Prahlad Saran Gupta v/s Bar Council Of India

Case No: Appeal (civil) 3588 of 1984

Equivalent Citations: AIR 1997 SC 1338, 1997(2) SCR 499 - Decided On: Feb 26, 1997
Bench (Judges): S.C. Agrawal & G.B. Pattanaik

Facts

1. Prahlad Saran Gupta (herein after referred as appellant) was enrolled as an advocate
with the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council and had been a practicing advocate at Ghaziabad.
There was a case entitled Atma Ram Nanak Chand vs Sri Ram Contractor in the
court of civil judge, Ghaziabad and the appellant was representing the decree holder.

2. Rajendra Prasad (herein after referred as complainant) was a partner in Atma Ram
Nanak Chand firm. He had made a complaint on the appellant to the UP State Bar
Council.

3. The following allegations are made by the complainant against the appellant. They
are:
i. Even though the appellant was representing the decree holder, he had colluded
with the judgement debtor and had realized Rs.1600/- from him. Out of which
Rs.1500/- was withheld by him with himself and he did not pay that said amount
to the decree holder for the period of 8 months. In spite of repeated requests for
the said amount, the appellant did not handover the amount to the decree holder
and instead deposited the said amount in the court just to annoy or harass the
decree holder.
ii. Rs. 100/- which was left out was taken by the appellant from the judgment
debtor as a fee for seeking time from the high court in order to acquire order of
stay in the proceedings of execution.
iii. Further the appellant has obtained Rs. 450/- from the judgement debtor as fees
and expenses for engaging a lawyer named Shri V.K.Gupta at Allahabad to get
stay order in the execution proceeding. The appellant also mentioned the
judgment debtor that he had given a letter regarding the same to the Shri
V.K.Gupta, advocate at Allahabad.
iv. The judgment debtor instead of going to the advocate at Allahabad with a letter,
he sent a reply letter to Shri V.K.Gupta stating the enquiries upon the stay order
but to his surprise the judgment debtor had received a reply to his reply letter
stating that no case of this kind was referred to him from the appellant.

v. The appellant filed a suit against Shri Ramnath Singh on behalf of the
complainant's firm in the Munsif Court with utter recklessness which is
ultimately the wrong court. The firm's new council had take back the
complainant from the wrong court and had to file in the proper court which is
Court of Civil Judge.
vi. The appellant had advanced loan to Sundar Lal, and was alleged in indulging in
money – lending business at very high rate of interest and misconducting
himself as an advocate.
vii. The copy of the complaint was sent to the appellant by the U.P Bar Council for
his explanation but he rejected all the allegations that are made against him in
the complaint. The case was referred by the state bar council to its disciplinary
 committee but the committee was unable to complete the said proceedings in
the time of 1 year and hence the matter was sent to Bar Council of India under
Section 36B of Advocate's Act, 1961.

4. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India did not find any kind of merit
in the allegation made in the complaint that the appellant was careless in handling the
case of execution but however the committee found that the appellant as guilty of gross
professional misconduct based on its findings on withholding Rs. 1500/- for the period
of 8 months and not returning the said amount to the decree holder and had imposed
the punishment of suspension from practice for a period of 1 year.

5. Aggrieved by the order passed by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of
India, the present appeal was filed by the appellant under Section 38 of the Advocates
Act, 1961 before the Supreme Court.

Issues

1. Whether the appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct?

Rules

Advocates Act, 1961

35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct:

1. Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe
that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall
refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
2. 1A. The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it
by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary
committee and direct the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that
State Bar Council.
3. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the
case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the
Advocate-General of the State.
4. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned
and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the
following orders, namely:
(a) Dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of
the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed;
(b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit;
(d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
5. Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he
shall, during the period of suspension, be debarred from practising in any court or
before any authority or person in India.
 6. Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under sub-section (2), the
Advocate-General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar
Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf.

Explanation:
In this section, [section 37 and section 38], the expressions Advocate-General and Advocate-
General of the State shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the Additional
Solicitor General of India.

36B. Disposal of disciplinary proceedings

1. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall dispose of the complaint
received by it under section 35 expeditiously and in each case the proceedings shall be
concluded within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or
the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance of the State bar Council, as the
case may be, failing which such proceedings shall stand transferred to the Bar Council
of India which may dispose of the same as if it were a proceeding withdrawn for inquiry
under sub-section (2) of section 36.
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where on the commencement
of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973 (60 of 1973), any proceedings in the respect
of any disciplinary matter against an advocate is pending before the disciplinary
committee of a State Bar Council, that disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council
shall dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of such
commencement or within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the
complaint or, as the case may be the date of initiation of the proceedings at the instance
of the State Bar Council, whichever is later, failing which such other proceedings shall
stand transferred to the Bar Council of India for disposal under sub-section (1).

S.38 - Appeal to the Supreme Court Any person aggrieved by an order made by the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 [or the
Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-General of the State concerned, as the case may
be,] may within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an
appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order [(including an order
varying the punishment awarded by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India)]
thereon as it deems fit:
Provided that no order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India shall be varied
by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person aggrieved without giving him a
reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Analysis
1st Issue:
Learned Senior Counsel R.B. Mehrotra, who was representing the appellant, has made
certain following submissions:
He submitted that the findings of disciplinary committee are not completely correct and there
are some errors in the findings of the disciplinary committee.

1. Appellant had been held guilty by the disciplinary committee for the professional
misconduct which is based on the charge relating to notice under section 80 of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908. It was alleged that the notice was drafted by the appellant
 himself but he shouldn't have drafted the said notice as he was a standing council for
the railways
2. It was submitted that the above mentioned charge was not filed in the complainant and
was directly put forward before the disciplinary committee of the state bar council in
the application made by the complainant.
3. In addition to this, the disciplinary committee has rejected the request of examination
of hand writing by the expert. The appellant has requested the disciplinary committee
to check whether the handwriting in the notice is same as that of the handwriting of the
appellant but for which the disciplinary committee has not accepted the said request
which is considered as error made by the disciplinary committee of Bar Council of
India. Instead of obtaining an expert opinion regarding the handwriting, the committee
itself declared that the handwriting of the appellant and the writing in the notice is
similar.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that the error has been made by the disciplinary
committee of Bar Council of India in rejecting the request made by the appellant. The court
relied upon the judgement given in the case of State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram[1],
stating that it is not advisable for the judge to make the comparison of hand writing and it is
better to take expert opinion and assistance regarding the comparison of the hand writing.

Therefore the court held that the appellant was not guilty of serious professional misconduct
just because he drafted the notice under Section. 80 of CPC, 1908 this was served to the
railways. This offence is considered as quasi criminal in nature and hence it has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. If the opinion of an expert is considered to compare the handwriting
then it might be proved beyond the reasonable doubt.

The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India also passed an order stating that the
appellant is guilty of professional misconduct for the letter sent to the Shri V.K.Gupta. The
Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that Shri Ram (judgement debtor) handed over
the letter to V.K. Gupta and advocate at Allahabad.

Even though the Hon'ble Supreme Court has rejected all the charges that are made against the
appellant, it has found one charge against the appellant established and that was it has found
the appellant guilty of wrongfully withholding Rs. 1500/- with himself, which were due to the
decree holder.

It was contended by the appellant that the said amount was placed with him by both decree
holder and judgement debtor with regarding to the settlement that was negotiated between both
the parties but the appellant has refused to pay the appellant the said amount because it could
be paid only if the joint receipt of both the parties was handed over to him. This has been
contended by the disciplinary committee.

The Supreme Court has held that the anticipated settlement between the parties for Rs.1500/-
was deposited with the appellant, but he did not return the amount either to the decree holder
nor the judgement debtor and retained the amount for himself until he deposited the said
amount in the court which is against the professional ethics and conduct especially being a
senior counsel this kind of conduct is not expected.
Therefore the Supreme Court held that for this ground the appellant was held guilty for gross
professional misconduct and is punished for the same. The punishment of reprimand is imposed
on the appellant for this part of his misconduct to meet the ends of justice.

The judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is just and in consistent with the law. The
Supreme Court has examined the laws of professional misconduct which is ultimately related
to the professional ethics. Professional ethics are very important for a person to follow his
professional rules and conduct or duties. In the present case the appellant was found guilty of
wrongfully retaining the amount to himself and not returning the said amount to the decree
holder.

This implies that there has been breach of trust by the appellant that his client has trusted upon
him. In the latter case of Harish Chandra Tiwari v. Baiju[2] stated that there are different types
of misconducts envisaged for a legal practitioner but the gravest professional misconduct is
misappropriation of the client's money. Hence, the Court has rightly held that for this ground
the appellant was held guilty for gross professional misconduct and is punished for the same.

End-Notes:

1. 1979(1) SCR 931

2. AIR 2002 SC 548

.R. Janardhana Rao v/s G. Lingappa

At, Supreme Court of India

By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. MAJUMDAR & THE HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE U.C. BANERJEE
For the Appellant :- Mr. A. Subba Rao, Advocate. For the Respondent :- Mr. Anjani
Kumar Jha, Advocate.

he appellant who is a practising Advocate has brought in challenge the order passed by the Bar
Council of India under the provisions of Advocates Act, 1981 holding him guilty of
professional misconduct and ordering his suspension from practice from a period of two years.

2. A few facts leading to this appeal deserve to be noted.

3. One G. Rami Reddy had filed a suit against the respondent-complainant, G. Lingappa and
another being O.S. No. 173 of 1983 on the file of Assistant Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad for dissolution of partnership. In the suit, the appellant represented the opponent of
the present respondent-complainant. In the suit, the parties negotiated for compromise. As per
the terms of agreement dated 2.7.1984 a compromise memo was filed in the Court. On the day
of compromise, the complainant however was paid an amount of Rs. 12,000/- cash though he
had to receive Rs. 3,000/- more meaning Rs. 15,000/-. It is the case of the complainant-
respondent before the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh that after the said
compromise was entered into, the appellant-Advocate for the other side called him for cup of
tea in the canteen and persuaded him to give him a hand loan of Rs. 3,000/- as he was in urgent
need for providing furniture for the School run by his wife. It is the further case of the
respondent that accordingly he parted with Rs. 3,000/- against a post-dated cheque dated
8.3.1984 given by the appellant to him. The said cheque being presented bounced. Despite
repeated requests of the complainant-respondent, the appellant did not refund the said amount.
Hence, according to him, the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct. A complaint was
filed before the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant contested the proceedings.
After hearing the parties and recording the evidence offered by them, the State Bar Council
came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct and hence he
was ordered to be suspended from practising as an Advocate for a period of two years from the
date of receipt of the order. Appellant's appeal before the Bar Council of India failed as its
Disciplinary Committee was not inclined to take a contrary view.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, it is found that all that the complainant alleged
was to the effect that the appellant being an Advocate of the other side and after settling the
civil dispute between the parties by way of compromise had persuaded the complainant to part
with an amount of Rs. 3,000/- by way of a hand loan. The post-dated cheque given by him to
the complainant bounced and the appellant did not repay the amount even thereafter despite
repeated requests. In our opinion, these type of allegations even taken at the highest, would
show that the complainant was persuaded to give a hand loan of Rs. 3,000/- to the appellant
and that amount was not repaid by him. It is pertinent to note the appellant while taking the
loan from the respondent on any pretext was not acting in his professional capacity qua the
complainant. He was acting as a needy person and persuaded the creditor to give him an amount
of Rs. 3,000/-. If that amount was not paid back, civil remedy was available to the complainant
and if the cheque had bounced after coming into force of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, it might have resulted in criminal litigation, but however so far as the
professional misconduct is concerned, we fail to appreciate as to how the Disciplinary
Committee of the State Bar Council held that the appellant qua the complainant had committed
any professional misconduct because he had taken a hand loan from the complainant-
respondent and not repaid it. It is also to be noted that against the order of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India, this Court as early as on 8.11.1989 issued notice and
suspended the order of the Bar Council of India. The said order is continuing althroughout and
we are informed by learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is still practising. By an
order dated 9.9.1991 in presence of learned counsel for the respondent this Court had directed
that the appellant shall take steps to deposit a sum of Rs. 3,000/- in the Registry of this Court
within a period of four weeks for payment to the respondent. Office report shows that the
amount was already deposited as early as on 25.9.1991. Learned counsel for the respondent
states that this amount is still not withdrawn. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the
appellant cannot be said to be guilty of any professional misconduct. It is also interesting to
note that in the very examination-in-chief before the Disciplinary Committee of State Bar
Council the complainant stated that if Rs. 3,000/- is paid to him, he is prepared to withdraw the
complaint. We fail to appreciate how the appellant being a practising Advocate did not take up
this opportunity to close the chapter as admittedly he had taken the loan and had not repaid the
same to the complainant-creditor. That shows an inadvertent conduct on the part of the
appellant but still it does not make out any professional misconduct. We would have understood
if the appellant was alleged to have misused his position and had taken any money from his
own client and had retained that amount. That would have been a clear case of professional
misconduct in view of the decision of this Court in the case of N.B. Mirzan v. The Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in (1972) 4 SCC 412. But
this is not one case. There was no professional obligation or duty of the appellant qua
respondent-complainant who was a third party and who was no better than a third party creditor
qua the appellant.

5. In the result, the order passed by the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh and the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India are set aside and the complaint filed by the
complainant is dismissed. However, an amount of Rs. 3,000/- which is lying in the Registry of
this Court shall be permitted to be withdrawn by the respondent towards his dues. We deem it
fit to award by way of cost to the respondent-complainant an amount of Rs. 1,000/- which shall
additionally.

V .P .Kumarvelu v. Bar Council of India

The appellant was appointed as city government pleader in all the Civil courts constituted in
Madras other than the High Court of Madras, in October 1978 .

The commission and secretary of Tamilnadu filed a complaint against appellant before the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Tamilnadu was in respect of Suite Number
400/1978 on the file of the City Civil Court at Madras. The government pleader was instructed
to appear on behalf of the state government in that case .The memo of appearance was filed by
the previous government pleader. However when the Appellant was appointed government
pleader, a fresh memo of parties was not filed on his behalf nor the papers were put before him
. As a result , the suit was decreed ex Parte against the state.

In another case pertaining the appellant, a suit was filed by the Travancore textile Limited
against the state of Tamilnadu relating to the lease of land forming part of a Channel. plaintiff
had prayed for a declaration that the annual rent of Rs 3609.66 as also the municipal taxes
levied were illegal. Plaintiff had also made a prayer of the refund of ₹ 25,575.40 with interest
and for a further declaration that he need not to pay any rent after 30 June 1974 the complainant
alleged that as a result of the gross negligence on the part of the appellant the government of
Tamilnadu had suffered substantial loss.
The appellant contended that since the office staff had not put the paper of this case before him,
it was through inadvertence that the suit was decreed ex Parte, The bar council of India had
noted that at the time when and application for setting aside the order was filed , the applicant
the applicant must have known the pendency of the case and serious consequences that could
follow,If the order for payment of cost were not complied with. The bar council held that for
this lapse the appellant/ applicant could not raise the plea that staff was negligent. The bar
council stated that the office staff of the appellant was also responsible for misleading the
applicant and keeping him in dark.
In another complaint it was alleged that the applicant did not attend to the case and an ex Parte
decree was passed. This complaint was in respect of a suit filed by an employee of the
Directorate of Education of state of Tamilnadu challenging his date of birth. Summons was
forwarded to the appellant along with a letter informing him the date of hearing.

There was an endorsement made by the office of government pleader on that letter. Another
letter was received by the government pleader on which An endorsement was made
remarks/written statement to be prepared ". However, no memorandum for reappearance was
file in that suit on behalf of the state of Tamilnadu and an ex Parte decree was passed in that
suit. In this respect, the applicant contended that the office had not put up this papers before
him and therefore there had been Lapse in attending the case. The bar council of India accepted
that there was no deliberate lapse on the part of the appellant. However he was held guilty of
constructive negligence by the bar council of India and it is reprimanded him for time lapse .

In Appeal, the supreme court held that there was no finding of any Mala fides on the part of
the appellant or any deliberate inaction on his part in not attending to the two cases. There was
failure on his part to discharge his duties towards his client but it was not deliberate but on
account of heavy pressure of work and lack of diligence on the part of his stuff. The negligence
on his part was without moral turpitude or delinquency and therefore he was not held guilty of
professional misconduct.
The supreme court observed -Whether negligence will amount to professional misconduct will
depend upon the fact of each case. Gross negligence in the discharge of partakes of shades of
delinquency and would undoubtedly amount to professional misconduct. But negligence
without moral turpitude or delinquency may not amount to professional misconduct ".The
supreme court however observed that the appellant was rightly held guilty of negligence but in
the absence of any moral turpitude or delinquency on his part, the finding of the bar council of
India that his conduct in the facts and circumstances of the case amounted to professional
misconduct could not be suited sustained.

RD Saxena Vs Balram Prasad (AIR 2000 SC 2912):

Honorable Court: Supreme Court

AIR 2000 SC 2912
Appellant: R.D. Saxena
Respondent: Balram Prasad
Judge:- K.T. Thomas

This case is unique in itself and no case before such a case has explicitly answered the
question of lien on the litigant’s papers.
Facts of the Case

The appellant was appointed as a legal advisor to the Madhya Pradesh State Co-operative
Bank Ltd. (herein referred to as ‘Bank’) in 1990. He used to conduct cases on behalf of the
said bank. Subsequently, on 17.7.1993 the bank terminated the retainers of the appellant; and
requested him to return his files related to the bank. Instead of returning the files, he informed
the bank that only after dues amounting to rupees 97,100/- were paid will he return the files.

Hence, the Bank filed a complaint before the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh on
3.2.1994; wherein the appellant contended that he has a right of lien on those files; whereas
the respondent contended that the appellant is guilty of professional misconduct by not
returning the files to his client.
Subsequently, the matter got transferred to the disciplinary committee of Bar Council of
India; wherein the appellant was held guilty of professional misconduct and was imposed
a fine of rupees 1000/-; and also debarred him from practicing for 18 months; and was
directed to return all the case bundles of the client without any delay.

Therefore, the advocate/appellant filled for the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether the advocate can have a lien on the litigation papers entrusted to him by his clients for
pending fees?

Arguments

Arguments by the appellant:

(1) The failure in the part of the Bar Council of India for not considering the defense of the
appellant; wherein he was having a lien over the files for unpaid fees dues due to him has
resulted in the miscarriage of justice.

(2) Section 171 of the Contract Act, 1872 clearly states that; “Bankers, factors, wharfingers,
attorneys of a High Court and policy-brokers may, in the absence of a contract to the contrary,
retain as security for a general balance of the account, any goods bailed to them; but no other
persons have a right to retain, as a security for such balance, goods bailed to them unless there
is an express contract to that effect”; and hence he can have a lien on litigants paper.

Arguments by the respondent:

(1) After the termination of engagement with the client, an advocate cannot retain the files and
can have no lien over it.
Judgment: Decision of the court

Rule of Law-

Section 148 of the Contract Act defines the bailment which states that; if the goods are
transferred from one person to another for some purpose; and after completion of the purpose
the goods have to be returned to; or otherwise disposed of according to the directions of the
person delivering them then such transfer can be termed as a bailment.
But in this case, the goods are not bailed to the appellant/advocate as there was no delivery of
the goods; because the advocate owned paper on his account.

The divisional bench of Madras High Court in the case of P. Krishnamachariar Vs. The
Official Assignee of Madras; held that an advocate could not have such a lien; unless there
was an express agreement to the contrary; and the same view was held by the Patna High
Court in In RD SAXENA Vs BALRAM PRASAD, advocate in the matter of Misc. Judl.
Case No. 18/33

After the enactment of Advocates Act, 1961 the Bar Council of India framed the rules in which
Rule 28 and 29 explicitly states that ‘if any sum is remaining in the hands of an advocate
then he is at liberty to appropriate the same after the termination of proceeding’ & ‘if the
fees have been unsettled then the advocate can deduct it from the client’s money in his hand
and rest should be refunded to the client’s’ respectively

Reasoning-

India is a country having vast illiterate population; and asking them to have a lien on the
litigation papers will lead to the exploitation of those very clients. A litigant has the freedom
to change his advocate and the same should be disposed of while returning the files. The
criminal accused has also a fundamental right of choice as per Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India; and in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobharam & Ors; the court
observed that the choice; herein referred to is the choice to change the advocate engaging in
the same case. An advocate must return the file to the client to get the file returned.

Section 35 of the Advocates Act pertains to misconduct; and accordingly, the refusal of an
advocate to return the file of the client comes under the ambit of professional misconduct.
Therefore, he is liable for the same punishment. However, here the appellant had a bona fide
belief that; he did have a lien and such presumption pertains to restricting harsh punishment on
the appellant.

Court’s Conclusion: R.D. Saxena Vs. Balram Prasad

In thPunishment will be altered to reprimanding the appellant. However, if any person commits
this type of professional misconduct in the future; then Bar Council will determine respective
punishment; and the lesser punishment imposed in this case should not be taken under the ambit
of precedent.

Conclusion:

The decision laid by the Supreme Court is of prudent nature and the judgment is done away
with all the relevant laws and precedents. The relation of client and counsel is based on trust
and hence presumes a fiduciary relationship; therefore the same should be respected throughout
the existence of such a relationship. The ordinary perspective presumes that there should be a
prior agreement between the council and the client; wherein it should be stipulated that the
client will pay a certain amount as legitimate fees; which will help in meeting counsel’s later
hardships. An example would suffice the same, suppose a person is hospitalized; and the same
person has to be shifted to any other hospital due to lack of facility in the former hospital.

Therefore, in such a case, it would not be correct if the hospital takes a lien on such medical
report; until the dues are paid as the later hospital ought to have a glance on the previous reports
for further medication; the same process will go in the attorney’s lien. By having such lien one
cannot play with the justice system. Considering such hardships of the attorney about claiming
the dues, the Advocates Act, 1961; makes a right for the advocates to retain the property if
any entrusted to him as per Rule 28 & 29. This very rule gave a tooth to the attorney’s rights.

For initiation of lien, there is a requirement of possession that ought to happen in the case of
bailment. For a bailment, there should be a transfer of goods, now a lien on the case file is not
considered as a good; because it does not have marketability in the legal sense. A person cannot
sell one client’s case files to another client for the sake of marketability. Hence, it will be
considered bad in law and which would ultimately lead to professional misconduct.