Actual Vs Contracting Carriers

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Shawcross & Beaumont: Air Law/Division VII Carriage by Air/Chapter 41 Actual and Contracting Carriers, Servants
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/The Guadalajara Convention
CHAPTER 41 ACTUAL AND CONTRACTING CARRIERS, SERVANTS AND AGENTS
A ACTUAL AND CONTRACTING CARRIERS
The Guadalajara Convention
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The Guadalajara Convention was signed in September 1961, and provides rules to govern international carriage by air
performed by a carrier who is not the carrier with whom the original contract of carriage was made. With minor drafting
changes, the text of the Guadalajara Convention is incorporated as Chapter V (arts 39 to 48) of the Montreal
Convention 1999.
The situation addressed by the Convention arises very frequently in practice, but was not clearly dealt with in the
Warsaw Convention; indeed the position under the text of that convention (in both its original form and as amended at
The Hague) was the subject of much controversy and uncertainty. The nature of the disputed issues has already been
examined, and reference is made to that discussion1. The incorporation of the provisions in the Montreal Convention
1999 and the ratification of that Convention by the United States have changed the approach of US courts2.
1 See paras VII[170]–VII[182].
2 McCarthy v American Airlines Inc 32 Avi 16,472 (SD Fla, 2008).
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Interpretation
Implementation in the United Kingdom
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The Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 gave effect in the law of the United Kingdom to the
provisions of the Guadalajara Convention, which are set out in the Schedule to the Act. The Act was so drafted that
when it first came into force (on 1 May 1964) it supplemented the Carriage by Air Act 1932, the Act then in force and
applying the unamended Warsaw Convention in the law of the United Kingdom, and was later (from 1 June 1967)
supplementary to the Carriage by Air Act 19611. When in 1999 effect was given in English law to the Montreal
Additional Protocol No 4, the Act was amended so that its provisions were also supplementary to the convention as
amended by that Protocol2, and the Act was further amended to reflect the Montreal Convention 19993.
The 1962 Act applies to regulate the rights and liabilities of carriers, carriers' servants and agents, passengers,
consignors, consignees and other persons, irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing the carriage4. The
provisions of the Convention have also been applied, with very limited modifications, by the Carriage by Air Acts
(Application of Provisions) Order 20045.
1 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 2, as amended by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 2004, s 1 and Sch 1, Pt 4. A
German court has held that the Guadalajara Convention only applies if the places of departure and of destination are in states party to the
Convention: Landgericht Offenburg (I S 356/84) (14 January 1986); a Belgian court has held the convention applicable if either the country
of departure or that of destination has ratified the convention: Alliance Insurance Co Ltd v Air Express International (USA) (Brussels, 4
March 1991), (1991) 2 S & B Av R VII/29, (1991) 26 Eur Tr L 556. There is nothing in the text of the Convention to justify any such
limitation, nor is there in the 1962 Act which would govern were a similar argument to be advanced in England; the Act will be applied in
England whenever the carriage is governed by the Warsaw Convention (in its amended or unamended form).
2 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 2(1)(b) as amended by SI 1999/1312.
3 SI 2002/263, art 3.
https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/results/enhdisplayunit.do?level=2&linkValue=0&docViewState=defaulte 1/13
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4 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 1(1). For power to amend the Act by Order in Council in the event of any
revision of the Warsaw or Guadalajara Conventions, see Carriage by Air Act 1961, s 8A and Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions)
Act 1962, s 4A, both inserted by the Carriage by Air and Road Act 1979, s 3(1) (2).
5 SI 2004/1899.
Interpretation
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The Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 provides that, if there is any inconsistency between the text
in English in Part I of the Schedule to the Act and the text in French in Part II of that Schedule, the text in French will
prevail1. The Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) Order 2004 applies the English text to the cases falling
within the scope of the Order, and does not reproduce the French text2.
1 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 1(2).
2 Carriage by Air Acts (Application of Provisions) Order 2004, SI 2004/1899, art 2(1).
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Definition of contracting carrier
Definition of contracting carrier
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The Convention provisions govern the position of the actual as distinguished from the contracting carrier, the latter
being the person who as a principal makes an agreement for carriage governed by the Warsaw or Montreal
Convention with a passenger or consignor or with a person acting on behalf of the passenger or consignor1.
The application of this definition to tour organisers, travel agents and the like has been examined in the literature2, but
received a judicial interpretation in Re West Caribbean Airways SA3. The airline entered into an agreement with a
corporation called Newvac, under which it chartered aircraft to Newvac for the holiday season. Newvac in turn agreed
to make aircraft (and other facilities such as hotel accommodation) available to Globe Travel Agency for a series of
flights from Panama to Martinique, and the Agency sold flights to individual passengers. The court held that Newvac
was a contracting carrier. It held first that Newvac had made an agreement for carriage governed by the Montreal
Convention with the Agency, and then examined the question whether it did so as 'principal'. Whether or not a
particular person acts as a principal depends on the facts of each case; but in civil law countries, with a more formal
approach to the characterisation of contracts, there are greater difficulties4. The court in West Caribbean Airways
explained that the term merely excluded those acting solely as agents.
The phrase 'as a principal' was examined by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Air Tahiti Nui Pty Ltd v
McKenzie5. The court held that the phrase described the capacity of a person who 'makes an agreement for carriage'.
An agent who 'makes' such an agreement, such as a travel agent, was not a contracting carrier. The court referred to
the remarks of Richard Wilberforce QC (as he then was) for the UK delegation at the Guadalajara:
'It was important to exclude from Article I cases in which the person entering into the agreement for
carriage was only an agent for another person. It was important to exclude from the definition of the
expression 'contracting carrier' the travel agent or booking agent. The air freight forwarder might in some
cases be a contracting carrier. He believed that he was so in the United Kingdom. He was a principal; he
was a carrier; he engaged to carry, and, therefore, that person was and should be treated as a
contracting carrier. But in other cases, and in most cases in the United Kingdom, the air freight forwarder
was not a principal. He was simply an agent; he contracted as agent for the operator who ultimately was
going to carry the goods. Where he was an agent he should not be treated as a contracting carrier and
be brought within the Warsaw rule as to contracting carriers. Hence, the insertion of the words 'as
principal' was legally correct.'
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It followed that travel and transport intermediaries may procure a contract of carriage as a broker or agent; or may
undertake a contractual obligation for carriage. In the former case they were not a principal, but in the latter they were,
even if they could not perform the contract themselves but had to subcontract with an actual carrier. An entity could be
the contracting carrier although its parent company was the actual carrier.
The identity of the contracting party was to be determined looking at the matter objectively, examining and construing
any relevant documents in the factual matrix in which they were created and ascertaining between whom the parties
objectively intended to contract. This was a process of construction similar to the task of identifying whether a clearly
contractual document (such as a bill of lading) is made with one party or another.
In the cases of Selke v Germanwings GmbH6, two of the cases arising out of the crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 in
2015, the claimants argued that United Airlines and Lufthansa qualified as contracting carriers for the purposes of the
Montreal Convention 1999. The deceased passengers purchased from United a round trip from Virginia, US to Munich
(on United), Barcelona (on Lufthansa), Dusseldorf (on Germanwings – the accident flight), Manchester (on
Germanwings) and back to Virginia (on United). With respect to Lufthansa, the claimants argued that it qualified as a
contracting carrier because it 'maintained a contractual ticketing relationship with Germanwings and wholly owned
Germanwings at the time of the crash…'. With respect to United, the argument went that it had an agency relationship
with Germanwings at the time of the accident. The District Court rightly dismissed both arguments. Lufthansa did not
qualify as contracting carrier because it did not act as 'agent for the entire transaction' and did not give authority to
Germanwings to operate the relevant flight. As it did not operate the flight, Lufthansa did not qualify as actual carrier
either. The court dismissed the claim against United on similar grounds. United's interline agreement with
Germanwings expressly stipulated that 'the two carriers are not in any employment, agency, partnership, or joint
venture relationship' and United assumed no responsibility for the operation of the Germanwings flight. The two
carriers did have a code-share agreement at the time of the accident, but United opted against using it in this occasion
and as such its airline designator code did not appear in the tickets. The court held that tickets sold pursuant to an
interline agreement qualify the carriers as successive carriers under the Montreal Convention rather than contracting
carriers. As neither United nor Lufthansa performed the accident flight and United, as first carrier, did not assume
liability for the entire carriage, they could not be held liable.
In the Air Tahiti case, the plaintiffs bought their tickets from a travel agency, Flight Centre. This had an agreement with
the appellant, an Australian company which was responsible for all sales and marketing in Australia for the actual
carrier, ATSA, registered in French Polynesia. ATSA itself had no offices in Australia and references in the various
documents to Air Tahiti had to be understood in the Australian context as referring to the appellant. On the facts the
contractual arrangements for carriage were made with the plaintiffs by Flight Centre on behalf of the appellant as
principal; an argument that ATSA was the undisclosed principal was rejected.
What was perhaps a more difficult question in the West Caribbean Airways case was whether the Agency could be
said to be 'a person acting on behalf of the passenger', there being no identified passengers when the contract was
entered into. It was argued that the convention definition was not satisfied on this point, but the court refused to accept
'this rigid construction'. In fact it was Newvac which issued the individual passenger tickets and supplied both aircraft
and crew, and those facts in themselves seem to make it a contracting carrier.
In considering who is the contracting carrier, the terms of the documents issued to the passenger or consignee will be
decisive. Where a passenger bought an electronic ticket issued by Air France for a flight to be performed by Kenya
Airways, and issued with a boarding card also issued on Air France stock, it was held that Air France was the
contracting carrier. The terms of IATA Interline agreements, not disclosed to the passenger, were irrelevant7. The Cour
de cassation reached the same conclusion on similar facts, also noting that the documents said that terms and
conditions could be obtained from the carrier issuing the ticket, Air France8.
A United States District Court has held that plaintiffs may bring a claim under the Montreal Convention against a carrier
where the identity of the carrier is determined pursuant to the lex fori's 'alter ego' theory of liability. The court held that
the Montreal Convention does not expressly address the question of whether domestic alter ego or joint venture
liability theories can be pursued under it. On the basis that the Montreal Convention was described in previous cases
as 'a treaty that favors passengers rather than airlines' and on the basis that 'treaties are construed more liberally than
private agreements', there was nothing to prevent the application of such forum rules in identifying one or (possibly)
more carriers9.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch, art I(b)); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B, as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 39.
2 D Grant, 'Tour Operators, Airlines and the Warsaw Convention' [1999] TAQ 23 (examining whether a tour operator is a 'contracting
carrier').
3 32 Avi 15,595 (SD Fla, 2007).
4 See Miller, 'Liability in International Air Transport' (1997), 261–275, and para V[807].
5 [2009] NSWCA 429, (2009) 264 ALR 709.
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6 37 Avi 18,447 (ED Va, 2017) and 37 Avi 18,461 (ED Va, 2017); the court cited with approval Best v BWIA West Indies Airways Ltd 581
F Supp 2d 359 (ED NY, 2008).
7 Kuate v Air France (Paris CA, 2011).
8 Marsans International v Air France (Cour de cass, 26 January 2012).
9 Re Air Crash near Rio Grande, Puerto Rico, on December 3, 2008 (SD Fla, 2015).
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Definition of actual carrier
Definition of actual carrier
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The 'actual carrier' is therefore defined as the person, other than the contracting carrier, who, by virtue of authority from
the contracting carrier, performs the whole or part of carriage in respect of which the contracting carrier has made an
agreement governed by the Warsaw or Montreal Convention but who is not, with respect to such part, a successive
carrier1 within the meaning of the relevant Convention. Such authority is presumed, in the absence of proof to the
contrary2.
A handling agent effecting surface transportation within the airport, as part of the operation of disembarking
passengers or unloading cargo, is clearly authorised so to do by the carrier by whom he was appointed. That carrier
will in many cases be an 'actual carrier' for the purposes of the 1962 Act; but if he happens to be the contracting
carrier, it becomes possible to argue that the handling agent falls within the definition of 'actual carrier'. It is submitted
that this argument should not prevail: he is properly regarded as an agent of the carrier, and not as a carrier in his own
right (and to hold otherwise would severely reduce the category of agents, one retained in the Guadalajara
Convention), and it would ill accord with commercial realities for the handling agent's legal position to depend on
whether the appointing carrier were acting as contracting or actual carrier for the purposes of that Convention3.
A carrier who is a successive carrier is not within the scope of the Guadalajara or Montreal Convention provisions.
Because there are important differences between the position of actual carriers and successive carriers the distinction
between the two may, in practice, become vital. Where there is successive carriage, a claim lies only against the
carrier which performed the actual carriage in question4; where there is no successive carriage, both the actual and
contracting carriers may be liable5.
The growing practice of code-sharing may lead to difficulties so far not fully debated. If the special contract position of
the operating airline is different from that of the code-sharing partner, either better or worse, difficulties may arise if
victims of accident seek to avail themselves of special contract terms to which they may not apparently be
contractually entitled. This could arise, for example, were passengers ticketed by a code-sharing partner seek to argue
that, in case of accident, they were entitled to the benefit of the actual carrier's special contract terms. In any such
case, it will always be necessary to determine the identity of the carrier; it is submitted that the identity of the carrier is
easily determined as a matter of fact and that, as between carriers as contrasted with the passenger and the carrier
with which he contracted, indemnity and claims handling contractual provisions must be examined to determine the
legal liability position. The code-sharing issue arose in one United States case, the court requiring further argument on
the effect of code-sharing on the identity of the actual and of the contracting carrier6.
1 For the meaning of 'successive carrier', see para VII[341].
2 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art I (c) Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 39.
3 Cf G R Baccelli, 'L'exploitant de l'assistance aéroportuaire comme préposé du transporteur aérien' (1990) 15 Annals ASL 17.
4 See para VII[330].
5 See para VII[1066] and Best v BWIA West Indies Airways Ltd 581 F Supp 2d 359 (ED NY, 2008), 33 Avi 17,116 (a successive carriage
case).
6 McCarthy v American Airlines Inc 32 Avi 16,472 (SD Fla, 2008).
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and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Liability and obligations of the
actual carrier
Liability and obligations of the actual carrier
[1066]
If the actual carrier performs the whole or part of carriage which, according to the agreement for carriage, is governed
by the Warsaw or Montreal Convention, both the contracting carrier and the actual carrier are, with certain exceptions,
subject to the rules of the relevant Convention: the former for the whole of the carriage contemplated in the agreement,
the latter solely for the carriage which he performs1.
The acts and omissions of the contracting carrier and of his servants and agents acting within the scope of their
employment are deemed, in relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, to be also those of the actual
carrier2. But no such act or omission (for example, intentional or reckless misconduct in the case of carriage governed
by the Warsaw-Hague text) will subject the actual carrier to liability in excess of the limits specified in the relevant
Convention3.
Moreover any special agreement under which the contracting carrier assumes obligations not imposed by the relevant
Convention, or any waiver of rights4 conferred by that Convention, or any special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination does not affect the actual carrier unless agreed to by him5.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art II; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air
Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 40. The meaning of 'the carriage which he performs' was examined in a cargo context in
Ericsson Ltd v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2005] HKCU 1, applying the meaning of carriage by air in art 18(2) of the Warsaw-Hague
Convention (as to which see para VII[940] ff.)
2 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art III(1); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 41(1). In Louis Vuitton North America Inc v Schenker SA (ED NY, 2019) it was rightly
held that art 41 of the Montreal Convention attributes liability to contracting and actual air carriers for the acts and omissions of their agents,
but it 'does not extend liability to an agent of an actual carrier…for the acts or omissions of either [contracting or actual] carrier'.
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 41(2).
4 The Montreal Convention text (art 41(2)) adds 'or defences'.
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 41(2).
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Liability of the contracting carrier
Liability of the contracting carrier
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The acts and omissions of the actual carrier and of his servants and agents acting within the scope of their
employment1 are, in relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, deemed to be also those of the contracting
carrier2. This enacts what is believed to have been the position before the Convention. As a result the intentional or
reckless misconduct of the actual carrier renders the contracting carrier fully liable by depriving him of the protection of
art 22 of the Warsaw-Hague text.
There is doubt as to whether advance booking charter operators are 'contracting carriers'. The conditions of air travel
organisers' licences3 require the organiser, in effect, to make seats available as principal, but the practice is for tour
and ABC operators to use a standard condition that they act as booking agents only, so that liability rests upon the
carrier whose tickets will usually be issued. However, it is now also common practice for tour operators to issue tickets
in a standard computerised form in which the particular carrier is designated by distinctive initials.
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1 For 'scope of employment', see para VII[546].
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 41(1); Ericsson Ltd v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2005] HKCU 1; McCarthy v American
Airlines Inc (SD Fla, 2008).
3 See paras V[439] ff.
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Complaints and orders
Complaints and orders
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Any complaint made under the Warsaw or Montreal Convention has the same effect whether addressed to the
contracting carrier or to the actual carrier1.
Any order2 given under the Warsaw or Montreal Convention to the carrier will have the same effect whether addressed
to the contracting carrier or to the actual carrier3. Nevertheless, orders referred to in art 12 of either Convention (which
deals with delivery)4 are only effective if addressed to the contracting carrier5.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art IV; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 42. The same result was achieved by a liberal interpretation of art 26 of the
unamended Warsaw Convention (the US not being a party to the Guadalajara Convention) in Maschinenfabrik Kern AG v Northwest
Airlines Inc 562 F Supp 232 (ND Ill, 1983), 17 Avi 18,340. See also Jalloh v Trans World Airlines Inc 19 Avi 17,804 (USDC DC, 1985)
(notice to second, and last, carrier in successive carriage held sufficient, without discussion of convention text).
2 The Montreal Convention substitutes 'instruction'.
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Servants and agents
Servants and agents
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In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, any servant or agent of that carrier or of the contracting
carrier shall, if they prove that they acted within the scope of their employment, be entitled to avail themselves of the
conditions and limits of liability which are applicable under the Guadalajara Convention or the Montreal Convention to
the carrier whose servant or agent they are, unless it is proved that they acted in a manner that prevents the limits of
liability from being invoked in accordance with the Warsaw or Montreal Convention1.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art V; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Aggregation of damages
Aggregation of damages
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[1070]
In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, the aggregate of the amounts recoverable from that carrier
and the contracting carrier, and from the servants and agents acting within the scope of their employment1, will not
exceed the highest amount which could be awarded against either the contracting carrier or the actual carrier under
the convention, but none of the persons mentioned will be liable for a sum in excess of the limit applicable to him2.
1 For 'the scope of employment', see para VII[546].
2 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art VI; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Persons against whom an action
may be brought
Persons against whom an action may be brought
[1071]
In relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, an action for damages may be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, against that carrier or the contracting carrier, or against both together or separately1. If the action is brought
against only one of those carriers, that carrier will have the right to require the other carrier to be joined in the
proceedings, the procedure and effects being governed by the law of the court2 seised of the case3.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art VII; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 45. See Sté Marsans International v Air France (Cour de Cass, 26 Jan 2012), (2012)
66 RFDA 110. For actions against servants and agents, see para VII[1078].
2 'Court' includes, in relation to an arbitration, arbitrator: Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 2(2).
3 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art VII; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
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Any action for damages contemplated in Art VII of the Guadalajara Convention or art 45 of the Montreal Convention
19991 must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, either before a court in which an action may be brought against the
contracting carrier as provided in the Warsaw or Montreal Convention2, or before the court having jurisdiction at the
place where the actual carrier is ordinarily resident3 or has his principal place of business4.
2 See paras VII[420] ff, where the terms 'ordinarily resident', 'domicile' and 'principal place of business' are discussed.
3 The Montreal Convention 1999 substitutes 'domicile'.
4 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art VIII; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 46. For an illustration, see Pierre-Louis v Newvac Corp 584 F 3d 1052 (11th Cir,
2009), 33 Avi 18,186.
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and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Limitation of actions
Limitation of actions
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The rules as to limitation of actions in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, that is arts 29 and 35 respectively1, will
equally apply to actions to which the Guadalajara Convention is relevant. It is expressly provided that the two-year limit
imposed by s 5(1) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 on actions against the servants or agents of a carrier, and by s 5(2)
of that Act on actions for contributions from a carrier, applies in relation to both actual and contracting carriers2.
2 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 3(2), as amended by SI 2002/263. For ss 5(1) and 5(2) of the 1961 Act both as
amended, see para VII[446].
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Contractual provisions tending to
relieve from liability
Contractual provisions tending to relieve from liability
[1074]
Any contractual provision tending to relieve the contracting carrier or the actual carrier of liability under the Guadalajara
Convention or Chapter V of the Montreal Convention), or to fix a lower limit than that which is applicable thereunder, is
null and void; but the nullity of any such provision does not involve the nullity of the whole agreement which remains
subject to the provisions of the Convention or Chapter1. It is, however, provided in the Guadalajara Convention (but not
in the Montreal Convention) that the above rule, in respect of the carriage performed by the actual carrier, does not
apply to contractual provisions governing loss or damage resulting from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo
carried2.
Any clause contained in an agreement for carriage, and all special agreements entered into before the damage
occurred, by which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by the Convention, whether by deciding the law to
be applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, will be null and void3. Arbitration clauses are allowed in the
carriage of cargo4.
1 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), IX(1); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
2 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art IX(2).
3 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art IX(3); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage
by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 49.
4 See Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art IX(3) and Montreal Convention, arts 33
and 34.
and Agents/A Actual and contracting carriers/Implementation in the United Kingdom/Position as between the
contracting carrier and the actual carrier
Position as between the contracting carrier and the actual carrier
[1075]
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Except in relation to the right of the actual carrier or the contracting carrier, when a defendant in an action for damages,
to have the other joined in the proceedings1, nothing in the Convention affects the rights and obligations of the two
carriers between themselves2.
1 See para VII[1071] and Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), VII; Montreal Convention
1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 45.
2 Guadalajara Convention (Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, Sch), art X; Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by
and Agents/B The Carrier's servants and agents/Background
B THE CARRIER'S SERVANTS AND AGENTS

Background
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The text of the Warsaw Convention in its original form contains a number of references to the carrier's servants and
agents1, which represent an acknowledgment of the obvious truth that the actual operations of flying aircraft and
handling baggage and cargo are carried out by individuals working for the carrier. However, the text of the unamended
Convention makes no provision as to an action by a passenger (or consignor or consignee) against the carrier's
servants or agents2. It is a matter of some controversy whether the unamended Convention has any application to
such actions. The matter is usually discussed in the context of the limits of liability imposed by art 22, but is of much
wider importance: if the Convention does not apply to an action against a servant or agent of the carrier, his liability will
not be subject to the régime of presumed fault, nor will the specific defences in arts 20 and 21 be available to him, and
in place of the Convention rules in arts 28 and 29 as to jurisdiction and limitation of actions those generally applicable
to the appropriate form of civil action will govern. On all these points, choice of law questions will arise.
The matter was discussed at The Hague in 1955 and a new art 25A was adopted clarifying what was almost certainly
the meaning of the unamended text and applying the liability limits of art 22 to claims against the carrier's servants and
agents3. A similar provision is to be found in the Montreal Convention 19994. Lord Denning has commented, with
reference to the inclusion of art 25A, that Parliament stepped in to prevent the flank of the Warsaw Convention being
turned and the balance of risks it contains being upset5.
A similar view was taken, in a case examining the effect of the unamended Convention, by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Reed v Wiser6. The case arose out of the crash of a TWA aircraft into the Ionian Sea.
The personal representatives of the deceased passengers brought an action against the President of the airline, and
his Vice-President of Audit and Security, claiming that they were negligent in failing to prevent the placing of a bomb on
board the aircraft. The Court of Appeals noted that if employees were held not to be protected the entire character of
international air disaster litigation would be radically changed, the liability limits being circumvented, leading to higher
costs which would be passed on to the passengers. For this purpose it was wrong to separate the corporate carrier
from its employees for liability purposes, even though that was the general approach of the common law in other
contexts. Indeed any other decision than that reached by the court would re-open all the choice-of-law problems the
Convention was designed to avoid.
Although the issue in Reed v Wiser was the applicability of art 22, the judgment deals in more general terms with the
applicability of the Convention provisions; some aspects had been examined in earlier decisions of lower courts in the
United States, which were divided in their opinions7. It is greatly to be hoped that Reed v Wiser will be accepted in
spirit as well as in letter.
It has been followed in cases involving providers of passenger handling ('skycap') services8 and of services related to
terminal operations more generally9. The principle was held applicable, rightly it is submitted, to sub-contractors (in the
instant case the aircraft cleaners used by the company providing ground support services to the carrier)10.
In English law, in addition to art 25A agreed at The Hague, s 5(1) of the Carriage by Air Act 196111 applies the
Convention's two-year limitation period to actions against the servants or agents of the carrier. Although on the
interpretation here advocated that provision is strictly unnecessary, it does indicate a policy preference for the
application of the same rules whatever the identity of the defendant.
1 Warsaw Convention 1929, arts 16(1), 20(1), 20(2) and 25(2).
10/10/22, 10:06 PM
2 Western Digital Corpn v British Airways plc [2001] QB 733, [2001] 1 All ER 109, CA.
3 Warsaw-Hague text (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1), art 25A; MP4 Convention (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1A as inserted by SI
1999/1312), art 25A.
4 Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 30. See Vumbaca v Terminal One Group
Association LLP 35 Avi 17,383 (ED NY, 2012).
5 Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 1 at 22, HL.
6 555 F 2d 1079 (2nd Cir, 1977), 14 Avi 17,841, cert den 98 S Ct 399 (see King, (1978) 44 JALC 175).
7 Reasoning similar to that in Reed v Wiser, above, was used in Chutter v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 132 F Supp 611 (SD NY, 1955), 4
Avi 17,733; also favouring the application of the convention was Wanderer v Sabena [1949] US Av 25 (NY Sup Ct) (where the context was
limitation of actions). To the contrary were Pierre v Eastern Airlines Inc 152 F Supp 486 (DC NJ, 1957), 5 Avi 17,515 and (in the context of
the jurisdictional rules of art 28) Hoffman v BOAC 9 Avi 17,180 (NY Sup Ct, 1964). Pierre v Eastern Airlines Inc was not followed in
Croucher v Worldwide Flight Services Inc 111 F Supp 2d 501 (DC NJ, 2000), 27 Avi 18,062.
8 Julius Young Jewelry Manufacturing Co Inc v Delta Air Lines 67 AD 2d 148 (1979), 15 Avi 17,568 (agents handling inter-line baggage
transfer at Kennedy Airport, NY, held protected by liability limits); Baker v Lansdell Protective Agency Inc 590 F Supp 165 (SD NY, 1984), 18
Avi 18,497 (agents carrying out security checks for British Airways at that airport); Kabbani v International Total Services 807 F Supp 1073
(DC DofC, 1992) (similar facts); Amiel v Voyages Veloce (Paris, 25 February 1993), (1993) 46 RFDA 261 (travel agent protected by art 22
in claim for delay in carriage of baggage); Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 25 Avi 17,116 (SD NY, 1995) (agent
issuing air waybill); American Home Assurance Co v Jacky Maeder (Hong Kong) Ltd 969 F Supp 184 (SD NY, 1997), 25 Avi 18,421 (cargo
handling agent); Croucher v Worldwide Flight Services Inc 111 F Supp 2d 501 (DC NJ, 2000), 27 Avi 18,062 (ground handling agent
providing aircraft cleaning services); Carroll v United Airlines Inc (NJ Super, 1999) (agent providing wheel-chair services for disembarking
passengers held within Convention); Dazo v Globe Airport Security Services 268 F 3d 671 (9th Cir, 2001), 28 Avi 15,757 (airport security
firm; immaterial that firm also acted for domestic carriers) (as to which see Leenardo v Singapore Airlines Inc 140 Fed Appx 661 (9th Cir,
2005); McCaskey v Continental Airlines Inc 159 F Supp 2d 562 (SD Tex, 2001), 28 Avi 15,602 (MedAire, a company providing medical
advice to flight crew dealing with a medical emergency in flight); Baillie v Medaire Inc 37 Avi 17,478 (DC Ariz, 2015). See also St Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Co v SEA (Milan, 19 November 1979) (handling agents protected by art 25A) and other Italian cases to the same
effect: Great American Insurance Co v Alitalia (C de Cass, 23 February 1983); Gastaldi International SRL v Società Aeroporti di
Roma (Rome, 3 October 1989); see G R Baccelli, 'L'exploitant de l'assistance aéroportuaire comme préposé du transporteur aérien' (1990)
15 Annals ASL 17; G Guerreri, 'The Airport Operator: Aircarrier's Agent or Independent Contractor?' (1992) 17 Air L 231. More recent Italian
cases appear to treat an airport handling service as an independent contractor and not an agent of the carrier for the purposes of liability
under the Warsaw Convention: see Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SpA v Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino (Rome CA, 11 August 1992),
[1993] Dir Mar 1047; Società Esercizi Aeroportuali SpA v Taisho Marine and Fire Insurance Co (Corte di Cassazione, 14 July 1992), [1993]
Dir Mar 1003 (and note by C Golda). In France there seems to be a move in the opposite direction: Cie Nationale Air France v Sté
Zagarup (Cour de Cass, 2 April 1996). In Singapore, while it has been held that 'carrier' in arts 17 to 19 cannot include the carrier's servants
or agents (so that actions against them are at common law) (Seagate Technology International v Changi International Airport Services Pte
Ltd [1997] 3 SLR 1 (Sing CA); Powermatic-Apcom Systems Pte Ltd v Concord Express (S) Pte Ltd [1999] 3 SLR 513 (Sing CA); Yusen Air
and Sea Service (S) Pte Ltd v Changi International Airport Services Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 135 (Sing CA)), the principle of Reed v Wiser is
fully accepted in the context of art 22: Yusen Air and Sea Service (S) Pte Ltd v Changi International Airport Services Pte Ltd [1999] 4 SLR
135 (Sing CA). Seagate Technology International v Changi International Airport Services Pte Ltd [1997] 3 SLR 1 (Sing CA) was followed in
Hong Kong, the court holding that actions at common law against the carrier's servants and agents were permitted despite the general
exclusivity of the Convention (as to which see para VII[410]): Ericsson Ltd v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2005] 1815 HKCU 1. Johnson v
Allied Eastern States Maintenance Corpn 488 A 2d 1341 (DC App, 1985), 19 Avi 17,847 (passenger handlling: wheelchair accident).
9 Vumbaca v Terminal One Group Association LLP 35 Avi 17,383 (ED NY, 2012) (duties including removing snow and ice from gates).
See M J Holland, 'Applying the Montreal Convention to Airport Terminal Operators: The Sword and the Shield' (2012) 37 ASL 487 arguing
that the decision makes terminal operators potentially liable to passengers for delay or personal injuries 'unconnected with the basic
operations of the airport terminal'; but is not access to gates part of those basic operations?
10 Waxman v CIS Mexicana de Aviacion SA de CV 13 F Supp 2d 508 (SD NY, 1998), 26 Avi 15,802.
11 As amended by SI 1999/1312 and SI 2002/263.
and Agents/B The Carrier's servants and agents/Which agents?
Which agents?
[1077]
It does not follow that the Convention provisions should ever be extended to agents whose role does not involve
activities directly related to the carriage of passengers, baggage or cargo, for example those engaged in the
maintenance or repair of the carrier's aircraft. In principle, it is submitted that claims against repairers, like those
against manufacturers, are outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention, and agency theories should not be allowed
to obscure this.
10/10/22, 10:06 PM
The agents within the scope of the Convention are those performing services in furtherance of the contract of carriage;
this may include agents performing a service, such as the provision of certain airport security services or ground
handling, which the carrier as such is obliged by law to perform1 but there seems no good reason why other services
directly related to carriage should not be relevant2. In Garnett v Qantas Airways Ltd3, the argument was advanced that
an 'agent' is required to have authority to create legal relations between the principal and third parties and it is not
sufficient that is performing services that otherwise would be performed by a carrier. Following an extensive review of
case law and with approving reference to this paragraph, the Court of Appeal of Western Australia held that the
Montreal Convention 1999 favours a wider interpretation that includes entities and persons through which, or by whom,
the carrier provides the contracted service of carriage. The reason is to prevent the circumvention of the protection
afforded to the carrier by providing to other defendants, who may claim against the carrier, the benefit of the same
limitations. As such, the Convention applies to an independent contractor engaged by an air carrier to marshal
passengers from the aircraft to the terminal in the performance of a function required of the carrier under the contract
of carriage, namely disembarkation.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that where maintenance and operating functions are carried out by
companies forming part of a single corporate grouping, the whole may be regarded, under theories applied in some
United States courts, as a single enterprise having the character of a 'carrier'4. The matter was examined by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Lathigra v British Airways plc5, where the conduct complained of was
the action of the British Airways office in Seattle in re-confirming an Air Mauritius flight from Nairobi to Antanarivo which
had been discontinued. The court refused to allow the matter to be governed by questions of corporate structure, and
would not adopt an artificial distinction between services typically provided by carriers and those by non-carriers. It
held that the conduct had to be not just in the furtherance of the contract of carriage but related to the performance of
the carriage. The conduct in question was not so related.
Lathigra was not cited in Re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, on September 2, 19986, where a US
District Court gave what seems an unacceptably wide scope to the notion of the carrier's agents. The court relied
heavily on an earlier New York case, Lear v New York Helicopter Corpn7, where the protection of the Warsaw
Convention was extended to 'interrelated sister and parent corporations of [the carrier which] were obligated to perform
services (eg inspection, maintenance, and repair of the helicopter and its components) for [the carrier] which were in
furtherance of the contract of carriage'. This range of protection seems to have been further extended, the Peggy's
Cove court speaking of:
'those independent agents which, pursuant to contracts or subcontracts with the carrier, perform services
related to air travel and in furtherance of the carriage enterprise that the carrier was bound to perform,
either by law or in the interest of providing the best, safest, and most thorough carriage services, in
furtherance of its contract with its customers.'
In neither case was there any real analysis of the notion of services being 'in the furtherance of' the contract of
carriage. The services performed in the Peggy's Cove case were the oversight of the installation in the carrier's aircraft
of an in-flight entertainment system, a defect which was alleged to be the cause of the accident. The court argued that
as the aim was to enhance the passengers' enjoyment of the flight and as the system caused the crash, it had to be
'flight-related', which distinguished the case from those involving 'terminal maintenance'. If the distinction is one which
can be regarded as valid, it does not address the question whether the act of installing the system was in furtherance
of a contract of carriage. The decision seems flawed.
1 Re Air Crash Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988 (1991) 1 S & B Av R VII/717 (ED NY, 1991), 776 F Supp 710, 23
Avi 18,194; Compania Panamena de Aviacion SA v Gerstein 645 So 2d 55 (Fla App, 1994); Mather v EasyJet Airline Co Ltd [2022] CSOH
40, 2022 Scot (D) 13/5 (ground handler that was an independent contractor to the airport and injured a passenger in a wheelchair during
disembarkation was rightly held to be an agent of the carrier).
2 Rhodes v American Airlines Inc (ED NY, 1996); Waxman v CIS Mexicana de Aviacion 13 F Supp 2d 508 (SD NY, 1998), 26 Avi
15,802; Croucher v Worldwide Flight Services Inc 111 F Supp 2d 501 (DC NJ, 2000), 27 Avi 18,062.
3 [2021] WASCA 110.
4 See Lear v New York Helicopter 597 NYS 2d 411 (App Div, 1993).
5 41 F 3d 535 (9th Cir, 1994), 24 Avi 18,284. See also Alleyn v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 58 F Supp 2d 15 (ED NY,
1999), 26 Avi 17,130 (escalator maintenance held unrelated to carriage and so outside scope of Convention).
6 210 F Supp 2d 570 (ED Pa, 2002), 28 Avi 16,158.
7 597 NYS 2d 411 (App Div, 1993).
10/10/22, 10:06 PM
and Agents/B The Carrier's servants and agents/Protection of servants and agents
Protection of servants and agents
[1078]
If an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier arising out of damage to which the applicable
Convention relates, such servant or agent, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment1 will be
entitled to avail himself of the limits of liability which that carrier himself is entitled to invoke2. (It follows that if the
carrier is a Community carrier, to whom certain limits do not apply, the servant or agent of the carrier cannot avail
himself of those limits3). The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, his servants or agents, in that
case, shall not exceed those limits4.
The above provisions do not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act of the servant or agent done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result5.
The interpretation of these provisions is not entirely free from doubt. They can usefully be discussed in relation to two
possible situations:
(a) In a case governed by the Warsaw-Hague text, the appropriate document of carriage (for
example, the passenger ticket) is not delivered. The carrier is not entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of art 226. It follows that no servant or agent of his is entitled to avail himself of those
provisions, and liability will be unlimited.
(b) A more difficult case is one, also governed by the Warsaw-Hague text, in which servant A is
guilty of negligence and servant B of intentional or reckless misconduct, each contributing to the
damage sustained by the plaintiff. The position of the carrier is that the liability limits will not apply
if the damage resulted from an act of intentional or reckless misconduct on the part of a servant. It
is not clear whether, in a case such as that supposed, the limits remain applicable, in whole or
part, where such misconduct is a factor but not the whole cause of the damage. If the carrier was
sued in respect only of A's negligence, could the plaintiff also rely on B's misconduct to render the
liability limits inapplicable? If the answer is 'yes', it is difficult to understand why art 25A(3) was
included; the carrier will be unable to avail himself of the limits, and the servant, by virtue of art
25A(1) will be in the same plight. If the answer is 'no', art 25A(3) makes it clear that servant B is
unprotected but that the limits are available to servant A7.
Article 25A refers expressly to the limits of liability set by art 22. It is however inserted in chapter III of the convention,
which deals with 'The Liability of the Carrier', and is not inconsistent with an interpretation of that chapter which applies
many of its provisions to actions against a servant or agent. Article V of the Guadalajara Convention, given effect in
English law by the Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962 contains a related provision, not expressly
limited to art 228. It provides that:
'in relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier9, any servant or agent of that carrier or of the
contracting carrier shall, if he proves that he acted within the scope of his employment, be entitled to
avail himself of the limits of liability which are applicable under this Convention to the carrier whose
servant or agent he is unless it is proved that he acted in a manner which, under the Warsaw
Convention, prevents the limits of liability from being invoked.'
This provision applies to supplement either the amended or unamended versions of the Warsaw Convention. Under
the former it is only art 22 the protection of which may be lost (by defective documentation or intentional or reckless
misconduct); under the unamended Convention the carrier may lose the protection of a wider, but not clearly defined,
group of provisions 'which exclude or limit his liability'10. Although not entirely clear in its drafting, art V is not
inconsistent with the view that the Warsaw Convention does apply to many aspects of actions against servants and
agents.
The German Bundesgerichtshof has taken a more literal and restrictive view of these provisions. It held the
jurisdictional rules of art 28 inapplicable in an action brought against the pilot of an aircraft, declaring that neither art
25A of the amended Warsaw Convention nor art V of the Guadalajara Convention was relevant to the question11.
10/10/22, 10:06 PM
1 For 'scope of employment', see para VII[546].
2 Warsaw-Hague text (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1), art 25A(1); MP4 Convention (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1A as inserted by
SI 1999/1312), art 25A(1); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 30(1); Re Air
Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 32 Avi 16,396 (ED Ky, 2008).
3 See para VII[211] and R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex p IATA [1999] 2 CMLR 1385.
SI 1999/1312), art 25A(2); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 30(2).
SI 1999/1312), art 25A(3); Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as inserted by SI 2002/263), art 30(3).
6 Warsaw-Hague text (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1), art 3(2).
7 See G N Calkins, 'Grand Canyon, Warsaw and the Hague Protocol', (1956) 21 JALC 253.
8 A similar provision appears with immaterial drafting changes in Montreal Convention 1999 (Carriage by Air Act 1961, Sch 1B as
inserted by SI 2002/263), art 43.
9 The provision has no relevance where the contracting carrier performs the relevant carriage.
11 6 October 1981, 1982 NJW 524, (1983) 18 Eur Tr L 539, citing Pierre v Eastern Airlines Inc 152 F Supp 486 (DCNJ, 1957), 5 Avi
17,515 and Stratton v Trans-Canada Airlines (1961) 32 DLR (2d) 736 (BC CA) but no more recent common law authority. Cf Globus
International v Cie Sabena (Brussels, 15 May 1981), (1983) 37 RFDA 371 where art 28 held applicable but on the erroneous ground that
the handling agent could be treated as a carrier by virtue of a definition clause in the air waybill, the action being commenced at the place of
ordinary residence of the agent.
and Agents/B The Carrier's servants and agents/Is action against an agent possible?
Is action against an agent possible?
[1079]–[1100]
The above discussion is without prejudice to the question whether any action can be brought against the agent. This is
certainly possible in common law jurisdictions and in some civil law countries1, but in France the prevailing view is that
as servants and agents of the carrier are not parties to the contract of carriage they are under no liability, art 25A
having no effect on that position2; but there might be liability in delict3. It would appear to be a matter for the lex fori
whether such an action can be maintained, and which persons fall within the class of agents4.
1 Globus International v Cie Sabena (Brussels, 15 May 1981), (1983) 37 RFDA 371.
2 Cie Le Languedoc v Sté Hernu-Peron (Paris CA, 17 November 1975), (1976) 30 RFDA 109; affd (Cour de Cass, 14 December 1977),
(1978) 32 RFDA 188. See G Miller, Liability in International Air Transport (1977), pp 275–283 (criticising Reed v Wiser (para VII[753]) as
misrepresenting the civil law, or in particular the French, position). Cf Amiel v Voyages Veloce (Paris, 25 February 1993), (1993) 46 RFDA
261 (travel agent liable for delay in carriage of baggage, but protected by art 22).
3 Cie Nationale Air France v Sté Zagunep (Cour de Cass, 2 April 1996).
4 See M Godfroid, Note (1983) 37 RFDA 373, 376.

Actual Vs Contracting Carriers

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10/10/22, 10:06 PM

CHAPTER 41 ACTUAL AND CONTRACTING CARRIERS, SERVANTS AND AGENTS

A ACTUAL AND CONTRACTING CARRIERS

The Guadalajara Convention

1 See paras VII[170]–VII[182].

Implementation in the United Kingdom

3 SI 2002/263, art 3.

1 Carriage by Air (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1962, s 1(2).

Definition of contracting carrier

3 32 Avi 15,595 (SD Fla, 2007).

5 [2009] NSWCA 429, (2009) 264 ALR 709.

7 Kuate v Air France (Paris CA, 2011).

8 Marsans International v Air France (Cour de cass, 26 January 2012).

Definition of actual carrier

1 For the meaning of 'successive carrier', see para VII[341].

4 See para VII[330].

Liability and obligations of the actual carrier

Liability of the contracting carrier

3 See paras V[439] ff.

Complaints and orders

2 The Montreal Convention substitutes 'instruction'.

4 See para VII[934].

Servants and agents

1 For 'the scope of employment', see para VII[546].

Persons against whom an action may be brought

1 See para VII[1071].

3 The Montreal Convention 1999 substitutes 'domicile'.

1 See para VII[443].

Contractual provisions tending to relieve from liability

Position as between the contracting carrier and the actual carrier

B THE CARRIER'S SERVANTS AND AGENTS

5 Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 1 at 22, HL.

11 As amended by SI 1999/1312 and SI 2002/263.

3 [2021] WASCA 110.

6 210 F Supp 2d 570 (ED Pa, 2002), 28 Avi 16,158.

7 597 NYS 2d 411 (App Div, 1993).

Protection of servants and agents

1 For 'scope of employment', see para VII[546].

10 See para VII[535].

Is action against an agent possible?

4 See M Godfroid, Note (1983) 37 RFDA 373, 376.

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