African philosophy of education Chapter

through a (post)critical lens 1

Yusef Waghid and Philip Higgs

Introduction
As the authors of this chapter, our current understandings of the notion of an
African philosophy of education have arisen from our pedagogical encounters
with learners and insights of philosophy of education obtained over the past two
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decades. We have been greatly influenced by the (post)analytical tradition of

philosophy of education that, first, takes a critical view of education and, secondly,
has a post-structuralist understanding of education. In other words, while we are
attracted to an African philosophy of education that aligns with critical discourse
and post-structuralist thought, we are concerned with concepts and practices that
seek the achievement of socially just human relations, specifically on the African
continent. Rather than taking an exclusively analytical view of such philosophy
and focusing intently on ideas that make the concept what it is, we concentrate
on how practices of this philosophy attune to the achievement of social justice
within human forms of engagement – that is, we consider an African philosophy
of education in action. Drawing on established understandings of this philosophy,
we first show why and how the concept can be linked to critical understanding,
and secondly we make a case for an African philosophy of education from the
post-structuralist perspective.

Philosophical/conceptual underpinnings of an African

philosophy of education
An African philosophy of education and what it means to be
‘an African’
What is unique about an African philosophy of education? Does the construction
of such a philosophy exclude it from other forms of philosophy? To prefix the
notion of ‘African’ to philosophy of education suggests that this philosophy is
framed by what it means to be African. In this chapter, we use the term ‘African’
not to mean that every African adheres to such a philosophy, but rather in the
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sense that an African philosophical system arises from, and thus is somewhat
related to, African thought, practices and traditions. And just as European, Western
and Oriental philosophy are labels accorded to the different experiences, traditions,
cultures, values and attitudes of the people living in the various areas, we use
‘African’ in a non-essentialist way. In other words, we see an African philosophy

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 A Reader in Philosophy of Education

of education as a means of bringing to light and making sense of the experiences

and enactments that speak to this philosophy’s African-ness yet remain accessible
to other thoughts and traditions. Since the ideas fund in African philosophy are
also present also in other traditions, these similarities are echoed, seen, interpreted
and analysed in the theories of African thinkers. Drawing on our foundational
understanding of this philosophy, we contend that being ‘African’ is an identity
which accentuates human beings’ concern to act in the interests of Africa even if
we do not reside on the continent. Having an African identity does not restrict us
to a particular geographical realm; it orientates us to act in the interests of Africa’s
demands and expectations wherever we may find ourselves.
As South Africans, we authors find that our African identity has been shaped
significantly by traumatic histories of segregation and othering. Thus our political
and societal concerns with democratic justice for all human beings are embedded
in our personal life stories, our particular histories. Our concern for Africa, and for
what it means to be African, is not limited to a political construction of identity.
Because of our own encounters with oppression and dis-location, we are engrossed
in what it means to act with humanity, dignity and justice. The idea of democratic
justice is linked with engaging with human beings on the basis of equality and
freedom to speak our minds in an atmosphere of deliberation, where there is also
the opportunity for us to agree and disagree on particular matters without having
to alienate and exclude one another from any form of human engagement. Such
exclusion would undermine the possibility of justice being achieved, considering
that the practice of justice involves listening to the voices of others and being
willing to speak our mind in a responsible manner.
Thus our African identity is guided by our willingness to engage with all other
human beings on the continent, and to work towards justice for all Africa’s people
on the basis of deliberation and freedom of expression. This account of African
identity resonates with Masolo’s (1994) depiction of the concept. For Masolo
(1994:1–2), African identity invokes two terms: ‘negritude’ and ‘return’. Negritude
refers to ‘the dignity, the personhood or humanity, of black people’ (Masolo
1994:1–2). The notion of return refers to a conscious state of the mind in which
Africa’s people become aware of and rebel against the manipulative power relations
that control them (Masolo 1994:1–2). In the same way in which democratic justice
is committed to African people’s emancipation from subjugation and control, so
Masolo’s (1994:2) depiction of an African identity aims to recognise Africans –
and we would add across racial categories – as dignified human beings who reject
alienation and domination.

An African philosophy of education and democratic justice

Unlike Masolo (1994), our (the authors’) African identity is not racialised in terms
of ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’, as if exclusion and marginalisation involve only

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 Chapter 1 African philosophy of education through a (post)critical lens

‘black’ people on the African continent. Instead, our African identity transcends
the notion of ‘race’, because exclusion and alienation are human sufferings that
are not dictated by the colour of our skin. As ‘white’ and ‘black’ South Africans,
we have both suffered the inhumanity of apartheid in that, because of our social
differences, we have not been permitted to engage with one another in the same
social contexts. Not being granted the spaces for social engagement has meant,
and continues to mean, that in many instances people do not ‘see’ one another.
By denying us the possibility of intersubjectively sharing our cultural spaces,
segregation and domination have harmed our human psyche and distorted our
identities as Africans. Our quest for justice for all South Africans was a real
concern, but our prejudicial views – imposed upon us by the apartheid government
– kept us physically apart.
Yet even with prejudiced African identities we both yearned for democratic
justice for all citizens in our country. So we identified apartheid as a major
problem in our society, and this stance shaped our philosophy of education
towards one of recognising all humans as equal and having the same rights to
enact their autonomy and freedom. Our subsequent views on justice and equality
for all South Africans have been shaped by our commitment to enhancing
democratic justice through our educational advances. Our African philosophy of
education has been informed by an understanding that problems – albeit political
and societal problems – ought to be changed in conjunction with the cultivation
of democratic justice for all. The understanding of the African philosophy of
education that we have contended can be achieved only if the human encounters
among all South Africans can be enacted along the lines of democratic and just
actions. Such an understanding of this philosophy therefore invokes the following
meanings and actions: Humans recognise major problems in their societies and
respond to such problems before examining the educational implications thereof.
In our view, apartheid segregation was a major wrong. Our response was not just
to wish apartheid away – we also had to examine how education as a form of
human engagement would be negatively affected.
In our view, the negative consequences of apartheid are that our universities
remain segregated institutions, and knowledge production is still dominated by a
privileged view. Our knowledge interests continue to be subjected to control by
the more ‘powerful’ other. Our educational spaces have been unjustly guided by
manipulation, control and exclusion of the other. In response we consider our
African philosophy of education as being committed to the cultivation of critical
action, and as pursuing unimagined and unexpected human encounters that
could enhance democratic justice for all. In the next section we highlight how our
allegiances to critical and post-structuralist thought assisted us to engender a more
defensible understanding of an African philosophy of education.

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 A Reader in Philosophy of Education

Key issues and debates within critical and post-

structuralist views of African philosophy of education
An African philosophy of education, culture and the struggle
for scientific meaning
Hountondji (2002:xix) suggests that ethnophilosophy, in focusing on the cultural
practices of Africans, is defective – it is not real science in the strictest sense of the
term. We authors contend that such a philosophy does not undermine an African
philosophy of education. Hountondji (2002) is correct to critique an over-reliance
on ethnophilosophy, such as in the forms of Africans’ traditional ethnic views,
artefacts, languages and prose, and cultural forms of living. And we agree with
him that any philosophy of education cannot ignore the ‘struggle for [scientific]
meaning’ (Hountondji 2002:xvii). Meanings of a ‘scientific’ kind are developed
through argumentation and the putting forward of different points of view that are
considered equally on the basis of refutation and agreement. For the latter to take
place we must look at reasons. Reasons give arguments their distinctive features
in terms of which views are modified, refuted and accepted. We thus concur
with Hountondji (2002:30) that ‘science’ can be valorised only on the basis of its
significance for human beings and ‘its meaning for life’.
However, even Hountondji would not argue against the importance of culture,
as he acknowledges its significance in producing new human understandings
(Hountondji 2002:243). Culture, and its ability to produce new understandings,
also plays a role in argumentation that relies on reasons. Even if our reasons are
culturally grounded, argumentation remains valid. Rather, argumentation relies on
a different source of justification: human cultural understanding. Therefore our
understanding of an African philosophy of education is not remiss of culture. We
instead maintain that culture and human reason are used in an integrated manner
to develop particular or perhaps alternative points of view. Such an understanding
of culturally informed reasons has the potential to guide an African philosophy of
education differently. We now consider two views – critical and post-structuralist
– of a culturally reasonable understanding of this philosophy.

A critical notion of an African philosophy of education

Gyekye (1992:27) offers an integrated account of African philosophy that can
have an alternative impact on education. On the one hand, the particularist
thesis ‘perceives philosophical ideas or doctrines as particular – that is, relative
and relevant only to the times and cultures out of which they emerge’ (Gyekye
1992:28). By implication, meanings associated with Africans’ experiences on
the continent are constituted in the culturally informed reasons that shape such
meanings. For instance, when reasons are given in defence of African women
cultivating their farmland, these reasons are not only grounded in the women’s

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