NATURAL REVELATION, THE GOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, AND CHRISTIAN

THEISM1
Introduction

There has been a tendency amongst some contemporary Evangelical theologians to

diminish, or even to reject, the importance of natural knowledge about God for Christian Theism.

Attempting to maintain orthodoxy as defined by the Westminster Confession, some theologians

have gone so far as to say that though God reveals himself in nature such that humans should be

able to come to some knowledge of God, it is in fact the case that unregenerate humans cannot

know anything about God from nature.2 God reveals himself, but we cannot understand natural

1
Paper presented at 2019 ETS annual conference in San Diego, CA, in the ETS Models of God Session.
2
For example, “Reformed theology does believe in total depravity. In consequence, Reformed theology

teaches that man by nature has no knowledge of God or of morality at all. (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the

Faith, 4th ed., ed. K. Scott Oliphint (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2008), 187.)” Now, a couple paragraphs

later on the same page, Van Til contradicts this statement by stating that “The Reformed confessions speak of small

remnants of the knowledge of God and of morality possessed by the natural man. And these small remnants must be

upheld by common grace. (Van Til, DF, 187.)” “Some”, no matter how small, is the contradiction of “none”. He

later states that “All men have common notions about God; all men naturally have knowledge of God. (Van Til, DF,

190.)” To make some sense of Van Til, here, we must understand him to be saying that this “knowledge of God”

that is naturally in man, is an “innate knowledge (Van Til, DF, 175.)” of the existence of God (the “sense of deity”,

Van Til, DF, 195, 198, 255-56.) that is in man because man is made in the image of God (Van Til, DF, 175.). Man

“cannot help but own to himself that God does exist. (Van Til, DF, 197.)” However, due to sin and total depravity,

all unregenerate men supress this knowledge (Van Til, DF, 196.) such that it can effectively be said that they both

have (it is actually in them) and do not have natural knowledge of God (Van Til, DF, 195.). “All men not only have

the ability to know but actually know the truth. This is so even in the case of those who do not know all the truth that

they would need to know in order to be saved. All men know that God exists and is their Judge. Secondly, all men

1
 2

revelation. It is, in fact, suggested that even the regenerate can know nothing of God from nature

without the leading of the Holy Spirit and the guidance of Holy Scriptures. These same

theologians suggest that even if some unregenerate thinker somehow concluded that some god

exists, it would be, to quote Cornelius Van Til, “a finite God”,3 and, thus, not the true God.4 The

have become sinners through Adam’s fall. All men therefore suppress the truth that they know. This suppression is

perfect in principle. (Van Til, DF, 196.)”

3
Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, vol. 5 of In Defense of the Faith (1974; repr.,

Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1982), 57. In The Defense of the Faith, Van Til says, “In reality the natural man’s

‘God’ is always a finite god. (Van Til, DF, 260.)” Cf. Van Til, DF, 264.
4
It is worth providing a number of clear statements in Van Til’s works in which he makes this claim: “the

natural man may accept the ‘theistic proofs’ as fully valid. He may construct such proofs. He has constructed such

proofs. But the god whose existence he proves to himself in this way is always a god who is something other than

the self-contained ontological Trinity of Scripture. (Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed., ed. K. Scott

Oliphint (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2008), 101.)” “For man to reflect on his own awareness of meaning and

then merely to say that a higher power, a god, exists, is in effect to say that God does not exist. (Van Til, DF, 108.)”

“For him [the protestant apologist] theism is not really theism unless it is Christian theism. (Van Til, DF, 127.)” In

discussing the Roman Catholic view of Authority and reason in Christian Apologetics, Van Til states that “The

question that at once appears is as to how it may be known that the God of reason and the God of faith are the same

God. (Van Til, DF, 154.)” He goes on to discuss the RC approach to Aristotle’s God, interacting primarily with

Étienne Gilson. He asks, “Is then the God whom Aristotle discovers the same God of whom Christian theology

speaks? (Van Til, DF, 155.)” Van Til’s conclusion is that, lacking a number of key attributes of the Christian God,

the God of Aristotle is not, nor can be, the same God. “For the god of Aristotle has then begun to appear to be quite

different from the God of the Christian faith. Aristotle’s god, it is admitted, has not created the world and does not

know the world. If such a god is the natural outcome of the activity of reason when it is not enlightened by faith,

does it not seem as though faith will have to reverse the decisions of reason with respect to God? (Van Til, DF,

156.)” Van Til proposes that any theistic proofs used apart from the Scriptures “are apologetically worse than
 3

useless. (Van Til, DF, 199.)” In defending himself against the charges of some thinkers who disagreed with his

claims, Van Til states, “Man cannot know anything, let alone deduce anything, about the nature of God except God

reveals something of himself by voluntary revelation. (Van Til, DF, 206. Cf. Ibid., 228.)” In his discussion of Greek

metaphysics, Van Til states that “There is in Greek philosophy no room for God as self-contained and as therefore

transcendent above the universe. To be sure, Greek philosophers spoke of God as above and beyond the universe.

But the kind of god thus thought of as beyond the universe is not the Creator and controller of the world. He is, or

rather it is, indeterminate. (Van Til, DF, 238.)” Turning to Aristotle directly, Van Til states, “Aristotle, for instance,

is at best an abstract, impersonal, noncreative principle of specific unity. It is quite impossible to identify this

principle of cosmic or acosmic unity with the idea that the God of Scripture is one. (Van Til, DF, 239.)” Critiquing

the Roman Catholic acceptance of some Greek notions of God, Van Til says, “The theism of Roman Catholic

theology is not ‘theism come to its own’; it is a vague, general sort of theism. It is a theism in which the God of

Christianity and the god of Greek philosophy, particularly the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, are ground together into

a common mixture. The theism of Romanist theology is a theism heavily freighted with pagan elements of thought.

If such a theism were proved to be true, then the Christian theism of the Reformed Christian would be proved to be

untrue. If with the Romanist we ‘prove’ the existence of a god, then we have disproved the existence of the God of

Christianity. (Van Til, DF, 307-308.)” In his book Christian Apologetics, Van Til states, “In not challenging this

basic presupposition with respect to himself as the final reference point in predication the natural man may accept

the ‘theistic proofs’ as fully valid. He may construct such proofs. He has constructed such proofs. But the God

whose existence he proves to himself in this way is always a God who is something other than the self-contained

ontological Trinity of Scripture. (Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed., ed. William Edgar

(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2003), 98.)” In his work An Introduction to Systematic Theology, Van Til states

that “But sinners until saved by grace do not reason analogically. They reason univocally. And because they reason

univocally about nature they conclude that no God exists or that a god exists but never that the true God exists…By

univocal reasoning, one can never find the truth about God, either as to his existence or as to his being. (Cornelius

Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology, vol. 5 of In Defense of the Faith (1974; repr., Phillipsburg, NJ:

P&R Publishing, 1982), 101.)” And, again, “It is remarkable how many scientists have said that they have

discovered God in nature. It is, to be sure, not the true God that they discover (Van Til, IST, 104.)”
 4

Westminster Confession, however, states that “the light of nature, and the works of creation and

providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men

inexcusable.”5 Historical research has sufficiently demonstrated that this statement reflects the

conviction, held by most early Protestant theologians of the magisterial reform, that even

unregenerate humans can know some truths about the one true God from nature, by the faculty of

reason (the light of nature), without the aid of written revelation. Our purpose, in this paper, is to

show that some unregenerate philosophers have indeed come to hold some knowledge of the one

true God. This knowledge is thought to have been attained through rational processes and not

through some form of special revelation (i.e. – Scriptures, dreams, visions, or hearing God speak

to them directly).

In pursuing this line of reasoning, we will only consider the views of some major pre-

Christian philosophers, thus avoiding the possibility of any Christian influence on the

philosophical conception of God.6 To accomplish our goal, we will first provide a brief overview

of the primary claims of Classical Christian Theism concerning the divine nature. We will then

5
WC, ch. 1, a. 1. The Belgic Confession of Faith, in the second article, clearly states, “We know him by two

means: first, by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe; which is before our eyes as a most

elegant book, wherein all creatures, great and small, are as so many characters leading us to contemplate the

invisible things of God, namely, his eternal power and Godhead, as the Apostle Paul saith (Rom. i. 20). All which

things are sufficient to convince men, and leave them without excuse”
6
A great deal of research has already been published about the so-called “God of the Philosophers.”

However, much of this work was done in order to compare the God of patristic, medieval, modern, and

contemporary philosophers with the God of Christian theism, or to discuss philosophical conceptions of God. Our

purpose is to show that some philosophers, who were not influenced by Christian Scriptures, have arrived at some

knowledge of the one true God.

 5

explain the models of divinity that were held by important pre-Christian philosophers such as the

Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. We believe that this comparison will reveal that pre-Christian

philosophers and Classical Christian Theists agree about several important truth claims

concerning the existence and nature of God, demonstrating that unregenerate human thinkers

have, without the aid of divinely inspired Scriptures, come to some knowledge of the true God,

who has revealed himself in Christian Scriptures. We will conclude by responding to some

possible critiques.

Classical Christian Theism

The primary claims of Classical Christian Theism in relationship to the divine nature are,

as I have argued in other published works, well summarized in the Belgic Confession of Faith,

one of the three forms of unity, which are supposed to be accepted by all Reformed churches,

“We all believe with the heart, and confess with the mouth, that there is one only simple and

spiritual Being, which we call God ; and that he is eternal, incomprehensible, invisible,

immutable, infinite, almighty, perfectly wise, just, good, and the overflowing fountain of all

good.”7

7
The Belgic Confession (1561), in Philip Schaff, The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, With Translations,

vol. 3 of The Creeds of Christendom, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 383-4. In The Augsburg

Confession of the Lutheran churches, article 1 of the first part says, that they believe “that there is one divine

essence which is called and is God, eternal, without body, indivisible [without part], of infinite power, wisdom,

goodness, the Creator and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and that yet there are three persons of the

same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. (The Augsburg Confession

(1530), in Philip Schaff, The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, With Translations, vol. 3 of The Creeds of
 6

Classical Christian theists also believe that though the divine nature is revealed in nature

in such a way that all men are able to come to some knowledge of it, it is only through special

revelation in Christian Scriptures that man can come to know of the doctrine of the Trinity.8 This

implies, of course, that though that which can be known through nature may be partial, it is not,

therefore, false. This true knowledge of God which is understood through nature (whether it be

through a simple intuition of Being,9 via some form of innate ideas which some identify with

Calvin’s Sensus Divinitatus, or through discursive reasoning), though insufficient for salvation,

is sufficient for man to be held responsible for not worshipping the Creator and thus for man to

be rightly judged by God. It is not, according to classical Christian theism, possible to know that

God is triune through nature, as this is only revealed in Scriptures.

Christendom, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1877), 7.)” The Westminster Confession and the London

Baptist Confession of Faith 1689 both agree with these articulations of the divine nature.
8
The Belgic Confession states that “We know him by two means: first, by the creation, preservation, and

government of the universe; which is before our eyes as a most elegant book, wherein all creatures, great and small,

are as so many characters leading us to contemplate the invisible things of God, namely, his eternal power and

Godhead, as the Apostle Paul saith (Rom. i. 20). All which things are sufficient to convince men, and leave them

without excuse. Secondly, he makes himself more clearly and fully known to us by his holy and divine Word; that is

to say, as far as is necessary for us to know in this life, to his glory and our salvation. (Belgic Confession, in Schaff,

EPC, 384.)” The Westminster Confession and Larger Catechism, as well as the Synod of Dort, all agree with this

statement, as does the London Baptist Confession of Faith 1689, and the French Confession of Faith which was

written by John Calvin himself. Upon this basis alone, therefore, it could be argued that all Protestants must hold to

these claims in order to be orthodox.

9
Cf. Jacques Maritain, “Man’s Approach to God”, in Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Readings, ed.

Roland Houde and Joseph P. Mullally (New York: J. B. Lippincott, Co, 1960), 331-332.
 7

These beliefs are typically taken to be based upon the right interpretation of Psalm 19:1-

4, Acts 14: 14-17, Acts 17: 22-31, Romans 1:19-20, and Romans 2:14-16. These verses are

taken, by the great majority of Christian exegetes throughout the history of the church, to clearly

teach the claims of Classical Christian Theism. But, have humans been able to come to any true

knowledge of God through their rational observations of nature? To answer this question, we

turn to the pre-Christian Greek philosophers.

Pre-Christian Knowledge of God

Pre-Socratics

Before we look at how the Pre-socratics thought about God, it is worth briefly discussing

a distinction that Giovanni Reale has aptly noted between philosophy and mythology. Aristotle,

in the Metaphysics, says, “And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant

(whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed of

wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they

were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end.”10 Reale notes that for

the ancient philosophers, there were three primary characteristics of Philosophy: (a) in regards to

content, philosophy sought to explain the totality of reality, (b) in relation to method, philosophy

seeks to give rational explanations of what is observed (moving beyond experience to what can

be known through experience), and (c) that the goal or end of philosophy is truth for the sake of

10
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 982b18, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, rev. ed., ed.

Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2:1554.

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truth11—that is, philosophy does not have, as we saw in the quote from Aristotle’s Metaphysics,

a practical purpose. Mythology, on the other hand, does not seek to give rational explanations of

what is observed, but the poets writing the myths proceed with, “imaginative descriptions, poetic

license, and intuitive analogies suggested by sensible experience.”12

So, mythology and philosophy are clearly related, but whereas mythology seeks to

“satisfy the desire for the marvelous”,13 philosophy seeks to understand the causes and reasons

for the marvelous. It is worth noting that both Greek mythology and Greek philosophy found it

necessary to use the notion of the divine to explain what was observed. In our overview of the

Pre-Socratics we will note that they began with their observations of the natural world, and were

drawn from these observations towards the notion of a higher principle which must be the cause

of the natural world. As Jaeger notes, “Taking the natural world as their starting-point, they

develop the idea of some highest principle…and then proceed to assert of it that ‘this must be the

Divine’.”14 This is, of course, what we essentially mean when we talk about Natural Theology.

Consider how some of the Pre-Socratics called upon the divine in order to explain the

marvelous.15

11
Giovanni Reale, From the Origins to Socrates, vol. 1 of A History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. and ed.

John R. Catan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 17-18.
12
Reale, FOS, 29.
13
Reale, FOS, 30.
14
Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (1947; repr., Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1967), 31.

15
It is worth noting, in passing, that most of what we know about the Pre-Socratics is based upon quotations

or references in later authors such as Plato, Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, Simplicius, etc. As such, we are patching
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Thales

Thales is said, according to common philosophical folklore, to be the first philosopher.

This is said to be the case because Thales was the first to turn from either mythological

explanations of the universe or purely practical concerns, to attempt to discover the primary

principle and cause of everything. Thales, according to philosophical tradition, said that this

primary principle was water.16

Now, though it might seem pointless to begin our consideration of Greek theology with a

discussion of such an obviously false claim—water is the principle and cause of everything that

exists. However, there are three important points that we must raise in relationship to Thales.

First of all, Thales was clearly looking for a reason or cause of everything. Secondly, his

observations of the universe led him to the realization that there must be a single unique cause of

all that exists. Giovanni Reale notes that the notion of a “principle”, which is present in Thales

(though the term itself was coined by Anaximander),17 refers to “a) the source or origin of all

things, b) the focus and final goal of all things, c) the permanent sustainer (substrate, we can say

with a term of later usage) of all things. In short, the ‘principle’ is that from which all things

come, that through which they exist, that into which they are resolved. Such a principle was

denominated by these first philosophers…as physis, a word that means, not ‘nature’ in the

together passing comments and occasional quotes, and attempting to figure out how they fit together. This means

that there will be some things that we cannot say with certainty.
16
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 983b20. Jaeger, TEGP, 20. Reale, FOS, 35.
17
Reale, FOS, 39.
 10

modern sense of the term, but rather the primary, original, and fundamental reality.”18 Thirdly,

Thales seems to have referred to this primary principle as God.19

Thus, Thales arrived at the conclusion that there must be a single first principle or cause

and sustainer of everything that exists (from which all exists, through which everything is, and

towards which everything tends), which is God. This much is true, and in complete agreement

with the teachings of the Bible and the Christian creeds and confessions, despite the other errors

that Thales introduced into his attempt at understanding the nature of this first principle.

Anaximander

Anaximander appears to have been the friend and disciple of Thales.20 As mentioned

above, Anaximander seems to have been the first to use the term “arche” to designate the first

18
Reale, FOS, 35.
19
Reale, FOS, 37. “Thales had said [according to Diogenes Laertius] that ‘God is most ancient because

ungenerated.’” Jaeger thinks, however, that Thales is not using the term “God” in its ordinary meaning (Jaeger,

TEGP, 21.).
20
Theophrastus in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, in Beginnings and Early Ionian

Thinkers, vol. II of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 2016), 1:276-277. Strabo, Geography, in in Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. II

of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 2016), 1:276-277.

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principle and cause of all things.21 For Anaximander, however, rather than finding the first

principle and cause of all things in a material element of the world (as Thales did before him, and

others would after him), he proposed that the “Apeiron” was the first principle and cause of all

things.22 This term, apeiron, is often translated as “infinite”, “unlimited”, or “unbounded”, but

Giovanni Reale notes that “‘A-peiron’ means that which is lacking a peras, that is, not only

external but internal limits or determinations as well. In the first meaning, apeiron indicates

unlimited space, unlimited quantity that is, a quantitative unlimited. In a second meaning,

instead, the unlimited is according to quality, that is, the qualitative unlimited.”23 So, the first

principle and cause of all things is that which is both quantitatively and qualitatively unlimited—

the absolutely infinite.24 Note, this is not a positive term, but a negative attribute—the negation

or absence of all limits. Reale notes that the claim that the first principle and cause of everything

is the infinite is based, for Anaximander, upon the claim that in order to be a first principle, it

must be uncaused or ungenerated, and imperishable.25 Aristotle, in discussing the views of the

physicists (those who proposed that phusis must be the principle of everything), provides an

interesting analysis of views associated with Anaximander,

For everything is either a principle or derived from a principle. But there cannot
be a principle of the infinite, for that would be a limit of it. Further, as it is a principle, it
21
Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, in Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. II of Early

Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

2016), 1:283.
22
Simplicius, CAP, 283. Reale, FOS, 39. Jaeger, TEGP, 24, 28.
23
Reale, FOS, 39.
24
This, of course, reminds us of something Van Til said about how the god discovered by the philosopher

could not be finite.

25
Reale, FOS, 39.
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is both uncreatable and indestructible. For there must be a point at which what has come
to be reaches its end, and also a termination of all passing away. That is why, as we say,
there is no principle of this, but it is this which is held to be the principle of other things,
and to encompass all and to steer all…Further they identify it with the divine, for it is
deathless and imperishable as Anaximander says.26
Aside from being infinite in both quantity and quality, as well as ungenerated and

imperishable (and, thus, eternal), Anaximander’s first principle, as is seen in the quote from

Aristotle’s Physics, also governs, rules, and encompasses all things. Reale notes that “To

encompass (περιέχειν), to rule (κυβερνᾶν) indicate and specify precisely the function of the

principle, that is, to embrace and rule all things because all things are generated from the

principle and they co-exist and have existence in and through the principle.”27 Now, some might

think, this is starting to sound a lot like an actual “deity”, but it can’t be, not in the works of the

Pre-Socratics. However, it is indeed the fact that, as Reale puts it, “Anaximander considered his

principle as divine, because it is immortal and incorruptible (the exact words of Anaximander

were ‘eternal and ever-youthful’).”28

So, both Thales and Anaximander, possibly the first true philosophers, proposed that the

entirety of all that exists flows out from a first principle or cause that, as far as they were

concerned, was God or, at very least, divine.29 Anaximander proposed that this divine first cause

was the infinite, eternal, ever-youthful, incorruptible, ruling, encompassing and governing

principle from which all other things flowed. Now, as hard as we can try to make this not sound

26
Aristotle, Physics, bk. III, 203b6-15, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of

Aristotle, rev. ed., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984),
27
Reale, FOS, 40.
28
Reale, FOS, 40.
29
Reale, FOS, 40.
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like a description of the divine nature, as it is described in orthodox Christian theology, it is hard

to deny that on these points at least, Anaximander was entirely right. He had accurately

described the one true God, in other words, on at least these points.

Of course, it is also right to note that both Thales and Anaximander would not go so far,

at least based upon the fragments and testimonies we have of their teachings, as to dissociate the

divine from the universe itself.30 So, at best, they seem to be advocating a form of Pantheism—in

which God is the world, and the world is divine. This is what would undergird the claims of

Thales, at least, that experience with nature (phusis) puts us in contact with the divine,

“experience of the reality of φύσις provides it [our understanding] with a new source of

knowledge of the Divine: it is there for us to grasp as if with our own hands, everywhere in the

world.”31 This is why they were called the naturalists (a reference to the common translation of

the Greek word phusis), because though there was necessarily a first uncaused cause of all

things, this first cause was not necessarily altogether separate from the everything of which it

was the principle.

Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles

To a certain extent, if we compare Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles with

Anaximander, we could almost suggest that they took a short step back towards the approach of

30
According to Aëtius, for example, “Anaximander declared that the unlimited heavens are gods (Aëtius

1.7.12, in Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. II of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and

Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1:294-295.).”

31
Jaeger, TEGP, 22.
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Thales (who had proposed that one element of the physical universe was the ultimate and first

principle of the universe—water).32 For, according to Aristotle, Anaximenes (who is said to have

studied with Anaximander)33 proposed that the first principle was air (unlimited in what it can

become, but limited according to its qualities).34 Reale suggests that Anaximenes changed the

first principle of Anaximander to air in order to somehow account for the generation of

everything (a problem that Anaximander had trouble solving).35 Heraclitus (who is said by some

to have studied with Xenophanes)36 proposed that the first principle was fire.37 Empedocles

proposed that the first principle was earth.38

However, it may not be as simple as it first appears. In fact, Anaximenes also thought that

the first principle (air) was God,39 and rationally governed all things via the divine mind.40

32
Reale notes that a number of scholars question this idea, suggesting that we see “a progress over his

predecessors by trying to explain rationally the qualitative difference of the things which are derived from a

quantitative difference of the originating principle. (Reale, FOS, 47.)”

33
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, in Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. II of

Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 2016), 1:335. Cf. Reale, FOS, 45.

34
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 984a5. Simplicius, CAP, 339. Reale, FOS, 45.
35
Reale, FOS, 45.
36
Diogenes Laertius, LEP, in EIT, vol. III of EGP, 2:124-125.
37
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 984a6.
38
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 984a7.
39
Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, in Beginnings and Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. II of Early Greek

Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016),

1:345. Cf. Reale, FOS, 46.

40
Jaeger, TEGP, 36.
 15

Heraclitus seems to describe the first principle (fire) as the “wise” God that transcends and

governs all things (though he may, as we will see, have been influenced by Xenophanes in

this).41 He clearly states, in comparing the divine nature and the human nature, that “The human

character does not possess judgments (gnômai), but the divine one possesses them.”42 Another

helpful quote is found in Diogenes Laertius, “One thing, what is wise: to know the thought

(gnômê) that steers all things through all things.”43 Gnomaî or gnômê in these quotes could be

translated as knowledge or intelligence. These statements have led scholars to believe that

Heraclitus understood the first principle of all things, that which provides the overarching

harmony for the conflict of opposites which grounds the perpetual flux of sensible reality (the

appearances), to be a divine intellect.44 Heraclitus also calls his first principle the logos,45 which

seems to mean a rational or intellectual law which is found in, and governs, all things.46

So, with Anaximenes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, we see philosophers contemplating

the universe that presents itself to them, considering what those who preceded them had

observed, and coming to the conclusion that there must be a first principle of the totality of

41
Jaeger, TEGP, 125, 126. Heraclitus is said, in Plato’s Greater Hippias, to have taken God to be greater

than man in “wisdom, beauty, and everything else. (Plato, Greater Hippias, in Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. III of

Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 2016), 2: 175.)” Reale notes that it is “clear that God or the Divine for Heraclitus…coincides with this fire.

(Reale, FOS, 52-53.)”

42
Heraclitus, in Origen, Against Celsus, in EIT, vol. III of EGP, 2:174-175.
43
Heraclitus, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, in EIT, vol. III of EGP, 2:158-159.
44
Reale, FOS, 53.
45
Reale, FOS, 53.
46
Reale, FOS, 53.
 16

everything that is. With Anaximenes and Heraclitus, this first principle was endowed with an

intellect and possessed knowledge and wisdom (this appears to be a development when

compared with those who preceded them). Furthermore, this divine intellect governs and directs

all things (allowing us to bring the term “divine providence” into the description of God. Again,

in these elements, these philosophers seem to have latched onto some truths about God, and, this,

despite a number of errors that can be found in their thought.

Xenophanes

Xenophanes is said to have studied under Anaximander47 and taught Parmenides48 and

Empedocles.49 Xenophanes explained the existence of the totality of reality by arguing that there

is one God in a way that has been taken by some Christians as resembling a form of

monotheism.50 His idea of there being one supreme God,51 as Aristotle notes, came from his

47
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, in Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. III of Early Greek

Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 2:

14-15.
48
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 986b21.
49
Diogenes Laertius, LEP, in EIT, vol. III, of EGP, 2:14-15.
50
Jaeger, TEGP, 42, 43.
51
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. III of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and

trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 2:32-33. Clement says,

“Xenophanes of Colophon, who teaches that god is one and bodiless, does well when he asserts, One god, among

both gods and humans the greatest, Neither in bodily frame similar to mortals nor in thought.”
 17

contemplation of the heavens.52 In this text, Aristotle notes that Xenophanes says that “the One is

God.”53 Now, Reale rightly warns against finding, in Xenophanes, the type of monotheism that

we find in Judeo-Christian Religions.54 He argues that such a form of monotheism would be an

a-historical interpretation of Xenophanes, as it is clearly contrary to the “mental attitude of the

entire Greek outlook”,55 and as Xenophanes seems to be leaning more to the view of many gods

with One God that rules them all (as can be seen in the quote attributed to Xenophanes by

Clement of Alexandria, “One god, among both gods and humans the greatest.”56). Reale argues,

in fact, that it is better to speak of Xenophanes’ God in terms of a “cosmos-God”.57 Reale

suggests, in fact, that Xenophanes could be read as proposing a form of pantheism, however, he

cautions against being overly dogmatic, as Xenophanes, “if he identified God with the whole

world, also continued to speak of Gods without determining their relationship with the world.”58

Reale is right to caution against overly dogmatic interpretations of Xenophanes, for the

very quotes that Reale uses to propose a pantheistic cosmic-God could also be read as proposing

a hierarchy of divine beings with a single and simple supreme divinity ruling over the entire

universe by his transcendent and immanent presence in and beyond every part of the universe.

52
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 986b24-25.
53
Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 986b24-25.
54
Reale, FOS, 79-80.
55
Reale, FOS, 79.
56
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in Early Ionian Thinkers, vol. III of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and

trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 2:32-33.
57
Reale, FOS, 80.
58
Reale, FOS, 81.
 18

Indeed, Jaeger notes that “Xenophanes is not to be dismissed with the word pantheist.”59 Rather,

says Jaeger, “the one all-embracing God is so far superior to all the other lesser divine forces that

he alone could really seem important to Xenophanes.”60 Furthermore, contradicting Reale’s first

argument against finding monotheism in Xenophanes, Jaeger notes that “The idea of an

omnipotent Being, transcending all the other powers in the world, even the gods themselves, was

one which the later epic-writers had already associated with their highest god.”61

Jaeger suggests that with Xenophanes, “we find a new motif, which is the actual source

of his theology. It is nothing that rests on logical proof, nor is it really philosophical at all, but

springs from an immediate sense of awe at the sublimity of the Divine.”62 Indeed, this awe can

be described as religious, for, as Jaeger remarks, “no one can doubt that Xenophanes actually

prays to his God.”63

He declared the character of the one supreme God to be an ungenerated and undying,64

conscious,65 immaterial,66 personal being.67 The God of Xenophanes was also unmoving or

59
Jaeger, TEGP, 43.
60
Jaeger, TEGP, 44.
61
Jaeger, TEGP, 46.
62
Jaeger, TEGP, 49.
63
Jaeger, TEGP, 44.
64
Reale, FOS, 78.
65
Jaeger, TEGP, 44.
66
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in EIT, vol. III of EGP, 2:32-33.
67
Jaeger, TEGP, 44. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Against the Natural Philosophers, in Early Ionian Thinkers, vol.

III of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
 19

immutable,68 all powerful,69 morally upright,70 and absolute unity.71 According to Jaeger,

Xenophanes thought that the anthropomorphic views of God (found in Homer and Hesiod) did

not do justice to the divine nature, and needed to be rejected,72 using a form of what I have called

in another paper the principle of appropriate predication.73 The effect of Xenophanes’s critique

of anthropomorphic views of God, according to Reale, was that “Western man could no longer

comfortably conceive the divine according to a human form and measure.”74

Xenophanes seems to have been the origin of the idea that God was not some sort of

cultural construct, but, rather, that there was one God for all people of all nations (whether they

believed in Him or not).75 This, as Jaeger has noted, “was not an isolated phenomenon. He

merely brought to the full light of consciousness the inevitable consequences of the philosophical

University Press, 2016), 2: 32-33. Sextus Empiricus says, “As a whole he sees, as a whole he thinks, and as a whole

he hears.”
68
Jaeger, TEGP, 45. Reale, FOS, 78. Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, in Early Ionian

Thinkers, vol. III of Early Greek Philosophy, ed. and trans. André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 2016), 2:34-35.

69
Jaeger, TEGP, 45. Theophrastus in Simplicius, CAP, in EIT, vol. III of EGP, 2:76-79. In this excerpt from

Simplicius, Theophrastus is quoted to the effect that Xenophanes argued that there is One principle and cause of all

who is all powerful and the absolute best, who is ungenerated, neither unlimited (or infinite) nor limited, neither

moving nor moved.

70
Jaeger, TEGP, 47.
71
Jaeger, TEGP, 51.
72
Jaeger, TEGP, 47. Cf. Reale, FOS, 78.
73
Jaeger, TEGP, 49-51.
74
Reale, FOS, 79.
75
Jaeger, TEGP, 48.
 20

revolution in religious faith to which the Ionian theories of nature led; from this time on,

universalism had a place in the theology of all Greek thinkers as one of their basic assumptions,

whether or not they took the trouble to express it.”76

We can make a similar observation about Xenophanes as we made of the other Pre-

Socratics. Whatever errors he may have introduced into his understanding of God, he rightly

described God as the intelligent and personal first principle or cause of the totality of the

universe. He rightly describes God as without beginning or ending, as immutable, omnipotent,

morally upright, absolutely one, and as the ultimately supreme Being that is in all but beyond all.

Plato

We begin our discussion of Plato by noting that the views of Plato on the divine are far

from easy to summarize without the risk of oversimplification, or the exclusion of important

themes. For example, in the Apology we learn that one of the accusations against Socrates was

that he did not believe in the gods,77 yet, in the same work he calls upon the god to let the trial

proceed according to his will,78 and then sets out to convince the jury that he does, in a sense,

believe in the gods. Later, he calls upon “the god at Delphi” to help him in his defense.79 There

76
Jaeger, TEGP, 48.
77
Plato, Apology 23d, 24b, 26c, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M.

Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 23.
78
Plato, Apology 19a.
79
Plato, Apology 20a.
 21

seems to be a clear polytheism in Plato,80 and yet, he also seems so suggest the existence of a

higher deity (perhaps even leaning, towards the end of his life, towards a form of Monotheism).81

Add to this Plato’s discussion about the Demi-urge in the Timaeus, the Nous in the Philebus, and

his hierarchy of the Forms which has the One-Good-Dyad as the highest divine principle, and we

have plenty of room for debate and discord.82 As such, we will restrain ourselves to making a

couple comments about Plato’s views concerning the divine.

We begin with the Timaeus, where we find Plato’s “account” of the production of the

sensible world of change. For our purposes, it is important to note that in the relevant passages,

he first argues, through the voice of Timaeus that “everything that comes to be must of necessity

come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be without a

80
Cf. Gustav E. Mueller, “Plato and the Gods”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 45, no. 5 (Sept., 1936): 462-

466. In the Neo-Platonic thought of Proclus, for example, his hierarchy of emanations will begin with the One-Good

as the ultimate and supreme principle and cause of all things. This One-Good is called, by Proclus, God. However,

Proclus then finds a way to fit the gods of Greek polytheism into his hierarchy, as lower emanations from the One-

Good. Is Plato’s Polytheism in some way similar to Proclus? One ultimate cause and principle of all things, which

creates a pantheon of lesser deities?

81
Cf. Mueller, “Plato and the Gods”, 469-472. See also F. M. Cornford’s remark, in his response to A. E.

Taylor, “I now admit that it is, on the whole, truer to say that Plato was at heart a monotheist than to say that he was

not. He may have combined polytheism and monotheism in somewhat the same way that St. Thomas found to

justify what a strict Jew or Mohammedan might regard as the polytheism of the Roman Church (F. M. Cornford,

“The ‘Polytheism’ of Plato: An Apology”, Mind, vol. 47, no. 187 (Jul., 1938): 324.)”
82
R. Hackforth notes, for example, that Plato applies the terms “God” or “Divine” to numerous very

different things, such as the Demi-urge, the sensible universe, the forms, etc. (Cf. R. Hackforth, “Plato’s Theism”,

The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 30, no. 1 (Jan., 1936): 4.)

 22

cause.”83 Then, turning to the question of the universe, he asks whether the universe has always

existed or came into existence at some point, his answer is “It has come to be. For it is both

visible and tangible and it has a body—and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we

have shown, perceptible things are grasped by opinion, which involves sense perception. As

such, they are things that come to be, things that are begotten.”84 The question now is, if that

which comes to be is brought about by some causal agent, and if the entire visible universe has

come to be, then how did this causal agent bring about the sensible universe? The answer? “Now

surely it's clear to all that it was the eternal model he looked at, for, of all the things that have

come to be, our universe is the most beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most excellent.

This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless

and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.”85 Having established these points,

Timaeus suggest that he provide a plausible account of how the craftsman brought about the

83
Plato, Timaeus 28a, trans. Donald 1. Zeyl, in The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S.

Hutchinson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 1234.

84
Plato, Timaeus 28c. It is important to note, here, that Plato is not saying that there was only the Demi-

urge, and then, out of nothing (ex nihilo), the Demi-urge created the sensible universe. Rather, Plato is saying that

the Demi-Urge organized the material chaos by looking at the eternal forms. Giovanni Reale explains Plato’s

creation story as follows, “the creative activity of the Platonic demiurge is not unconditioned, insofar as it

presupposes, in order for it to act, the existence of two realities having between them a bipolar metaphysical nexus:

that of a being that is always identical, that functions as an exemplar, and that of a sensible material Principle,

characterized by more-and-less, by unequal, by disorder and excess. (Giovanni Reale, Plato and Aristotle, vol. 2 of

A History of Ancient Philosophy, trans. and ed. by John R. Catan (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,

1990), 109.)”
85
Plato, Timaeus 29a.
 23

sensible universe, and the rest of the dialogue deals with the “creation” of the sensible universe,

by the Demi-urge, who consulted the eternal and immutable forms in order to create the best

possible world in imitation of these forms.86 Of interest, here, is that his proposition that the

sensible universe was brought about by a wise and rational craftsman is “proved” prior to

providing a “plausible account” of “how” the Demi-urge produced the sensible universe. The

arguments concerning the production of the sensible universe are proposed as proofs which

provide the impetus for providing an account of how the production took place. It is reasonable,

therefore, to conclude that Plato thinks it necessary to explain the existence of the sensible

universe by calling upon a wise and rational “divinity” who modeled the sensible world after the

eternal and pre-existing divine ideas (which, for Plato, are other than, and above, the demi-Urge).

Clearly the demi-Urge is not entirely like the Christian conception of a creator God, though this

is not to say that there are not some similarities.87

Turning to Plato’s Laws, we find Plato asking the question, “Tell me, gentlemen, to

whom do you give the credit for establishing your codes of law? Is it a god, or a man?”88 One of

the issues dealt with in this book is the divine foundation for the laws of Athens, and, in Book X,

86
Stephen Menn suggests that the Nous of the Philebus is essentially the Demi-Urge of the Timaeus, and

that these two are, quite simply, reason itself. This seems to suggest that the notion that the sensible universe was

produced by divine reason (a doctrine also found in many pre-Socratics) is a doctrine that Plato wishes to maintain

as both rationally acceptable and, indeed, necessary (cf. Stephen Menn, “Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as

the Good”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Mar., 1992): 15.).
87
This point is well made by F. M. Cornford (cf. Cornford, “The ‘Polytheism’ of Plato: An Apology”, 324-

329.).
88
Plato, Laws, bk. 1, 624a, trans. Trevor J. Saunders, in The Complete Works of Plato, ed. John M. Cooper

and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), 1319.

 24

Plato attempts to refute one of the misconceptions about the Gods which might lead men to lead

lawless lives: Atheism.89 He does this by arguing that soul is the primordial principle of all

movement. R. Hackforth, in his article on Plato’s theism, notes that “It is often said, and is

probably the orthodox views, (I) that ψυχή is there treated as an ultimate principle of things and

(2) that there is a hierarchy of ψυχαί amongst which one ἀρίστη ψυχή is God in the sense of a

single spiritual Being who rules the world with providential care and wisdom.”90 Hackforth then

sets out to prove that this commonly held view is false. That is, he wishes show that if we are to

talk about Plato’s theism, then we must look to the nous of the Philebus which is essentially

transcendent reason which produces and governs the sensible universe.91 Michael L. Morgan,

however, notes that regardless of whether or not Plato ultimately proves that God exists, in book

X of the Laws, he clearly “associates divinity with priority, self-sufficiency, motion, and life.”92

Morgan also notes, that “In the Republic (II 380c-383c and Book X) and Phaedrus (245c5-

246a2), for example, he reflects on the causal and hence providential dimensions of divinity,

how divinity is responsible for motion, life, and goodness in the natural world.”93 For many

89
Plato suggest that, “No one who believes in gods as the law directs ever voluntarily commits an unholy

act or lets any lawless word pass his lips. If he does, it is because of one of three possible misapprehensions: either,

as I said, he believes (1) the gods do not exist, or (2) that they exist but take no thought for the human race, or (3)

that they are influenced by sacrifices and supplications and can easily be won over. (Plato, Laws, bk. X, 885b.)”
90
Hackforth, “Plato’s Theism”, 4.
91
Hackforth, “Plato’s Theism”, 5. This interpretation of Plato corresponds with what Menn also suggests

(Op.cit.).
92
Michael L. Morgan, “Plato and Greek religion”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard

Kraut (1992; repr., New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 240.
93
Morgan, “Plato and Greek religion”, 240.
 25

scholars, it seems reasonable to think that Plato equated the Nous of the Philebus with the Demi-

urge of the Timaeus.

In the neo-platonic thought of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus, Plato’s understanding of

the constituents of the world is slightly tweaked, and that which Plato proposed as his highest

divine principle—the One-Good—is explicitly named God (from whom all other beings emanate

through various stages of being), and many early Christian theologians (including Pseudo-

Dionysius) found in the Platonic notion of the One-Good, an apt philosophical description of the

divine nature of the Christian God. This is a somewhat debated question, some scholars have

suggested that Plato himself may have understood the ultimate dyadic principle as God,

however, this is probably not the case.94 It is worth noting, however, that the One-Good-Dyad

was, for Plato, divine, and the highest principle and exemplar cause of all the Forms, including

Being itself, and, therefore, of everything else that in any way is.95 Though Plato’s One-Good-

Dyad eventually became the God of Neo-Platonism, and was extremely influential in early

Christian descriptions of the God of the Bible, it was not was Plato’s God. The closest thing we

get to, in Plato, to a divinity is the Demi-urge: the intelligent, powerful craftsman which gave

existence to the sensible world by organizing the primal chaos in imitation of the best of the

94
Clodius Piat, in his article “Dieu, d’après Platon » (Revue néo-scolastique, 12, n. 46 (1905): 198.), notes

that Plato never equated the dyadic One-Good with a personal Divine being (even if we accept the position of Piat, it

must be remembered that Plato would have called this dyadic principle “divine”. Cf. Reale, Plato and Aristotle,

114.). Maurice Corvez, in his indepth study of Plato’s ultimate principle, concurs (Maurice Corvez, “Le Dieu de

Platon », Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 3e serie, tome 65, no. 85 (1967) : 5-35), as do most, if not all,

contemporary interpreters of Plato.

95
Cf. Piat, « Dieu, d’après Platon”, 199.
 26

eternal Forms, and primarily in imitation of the One-Good-Dyad. We can make a similar

observation about Plato as we made of the Pre-Socratics. Whatever errors he may have

introduced into his understanding of God, he rightly described God as the intelligent, wise,

powerful, and personal first principle or cause of the totality of the sensible universe.

Aristotle

Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, book Λ (12), discusses the existence of a “first unmoved

mover”,96 which he also calls the “principle” upon which depends the heavens and all of

nature,97 and “God”.98 Aristotle describes “God” as, “a mover which moves without being

moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.”99 Later, he explains that this God is eternally

living in an eternal state of actual pleasure.100 Furthermore, says Aristotle, “If, then, God is

always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better

this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the

actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most

good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and

duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God.”101 He goes on to describe God

96
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072a19-36, trans. W. D. Ross, in the Complete Works of Aristotle,

revised, ed. Jonathan Barnes (1984; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 2:1694.
97
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072b14-17, trans. W. D. Ross, 2: 1695.
98
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072b24-31, trans. W. D. Ross, 2:1695.
99
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072a25-26, trans. W. D. Ross, 2: 1694.
100
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072b15-16, trans. W. D. Ross, 2:1695.
101
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1072b24-31, trans. W. D. Ross, 2:1695.
 27

as, “a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been

shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible.

For it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power…it is also

clear that it is impassive and unalterable.”102

There are a number of important conclusions that we can draw from just these short

excerpts from the Metaphysics. First of all, Aristotle believes that he has proved the existence of

one unique God—not one God among many, but one God. Secondly, this God is, as a final

cause, the principle upon which depend the heavens and all of nature. Thirdly, as can be seen in

the comment that such a being inspires “wonder”, it would appear that Aristotle thinks that this

God is worthy of some form of adoration. Fourthly, God is said to be eternal, pure actuality,

immutable, necessarily existing, alive, joyful and eternally happy, thinking thought, most good,

immaterial, transcendent (“separate from sensible things”), un-extended (in other words, not

constrained to any one place—omnipresent), absolutely simple (without parts and indivisible),

absolutely infinite, and impassible.

What we see here is a fairly clear statement of what might be called “classical

monotheism”. The very same predications made by Aristotle about God, are predicated of the

divine nature of the Christian God. It would seem, then, that if there is only one true God, and if

something of God is knowable when we consider the things He has created, then Aristotle has

come to some knowledge of the one true God—namely, that God exists, something of the divine

nature, and that this God is worthy of worship.

102
Aristotle, Metaphysics, book Λ (12), 1073a4-11, trans. W. D. Ross, 2:1695.
 28

Some, however, seem to be concerned by the claim that Aristotle’s God is “thought

thinking itself.” Wouldn’t this imply that Aristotle’s God lacks omniscience—unlimited

knowledge of all things? Thomas De Koninck notes that to propose that Aristotle’s God,

understood as thought thinking itself, is ignorant of everything other than Himself, “obliges us to

isolate the book Λ and to put it in contradiction with many other texts of Aristotle where the

question of God is approached...It is these which have been most often emphasized, since

Brentano in particular, to defend Aristotle against this interpretation. Their cumulative effect is

undeniable.”103

Aquinas, along with the greater part of the tradition of Aristotelian commentators,104

agrees with De Koninck’s verdict, “We believe, however, that this is immediately evident: an

ignorant God is a contradiction in terms, all ignorance being a manifest imperfection and God, if

he is, is perfect being.”105 After having commented on the sections that we quoted above,

Aquinas arrives at the section of the Metaphysics where Aristotle describes God as thought

thinking itself. Aquinas comments a portion of this text, and then adds the following comment:

Now we must bear in mind that the Philosopher’s aim is to show that God does not
understand something else but only himself, inasmuch as the thing understood is the
perfection of the one understanding and of his activity, which is understanding. It is also

103
Thomas De Koninck, Aristote, l’intelligence et Dieu (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 32.

My translation of the French, “oblige à isoler le livre Λ et à le mettre en contradiction avec quantité d'autres textes

d'Aristote ou il est question de Dieu...Ce sont ceux-la qu'on a fait le plus souvent valoir, depuis Brentano

notamment, pour défendre Aristote contre cette interprétation. Leur effet cumulatif est indéniable.”
104
Cf. De Koninck, AID, 31.
105
De Koninck, AID, 33. My translation of the French, “Nous croyons qu'il s'agit toutefois ici d'une

évidence immédiate: un Dieu ignorant est une contradiction dans les termes, toute ignorance étant une imperfection

manifeste et Dieu l'être parfait s'il en est.”

 29

evident that nothing else can be understood by God in such a way that it would be the
perfection of His intellect. It does not follow, however, that all things different from
Himself are not known by Him; for by understanding Himself He knows all other things.
This is made clear as follows. Since God is His own act of understanding and is the noblest
and most powerful being, His act of understanding must be most perfect. Therefore He
understands Himself most perfectly. Now the more perfectly a principle is known, the more
perfectly is its effect known in it; for things derived from principles are contained in the
power of their principle. Therefore, since the heavens and the whole of nature depend on
the first principle, which is God, God obviously knows all things by understanding
Himself.106
Jonathan Lear, in his work on Aristotle, agrees with Aquinas, adding that, “the possibility

lies open that God thinks the (essences embodied in the) world as a whole).”107 Lear adds, “The

world has an order and thus can be thought of as a whole. God’s thinking is a thinking this

whole, but in a strange sense he is not thinking about the world at all. His thinking is independent

of the world; yet it is because of his thinking that the world comes to have the order it has.”108 In

other words, the divine thought cannot be said to be thinking of the world in any way that would

make its thought dependent on the world. Rather, it must be said that the very being of the whole

world is entirely dependent on the divine thought thinking it. It would seem, then, that the God of

Aristotle also knows all things other than Himself, but not in a way that would make His

knowledge dependent on the existing of all other things.

Some Possible Critiques

We have now provided a brief survey of some of the most important pre-Christian

thinkers. These philosophers were not influenced by Christianity, nor by Hebrew or Christian

106
Aquinas, CAM§2614-2615, trans. John P. Rowan, 828
107
Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The desire to understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 305.
108
Lear, Aristotle, 306.
 30

Scriptures. Most of these thinkers went against the Greek culture of their time period, rejecting

the panoply of gods, and argued that there must be one principle or cause of the entire universe.

Arguably, they did not all arrive at equally the same amount of truth claims, and they frequently

contradict themselves. However, it is striking to note that even the most obviously contradictory

or incoherent positions still claim that, at least: there is one God that is the principle or cause of

all that exists. The historical position of Christian theism, concerning natural knowledge of God,

is that even the pagans can know something true about the one and only God that exists, and,

this, without recourse to special revelation. These truths are obtained via the reasoned

observation and consideration of the sensible universe. Our overview of the positions of these

thinkers has shown that the historical position of Christian theism is vindicated by the writings of

the Pre-Christian philosophers—some people have come to know some truths about God via

reasoned observations of the sensible universe. We turn, now, to some possible objections.

No Trinity, therefore, Not the True God

An example of this critique can be found in the Van Til’s book Christian Apologetics,

where he states, “In not challenging this basic presupposition with respect to himself as the final

reference point in predication the natural man may accept the ‘theistic proofs’ as fully valid. He

may construct such proofs. He has constructed such proofs. But the God whose existence he

proves to himself in this way is always a God who is something other than the self-contained

ontological Trinity of Scripture.”109 The idea, here, is that unregenerate man may indeed

109
Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 98. Cf. Van Til, DF, 101.
 31

construct numerous proofs of the existence of God, which he accepts as formally valid, but, that

because these proofs in no way lead us to the existence of the Triune God.

We must note that Van Til is entirely right in saying that the God whose existence has

been proven by the pre-Christian philosophers is not a triune deity. We think, however, that this

does not imply that these philosophers have therefore failed to come to some knowledge about

the one true God that exists. There are three comments which must be made in order to show that

this critique does not hold water. First of all, Christian Scriptures and theologians nowhere

affirm that man can know anything about the divine trinity from nature alone. Rather, the

continuous testimony of Christian Scriptures, theologians, and confessions all seems to agree (1)

that something of the divine nature can be known via nature, (2) that what is known of the divine

nature through the sensible universe does pick out something that is true of God, and (3) that the

three persons in the one divine nature are only revealed in Scriptures. This, however, is not what

we expected to find in the first place.

Secondly, if it is necessary to know of the three persons of the divine Trinity in order to

have knowledge about God, then the prophets, priests, and people of Israel who lived prior to

Christ had no knowledge of God. The God that is revealed in the Old Testament is not revealed

as Triune, but as One. This is, in fact, one of the difficulties that contributed to the debates in the

first four centuries of the Church concerning the nature of Jesus and his relation to the Father and

the Holy Spirit. Thus, via Reductio ad absurdum, we must allow for the possibility that it is

possible to know something of the divine nature (to truly possess knowledge about the one God

that exists), without knowing (1) everything about the divine nature, or (2) anything about the

Trinity. If this is the case, then we are fully entitled to point at the true statements that were made

by Pre-Christian philosophers about God, and affirm that they indeed knew something true about
 32

God (even if they didn’t know everything, and introduced many errors into what they knew

about God).

Thirdly, this critique seems to assume that one must know the person in order to know

the existence of the being. That is, this critique assumes that in order to know that God exists,

one must know who God is (three persons in one essence). This, however, is demonstrably false.

It is entirely possible to know that the police officer coming towards your car to give you a

speeding ticket is a human person without knowing anything about his person—who he is.

Anybody who has ever gone fishing is able to know, within a short period of time, whether he

has snagged a fish or a log sitting on the bottom of the lake. The fisherman can determine, just

by observing the effects on his line and pole, something about what is causing the effects (fish or

log). Let’s assume that he has caught a fish: even though the fisherman may not yet know the

exact type of fish he has caught, nor the exact size, colours, and so on, he is able to say with

certainty that he has caught something which is of the nature of a fish, he can also say something

about how it is acting (that it is putting up a good fight, that it doesn’t want to be caught, etc.),

and that it is not a log, or a rock. We could multiply our examples, but, the point is: it is possible

to know that something is, without knowing anything about it (that there is a cause of the

observed effects); and, it may even be able to know something about the nature of the thing

whose existence we have proven (for example, what it is not). As such, it is not necessary to

know anything of the three persons of the triune God in order to know (1) that God exists, and

(2) something of the divine nature.

 33

Introducing Greek thought into Christian Doctrine

Many forms of this critique have been advanced since the advent of modern philosophy.

The particular form of this counterargument that we will mention is found in Cornelius Van Til’s

Defense of the Faith. Critiquing the Roman Catholic acceptance of some Greek notions of God,

Van Til says, “The theism of Roman Catholic theology is not ‘theism come to its own’; it is a

vague, general sort of theism. It is a theism in which the God of Christianity and the god of

Greek philosophy, particularly the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, are ground together into a

common mixture. The theism of Romanist theology is a theism heavily freighted with pagan

elements of thought. If such a theism were proved to be true, then the Christian theism of the

Reformed Christian would be proved to be untrue. If with the Romanist we ‘prove’ the existence

of a god, then we have disproved the existence of the God of Christianity.”110 Note the bold

claim at the end of this quote: (1) if the theism of Roman Catholic theology is true, then the

Christian theism of Reformed theology is false. (2) If we prove the existence of a god, then the

God of Christianity does not exist.

Now, we have already shown that it is possible to know some truths about the existence

and nature of the one true God without knowing every truth about God, and without knowing

anything about the three persons of the divine Trinity. So, we need not return to these points, and

if all that Van Til is saying, in this quote, is that in order to know something true about God one

must adhere to every single truth about God that is articulated in the Reformed doctrine of God,

then we have already answered this claim. It is not necessary to have exhaustive knowledge of

something in order to know some truths about the thing in question. In fact, nobody has

110
Van Til, DF, 307-308.
 34

exhaustive knowledge of their own selves, yet everybody would agree that they know some

truths about themselves. There are, however, four points which we would like to point out in

order to show the absurdity of these claims and this critique.

First of all, Protestant theology has traditionally accepted the truth of the Roman Catholic

understanding of the divine nature. Thus, the first statement is both arrogant and false. Arrogant,

if Van Til pretends to be speaking for all Reformed theologians and Reformed theology in

general. False, for if we compare the “theism of Roman Catholic theology” as articulated by

Augustine, Anselm, or Aquinas, for example, with the “theism of Reformed theology” as

articulated by the Reformed confessions quoted above (or by the great Reformed theologians of

the 1500s to the 1700s), we discover them to be essentially the same.111 In fact, in an article on

the Classical Calvinist doctrine of God, Paul Helm states the exact opposite of Cornelius Van

Til, “I reckon”, says Helm, “that there is no such thing as the ‘Classical Calvinist Doctrine of

God.’ This ‘doctrine’ is none other than the mainstream Christian doctrine of God. It is the same,

give or take some details, as that set forth by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas—the A team—

three of the formative Christian theologians in the period before the Reformation.”112 Helm then

goes on, in this article, to demonstrate that the doctrine of God that is found in the writings of

Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas is essentially the same as that found in the works of Calvin and

other reformed theologians. The point is, Paul Helm is demonstrably right concerning Reformed

111
For a more elaborate demonstration of this fact, see David Haines, “Classical Theism in the Magisterial

Reformers and Reformed Orthodoxy” in Joseph Minich and Onsi A. Kamel, eds., The Lord is One: Reclaiming

Divine Simplicity (Leesburg, VA: The Davenant Press, 2019), 95-110.

Paul Helm, “Classical Calvinist Doctrine of God”, in Perspectives on the Doctrine of God: 4 views, ed.
112

Bruce A. Ware (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2008), 5.

 35

theism, and Van Til is demonstrably wrong. The doctrine of God that is found in Reformed

theology just is the same as the doctrine of God that is found in Roman Catholic theology.

Secondly, one wonders if this is not a case of the genetic fallacy—arguing that some truth

statement is indeed false due to its provenance. That is, Van Til seems to be suggesting that if a

statement about God is made by a pagan philosopher (or a Roman Catholic theologian), then it is

false. Such a claim, however, is clearly a case of the genetic fallacy—in fact, provenance does

not determine truth status. A statement may be made by Satan himself, but, if it is true, it is true,

regardless of who said it. Furthermore, Van Til is clearly rejecting the attitude of the great

Patristic theologians (such as Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil of Caesarea, etc.) who claimed

that all truth is God’s truth, regardless of where it is found. Thus, if we find some truth about

God in the writings of a pagan philosopher, we should not be afraid of this truth, but, rather, we

should treat it like a diamond—remove it from the dirt, clean it off, and use it to adorn Christian

theology. Truth is truth, regardless of said it. As we have seen, the pre-Christian theologians said

many true statements about God (for example, that God exists, that God is eternal, infinite,

immutable, all-powerful, wise, sovereign, intelligent, etc.). These statements, said of God, are

true regardless of who says them.

Thirdly, the very logic of these statement just seems suspect. For example, according to

Van Til, if the theism of RC theology is true (that is, if the God of RC theology is demonstrated

to exist), then the theism of Reformed theology is false. Would not the appropriate response,

then, be: “well, if Reformed theism is false and RC theism is true, then, those who wish to be in

the truth, and adore the true God that exists, should adhere to RC theism?” Van Til, the Roman

Catholic Apologist. Thankfully, as has already been shown, this is simply a false statement.
 36

Fourth, it is worth noting that the Reformed theologians have traditionally, and almost

unanimously, held the opinion that the pagan and Greek philosophers have indeed arrived at

some knowledge of truths about the one true God through their reasoned observations and

contemplation of nature. A couple key examples will suffice to prove this point. William

Tyndale (1494-1536) was a leading English reformer who translated the Bible into English. In a

treatise called The Parable of the Wicked Mammon, Tyndale states that “though the learned men

(as the philosophers) came to the knowledge of God by the creatures of the world, yet had they

no power to worship God.”113 Note, Tyndale clearly thinks that what the pagan philosophers said

truly about God, was “knowledge of God”.

Pietro Martyr Vermigli (1499-1562), for example, in his commentary on Romans 1:19-

20, that pagan thinkers “knew that God is most mighty by the very fabric of this world. They also

knew by the beauty, appearance, and variety of things that such great power was ordered by the

highest providence and wisdom. Moreover, the suitability and utility of created things taught

them the divine majesty, which consists chiefly in acting well towards all.”114 Speaking about the

pre-Christian philosophers precisely, Vermigli says, “These signs which have declared God to us

from the beginning are themselves creatures; when natural philosophers [Physici] studied them,

they were led to knowledge of God on account of the wonderful properties and qualities of

113
William Tyndale, The Parable of the Wicked Mammon, in vol. 1 of The Works of William Tyndale, ed.

Henry Walter (Cambridge: The University Press, 1849), 115.

114
Peter Martyr Vermigli, In Epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos, trans. & ed. Joseph C. McClelland in

Peter Martyr Vermigli, Philosophical Works: On the Relation of Philosophy to Theology, ed. Joseph C. McClelland

(1996; repr., Moscow, ID: The Davenant Press, 2018), 18.

 37

nature…Plato, Aristotle, and Galen have set forth these matters exceedingly well.”115 Note how

Vermigli clearly mentions Plato, Aristotle, and Galen, as well as the “natural philosophers”

(which is clearly a reference to the pre-Socratic thinkers such as those we have considered in this

paper), stating that they have come to know some truths about the one true God.

Henry Bullinger (1504-1575), a Swiss reformer, was the successor of Heidrich Zwingli.

He was one of the most influential of the reformers, and wrote more than Luther, Calvin, and

Zwingli combined. Though Bullinger frequently bemoans the errors of the pagan philosophers,

he states quite clearly that they did arrive at knowledge of some truths about the one true God, as

when he makes the following statement in commenting on Romans 1:19-20,

So then, the Gentiles knew God; yea, they knew whatsoever might be known of
God. But what teacher had they, or what master ? They had God to their master. In what
order taught he them, or out of what book ? Not out of the written books of Moses, or the
prophets ; but out of that great and large book of nature. For the things that are not seen of
God (in which sort are his everlasting eternity, his virtue, power, majesty, goodness, and
Godhead), those he would have to be esteemed of according to the visible things, that is,
the things which he hath created. For God’s eternal Godhead is known by man’s creation,
by the continual moving of heaven, and the perpetual course of rivers : for it must needs
be, that he is most mighty which sustaineth all these things, which moveth, strengtheneth,
and keepeth all things from decay, and which with his beck shakes the whole world.
Finally, who doth not see the goodness of him which suffereth the sun to rise upon the good
and the evil? But to what intent revealeth he these things to the Gentiles ? To the intent,
forsooth, that they may acknowledge him to be God, that they may glorify and worship
him as God, and be thankful to such a benefactor. When therefore they do not this, they are
inexcusable, and perish deservedly for their unbelief and unthankfulness sake. So then it is
manifest, that the law of nature doth expressly teach, that there is a God which is to be
acknowledged and reverently worshipped.116

115
Vermigli, EPAR, 21.
116
Heinrich Bullinger, The Decades of Henry Bullinger: the first and second decades, trans. H. I., ed.

Thomas Harding (Cambridge: The University Press, 1850), 196-97. Also of special interest is Bullinger’s

articulation of how we can come to know God through our contemplation of nature in his fourth decades (Heinrich
 38

Having made this statement, Bullinger goes on to consider the statements that a number of

different pagan philosophers made concerning God, and shows that they rightly pointed out some

truths about the one true God. He specifically refers to Pythagoras, Zaleucus, Cicero, Seneca,

Plutarch, Varro, etc.117 Theodore Beza (1519-1605), in his commentary on Job, also enumerates

a number of truths that can be known about God from our reasoned observations of sensible

nature.118

Richard Hooker (1554-1600), the great Anglican theologian, in his Ecclesiastical Polity,

agrees entirely with Bullinger, noting that,

The wise and learned among the very Heathens themselves have all acknowledged
some First Cause, whereupon originally the being of all things dependeth. Neither have
they otherwise spoken of that Cause than as an agent, which knowing what and why it
worketh, observeth in working a most exact order or Law. Thus much is signified by that
which Homer mentioneth, Διὸς ὂ ἐτελείετο βουλή. Thus much acknowledged by Mercurius
Trismegistus, Τὸν πάντα κόσμον ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργὸς, οὐ χερσὶν ἀλλὰ λόγῳ, Thus much
confest by Anaxagoras and Plato, terming the Maker of the world an Intellectual Worker.
Finally, the Stoics, although imagining the First Cause of all things to be fire, held
nevertheless, that the same fire, having art, did ὁδῷ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου. They all
confess therefore, in the working of that First Cause, that Counsel is used, Reason followed,
a Way observed, that is to say, constant order and Law is kept, whereof itself must needs
be author unto itself : otherwise it should have some worthier and higher to direct it, and
so could not itself be the first : being the first, it can have no other than itself to be the
author of that Law which it willingly worketh by. God therefore is a Law both to himself,
and to all other things besides.119

Bullinger, The Decades of Henry Bullinger: the fourth decades, trans. H. I., ed. Thomas Harding (Cambridge: The

University Press, 1850), 150-52.).

117
Bullinger, DHBFSD, 197-202.
118
Theodore Beza, Job (London: John Legatte, 1589), ch. 1, v. 1.
119
Richard Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, bk. 1, sect. 2, in The Ecclesiastical Polity and Other works of

Richard Hooker, ed. Benjamin Hanbury (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1830), 1:73
 39

Note how, in this short quote, Hooker not only states that the pagan philosophers have very

clearly come to knowledge of some truths about the one true God, but, he also explicitly names

Homer, Mercurius Tristmegistus, Anaxagoras, Plato, and the Stoic philosophers. Many more

important reformed theologians could be quoted in order to prove this point, but, one thing

should be clear: not only is Van Til, and those that follow him, not speaking for all Reformed

theologians, but he is actually contradicting the traditional view held by Reformed theologians

when he says that the pagans cannot come to any knowledge of the one true God through their

reasoned observations of nature.

Riddled with Errors

Many theologians have noted that Greek philosophical discussions about God are riddled

not only with errors, but with incoherencies. This is most certainly true. There are, however, two

comments that can be made about this claim. First of all, that someone has made some false

claims about something does not imply that every statement that has been made by that person

about the thing in question is false. Rather, it is very possible (in fact, it happens all the time) to

know some truths about something or someone, and, at the same time, believe false statements

about that thing or person to be true. For example, a husband may rightly believe that his wife

has gone to the grocery store to get the groceries, but falsely believe that that is all she is going to

get. She may also have gone to town to get her hair done, and to visit a friend for coffee, in the

same trip. That the husband does not know everything that his wife is doing on her trip does not

imply that he falsely believes that his wife has gone to get the groceries. It only means that he

holds 1 true belief, and 2 false beliefs, about what his wife is doing during this trip. What is

known about his wife, is true, regardless of the false beliefs he holds about her. The same can be
 40

said about natural knowledge of God. What is known about God, through nature, if true, is true,

regardless of any false beliefs that one may also hold about God. In fact, we should be thankful

that this is the case, as it is highly improbable that any human being exists who could be said

(even with the aid of the Holy Spirit and divinely inspired Scriptures) to have only true beliefs

about God, and to hold no false beliefs about God. Thus, the errors and inconsistencies of the

pre-Christian philosophers should not deter us from recognizing the true things they said about

God.

Furthermore, this [imperfect knowledge of God—truth mixed with error] is exactly what

we would expect if we accept the authority of Christian Scriptures. For example, Paul, in his

speech at Lystra, tells the people of Lystra that God “did not leave himself without witness, for

he did good by giving you rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, satisfying your hearts with

food and gladness. (Acts 14:17)” In fact, he seems to suggest, in his Areopagus speech, that God

so arranged the world (including not only the seasons, the weather patterns, etc., but even the

providential direction of human peoples and government) so that men “should seek God, in the

hope that they might feel their way toward him and find him. Yet he is actually not far from each

one of us, for ‘In him we live and move and have our being.’ (Acts 17:27-28)” In other words,

Paul clearly tells those who put no trust in divinely revealed Scriptures, that God has so arranged

the world that all men might be able to be drawn toward Him. The notion here of “feeling their

way toward him”, implies not a clear understanding of the divine nature, but, rather, a gradual

moving towards understanding.

That this is what Paul is saying can be validated by his claim, in Romans 1:19-20, that

“what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his

invisible attributes, namely his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived,
 41

ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made.” Paul, then, is not saying

that humans are able to attain to a clear and complete understanding of the divine nature. Rather,

he seems to be saying that enough can be learned about God from nature that man is responsible

for not worshiping God, but not enough is learned about God from nature such that man can be

saved. Aquinas puts it this way, in the first article of the Summa Theologiae, “Even as regards

those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man

should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could

discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of

many errors.”120

This approach to natural knowledge of God is corroborated by King David, who says, in

Psalm 19, that “The heavens declare the glory of God, and the sky above proclaims his

handiwork. Day to day pours out speech, and night to night reveals knowledge. There is no

speech, nor are there words, whose voice is not heard. Their voice goes out through all the earth,

and their words to the end of the world.” Without words, without speech, without a voice, nature

proclaims the existence of its Creator. Clearly not everything about God is revealed, but what is

revealed, and thus known by man, is true.

To know that God exists, one need only, as John Calvin himself says, go outside and look

around. “The final goal of the blessed life, moreover, rests in the knowledge of God [cf. John

17:3]. Lest anyone, then, be excluded from access to happiness, he not only sowed in men's

minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken but revealed himself and daily discloses

himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As a consequence, men cannot open their

120
Thomas Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, a. 1, respondeo.
 42

eyes without being compelled to see him. Indeed, his essence is incomprehensible; hence, his

divineness far escapes all human perception. But upon his individual works he has engraved

unmistakable marks of his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered and stupid folk

cannot plead the excuse of ignorance.”121

Calvin continues, a little later, “wherever you cast your eyes, there is no spot in the

universe wherein you cannot discern at least some sparks of his glory. You cannot in one glance

survey this most vast and beautiful system of the universe, in its wide expanse, without being

completely overwhelmed by the boundless force of its brightness.”122 Or, again, “this skillful

ordering of the universe is for us a sort of mirror in which we can contemplate God, who is

otherwise invisible. The reason why the prophet attributes to the heavenly creatures a language

known to every nation [Ps. 19:2 ff.] is that therein lies an attestation of divinity so apparent that it

ought not to escape the gaze of even the most stupid tribe.”123

Calvin continues by nothing that “There are innumerable evidences both in heaven and

on earth that declare his wonderful wisdom; not only those more recondite matters for the closer

observation of which astronomy, medicine, and all natural science are intended, but also those

which thrust themselves upon the sight of even the most untutored and ignorant persons, so that

they cannot open their eyes without being compelled to witness them.”124 Though it may be

necessary to acquire education in the liberal arts in order to understand the more complicated

121
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 1, ch. 5, §1, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T.

McNeill (1960; repr., Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 1: 51-52.
122
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §1, 52.
123
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §1, 52-53.
124
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §2, 53.
 43

proofs of the existence of God, “ignorance of them prevents no one from seeing more than

enough of God's workmanship in his creation to lead him to break forth in admiration of the

Artificer.”125 Calvin goes on to claim that knowing God through creation is a way that is

common both to unbelievers and believers, “Now I have only wanted to touch upon the fact that

this way of seeking God is common both to strangers and to those of his household, if they trace

the outlines that above and below sketch a living likeness of him.”126

Calvin is so entirely convinced that God can be discovered in his works, that he goes so

far as to say that the best way to find God is not to engage in complicated reasonings about the

universe, but to simply look inside yourself or go outside, or do both. “Consequently, we know

the most perfect way of seeking God, and the most suitable order, is not for us to attempt with

bold curiosity to penetrate to the investigation of his essence, which we ought more to adore than

meticulously to search out, but for us to contemplate him in his works whereby he renders

himself near and familiar to us, and in some manner communicates himself. The apostle was

referring to this when he said that we need not seek him far away, seeing that he dwells by his

very present power in each of us [Acts 17:27-28].”127 However, as is well known, Calvin does

not think that this is a complete knowledge of God, nor a knowledge of God which is sufficient

for salvation.128

125
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §2, 53.
126
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §6, 59.
127
Calvin, ICR, bk. 1, ch. 5, §9, 62.
128
Other important Reformed theologians agree with Calvin concerning how to understand the natural

knowledge of God which is possessed by non-Christian philosophers. Petrus Van Mastricht, for example, explicitly

ask whether pagan theology is true. The answer, taken absolutely, is no. However, van Mastricht makes a number of
 44

Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that many pre-Christian philosophers arrived at conclusions

about what they called “God” which are in complete agreement with what both the Scriptures

and Classical Christian theology says about God. They said, for example, that there is a first

uncaused cause or principle of everything that is. That this first principle is eternal, immutable,

all-powerful, intelligent and wise, sovereign over everything, and the cause of everything. They

said that this first principle was the one and unique God. We proposed that in these conclusions,

though they mixed many errors and inconsistencies into their conclusions, and though there was

indeed development over time, the pre-Christian philosophers spoke truthfully.

We have also responded to a number of objections that might be raised against the idea

that the pre-Christian philosophers, in these conclusions, were rightly recognizing truths about

God that were discoverable from their rational contemplation of the sensible universe. We

conclude, then, that not only is it possible for humans to know some truths about God (at least

important distinctions. He notes that “we grant that (1) pagan theology contained some true things about God and

about divine worship (Rom. 1:19-20; 2:14-15, nevertheless, it did not have the true God, that is, the triune God, and

the majority of the things that it held concerning the one God were not true…We also grant that (2) pagan theology

recognized that God must be worshiped and his will obeyed, yet the way of worshiping God, and the will of God

that they were responsible to obey, were thoroughly hidden from it. (Petrus van Mastricht, Prolegomena, vol. 1 of

Theoretical-Practical Theology, trans. Todd M. Rester, ed. Joel R. Beeke (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage

Books, 2018), 81.)” He goes on to makes similar distinctions concerning pagan knowledge of virtues and human

misery (van Mastricht, Prolegomena, 81.). The point being that taken absolutely, they did not worship the true God,

however, this does not mean that they did not say truth things about the true God and divine worship.
 45

that God exists, is the all-powerful creator, and is worthy of worship) by simply contemplating

the sensible world around them (including themselves), without the aid of special revelation, but

that it has actually happened in human history, and can still happen today. Furthermore, we

suggest that a right interpretation of the Bible, the Reformed confessions and catechisms, and the

great theologians of the church, requires us to accept this statement to be true.