WHY DO WORKERS JOIN UNIONS?

THE CASE OF ISRAEL

YITCHAK HABERFELD*

The author argues that because almost all Israeli wage earners were
covered by collective agreements in the early 1980s, neither the "collec-
tive voice" hypothesis nor the earnings premium hypothesis-the two
prevailing explanations of workers' decision to join unions-was then
applicable to Israel. Using 1982 survey data on Israeli workers, he
examines four alternative explanations of unionization in Israel: non-
work benefits; political ideology; social values, especially workers' atti-
tude toward unions as a means forsolidarity;and workand demographic
attributes, such as employing unit size, gender, ethnicity, education,
and age. He finds that Israeli workers' decision to join the Israeli
Federation of Labor-the Histadrut-can be explained in part by non-
work benefits of the Histadrut (health insurance and legal aid, for
example) and by the workers' social values.

One of the keyquestions in the studyof
labor unions is whyworkersjoin them.
Most research addressing this question
places a heavy emphasis on either the "col-
lective voice" provided to workers by labor
unions or the union premium added to
workers' earnings. As a result, the possible
role of such other factors as non-work ben-
efits, political ideology, social values, and
work and demographic attributes is often
ignored.
Some unique characteristics of the in-
dustrial relations system in Israel in past
years make it a useful setting for studying
workers' decision to join unions. In par-
ticular, in Israel the two prevailing explana-
tions of workers' decision to join unions
were (until recently) irrelevant. First, the
collective voice explanation could be ruled
out because almost all wage earners in Is-
rael were covered by collective agreements
and were thus protected by unions regard-
less of their union status. Second, the
union premium explanation was inappli-
cable because there was no union earnings
premium in Israel. Whereas empirical re-
search on this subject usually is faced with
a hypothesized reciprocity between union
status and earnings and, therefore, diffi-
culty in deriving unbiased estimates of the
effect of the union premium on the deci-
sion to join, the absence of a union effect
on earnings in Israel provides a quasi-ex-
perimental setting in which we can derive

*Yitchak Haberfeld is Senior Lecturer of Indus-

trialRelationsat Tel-AvivUniversity,
Israel. He thanks
Anat Milner and Yasmin Alkalayforassistance, Dalia
Moore and Eppie Yaar for providing their data, and
Yinon Cohen, Herbert Heneman III, and Yehouda
Shenhav for comments and suggestions.
Additional results, and copies of the programs
used to generate the resultspresented here, are avail-
able from Yitchak Haberfeld at the Department of
Labor Studies, Tel-AvivUniversity,Tel-Aviv69978,
Israel.

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 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL
unbiased estimatesof the reversedeffectof
earnings on unionization.
AlthoughI devote some attentionto the
collective voice and union wage premium
explanationsin thispaper, mymain focusis
on four other possible explanations for
workers'decision tojoin unions, based on
the following: non-workbenefitsprovided
by unions to their members; political ide-
ologies held by workers that affecttheir
decision tojoin; the degree to whichwork-
ers value collective action as opposed to
invidualism;and various work-relatedand
individualvariablesfound byother studies
to be correlated with the decision to join
unions. Next, I translate these potential
explanations into hypotheses that can be
tested in the context of the Israeli indus-
trialrelationssystem,and I testthe hypoth-
eses using data on 400 Israeli wage earners
froma 1982 survey.Finally,I interpretthe
resultsand consider them in comparative
perspective,thatis, withreferenceto find-
ings on workers'decision tojoin unions in
other countries.
Why Do Workers Join Unions?
Whyworkersjoinunions has long been a
key theoretical and empirical question in
the studyofAmericanand European indus-
trial relations. Attemptsto answer that
question have employed a varietyof theo-
retical considerationsthatcan be grouped
into six categories (Guest and Dewe 1988;
Wheeler and McClendon 1991). The first
and one ofthemostprevalentexplanations
relatesjob dissatisfactionand frustrationto
the decision tojoin a union.' According to
this explanation, unions provide workers
witha "collectivevoice" vis-a-vis
employers,
enabling them to eliminate sources of dis-
satisfaction(Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Abundant empirical evidence supportsthe
relationshipbetweenjob dissatisfaction and
the decision to join a union (see, for ex-
1I use the term"joining a union" in a broad sense
here. I make no distinctionamong differenttypesof
union participation,such as becoming a union mem-
ber or voting for a union in certification or
decertificationelections.
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657
ample,thereviewsbyHeneman and Sandver
[1983] and Wheeler and McClendon
[1991]).
The second typeof explanation is based
on one form or another of work-related
utilityconsiderations (Newton and Shore
1992). It can be traced back to the 1920s,
when the firstAmerican scholars in the
field-members of theWisconsinSchool-
emphasizedthisapproach. Perlman (1928),
for example, suggested that workersjoin
unions in order to obtain job securityand
betteremploymentconditions. These ap-
proaches, whether they rely on an eco-
nomic utilitymodel-mainly the expecta-
tion of higherwage rates (Farber and Saks
1980)-or a more general psychological
model of"instrumentalities" (Vroom 1964),
explain the decision to join a union by
workers'expectationthatdoing so willbring
them greater utility.Again, empirical evi-
dence supportsthistheoreticalframework
(see, forexample, Montgomery1989 [U.S.]
and Guest and Dewe 1988 [U.K.]).
However, this issue of pay deserves a
closer look, since pay is hypothesized to
affectunionism in two contrastingways.
First, there is the "consumption effect":
workers"buy"union representationjust as
theybuyothergoods. Hence, workerswith
higher incomes are more likelyto belong
to a union (Pencavel 1971). The hypoth-
esized effectof pay on unionization in this
case is positive. In contrast, the second
approach suggests that workersare influ-
enced by the supposed pay-enhancingin-
strumentalrole of unions, and that the
demand for union services is therefore
greater among low-payworkers. In this
model, a negative effectof pay levels on
unionization is hypothesized: the higher
the pay,the lowerthe likelihood ofjoining
a union. Empirical studies in the United
Statesshowa positiveeffectofpayon union
membership, and no effector a negative
effect of pay on unionism preferences2
(Fiorito, Gallagher, and Greer 1986).
2"Union preferences" refers to workers' percep-
tions of or attitudestowardunionism, as opposed to
theirmembership or non-membershipin unions.
658 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
The thirdframeworkcan be viewed as a
special case of the utilityframework. It
suggeststhat workersexpect union mem-
bership to increase their non-workutility.
Many unions provide their members with
benefitsthat are not work-related-health
and life insurance, credit cards, and legal
aid, forinstance-all at below-marketrates.
Workers may decide to join such unions
because theyfind these commodities and
servicesattractive.In fact,Americanunions
have been responsivein recentyearsto this
typeof consumerismand have created "as-
sociate membership" programs that offer
benefitsto associate membersin exchange
for annual dues regardless of whetherthe
associate member is represented by the
union duringthebargainingprocess (Jarley
and Fiorito1990). Towers (1989) suggested
that one of the strategiesused by British
unions to fight membership loss under
Thatcher was to expand members' services
such as privatehealth insurance and finan-
cial services.
The fourth and fifthexplanations are
often grouped by American scholars into
one category labeled "political and ideo-
logical beliefs" (forexample, Wheeler and
McClendon 1991). In thisstudy,a distiction
is made between the two because of the
hypothesized separate effectsof political
ideology and social beliefson unionization
in countries other than the United States.
Thus, the fourth explanation focuses on
workers' political ideology. According to
this explanation, workersjoin unions as a
result of their political beliefs. In many
countries,labor unions are affiliatedwith
political parties. The nature of thisaffilia-
tion varies from one countryto another,
but thepartyis usuallya socialistor a former
communistpartythatprovides "its"unions
withfavorablelegislation,access to public
budgets, and political power in returnfor
the unions' political mobilization and sup-
port duringelections. In England, France,
and Israel, forexample, unions are deeply
politicallyinvolved. It is expected thatthe
decision tojoin or notjoin a union in such
countries is explained, at least in part, by
workers' political ideologies. Some sup-
portforsuch an expectationwas found,for
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example, in a studyof French union mem-
bers (Smith 1987).
The fifthexplanation concerns thevalue
workersplace on collective action, an out-
look that is assumed to be shaped by the
socialization process (Newton and Shore
1992). Those who believe in workers'soli-
darityjoin unions because they perceive
trade unions as a major instrumentfor
collectiveaction. Again, thistypeof expla-
nation is assumed to hold truerfor Euro-
pean workersthanforU.S. workers(Fiorito
et al. 1986; Wheeler and McClendon 1991):
whereasmostU.S. scholarsdo not attribute
a major role to solidarityin a U.S. worker's
decision tojoin a union, European studies
support thisframework.Among the most-
cited literaturein thiscategoryis the "afflu-
ent worker" research conducted by
Goldthorp,Lockwood,Bechhofer,and Platt
(1968).
It is clear that political ideology and
social values can be highlyinterrelated. I
distinguishthe two, however,for the rea-
son cited above. More specifically,in Is-
rael, opposition to or supportforcollective
action does not necessarilycoincide with
oppositionto or supportfora socialistparty.
The sixthtypeof explanation highlights
therole ofwork-relatedand individualvari-
ables in the decision to join a union. Re-
search on the decline in union densityin
the United States supports the view that
changes in the mix of occupations and
industries,in the regional distributionof
industries,and in the distributionof work-
ers by gender, education, and age have
been resposible for most of the decline in
unionization in the United States (for ex-
ample, Dickens and Leonard 1986; Free-
man and Medoff 1984). Among the vari-
ables examined are gender, race, educa-
tion, age, and certainwork-relatedcharac-
teristics,such as employing unit size and
industry. It is clear that some of these
factorscould be integratedwith explana-
tions described above. For example, race
might serve as a proxyfor the need for a
collective voice in a hostile or discrimina-
toryworkenvironment.Similarly,jobchar-
acteristicsmight capture pay differentials
and hence could serve as an indication of
 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL
utility motives. Given, however, that no
published theory comprehensively relates
such demographic and work-related vari-
ables to the decision to join a union
(Heneman and Sandver 1983) and the
empirical literature addressing that rela-
tionship has yielded mixed results (Fiorito
et al. 1986; Heneman and Sandver 1983;
Wheeler and McClendon 1991), I treat these
variables as a separate group of "controls"
hypothesized to be related in unknown ways
to the decision to join a union.
As remarked, the two explanations for
workers' decision to join unions that have
dominated the field are the collective voice
provided by unions to dissatisfied and frus-
trated workers and the increased utility
provided by unions, whether in terms of
higher pay or improved working condi-
tions. Heneman and Sandver conclude in
their review of the literature (1983:539),
it appears that somewhere between 25 and 50
percent of the variance in votingbehavior may
be explained by employee satisfactionlevels.
Employees' attitudestowardunions also ap-
pear fairlypredictiveof theirvotingbehavior...
Among the more specific attitudes, most im-
pressiveare the resultsfor employees' percep-
tions of the instrumentality of the union as a
mechanism for obtaining individuallydesired
outcomes,such as a wage increaseorjob security.
As a result, the role of the other explana-
tions has often been downplayed, and some-
times neglected entirely. The Israeli indus-
trial relations system in the early 1980s
serves as a convenient setting for studying
whether these other explanations are
needed.
Unions and Collective
Bargaining in Israel
The Israeli industrial relations system
was characterized until recently by a very
high rate of unionization, a highly central-
ized collective bargaining process, and a
high level of government involvement
through legislation, bargaining, and politi-
cal influence.3 The major institution in
3For more informationabout the Israeli system,
see Brauer 1990; Reshef1986; Shalev 1984; and Shirom
1983.
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659
Israel's industrialrelations used to be the
Histadrut (General Federation of Labor).
It was founded in 1920 by the socialist po-
litical parties to coordinate several Wel-
farefunctions(forexample, medical insur-
ance) and social functions (for example,
education forworkers'children) offeredto
workers by these parties. The collective
bargaining function was adopted by the
Histadrutat a later stage. At the beginning
of the 1980s, approximately 80% of the
labor forceand 90% of the wage earners in
Israel were members of the federation or
one of its affiliates. Members came from
virtuallyall sectorsof the economy and all
classes of society. Moreover, they repre-
sented the entire range of Israeli political
ideologies. In fact,all the major political
parties in Israel, including conservative
parties,compete during elections forseats
in the Histadrut'slegislativeassembly. Re-
ligious members can choose between two
of the federation'saffiliatesthatare run by
religiousparties. Not onlysalaried workers
became Histadrut members; unemployed
people, homemakers,and even managers
and self-employedworkerswere allowed to
join as well.
Histadrutmemberspay theirdues to the
federation,not to the occupational or in-
dustrialunions. These unions are funded
and controlled by the Histadrut's Trade
Union Department, which is responsible
forformulatingand negotiatingunion poli-
cies with employer associations and with
the government.The Histadrutleadership
is elected byits members,not by the affili-
ated unions, and thushas totalcontrolover
the unions and over the bargaining pro-
cess. The industrial and occupational
unions bargain withemployerswithinthe
bargaining zone assigned to them by the
national-level agreements signed by the
Trade Union Department.
The Israeli Federation of Labor did not
limit itselfto labor relations. The Trade
Union Department,albeitimportant,isjust
one ofseveraldepartmentsin theHistadrut,
whichaffectsall aspects of lifeof Israelis of
all ages. The Histadrutoffersworkersand
theirfamilies,among other things,health
services in the Histadrut-ownedhospitals
660 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
and clinics, vocational education in its
school system and training programs,
higher education in its college, sports ac-
tivitiesin its sports associations, social ac-
tivitiesfor youngstersin its youth move-
ment,day-carefacilitiesforchildren,a daily
newspaper, and insurance and travel ser-
vices. In addition, the Histadrut owned
many enterprises across all industrial
branches-either as a sole owneror in part-
nership with the governmentand private
investors. This unique role of the Israeli
Federation of Labor made it one of the
largestemployersin Israel.
The dues designated to cover collective
bargaining costs were only one source of
financing for the Histadrut's activities.
Other important sources were revenues
from Histadrut-providedservices, mainly
its health insurance program; returnson
investmentsmade byHistadrut-ownedpen-
sion funds; and funds and loans provided
byall governments-whetherlabor or con-
servativeLikud governments(Brauer 1990;
Reshef 1986).
Anotherimportantinstitutionin Israel's
industrialrelations systemis the workers'
committees.These committees,whichrep-
resent the workerson the shop floor, are
elected byand representall workersin the
workplace-Histadrut members and non-
membersalike. These committeesserveas
a channel forrank-and-filedemands from
the national unions and the Trade Union
Department. They also guarantee that
managementfollowsthelabor contractand
that workers' rightsare not violated. In
almostall cases, theHistadrut,not thework-
ers, inaugurates these committees. After
their establishmentby the federation,the
workers'committeesadopt a more militant
attitude than the one held by national
unions and the Trade Union Department,
and veryoftenthisdifferenceis manifested
in wildcat strikesdeclared by the commit-
tees.
A collective agreement signed by the
Histadrutand a public or privateemployer
covers all workers employed by this em-
ployer-whetherHistadrutmembersor not.
Althoughthereis no law requiringemploy-
erstobargaincollectively withtheHistadrut,
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about 80% of Israeli workerswere covered
bycollective agreementsin 1982. Because
all public sector employees are covered by
collective agreements,the entire 20% not
covered were in the privatesector. Israeli
law authorizes the Minister of Labor to
extend the termsof a collectiveagreement
signed at the national level to all employees
in the labor market, and to extend the
termsof a collective agreement signed at
the industrial or occupational level to all
employeesin thisindustryor occupation-
even those workingforemployersthat are
not a partyto the agreement. The Minister
ofLabor uses thisauthorizationfrequently,
mainlywithrespect to wages, cost of living
adjustments,and pension plan provisions.
In addition, all Israeli workersare pro-
tected by a networkof labor laws thatpro-
vide workerswith many benefitsand pro-
tections, such as social securitybenefits,
working hours, paid vacations and holi-
days, severance pay, and protection from
gender-baseddiscriminationbyemployers.
Thus, Israeliworkersare providedwithpro-
tections, benefits, union representation,
and collectivebargainingcoveragewhether
theyare union members or not.
WhyDid Israeli Workers
Join the Histadrut?
It is apparent fromthe above description
thatthe twoexplanations usuallyofferedto
explain whyworkersjoin unions-the col-
lectivevoice and the utility-instrumentality
explanations-were irrelevantin Israel in
1982. Most workersin Israel were covered
bycollectivecontracts,enjoyedunion gains
at the bargainingtable,and wereprotected
by the workers' committees even if they
were not Histadrut members. People did
not need to join the Histadrutin order to
benefit from the collective voice or im-
provedworkingconditionsitprovided. The
extensivecoverage of the Histadrutagree-
ments and protections allowed people to
act as "freeriders."
The relevantmotivesforIsraeli workers'
decision tojoin the Histadrutmustlie else-
where. It is quite possible that Israelis
joined the Histadrutforthe non-workben-
 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL
efitsit provided. If so, then pay mightplay
a role in such a decision. The "consump-
tioneffect"explanationsuggeststhathighly
paid workersjoinunions because theycon-
sume more representation services than
low-wageworkers.Consuming more repre-
sentationservicesis irrelevantin the Israeli
context due to the almost universal cover-
age provided bythe Histadrut,but the con-
sumption of non-workbenefits could be
related to pay. The direction of thiseffect
could go either way: a positive pay effect
when non-workbenefits provided by the
Histadrutare normal goods sold in a com-
petitivemarket,or a negative effector no
effectotherwise(for example, when these
benefitsare lower-qualitysubstitutes).The
medical insurance program offeredby the
Israeli Federation of Labor is particularly
noteworthy. Until the early 1980s, this
programwas perceived to be the best medi-
cal insurance program available in Israel.
It provided workerswith extensive cover-
age and with convenientlylocated clinics
and hospitals all across the country. How-
ever, in the past fifteenyears or so, the
marketforhealth insurance in Israel, espe-
cially in large urban areas, has become
more competitive,and people now have a
choice among several, equally attractive
programs,although the lion's share of this
marketis stillin the Histadrut's hands.
Workers'political ideologycould also be
relevantin the Israeli context. The country
was founded and ruled by labor-oriented
parties-the same partiesthatfounded the
Histadrut.Theydominatedtheeducational
systemand Israel's public and political life
formanyyears. Such influencecould have
led to the strongsupport of the Histadrut
shownbyIsraeli workers. If,indeed, thisis
the case, then Israeli workersshow more
similarityto theirEuropean than theirU.S.
counterparts.
Workers' beliefs about the importance
ofcollectiveactions could also playa role in
the Israeli context. The governmentand
the Histadrutplayed a keyrole in building
the country through central planning,
mobilizationof national resources,and in-
vestmentsdrawn from public funds and
budgets. As a result, the more respected
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661
social ideology there used to be socialism,
not capitalism.
Finally, as in other countries, demo-
graphic and work-relatedattributesof Is-
raeli workersmay also be correlated with
their decision to join or not to join the
Histadrut.
The purpose of thispaper is to examine
these possible explanations in the Israeli
context byusing a design that controlsfor
the collective voice and job-related instru-
mentality explanations. In the United
States, the relationship between joining
unions and the utilitiesprovided byunions
is reciprocal and difficultto estimate(Free-
man and Medoff 1984; Lewis 1986).4 In
contrast,because job-related utilities did
not play a role in an Israeli's decision to
join the Histadrut, it is relativelyeasy to
estimatethe effectofpayon the decision to
join a union in Israel. In fact,the Israeli
industrialrelationssystemprovidesus with
a quasi-experimentalsettingforexamining
theissue ofworkers'decision tojoin unions,
because the reversed causation (namely,
unions' effectson workingconditions) op-
erated in the Israeli labor market for al-
mostall wage earners. Due to the resulting
lack of variationin union gains, there was
no "union effect"on payand otherworking
conditions in Israel. The lack of Histadrut
membership effecton pay will be empiri-
cally demonstratedin this study.
Sample and Variables
The data for this studywere collected
during 1982 byDahaf, one of Israel's most
experienced polling firms.Interviewswere
conducted with a national probability
sample of 1800 people representativeof
theJewishpopulation in Israel betweenthe
ages of 18 and 70. Forty-threepercent of
those intervieweddid not participatein the
4Althougheconomistsstudyingthe effectofunions
on earnings commonlyrecognize and tryto correct
for the simultaneous relationship between unioniza-
tion and union benefits,thatproblem has been over-
looked in unionization studies. Most studies thattest
the importanceof the instrumentality ofwork-related
outcomes do not even mention this problem.
662 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
labor force, and 9% were non-salaried la-
bor force participants (self-employedor
unemployed, for example). The analyses
presented here are based on information
gathered from 400 salaried workers (315
Histadrutmembersand 85 non-members)
forwhomcomplete data regardingthevari-
ables specified below were obtained.5
This data set is unique because it con-
tainsinformationabout each respondent's
membershipin the Histadrutas well as pay
level, occupation, demographic character-
istics,and political and social beliefs. Such
rich informationallows us to test some of
the explanations described above. The
dependent variable-membership in the
Histadrut-is measured by a dummyvari-
able coded as "1" if the respondent was a
member in 1982.
Lack of relevant data rules out a direct
test of the non-workutility ("consumer-
ism") explanation. Instead, three possible
indicators of consumerismare employed:
pay,familyincome, and geographical loca-
tion. Pay and familynet monthlyincome
are measured byordinal variables contain-
ing 20 categories. Here, I used the natural
logarithm of each category's midpoint.
Geographical location is measured by a
dummyvariable indicating residence in a
large city. If the consumerismexplanation
is correct,payand familyincome should be
5Certain categories of non-salaried workers and
non-workersare allowed to join the Histadrut, but
theywereexcluded fromthe presentstudy.There are
threereasons forselectingsalaried people only. First,
such a sample willallow some comparisonswithother
countries in which only salaried workers become
union members. Second, limiting the analyses to
salaried workershelps to controlforunobservedvari-
ables and selection processes associated withthe de-
cision to join the labor market,the choice of which
group in the market to join (for example, salaried
versus self-employed), and so on. Finally, such a
sample enables me to examine the reciprocal rela-
tionship betweenjoining unions and marketpay.
Approximatelyone-halfof the wage earners were
excluded fromthe analysisbecause ofmissingdata on
one variable or more. The questions withthe highest
rates of no answers were those concerning political
and social positions. Also, twelve salaried workers
with no missing data were excluded because they
were employed by Histadrut-affiliated cooperatives.
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related to Histadrutmembership. The di-
rection of this relationship, however, de-
pends on whether benefits and services
provided by the Histadrut "behave" like
normal goods. The direction of the effect
of geographical location is expected to be
negative: people livingoutside large cities
are expected tojoin because theHistadrut's
services,mainlyhealth care, are often the
only services available to them. Thus, a
positiveassociationbetweenruralresidence
and Histadrutmembership could support
the consumerismexplanation.
Political ideology is measured by two
dummy variables indicating whether re-
spondents perceived themselvesas belong-
ing to the political "left"or "right."Both of
thosegroupsare compared,as well,to those
who perceived themselvesas belonging to
neither the leftnor the right.
Respondents' beliefs and values regard-
ing various economic and social issues rel-
evant to trade unions are measured based
on theiranswersto questions regardingthe
following: their support for socialist (ver-
sus capitalist)policies; theimportancethey
attached to high pay and to job security;
their support for the tenure systemin the
workplace; whether they viewed the pay
level in their occupation to be fair when
compared to the pay level in other occupa-
tions; and whether they sought an active
union in the workplace.
Respondents' support for socialist poli-
cies and equitable pay levelsacross occupa-
tions can proxyfortheirbelief in the value
of collectiveaction byworkers.It indicates
a belief in interpersonaland group equal-
ityas opposed to individualisticmethodsof
rewards allocation. Support forjob secu-
rity,a tenuresystem,and an activeunion in
theworkplaceis based on a beliefthatmore
power should be shiftedfromemployersto
workers. Again, respondentswho indicate
such a belief probably favorcollective ac-
tion by workers. High importance placed
on pay level is somewhatdifferentfromthe
other variables included in this group be-
cause it does not necessarilyindicate sup-
portforcollectiveaction. However,people
whoregardhighpayas veryimportantmight
support collective action by workers,be-
 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL 663

cause such action is one possible means for of normativepressure to join the federa-
maximizingpay. Thus, all these beliefsand tion (Montgomery1989) or as a learning
prioritiesare expected to positivelyaffect experience thatacquaints workerswiththe
workers' decision to join the Histadrut, importance of collective action in general
because the strongerthe Histadrut is, the and unions in particular.
more likelyit will be able to fulfillthese The last group of independent variables
priorities. consistsof work-relatedand individualfac-
It should be emphasized that the vari- torsthathave been foundin empiricalstud-
ables for beliefs and attitudes described ies to be related to the decision to join
above are not used here to capture respon- unions. As mentioned before, these vari-
dents' viewofthe Histadrut'sinstrumental- ables should be perceived as correlates
itywithrespectto theirownjobs-nor were ratherthana coherent explanation of such
the questions worded along those lines. As a decision.
explained earlier, job-specific instrumen- The firstwork-relatedcorrelate,occupa-
talities of unions such as those that have tional prestige,was used to control forthe
been examined in the United Statesare not effectof occupations on union member-
relevant in the Israeli context. Instead, I ship. It was measured by Tyree's (1981)
am interested in Israelis' attitude toward 100-point scale, which is based on the first
collective action, "voice," and equality as principal component of the average educa-
general principles. tion and income of employees in occupa-
An examination of the relationships tions in Israel. Other work-relatedvari-
among the six items used to capture these ables were the sector of the economy in
beliefsrevealsthattheymeasure more than which the respondentwas employed (pub-
one unifiedconstruct.Supportforsocialist lic versus private),8 organization size, and
policies, forjob security,and for a tenure managerial position (as a proxyforlevel in
systemin the workplace are interrelated,6 the organizational hierarchy).9
and a high importance attached to pay is Demographic correlates that were in-
correlatedwithsupportforan activeunion cluded in the analyses because they have
in theworkplace.7Perceived equitabilityof been found in otherstudiesto be related to
pay level is not related to any of the other unionization are two dummyvariables for
fivemeasures. highest educational degree (one for aca-
In addition,severalcontrolvariablesthat demic degree and the other for a high
mightmoderate the relationshipsbetween school diploma), age and itssquared term,
membership and social and political be- gender, and maritalstatus. Two dummies
liefswereincluded. Dummyvariablescoded indicatingethnicoriginwere also included
as "1" ifthe person was religious and ifthe because IsraeliJewsof European or Ameri-
person had arrivedin Israel at the age of can origin ("Westerners") hold an advan-
fifteenyearsor older (see Kossoudji 1989) tage over those of Asian-Africanorigin
were included as possible sources of differ- ("Easterners") in everyaspect of socioeco-
ences in values and socialization processes. nomic status. In addition,these twogroups
Finally, a dummy variable indicating
whethertherewas an activeworkers'com-
mittee in the respondent's workplace was
included as well. The presence of an active 8It is impossible to separate those who were em-
ployedby the Histadrutfromotherpublic sector
workers'committeecould serveas a source workers because of thewaythedata werecollected.
This mightlead to a biased estimate(probablyan
oftheeffect
over-estimation) ofpublicsectoremploy-
6Thecorrelations of "socialist"with"importance menton membership in the Histadrut.Duringthe
ofjob security"and "tenure"were 0.15 and 0.13, period in whichthe data were collected,approxi-
respectively,and the correlationbetweentheselast mately5% oftheIsraelilaborforcewereemployedby
twovariableswas 0.12. All threecorrelationsare enterprisesownedsolelybytheHistadrut.
significantlydifferentfromzero at p < .01. 9Recallthatworkersin managerialpositionswere
7r= 0.11, p =.01. allowedtojoin theHistadrut.

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664 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table 1. Variable Definitions,Means, and (in Parentheses)

Standard Deviations for the Entire Sample and by Membership.
Sample
Variable Definition EntireSample MembersNon-Members pa

Dependent:
HistadrutMember A dummycoded as 1 if member 0.79
Independent:
Pay The natural logarithmof the midpoint 9.593 9.572 9.671 0.09
of each categoryin an intervalscale (0.475) (0.466) (0.504)
with 20 categories measuring net
monthlyincome
Academic Degree A dummycoded as 1 if has an 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.23
academic degree
High School A dummycoded as 1 if highest degree 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.35
is high school diploma
Age In years 36.71 36.92 35.91 0.43
(10.51) (10.55) (10.36)
Age Squared (Age)2
Occupational As measured by Tyree's scale, with 51.87 51.72 52.42 0.76
Prestige scores ranging from0 to 99 (18.66) (18.56) (19.13)
Sector A dummycoded as 1 if employed in 0.68 0.73 0.46 <0.01
the public or Histadrut sector; 0 if
employed in the privatesector
Organizational Size A dummycoded as 1 ifworksin an 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.57
organization withmore than 100
employees
Geographical A dummycoded as 1 if lives in one 0.78 0.74 0.93 <0.01
Location of the three largest cities in Israel
Manager A dummycoded as 1 if supervisesone 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.63
employee or more
Workers' Committee A dummycoded as 1 if a workers' 0.53 0.55 0.44 0.06
committee is active in the workplace
Gender A dummycoded as 1 if male 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.34
Married A dummycoded as 1 if married 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.70
Western A dummycoded as 1 ifwas born in 0.31 0.29 0.36 0.20
Europe or America
Eastern A dummycoded as 1 ifwas born in 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.27
Asia or Africa
Religious A dummycoded as 1 if religious 0.40 0.41 0.34 0.23
Immigrant A dummycoded as 1 if arrivedin 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.95
Israel at the age of 15 or older
FamilyIncome The midpoint of each categoryin an 27.25 27.20 27.45 0.55
intervalscale with20 categories (7.89) (7.77) (8.36)
measuring net monthlyfamilyincome
(in thousands of Israeli Shekels)
Importance of A five-category ordinal variable ranging 3.49 3.52 3.36 0.34
High Payb from 1 = least importantwork attribute (1.33) (1.32) (1.34)
to 5 = most important
Importance of A five-category ordinal variable ranging 2.63 2.74 2.22 <0.01
Job Security from 1 = least importantwork attribute (1.40) (1.43) (1.22)
to 5 = most important
Equityc A five-category ordinal variable ranging 2.47 2.45 2.52 0.52
from 1 = paid much less than deserve (0.85) (0.85) (0.88)
(in comparison withpay in other
occupations) to 5 = paid much more Continued

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 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL 665

Table 1. (Continued)
Sample
Variable Definition EntireSample MembersNon-Members pa

Tenured A dummycoded as 1 if supports the 0.42 0.44 0.31 0.02

tenure systemin the workplace
Union supports A dummycoded as 1 if supports a more 0.51 0.52 0.45 0.23
active union in the workplace
Socialist' A dummycoded as 1 if supports 0.60 0.63 0.51 0.05
socialist policies; 0 if supports capitalist
policies
Left9 A dummycoded as 1 if supports the 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.33
ideology of the political left
Right-Center A dummycoded as 1 if supports the 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.45
ideology of the political rightcenter
aA two-tailedprobability,based on a pooled variance estimate of the differencebetween the means of
members and non-members.
b"People tryto achieve differentwork outcomes. Rank order the following outcomes based on their
importance to you (1 = the most important; 2 = less important,and in a similar way down to 5 = the least
important): high pay;job security;convenientand easyjob; promotionopportunities;interestingand satisfying
job."
C"Whenyou compare general pay levels in your occupation to general pay levels in other occupations, you
conclude that people workingin your occupation earn: 1 = much less than theydeserve; 2 = less than they
deserve; 3 = what theydeserve; 4 = more than theydeserve; 5 = much more than theydeserve."
d"ThepresentIsraeli tenuresystempreventsemployersfromfiringworkerswithouttheWorkers'Committee's
approval. Which of the followingtenure systemsdo you support? 1 = the present system;2 = a systemwhich
allows employersto fireworkers,or a no-tenuresystem."
e"Would you like to see a more active union in yourworkplace? 1 = yes; 2 = I like the present situationin my
workplace."
f"Whichof the followingeconomic and social ideologies describes better your own economic and social
beliefs? 1 = capitalist; 2 = socialist."
9"Whichof the followingpolitical ideologies is supported byyou? 1 = left,left-center;2 = center,center-right,
right."
Source:Data collected in 1982 froma probabilitysample of theJewishpopulation in Israel between the ages
of 18 and 70.

mightdifferin socialization processes and union activityis found to be correlatedwith

beliefs regardingthe role of labor unions.
These twogroupswere compared toJewish
workersborn in Israel.
The reader should bear in mind two
limitationsof thisstudythatstemfromthe
nature of the surveydata. First,the con-
structvalidityof some of the variables is
questionable, especially that of the vari-
ables measuring ideologies and beliefs.
These are one-itemvariablesthatwereused
by the data collectorswithouttestingtheir
constructvalidity.Second, the directionof
the causal relationship between Histadrut
membershipand some of the membership
determinantsmight be reversed. For ex-
ample, if the support members show for
the probabilityof their membership,it is
possible that the latter gave rise to the
formerand not vice-versa.
Table 1 contains definitionsof the vari-
ables used in the studyand descriptivesta-
tistics for the entire sample and for
Histadrutmembersand non-memberssepa-
rately.
Results
Members Versus Non-Members
There are differencesbetween Israeli
salaried workerswho are members of the
Histadrutand those who are not. Table 1

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666 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

showsthatthese differencescan be divided a regressionequation in which pay served

into two types. The firstis related to the as the dependent variable and membership
structureof the labor marketin whicheach in the Histadrut,togetherwith other vari-
group works.A higherproportionof those ables,11served as its determinants. As ex-
who join the Histadrut than of those who pected, themembershipcoefficientwas not
do not are found in the public sector (p < found to be significantlydifferentfrom
.01), in peripheral locations (p < .01), and zero. I estimated a second equation in
in organizationsin whichworkers'commit- which membershipwas replaced by a vari-
tees are active (p = .06). In addition, mem- able measuring whether a workers' com-
bers earn, on average, less than non-mem- mitteewas active in the workplace. Again,
bers (p = .09). thiscoefficientwas not found to be signifi-
The second typeof differencebetween cantlydifferentfromzero. In otherwords,
membersand non-membersis in social and whenotherrelevantvariablesare controlled
economic beliefs. Histadrut members at- for, I find that pay differentialsin Israel
tribute,on average,more importancethan were not affected by Histadrut member-
non-memberstojob security(p < .01), and ship or by actions taken by workers' com-
a higher proportion of them support the mitteesin the workplace.12
tenure systemin the workplace (p = .02).
Finally, a higher proportion of Histadrut Membership Determinants
memberssupportsocialistratherthancapi-
talistpolicies (p = .05). The purpose of the final analysiswas to
The demographic differencesbetween examine the effectof the variables on the
the twogroupswere not statistically signifi- decision tojoin the Histadrut. The model
cant,although the directionofthese differ- used was an individual-level(ungrouped)
ences shows that non-members were logit. For each observationi, the probabil-
younger (and hence a smaller proportion ity that Y= 1 (that is, i is a Histadrutmem-
of themwere married), fewerof themwere ber) is
born in Asia or Africa,and more of them (1) Pi= 1/1+eXiP,
were born in Europe or America. Non-
members were more likelythan members where x denotes a vector of explanatory
to have academic degrees and less likelyto variables and f3is a vector of coefficients,
be religious.'0 includinga constantterm. P ranges from0
to 1.
Membership and Pay The resultsofthelogitanalysispresented
in Table 2 indicate that several explana-
As discussed above, a major hazard in tions can be used to understand the deci-
everyprocedure designed to estimate the
determinantsof union membershipis the
possible reciprocitybetween union mem- "1The list of independent variables included
bership and pay. In order to rule out such Histadrutmembership,academic degree, high school
a possibilityin the Israeli case, I estimated diploma, age, labor marketexperience and itssquared
term, occupational prestige, sector (public or pri-
vate), organization size, geographic location, mana-
gerial position, number of hours worked, gender,
I'Differences on these variables were retested us- maritalstatus,Westernorigin,Easternorigin,whether
ing a larger sample. This sample was obtained by the respondent immigratedto Israel at or beyond the
consideringall the non-missingdata foreach variable age of fifteen,importance of high pay, and impor-
(a "pairwise"methodratherthanthe "listwise"method tance ofjob security.
used originally). This method increased the sample 12The pay equations were not estimated simulta-
size to approximately800 subjects (as compared to neouslywiththe membershipequation because cross-
the 400 used in Table 1). These testsrevealed signifi- sectional, non-simultaneous pay equations provide
cant differencesin the direction described above for upper-limitestimatesofthe union effecton pay (Free-
the followingvariables: academic degree, age, mari- man 1984; Lewis 1986). The insignificantresultsin
tal status,being religious, and Asian or Africanori- this case indicate that there is no need for more
gin. complex estimationprocedures.

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 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL 667

sion of Israelis to become Histadrutmem- Table 2. Determinants of Joining the

bers. Histadrut: a Logit Analysis.
First,and contraryto empirical findings
Coefficient!
in the United States, pay was found to be Variable Coefficient S.E.
relatednegativelyto the (unobserved) prob-
abilityofbeing a Histadrutmember. Work- Pay -0.987** 2.25
ers with high pay tend to stay out of the Academic Degree 0.214 0.44
Israeli Federation of Labor. 13 The effectof High School 0.459 1.27
pay on the probabilityof being a Histadrut Age 0.068 0.66
member is -0.165." In addition, livingin Age Squared -0.0003 0.43
Occupational Prestige -0.001 0.19
small cities and rural areas was found to
Sector 1.074*** 3.26
have an effect of 0.259 on joining the Organizational Size -0.266 0.86
Histadrut. These twofindingsare grouped Geographical Location -1.550*** 3.08
under the consumerismexplanation. Manager -0.043 0.14
The negativepayeffectcan be explained Workers' Committee 0.668** 2.17
bythe factthatworkerswithlowerearnings Gender 0.691* 1.92
have a greater need for the lower-than- Married -0.216 0.50
market-price services offered by the Western -0.292 0.76
Histadrut. Eastern -0.387 0.88
How can thedifferencebetweenthenega- Religious 0.087 0.28
Immigrant -0.212 0.50
tivepay effectfound in Israel and the posi-
FamilyIncome 0.00002 1.24
tivepayeffectfoundin theUnited Statesbe Importance of High Pay 0.094 0.84
reconciled? One possibilityis that the si- Importance ofJob Security 0.247** 2.34
multaneous relationship between pay and Equity -0.058 0.33
membership is not corrected properlyin Tenure 0.442 1.42
the U.S. studies. Several scholars have ob- Union Support 0.688** 2.29
served that corrections made for possible Socialist 0.084 0.29
simultaneityin the union-paystudiesresult Left 0.134 0.28
in unstable and highlysensitiveestimates Right-Center -0.431 1.18
(for example, Lewis 1986). Second, one Constant 3.849
Pearson X2 380.26a
respect in which membership in the
d.f. 373
Histadrutmay differfrommembershipin
U.S. unions is thatitmore faithfully reflects aThe Pearson X2statisticis not distributedas Chi
workers'so-called "unionismpreferences." Square because it is derived from individual
(ungrouped) data. As a result,a testofgoodness-offit
U.S. studiesexamining the effectof pay on cannot be performed.
unionismpreferenceshave found no effect *Statisticallysignificantat the .10 level; **at the
or a negative effect (Fiorito et al. 1986). .05 level; ***at the .01 level.

13I performedan additional analysisthatincluded

pay and itssquared termin the membershipequation
to examine the possibilityofa curvilineareffectofpay
on membership. Neithercoefficientwas significantly
differentfrom zero, probably due to these terms'
instabilityand the large increase in the standard
error of the pay coefficient(from 0.22 to 4.31) that
resulted fromthe veryhigh correlation between pay
and pay squared.
14The effectof pay on the probabilityof Y = 1 is
evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent vari-
able [proportion(Y= 1) = 0.788], and is provided by
d[probability(Y= 1)]/dxk = b * 0.788 * (1 - 0.788).
The estimated logit coefficientis b, and the sample
proportion substitutesfor the probabilityof Y = 1.
Finally,thecontrastingpayeffectsmaystem
fromdifferencesbetweentheUnited States
and Israel in workers' behaviors or the
marketsforunion benefits.
The effectof geographical location de-
servesclose attentionas well. It was found
that those living away from major cities
tend to join the Histadrut. A possible ex-
planationis thatpeople livingin smalltowns
did not have as manyalternativeservicesas
people in large cities,and theHistadrutwas
oftentheironlyprovider. A good example

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668 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

is health services. The Histadrutprovided preted as indicating Histadrut members'

its health services in almost everyarea in endorsement of the principles of "voice"
Israel. Only residentsof large cities had a and job security. Again, such attitudes
choice among health service providers, should not be viewed as instrumentalin
because providers besides the Histadrut nature, because members and non-mem-
were not active in small towns or rural bers alike receive voice opportunitiesand
areas. If indeed thiswas the case, then the job security.'5
effectofgeographicallocation on Histadrut Interestingly, when othervariableswere
membership can be characterized as con- controlled for, political ideologies ("left"
sumer-based. versus"right")and supportof socialistpoli-
Second, workingin thepublic sectorand cies were not found to play any role in
in workplaces where workers' committees Israelis' decision tojoin theHistadrut.This
are active positivelyaffectedthe probabil- resultmaybe explained, at least in part,by
ity of joining the Histadrut. The magni- a distinctionIsraeli workersmake between
tudes of these effectswere 0. 179 and 0. 112, work-relatedissues on the one hand and
respectively. foreignpolicies and issues ofnational secu-
One possible explanation forthe public rityon the other.'6
sector effectis that public employers are Finally,and in accordance withfindings
less openly hostile to unions than private in other countries,men were found to be
employersbecause of public visibilityand more likely than women to become
the desire forbroad public support. These Histadrutmembers.
more positiveattitudesofpublic employers
towardunions maybe reflectedin the atti- Discussion
tudes of workersemployed in public orga-
nizations (Newton and Shore 1992). An- Severalimportantpossible determinants
other possible explanation involvesthe se- of workers'decision to join unions are of-
lection processes that mightbe operating ten overlooked in the literaturebecause of
in the labor marketwhen workerschoose the central role attributed to "collective
between public and privatesector employ- voice" and the union earnings premium.
ment. It is quite possible thatunobserved The results of this study,which uses data
variables are correlated with both deci-
sions-joining unions and choosing em-
ploymentin the public sector. "5Some readers might find the "union support"
The effectof the presence of an active variable a close proxy for membership. Thus, the
workers'committeeon the decision tojoin membershipequation was re-estimatedafterthisvari-
able had been excluded fromthe group of indepen-
the Histadrutalso deserves attention. It is dent variables. The new estimates were practically
possible that workers conclude that the identical to the original results. For example, the pay
Histadrutis a keysocial institutiondeserv- coefficientwas found to be -1.065 (as compared to
ing their support after they observe the -0.987). I decided to keep the variable in the model
operation of these committeesin theirown because it has a significanteffecton membership
despite a non-significantmean differencebetween
workplace. members and non-members. This significanteffect
Third, personal beliefs were found to probably results fromcontrolling for differencesin
affectthe probabilityofworkersbelonging other beliefs and values such as job securityand the
to the Histadrut. Surveyrespondentswho tenure system.
'6For example, one-halfof the workerssupported
expressed general supportforunion activ- union activityin the workplace,and a majority(60%)
ityin the workplace, and also those who supportedsocialistprograms,yeta majoritysupported
attached high importance to job security, the Israeli political center and right(59%). Despite
weremore likelythanothersto be Histadrut the fact that a larger proportion of Histadrut mem-
members. The effectsof these two vari- bers than non-memberssupported socialist policies,
theirsupport forthose policies did not have a signifi-
ables, as evaluated at the sample mean of cant effecton theirdecision tojoin. It is possible that
the membership variable, are 0.115 and the other beliefs affectingmembershipcaptured the
0.041. These two effectscould be inter- effectof support of a socialist ideology.

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 WHY WORKERS JOIN UNIONS IN ISRAEL 669

from a 1982 nationwide surveyin Israel, tention to these neglected explanations.

indicate that several of these alternative
factorsinfluencedIsraeli workers'decision
to join the Federation of Labor (the
Histadrut). Most notably, the likelihood
that a respondent belonged to the federa-
tion was positivelyassociated with the fol-
lowing: the importance to the respondent
of non-work benefits provided by the
Histadrut (which varied, I have assumed,
depending on such factorsas earningsand
the availabilityofcompetingserviceswhere
the respondent lived); the respondent's
belief that unions are major instruments
for workers' solidarity; and the
respondent's employment in the public
sector. Future research on workers' deci-
sion to join unions should pay more at-
Can the resultsfound in Israel be gener-
alized to othercountries? More studiesare
needed, of course, beforeanyfirmanswers
can be given to thatquestion. The factors
affectingunionization mightwellvaryfrom
one countryto another, and there is no
reason to expect thatexplanations relevant
in one contextwill be relevantin another.
A model featuringthe factorsidentifiedas
important in this study, however, might
neverthelessbe supported in other coun-
tries where most workers are covered by
collectiveagreements. Extensivecoverage
characterizes several European industrial
relations systems,and the Israeli system
probably has more in common withthose
systemsthan withthe U.S. system.

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