Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Utilities Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jup

Swaying public opinion on nuclear energy: A field experiment in Hong

Kong
Tin Fai Kwok a, Chung Hang Yeung a, Yuan Xu a, b, *
a
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
b
Institute of Environment, Energy and Sustainability, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This research focuses on understanding the significance of information in affecting public opinion. Nu-
Received 5 January 2017 clear energy is among the most controversial of policy issues and the information-saturated mature civil
Received in revised form society of Hong Kong makes it an ideal location for this study. A novel field experiment is set up in which
8 April 2017
pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear information collected from local media reports is inserted into two iden-
Accepted 8 April 2017
Available online 14 April 2017
tical questionnaires, to which respondents are randomly assigned. The percentage of the public who
switched their opinion was estimated to be 5e37%, depending on the framing of the question.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Information and public opinion
Nuclear energy
Field experiment

1. Introduction aroused by these issues (Taebi et al., 2012).

The adoption of any critical energy or environmental policy is
essentially based upon a society's collective decision. Few issues are
more divisive and controversial than nuclear energy. Nuclear
technology has attracted a disproportionate amount of public
concern compared to other energy technologies, with its potential
to trigger a massive loss of human lives in the case of accidents and
its close relationship to global politics and national security. As
Masco (2006) stated, nuclear technologies, in the form of nuclear
weapons and other related facilities, have been viewed with anxi-
ety and ambivalence. The fear of nuclear power stems from its
being associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, and in
the twenty-first century this fear is being intensified due to the rise
of terrorism (Masco, 2006). The unthinkable prospect of nuclear
war and national insecurity go hand-in-hand. Moving from this
destructive side of nuclear technology to the constructive side, few
types of modern energy sources have aroused such significant
political controversies as nuclear energy does, due to numerous
socio-political issues: the devastating consequences of nuclear ac-
cidents (despite their low probability); uncertainty about the
technology; nuclear waste disposal; and the public emotions
* Corresponding author. Department of Geography and Resource Management,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.
E-mail address: yuanxu@cuhk.edu.hk (Y. Xu).
Risk perception by the public on nuclear power is a major cause
of anxiety and controversy. Public perceptions about energy alter-
natives, such as nuclear power, are related to their perceived risk
and danger (Rosa and Dunlap, 1994). Instead of the technical
analysis of risk, public risk perception is highly qualitative,
involving individual psychological intuition, mental preparedness,
and social experiences (Renn, 1998). Factors that influence in-
dividuals' nuclear attitudes have been studied; these include social
location, values, trust towards the organisations, and perceived risk
(Whitfield et al., 2008). Although a gap between the public's
perception and the experts' assessments of nuclear risk cannot be
simply explained by a knowledge gap, better information should
contribute to the narrowing of this gap (Slovic, 2012). As stated by
Stoutenborough et al. (2013), information is needed to provide a
foundation for risk perception to develop. Different interpretation
of risk information, given significant subjective impacts (such as
emotions, personal experiences and socio-cultural factors), is
another major cause of the gap (Gierlach et al., 2010).
Based on information inputs, through individual information
processing and risk perception, opinion on nuclear energy is
formed. The literature has not reached a consensus on the rela-
tionship between information and public opinion in this area. In
order to provide information about nuclear energy to the public,
the knowledge-deficit model is generally assumed. The reasons
why the public rejects science are related to their understanding of
and perceptions about science and its role in society (Wynne,

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2017.04.001
0957-1787/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
2006). It is sometimes suggested that public opposition is
emotional and a result of ignorance, while the science is unques-
tioned. On the one hand, some studies have found no significant
impacts of information to validate this assumption (Ramana, 2011).
The problem may also be on the “scientific” side when experts fail
to understand the public's perceptions about risk. Taking the
example of genetically modified maize in Mexico, Brunk (2006)
argued that the conflict with the local farmers resulted from the
experts' failure to understand the social and cultural implications of
GM maize's “intrusion” into the local community. On the other
hand, some studies have confirmed that information has discern-
ible impacts. For example, a study in South Korea used the
contingent valuation method to estimate the social value of nuclear
energy, and better information was found to increase public sup-
port (Jun et al., 2010). The study by Stoutenborough et al. (2013)
also suggested that a person who possesses more information
tends to support nuclear power.
From the perspective of journalism, there is no absolute “unbi-
ased” or “undistorted” news since, according to Gans (1979), “the
mere act of reproduction would constitute a distortion on that re-
ality” and “non-distortion” of news can be judged only from a
“relational perspective”. In the real world, a single piece of infor-
mation can be more or less biased, one-sided, manipulated, or
sometimes even wrong. The internal values of the journalist and
the practices of news gathering would cause bias in the news
(Entman, 1990). The media play an influential role in public opinion
formation on environmental issues through agenda setting, which
is disclaimed by journalists, yet done (unintentionally) whenever
they decide what to report and at what level of detail (McCombs,
2004). Doyle (2011) examined how the media have contributed
to the reframing of nuclear power as a low-carbon substitute to
mitigate climate change in the UK and how this influences public
understanding. Palfreman (2006) gave a more detailed account of
how information can be distorted during its conveyance: the
“factual distortions” due to the journalist's scientific illiteracy, the
“narrative distortions” of reporting stories of readers' interest
instead of the facts, and the “distortions of balance” under the
notion of “balanced coverage”. Instead of a one-way flow of infor-
mation from the media to the public, there exists a two-way flow
because the media adjust their reporting frame based on the in-
terests of their readers or viewers.
A study of the power of the media on public opinion towards
nuclear energy in the post-war USA up to the 1980s showed that
the media discourse is influential on the formation of public
opinion on the issue (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989). In their work,
Gamson and Modigliani suggested that journalists play a double
role in opinion formation. How and what kinds of information are
delivered would affect the audience. With commentary, journalists
also react to the issue that has been partly framed, giving opinions
that are shared by the audience. The framing of the issue is rec-
ognised as an influential factor upon public opinion on the issue:
whether nuclear power is regarded as a progressive means for
economic development or a devil's threat to safety would alter
public perceptions and support for the utilisation of nuclear power.
A study by Bickerstaff et al. (2008) indicated that public attitudes
towards nuclear power are not necessarily fixed, but could vary
depending on the framing, although an increase in preference to-
wards nuclear power is probably a result of the reluctant accep-
tance of the lesser evil compared to other problems, particularly
climate change. When put into the context of climate change
mitigation and energy security, an increase in support for nuclear
power is possible, although it would be a conditional and reluctant
acceptance of nuclear power (Bird et al., 2014; Corner et al., 2011;
Pidgeon et al., 2008). Conversely, when nuclear power is pro-
posed as a solution to climate change, the public would also have a
49
lower tendency to decline the facts about climate change, which
means that the framing of solutions could influence public per-
ceptions of the problem (Pralle and Boscarino, 2011).
Pidgeon et al. (2008) also suggested that in the case of a major
incident, public support would be withdrawn over concerns about
safety, another possible frame. As illustrated by Bird et al. (2014),
Australian public opinion on nuclear power shifted more to the
negative side after the Fukushima incident. Mazur (1981) also
suggested that on controversial issues like nuclear power, media
coverage has a particular power in shaping public opinion, and the
impact could be difficult to determine. Citing the example of the
Three Mile Island incident, Mazur argued that the media could not
only report the event, but also generate and shape controversy,
given that the percentage of public opposition towards nuclear
power coincided with the amount of media coverage. He further
argued that the public tends to take a more conservative stand
when faced with scientific controversies, citing that people who
received both positive and negative information about fluoridation,
tended to oppose it compared to those who did not receive the
information. Even within scientific circles, support for nuclear po-
wer could be built by framing the issue in terms of “relieving the
energy needs of the under-developed countries” and “utilising
nuclear power for desalination”, as mentioned in Sovacool and
Ramana (2015), showing that scientists are not “immune” to
these rhetorical devices.
The issue of public risk perception further complicates the
problem. Renn (1998) summarised some of the major frameworks
of risk perception in a social scientific and technical analysis of risk.
Likewise, public risk perception is affected by personal biases and
issue framing (Renn, 1998). Kahan et al. (2007) suggested that even
when the same piece of information is given, “identity-protective”
cognition leads individuals to accept information when it is framed
in a way that affirms their personal values and commitments. In
addition, scepticism about information varies depending on the
source of the information: the government; scientists; or the nu-
clear industry for instance (Greenhalgh and Azapagic, 2009). Renn
(1998) proposed that there is a need for deliberative communica-
tions between experts, the general public, and industry regulators
for effective mutual learning and better understanding of social
values.
These literature provide examples of how framing influences
public opinion formation. The focus was mainly on how framing
can shift opinion, yet few studies have addressed how distorting
information about the same issue or frame might influence public
opinion. The frames most commonly discussed were risk percep-
tion and environmental concerns, including climate change. Issues
other than these two are rarely encountered in the available public
opinion polling analyses (e.g., Nealey et al., 1983; Rosa and Dunlap,
1994; Whitfield et al., 2008). Few studies have examined the rele-
vance of other significant frames for policy-makers and utility
regulators, including operating costs and reliability. Ansolabehere
and Konisky (2009) discussed the issues of cost, siting, and envi-
ronmental concern, but their work focused on the comparison of
different energy sources apart from nuclear power. Thus, research
relating to public opinion formation and nuclear power utilisation
remains limited. Knowledge about public opinion in this area and
the influence of issue framing is valuable for both the government
and civil society in order to facilitate collective decision-making
about nuclear energy. An understanding of public opinion can
also help utility regulators improve their practices, such as infor-
mation disclosure. The relevance of a particular aspect of nuclear
power to the process of collective decision-making will be affected
by public opinion, which is in turn shaped by information.
This paper aims to quantitatively measure “opinion switchers”, a
group within the general public that could easily switch between
50 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
positive and negative opinions when receiving different informa-
tion. Whether public opinion is altered, the proportion of switched
opinion and the factors affecting the switch are examined. The
mature media and numerous information channels, which allow
easy information distribution and access, make Hong Kong a good
location for this study. In this context, the presentation of distorted
or one-sided information from one source should be unlikely to
significantly influence public opinion formation due to scepticism
and easy access to alternative information sources. This influence
from one-sided information would be a bigger problem in other
societies where access to multiple information sources is poorer.
Another reason for studying Hong Kong is the growing impor-
tance of nuclear power in the fuel mix in light of the consequential
exposure to the issue following the Fukushima incident. The issue
of nuclear power utilisation in Hong Kong has been largely un-
touched by the general public and the media after the commission
of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant in neighbouring Guangdong
province in the early 1990s until the Fukushima incident. Public
opinion has also played an insignificant role in deciding the energy
mix in Hong Kong. In September 2010, with the objective of
replacing coal and reducing air pollutants and CO2 emissions, the
Hong Kong Environment Bureau proposed to increase the share of
nuclear power in the fuel mix for the electricity supply from 23% to
50% by 2020 by importing more nuclear electricity from the Daya
Bay Nuclear Power Plant (Environment Bureau, 2010). However,
several months later, in March 2011, the Fukushima incident
attracted broad media coverage, and public opinion towards nu-
clear power swung greatly to the unfavourable side. In order to
facilitate collective decision-making, there was a major focus to
provide more information to the general public and to enhance
“nuclear literacy” on the basic features of nuclear power operation,
safety systems, and evacuation procedures (Loh, 2012). In
September 2012, the Hong Kong Nuclear Society was established
with this purpose clearly in mind (Hong Kong Nuclear Society,
2014). Given that Hong Kong remains at the infancy stage of pub-
lic discussion about the utilisation of nuclear energy, there is thus
much interest in how information provision might affect public
opinion formation in this area.
Public opinion is commonly solicited as a single indicator in
opinion surveys, with various aspects of issues mixed together. In
this study, we argue that the public opinion could vary significantly
depending on issue framing and that it is crucial to examine the
underlying factors contributing to the opinion. We also argue that
public opinion could be shaped, though this is not likely for values
that have been deeply entrenched, and the proportion of opinion
switchers would vary for different aspects and values. These issues
should be handled with caution by utility regulators because public
pressure could ultimately affect decisions about utility operations,
especially in democratic societies, and regulators are also in a po-
sition to provide the information that influences opinion. Thus they
deserve a closer investigation. The organisation of this paper is as
follows. Section 2 introduces data and methodology. Section 3
analyses the data to measure the proportion of opinion switchers.
Section 4 explains the results and identifies key influential factors.
Conclusion and discussion are provided in Section 5.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. The design of the questionnaires
In an attempt to clearly distinguish the relationship between
public attitude, as the dependent variable, and one-sided infor-
mation, as the independent variable, one major obstacle is to
control many other potentially influential independent variables.
The directly solicited data of public opinion generally mix the
impacts of all the variables together, and this makes it difficult, if
not impossible, to single out the impacts of one-sided information
alone. We designed a novel field experiment to effectively eliminate
the impacts of these control variables. Field experiment as a
research method has been applied more and more widely to
conduct experiments on the natural environment (Harrison and
List, 2004). The said novel method is proposed to examine the
impact of one-sided information on public opinion in a daily-life
scenario, with the influence of respondent background and media
discourse about nuclear power isolated. The description of the
formulae that explains how this method works is shown in
Appendix 1.
Two questionnaires were designed, and every respondent was
randomly selected to answer one of them. These two question-
naires have exactly the same set of questions. We inserted simple,
easy-to-understand, yet one-sided information in front of opinion-
soliciting questions. The information in each of the two question-
naires was consistently one-sided, either positive or negative for
nuclear energy. The respondents would not be exposed to both
sides of the story and only the impact of the information from a
particular side was recorded for each respondent. If the re-
spondents were genuinely randomly selected, the paired ques-
tionnaires will effectively control the impacts of independent
variables other than the one-sided information.
Information in the two questionnaires was extracted from local
newspaper articles from the news search through the Wisenews
search engine. Articles from March 11, 2011 to February 4, 2013
about “nuclear power” were collected. The starting date marked the
Fukushima incident, which prompted media attention on many
nuclear-related issues, including the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant
and the role of nuclear power in Hong Kong's fuel mix. The search
results were further screened in three steps by using content
analysis, focusing on information about five nuclear-power-related
issues: stability; cost; safety; pollution; and impact on climate
change. Firstly, 588 passages were filtered out in accordance with
their relevance to the issues based on the topics. Secondly, key
points were extracted and categorised. Thirdly, anti-nuclear infor-
mation and pro-nuclear information were paired in a way that the
two sides form a “balanced report” on the issue. For instance, the
information “nuclear fuel costs less than fossil fuel” is given in the
pro-nuclear survey while the information “nuclear fuel cost would
increase with the rising demand” is given in the anti-nuclear sur-
vey. Put together, the two form a balanced report on fuel cost:
“nuclear fuel currently costs less than fossil fuel, but its price would
increase in the future with rising demand” (see Table 1 for details).
The information was provided without references to eliminate the
influence of the information sources.
The questions in the questionnaires were structured into three
categories (Table 2). In the first category, the respondents were
asked to express their general impression and concerns about nu-
clear power by using an 11-point scale: from 0 to 10, in which
0 denotes a positive impression or not concerned at all whereas 10
denotes a negative impression or highly concerned. Six questions in
total ask about general attitude and concerns about reliability, cost,
greenhouse gas emission, safety, and pollution from nuclear energy
(see Category 1 of Table 2). The purpose was to lead respondents
into the topic, and, more importantly, to test the distribution
randomness of the two questionnaires. If the randomness was well
achieved, the opinions of the two groups of respondents should
resemble each other statistically. In the second category, one-sided
information was given to the respondents before the questions on
the five aspects of nuclear power were asked, by again using an 11-
point scale (see the first five items in Category 2 of Table 2). Re-
spondents were revealed to the information that showed only part
of the story in the particular aspects, either supporting the anti-
 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57 51

Table 1
Paired, one-sided information in the two questionnaires.

Impacts Pro-nuclear information Anti-nuclear information

Reliability Hong Kong has been importing electricity from the Daya Bay Nuclear Nuclear power plants may shut down ahead in case of an oncoming
(POWER_CUT) Power Plant for 20 years. No major blackout has occurred. typhoon, to avoid damage to the facilities.
Electricity tariff For generation cost, using nuclear fuel is cheaper than using fossil fuel. The demand for nuclear fuel is expected to increase by 4% annually,
(TARIFF) which could lead to substantial increase in price.
Safety risk of nuclear
The Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant is situated at a geologically stable Facing geologic cycles and climate change, effective designs for safety of
power (SAFETY) location, with no record of magnitude 6 or above earthquakes. A huge nuclear power plants in the past may be no longer applicable today.
barrier is built to protect the plant from tsunamis.
Environmental No fossil fuel is burnt during nuclear power generation. Therefore, it does Nuclear waste is highly radioactive, which is harmful to human health.
impact not cause air pollution. The extraction and processing of nuclear fuel also generate significant
(POLLUTION) amounts of chemical waste.
Impact to climate Compared to a coal-fired power plant of the same scale, the Daya Bay Consider the whole process of construction, fuel processing and power
change (CLIMATE) Nuclear Power Plant can reduce CO2 emission equivalent to planting generation, the greenhouse gas emission of nuclear power is three times
100,000 ha of forest. that of other renewable energies.
Development of Whether Hong Kong is purchasing nuclear power from the mainland Hong Kong's purchase of nuclear power from Guangdong Province would
nuclear power in would not affect the development strategy of nuclear power in China. encourage the development of nuclear power in the province. A high
mainland China Hong Kong should buy more nuclear power to increase the participation concentration of nuclear reactors would largely increase the chance of a
in and influence on nearby nuclear power plants. nuclear accident.

Table 2
Questionnaire design and results.

Question Variables Explanation of variables One-sided information given before Mann- Asymp. Sig. (2-
category question Whitney tailed)
Ua

Category 1 IMPRESSION The feeling towards nuclear power No 32036.0 0.057

CON_STABILITY Power supply reliability No 34871.5 0.779
CON_TARIFF Electricity tariff No 32223.5 0.073
CON_GHG Greenhouse gas emission No 34475.0 0.610
CON_SAFETY Nuclear power safety No 32426.0 0.062
CON_POLLUTION Environment-related issues No 34802.0 0.742

Category 2 POWER_CUT The risk of power cut in Hong Kong if using more nuclear Yes 26919.5 0.000
power
TARIFF The impact on electricity tariff of more nuclear power in the Yes 24079.5 0.000
fuel mix
SAFETY The safety risk of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant to Hong Yes 27256.5 0.000
Kong
POLLUTION The pollution of nuclear power to the world Yes 18512.5 0.000
CLIMATE The significance of nuclear power in mitigating greenhouse Yes 18994.0 0.000
gases
JUDGE The overall judgment on the pros and cons of nuclear power No 25144.5 0.000
MIX_NUCLEAR Nuclear power's share in the fuel mix Yes 24673.5 0.000

Category 3 GENDER Demographic variables No 33267.0 0.606

AGE No 33675.0 0.475
EDUCATION No 34309.0 0.866
DISTRICT No 31413.5 0.959
INCOME No 27999.5 0.517
a
The two questionnaires have 272 and 260 respondents, respectively.

nuclear or the pro-nuclear stance. The information includes the
significance of nuclear power on greenhouse gas mitigation, the
electricity tariff, the risks of Fukushima-type accidents, and the
nuclear development plan in Mainland China (as shown in Table 1).
Besides answering specific opinion questions, the respondents
were asked for their overall judgment on the relative strength of
nuclear power's pros and cons as well as their ideal fuel mix (see
the last two items in Category 2 of Table 2). To ensure the re-
spondents' close attention, the high values in the scale corre-
sponded to a pro-nuclear stance in some questions but to an anti-
nuclear stance in others. In the third category, demographic data
were solicited (see Category 3 of Table 2). If the two questionnaires
were genuinely distributed randomly, the two groups of re-
spondents would show similar demographic characteristics.
No question asked for the respondent's impressions about the
five specific issues before the reception of information to avoid the
impression of suggestive interrogation which would distort the
result. Owing to time and resource limitations, no control group,
without receiving one-sided information, was set in the current
study. These two settings restrict the result analyses in several
ways, and this will be discussed in the respective sections below.
2.2. Questionnaire validation, data collection, and processing
To validate the questionnaires and to check their comprehen-
sibility before the main survey was conducted, a pilot survey was
conducted in the form of both a street survey in metro stations and
an online survey through email and social media. A total of 144
questionnaires were collected, namely, 80 from the street survey
and 64 from online. In the pilot survey it is shown that public
opinion could be intervened by one-sided information. Based on
the opinion of the respondents, the phrasing of the information
provided in the questionnaires was fine-tuned to reduce the
complexity for easier comprehension.
The main survey was conducted in the form of a street survey in
the autumn of 2015. Public parks and metro stations were selected
52 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
for the survey and they covered all major regions of Hong Kong,
including the New Territories, Kowloon, and Hong Kong Island. No
particular population group was targeted in this study and the
design of the collection method was mainly for randomness. The
two types of questionnaire were distributed alternately to ensure a
random and even selection of population. A total of 534 responses
were collected in the main survey, but not all responses could be
used.
The validity of the current study relies on the sampling process
that an unbiased random sampling should be conducted, to isolate
the impact of one-sided information on the deviation in judgment
on nuclear power, if any. As intentionally designed into the ques-
tionnaires, the randomness could be analysed with data from the
Category 1 and Category 3 questions (as shown in Table 2). The
Category 1 questions capture each respondent's impression
regarding nuclear power before receiving the one-sided informa-
tion, and any difference between the respondents is independent
from the current study. The results from these questions should not
be statistically significantly different between the two groups of
respondents who answered the different questionnaires, given the
same population for sampling and the sampling method. Any re-
sults that yield a statistically significant difference in this part have
to be discarded because this intergroup difference would add noise
to the final analysis.
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate the differ-
ences between the two datasets. This test often outperforms the t-
test in analysing ordinal-level scale data (Nanna and Sawilowsky,
1998). In addition, t-tests and ANOVA cannot be used because
normal distribution was not observed in the data (Norman, 2010).
While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KeS test) tests the distribu-
tional difference between the groups (Dytham, 2011), it is not
recommended for samples that consist of a large number of ties or
more categorical data, which was the case for this study, and this
was not utilised. The results showed that there was no significant
difference concerning the demographic factors, but a significant
difference in some of the Category 1 questions.
Based on the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, the data in 75
questionnaires collected during the first day of the survey were
excluded due to the intergroup difference in concern about nuclear
power between the respondents answering the two question-
naires. On that day, incidentally, the respondents who answered
the pro-nuclear questionnaire gave a significantly lower impor-
tance to the issues of electricity tariff and safety in considering the
usage in nuclear power compared to those who answered the anti-
nuclear questionnaire. The exact cause of this before-information-
reception intergroup difference remains unknown. This was
possibly a sampling bias due to the limited number of samples
collected within a day, although such a difference was not found in
the remaining samples, both in total and by date. Nevertheless, this
biased before-test impression had to be eliminated from the
dataset to ensure that any difference in public opinion after
receiving the one-side information was caused by the information
itself. The final number of valid responses was 459, in which 236
received pro-nuclear information and 223 received anti-nuclear
information.
3. Result on the proportion of opinion switchers
3.1. Influence on general public opinion
After the randomness check, neither the subjective opinions
(IMPRESSION (p > 0.05), CON_STABILITY (p > 0.5), CON_TARIFF
(p > 0.05), CON_GHG (p > 0.5), CON_SAFETY (p > 0.05), and
CON_POLLUTION (p > 0.5) in Table 2) nor the objective de-
mographic variables (GENDER, AGE, EDUCATION, DISTRICT, and
INCOME in Table 2, p > 0.4 for all) of the respondents showed
statistically significant differences between the pro-nuclear and the
anti-nuclear questionnaire respondents. This indicates that the two
groups of respondents responding to the two questionnaires were
statistically non-differentiable.
One-sided, paired information was given before the Category 2
questions. It was found that the one-sided information was effec-
tive in tilting public opinion, with a systematic, although not sub-
stantial, change. For the two groups of respondents on average,
there was a highly statistically significant difference between the
scores given in the two questionnaires for all Category 2 questions
(p < 0.001) (see Table 2). On whether nuclear power could enhance
electricity stability, lower the electricity tariff, operate safely,
mitigate pollution, and ease climate change (POWER_CUT, TARIFF,
SAFETY, POLLUTION, and CLIMATE in Table 2), the mean scores of
the pro-nuclear questionnaire were 0.87e1.99 lower: tilted to-
wards the side of positive impact, than those of the anti-nuclear
questionnaire. The general attitude towards nuclear power was
not tilted to either the pro- or anti-nuclear side before receiving the
one-sided information (IMPRESSION), with an average score of 5.34
under a scale of 0e10, in which 0 ¼ positive, 5 ¼ neutral, and
10 ¼ negative. After receiving the one-sided information, the av-
erages (JUDGE) became 4.57 and 5.53 for the pro-nuclear and anti-
nuclear questionnaires, respectively: tilted towards the two sides,
respectively. The information also generated statistically signifi-
cantly different opinions on revising the share of nuclear power in
Hong Kong's fuel mix (MIX_NUCLEAR in Table 2). On average, a
slight increase in the share of nuclear power in the energy mix from
the current 23%e24.2% was given in the pro-nuclear questionnaire,
whereas a decrease to 17.5% was given in the anti-nuclear
questionnaire.
Digging deeper into the individual responses, three types of
respondents can be perceived: (i) firm opinion holders who
showed a more pro-nuclear stance despite receiving anti-nuclear
information, and vice versa; (ii) the inert who showed no change
in preference after receiving the information; and (iii) the opinion
switchers. The opinion switcher is the focus of the current study
showing how much public opinion one-sided information can in-
fluence, whereas the inert represent the inability of the one-sided
information to influence public opinion. The firm opinion holders
represent an interesting phenomenon that one-sided information
would lead to deeper entrenchment of their existing perceptions of
the issue. There were some restrictions in analysing them in detail
in the current study due to the limitation from the questionnaire
design. The change in opinion can be measured for the general
attitude only, not the five specific issues and preferred energy mix;
this is because no base-line opinion was asked for. Furthermore, the
proportion of opinion switchers cannot be explicitly calculated due
to the lack of a control group. An alternative approach was utilised
in the analysis. The percentage difference between the proportion
of respondents having a pro-nuclear stance/preferring an increase
in nuclear share in the pro-nuclear questionnaire and that having a
pro-nuclear stance in the anti-nuclear questionnaire was consid-
ered as the proportion of opinion switchers which the pro-nuclear
information can induce. As summarised in Fig. 1, the proportion
varied for different questions.
3.2. The opinion switcher
For the change in general attitude, the attitude of the re-
spondents before and after receiving the one-sided information
was examined, looking at the percentage difference between the
two questionnaires of the respondents who changed their
impression towards nuclear power at the end of the survey. The
one-sided information was considered to be inducing the change as
 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
Fig. 1. Shares of respondents' perception to nuclear power.
long as the respondent's impression changed at the end of the
survey, regardless of whether the original stand was pro-nuclear or
anti-nuclear.
There was a statistically significant difference in the general
attitude change between the two groups after receiving the one-
sided information, whereas the degree of impact varied.
Regarding a ± 1 point from the original attitude as no change, to
reduce the rate of error, the percentages of respondents having an
opinion echo with the one-sided information were 32% and 22% in
the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear questionnaire groups, respec-
tively, whereas the opposite groups: respondents who favoured
nuclear more after receiving anti-nuclear information and vice
versa, were 20% and 14%, respectively (as shown in Fig. 1). This
suggests that the impact of the pro-nuclear questionnaire was more
significant, possibly due to the more negative impression towards
nuclear power in general in the first place. Upon calculation, 12% of
respondents were moved by pro-nuclear information to support
nuclear power, whereas 8% of respondents were moved by anti-
nuclear information to oppose nuclear power. Therefore, the
range of the opinion switcher percentage was 8e12%. In compari-
son, the percentages of respondents having no change in attitude
were 53% and 57% in the pro- and anti-nuclear questionnaires,
respectively.
For the issue of energy fix preference, the cutting point was at
the current percentage of nuclear power in the energy mix of Hong
Kong, 23% (Environmental Bureau, 2014), which was provided to all
the respondents. Regarding a 2% difference in preference from the
current 23% share as no change, the percentage of respondents
preferring more nuclear, no change in nuclear, and less nuclear
were 39.0%, 18.2%, and 42.8%, respectively, in the pro-nuclear
questionnaire, and 23.8%, 9.9%, and 66.4%, respectively, in the
anti-nuclear questionnaire (as shown in Fig. 1). 15% of respondents
were moved by pro-nuclear information to support nuclear power,
whereas 24% of respondents were moved by anti-nuclear infor-
mation to oppose nuclear power. Therefore, the range of opinion
switcher percentage was 15e24%, whereas the range of opinion
inertia was 10e18%.
For different issues of nuclear power, respondent opinion was
given in a scale of 0e10, and positive, negative, and neutral readings
were defined as follows: 0e3 denoted a positive opinion; 4e6
53
denoted neutrality; and 7e10 denoted a negative opinion towards
that certain aspect of nuclear power. Opinions of the respondents
on the five aspects of nuclear power were sought with one-sided
information given: risk of power cut; electricity tariff; safety;
pollution; and impact on climate change. The percentage of opinion
switchers varied significantly between different aspects from 5% to
37% (as shown in Fig. 1). The pro-nuclear information induced
5e23% more respondents to give a positive opinion, whereas the
anti-nuclear information induced 12e37% more respondents to
give a negative opinion. In all aspects except the risk of power cut,
the proportion of respondents induced by the anti-nuclear infor-
mation to change to the negative side was greater than that
induced by the pro-nuclear information to change to the positive
side. The percentage of opinion switchers was the smallest for the
safety issue: 5% and 17% were influenced by pro-nuclear and anti-
nuclear information, respectively. The percentages for the risk of
power cut were 18% and 12%, respectively, whereas those for
electricity tariff were 13% and 20%, respectively. The percentages for
the pollution problem were 22% and 34%, respectively, whereas
those for the issue of climate change were 23% and 37%, respec-
tively. This suggests that negative information would be more
influential upon the impression of people on nuclear power.
3.3. The firm opinion holder
A significant proportion of respondents maintained a stance
that was opposite to what the one-sided information implied. Some
respondents became more pro-nuclear, in terms of attitude or en-
ergy mix preference, despite receiving anti-nuclear information,
and vice versa. For simplicity, the two groups are regarded as
“firmly pro-nuclear” and “firmly anti-nuclear” hereafter. For gen-
eral attitude change, 20% of the respondents were firmly pro-
nuclear and 14% were firmly anti-nuclear. For energy mix prefer-
ence, 24% and 43% were firmly pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear,
respectively. For the five specific issues, the percentages of re-
spondents who were firmly anti-nuclear were more than those
who were firmly pro-nuclear in perception towards the safety,
pollution, and climate change issues of nuclear power, using the
methods stated in the opinion switcher section. For the safety,
pollution, and climate impact issues, the firmly anti-nuclear
54 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
percentages were 37%, 28%, and 17%, respectively, whereas the
firmly pro-nuclear percentages were 18%, 13%, and 16%, respec-
tively. The opposite result was revealed for reliability and electricity
tariff. The firmly pro-nuclear percentages were 35% and 21%,
respectively, whereas the firmly anti-nuclear percentages were 9%
and 17%, respectively (as shown in Fig. 1).
These results have some interesting implications. Theoretically,
the one-sided information should induce the respondents to give
an opinion that is inclined to what the information provokes: the
respondent should give a more pro-nuclear stance after receiving
pro-nuclear information. In reality, however, providing only one
side of the story has led to exactly the opposite result, namely, the
strengthening of some of the respondents’ existing perceptions of
the issue. This is illustrated with the result of general attitude
change, namely, that a clear shift in attitude to the opposite side
from what the one-sided information should provoke for some
respondents was observed.
The mechanism behind this could possibly be explained by the
personal perception of the information, with reference to previous
knowledge, identity affiliation, and even scepticism about the
intention of the information provision. It is possible that the in-
formation arouses alertness of previous knowledge that is in
contrast to the given information, and that the new information
might also conflict with the respondent's own value judgment. In
these cases, the respondent would decide to discard the new in-
formation. It is also possible that the provision of consistently lop-
sided information would lead to scepticism from the respondent on
the purpose of the study, and they would intentionally respond in
the opposite way. This has been reported during the data collection
process, that the respondent explicitly questioned the purpose of
the study, and thus the record had to be discarded. Further studies
should be conducted to explore these issues.
The results for the five specific issues may not have the same
implications since they were not derived from a beforeeafter
comparison. It is possible that the one-sided information provided
was simply insufficient to provoke the respondent to give a
different opinion from their original perception. Instead, the results
here suggest the significance of each of the issues on influencing
general public attitude towards nuclear power, that safety, pollu-
tion, and climate issues are major concerns which prevent the
public from supporting nuclear power, whereas the strengths of
nuclear power in terms of reliability and electricity tariffs are much
appreciated by the public.
3.4. Discussion
Taking both the firm opinion holders and the opinion switchers
into account, the negative image of nuclear power over the safety
issue is somewhat rigid and it is unlikely to change with a brief
twist in the information provided. In contrast, the positive image of
nuclear power in providing a reliable electricity supply is also
strong, but is less unlikely to change should the other side of the
story be told compared to the safety issue. While a significant
proportion of people held a negative view towards the impact of
nuclear power on climate change and pollution, it is more likely to
see a substantial proportion of people change their side should
different information be given, and this could twist the proportions
of supporter and opponent. The opinion on electricity tariff would
be unpredictable, since nearly half of the respondents held a
neutral perspective and neither side would dominate even when
one-sided information is presented; therefore, policy justification
would have to rely on influencing the neutral group.
The concern about the individual aspect could be an effective
predictor of the rigidity of respondents’ opinion on the particular
aspect. From the results of the Category 1 questions, the average
level of concern of the five issues, namely, reliability, electricity
tariff, safety, pollution, and climate issues were 7.76, 7.25, 9.08, 8.48,
and 7.71, respectively. While the pairing for the safety issue
matched the prediction: highest concern and highest rigidity in
opinion formation, the correlation was generally not as great as
expected. The correlation between the level of concern and the pro-
nuclear and anti-nuclear opinion switchers were 0.32 and 0.42,
respectively. The data indicate that public opinion on an issue of
very high concern would be relatively rigid and would not be
influenced by a brief twist of the information provided, but the
general trend is less obvious.
The impact of one-sided information on impression changing is
mixed when the issue is analysed in different ways. For the energy
mix preference, 43% preferred less nuclear power in the pro-
nuclear questionnaire: the firmly anti-nuclear proportion,
whereas only 24% preferred more nuclear in the anti-nuclear
questionnaire: the firmly pro-nuclear proportion. In contrast, the
percentage of respondents who were firmly pro-nuclear was larger
than that of those who were firmly anti-nuclear: 20% and 14%,
respectively, when inspecting the change in general attitude after
receiving the one-sided information. We found no correlation be-
tween the two factors: a change in attitude did not guarantee a
change in preference of the actual usage of the energy, and vice
versa. The results from firm supporters, opinion switchers and
general impression change altogether suggest that the impact of
the one-sided information on the general impression would be
mixed.
To conclude, the provision of one-sided information appears to
systematically influence public opinion on the issue. Depending on
the degree of the public's concern about the issue, the proportion of
opinion switching also varies. The relationship between the degree
of concern and the ability to influence public opinion through
manipulated information is generally negative. Public opinion can
vary greatly on issues of little concern yet information has only a
marginal impact for issues of high concern. In other words, the
significance of one-sided information in influencing public opinion
is limited. It is even possible for the provision of one-sided infor-
mation to induce deeper entrenchment of the public in terms of
their own perception, thus widening the split between the two
views. Nevertheless, information could still play a critical role when
the two views are evenly matched in strength and when the fate of
the decision rests with the opinion switchers.
4. Explaining the proportion of opinion switchers
Public opinion is typically given and captured in opinion polling
as a single output. What lies between the information input and the
opinion output is a black box in which the individual assigns weight
to the importance of information about different aspects of the
issue. Discovering the critical factors that would influence the
personal impressions about nuclear power would therefore be
important to policy-makers and interested parties who want to
understand and possibly shape public opinion. Multiple regressions
were conducted to examine the degree of impact from different
factors and aspects of nuclear power on opinion formation and
impressions of nuclear power. Three factors were set as the
dependent variables indicating the general impression towards
nuclear power: the personal impression after receiving the one-
sided information (JUDGE); the degree of change in general atti-
tude caused by the one-sided information (CHANGE_ATTITUDE);
and the proposed share of nuclear power in the energy mix
(MIX_NUCLEAR). The first two items directly measure the correla-
tion between each aspect of nuclear power and the general
impression, in terms of absolute degree and the change along the
impression spectrum compared to the original stand, respectively.
 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57 55

The last one measures the inclination of the respondent to reduce,
increase, or make no change in nuclear power usage, with reference
to the current energy mix of nuclear power in the local electricity
supply. Demographic factors were also added into the regression
models to examine their importance. Concerns about the different
aspects of nuclear power were also added to isolate the interper-
sonal difference of perception of the issues. The results are shown
in Table 3, in which the original model showing all factors (Model 1)
and the final model after removing the insignificant factors in
backward operation (Model 2) are presented.
In all three measurements, perception of the risk of power cut
with the utilisation of nuclear power is revealed to have no sig-
nificant influence on the general impression of nuclear power,
regardless of the type of one-sided information received. In
contrast, concern about the stability of the electricity supply ap-
pears to significantly influence the impression of nuclear power in
the measurements of judgment and attitude change. For every
point increased in the concern about stability, the judgment on
nuclear power is 0.097 points more positive, with a 0.104 points
change in general attitude towards the positive side (p < 0.01). This
supports the claim made in Section 3.3 that the positive impression
of the stability of nuclear power is strong. This impression is
conveyed into the overall judgment about nuclear power and it is
unlikely to be influenced by one-sided information. However, this
concern for stability does not significantly influence the preferred
energy mix.
The impact of the electricity tariff is revealed to have a statis-
tically significant influence on the general impression of nuclear
power, but with a lower significance level and a smaller degree of
impact. For every point increase in perceiving an increase in elec-
tricity tariff with the use of nuclear power, personal judgment is
0.065 points more negative, impression change is 0.077 points
more towards the negative side, and the preferred share of nuclear
power in the energy mix is 0.58% lower. Compared to the percep-
tion of the impact, the initial concern about the electricity tariff is
more significant in influencing the preferred share of nuclear po-
wer in the energy mix; for every increased point in concern, the
share of nuclear power is increased by 0.825%, with p < 0.01, which
is larger than that of perception of impact (p < 0.05). This suggests
that a low electricity tariff with the use of nuclear power is
perceived, and thus those who prefer a lower electricity tariff prefer
more nuclear power.
The safety issue is revealed to be the most influential factor
affecting the general impression of nuclear power (p < 0.01), but
not for the impression change in which the original impression
(IMPRESSION) is a determining factor, as expected. For every point
increase in considering nuclear power as dangerous, personal
judgment is 0.271 points more negative, impression change is
0.230 points more towards the negative side, and the preferred
share of nuclear power in the energy mix is 1.564% lower. For the
pro-nuclear questionnaire only, an increase in the concern about
the safety issue was associated with more nuclear power in the
preferred energy mix; people who are more concerned about the
safety issue actually prefer more nuclear power, by 0.784% for every
point increase in the concern about safety (p < 0.1). Because people
receiving pro-nuclear information preferred more nuclear power at
the end of the survey, the impact was projected onto the personal
valuation in the regression model.
Among the five aspects of nuclear power, the problem of
pollution is statistically significantly, it having a moderate impact
on the general impression of nuclear power. For every point in-
crease in perceiving nuclear power as polluting, personal judgment
is 0.115 points more negative (p < 0.01), impression change is 0.145
points more negative (p < 0.01), and the preferred share of nuclear
power in the energy mix is 0.472% lower, at a lower significant level
(p < 0.1). The concern about the pollution issue is more significant
in influencing the preferred energy mix. For every point increase in
concern, the preferred share of nuclear power in the energy mix is
0.892% lower (p < 0.01), thereby suggesting that nuclear power is
perceived to be polluting, before receiving the one-sided

Table 3
Influence of individual factors on public opinion on nuclear power.

Dependent variable Preferred energy mix Judgment Change in attitude

Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

N 459 459 459 459 459 459

R2 0.703 0.695 0.755 0.749 0.805 0.799

(Constant) 51.684 48.145 0.276 0.577 0.989 1.758

IMPRESSION 1.286c 1.233c 0.151c 0.153c -0.844c -0.839c

CON_STABILITY -0.470 -0.083b -0.097c -0.110b -0.104c

CON_TARIFF 1.005c 0.825c -0.039 -0.043
CON_SAFETY 0.968b 0.784a -0.008 0.047
CON_POLLUTION -0.936c -0.892c 0.011 0.002
CON_GHG -0.666b -0.660b 0.078b 0.071b 0.031

POWER_CUT 0.114 0.032 -0.012

TARIFF -0.644b -0.580b 0.053 0.065b 0.086b 0.077b
SAFETY 1.624c 1.567c 0.260c 0.271c 0.217c 0.230c
POLLUTION -0.412 -0.472a 0.117c 0.115c 0.167c 0.145c
CLIMATE 1.113c 1.149c 0.156c 0.159c 0.147c 0.134c

QUESTIONNAIRE 1.219 0.119 -0.059

Gender -0.506 0.125 0.218
Age -0.084 0.190b 0.177a 0.114
Education 0.791 0.128 0.146
Income -0.677 0.022 -0.008
District_NT West -0.430 -0.268 -0.346
District_NT East -0.878 -0.186 -0.322
District_Kowloon 2.645 -0.335 -0.357
a
Significant at 10%.
b
Significant at 5%.
c
Significant at 1%.
56 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
information.
The influence on climate change similarly has a moderate
impact on the general impression of nuclear power at a high sig-
nificance level (p < 0.01). For every point increase in perceiving
nuclear power as having a negative impact on climate change,
personal judgment is 0.159 points more negative, impression
change is 0.134 points more negative, and the preferred share of
nuclear power in the energy mix is 1.149% lower. An increase in
concern about the issue of greenhouse gas emission, as a measure
of the concern about climate change, is unexpectedly causing a
more negative impression of nuclear power, by 0.071 points and a
0.66% reduction in the share of nuclear power in the preferred
energy mix for every point increase in the level of concern
(p < 0.05). This suggests that nuclear power is also perceived as
having a negative impact on climate change and the public does not
appear to consider it as a clean energy source.
The initial impression (IMPRESSION) of nuclear power is
revealed to be the single most significant predictor of all three
measurements. This is not unexpected because it is unlikely that a
person's impression will change so rapidly and easily with a mere
exposure to some brief information about nuclear power in a 3-min
street survey. It can be considered as the “normaliser” in the
models. For every point increase in impression towards the nega-
tive side, personal judgment at the end of the survey is 0.153 points
more negative, whereas the change in general attitude is 0.839
points towards the positive side, and the preferred share of nuclear
power in the energy mix is 1.233% lower (p < 0.01). The one-sided
information does not necessarily dictate respondents' impressions
of an issue. Rather, the initial impression has a more significant
predictability, 0.463 on the final personal judgment. In contrast, the
predictability of questionnaire difference (QUESTIONNAIRE) is only
0.255. This suggests that once a person's perception is formed, it
would not be changed easily, even with the presence of opposing
information. Although the one-sided information can effectively
influence people's impression on the issue, the influence is limited
to a certain extent.
In the regression models (as shown in Table 3), nearly all de-
mographic factors, including gender, income, education level, and
location of residence, are not statistically significant in terms of
influencing the personal judgment and preference about the share
of nuclear power in the energy mix. Age is the only factor that was
found to influence personal judgment, with judgment 0.177 points
more negative as the age group increases by each 20-year interval
(p < 0.1).
While the demographic factors appear to have no significant
influence on the final personal judgment, they have some influence
on the opinions related to particular aspects of nuclear power,
although the predictability varies and is generally low. Gender
appears to significantly influence opinions about safety, pollution
problem, and climate change. Each of the other demographic fac-
tors (age, income, education, and location of residence) are influ-
ential on two of the aspects. The perception of power stability is
influenced by income and location of residence. The increase in
income by one income group (HK$30,000 interval) induces a
perception that is 0.418 points more positive (0.418, p ¼ 0.01), and
the residents of Kowloon Districts have a 0.470 points more positive
perception as well (0.470, p < 0.1). The overall predictability is a
mere 0.159. Opinion on the electricity tariff is influenced by age
(20-year interval grouping, one group increase induces 0.377
opinion point change, p < 0.05), income (0.378, p < 0.05), and
location of residence (Kowloon residents: 0.521, p < 0.05). The
overall predictability is 0.198. Opinion on the safety issue is influ-
enced by gender (male: 0.735, p < 0.01) and education level; for
every level of education increase, opinion point is 0.378 more
negative (0.378, p < 0.05). The overall predictability is 0.175.
Opinion on the pollution problem is influenced by gender
(male: 1.174, p < 0.01), age (0.496, p < 0.01), and education level
(0.340, p < 0.1). The overall predictability is 0.269. Opinion on
climate change is influenced solely by gender (male: 1.485,
p < 0.01), which also gives the highest predictability of 0.289.
5. Conclusion and discussion
This research quantitatively estimated the impacts of one-sided
information on public opinion towards nuclear power. We designed
a novel field experiment in the real world to single out the impact
of this influential variable among several control variables. This
method provides a tool to gain insight about the influence of media
and information on public opinion formation, and is not time-
restrictive by isolating the impact of current events through
random selection and the method of information provision. The
percentage of opinion switchers varies from 5% to 37% for different
aspects of the nuclear power issue.
While public opinion is more or less fixed in some aspects, it is
largely indecisive in others. This reveals that the framing of the
issue could be highly influential in altering the results. This pre-
sents an information loophole in public opinion formation that can
be exploited by interest groups. Depending on the intention, public
attention could be drawn to aspects of the issue for which public
opinion is largely undecided, and groups can influence public
opinion by providing information favourable to their interests. In-
terest groups could also draw the public's attention to aspects for
which public opinion is rigid, leaving the debatable issues un-
touched to ensure a favourable result. For instance, one-sided in-
formation about the impact of nuclear power on climate change
and pollution could possibly be provided to influence public
opinion. Nevertheless, given that public opinion is commonly
solicited as a single indicator with concerns about individual as-
pects mixed together, the impact of particular information on
general support would be uncertain, particularly given the varia-
tion in the relative importance of different aspects in forming
general opinion. Moreover, public opinion cannot be effectively
shaped if there is a firm public perception about the issue or if the
issue does not play a significant role in overall opinion formation.
For instance, public opinion on the stability of nuclear power may
be altered but it would not significantly impact the general judg-
ment about nuclear power. Any attempt to alter general judgment
through information provision on the safety issue would also be
unsuccessful, despite its significant influence in forming impres-
sions, given the rigidity of public opinion on this issue. Still, we do
not dismiss the possibility of information manipulation in altering
public opinion on nuclear power.
We note that we have exerted only a small twist on the infor-
mation given to the respondents, given that the information on
nuclear technology has already saturated the Hong Kong society. If
a systematic, large-scale information campaign is launched, as in
the real world, public opinion might reflect significant variation
and fluctuation. A campaign to manipulate information is not
consistent with the values of a democratic society, as the omission
of relevant information would likely lead to less-than-optimal de-
cision-making processes and results. In a direct democracy, the
general public could make direct decisions through a referendum;
while in a representative democracy, such decisions are made by
elected representatives. The influence of public opinion on policy-
making would be ultimately felt by the regulated utilities in these
democratic societies. While nuclear power is chosen as a case study
to highlight how public opinion formation could be altered by the
information which the public receives, the same issues apply to
other public utility issues and controversies, whenever public
opinion is taken into account.
 T.F. Kwok et al. / Utilities Policy 46 (2017) 48e57
The results suggest the high importance of information trans-
parency, particularly in a democratic society, for the formulation of
significant environmental and energy policies and the develop-
ment of utilities. Utility regulators and government bodies should
be highly cautious of the underlying reasons for public support or
opposition to utility issues, and observe whether it is a result of
how and what information is provided. Information transparency is
of particular importance to utility regulators in a democratic society
where public opinion and public engagement in the decision-
making processes are a major force of public policy. Uneven or
missing information on issues that arouse significant public
concern is not favourable to policy development.
Considering the particular importance of the media in deliv-
ering information, and that reporters use their own judgment in
deciding what and how to report, this research also suggests the
importance of a free press and the free flow of information. Our
results demonstrate the impact of how one-sided information
could potentially influence public opinion. Because it is virtually
impossible to cover the entire spectrum of a particular issue by a
single information source, and every individual report constitutes
some distortions of reality, the availability of alternative sources
and viewpoints is crucial for public engagement and the decision-
making process. Finally, in the wake of recent political de-
velopments globally, research on public opinion may be increas-
ingly important in terms of the role of direct democracy in making
important energy and environmental policies.
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by the Social Science Collaborative
Research Fund, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (6903778)
and General Research Fund of the Hong Kong Research Grants
Council (14619315). The authors also thank the editor and two
anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
Appendix 1. Equations of the novel field experiment method
We designed two questionnaires for the field experiment, as
illustrated in the following equations.
p
X
n
Y p ¼ b0 þ b1 x 1 þ bi xi þ ε
i¼2
X
n
Y a ¼ b0 þ b1 xa1 þ bi x i þ ε
i¼2
 p  Rosa, E.A., Dunlap, R.E., 1994. Poll trends: nuclear power: three decades of public
ðY p  Y a Þ ¼ b1 x1  xa1
Y p and Y a represent the overall distributions of the respondents'
opinions on nuclear power who answered the pro-nuclear and the
anti-nuclear questionnaires, respectively. Y p  Y a indicates the
difference in the distributions, xp1 and xa1 are the independent var-
iables of one-sided information to the pro-nuclear and the anti-
nuclear sides, respectively. xi refers to the control variables.
Because the one-sided information is the only variable that differ-
entiates the two randomly surveyed groups of a same population, it
could be explained as the single source leading to their different
opinions towards nuclear power.
57
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