot.
Under these circumstances the AKP de-
termined that old-style populist fiscal spend-
48.  Anne O. Krueger, “Perseverance in a Good Cause:
The Benefits of Turkish Economic Reform,” keynote
speech, Istanbul Forum, Istanbul, 6 May 2004, www 
.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2004/050604.htm.
At that time Krueger was acting managing director
of the IMF.
Published by Duke University Press
ing was no longer an option. How much of 445
this thinking can be attributed to political op-
portunism and how much to a new economic
realism is ambiguous. The AKP most certainly
recognized the risks of deviating from the neo-
liberal trajectory. AKP leaders campaigning in
2002 in the shadow of the 2001 economic crisis
were well aware of the repercussions of the De-
Marcie J. Patton 
The Synergy between Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”
cember 2001 Argentine financial crisis in which
Carlos Menem’s government defaulted on the
country’s massive debt and was refused an IMF
bailout, after which followed a massive currency
devaluation that precipitated massive riots, pro-
tests, and ultimately the government’s collapse.
In addition, the party had the advantage
of being an outsider to the cronyism of the po-
litical establishment. It had an impressive repu-
tation for being a clean, uncorrupt party based
on its visible track record of having run munici-
pal governments. Once in power the AKP stuck
to tightened controls over public spending, tak-
ing full credit for strictly following the IMF’s fis-
cal recommendations.
A Social Democratic Alternative?
The social democratic left in Europe aligned
itself with neoliberalism within a decade or
so of Reagan-Thatcheromics. Clintonian New
Democrats and Blairist New Labourites as well
as other European political parties with social
democratic roots identified with a third way ap-
proach to neoliberalism that called for competi-
tive, free-market strategies while using govern-
ment to prevent the market from devastating
those least prepared to live without the protec-
tions of the welfare state. In Latin America as
well the authoritarian rulers and military dic-
tators who had pioneered orthodox neoliberal
adjustment programs were succeeded in the
1990s by leftist heads of government who were
elected with promises to help the poor and
who once in office tempered acceptance of the
dominance of transnational capital and market
rationality with programs of poverty alleviation.
Yet not until the AKP was there a party in Tur-
key that “projected the image of a political party
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

446 of the third way . . . judged by the standards of
European-­style third-way politics.” 49
The paradox of “the co-existence of eco-
nomic liberalization and the resurgence of tra-
ditionalism” in Turkey is partly attributable to
the peculiar role the social democratic left has
played in politics.50 The evisceration of the Turk-
  ish Left by the military in the early 1980s in ad-
i ve
rat
m pa dition to the lack of a genuine social democratic
Co
f  identity on the part of political parties that have
ie so
tu d
claimed social democratic credentials, 51 their
S , 
A si a unreserved support for neoliberal economic
u th  
So t he policies, and their single-minded focus on op-
a nd posing political Islam rather than offering up
frica
A st social democratic socioeconomic strategies to
Ea
d le cushion the impact of free-market reforms cre-
d
Mi
ated a propitious opening for the AKP to pres-
ent itself as a pro-globalizing, progressive force
sensitive to issues of social justice. The AKP of-
fered a more credible alternative to voters with
social justice concerns because the center-left
parties had made it their mission to defend the
secular character of the Kemalist state.
The failure of center-left parties to repre-
sent a social democratic platform discredited
their rhetorical claims to stand for social justice.
Ironically the party most sensitive to social jus-
tice concerns, and in this sense resembling a so-
cial democratic party, was the Refah Party, whose
discourse castigated rising economic inequali-
ties and the maldistribution of income. How-
ever, in contrast to traditional social democratic
parties, Refah’s commitment to building a Just
Order stemmed from Islamist beliefs rather than
a class-based ideology. Moreover, Refah’s claims
proved to be limited to rhetoric. The Refahyol
government economic program contained none
of the radical, anticapitalist measures of Refah’s
Just Order, and for all of Erbakan’s talk, once he
became prime minister, he dropped mention of
a Just Economic Order, abandoned his critique
of free-market capitalism, and dumped calls for
state interventionism.52
Fashioning the Neoliberal
Communitarian Synthesis
The strong assertion of political Islam and Kurd-
ish ethno-nationalist identity claims prompted
the 1997 military intervention and led to a
“politics of inertia,”53 while at the same time so-
cial exclusion and marginalization of the poor
were becoming more and more pressing as po-
litical concerns. Continued fighting between
the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK, Kurd-
istan Workers’ Party) and the military in the
southeastern Kurdish regions of the country
and the destruction of Kurdish villages caused
thousands of displaced Kurds to flee to impover-
ished urban centers in the east and precipitated
a flood of rural migration to Istanbul, swelling
the ranks of the urban poor.
As threats to social cohesion mounted,
governments in the 1990s opted for policies
aimed at managing social risk. In 1992, for ex-
ample, a “green card” scheme was added to the
Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund to provide
free health care treatment to the “qualified”
poor. However, reckless fiscal spending and
borrowing for political and personal gain drove
the country into the mega-economic crisis in
2001, recovery from which necessitated positive
engagement with the Washington Consensus to
implement a stronger regime of neoliberalism.
Since taking office in 2002, the AKP gov-
ernment, while continuing to maintain the risk
mitigation social programs of its predecessors,
has redirected the emphasis of its social policy
programs to dovetail with communitarian ob-
jectives, specifically, enhancing employment
opportunities and employability, transform-

49.  Ziya Öniş, “Political Economy of Islam and Democ-
racy in Turkey,” in Democracy and Development: New
Political Strategies for the Middle East, ed. Dietrich
Jung (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 115.
50.  E. Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, “Globaliza-
tion, Alternative Modernities, and the Political Econ-
omy of Turkey,” Review of International Political Econ-
omy 12 (2005): 109. Keyman and Koyuncu ascribe the
emergence of this coexistence to the legitimacy crisis
of Turkey’s strong state tradition in the 1980s and the
emergence of alternative models of modernity that
challenged the state-centric one. They interrogate
the impacts of globalization in Turkey, whereas I am
interested in why a neoliberal communitarian third 52.  Birol Yeşilada, “The Refah Party Phenomenon in
way is articulated by a religio-conservative party Turkey,” in Comparative Political Parties and Party
rather than a social democratic one. Elites: Essays in Honor of Samuel J. Eldersveld, ed. Birol
Yeşilada (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
51.  Since 1980 five parties have claimed social dem-
1999), 123–50.
ocratic credentials: the People’s Party (Halkçı Par-
tisi, HP; 1983–85), the Social Democracy Party (So- 53.  Cizre and Çınar, “Turkey between Secularism and
syal Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP; 1983–85), the Social Islam,” 3–4.
Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı
Partisi, SHP; 1985–95), the Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP; 1992–), and the Social
Democratic People’s Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halk Par-
tisi, SHP; 2002–).

Published by Duke University Press

 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
ing individuals into productive and financially
self-sufficient individuals, and creating income-
generating projects for marginalized communi-
ties. These policies are consonant with the gov-
ernment’s goal of reembedding neoliberalism.
Synthesizing neoliberal assumptions about the
economic efficiency of capitalism and commu-
nitarian notions of self-sufficiency and opposi-
tion to entitlements, the AKP government has
produced a Turkish Third Way.
Despite the multiplicity of Third Ways
(there is no one-size-fits-all), three core values
underpin Third Way politics: opportunity for
all, equal worth, and responsibility. 54 These val-
ues are reflected in AKP’s neoliberal commu-
nitarian approach to social policy. Opportunity
for all means creating opportunities for individ-
uals to advance themselves and achieve a decent
standard of living (as opposed to equality of
outcome). One way to realize this is to improve
participation in the workforce by unleashing
entrepreneurism. In June 2003 Prime Minister
Erdoğan invited Muhammad Yunus, founder
and chief executive officer of the Grameen
Bank, to Turkey to publicize the introduction of
a microcredit system. Erdoğan was enthused by
the idea that microfinance could both reduce
welfare dependence on the state and spur self-
employment.55 During Yunus’s visit, Aziz Akgül,
president of the Turkish Waste Reduction Foun-
dation and the AKP deputy from Diyarbakır,
signed a joint venture agreement between the
foundation and Grameen Trust to launch a pilot
project in Diyarbakır, the largest urban center in
the poverty-stricken southeastern region of the
country.56 Akgül also proposed that 50 percent
of the Social Assistance and Solidarity Funds be
directed to microcredit programs.57 While this
figure has not been reached, the AKP govern-
ment has started shifting priorities in how the
54.  See, e.g., Stephen Driver and Luke Martell, “Third
Ways in Britain and Europe,” in The Third Way Trans-
formation of Social Democracy: Normative Claims and
Policy Initiatives in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Oliver
Schmidtke (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002), 75–101;
and Peter Dwyer, Understanding Social Citizenship:
Themes and Perspectives for Policy and Practice (Bris-
tol, UK: Policy, 2004), 72.
55.  Ayşe Buğra and Cağlar Keyder, “Framework Paper:
Poverty and Social Policy in Contemporary Turkey,”
29, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, 14 Janu-
ary 2005, www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/IYIYNTSM 
/poverty.pdf.
Published by Duke University Press
monies in the Social Solidarity and Assistance 447
Fund are disbursed, allocating more resources
to projects that are employment generating,
such as job training and microfinance. Erdoğan,
in a 2008 celebratory ceremony, presented with
great fanfare a check to the ten thousandth cli-
ent of the Turkish Grameen Microcredit Project
(TGMP).58
Marcie J. Patton 
The Synergy between Neoliberalism and
Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”
The second value, equal worth, means a
minimal fair chance in life for everyone (this
is distinct from entitlement to the same op-
portunities as others). An AKP remedy for so-
cial exclusion is to enhance the capabilities of
the vulnerable and disadvantaged so they may
enter the workforce. Since poverty is believed
to be at the root of social exclusion, children
are an important target group. The AKP gov-
ernment offers conditional cash transfers to the
poorest 6 percent of households, with payment
conditional on use of basic health services and
sending children to school, and also it plans to
extend universal health insurance to all chil-
dren under age eighteen. Preparing children to
become working adults will make them less reli-
ant on the state and more employable and will
reduce social expenditures in the future.
The third value, responsibility, signifies
that individuals, rather than look to the state
to ensure their well-being, should take charge
of their lives and accept their obligations to
family, community, and society. The AKP gov-
ernment aims to transfer social policy respon-
sibilities from the state to the voluntary sector
and individuals. These obligations include the
responsibility to work and to make an effort to
acquire relevant skills for work. The govern-
ment’s preference is for projects and programs
that will produce productive citizens who will
not burden the state or demand entitlements.
For example, in preparing the Law on Social
56.  Ferit Aslan, “‘Yoksulbank’ ilk imzayı Diyarbakır’da pled the number of its borrowers. That the micro-
attı,” Hürriyet, 11 June 2003. finance sector is proving profitable is evidenced by
HSBC’s announcement in August 2008 that it would
57.  Final Declaration of the International Conference
channel $5 million in microcredit loans through three
on Poverty Reduction Through Microcredit, 9–10 June
Turkish nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), one
2003, organized by the Turkish Foundation for Waste
of which is the Turkish Waste Reduction Foundation.
Reduction, www.israf.org/pdf/FinalDeclaration.pdf.
58.  “Microfinance Expansion Jumps in Turkey,” Reu-
ters, 21 July 2008. The TGMP, which was first estab-
lished to take on the Diyarbakır pilot, is, like other
Grameen Banks, a private, nonprofit organization
that grants loans only to women. It has rapidly ex-
panded from three to twenty-five branches and tri-
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East
448 Security and General Health Insurance, which
went into effect in 2008, the AKP government
opted for reforms that would finance health in-
surance and pension payments through income-
based contributions rather than through taxes
that would have covered everyone. It is highly
doubtful that the 50 percent of the population
e  that works in the informal sector will be able to
ra ti v
m pa afford payments, because they lack discretion-
Co
f  ary income and therefore most will likely be ex-
ie so
tu d
cluded. The AKP’s message is that work is the
S , 
A si a individual’s obligation and responsibility.
u th  
So t he
a nd Conclusion: A Just Third Way?
frica
A st Third Way–modernized social democrats have
Ea
d le altered the notion of what claims of social justice
d
Mi
mean in politics. Class conflict is no longer their
reference point for political cleavages; there is
no promise of emancipation from capitalist ex-
ploitation, nor is the government expected to
be responsible for furthering social justice. 59 As
Giddens puts it, “Having abandoned collectiv-
ism, Third Way politics looks for a new relation-
ship between the individual and the community,
a redefinition of rights and obligations.” 60
One of the AKP’s favorite catchphrases is
to avow its determination “to increase the wel-
fare and happiness of our people.” The AKP’s
perception of social justice rests on Islam-based
notions of strengthening traditional institutions
(like the family), but it subsumes the moral
dimension under its neoliberal economic ap-
proach. Its neoliberal communitarian synthesis
has successfully redefined social justice, a key
Islamic value, so that it conforms to the logic
of neoliberal capitalism. In this article I have
argued that Erdoğan’s policies represent a new
threshold in embedding neoliberalism. At the
same time I argue Erdoğan’s Third Way is pro-
foundly different from the MG tradition. The
AKP channels resources to social assistance pro-
grams as did Refah, but it holds opposite views
about the international orientation of Turkish
capitalism, and its understanding of social jus-
tice is centered on equality of opportunity, not
equality of result.
59.  Paul Cammack, “Giddens’s Way with Words,” in
The Third Way and Beyond: Criticisms, Futures, and
Alternatives, ed. Sarah Hale, Will Leggett, and Luke
Martell (Manchester, UK: Manchester University
Press, 2004), 158–59.
Published by Duke University Press
Erdoğan’s Third Way inserts social justice
into an economic discourse that emphasizes the
promotion of economic growth and opportu-
nity. The party claims that social justice will be
achieved through “a continuous and sustainable
growth strategy,” which it anticipates will raise
living standards and lower unemployment and
thereby produce a more just distribution of in-
come.61 Significant weight is placed by the AKP
on the development of cost-effective programs
and on investment in education, job training,
and family services to remove barriers to partici-
pation in the market.62
Erdoğan’s Third Way connects social jus-
tice to inclusion rather than to equality and as-
sociates exclusion with inequality. Social justice
is achieved through social inclusion and not via
redistributive outcomes. The government’s so-
cial policy approach looks to individuals to re-
alize their capabilities and thereby gain access
to opportunities. In addition, responsibility for
social protection is shifted from the state to the
family, handed off to communities, and trans-
ferred to partnerships with NGOs, the private
sector, and local authorities.
A critical element of the AKP’s electoral
appeal has been its pledge to deliver social jus-
tice to the population. In the 2007 election
campaign the party gave considerable weight to
this issue. However, the social consequences of
neoliberal competitive restructuring have not
been seriously questioned by the AKP govern-
ment. While the previous pro-market liberal-
ization governments tried to mitigate the so-
cial disruptions of neoliberal reforms through
damage-control policies, the AKP’s priority is to
forge ahead and deepen neoliberalism.
Two interrelated questions suggest them-
selves. How will the government deal with the
many who remain “excluded,” and will the AKP’s
neoliberal communitarian synthesis continue to
be politically successful? By framing social pol-
icy as a problem related to economic growth,
Erdoğan’s Third Way appears to depoliticize
the issue of social inequalities. Genuine politi-
cal concerns over social inequalities have been
60.  Anthony Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge:
Polity, 1998), 65.
61.  AKP, Party Program, sec. 5, pt. 3.1.
62.  Ibid., sec. 5, pts. 5.2, 5.8.
 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East

replaced by the question of how the economy 449

can run more efficiently, overcome market dys-
function, and be less crisis prone. But this begs
an answer as to what institutional arrangements
will cope with the many who will not obtain jobs
and compete in the formal market, in addition
to the many who participate in the informal
economy.

Marcie J. Patton 

The Synergy between Neoliberalism and

Communitarianism: “Erdoğan’s Third Way”

The AKP appears to have put its faith in a
synergistic relationship between the individual
and the community to manage these deficien-
cies. Erdoğan’s Third Way does not see a tension
between management of an economy geared to
growth and inclusion of the poor and marginal-
ized. Indeed on this point the government is in
sync with the opposition political parties.
It is too soon to draw firm conclusions
about shifting balances in state-society-market
relations; nevertheless, the persistence of social
inequality and exclusion will pose a challenge
to social cohesion in two ways. First, the risks
of social fragmentation and loss of social co-
hesion will grow if there are disparities in and
struggles over resources. The AKP’s enthusiasm
for decentralizing public services is not likely to
diminish regional inequalities such as the gap
between the western and eastern parts of the
country, for the poorer eastern provinces will
be dependent on redistributed national funds
and are unlikely to develop an autonomous tax
base unless they can attract foreign investors. A
decentralizing project when coupled with neo-
liberalism is more likely to work against social
cohesion.
Second, while there is agreement across
the political spectrum for social partnerships
and community building, there is considerable
friction in Turkey over the kind of community
that is desirable—morally conservative, liberal,
Islamist, or secular. Yet in spite of these chal-
lenges, and although the social costs of neo-
liberal policies are mounting, the lack of a po-
litically viable opposition to challenge the AKP
casts doubt that the synergism of its neoliberal-
communitarian outlook will come undone.

Published by Duke University Press