PREDICTING THE EMPLACEMENT OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES:

AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION

by

Warren D. Lerner

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Science in Information Assurance

CAPITOL COLLEGE

April 2013
 PREDICTING THE EMPLACEMENT OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES:

AN INNOVATIVE SOLUTION

by

Warren D. Lerner

April 2013

Approved:

Jason M. Pittman, DSc, Chair/Mentor

Helen G. Barker, DM, Committee

Lisa C. Giulianelli, PhD, Committee

Accepted and Signed:

Jason M. Pittman, DSc Date

Accepted and Signed:

Helen G. Barker, DM Date

Accepted and Signed:

Lisa C. Giulianelli, PhD Date

William V. Maconachy, PhD Date

VP Academic Affairs, CAO
Capitol College
 ABSTRACT

In this quantitative correlational study, simulated data were employed to examine

artificial-intelligence techniques or, more specifically, artificial neural networks, as they

relate to the location prediction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). An ANN model

was developed to predict IED placement, based upon terrain features and objects related

to historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of

sight of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-

hour period. The architecture of the model contains a multilayer perceptron network to

realize advanced performance. The findings indicate that the model is suitable for IED

placement prediction. This research also established that opportunities exist for the

development of sophisticated techniques, grounded in AI, that can predict the location of

emplaced IEDs.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables ................................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

Background of the Problem ...........................................................................................2

Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study......................................................4

Significance of the Study ...............................................................................................5

Nature of the Study ........................................................................................................7

Research Question and Hypotheses ...............................................................................9

Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................10

Definition of Terms......................................................................................................11

Assumptions, Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations ..................................................12

Summary ......................................................................................................................15

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ............................................................16

Overview ......................................................................................................................16

Military Paradigms.......................................................................................................21

Defensive and Reactive Weaponry ........................................................................21

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization ..............................25

Evolution .........................................................................................................26

Effectiveness ....................................................................................................27

Recommendations of Critics ............................................................................31

Future Approaches .......................................................................................................37

A Systems Approach..............................................................................................38
 v

Detection and Prevention .......................................................................................44

Strategic Approaches .............................................................................................46

Combatting Improvised Explosive Devices.................................................................51

Projectile Techniques .............................................................................................51

Chemical and Radiation Techniques .....................................................................53

Vision-Based Detection .........................................................................................54

Vehicle-Examination Techniques ..........................................................................57

Directed Energy .....................................................................................................58

Artificial Intelligence .............................................................................................59

Profiling ...........................................................................................................60

Electromagnetic Sensing ..................................................................................63

Offensive Techniques ......................................................................................63

Information-Management Systems ..................................................................66

Urban-Terrain Techniques ...............................................................................69

Automated Sense Making ................................................................................72

Probabilistic Techniques ..................................................................................74

Robotics .................................................................................................................76

Surveillance............................................................................................................81

Active and Passive ...........................................................................................82

Automated Computer-Image Analysis ............................................................84

Ground-Based Operational ..............................................................................86

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................88
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD ...................................................................................................90

Research Design and Appropriateness .........................................................................91

Research Question, Hypotheses, and Variables ...........................................................93

Population ....................................................................................................................95

Sampling Frame ...........................................................................................................98

Data Collection ............................................................................................................99

Instrumentation ..........................................................................................................102

Validity and Reliability ..............................................................................................105

Data Analysis .............................................................................................................106

Summary ....................................................................................................................107

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS ................................................................................................108

Findings......................................................................................................................110

Descriptive Analysis .............................................................................................110

Correlation and Regression Analysis ....................................................................114

Summary ....................................................................................................................120

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................121

Limitations .................................................................................................................121

Findings and Interpretations ......................................................................................122

Correlation and Regression Results ......................................................................122

Artificial Neural Networks ...................................................................................123

Recommendations ......................................................................................................125

Summary ..............................................................................................................126
 vii

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................129
 viii

List of Tables

Table 1: Terrain Feature and Object Frequencies ............................................................112

Table 2: Flat Terrain Data Ranges ...................................................................................113

Table 3: Flat Terrain Descriptive Statistics .....................................................................113

Table 4: Mountainous Terrain Data Ranges ....................................................................114

Table 5: Mountainous Terrain Data Descriptive Statistics ..............................................114

Table 6: Correlation Analysis ..........................................................................................115

Table 7: ANN Performance Metrics of the Artificial Neural Networks ..........................117

Table 8: Overall Training Results ....................................................................................118

Table 9: Results of Trained Artificial-Neural-Networks Testing ....................................119

Table 10: Trained Artificial-Neural-Networks Model Confusion Matrix .......................119

 1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This quantitative correlational study examined artificial-intelligence (AI)

techniques or, more specifically, artificial neural networks (ANNs), as they relate to the

location prediction of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The term IED is now

instantly connected with U.S. military activity within Iraq and Afghanistan (Wehri,

2007). However, as noted by Cordesman (2008) and Martin (2009), the use of these

devices predates these Middle East conflicts. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO; 2008) asserted that IEDs have been, and will likely

continue to be, used in insurgencies and terrorist attacks throughout the world.

Countering the threat of these devices is a challenging, multilayered problem (JIEDDO,

2012a). A growing national security challenge is represented in the need to develop

innovative methods of predicting the placement of hidden IEDs such as plastic explosives

placed under piles of sand or inside a corpse along a roadway (Cordesman, 2008).

The evolution of efforts toward countering IEDs has been swift but complex

(Borjes, 2008; Byford, 2010; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wilson, 2006). The Department of

Defense (DoD) and the JIEDDO (2012a) have recognized that using the best available

science to combat this threat is wholly justified. It is estimated that the U.S. military has

invested $40 billion dollars in combating IEDs through 2010 (Byford, 2010). The

JIEDDO (2012b) views current detection technologies as inadequate for the prediction of

IED placement. To date, minimal published evidence exists to suggest that a reliable

method of predicting IED location has been developed.

 2

Background of the Problem

Adversaries planting IEDs in asymmetric battlefield scenarios, including urban

areas, has been one of the most problematic acts of weaponry against U.S. military

presence within Iraq and Afghanistan (Borjes, 2008; Byford, 2010; Sundram & Sim,

2007; Wilson, 2006). Efforts to combat the use of these devices have had some success;

however, the JIEDDO (2008) reported that, during FY 2008, such attacks fell to 2004

levels, with only 33% of attacks caused by IEDs and the number continuing to drop

“dramatically” (JIEDDO, 2008, p. 4). Although the JIEDDO (2008) reported that, by

2008, only 16% of U.S. casualties had been caused by IEDs, the devices continued to

cause a high number of deaths, as well as a significant amount of collateral damage.

IEDs are notoriously difficult to detect. This is exhibited in their continued use;

however it is more specifically exemplified in the 94% increase in their use during the

first quarter of 2010 (Byford, 2010). Consequently, IEDs pose a massive threat to “state

assets such as soldiers, government officials, transportation infrastructure and aid

vehicles” (Sundram & Sim, 2007, p. 17). Guill (2009) noted that these devices are

responsible for approximately 30% of all combat causalities within Afghanistan and 50%

within Iraq. Yet, the death rate attributed to IEDs has been reduced by improved medical

response to fewer than 10% of these casualties. These statistics equate to 7,000 personnel

who were wounded in action by IEDs and unable to return to duty. Sundram and Sim

(2007) also concluded that “current countermeasures have only been partially effective

despite these multi-billion [sic] expenditures” (p. 17).

 3

In terms of fielded methods, advanced detection is the most favored approach,

with emplacement detection the most commonly implemented method by the military.

Sundram and Sim (2007) argued that, although adopted as best practice, emplacement

detection remains extremely difficult, whether the IED is placed below or above ground.

Current methods were developed as a response to the types and forms of IEDs found

including those containing common garden fertilizer (i.e., ammonium nitrate); fuel oil; or

commercial explosives, as well as objects ranging from nails to “shipyard confetti” and

common hardware. While efforts have been made to disrupt the delivery structure by

capturing the bomb makers and “triggermen,” the most feasible target of capture is the

emplacer. However, Sundram and Sim argued that, to the degree that a consistent pattern

in emplacement exists, emplacement-area detection may present the most effective

approach. This would entail the development of both typical and atypical models of flow

(i.e., traffic, people, and goods), as well as the infrared and magnetic signatures of city

squares. Models of the same characteristics for roadside and confined spaces would be

needed, the latter including religious sites. Therefore, a third paradigm, or surveillance

through AI-guided wireless sensor networks, seems more feasible in the long run for

preventing the detonation of IEDs.

The review of related literature conducted for this current study revealed research

focused on the current operational landscape of countering IED efforts (Borjes, 2008;

Byford, 2010; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wilson, 2006); the debate over the appropriate

nature of the JIEDDO paradigm in addressing the larger issue of IED emplacement

(Borjes, 2008; Burton, 2011; Byford, 2010; Darnell, 2010; Day, 2006; DeTeresa &
 4

McErlean, 2008; Guill, 2009; Kaminski, 2008; Lopez, 2009; Martin, 2009, Mitchell,

2009, 2011; Sadowski, 2008; Smith & Coderre, 2012); and sophisticated techniques

based in AI to counter IEDs (Fienberg & Thomas, 2010; Golinghorst, 2010; Graham,

2010; Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette, 2008; Ntuen, 2009; Ntuen &

Gwang-Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). This existing body of research lacks a

method for predicting the location of IED placement. This current study encompasses the

potential of an ANN-based approach to predict such vital information.

Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study

According to the JIEDDO (2012a), a wide range of efforts is required to

neutralize threat networks and IEDs. One way to decrease the number of soldiers injured

by IEDs is to develop a system to identify likely placement locations prior to deploying

soldiers into danger. If a prediction tool can be developed that is able to identify and

predict such locations from a secure locale, the deployment of operational military

personnel could be conducted with far greater safety.

The research and development capability gaps currently experienced by the

JIEDDO (2012b) represent an overarching problem in the fight against IEDs. The

organization has described an inability to detect IEDs from a safe stand-off distance, as

well as a desire for automated pattern-recognition technologies to identify hostile intent.

The specific problem addressed by this quantitative correlational study is the minimal to

no published evidence suggesting any method, model, or tool using AI to predict the

location of emplaced IEDs. This current research examined how an ANN-based

approach might be used to render such predictions.

 5

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. Creswell (2012) noted that correlational methods are appropriate for

studies applying quantitative data analysis to answer research questions. This type of

analysis was implemented in this study to determine whether terrain features and objects

related to historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line

of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-

hour period predict IED placement.

The basic design of this study is quantitative in nature and appropriate because the

problem under study calls for the recognition of factors influencing an outcome and

knowledge of the best predictors of an outcome (Creswell, 2009). The predictor

variables of this study include terrain features and objects related to historical IED

detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these features

and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period. The

population sample consisted of 4,000 IED observations—2,000 with a flat terrain and

2,000 with mountainous-terrain. The experiment was performed with a single personal

computer.

Significance of the Study

The findings of this study may be of interest to scholars within the field of applied

AI, as well as military leaders, particularly those involved in IED countermeasures.

Sophisticated techniques grounded in AI and intended to predict the location of emplaced

IED delivery systems, identify hostile threats, and counter IEDs are core areas of research
 6

within the military forces and military organizations, government and political science,

and the overarching realm of AI (Fienberg & Thomas, 2010; Golinghorst, 2010; Graham,

2010; Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette, 2008; Ntuen, 2009; Ntuen &

Gwang-Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). Existing literature is replete with the

study of defensive and reactive weaponry in response to the IED threat (Borjes, 2008;

Burton, 2011; Byford, 2010; Darnell, 2010; Day, 2006; DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008;

Guill, 2009; Kaminski, 2008; Lopez, 2009; Martin, 2009; Mitchell, 2009, 2011;

Sadowski, 2008; Smith & Coderre, 2012; Stinson, 2009; Thompson, 2012; Wehri, 2007).

This current study will contribute to this body of literature by considering AI as one

technique augmenting existing technology. This approach shifts the focus of attention

from mitigation of the effects of IED attacks to the detection of IEDs from a safe stand-

off distance.

From a practice standpoint, this study is relevant and timely for the defense

sector, which is currently in the midst of a “war on terror.” Without the ability to predict

the location of IED placement, countermeasure expenditures will continue to increase

along with the concurrent cost in human lives. The JIEDDO (2012a) has reported that

the threat of IED use within the United States by organized crime and other maleficent

groups is real. Therefore, the contribution of this study is not expected to be exclusive to

the defense context. The findings may also be of value to civilian law-enforcement

agencies and other organizations searching for innovative technology to defend the

civilian population and tactically vital physical assets.

 7

Nature of the Study

The design of this study is quantitative in nature and a correlational method was

applied. A quantitative design was selected because, according to Creswell (2009), such

approaches are used to “understand the best predictors of outcomes” (p. 18). Moreover,

Creswell (2012) stated that quantitative, correlational research approaches are used when

“you seek to relate two or more variables to see if they influence each other” (p. 338).

Furthermore, quantitative research is consistent with explaining phenomena by collecting

numerical data that are subsequently analyzed via mathematically based methods,

particularly statistics (Creswell, 2009). This study utilized ANN-based techniques to

develop a model predictive of the location of IED placement.

The mean square error (MSE) is the most frequently used measure when assessing

the performance of an ANN (Rojas, 1996; Zhang, Patuwo, & Hu, 1998). This

quantitative study focuses upon the use of correlational research methods to measure the

MSE of an ANN to develop a model predictive of the location of IED placement. Zhang

et al. (1998) maintained that “one may use multiple performance measures in a particular

problem” (p. 51). Creswell (2012) asserted that, in addition to reporting correlations,

other statistical procedures may be included. To provide a wide-ranging analysis

correlation ( ), the number of correct identifications, incorrect identifications, and

percentage correct are considered. ANNs have been widely found to provide more

accurate predictive models compared with more commonly used methodologies such as

discriminant analysis (Zhang et al., 1998). The use of ANN-based techniques in

 8

predicting the location of IED placement accomplished the primary goal of this study and

provides an optimal predictive model.

A quantitative correlational design was selected for this study because this

approach is appropriate for the predictive purpose of the research (Creswell, 2009, 2012).

Data were gathered in a quantitative fashion using instruments for its collection, which is

consistent with the Creswell (2009) approach to quantitative research. The correlational

design also calls for one or more predictor variable(s), and a criterion variable was

identified to predict outcome (Creswell, 2012). Quantitative research is appropriate for

explaining phenomena via the collection of numerical data analyzed with mathematically

based methods, particularly statistics (Creswell, 2009, 2012).

Creswell (2009) explained that qualitative research designs are used when the

important variables are unknown, while mixed-method designs are useful when either the

quantitative or qualitative approach alone is inadequate to gain a clearer understanding of

the respective problem. Data-collection methods within a qualitative design involve

general interviews and observation, which are not conducted through use of an external

instrument (Creswell, 2012). Moreover, the purpose of this study does not include what

Creswell (2009) asserted as an “exploration or understanding [of] the meanings ascribed

by individuals to a social or human problem” (p. 4). A mixed-method design requires

that both qualitative and quantitative data are collected (Creswell, 2012). Ultimately, any

qualitative analysis would not provide insight into the factors behind IED placement and

could not result in a predictive model, which is why a qualitative or mixed-method

research design was not considered for this study.

 9

Research Question and Hypotheses

The following research question will guide this study: Can the location of IED

placement be predicted by an ANN and certain terrain features and objects related to

historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight

of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour

period? This question was investigated using simulated data fashioned from real-world

terrain data and signal propagation analysis processed through ANN software

(NeuroDimension, 2012). Creswell (2012) defined a hypothesis as an assertion of

quantitative research with which the researcher renders a prediction or supposition

regarding the product of a relationship. Hypotheses are used to confine the purpose

statement to specific predictions. A quantitative hypothesis was developed for this study

to assist in directing the research activities. It is intended as a fundamental entry into the

existing body of knowledge using AI-based prediction to assist in defeating the threat of

IEDs. The hypothesis states that certain terrain features and objects related to historical

IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these

features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period can

be integrated with an ANN to predict the location of IED placement.

Creswell (2009) identified a quantitative hypothesis as establishing a prediction

surrounding an expected relationship among variables. Through the establishment of the

variables identified for this study and their relationships, information can be obtained that

is hypothesized to permit an ANN to predict IED location. Creswell explained that a null

hypothesis, in contrast to a quantitative hypothesis, establishes that no relationship exists

 10

among defined variables. The null hypothesis for this study states that certain terrain

features and objects related to historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and

radio-frequency line of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of target-

vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period cannot be integrated with an ANN to predict the

location of IED placement.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is grounded in the theory of geospatial

abduction problems developed by Shakarian and Subrahmanian (2011). These

researchers were able to locate insurgent weapon cache sites, given information on

previous IED attacks along with specific supplemental data. Generalized, the theory of

geospatial abduction problems relates to the problem of discovering the most likely set of

locations congruent with domain knowledge that explains a set of observations. A “set of

observations” refers to sites where the phenomenon under examination is present, while

“domain knowledge” specifies known relationships between a site being located and a set

of observations. Notably, Shakarian and Subrahmanian stressed that geospatial abduction

problems are computationally complex, which causes researchers to resort to

approximation techniques.

ANNs have been effectively applied to a range of real-world tasks within diverse

fields (Widrow, Rumelhard, & Lehr, 1994). Network applications include radio-

frequency signals and function approximation (Thames, Abler, & Schaefer, 2011);

bankruptcy prediction (Altman, Marco, & Varetto, 1994; Lacher, Coats, Sharma, & Fant,

1995; Leshno & Spector, 1996; Tam & Kiang, 1992; Wilson & Sharda, 1994; Zhang, Hu,
 11

Patuwo, & Indro, 1999); handwriting recognition (Guyon, 1991; Knerr, Personnaz, &

Dreyfus, 2002; Le et al., 1989; Martin & Pittman, 1991); speech recognition (Bourlard &

Morgan, 2002; Lippmann, 1989); product inspection (Petsche et al., 1998); fault

detection (Siddique, Yadava, & Singh, 2005); medical diagnosis (Baxt, 1990; Burke,

2006); and bond ratings (Dutta & Shekhar, 2002; Utans & Moody, 2002). Performance

evaluations of various ANNs have been conducted by several studies (Curram &

Mingers, 1994; Huang & Lippmann, 1987). Additionally, computer experimental

assessments of ANNs for problem solving have been performed under a range of

conditions (Subramanian, Hung, & Hu, 1993).

This current study was conducted to expose a gap in existing research pertaining

to the use of ANN with certain terrain features and objects related to historical IED

detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these features

and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period to predict

the location of IED placement. The findings may provide defense and law-enforcement

personnel with a tool to improve defenses against IEDs. The results may also assist

researchers investigating AI and military leaders involved in operational planning.

Definition of Terms

The following terms are used throughout this study and are defined for purposes

of the research:

Artificial intelligence (AI): Generally concerned with developing techniques

allowing computers to operate in a manner emulating intelligent organisms such as

human beings (Raynor, 2009).

 12

Epoch: Iteration within a procedure, commonly related to neural net algorithms

(Raynor, 2009).

Improvised explosive device (IED): A device placed or fabricated in an

improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary

chemicals or explosives and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract (Stinson,

2009).

Neural network: A massive parallel-distributed processor comprised of simple

processing units that attempt to simulate the powerful capabilities of the human brain

such as knowledge acquisition, synthesis, and problem solving (Haykin, 1999).

Perceptron: A simple pattern-recognition device that was the precursor of modern

neural nets. The original perceptron took a weighted sum of a set of inputs, added a

constant bias or offset, and returned a zero or one, depending upon whether the sum was

above or below a specific threshold. Perceptron-type circuits underlie modern neural nets

(Raynor, 2009).

Assumptions, Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations

General assumptions are made regarding the processes planned for use within this

study. Attention was given to ensuring that the threat analysis is comprehensive and

affords a thorough understanding of the operating environment. Due to the difficulty

associated with collecting data within a hostile area of operation and the associated

national security issues, several assumptions were made throughout the execution of the

research. These assumptions are based principally upon careful analysis of literature

relevant to combat operations and tactical concepts, as well as established principles of

 13

engineering. It was assumed that the available unclassified, open source information

would be sufficient to adequately understand the threat and environments associated with

the use of IEDs. From this information and a general understanding of military

operations, a sensible data set can be established. Solely information released to the

public was used in this study. The methods described can be applied to other studies

pertaining to IED attacks on military vehicles operated on established road networks

(Fienberg & Thomas, 2010).

It was assumed that the IEDs under study were placed on the ground and with

antennas approximately 1 to 2 feet above the ground, with the manual command

detonation device held by a malicious actor 6 feet above the ground (Pettitt, Redden,

Turner, & Carstens, 2009). The IEDs were assumed to be most often placed where the

visual line of sight is the greatest as a guideline for radio-frequency line of sight and

detonation timing (Sundram & Sim, 2007). It was also assumed that their placement is

most often where target-vehicle traffic is the heaviest. The blast radius of the IEDs under

study were assumed to be limited to the same magnitude as those of historical IED

detonation events (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).

This study was limited in size and scope. The research did not utilize official,

classified, or sensitive information. Access to classified information is restricted by law

and is allowed only with multiple restrictive requirements. All data collected and

analysis conducted in this study were derived from published, unclassified, and open

source documents.
 14

A theoretical data set was created for use in this research. Selected IED locations

were based upon analysis and understanding of present-day areas of conflict, threat

tactics, techniques, and procedures (Sundram & Sim, 2007). The data set was created by

identifying a number of theoretical IED attack locations within terrain tiles acquired from

the U.S. Geological Service (2011). Validation of this data set was derived from a logic-

based analysis, in conjunction with an understanding of ANNs and both the historical and

present-day IED environment (Cordesman, 2008). Ultimate validation of these concepts

can be achieved through the integration of real-world location information and IED data.

The IED detonation method is limited manual operation (i.e., a malicious actor, at a

distance, visually determines when the target is in proximity to the IED and manually

detonates the device via a radio-frequency signal). Automated detonation devices, such

as those pressure or heat sensitive, are beyond the scope of this study.

The delimitations associated with this research are characteristics that serve to

define the boundaries of the study and narrow the research scope (Leedy & Ormrod,

2010). Leedy and Ormrod (2010) defined delimitations as statements a researcher does

not intend to address. Delimiting factors include the research questions, variables of

interest, theoretical perspectives, and the population selected for investigation. Stationary

IEDs were the specific focus of this investigation. The study was not conducted with the

intention to predict attacks involving mobile IEDs such as person-borne, vehicle-borne,

and water-borne devices. The research centered on IED detonators that use the 150 MHz

to 450 MHz frequency range. This was merely for practicality and in no way represents a

restriction of the capabilities of the study approach.

 15

Summary

The existing body of literature related to this study is lacking research

investigating the prediction of IED placement using AI. Countering the threat of IEDs is

a challenging, multilayered problem (JIEDDO, 2012a). The significance of this study

lies in the provision of a system to accurately predict the placement of these devices.

Without this ability, countermeasure expenditures will increase and human lives will

continue to be lost both now and in the future. The proper implementation of an IED

prediction system will enable an improvement in current placement-prediction

technology and a reduction in long-term costs associated with combating the use of IEDs.

The nature of this study is correlational with a quantitative focus. The research

answers whether certain terrain features and objects, line-of-sight data, and target-traffic

data can be used with an ANN-based technique to predict IED placement. The review of

related literature describes the contemporary operational landscape of counter-IED

efforts, deployed efforts designed to reduce IED casualties, studies discussing the

challenges and issues involved in counter-IED efforts, and advanced techniques grounded

in AI intended to neutralize the IED threat.

 16

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Overview

The literature reviewed for this study was drawn from a search of the following

EBSCO databases: Academic Search Premier, MasterFILE Premier, and DTIC Online:

Information for the Defense Community. The keywords used in the search included

IEDs, improved explosive devices, Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, terrorist networks,

technology, robots, AI, algorithm, intelligence, counter IED efforts, and the JIEDDO.

The review examines the evolution of mapping systems based in AI to combat the

emplacement of IEDs within the battle space of Iraq or Afghanistan. A general survey of

the current operational landscape of counter-IED efforts was conducted that found that

the paradigm of technological response to roadside IEDs, which was developed by the

JIEDDO, remains in the control of the U.S. response (Borjes, 2008; Byford, 2010;

Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wilson, 2006). The survey also discovered that while the ANN

model is well developed, there is a gap in existing literature regarding the application of

AI to the problem of IED placement prediction. This gap is particularly apparent when

examining research less than 5 years since publication.

This review also examines a number of efforts deployed by the JIEDDO to reduce

casualties from IEDs. These initiatives were successful in their primary immediate goal,

which was to reduce casualties. The review also surveys the research debate over the

appropriate nature of the JIEDDO paradigm in addressing the primary issue of IED

emplacement (Borjes, 2008; Burton, 2011; Byford, 2010; Darnell, 2010; Day, 2006;

DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008; Guill, 2009; Kaminski, 2008; Lopez, 2009; Martin, 2009;
 17

Mitchell, 2009, 2011; Sadowski, 2008; Smith & Coderre, 2012; Stinson, 2009;

Thompson, 2012; Wehri, 2007). A number of researchers have reported that, while

immediate, singular-event counter-IED efforts have reduced causalities, the efforts of the

JIEDDO have in no way reduced the use of IEDs or the central and widespread role of

IEDS in the strategic purpose of the insurgency, all of which have demonstrated broad

strategic and symbolic effectiveness far beyond roadside explosions (Spitzer, 2007;

Staszewski, 2007).

Research into optimal ways of combating IEDs is evolving from a search for a

technological “silver bullet” to a more systems-oriented, holistic approach by which the

entire network supporting IEDs (i.e., the entire battle space of the insurgency including

both civilians and combatants) is mapped to allow commanders to make informed

decisions. The aim of such decisions is to disrupt the networks supporting IEDS, reduce

the absolute number of devices, and diminish their strategic value. This review of related

literature therefore examines some of the more sophisticated techniques based in AI to

support efforts to counter IEDs.

Studies focused on mapping battlespace or providing battlespace visualization to

assist commander decision making have found that AI-based robotics are being

integrated with mapping (Fienberg & Thomas, 2010; Golinghorst, 2010; Graham, 2010;

Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette, 2008; Ntuen, 2009; Ntuen & Gwang-

Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). This creates almost futuristic visions of

transformed battle spaces wherein all activity is converted to data by AI algorithms and

decisions are made in ways that disrupt and destroy IED networks. Overall, however,
 18

this review of related literature evidences that the majority of these advanced systems are

in their infancy and only pilot, program-type operationalization has been deployed within

Iraq and Afghanistan.

IEDs planted by adversaries in asymmetric battlefield scenarios, including urban

areas, represent one of the most problematic forms of weaponry used against U.S.

military presence within Iraq and Afghanistan (Borjes, 2008; Byford, 2010; Sundram &

Sim, 2007; Wilson, 2006). While use of these devices soared from 2003 to 2007,

evidence also indicates that IED use has leveled off since mid-2005 (Wilson, 2006).

Sundram and Sim (2007) reported that, from 2003 to 2005 (i.e., during the first few years

of the Iraq war), 11,784 IED incidents caused harm to U.S. troops. Through 2007, IEDs

had killed 1,500 individuals, and 40% of all U.S. causalities within Iraq were due to these

devices (Borjes, 2008). The U.S. military has invested an estimated $40 billion to

combat IEDs through 2010 (Byford, 2010). These efforts have had some success;

however, the JIEDDO (2008) reported that, in FY 2008, IED attacks fell to 2004 levels,

with only 33% of total attacks caused by IEDs, and the attack numbers were continuing

to drop “dramatically” (p. 1).

It is clear that IEDs have caused a high number of casualties, as well as massive

collateral damage. However, the JIEDDO (2008) reported that, by 2008, a low 16% of

U.S. casualties had been caused by the devices. IEDs are notoriously difficult to detect,

which is evident by not only their continued use, but also by the dramatic 94% increase in

their use during the first quarter of 2010 alone (Byford, 2010). Consequently, they pose a

threat to “state assets such as soldiers, government officials, transportation infrastructure

 19

and aid vehicles” (Sundram & Sim, 2007, p. 17). Guill (2009) noted that IEDs are

responsible for approximately 30% of combat causalities within Afghanistan and 50%

within Iraq. Yet, the death rate due to IEDs has been reduced by improved medical

response to fewer than 10% of the victims. This still equates to 7,000 military personnel

wounded in action and unable to return to duty because of IED-related injuries. Sundram

and Sim (2007) concluded that “current countermeasures have only been partially

effective despite these multi-billion [sic] expenditures” (p. 17).

In describing the various forms of anti-IED efforts, Sundram and Sim (2007)

noted a few different paradigms. One involves a legislative response, rendering it illegal

to obtain the precursor chemicals that are used to manufacture these explosives. The

effectiveness of this approach, however, has been questioned. In terms of field methods,

advanced detection is the most favored approach, with emplacement detection the most

commonly implemented method by the military. Sundram and Sim argued that, although

adopted as best practice, emplacement detection remains extremely difficult, whether the

IED is placed below or above ground. These methods have responded to the types and

forms of IEDs found including those containing common garden fertilizer (i.e.,

ammonium nitrate); fuel oil; and commercial explosives, as well as objects ranging from

nails to shipyard confetti and common hardware.

The majority of IEDs include a firing device that can be triggered by cell phones

and a casing that can be anything from a drink can to a cigarette package. The devices

can be initiated either instantaneously or with delayed ignition. Command detonation of

targets in transit in a routine pattern is the most common use of IEDs. To date, known
 20

indicators of the presence of IEDs include visual indicators such as disturbed soil,

isolated boxes or containers, and exposed trip wires or strings. Visual vigilance by

soldiers has been increased and focused on detecting these indicators. Graffiti on the

sides of buildings, improvised methods of marking piles or stones or trees or walls, and

suspicious behavior including videotaping ordinary activities or the absence of women or

children have also emerged as visual clues of the possible presence of IEDs. The devices

are typically buried underground, rolled under vehicles, or placed on top of antitank

mines. IEDs can also be “daisy-chained” along a stretch of ground to attack a large

segment of a convoy concurrently. Common targets of IEDs are high-visibility transport;

military targets; lines of communication; and bridges, overpasses, and checkpoints.

Likely placement is along supply routes, but also within shopping malls, religious sites,

and on roadsides adjacent to government-agency buildings and other strategic locations

as asymmetrical tactics.

There are two primary types of IEDs—(a) those packaged and camouflaged in

common objects expected along roads, and (b) vehicle IEDs typically involving suicide

delivery. Suicide bombings commonly involve IEDs that are inexpensive to build,

costing as little as $150. The small number of personnel involved in IED operations,

which is frequently less than eight individuals, renders prevention difficult. Bomb

makers, who can obtain necessary information on the Internet if untrained, need only

locate emplacers and triggermen to complete the jobs they set out to perform. While

efforts have been made to disrupt the delivery structure by capturing the bomb makers

and triggermen, the most feasible target of capture is the emplacer. However, Sundram
 21

and Sim (2007) argued that, to the degree that a consistent pattern exists in emplacement,

the area of detection might be a more effective approach. This would entail developing

models of typical and atypical flows of traffic, people, and goods, as well as the infrared

and magnetic signatures of city squares. The same characteristics for roadsides and

confined spaces would be developed, the latter including religious sites. As a result, a

third paradigm, or surveillance through AI-guided wireless sensor networks, seems to be

a more feasible solution to preventing the detonation of IEDs.

Military Paradigms

A number of paradigms have emerged for combating IEDs within Iraq and

Afghanistan (Borjes, 2008; Burton, 2011; Byford, 2010; Darnell, 2010; Day, 2006;

DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008; Guill, 2009; Kaminski, 2008; Lopez, 2009; Martin, 2009;

Mitchell, 2009, 2011; Sadowski, 2008; Smith & Coderre, 2012; Stinson, 2009;

Thompson, 2012; Wehri, 2007).

Defensive and Reactive Weaponry

The development of countermeasures within the battlefield space, typically in

response to explosions or the chance of an explosion (Thompson, 2012), is a paradigm

that presents a common-sense approach to combating IEDs. This involves a weapons-

based response to IEDs, either detonating those discovered via bomb squads or

addressing the manner in which the devices are detonated and defensively working to

prevent incidents before they occur. Borjes (2008) described a method toward reducing

the activation of vehicle-borne IEDs by neutralizing one class of devices known as

victim-operated IEDs where the triggerman is the victim activating the device. The
 22

method is referred to as the self-protection adaptive roller kit (SPARK) and involves a

modular mine roller system designed to be installed on wheeled platforms that can be

used in convoys to clear a route. The roller causes the IED to detonate below and out

from a vehicle, greatly reducing the impact of the IED.

Born of immediate need and improvisation, the SPARK roller has been attached

to the front and back of lead convoy vehicles since 2006. Borjes (2008) conceded that

the rollers represent solely a stopgap measure until a more effective solution can be

found; however, the roller has been successful in reducing the number of casualties from

IEDs. Trucks fitted with the SPARK have triggered blasts away from the trucks with

some degree of success. Since 2007, SPARK has been involved in 22 IED incidents and

cited for saving lives. In one case, the roller triggered an IED that propelled the entire

apparatus attached to the front of the truck 20 feet away while leaving all five crew

members on the truck unharmed. Nonetheless, the SPARK response still allows for the

explosion of the IED, therefore presenting a reactive response, which is not aligned with

emerging best practice focused on detection and prevention.

Technological advances have been developed to counter all aspects of IED

detonation. For example, one type of device releases explosively formed explosives.

This projectile is responsible for a high percentage of the deaths resulting from IEDs. To

defend against such projectiles, Kaminski (2008) recommended the development of

armor plates for vehicles whose properties, designed by isentropic conservation

equations, would resist penetration by such explosives. This replaced the traditional
 23

method of adding inches of steel to armor as a deterrent because such thickening of the

plates renders vehicles too heavy for patrolling.

The plates designed by Kaminski (2008) improved the survivability of such IED

attacks with reduced vehicle vulnerability to the projectiles. Theoretical mathematical

measurements of the projectile, pressure, deformation, displacement, transient vibration,

heat transfer, thermal stress, and other finite elements involved in the explosion were

considered in the design. Advanced laminated armor plate was subsequently modeled.

The results were provided in terms of stress distribution, deflections and Von Mises stress

on tested materials, and the kinetic loading results of steel at various thicknesses. Two-

dimensional modeling indicated that a sandwiched construction of composites with

aluminum sheets would produce armor plates resistant to explosives. Kaminski

acknowledged that the composites used in the study may also be too heavy; consequently,

further research using ceramics and other materials was recommended. This line of

research, however, is based upon using advanced stress science to find a weapon-based

way of defending against IED blasts.

Martin, Holzbach, Riegler, Tam, and Smith (2008) sought to determine whether

three-dimensional (3D) hologram representation of scenarios, as opposed to two-

dimensional imagery, improved human vision-based perception of the elements of battle

space, with an aim toward the improved detection of IED presence. Nine joint terminal

attack controllers were tested using both types of imagery. All nine reported 3D imagery

that was superior to two-dimensional imagery for all aspects and subtasks of the planning

and operation of a mission, based upon relative height information, enhanced collateral
 24

damage estimation, and the determination of lines of sight and lines of fire. Martin et al.

(2008) found that the 3D representation of battle space improved planning at a tactical

operations center. Although the method was not practical for vehicular use, due to the

size of the format, it could be applied to improve flight planning and the detection of

IEDs. The project was initiated after the JIEDDO expressed interest in improving

methods for such detection. The broader importance of hologram improvements is that

most duties of the joint terminal attack controllers are already performed with products of

the intelligence cycle including geospatial intelligence maps, platform imagery, and

human and imagery intelligence. This includes use of “off-the-shelf” software.

Nonetheless, until introduction of the 3D hologram, these programs had difficulty reading

the imagery of urban spaces.

DeFisher et al. (2006) provided an example of robots created to protect explosive

ordnance-disposal operators from IEDs. These researchers proposed that such robots be

designed to deliver a high-performance, shaped anti-IED charge that would penetrate and

detonate emplaced IEDs. Using the robot to place the charge ensures that operators

maintain a safe distance from the IED they are deactivating. DeFisher et al. tested a robot

of this description and found that another major advantage is that the robot can penetrate

up to one-half foot of asphalt and rocky soil to deactivate IEDs far below the surface.

The IED problem is so complex that, in 2004, the U.S. DoD created the JIEDDO

to specifically focus on the development of counter-IED projects. Under this

organization, certain approaches to preventing IED impact have predominated. One has

been to increase the blast resistance of combat vehicles and insert jamming technologies
 25

into theaters of action to prevent detonation, which is primarily initiated through radio

frequencies. Improving the treatment of causalities is another focus. Only since 2008

has research turned from an essentially defensive response to efforts targeting the

improvement of capabilities enabling detection of IEDs prior to detonation. Guill (2009)

focused on remote detection capabilities, a subfield he reported as understudied. With up

to $14 billion in funding as of this current proposal, the JIEDDO has established a

paradigm for addressing the problem of IEDs.

The JIEDDO has been responsible for a number of efforts to counteract the effect

of IEDs. Lopez (2009) described the Tidal Sun pilot program run by the organization,

through which soldiers were trained to gather information and evidence from IED sites to

provide headquarters with information potentially leading to the capture of emplacers.

The intention was that such information may allow the staff to prevent the emplacement

of similar devices. The teams, including personnel from the Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms Agency, gathered pieces of bombs, circuit boards, and evidence of explosives to

conduct forensic studies to determine the identity or methods of insurgents. The pilot

program represented the first of its kind, training stateside teams to perform such

investigations.

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

Whether the paradigm developed by the JIEDDO is optimal or even effective thus

far, remains a topic of intense debate. Research has credited the organization for

“fiddling” with various solutions to IEDs and quickly deploying those approaches to the

field in ways that have reduced causalities from IEDs in the short term (Smith & Coderre,
 26

2012). Put simply, the JIEDDO indeed ramped up quickly in response to a short-term

spike in IED deaths.

Sadowski (2008) documented the evolution of the JIEDDO, remarking that, from

the onset, the organization exhibited a bias in favor of a short-term solution. This led to

the development of fragmentation kits for armored vehicles, as well as improved body

armor, but also to “deterred interagency engagement for methods guided by intelligence

operations” (p. 22). DeTeresa and McErlean (2008) examined whether the JIEDDO was

“winning” the counter-IED “battle,” and if the U.S. DoD had a long-term plan for the

JIEDDO for addressing IEDs in other asymmetric “theaters of war”. The organization

was created after commanders serving in Iraq observed the pervasiveness of the IED

problem and called for a targeted government response modeled on the Manhattan

Project, specifically to address IEDs.

Evolution. The first wave of efforts to defend against IEDs included the use of

electronic jammers, which are vehicle armor coupled with IED detection and

predetonation techniques. DeTeresa and McErlean (2008) referred to the activity as

“defensive measures, dealing with the IED after it had been emplaced” and therefore

having no effect on the increased use of the devices (p. 64). These defensive efforts were

then classified as “defeat-the-device” efforts because they were viewed as defending

against IEDs, attempting to reduce their casualties, but leaving insurgent forces to

continue their use with impunity.

Effort was also made to take a more offensive approach by attacking those

individuals and networks that created the IEDs. This became known as the “attack-the-
 27

network” approach to IED prevention. DeTeresa and McErlean (2008) also viewed this

objective as unsatisfactory because the JIEDDO had become increasingly involved in a

mandate to train the force. Along with the other two described mandates, all three served

as the collective core of the JIEDDO approach. However, in measuring the amount of

effort the organization devoted to each, DeTeresa and McErlean found that, while 12% of

funding was allocated to training, 30% financed attacking the network (i.e., intelligence)

and 56% was committed to defeat-the-device tactics, indicating that the defensive line of

operation continued to dominate the JIEDDO approach.

DeTeresa and McErlean (2008) acknowledged that the technology procurement

and development process involved in defeat-the-device efforts had “spilled over” into the

creation of intelligence and surveillance tools (i.e., attack the network). These efforts

have also led to the search for networks of experts from industry and academia to

contribute to war-fighting efforts in broader areas. The JIEDDO activity has led to the

development of Talon detection robots, the Rhino and Husky mounted detection systems

installed on the front of trucks, and the wire-neutralization system known as Wolf Collar,

which rakes up command wires from IEDs that are left on the ground in front of convoys.

Whether the JIEDDO is acquiring these technologies with sufficient rapidity is of

question. DeTeresa and McErlean suggested that the organization work with the Joint

Rapid Acquisition Cell and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force to improve deployment

speed.

Effectiveness. The intelligence support provided by the JIEDDO for attack-the-

network efforts are undertaken by Counter-IED Operation Integration Centers (COIC),

 28

which collect and analyze intelligence, often employing IED field teams to analyze blast

sites for forensic and other evidence (DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008). The COIC reached

full operational capability during 2007 and has since gained favor from troops by

providing tactical intelligence support to lower echelon units. The General

Accountability Office (GAO) and the Marines, however, have expressed concern that the

COIC are not adequately integrated into preexisting military-intelligence organizations,

and that the conceptualization of insurgent networks is as exclusively concerned with

IEDs.

A critic of the COIC found that numerous separate counter-IED efforts are not

consolidated, centralized, or coordinated examples of the “ad-hocracy” (as cited in

DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008, p. 23) of the JIEDDO initiative. The training delivered by

the JIEDDO takes place in a center located within the state of California and focuses on

not only soldiers, but also dog training and the development of radio-controlled electronic

warfare. DeTeresa and McErlean (2008) reviewed the strategic planning efforts of the

JIEDDO and they appeared to be a work in progress. Nonetheless, these investigators

issued their report because of concerns that the JIEDDO has shown an “inability to

clearly articulate what it has accomplished with its relatively large budget, permissive

spending authorities and broad charter” (p. 84).

In reviewing the effectiveness of the JIEDDO, DeTeresa and McErlean (2008)

found abundant positive anecdotal evidence of successes, but little in the way of

metrically quantified proof that the anti-IED efforts of the organization facilitated

“gained ground” in the war against IEDS. It was unclear to DeTeresa and McErlean
 29

whether efforts of the JIEDDO had decreased the number of intercepted IED attacks, and

whether the organization had altered insurgent IED-emplacement behavior. Day (2006)

cast further aspersion on the quest for technological solutions, quoting a retired Army

IED officer as saying, “We all drank the Kool-Aid. . . . We believed that because the

United States was the technology powerhouse, the solution to this problem would come

from science. . . . All we have to do is throw technology at it and the problem will go

away” (p. 3).

Day (2006) also assessed the JIEDDO and found that its work with other

organizations lacked coordination, and its presence contributed to the failure of the

services to come to a consensus on how to best fight IEDs. He summarily described the

JIEDDO as “a lumbering giant bureaucracy which is primarily focused on technological

solutions to the IED problem and which has no authority to compel other organizations to

act or even participate in its efforts” (p. 4). Focused solely on finding short-term

problems to the present-day IED threat, this goal itself is undermined by the fact that the

acquisitions process under its command is slow and “muddled,” ending in defeating the

IEDs of “yesterday.”

Day (2006) conceded that some technology developed by the JIEDDO has saved

lives, which includes personnel-protection technology such as mine-resistant ambush-

protected vehicles. However, as soon as new vehicles are developed, the insurgents

respond with a newer, more destructive IED. Thus, an escalating “arms race” ensues,

which is exemplified by the U.S. introduction of the explosively formed penetrator

technology and the immediate response of the insurgents, which in turn, necessitated
 30

further U.S. development. As Day summarized, “MRAP is the shining example of the

wrong mindset [sic] with regard to the counter-IED” in that a force protection measure

will only isolate troops in ways that further erode their ability to gain hearts and minds

(p. 4). Consequently, for Day, an anti-IED war must focus on five functional areas—

prevention, detection, neutralization, protection, and training. Therefore, holistic anti-

IED efforts must therefore capture and kill emplacers and all others involved, deploy

surveillance techniques, render encountered IEDs safe, use electronic warfare to prevent

detonation, and train soldiers to possess expertise in all areas.

While the JIEDDO (2008) reported that its mission has led to successes within the

field, criticism of its efforts thus far give pause with regard to a purely technological

solution to IED attacks. Ellis, Rogers, and Cochran (2007) repeated many of these

criticisms, focusing on the disorganization of the JIEDDO in its bureaucratic structure,

which has resulted in duplicated effort and squandering of scarce DoD resources. These

are problems that, in fact, the JIEDDO was founded to avoid. The increased size of the

organization has compromised its ability to quickly develop and deploy new devices

within the field and, as a result, the early ability of the JIEDDO to adapt quickly to

change has eroded. The fact that the organization continues to focus not only on

technology, but on finding a silver bullet to defeat IEDs, demonstrates that it has also

become mired in a battle of measure versus countermeasure with insurgents.

The fact that the JIEDDO has established its general paradigm and is only

concerned with fielding “widgets” added to the system has exhibited its further

immersion into the cumbersome DoD acquisition process. This is a problem because
 31

“the average time for a normal DoD acquisition program to progress from determining a

mission need to actually fielding a system is approximately 84 to 144 months” (Ellis et

al., 2007, p. 8). Once a program is deployed, the insurgents respond; they are able to

change their tactics in days or even hours. The JIEDDO short-term focus exacerbates the

problematic process by failing to assign funding requests to long-term outlooks, which

contributes to an even greater slowing of the process.

Recommendations of Critics. Ellis et al. (2007) brought further insight to the

JIEDDO lack of attention to strategic decision making, arguing that, within its structure

and mission, strategic planning is an afterthought rather than a deliberate activity, with

staff poorly trained in strategic planning and only taught to focus on technological

solutions. Therefore, Ellis et al. and others recommended realigning the JIEDDO under a

combatant commander, such as the U.S. Joint Forces Command, to streamline the

counter-IED fight. This would not only overlay strategic planning onto its efforts, but

also give the organization the power to enforce adoption of its technologies in various

services. Thus, Ellis et al. joined the chorus of critics on the limited approach to counter-

IED efforts adopted by the JIEDDO.

The GAO (2011) provided a still more specific critique on the limited nature of

the JIEDDO anti-IED efforts by analyzing the applicability of the efforts and devices

fielded by the organization with regard to humanitarian demining. This entails demining

away from supply routes and into spaces where civilians are killed. The GAO found that

only six of the 150 technologies supported by the JIEDDO and deployed within Iraq or

Afghanistan would be applicable to humanitarian demining. Of these, four of the six

 32

technologies were duplicated by other agencies under the DoD and, “because of technical

issues, were not suitable for use in humanitarian demining” (p. 3).

The GAO (2011) found fundamental and inherent differences between counter-

IED efforts and humanitarian demining. In counter-IED efforts, the force must only clear

an area to allow for safe passage of a convoy, while in humanitarian demining, clearance

must be extensive and permanent so that, for example, farming could be conducted on

previously mined ground. The lack of applicability with counter-IED technologies

fielded by the JIEDDO beyond the immediate clearance purpose of a roadway for troop

or convoy passage starkly accentuated the limitations of the organization perspective on

IED containment. The GAO (2012) reviewed the JIEDDO strategic plan again in 2012

and again found that JIEDDO practice had not followed leading strategic-management

practice; in particular, no means of measuring performance outcomes was evident. In

reviewing the 2012 strategic plan of the JIEDDO, the GAO asserted that the new plan

continues to lack the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-

IED efforts and, as a result, the organization will “continue to face difficulty measuring

effectiveness,” especially because the DoD itself has also failed to fully identify the goals

of counter-IED initiatives (p. 3).

The JIEDDO discontinued maintenance of its Technology Matrix database to

track the progress of all counter-IED efforts because other services could not access the

database, which left the agency open to duplication and overlap of programming.

Moreover, the JIEDDO plan to develop an organization-wide information-technology

architecture by the end of FY 2012 does not include an implementation plan with a
 33

detailed timeline inclusive of milestones and a key management practice to track progress

to the goal (GAO, 2012). As a result, the JIEDDO continues to lack an automated

mechanism allowing the organization to reliably and quickly identify and review its own

counter-IED initiatives.

The GAO feared overlap in counter-IED, directed-energy technology

programming emitting radio waves or other energy to neutralize IEDs and radio-

frequency jamming systems. These technologies had already been developed by both the

Army and Navy, although with a limited radius of protection from IEDs and electronic

data-collection systems, which store data to support the fight against the IED threat. The

GAO identified $104 million of JIEDDO counter-IED programming that appeared to

duplicate programs already in place by other services. The Office called for the DoD to

create a comprehensive counter-IED plan to avoid risk associated with the fragmentation,

overlap, and duplication identified in the report.

Although the future strategic plan of the JIEDDO (2012a) expressed interest in

threat-chain dismantling by partnering with intelligence and discussed more integrated

and networked approaches to combating IEDs, the report still appeared to

overwhelmingly favor a technology-focused approach to combating IEDs. Consequently,

the majority of networking by the JIEDDO would involve leveraging the research and

development community for additional solutions to the IED problem. The JIEDDO

outlined, however, a “whole-of-government” approach to integrate its efforts to deploy

counter-IED technology with operations and information intelligence, as well as with

weapons technical intelligence, which may reach beyond its current focus. Nonetheless,
 34

the future of the JIEDDO continues to be formed by a focus on three lines of operation—

attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force. It is therefore unclear whether,

based upon its future projection, the JIEDDO can reshape itself to overcome criticism of

its plan of operation.

Mitchell (2011) examined the complexity of contemporary battle space, arguing

that optimal action in such a space is a result of the interaction of actional assets at the

edge of the battle space and the organizational functions, structures, and processes of the

respective organization. He compared a network versus a hierarchical organization to

determine within which context optimal interaction of these elements manifests. An

effects-based approach to operations planning was modeled for battle space within the

Upper Gereshk Valley of Afghanistan. The variable measured was agility, defined as

“the effectiveness of the military organization in moving developed knowledge to

decision points where actions are taken to cause the desired effects in the battle space

environment” (p. 6). This equates to a transfer of new knowledge in a timely manner to

key points within the battle space.

The asymmetric nature of the counter insurgency (COIN) battle space involving

both physical and human terrain, especially within Afghanistan where the battle space is

likely to host official, traditional, “shadow,” and dark organizations, renders this problem

more difficult for current operations (Mitchell, 2011). A project involving mapping and

engaging local nationals was reviewed, but was found to falter due to the state approach

to the battle space adopted by the military and focused on fixed patrol bases and the

avoidance of IEDs. As a result, the networks that created and delivered IEDs became
 35

“extremely efficient in the production, distribution and placing of IEDs around fixed

coalition forces,” increasing the limited freedom of troop movement, thereby increasing

the static nature of operations (p. 9). This, in turn, allowed a network of insurgent “safe

houses” to take root, within which IEDs were stored and created.

The goal of the study conducted by Mitchell (2011) was to regain sufficient

freedom of movement to undertake a human-terrain mapping of the local population.

The results of an analysis of the evolution of commander situational awareness of the

operation over a period of 5 months revealed chaotic networking from poor

communication, which resulted in the placement of additional liaisons throughout the

area. Mitchell also found that hierarchical communication has a tendency to “stovepipe”

information, negatively affecting battle-space agility because it requires repeated

communication of messages, as well as threatening information precision. Moreover, the

accessibility of information from the top to the bottom of the organization was

misinterpreted as a security breach by the hierarchy, generating friction and promoting

increased networking chaos.

Mitchell (2011) concluded that, while the intelligence, surveillance, target

acquisition, and reconnaissance of a 21st-century platform was developed to provide

situational awareness, the optimization of its battle space is hindered by a social structure

within the military hierarchy “that at best can be described as 19th century” (p. 27). As a

result, the organization cannot manage fourth-generation intelligence, surveillance, target

acquisition, reconnaissance, and flat-lining of information with multiple share points.

Mitchell concluded that, in addition to the bureaucracy, the very hierarchy of a military
 36

organization, by nature, tends to compromise the full optimization of more advanced

communication networks within the battle space.

Darnell (2010) emphasized yet another disadvantage to the deployment focus on

the preventive and intelligence-based technology implemented to combat IEDs.

Numerous new sensor and surveillance systems for targeting have been fielded in recent

years, rendering soldier training on the systems inadequate. Consequently, the systems

are often used minimally and, when implemented, used ineffectively. Darnell argued

that, as technology continues to flow into the battle space, this problem will persist as

“military occupational specialty producing schools cannot keep up with these changes”

and thus training will continue to lag behind (p. 5). The problem is exacerbated by the

fact that Marines often hear of new devices only a week or so prior to deployment, or

worse, only after they emerge within the field where no training is available. As a result,

“some gear sits unused because no one has the time to figure out what is in the big plastic

cases” and, if deployed, it is without safety considerations (p. 5). The lasers of ground-

based, operational surveillance systems (G-BOSSs), for example, require physical-safety

classes prior to use; however, this training is typically not received, equating to frequent

related injury.

A number of dissimilar protocols exist for introducing new technology into the

field. Darnell (2010) exemplified the JIEDDO for introducing technology into the field

and subsequently failing to coordinate its use across services. The Counter Radio-

Controlled IED Electronic Warfare systems designed by the JIEDDO to jam IEDs, as

well as the Keyhole Kit produced by the organization as surveillance equipment, were
 37

both poorly coordinated across services, compromising their effectiveness. Darnell

therefore argued that the Marine Corps, in particular, must create an operational

integration and support team within the field to train soldiers in use of the latest

technology to battle against IEDs.

Future Approaches

Research focused on IEDs is typically conducted with a perspective of purely

technological approaches to counter IEDs as less than best practice. It is also true that

technology will continue to play a growing role in warfare. Mitchell (2009) examined

the concept of a disruptive technology, defined in commerce as a technology that will

very quickly disrupt a market before a response is possible (e.g., the Smartphone

disruption of the camera market or the Internet disruption of the newspaper publishing

business). A disruptive technology can be characterized by a powerful commercial

enterprise, grounded in market domination by a traditional technology, suddenly losing

market share with the introduction of a new, unexpected technology and left to file for

bankruptcy amid the confusion of a suddenly and drastically changed business landscape.

Within military circles, disruptive technologies are derived from the biotechnology field

and cyber and space operations with direct-weapons systems. The military has, since the

1950s, exploited research and development more than at any other time in history to

develop technology; however, whether it is capable of developing disruptive technology

is uncertain.

According to the black swan theory, “The more knowledge that individuals have,

the more likely the individuals are to theorize about what they know” (Mitchell, 2009,
 38

p. 36). According to the theory of technical surprise, a technology can frequently be

thrusted onto the scene in a manner that “explodes our consciousness rather than evolving

in a predictable way” (p. 37). Both theories present ways in which an organization, such

as the military, must protect itself from disruption by either event.

With regard to the military, it would appear that any technological surprise or

disruptive technology will emerge from the realm of robotics or aerospace. Computer

integration with either would also increase the likelihood of such sudden development.

Unmanned combat robots appear to be a particularly fertile ground for disruptive

development. According to Mitchell (2009), “Unmanned autonomous vehicles are robots

that use semi-AI with rule sets to conduct certain operations without interaction from

human operators” (p. 46). Armed robot technology has been embraced by the military

through multifunction utility logistics and equipment ordered with delivery expected

during 2014. While reviewing a number of other startling technological developments,

Mitchell also considered whether IEDs in asymmetric warfare could be considered

disruptive. He concluded, “While (an IED) does affect the tactical operational levels of

war, in almost all cases of asymmetric warfare, there is nothing disruptive about the

technology being used” (p. 52). This conclusion, in light of the fact that disruptive

technologies will continue to develop, holds promise for the aforementioned robotics as a

technological answer to countering IEDs with the integration of AI.

A Systems Approach

The National Research Council (2008) reported developments in IED detection

that were based upon the concept of the IED threat chain. The IED is only the last and
 39

most publicly visible facet of a campaign of violence and, based upon this model, the best

way to prevent IEDs is to disrupt the social network of the chain leading to their

emplacement. This model views IED use from within the context of a broader IED

campaign; that is, as strategic and ideological in nature. The model was developed to

seek a clearer understanding of the underlying factors related to the dynamics

surrounding the prediction of IED placement. This can involve searching for the

information network behind IEDs, or working to ensure that a network to build and

deliver the devices is not developed (Wehri, 2007). Wehri (2007) proposed an approach

to prevent an IED network from developing within the United States by placing

intelligence triggers and warnings throughout the information system that connects

various agencies. According to this model, IED placement is typically characterized by

asymmetry or, in a condition of unequal power idiosyncrasy, meaning that terrorists find

unique ways to place IEDs, or dynamism, which argues that placement spikes and falls

based upon measure-countermeasure cycles.

The entire threat chain of the IED includes its funding, organization, material and

personnel gathering, bomb creation, attack performance, outcome observation and

evaluation, and future plans. This all relates to the human terrain of the IED model,

which necessitates development of an understanding of how terrorism emerges and what

can disrupt its development. With regard to placement of the IED itself, the threat-chain

model involves determining the relevant data required to understand why an IED is

placed, the approaches to mining this data, how human expertise can be leveraged to

interpret the data, and the research needed to permit the efficient analysis of large
 40

datasets leading to the answers to these questions. The National Research Council (2008)

argued that effort must be made to model the manner in which human beings make

complex decisions in circumstances with limited information as the basis for determining

how IEDs are placed or detected. This would entail research into cognitive psychology

such s determining why some law-enforcement personnel are better able than others to

distinguish a criminal from a group of individuals. Ultimately, this would equate to the

creation of an expert AI system to guide in determining these factors, which is a currently

underemphasized form of IED detection.

The National Research Council (2008) argued that the creation of an IED threat-

chain analysis that considers all factors leading to the creation and placement of IEDs

will require interdisciplinary work from computer scientists, statisticians, and others.

This was exemplified in the creation of law-enforcement methods to detect telephone

fraud. Overall, the Council argued from the perspective of a more systems-oriented

paradigm in applying the expertise of AI to creating decision-making expert models that

would greatly improve military detection of IED development, deployment, and

placement.

Jackson et al. (2007) also addressed system-level chains of terrorist activities,

focusing on how terrorists also must turn back against the defensive technologies

developed by the United States and others to protect their IED operations. Such

technologies entail (a) information acquisition and management technology such as that

used in surveillance to track individuals and vehicle movement and detect concealed

weapons or operations; (b) prevention technologies including specific terrorist weapon

 41

systems such as radio-detonator jamming devices and those implemented to prevent

terrorist access to money, weapons, and other aspects of the threat chain; and (c) denial

technologies that harden potential targets through setbacks, blast walls, reinforced

windows, design changes to structures, and the hardening of populations by

psychologically preparing them for IED attacks. Response technologies are also used by

the U.S. military to stop an operation in progress including explosive-ordnance disposal

teams and emergency-response teams. Investigative technologies are used to collect

forensic evidence potentially leading to the tracking and capturing of terrorists.

Jackson et al. (2007) did not focus on the human-intelligence aspect of defensive

efforts against the terrorist threat chain. A better understanding of the antidefense efforts

of terrorists is derived from case studies of Palestinian terrorist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah

groups within Southeast Asia, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, and the

Provisional Irish Republican Army. Antidefense measures adopted by the these groups

include avoidance, camouflage, the acquisition of new weapons, forgery, deception,

changes in target selection, the modification of operational practices to include out-of-

profile operatives, the evasion of detection technology by hiding signatures, jamming and

neutralizing weaponry, and interfering with police efforts to investigate terrorist acts

following events.

A wide variety of countermeasures were revealed in the Jackson et al. (2007)

study. The research contributed to a better understanding of the complexity of detecting

and preventing terrorist attacks by adding terrorist response efforts to the equation

including the alteration of operational practice, technological changes or substitutes, the

 42

avoidance of defensive technology, and attacking defensive technology. This taxonomy

of terrorist countermeasures allows a more dynamic systems approach to developing a

model of IED prevention and detection. Because terrorists will rapidly adjust and change

after recognizing that IED use is being thwarted by a new method, yet another

countermeasure by the U.S. military is soon necessitated.

Jackson et al. (2007) also advanced that the consideration of terrorist

countermeasures necessitates new defensive technology, which calls for “red-team”

testing. Such testing is based upon the countermeasure palette of the respective terrorists;

the information analysis of adversarial circumvention efforts; the design in flexibility

allowing technologies to adapt to new countermeasures; and anticipating new technology

that will, in turn, necessitate new countermeasures. Jackson et al. concluded that any

development, from simple detection technology to AI-enabled robotics and information

systems, that does not consider countermeasure responses in cost-benefit calculations will

be compromised. This calls for a model of adaptive destruction for security to ensure

that, if a technology is neutralized by a countermeasure, the technology itself has the

capability to respond to retain its effectiveness within the field. A systems perspective on

IED placement would therefore entail creating not only an expert system, but also a

technology infused with an understanding of this dimension of the system.

Stinson (2009) presented a promising approach to fighting the network or the

threat chain that supports the culture of IEDs while focusing on the terrorist education

networks that thrive on the Internet (i.e., discerning where they are; where they lead; who

participates in them; and with this information, tracking potential emplacement teams and
 43

disrupting the chain). This task has been notoriously difficult for government-based

intelligence due to the difficulty in locating these education networks. Most

governmental agencies make use of commercial search engines to find evidence of these

networks on the Internet. Stinson bluntly dismissed the networks as not up to the task “as

they have been optimized to catalog information quickly and efficiently for user ease of

access while promoting retail commerce at the same time” (p. 3).

Stinson (2009) also reviewed vector-space, language-based, probabilistic,

inference, extended-Boolean, and latent-semantic indexing; ANN; fuzzy-set retrieval;

WebCrawler algorithm; and breadth-first, best-first, shark-research, info-spiders, and

page-rank-algorithm search methods and engines. He found fault with the majority of

these and hence advanced that a search engine specifically designed to find the IED

education networks using the Nutch open-source search-engine architecture was needed.

This engine and its supporting algorithm, the Nutch algorithm, were reviewed for their

effectiveness. A test run of the search engine found interesting clues as to where IED

networks might be lurking on the Web. For example, Web pages approached via

references from other Web pages, regardless of the domain, were found to be important

for locating pages linked to the IED education network. This approach is rooted in

elements common to AI and would therefore exemplify an AI-based algorithmic search

engine used to combat IED networks, which from a more system-oriented approach, are

linked to IED explosions.

 44

Detection and Prevention

Research interest is primarily within the areas of the detection and prevention of

IED emplacement, which entails an emerging paradigm that is not only the primary

response to IEDs, but also the platform for the AI-mapping approach to the IED problem.

Detection studies have been conducted; however, within the context of current ground

weaponry. Burton (2011) described the vehicle optics sensor system (VOSS) used on

RG-31 and Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles in Iraq and

Afghanistan. The system is described as a “remotely controlled, gyro-stabilized, multi-

sensor camera system” for zoom, night, and thermal vision, which can assess a target on

the move to detect IEDs, their triggering sources, and related threats. It is favored by the

JIEDDO because it allows for neutralization without jeopardizing the involved troops.

Although Burton (2011) was more interested in auditing the vehicle optics sensor system

to ensure its legality, the system appears to prevent IED detonation by detecting the

presence of the devices prior to vehicle approach.

The third facet of the JIEDDO approach to combating IEDs is to train the force.

The training program developed by the organization was modeled on the success of the

Recognition of Combat Vehicles training program (Pettitt, Redden, Turner, & Carstens,

2009). Pettitt et al. (2009) reported on the utility of another program that is centered in

night-vision and electronic-sensor training. Soldiers learn to identify the thermal

signatures of combat vehicles by examining the shapes and patterns of vehicle “hot

spots” and learn to use virtual sight controls while developing other skills. This

computer-based, self-training course is known as Recognition of Combatants-Improvised

 45

Explosive Devices and was based upon the Fort Leonard Wood Counter Explosives

Hazards Center Train the Trainer program.

Pettitt et al. (2009) sought to determine the effectiveness of the training program

examined in their study by investigating its implementation at a training center for an

IED-defeat team. A population of 82 soldiers in training were surveyed during a 3-day

training regimen. The effectiveness of the training was measured by the ability of the

soldiers to recognize IED indicators as they “dismounted and mounted patrol lanes with

simulated IEDs concealed along their routes” (p. 12). Three groups of soldiers were

assessed—(a) those who had only taken the computer-based, self-training course; (b)

those who had taken the course from an instructor; and (c) those who had taken a

combination of these two course formats.

The results of the Pettitt et al. (2009) study indicated that the computer-trained

soldiers performed significantly better than those who received solely the instructor-

based lesson. The opinions of the participating soldiers differed with regard to the

amount of time they could spend in a computer-based, self-training mode. The results

also found a gap between classroom knowledge and the ability of the soldiers to apply the

knowledge to practice. Consequently, Pettitt et al. recommended that “hands-on counter

IED lane training should be included in any counter IED training POI [program of

instruction] as well as additional computer-based lane training” (p. 33). Overall, these

researchers found that the training was adequate to allow soldiers within the field to

identify IEDs using computer-based programming focused on hot-spot patterns and

shapes.
 46

Strategic Approaches

Byford (2010) noted that, despite $40 billion in efforts to prevent IED casualties,

use of the devices by enemy combatants continues to rise and, overall, “efforts to counter

the IED are failing” (p. 5). Put simply, efforts to establish security based upon two

solutions (i.e., either training soldiers to detect IEDs or developing more technological

solutions to mitigate their effects), while reducing the loss of life, have not changed the

battle arena within which IED use is the norm. In accordance with Army regulations on

the six lines of COIN operations, current approaches to IED deterrence address only one

line of operations—combat. Therefore, Byford argued that the military “must broaden its

focus beyond the pursuit of technological and force-protective solutions” to synchronize

and integrate all aspects of counter IED efforts into a balanced operational design and

framework that meets all guidelines of COIN operations (p. 6).

The majority of military operations are currently disconnected from tactical or

strategic long-terms goals. An example of this is the routine practice of deploying

clearance patrols to sweep roads clear of IEDs on a daily basis without ever securing the

roads through continuous observance. Thus, as the clearing patrol moves on, insurgents

move back in and plant more IEDs. Consequently, route clearing has no lasting tactical

effect. However, insurgents do indeed make use of IEDs within the context of a strategy

to exhaust the will to continue the COIN. Attacks are also synchronized to gain

propaganda victory linked to key events such as presidential elections. The fact that their

strategy has forced those involved in counter IED operations to overly focus on combat

operations equates to continued U.S. engagement in an expensive, technologically based

 47

war involving constant IED hunting with no strategic outcome. Insurgent

countermeasures based upon the observation of U.S. efforts increases the level of

frustration.

Byford (2010) critiqued the JIEDDO mission to “attack the network, defeat the

device and train the force” as validating a combat-only approach to IEDs. Regardless of

the involvement of detection and neutralization paradigms, Byford opined that such a

focus is inappropriately limited. A broader perspective would involve training a host-

nation security force in IED detection, assisting local governments to use biometric

evidence to convict individuals found placing IEDs, and focusing on IED attacks on both

local populous and infrastructure as a way of building essential services for the host

country. Controlling the information distributed on IEDs will block insurgents from

benefiting from the data and incorporating it into their own propaganda. A broader

perspective of combat would also include a much clearer sense of insurgent objectives in

IED attacks through intelligence. This balanced, holistic operational approach would

provide a balance to efforts against IEDs in combat, reducing their negative impact on

overall operation strategy until they become ultimately ineffective. Byford critiqued all

paradigmatic responses focused on military causalities alone.

Martin (2009) argued that failure to consider the strategic purpose of IED use by

insurgents has misdirected efforts to intercept their use. While the manual related to the

mission in Iraq acknowledged the strategic implications of IED emplacement, current

U.S. policy and focus in combating the devices seems to lack broader awareness of the

strategic framework of the practice. Martin argued that, to design a more effective COIN
 48

campaign, the strategic influence of the IED must be addressed in greater detail. IED

strikes have both short- and long-term effects on missions. These attacks intend to not

only destroy the intended target, but also to influence the civilian populations of Iraq,

Afghanistan, and the United States. While each successful IED attack is traumatizing on

an individual scale, the cumulative effect of a long-term IED campaign serves to weaken

the psychological commitment of the populous to defend against the insurgency. This

psychological impact demonstrates the ability of the insurgents to choose the time and

place of attack, resulting in a sense of COIN control over either the physical or human

terrain.

Repeated use of IEDs and their rapid deployment renders it quite clear to all

involved that the human terrain has become an emplaced social network enabling the

making and placing of these devices. The simplicity of the IED as a weapon also makes

it easy to produce within the human terrain, in addition to making a mockery of the

advanced weapons brought to the field by the United States. While there is little question

that this country has the superior force when compared to the Iraq military, the IED has

“leveled the playing field.” It is also apparent that the JIEDDO and even the COIN

manuals fail to fully address the strategic dimension of IED use, tending to apply a purely

technological approach to their eradication. With the JIEDDO in particular, the

organization mission of defeat the device still receives 56% of all funding. Martin (2009)

found that the JIEDDO has begun to rearrange organization priorities to focus on

defeating the network through intelligence, which led to the creation of the COIC in
 49

2007. Contention surrounding the emergence of this additional center has hampered its

effectiveness, especially in coordinating efforts with other services.

Martin (2009) argued that the cumulative psychological damage caused by IED

attacks is far worse than the immediate physical damage of individual attacks. He

conceptualized the violence caused by IEDs as symbolic violence, which is defined as

“the use of violence against one target (the target of attack) to influence a different target

(the target of influence)” (p. 32). This notion is rooted in the propaganda surrounding the

philosophy developed by 19th-century European terrorists and refined by those of recent

times. According to this philosophy, even a small, short-term event can result in long-

term psychological effects on the respective population, leading to the achievement of

goals. Insurgent groups (e.g., the Irish Republican Army) only made this philosophy

more systematic and lethal. Terrorism is now generally defined by its psychological

impact, the actions “ultimately designed to influence one target by attacking another”

(p. 35). Insurgent terrorism is acknowledged to be somewhat more tactical in nature

because it is designed with more specific goals, both short and intermediate term in

nature.

IED use by insurgents has become, in Iraq for example, the weapon of choice,

with 50% to 65% of all violent incidents leading to causalities involving IEDs (Martin,

2009). The frequency of IED use is undoubtedly due to the fact that urban guerilla

warfare is the norm and the population hides the insurgents. The mix of insurgents

within the general population renders it very difficult to attack the problem at its source

in conventional ways. The IED has proven its strategic value within Iraq to the extent
 50

that its use has influenced the decision-making processes of senior military and political

leadership. As a symbolic weapon, Martin (2009) argued that, although the immediate

blast has its intended effect, each blast thereafter also delivers a symbolic effect that

reaches far beyond the immediate target to influence the entire COIN. It is a small

weapon with large effects; however, it is classified as a nonlinear operation, delivered not

only within the battle space, but also within the social space in a simultaneous manner.

As is the terrorist intention, any agitation or provocation carries cumulative effects that

reverberate far beyond the immediate site. Consequently, for insurgents, the IED creates

a perception of strength, separates the COIN military from the populace, undermines

security, and leads to expectations of further attack. Symbolic violence also leads to a

sense of martyrdom in cases of suicide-bomber IED emplacement.

Within Iraq, the goals of the three terrorist insurgencies responsible for IED use

are idealistic to the extent of operating solely on symbolic value. The Al Qaeda of the

Jihadi Salafists and Ba’athists seek to eject occupation forces, unite Sunni Arabs to

uproot the current Iraqi government, and establish a large Caliphate within the Middle

East with Iraq as its base. Ba’athist nationalists seek to restore the Sunni rule of Iraq

while Islamic Shi’a nationalists seek Shi’a rule. Martin (2009) demonstrated how

incidents of IED attack serve the broader symbolic purposes of all groups, which seems

to overshadow the immediate impact.

Martin (2009) argued that responses targeted at solely the IEDs, such as the

jammer program created by the JIEDDO (i.e., the Counter Radio-Controlled IED

Electronic Warfare) simply lead to a measure-countermeasure arms race that, in turn,

 51

quickly leads to diminished returns. Psychological effects are gained when, after

repeated IED attacks within particular areas, an area is added to a “no-go” zone,

communicating to all that insurgents control the terrain. Concurrently, the increased use

of ever heavier armor and better counter-IED training and other JIEDDO-sponsored

approaches has “the unanticipated effect of separating the troops from the populace, a

clear violation of COIN theory” (p. 5). This has asserted that winning the hearts and

minds of the populace is most important, as well as decisive. The repeated use of IEDs

also leads the majority of soldiers to distrust the Iraqi populace because they were clearly

aiding IED emplacers. Thus, “this interplay of psychological attrition would become a

major impediment to building the trust and credibility required to succeed in a COIN

campaign” (p. 95). Martin concluded that the JIEDDO must move more quickly to

coordinate its efforts with all agencies to ensure that the focus of counter-IED efforts

broadens to include greater consideration of both the symbolic and strategic dimensions

of IEDs, as opposed to simply clearing them from roadsides.

Combatting Improvised Explosive Devices

Projectile Techniques

One approach suggested for neutralizing IEDs is to develop a weapon that can be

launched toward a detected IED and render it harmless in a manner that results in

minimum causalities (Spitzer, 2007; Staszewski, 2007). Bless, Wilson, Pedersen,

Wienman, and Garnier (2008) described the effort to develop a projectile that could be

launched toward a vehicle-borne IED to neutralize the explosive with minimal collateral

damage. This method would mimic the current practice undertaken by bomb squads,
 52

which is to detonate the discovered bomb in a manner that results in minimal damage.

The projectile delivers a load of ammonium-nitrate fuel oil onto the IED. The fuel oil

hits the IED and a vented deflagration results (i.e., the IED explodes); however, ballistic

impact of the explosion is reduced by the fuel oil.

Tests of the projectile fired from a percussion-activated, nonelectric disruptor

commonly used by bomb squads were undertaken by Spitzer (2007). The tests

demonstrated that the projectile breaks open the container of the IED in a manner that

renders the device harmless. Bless et al. (2008) declared this approach feasible and

recommended its approval for development. Currently, however, the method is solely a

component of the neutralization paradigm, of responding to discovered IEDs with the

help of conventional robots to open the walls of trucks to receive the projectile.

Therefore, similar to bomb-squad work, this method is successful only after the IED has

been discovered and needs deactivation.

Closely related to IED detection are efforts to detect buried land mines or

unexploded ordnance, both of which are responsible for loss of life. The majority of

current efforts to detect the presence of these objects underground use electromagnetic

induction, which detects evidence of metal casings or solely components. Ground-

penetrating radar has also been made used. However, both technologies are prone to high

incidence of false alarms; consequently, they are far from effective in terms of time and

cost. Spitzer (2007) argued that more unique discriminators of unexploded ordnance and

buried land mines are required to improve their detection, which can only be identified

through innovative means.

 53

Chemical and Radiation Techniques

Two newer approaches are chemical-trace detection and radiation techniques.

Chemical-trace detection will identify either vapor or particles emanating from the device

and the path of the device or leakage emanating through the soil. Although this is a

complex process, “even the most capable chemical detection equipment cannot provide

robust detection in all environments and scenarios” (p. 9). In an analysis of over 20

available chemical-detection techniques, Spitzer (2007) favored ion mobility

spectrometry, preconcentrators, and gas chromatography.

With regard to radiation techniques, such approaches are currently limited in their

ability to find shallowly buried objects and often take time to achieve explosive detection.

As a result, they must be combined with scanning sensors; consequently, Spitzer (2007)

espoused nuclear quadrupole resonance and pulsed fast-neuron analysis. To assist in the

improvement of detection with buried explosives, the Army Engineer Research and

Development Center and the Sandia National Laboratories have developed models of the

movement of explosive particles, developing a time history through a number of phases

as the material moves to the surface. This can be modeled through finite-element

simulation of the transformation and transport of chemicals within the ground. It is based

upon chemical reactions, molecular diffusion, and other factors. Spitzer provided a

detailed description of finite-element simulation and its application in a one-dimensional

situation.

Use of the described models greatly improves the ability of field measurements to

detect materials alone. The models can be improved still further by calculating such
 54

factors as ground characteristics, ranging from dirt to clay to sand, into the detection

algorithms. Spitzer (2007) recommended the AI-based creation of a parametric model

describing the amount and types of explosives and compounds in buried ordnance to

serve as the basis for applying nuclear quadrupole resonance techniques toward improved

detection rates using either x-ray or chemical-detection techniques.

Vision-Based Detection

Staszewski (2007) examined a method of training soldiers to detect the location of

buried land mines through examination of the ground surface with natural human vision.

Similar to many contemporary practices, this method sought to improve natural human

skills, as opposed to developing AI response above and beyond human-sensory

capability. Expertise in human-vision detection of buried land mines has improved

detection rates during all U.S. wars dating back to World War II. Past reports provide

minimal specific information on what was detected to lead soldiers to land mines.

The specific purpose of the Staszewski (2007) study was to generate special

parameters to fashion a battery of criteria for detecting IEDs in a more expert manner.

Land mines were buried, moved, and reburied within a Missouri range over a 4-week

period. Experts were subsequently asked to analyze the ground for signatures of

disturbed soil and changes in the nature of the environment over time. Data were

collected for analysis through high-resolution photographs. A cognitive engineering

model intended to improve expertise was used to give form to the training and involved

analyzing the photographs. This method codifies the criteria for detection and

subsequently uses the data as a template for training novices. An archive of signature
 55

photographs facilitates the identification of information that allows skilled observers to

detect mines. Staszewski assembled a corpus of photographs and tested the hypothesis

stating that ground-surface disturbance was the clearest sign of land-mine burial.

The variables examined in the Staszewski (2007) study were land-mine size and

type; ground-surface type (i.e., bare soil or vegetated); and the presence or absence of a

mine target. Demilitarized blast mines were used to also explore the potential effects of

escaping vapors on surface vegetation and growth. The photography was generated

through remote-control cameras, and the images were conveyed by satellite to remote-

viewing areas. In the majority of cases, the experts, following guidelines of detection in

this specialty, were able to detect if land mines had been buried.

The Staszewski (2007) training method is not unequivocal or 100% certain due to

the periodic less-than-distinctive signatures. Therefore, overall scanning by examining

surface-soil disturbance signatures seems viable for the majority of mines. This is

because, when a mine is planted, the ground disturbance assumes a geometric form for

some time afterward that can include discoloration if the vegetation has been uprooted.

Staszewski argued, therefore, that soldiers must be trained in soil disturbance and

environmental changes as a means of detecting the presence of IEDs buried in the

ground. He also saw the potential of AI to further enhance this type of data analysis

because

specification of signature properties can inform technologies that pursue optical

processing as a means for remote detection by narrowing the pool of visual cues

that should be explored as candidate inputs for visual processing algorithms [and
 56

viewed such information as a] potential utility for technologies that exploit sensor

fusion. (p. 18)

Research on developing algorithms that exploit input from multiple sensors is

ongoing to develop this method of sensing to the level of AI. Because the described

Staszewski (2007) method relies solely upon natural human perception, it is limited to the

electromagnetic spectrum to which human vision is sensitive. However, recent research

has suggested that hyperspectral information might be provided by disturbed soil, and the

development of AI technology to detect these data may further improve the method.

Similar to many of the techniques used by soldiers to detect IEDs, training to improve

natural human capabilities remains the status quo, but the awareness building that

enhances human skills with AI capabilities would provide a much more effective

approach.

Spitzer (2007) also addressed use of the described techniques for the detection of

IEDs. Chemical detection can be applied through standoff detection where the sensor

remains at a safe distance, as well as through remote detection where a remote-controlled

robot is involved. Chemical detectors are deployed at checkpoints to determine whether

vehicles are carrying devices; however, Spitzer argued that chemical detection can only

play a complementary or even niche role in IED detection. With regard to standoff

chemical detection, no commercial systems have been developed, and Spitzer argued that

only laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy, terahertz spectroscopy, bioluminescence,

and Raman spectroscopy are useful. However, research has yet to develop a fingerprint in

the spectroscopic spectrum that is unique to explosives. With regard to IEDs at

 57

checkpoints, only the amplified fluorescence polymers technology is used within Iraq and

this only detects explosives externally on people or within equipment. With regard to

bulk detection, this seems the most suitable for vehicle-borne IEDs because of the

concentration of explosives.

Considering all of the described techniques, Spitzer (2007) strongly suggested

that few rise to the level of AI because only a few field measurements are acquired to

identify the device clearly, and in no case has current equipment used standardized data

collection and documentation to develop computer-based decision-making models

determining whether a chemical trace indicates, for example, the presence of an IED.

Therefore, Spitzer called for development of a code based upon a number of data sets and

using standardized data-collection procedures. A database of parameters is also

necessary to assist in the decision-making detection process. Therefore, Spitzer

concluded that, until chemical detection is advanced from current methods to collect all

data and is used as a basis for detection (i.e., with AI applied to chemical detection), it

will remain less than fully reliable (p. 1).

Vehicle-Examination Techniques

Johnston, Vetrone, and Warner (2010) studied methods of calculation designed to

detect whether an enemy combatant had secretly placed an IED on a truck or within a

cargo load, usually with duct tape or magnets, which is why this form of IED is referred

to as a “sticky bomb.” One method tested was measuring small changes in the weight of

a vehicle, as indicated by tire pressure using an analog-to-digital converter to sample

differential pressure. Johnston et al. connected the device to be measured to a laptop

 58

computer and calculated the weight differential. The results demonstrated that the

addition of a 10-pound weight to the vehicle was detectable through an increase in air

pressure in the front, driver-side tire. In another test, the computer produced a graph

comparable to a lie-detector test that was effective in identifying weight additions as

small as 2 pounds. The test used a parked vehicle, and Johnston et al. acknowledged that

vehicle movement and inclement conditions would render measurement more difficult.

However, these researchers concluded that the method would be helpful in detecting the

placement of IEDs on vehicles. It might also be able to detect whether a global

positioning device or other illicit tracking device had been placed on the vehicle.

A second method analyzed by Johnston et al. (2010) to detect IED emplacement

on a vehicle addresses devices attached with magnets, regardless of any magnetic field

surrounding the vehicle. Two commercial magnetometers were tested—a handheld

Walker Scientific Traxial FluxGate Magnetometer and a PNI V2XE 2-axis Digital

Compass. A laptop computer was again used to record the digital compass readings in a

test case using a Subaru automobile. The results found that the magnetometers were

successful in detecting the addition of a magnet to the undercarriage of the automobile.

While acknowledging the crude nature of the experiments, Johnston et al. nonetheless

asserted that the tests confirmed the effectiveness of these metric devices in enhancing

human capabilities to detect the presence of illicit IEDs attached to vehicles.

Directed Energy

Researchers for Directed Energy (2012) opined that directed-energy weapons may

represent the optimal approach for the future management of IEDs. They described an
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unmanned, mobile, remote-controlled radio-frequency transmitter using directed-energy

weapons integrated into geostationary satellite telemetry to collect intelligence and

situational-awareness data from every member of a unit on patrol to locate IEDs. In this

way, miniaturized directed-energy systems “open the door to the realization of a whole

new set of effective and efficient wireless modalities” (p. 62). The fact that the devices

are linked to a mobile adhoc network by satellite translates to intelligence guidance

developed by AI and a directed-energy weapons system representing a fusion of simpler

detection devices with a more systems-oriented, data-based approach to IED prevention.

Artificial Intelligence

Technology-based, IED combat devices are not necessarily developed with AI

including some of the more advanced computer-based systems (Fienberg & Thomas,

2010; Golinghorst, 2010; Graham, 2010; Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette,

2008; Ntuen, 2009; Ntuen & Gwang-Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). The aspects

of AI that seem most germane to the topic of study include its definition, which is mental

activity normally associated with humans, such as data analysis, decision making, and

problem solving, but manifested by computer programs operating under mathematical

algorithms. Problem solving; logical reasoning; automatic programming; and most

importantly, computer-aided pattern recognition, data mining, and knowledge-

management-based creation of computer-based models of expertise are all translated into

computer programs that read and interpret data. The underlying assumption is that AI

through computers possesses the capacity to exceed human ability to amass and store

data, represent data in more understandable ways, and analyze data in an expert fashion
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through the use of expert systems. As a result, AI is now routinely used with technology

driving search engines, medical diagnostic systems, error-detection systems, program-

verification systems, Web personalization, credit-card verification, data mining, computer

games, and security.

The ultimate goal of AI is to create intelligent automated agents that can act

within the environment in place of human beings. Within an industrial context, an AI

agent might be a part-picking robot who, commanded by algorithms, works at a conveyor

belt with a jointed arm as actuator and cameras as sensors to maintain a performance

measure indicated by the percentage of parts it places within the correct bins. Algorithms

and agents are the minimum requirements of emerging AI best practice. With regard to

discovering innovative ways of detecting IEDs, current practice continues to rely upon

natural human perception aided by sensors of various types. Contemporary practice is

only evolving in the direction of developing thorough pattern recognition and mapping

algorithms that will lead to the creation of pure-AI IED prevention.

Profiling. Bornstein, Damarla, Lavery, Morelli, and Schmeisser (2010) reviewed

new approaches to identifying the covert intent of individuals to do harm in the “clutter,”

or human beings and physical objects within a combat environment. The primary

challenge is for soldiers to identify the adversarial intent of individuals prior to a strike.

Soldiers must currently engage in close-range searching or make judgment calls

surrounding the intent of a potential adversary, a process that results in an unacceptably

high number of false positives. In relation to checkpoints, however, where IED

explosions are frequent, no screening mechanism is currently available by which an

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individual with adversarial intent can be identified before approach. Such detection is

particularly problematic within asymmetric situations wherein humans have been trained

to conceal their intentions, vehicles have been optimized to conceal devices and

explosives such as IEDs, and bulk explosives of unknown construction have been hidden

or camouflaged. The fact that the majority of adversaries using these forms of covert

actions have been trained to appear as normal as possible during the time leading up to

the assault renders detection even more problematic.

Bornstein et al. (2010) reviewed existing research to determine the principles that

allow for remote sensing and the technology or models associated with such a system.

They argued that, while empirical observation remains important, only a system using

analytical and computational procedures based upon quantitative predictive models

integrating elements of a number of fields from kinesiology to information science is able

to ensure improved detection. The data that could be collected by such a system as an

indicator of adversarial intent can range from any number of biometric measures

including heartbeat waveform, blood-pressure levels, movement, muscle tension, voice

stress analysis, and avoidance behavior.

Bornstein et al. (2010) argued that “sensing technologies that may be able to

measure relevant data include visible bandwidth imagers, thermal imagers, hyperspectral

imagers, laser Doppler vibrometry, E-field . . . chemical sensors . . . seismic sensors and

magnetic sensors” (p. 10). Related previous efforts involved the Facial Action Coding

System created during the 1970s to detect the microexpressions in facial muscles that

indicate adversarial intent. From the Bornstein et al. perspective, other sensors are
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suitable for airport screening but not for asymmetric defense scenarios. This emerging

science has yet to fully understand the principles allowing for the remote identification of

covert adversarial intent.

Bornstein et al. (2010) remarked, “The step from recognizing physical objects,

events and patterns to recognizing intent is fairly described as a scientific chasm” (p. 14).

Related efforts have included future-attribute screening technology, violent-intent

modeling and simulation, the detection of intent through biomotion signatures, systems

based upon visualization of belief, remote and passive identification of electrodermal

response, behavioral signatures, and hostile-intent detection, all of which are under study

by laboratories linked to all of the armed services. To coordinate these data, a data-

fusion model will be required because this construct has stood the test of time, despite

criticism within related research. Bornstein et al. therefore argued that the data-fusion

model is reliable.

The extent to which the classical probability theory, or the Bayesian theory, can

be useful in fusion processes requires further study. Alternatives to the classic theory

include the Dezert-Smarandache theory used in robotics, the Dempster-Shafer theory

applied in real-life situations, the transferable-belief model used in marketing, and the

analysis of competing hypotheses implemented in the study of human intelligence.

Possibility theory is another potential construct. Given that an adversarial-intent

detection system has yet to be developed, and research is still required to develop a

prototype system for remote detection of covert, tactical adversarial intent in asymmetric

operations, Bornstein et al. (2010) believe the provision of funding is appropriate toward
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such an end. These researchers projected, however, that the development of reliable

remote sensing for such use is 5 to 15 years in the future.

Electromagnetic sensing. Sandler, Myers, and Wu (2009) presented a test case of

an effort to use antennas to identify the electromagnetic signature or fingerprint of the

command wires inside roadside IEDs toward their detection and disarmament. Maxwell

equations defining electromagnetism were utilized in their experimental test case. The

fingerprint was found to reside in the five lowest resonant frequencies of the wires.

These values were obtained, rendering the method feasible and promising. Sandler et al.

also discussed the antenna structures that would be needed to implement such an

electromagnetic sensor “to exploit the resonances for the detection and identification of

command wires” (p. 7). When these researchers first experimented with this approach,

they subsequently found that IEDS were created in too many different forms to locate a

signature. However, by focusing on the command wires, they found a signature, which is

a significant achievement. While not directly related to AI, the theoretical basis of the

Sandler et al. approach in their study of electromagnetic radiation near an interface,

combined with rigorous mathematical equations of those frequencies that would be

detectable, certainly provides elements amenable to translation into an AI platform for

optimal implementation.

Offensive techniques. Graham (2010) assumed a nearly “devil’s-advocate” role

in the debate over IEDs by questioning the abandonment of land-mine warfare by the

United States with the lethal nature of IEDs demonstrated within Iraq and Afghanistan.

He argued that the primary reason the United States has overlooked land mines is that the
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government seems to remain beneath broader notions of the science of war and use of the

latest technology, when in fact, war is basically about “the base ability to attrite enemy

forces—or to kill” (p. 10). It cannot be denied that IEDs are an effective means of killing

an enemy. Insurgents quickly found it impossible to fight this country in close quarters

during traditional battles; IEDs served a key strategic purpose in countering or

overwhelming U.S. firepower. Not only did the devices provide enemies with standoff to

avoid U.S. fire, but they protected anonymity. Additionally, their simplicity equated to

rapid action, reaction, and counteraction.

Although a low-tech method, IEDs serve the strategic ends of insurgents as

completely as sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) serve U.S. strategy in that

“they tirelessly do dangerous work that is too risky for soldiers or pilots to perform”

(Graham, 2010, p. 12). IEDs also allow a force outnumbered 11 to 1 in the field to

remain a threat. The cost of maintaining a single soldier within Afghanistan is $1 million

per year, while a three-vehicle, mine-resistant, ambush-protected patrol includes vehicles

valued at over $4.2 million. An IED fashioned from an artillery shell looted from Army

caches with a $30 trigger will cost the emplacement combatant no more than $300 and

bring the same patrol to a halt.

The fact that IEDs have drastically limited the movement of coalition forces is yet

another strategic advantage. Avoidant driving regimens and the use of lumbering

vehicles have also isolated the military from the populous, directly undermining key

COIN strategic objectives. Graham (2010) argued that the United States must begin to

engage in mine-based warfare with the same strategic advantages. Because mines have
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been removed from the basic tools of military practice and are morally reprehensible to

the American people, they are no longer used. Therefore, Graham proposed a new

system of networked munitions that are recoverable, reusable, and scalable. One such

system is known as Spider, which notifies operators of wire trips, allowing them to then

decide whether to detonate the mine in a controlled manner. The Spider is networked in

a modular fashion, but also in a “man-in-the-loop” manner. An AI system networked to a

central control station from which mines can be activated is known as Scorpion.

However, Graham also argued that both systems must be adapted for use within either

Iraq or Afghanistan because the current trip-wire technology is not sufficiently

discriminating to determine enemy presence. An observation element involving manned

or unmanned aerial-observation platforms, such as CONSTANT HAWK, AIR SCAN,

and SHADOW, is required.

The next generation of sensors, known as tactical unattended ground sensors and

urban unattended ground sensors, also have a built-in optical component (Graham, 2010).

Incorporation of the Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors-Combined,

or the Army surveillance system for bases, would also achieve optimal results. Thus,

each sensor could be ultimately connected with the overarching Army Battle Command

Systems, which through computers, form the digital “backbone” of the common

operating view provided by commanders with situational awareness “by giving them an

integrated view of friendly forces, enemy actions and the terrain” (p. 26). Once the

tactical strategies of the Army are rewritten to include land mining, exhibiting education
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from experiencing insurgent success with IEDs, a fully integrated, AI-based, anti-IED

system will emerge.

As battlefields become more complex, battlefield visualization will require an

increasing number of automated tools to reduce the burden of maintaining complex data

drawn from the field. Taylor, Wood, and Knudsen (2005) identified the requirements of

a system using automated information-management processes to enable improved

battlefield visualization. The architecture for information management was described,

involving, in particular, the use of intelligent interface agents that assist commanders in

battlefield visualization. The agents serve the commander and his or her information

requirements by decomposing the various coordinates of the battlefield into specific,

sensor-relevant collection needs, subsequently gathering and analyzing the data to make

decisions. The prototype of this system was built around the intelligent-user interface

metaphor “wherein the interactions with the user are driven by intelligent interface agents

that, themselves, interact with other services to perform aspects of information

management” (p. 10). The agents are involved in monitoring, interaction, coordination,

information management, and tasking. A prototype demonstrated how the system would

work to improve commander battlefield visualization within an urban environment as

mapped. The system was found to be effective in its prototype form.

Information-management systems. Geospatial assets, such as digital databases,

specialized software, and Web services with geospatial information, have become

commonly used within the U.S. DoD. The Geospatial Information System has assisted in

planning and developing deployment and base location. War-fighting and intelligence
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data assets have also been combined with those geospatial in nature. This follows

civilian practice, as well, because “a shared and integrated GIS-based web [sic] system

provides a common picture to personnel involved in homeland defense responses or

bioterrorism . . . or other emergencies” (Lachman et al., 2007, p. 51).

Global positioning systems have further enhanced geographic information

systems (GISs) to improve war fighting. However, Lachman et al. (2007) found a

number of barriers to their optimal use. These researchers therefore conducted a study of

efforts to integrate geospatial data assets across business, war-fighting, and intelligence

mission domains within the DoD, as a measure of the extent to which the use of

geospatial data assets approach best practice within this agency. Personnel using maps,

and PowerPoint slides for viewing installation geospatial data from the Army Geographic

Information Repository were interviewed. While the type of data shared and the scope of

the study examined far exceed the focus of this research, Lachman et al. nonetheless

found that, by and large, the sharing of geospatial data assets within the military was not

at a best-practice level. This was primarily because sharing data is labor intensive and

time consuming. Security concerns also inhibit geospatial data sharing. While broad,

this conclusion explains why, if AI-based, counter-IED mapping was developed, its use

in practice might well be compromised by preexisting limits placed upon geospatial-data

use throughout the military.

Madera (2006) examined a case study within which a geospatial information

system was used to manage counterinsurgency efforts in a test case during the Colombia

Long War. Madera sought to determine if GIS could support the use of a civil-
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information management system by commanders to gain a full view of the field of a

campaign. Madera worked on development of the Civil Affairs Knowledge-Management

System prototype within Iraq to help commanders plan, execute, and assess civil military

operations. He noted that such systems are currently hampered by a less-than-optimal

flow of information, limited integration, a lack of data, and inadequate management of

databases. Development of the Civil Affairs Knowledge-Management System was based

upon the notion that operational advantage relies upon a common operational perspective.

Through information flow, commanders then have a clear view of all variables.

Civil Information Management Systems (CIMS) have become necessary to ensure

coordinated efforts between military and civilian authorities, both during warfare and in

response to disasters. However, GIS, while used within several civilian settings, has been

“underutilized by the military” (Madera, 2006, p. 11). Madera (2006) argued that, too

often, the military defines geographic data as purely topographical in nature.

Consequently, current military approaches do not “fully exploit existing technologies that

allow for systematic collection, visualization and analysis of data” in these areas (p. 11).

Madera tested the usefulness of GISs within Colombia. Effective CIMS must capture

data on demographics; economics; social constructs; political processes; political leaders;

civil-military relationships; infrastructure; and nonstate actors in the area of operations,

civil defense, public safety, and health. Without this data, a commander does not have a

clear view of the ecology of the insurgency and is likely to make poor decisions. The

inclusion of a GIS simply ensures that both geographic and topographic information is

collected to gain a full view of the terrain. This involves more than simply mapping, but
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developing maps with a high level of data intensity, visually presented to the user in a

useful manner.

The development of data maps within GISs gradually evolves toward a form of

AI, and while progress with GISs has been rapid within civilian contexts, its use has been

limited to specific subfields such as military aviation or intelligence. Madera (2006)

attributed this lag to the military preference for hard versus soft data, likely reinforced by

the Cold War against the closed society of the Soviet Union, necessitating reliance on

hard knowledge. The Cold War itself “created doctrinal, fiscal and even conceptual

patterns from which the intelligence . . . and national defenses community at large are

only recently beginning to deviate” (p. 32). As a result, most CIMS and GISs do not

capture the type of data needed to create an ecological model of the insurgency including

cultural factors. Consequently, the human terrain of the counterinsurgency continues to

be understudied as one aspect of the overall terrain to be captured by CIMS combined

with a GIS.

Imagery intelligence remains fixed on physical geography and traditional terrain

analysis (Madera, 2006). Emergence of the new discipline of geospatial intelligence

holds promise for this development. Testing the combination of CIMS and GIS within

Colombia, Madera (2006) outlined the physical-cultural dynamics of the insurgency.

Weaknesses were also uncovered and Madera subsequently called for the development of

rich data sets for the GIS so that future analysis would be enhanced.

Urban-terrain techniques. Extrapolating the ideas advanced by Madera (2006)

with a GIS to locate IEDs within, for example, urban terrains, the system would need to
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include not only a map of the physical terrain, but also a clear sense of the social terrain

to accurately predict where IEDs might have been placed, increasing the likelihood of

their detection. Golinghorst (2010) also supported further development of CIMS efforts

to map the human-terrain aspect of the counterinsurgency within Iraq and Afghanistan.

The majority of efforts to map the human terrain within areas of operation have been ad

hoc to date and have not paralleled best practice in understanding the situational

parameters of any sociogeographic context. Not only is the tribal layering of the Middle-

East societies complex, but determining which elements of the counterinsurgency emerge

from which tribes is highly challenging, with rapid relocation of units from one area of

operation to another adding to the complexity. Additionally, combat units are interrelated

with civilian populations, and often in ways minimally understood by current CIMs.

The JIEDDO (2008) developed a program to improve the ability of the U.S.

military to understand the sociocultural and geographical terrain in the fight against IEDs.

The human-terrain system (HTS) that resulted deploys several units of personnel, which

exploits access to academic research to address immediate social complexities arising as

barriers in ground operations. The system has, however, become “stovepiped” with little

integration with other intelligence (Golinghorst, 2010). Golinghorst (2010) sought to

determine which deployed U.S. Army units or systems expand the capability of this

effort, considering integration of the HTS with preexisting CIMS. The relevance of the

human terrain in developing a useful common operating view of the situation a unit will

encounter is well documented in research focused on counterinsurgency in general. The

U.S. Army also acknowledged how counterinsurgent exploitation of local political

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tensions can create fissures and pressure from which various collateral counterinsurgent

efforts can emerge. This physically manifests as new groups of social actors participating

in IED emplacement. Therefore, human-terrain analysis is an integral facet of leader

training in an operational area and shapes predeployment training.

Most HTS efforts have only occurred on the ground from 2007 forward, and HTS

methods have only been codified since 2009. As a result, soldiers deployed to

Afghanistan are undergoing a greater amount of country immersion prior to deployment,

the destination language is being taught more diligently, and studies of the destination

culture are now mandatory. A Middle-East tribal configuration matrix has also been

developed that includes a tribal map indicating territories, tribal-leader photo and profile

cards, social-network charts, and a tribal database correlating leaders with contact

information.

Based upon recommendations by Madera (2006), GIS-based CIMS have been

tested through a Stryker ASCOPE Decision Maker tool has been tested in Iraq to

correlate social and geographic knowledge. The related database has been helpful in the

planning and decision-making processes of operational leaders. An Asymmetric

Software Kit has also been used in human-terrain management by Special Forces to

improve their operations. The majority of the human-terrain mapping projects currently

remain demonstrational. Golinghorst (2010) addressed the integration efforts between

units, departments, and services; however, it is clear by the involvement of the JIEDDO

in piloting a HTS project that overlaying HTS knowledge mapping on geographical, GIS-

based mapping of a terrain would provide a data map much more precisely targeted on
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the tension points from which IED use might develop. This tool would greatly expedite

AI solutions to IED placement detection.

Automated sense making. Ntuen and Gwang-Myung (2008) focused on the

technical aspects required of CIMS, which are grounded in a decision-making model

involving information visualization and sense making. The Sense Making Support

System was developed as a visualization tool to make sense of minimally constructed

stories of events within unstructured battlefields. The tool assists commanders with the

fast-space changes of battle-space dynamics in so-called fourth-generation warfare. This

requires sense making and training in applying visualization techniques to foresee

changes in battle dynamics and understand the needs to address the changes. Therefore, a

dynamic common operating view must be developed. Ntuen & Gwang-Myung defined

sense making as “a process, a design or a technique of fusing information in context to

derive understanding from fragmentary pieces of information” (p. 4). It has been

hypothesized that battle rhythms can be best understood through sense making and

intuition defined as experience-based subconsciously processed imagination and

judgment. The contemporary view was modeled on information-management systems of

physical assets and has not yet been developed for efficacy with sociocognitive

processes.

Ntuen and Gwang-Myung (2008) applied the Cynefin model of complexity to

provide the type of sense making required on dynamic battlefields, superseding more

than 20 contemporary decision-making models. These researchers described the software

system and display of the system in detail and tested the system with a sample of six
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experienced military commanders working in the field. The commanders assessed the

efficacy of the system based upon sense making, situation awareness, and situation

understanding. All of the participating commanders highly rated the system because it

facilitated their visualization of the dynamics of the operations, clarified their sense of the

scenario, and supported their decision making. Ntuen and Gwang-Myung concluded that,

through sense-making software, information-management systems for civilian or military

terrains can be operationalized within the field to map the complex dynamics of an ever-

changing environment.

Ntuen (2009) subsequently developed a theoretical model to explain how

visualization adds to the decision-making process, focusing on how a richer

understanding of the visualization process can improve the manner in which visualization

is constructed within current operational technology to make clearer sense of operations.

Ntuen recommended that visualization tools support commander decision making by

mapping concepts in 3D representations, with decision-oriented graphic symbology and

the ability to change the graphics in an interactive fashion. Ntuen tested 11 experienced

military officers in the use of pilot-visualization tools (i.e., the Sense Making Support

System) based upon specified performance variables. The sense-making model was

found to improve the ability of the officers to make clear decisions and share them as

they conferred with other officers. This approach to mapping focuses on the visualization

and sense-making processes derived from the optimal depiction of the battle space

through the support of computer software.

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Probabilistic techniques. Fienberg and Thomas (2010) addressed the prevention

of IED deployment through AI, which involves the development of models grounded in

probability analysis. These researchers applied generalized linear models based upon the

Canadian Traveler Problem, adapting them to IEDs to predict the probability of IED

deployment in terms of the increased effort required to place a device. Fienberg and

Thomas focused on modeling the probability of placement in particular roadside spaces,

considering the dimensions of the space, as measured by the dynamics of a specific

mathematical problem—the Canadian Traveler Problem.

The notion of betweenness centrality is the essence of the Canadian Traveler

Problem, wherein the road is blocked with an independent probability, which the traveler

only discovers upon reaching an intersection that bounds the stretch of road. Solving this

problem through a generalized linear model entails the application of expert decision

making and probability models over human reason to improve the estimations of

deployment and reduce the potential danger and death caused by the IED. The model can

then be subsequently used to alter vehicles routes, avoiding roads the model finds with a

higher probability of IED placement. The decisions already made by the drivers of the

vehicles regarding whether a particular road should be traveled are already considered in

the complex game-theoretic scenarios that are modeled. The known travel time to move

down a stretch of road can be calculated, a traversable graph can take interference into

consideration, the probability of successful convoy transit can be calculated, and the

extent of attack minimization can be determined. The model is rooted in dynamic

transportation research, which is conducted to model how efficiently and problem free a
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fleet of trucks can be managed to transport products to destinations in an expedient

manner.

Dynamic traffic-assignment models support the decisions of individual truck

drivers regarding how to optimally move through traffic to arrive at a destination in the

shortest amount of time. These models are included in the Fienberg and Thomas (2010)

modeling, along with dynamic shortest-path problems. The Canadian Traveler Problem

is derived from this line of research and considers the possibility that “roads may be

closed due to stochastic intervention” such as a snow blockage or landslide or other event

stopping traffic on the road (p. 4).

In the problem introduced by Fienberg and Thomas (2010), the driver only

discovers the blockage when he arrives at the node leading to the road. He must then

make a series of decisions to recourse or dynamically reroute to continue moving

forward. The answer to the problem is derived from reliability theory, which seeks

optimal solutions to system failures. Fienberg and Thomas provided a mathematical

model of the problem. A key concept, as noted in the problem, is that of betweenness

with placement of a node within a system of nodes, which ultimately determines the

solution chosen by the traveler. The work of the model is to ensure that the optimal path

is selected. Fienberg and Thomas concluded that the optimal way of preventing trucks

from enduring roadside attacks by IEDs is to develop an expert knowledge model that

can predict the probability of attack based upon a mathematical model of a road, as well

as the size of the respective convoy, preventing additional IED attacks.

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Robotics

Robotics has been a popular means of providing troops with greater protection

from IEDs. The JIEDDO has repeatedly announced the deployment of new robots, such

as the recently implemented Tanglefoot (Research, Development and Engineering

Command Public Affairs, 2010), and has called for greater development of the robot

technology (Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis System 10, 2010). The

organization touts the success of the Warrior unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), describing

it as “an integrated digital fighting system that improves situational awareness and

survivability of dismounted soldiers” (Weapon Systems Technology Information

Analysis System, 2008, p. 5). If a robot, such as the MarcBot, is presented within the

context of the JIEDDO defeat-the-device mission, it is likely to be solely a robot. If,

however, it is enlisted to defeat the network, greater likelihood exists that more advanced

approaches evolving toward genuine AI will emerge. A number of case studies have

presented the development of this type of system.

Ho (2006) examined the potential use of ground-swarm robotics to accomplish

tasks too dangerous for foot patrols, especially those involved in flushing operations

including the detection and deactivation of IEDs and the search for weapons of mass

destruction. Detecting hidden elements within battlefield terrain is a larger problem

within which IED detection is categorized. Ho presented an agent-based simulation that

models a ground-robotic swarm on a search and detection mission against stationery

IEDs. The robots involved in the project included platforms on wheels mounted with

sniff-type detectors. Robots in the field have had measured success, including the
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MarcBot, which has been deployed in Iraq to support dismounted soldiers performing

sweeps for IEDs and interrogating suspicious objects within their search areas.

Approximately 300 MarcBots with a remote-observation ability over 100 meters have

been deployed. One sergeant reported that, during 1 week, a MarcBot interrogated 32

possible IEDs, 26 of which were actual devices. Consequently, unmanned ground

systems are increasingly viewed as critical on the battlefield and are now included in the

Future Combat System developed by the U.S. Army.

The development of the ThrowBot was also reviewed by Ho (2006). The Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency funded the Centibots Project to develop swarms of

over 100 robots to provide surveillance within urban areas. iRobots operating on swarm

algorithms and using C functions to model group behavior are also in development.

Swarm robotics is “the study of how a swarm of relatively simple physically embodied

agents can be constructed to collectively accomplish tasks that are beyond the capabilities

of a single one” (p. 1). The technology is modeled on the swarm tactics used by ants and

termites in nature to achieve complex tasks.

Ho (2006) also reviewed robotics developed on the concept of biomimetics using

the neuromechanics of cockroaches, crickets, and lobsters as models. An example of this

is the Mini-Whegs developed at Case Western University, which has legs that can climb

or even jump. With specific reference to IED detection, Ho noted that the military

currently has “no robust solution in looking for explosives materials such as IEDs,

roadside bombs and munitions caches” (p. 25). Therefore, deploying remotely-operated

robots to perform this function has become popular. To give robots detection capability,
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Ho recommended the FIDO XT, which is currently used to detect IED residue on the skin

of bomb makers at checkpoints. The agent-based simulation model applies the map-

aware nonuniform automata (MANA) model of a ground-robotic swarm to a search and

detection mission. The model was developed through data mining and an efficient

experiment design focusing on those factors with the most impact on the overall

effectiveness of robotics deployment. Development of the algorithmic aspects of the

research was beyond the scope of the Ho study. A shared memory map was used to

guide the spread and coverage of the robot swarm, and it was found to improve the ability

of the swarm to detect IEDs.

The focus of the Ho (2006) research was on determining if agent-based simulation

can be used to model ground-robotic swarms searching for IEDs and to determine the

critical capabilities needed of the swarm to carry out the mission. The efficacy of swarm

techniques was found to depend upon their number, speed, and sensor range. Ho

therefore concluded that 80 Min-Whegs robots equipped with virtual pheromones can

potentially meet the speed mandates of the model. The majority of swarm failures were

the result of low speeds. Nonetheless, Ho concluded that “agent based simulation is

found to have huge potential as a means to investigate swarm robotics” and improve

swarm robotics to detect and locate IEDs (p. 25).

Guill (2009) presented a systematic approach combining multiple-sensor

technologies to detect the presence of IEDs. The approach was adopted based upon an

analysis of the weaknesses of existing sensing technologies and the fact that the act of

measuring often skews results drawn from an extraction of energy from a measured
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medium. A variable-manipulation element, built into a system that transmits data by a

data-transmission element, not only produces a better result, but also stores the data in a

database to improve the decision-making process of the system. Focusing on remote

sensing, Guill suggested that biomimicry, or the development of artificial noses, is the

most promising avenue of exploration. This line of research has used failures to develop

improved ways for animals to better detect bombs. Guill exemplified efforts to determine

if bees could detect bombs. Mechanical noses or sniffer-based technologies inspired by

dogs have been found to surpass the capabilities of canines in the field. One sensor

consists of “a miniature cantilever sensor which has two integrated elements, a combined

sensor and actuator and an integrated heating element which combined are smaller than

an ant’s eye” (p. 23).

A mininose using HF-QCM technology also mimics the mammalian nose with a

higher level of sensitivity and selectivity in the detection of trace chemicals related to

IEDs (Guill, 2009). Unfortunately, this device must have close contact with the

explosive object and thus does not show promise for remote sensing. The FIDO XT

sensor mounted on robotic vehicles, however, has had greater success in detecting IEDs

from a distance, provided the conditions are right. As reported by Guill (2009),

“Successful detection at these distances is currently possible, but not with a high degree

of probability” (p. 24). The same device mounted under a helicopter was compromised

by the impact of the helicopter movement on the vapors to be detected; however, it was

able to indicate that an IED had been located “somewhere in the flight path of the

vehicle” (p. 25).

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Additional electronic-chemical sensing is not based upon biomimicry, including

surface-enhanced resonance Raman spectroscopy and microelectromechanical systems;

however, polymer coating techniques are dramatically improving their sensing

capabilities. Guill (2009) opined that, as these devices are further developed, their

micromechanical evolution, combined with nanomaterials, will “blur the distinction

between device and system,” rendering it possible to at last fully integrate devices and

systems (p. 26). Other optical sensors have become common to sense chemicals within

the environment. Overall, however, Guill found that the majority of these sensors have

technological limits leaving them less than perfect for battlefield situations, and “having a

sensor that can scan a large surface area remotely and quickly would be a significant

asset” (p. 33). Therefore, Guill concluded that robotic platforms, in addition to hovering

micromini and swarming UAV technologies, appear to hold the greatest potential for the

remote sensing of IEDs.

UAVs have already been deployed in Iraq to perch atop buildings and “see”

around corners as ground forces move through urban areas. Micro UAVs for sensing

IEDs would be ideal. Although the Dragon Eye chemical-agent sensor is an example of

this technology, development for IED detection is yet to manifest. However, Guill

(2009) opined that “converting insect behaviors into algorithms combined with the

computational power of modern computing may lead to the production of inexpensive

swarming micro- UAVs” (p. 35). The swarm can manage terrain by dropping digital

pheromones that mark the territory already reviewed and allow them to change course to
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focus on unexplored areas. As nanotechnology develops, and cost-per-unit decreases, a

swarm model seems more feasible for IED detection.

Guill (2009) remarked, “The tight integration of sensing, signal-processing, [and]

computation and communication functions that become possible because of parallel mass

fabrication of microsystems increases performance [and] reduces unit costs” (p. 36).

With regard to distribution of the data drawn from the sensors, Guill cited the example of

the Air Force AngelFire, which consists of a wide-area, electro-optic and infrared staring

sensor system that can be scaled to cover an entire city. Providing real-time video at a 5-

to 10-second delay to commanders, AngelFire is currently being tested on aircraft. It

makes use of a graphical user interface similar to Google Earth and, as such, is viewed by

Guill as a possible format to serve as the “mother ship” for the sensors within the

described swarm model. Any similarly developed system will likely be implemented

within the context of the DHS Low Vapor Pressure Chemical Detection Systems

program. Guill predicted that, by 2030, the U.S. forces will be able to work with a

complete remote view of the field in any weather conditions, rendering it unlikely that

IEDs will be a threat. This is because “sensors capable of distinguishing the location of

explosives will evolve such that [the] detection of IEDs from distances of six meters or

greater will be possible” (p. 42).

Surveillance

Sundram and Sim (2007) tested the creation of a wide-area surveillance system

using wireless sensor networks to detect the presence of IEDs within a relatively large

public area. In their study, the setting was a public street. The test intended to expand
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the range and efficacy of existing methods to enable the detection of IEDs emplaced

within public areas. The majority of research conducted on IED detection has focused on

the use of handheld devices, unmanned ground vehicles, and UAVs. Sundram and Sim

commented, “Research has employed a myriad of signature-based detection schemes,

behavioral disparity, and so on; even mine dogs are beginning to gain popularity as

potentially efficient IED detection tools” (p. 18).

Active and passive. Sundram and Sim (2007) characterized as active any

technology that stimulates a response from explosives or devices using x-ray or radio-

frequency radiation. They also defined as passive any device that detects solely vapors or

microscopic elements emitted from explosives. Among passive devices, the detection of

chemiluminescence or infrared light has provided good sensitivity when used in

combination with high-speed gas chromatography. This method has detected

dinitrotolvene, research-department explosives, and pentaerythritol tetranitvate.

The chemical with the signature-based FIDO that is used with the Dragon Runner

platform involves vapor sensing and has detected IEDs in vehicles, but presents problems

with ruggedization, and “the need for a sensor algorithm that alerts the operator with an

alarm” (Sundram & Sim, 2007, p. 18). The FIDO on a Dragon Runner is, essentially, a

vehicle robot that moves unmanned through an environment. Another popular approach

is the use of magnetic sensors combined with UAV to detect the magnetic properties

contained in unexploded ordnance. The magnetic presence is recorded on a tensor

magnetic gradiometer that detects the magnetic moments. The problem with the majority

of commercial versions of this approach is that “they are limited in utility primarily due
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to the lack of accuracy, sensitivity and false alarm rates” (p. 20). More active technology

includes use of the millimeter wave, which is a radiometer construction of images of

buried IEDs using an active-illumination method that detects signatures of disturbed soil

and vegetation.

A nuclear system detects explosive materials through thermal low-energy

neutrons, which provide good penetration power (Sundram & Sim, 2007). Wave-length

gamma-ray photons are released as a thermal neutron is absorbed by the nitrogen present

in IED explosives such as trinitrotolvene. The problem presented by crowded urban

areas, however, is rarely addressed by these systems because elements of emplaced

explosive devices can be concealed and remain undetectable by sensors due to numerous

interferences.

Sundram and Sim (2007) argued that simple detection methods based upon

devices must be superseded by the creation of modular, wireless sensor networks that

detect the modular configuration of IEDs within a topology; in essence, “seeing through”

interferences. This system leverages passive magnetic and infrared sensors from

Crossbow Technologies that are able to detect the presence of an IED anywhere on a

public street, but more specifically, when placed in a trash receptacle. Once sensors are

positioned within the environment, humans can move through the area carrying

ferromagnetic materials. The advantages of this type of sensor network include the high

degree of interoperability with various agencies, allowing shared information. The

sensors are also minimally intrusive and characterized by distributed data collection,

energy efficiency, security, and minimal human interaction. The Crossbow method
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utilizes eight different types of sensors and can be placed either around the perimeter of a

site or deployed within a dense grid.

The purpose of tests run by Sundram and Sim (2007) was to determine the

characteristics of detectable IEDs, the most efficient positioning topology of sensor

nodes, and the feasibility of adopting the network approach. The settings were a

shopping mall and roadside scenarios. Ferromagnetic materials are a common signature

of IEDs. Sundram and Sim gathered raw data by computer software and extracted the

relevant data, comparing it with thresholds established by a database before signaling the

positive identification of a device. The facilitating software was MoteView,

SerialForwarder, and TinyOS. Results were run through a Listen.class reader and display

system. While some IEDs did not contain a sufficient amount of suspicious

ferromagnetic materials to be detectable, the system was generally able to improve the

rate of IED detection. The infrared detector of the system was less effective due to the

large amount of infrared radiation in the background. Overall, Sundram and Sim found

the system satisfactory; however, they acknowledged that further research is required to

improve the decision-making process leading to alerts. This is based upon an analysis of

multiple sensor data, improving both selectability and scalability, as well as on

localization through triangulation methods to minimize crowd and other disruptions.

Automated computer-image analysis. Bucholtz, Nichols, Duncan, and Smith

(2008) noted that, while the military has developed its ability to acquire data from, for

example, persistent-surveillance systems, the human evaluation of such data has lagged,

rendering the data useless. Consequently, these researchers recommended that a

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computer-automated approach (i.e., an image analyst) be developed to undertake the

analysis of a key portion of the data. Bucholtz et al. stated, “For example, an algorithm

that rapidly identifies a certain type of vehicular activity would be potentially useful for

identifying activity leading to placement of roadside IEDs” (p. 1). Further data analysis

may reveal particular suspicious activity indicative of an identifiable signature of IED

placement, thus helping military observers predict and prevent IED events. Bucholtz et

al. therefore called for the development of tools and algorithms using an automated

method to identify suspicious activity through airborne surveillance data. They argued

that the algorithms of nonlinear dimensionality reduction seem to hold the greatest

promise because they have demonstrated movement beyond linear techniques. They

reduce the data reviewed to solely that required to make an identification based upon a

problem of limited focus.

Local linear embedding forms a type of algorithm from nonlinear dimensionality

reduction that is better able to separate key data from environmental clutter, resulting in

fewer numbers of false alarms (Bucholtz et al., 2008). However, problems that would be

encountered in developing such an AI tool within this context include data quality that is

repeatedly compromised by low spatial resolution and occlusions due to buildings,

vehicles, and other objects. Bucholtz et al. (2008) described a pilot study of the nonlinear

dimensionality reduction that involves observation of the simulated movement of ground

vehicles. A persistent surveillance video collects sequential images of a fixed

geographical region over time. Rather than analyzing the raw data directly, the system

first extracts vehicle tracks and subsequently applies a nonlinear dimensionality-

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reduction technique to reduce and display all data of interest in three dimensions.

Bucholtz et al. found that data in three dimensions can be rapidly and robustly analyzed.

Bucholtz et al. (2008) demonstrated that local linear embedding yields superior

results primarily because it more clearly delineates the tracks of stopped vehicles from

those that did not stop. These researchers concluded that the AI data-analysis and

decision-making tool implemented in their study showed great promise in providing

military personnel with alerts on vehicle movement based upon track analysis alone. In

turn, the ability to determine truck involvement in the planting or delivering of IEDs is

improved.

Ground-based operational. A surveillance system is currently in place within

Iraq and Afghanistan to detect IEDs. The G-BOSS is deployed by the Marines and

consists of a tower, multiple cameras, and a combat-operations center established within

various locations throughout the operational landscape. Midgette (2008) reported that the

usefulness of these additional sensors has not yet been determined, and the

implementation of effective techniques and procedures by operators appears to be a

continuing problem due to minimal guidance. The majority of G-BOSS towers reside

within stand-alone configurations with minimal centralized coordination, likely because

the coordination phase of development has yet to be reached. Therefore, Midgette argued

that it might be more beneficial to adapt an agent-based simulation model to improve

system quality because this type of simulation would provide analytic support to improve

operational effectiveness. The simulation used by Midgette was created by a data-

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farming center that designs simulations to support the JIEDDO in the search for

improved ways of combating IEDs and modeling on-site best practice.

Agent-based distillation is a type of computer simulation that attempts to capture

the critical factors of a situation without modeling every physical detail (Midgette, 2008).

Experiments conducted within various scenarios were studied by Midgette (2008). The

primary scenario was an IED emplacement team working at night. The MANA modeling

environment was implemented because it represents key temporal and spatial elements

within this scenario that are subsequently used to construct medium-resolution

simulations. Operation is intuitive and can be performed with ease using a graphical user

interface. It measures terrain, the behavioral patterns of individual agents within the

terrain and automata or the individual reactions of agents on the battlefield. Modeling is

well known for its ability to measure the uncertainties involved in situational awareness.

Measures of effectiveness are also derived from its calculations.

Midgette (2008) found that the MANA simulation system could classify objects it

identified, whether IED emplacements or other objects, within a variety of

configurations. The most critical factor for G-BOSS success is placement of the tower.

Midgette recommended utilization of the line-of-sight motion-detection radar because,

without motion detection, the usefulness of the system is profoundly compromised. The

Midgette findings also indicated that the ability of the system to detect presence is

compromised by stealth; the only current solution to this is improved operator training.

The primary purpose of G-BOSS was to counter the threat of IEDs, which renders the

Midgette testing promising with a 76% IED-detection rate.

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Conclusion

This review of existing literature examined the efforts undertaken by the U.S.

military to combat insurgent use of IEDs as a weapon of choice within Iraq and

Afghanistan, resulting in a high number of U.S. casualties since 2003. The evolution of

counter-IED efforts has been swift, but complex (Borjes, 2008; Byford, 2010; Sundram

& Sim, 2007; Wilson, 2006). Whether best practice has emerged as successful remains

questionable (Borjes, 2008; Burton, 2011; Byford, 2010; Darnell, 2010; Day, 2006;

DeTeresa & McErlean, 2008; Guill, 2009; Kaminski, 2008; Lopez, 2009; Martin, 2009;

Mitchell, 2009, 2011; Sadowski, 2008; Smith & Coderre, 2012; Stinson, 2009;

Thompson, 2012; Wehri, 2007). The majority of efforts to counter IEDs within Iraq and

Afghanistan are managed and operationalized under the aegis of the JIEDDO, a special

interagency organization created in 2003 to focus specifically on the problem of

countering IEDs.

This review evidences that the JIEDDO has been responsible for developing and

deploying a number of technologies and plans conducive to its mission that have reduced

casualties from IEDs (Spitzer, 2007; Staszewski, 2007). The efforts have also met with a

great deal of criticism not only because the JIEDDO is a bureaucracy that seems to lack

accountability in terms of spending, but also because the organizational focus is

overwhelmingly on defending the troops from IED causality. Critics have opined that the

JIEDDO tends to search for a technological silver bullet and only serves the immediate

battle-space site where an IED has been detected, exploded in advance, or armored

against potential explosion. Sites are subsequently studied forensically for clues of the
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responsible network. This approach, for some critics, fails to address the root of the

problem, which is the support of IEDs by elaborate enabling networks. As weapons,

IEDs have gained strategic and symbolic value far exceeding their individual use.

Overall, they have had a dramatically negative strategic impact on U.S. operations within

Iraq and Afghanistan. Additional holistic, network-oriented approaches are therefore

needed to support IED prevention.

As counter-IED efforts have evolved, AI-based robotics and surveillance systems

have been increasingly used, even though current testing involves solely their prototype

forms. An AI-based counter-IED effort has been defined by algorithm-based agents with

decision-making capabilities that are exploited to expertly analyze much more data than

would be possible through human interface. Computers can either control advanced

robotics or manage sophisticated mapping and surveillance systems in ways that would

prevent the initial emplacement of IEDs (Fienberg & Thomas, 2010; Golinghorst, 2010;

Graham, 2010; Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette, 2008; Ntuen, 2009;

Ntuen & Gwang-Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). Overall, however, this review

indicated that the majority of such systems remain in the embryonic stage. The first

paradigm established by the JIEDDO in counter-IED efforts (i.e., defeat the device) may

continue to limit the development of advanced, AI-based counter-IED mapping

technologies within Iraq and Afghanistan.

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CHAPTER 3: METHOD

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. Two pseudopopulation samples resembled the real world in relevant

respects—(a) 2,000 observations representing flat terrain, and (b) 2,000 observations

representing mountainous terrain. One criterion variable was examined (i.e., IED

presence) along with four predictor variables (i.e., terrain features and objects, visual line

of sight from each terrain feature and object, radio-frequency line of sight from each

terrain feature and object, and observed target-vehicle traffic during the preceding 24

hours). An initial overall concern was whether the data collected would support the

hypothesis (Creswell, 2012).

Data analysis in this study consisted of measures of central tendency and

variability (i.e., the mean, median, and mode) with all continuous variables, and

frequency tables were constructed for all categorical variables. These tables include the

sample sizes and percentages associated with each category of response for all categorical

variables. An ANN analysis was subsequently conducted with the dependent variable of

IED presence calculated by using the independent variables as predictors. This analysis

served to develop a predictive model focused on IED placement. Performance of the

ANN consisted of a measure of MSE, correlation ( ), the number of correct and incorrect

identifications, and the percentage correct.

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Research Design and Appropriateness

This quantitative correlational study was conducted to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using historical IED data processed with ANN-based

techniques implemented within a personal-computer environment. A NeuroDimension

(2012) ANN software was used to process the data and provide key performance metrics.

As noted earlier, specific metrics included MSE, correlation ( ), number of correct and

incorrect identifications, and percentage correct. A quantitative research methodology

was selected for the study, rather than a qualitative or mixed-method technique. Creswell

(2009) outlined the meaning of qualitative and quantitative research methods and

described a blend of qualitative and quantitative techniques (i.e., mixed method). He

contended that it is useful to consider the full range of research methods before choosing

a specific approach.

Creswell (2009) defined qualitative research as a means of exploring and

understanding individuals or groups to whom a social or human problem has been

attributed. He described the qualitative research process as one wherein “the researcher

seeks to establish the meaning of a phenomenon from the views of the participants”

(p. 16). A key data-collection element involves the observation of participant behavior

by engaging in their activities. Data collection in qualitative research employs an open-

ended style with responses shaped by the participants (Creswell, 2012). It is a useful

method when researchers cannot identify the significant variables to consider (Creswell,

2009, 2012).
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Quantitative research is a method of study assessing attitudes prior to and

following an experimental treatment (Creswell, 2009). Data collection in quantitative

research employs open-ended methods with sharply defined response categories

(Creswell, 2012). Creswell noted that the data collected is “analyzed using statistical

procedures and hypothesis testing” (p. 16). The statistical analysis performed in

quantitative research answers the research questions and tests the hypotheses, relating

variables or comparing groups so that inferences can be drawn from samples that will

allow findings that can be generalized to other populations (Creswell, 2009). In this

current study, a quantitative research methodology was applied. Neither qualitative nor

mixed-method research were suitable for the study because the objective is not to

understand the meaning applied by individuals to a social or societal problem.

Creswell (2009) opined that issues or concerns calling for “understanding the best

predictors of outcomes” (p. 18) are best studied via a quantitative research design.

Moreover, he asserted that correlational research designs are used to determine whether

two or more variables have a tendency to vary consistently or covary (Creswell, 2012).

Variables that covary can predict the value of one variable based upon knowledge

surrounding the value of another variable. This current correlational study was

conducted to examine how IED placement can be predicted using historical IED data

processed with ANN-based techniques. A quantitative method was appropriate because

the intent is to anticipate outcomes through the analysis of specific predictive variables.

Toward this end, variables considered predictors of IED placement were examined. As

noted earlier, qualitative or mixed-method research techniques were inappropriate for this
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study because no attempt was made to investigate the meaning applied by individuals to a

social or societal problem (Creswell, 2009).

A dearth of research is evident regarding the prediction of IED placement and

using historical IED data processed with AI systems. Use of the NeuroDimension (2012)

neural-network software application to process IED data was fitting for this current study

because the purpose was to develop a predictive model of IED placement. This software

application allowed for rapid testing of several predictive models, as well as for

computerized calculation.

Research Question, Hypotheses, and Variables

This quantitative study was conducted with a focus on the use of correlational

research methods to measure the MSE of an ANN to develop a predictive model of IED

placement. The purpose was to examine how IED placement can be predicted using

related historical data processed with innovative ANN-based techniques. The research

question guiding this study asked, “Can the location of IED placement be predicted by an

ANN and certain terrain features and objects related to historical IED detonation events,

the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these features and objects, and

the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period? This question was

investigated using a recognized neural-network software application to develop a

predictive model of IED placement. The hypothesis in this research stated that certain

terrain features and objects related to historical IED detonation events, the associated

visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of

target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period can be integrated with an ANN to predict
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the location of IED placement. The null hypothesis states that certain terrain features and

objects related to historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-

frequency line of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle

traffic during a 24-hour period cannot be integrated with an ANN to predict the location

of IED placement.

Quantitative research problems frequently require researchers to explain how one

variable affects another (Creswell, 2012). Creswell (2009) stated, “Quantitative research

is a means for testing objective theories by examining the relationships among variables”

(p. 4). He defined a variable as an “attribute of an individual or organization that can be

measured or observed by the researcher and that varies among individuals or

organizations studied” (Creswell, 2012, p. 630). There are two variable categories

involved in a correlational study that investigates a causal nexus—predictor variables and

criterion variables. Creswell defined the predictor variable as “a variable used to make a

forecast about an outcome in correlational research” (p. 341). Conversely, he defined the

criterion variable as “the outcome being predicted” (p. 341). This current study contains

four predictor variables and a single criterion variable.

The criterion variable in this research is nominally scaled, has no weight or

numeric value, and is codified as a prediction of an emplaced IED. This variable was

assigned the value of “1” to represent the presence of an IED, or “0” to represent the

absence of an IED. Predictor variables are those that predict the criterion variable

(Creswell, 2012). This study contained four ordinal criterion variables—

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(a) terrain features and objects, (b) visual line of sight, (c) radio-frequency line of sight,

and (d) the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period.

Population

Authoritative data regarding the emplacement of IEDs is classified and was

therefore not eligible for use in this study. The two pseudopopulations for analysis

resembled the real world in relevant respects and were created using Monte Carlo

simulation and a logic-based examination of publicly available IED sources (Byford,

2010; Cordesman, 2008; DeFisher et al., 2006; DeTeresa & McErlean 2008; Guill 2009;

JIEDDO, 2012a; Kaminski, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wheri, 2007). One population

was comprised of 2,000 individual observations of terrain features and objects that could

potentially house an IED emplaced within flat terrain. The second population was

comprised of 2,000 individual observations of terrain features and objects that could

potentially house an IED emplaced within mountainous terrain. Both populations

included the same terrain features and objects, with a different quantity for each study

group.

A correlation was present among the variables of terrain features and objects,

visual line of sight, radio-frequency line of sight, volume of target-vehicle traffic during a

24-hour period, and placement of an IED. The terrain features and objects that indicate

the presence of an IED are numerous and distinct (Byford, 2010; Cordesman, 2008;

DeFisher et al., 2006; DeTeresa & McErlean 2008; Guill 2009; JIEDDO, 2012a; Kaminski,

2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wheri, 2007). In basic terms, terrain features and objects
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represent various natural features or manufactured casings that could be used to conceal

IEDs prior to activation. The selection of terrain features and objects for this study were

representative of those reviewed throughout related literature.

Simply put, visual line of sight is an unobstructed path between a transmitting and

receiving antenna (i.e., an individual can see the receiving antenna if looking from the

sending antenna, and vice versa; Silver & American Radio Relay League, 2011).

Similarly, radio-frequency line of sight is an unobstructed signal path between a sending

and receiving antenna (i.e., an individual can perceive the receiving antenna if looking

from the sending antenna, and vice versa). In the radio-frequency line-of-sight case, the

signal path may be obstructed by terrain, buildings, or vegetation. However, due to the

behavior of electromagnetic waves at radio frequencies, the signal from the sending

antenna will travel over obstructions and still be received at the receiving antenna, similar

to visual line of sight. If there is radio-frequency line of sight from the sender to the

receiver, sighting will also be possible from receiver to sender if the roles of the antennas

are reversed. Since radio-frequency line of sight can travel over and around obstructions,

depending upon the frequency of interest and the size of the obstruction, it is typically

longer than visual line of sight, which is impeded by any opaque obstruction.

The visual line of sight and radio-frequency line of sight from each location

identified as a possible IED location are calculated to rank those locations by their ability

to be seen from a distance (i.e., visual line of sight), as well as their ability to successfully

send a wireless signal from a remote-control device to a receiver connected to an IED

(i.e., radio-frequency line of sight). These calculations are used as predictor variables to
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the ANN, based upon the assumption that the malicious actor will select those spots

along a route for IED concealment that have the greatest off-road visibility so the system

can be controlled with a wireless remote. Radio-frequency line of sight from remote to

receiver is required for successful detonation, and visual confirmation of the proximity of

the target vehicle to an IED location (i.e., visual line of sight) is required for timely

detonation. It is assumed that, when selecting IED emplacement locations and preparing

a waiting location, the malicious actor will frequently take only visual line of sight into

account in advance; however, over time, it will become evident which locations or types

of locations will not trigger the receiver, thereby indirectly forcing consideration of radio-

frequency line of sight.

Location selection for IED emplacement involves determining a site that will

afford the malicious actor the greatest advantage, considering maximum exposure and

damage (Sundram & Sim, 2007). It is assumed that the evaluation factors for IED

emplacement are similar to the location selection for a convenience store, which is

important for a successful business (Kuo, Chi, & Kao, 2002). Some of the many factors

affecting convenience-store locations are high visibility and maximum traffic flow.

Simply put, potential locations that are easier to see and with greater traffic flows are

weighted more favorably in the decision-making process for convenience-store

placement than those difficult to see and with less traffic flow. Similarly, it is assumed

that the maximum exposure and damage desired by a malicious actor would consider

visibility and traffic flow when selecting a location for IED emplacement.
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No published research could be found that examined how terrain features or

objects, visual line of sight, radio-frequency line of sight, and traffic flow can be used to

predict IED placement. Although substantial evidence is lacking, it appears that these

variables may positively relate to the placement of these devices. An identified intent of

this study is to expand the knowledge base related to the relationship between visual line

of sight, radio-frequency line of sight, traffic flow, and IED placement. The theoretical

model for this study was developed by the investigator based upon a review of current

literature regarding the operational landscape of counter-IED efforts; efforts deployed by

the JIEDDO to reduce casualties from IEDs; the appropriate nature of the JIEDDO

paradigm in addressing the larger view of IED emplacement; and sophisticated AI-based

techniques to counter IEDs, some focusing on mapping the battle space and others on

providing for battle space visualization to assist commander decision making. This

theoretical model suggests a positive relationship between terrain features or objects,

visual line of sight, radio-frequency line of sight, traffic flow, and IED placement.

Sampling Frame

Creswell (2012) defined a population as a group of people with common

individual characteristics. Urdan (2010) defined a sample as “a collection of cases

selected from a larger population” (p. 11) and maintained that researchers have a variety

of avenues at their disposal for sample selection. However, the nature of a research

design may place limitations on the sampling methodology, as well as the size of the

sample. Creswell (2012) recommended a minimum of 30 participants for correlational

study. Zhang et al. (1998) established that “no definite rule” exists for the size of a
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population sample; however, the larger the sample size, the more precise the outcome (p.

51). The rationale for the sample size in this current study rests in the Zhang et al.

recommendation that each weight in the ANN have a minimum of 10 samples. The ANN

in this study has four weights—one for each input—therefore requiring a minimum of 40

samples under this guideline. As noted earlier, two samples of 2,000 observations were

used, for a total population of 4,000 observations.

With regard to sample design, this current study employed a representative

sampling technique. Urdan (2010) explained that, with representative sampling, group

members are purposely selected to create a sample that represents the target population

based upon a characteristic of interest. Such sampling is conducted when access to

classified information is limited. This type of data is restricted by law and provided only

with multiple requirements for access and handling. All data collection conducted in this

research will involve published, unclassified, and open source documents. It is important

to protect the privacy and confidentiality of all individuals who participate in research

studies (Creswell, 2012). This study will not involve the use of human subjects, and data

collection will not involve face-to-face interviews, focus groups, direct observation,

surveys, or similar methods of data retrieval. An informed-consent form is unnecessary

for the research, and issues related to the geographical location of the study are irrelevant.

Data Collection

This study collected data in the form of MSE, correlation ( ), number of correct

and incorrect identifications, and percentage of correct metrics via the NeuroDimension

(2012) software application. Creswell (2009) explained that quantitative research

 100

employs instruments to measure variables so that “numbered data can be analyzed using

statistical procedures” (p. 4). Official data regarding the emplacement of IEDs is

classified and therefore not eligible for use in this study. Therefore, as described by

Mooney (1997), a pseudopopulation was specified as a computer algorithm in a manner

allowing it to be created using Monte Carlo simulation and Excel to generate

observations. Two study samples were created using the values simulated for the

independent variables of interest (i.e., terrain features and objects, visual line of sight,

radio-frequency line of sight, and observed traffic flow), which are expected to resemble

the real world in all relevant respects.

Creswell (2012) recommended at least 30 participants for a correlational study.

Zhang et al. (1998) established that “no definite rule” (p. 51) exists for sample sizes;

however, the larger the sample size, the more precise the outcome. The rationale for the

sample size in this study rests in the Zhang et al. recommendation that each weight in the

ANN have a minimum of 10 samples. The ANN in this study has four weights—one for

each input—therefore requiring a minimum of 40 observations. Two samples of 2,000

observations were compiled, for a total population of 4,000 observations. The terrain

objects and features suggesting the presence of an IED are numerous and diverse

(Byford, 2010; Cordesman, 2008; DeFisher et al., 2006; DeTeresa & McErlean 2008; Guill

2009; JIEDDO, 2012a; Kaminski,2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wheri, 2007). In this

study, 27 different terrain features and objects were nominally scaled and selected as

indicators to represent the possible presence of IEDs, based upon their relationship to

terrain potentially conducive to IED activity.

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Monte Carlo simulation for visual line of sight and radio-frequency line of sight

was performed in this study using values calculated from a real-world propagation

analysis of 10 emplaced simulated IEDs. The IEDs were emplaced using a strategy

similar to a preferred strategy of malicious actors (Cordesman, 2008). A Monte Carlo

simulation for the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period was performed

using 10 as the mean value for the distribution function. Each sample data set was

comprised of 2,000 observations simulated from the flat and mountainous terrain tiles

selected for representative IED placement. Each observation contained information for

every independent variable of the study (i.e., no observations will contain missing data).

All observations for each terrain type were initially pooled into one large data set.

When submitted to the NeuroDimension (2012) software for processing, two subsets

were extracted from the full data set. The first extracted set contained 1,200 randomly

selected observations for each of the independent variables and becomes the training data

set. The 1,200 number was chosen because it represents 60% of the total number of

observations available and utilizes 60% of the available data for training. The second

data set was extracted from the remaining data and contained 300 randomly selected

observations for each of the predictor variables and became the validation data set. This

number of observations represents 20% of the total available. All remaining observations

(i.e., 500) were placed in the testing data set. The criterion variable of each data set was

coded as a binary variable so the response variable conformed to the architecture of the

ANN (i.e., four output nodes). Because the level of analysis in this study is the IED,

issues such as informed consent and confidentiality are irrelevant.

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Instrumentation

The research question that guided this study asked, “Can the location of IED

placement be predicted by an ANN and certain terrain features and objects related to

historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency line of sight

of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour

period?” The NeuroDimension (2012) ANN software supported the investigation to

answer this research question. Creswell (2012) listed the criteria used to select a good

instrument, which includes use of the most recent version of the tool and using an

instrument that is frequently cited and hence used by other researchers, an instrument

with favorable published reviews in peer-reviewed journals, and an instrument with

proven validity and reliability. However, surveys were not used in this study.

In this research, ANN models incorporated a supervised classification process to

classify each observation into either IED present or IED absent. Prior to use, ANNs

require the selection of several architectural and training parameters. The optimal

number of hidden layers and the amount of nodes for each hidden layer are typically

unknown a priori for a particular data set; they must be established through an

examination of various parameter settings (Haykin, 1999).

One hidden layer was employed in this study, which NeuroDimension (2012) has

found to be satisfactory in the majority of situations. Determining the optimal amount of

nodes within this single hidden layer is a challenging process (Zhang et al., 1998). While

several methods exist to make this determination, no approach is universally appropriate

because the number of nodes depends upon the complexity of the problem to be solved
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(Cawsey, 1998; NeuroDimension, 2012; Zhang et al., 1998). By methodically

experimenting with the amount of hidden nodes within a network, the best fit may be

irrelevant to any a priori assumptions (Marzban & Stumpf, 1998).

Because several ANNs with a mixture of hidden nodes were tested in this study,

the network that produces the maximum performance on the testing set was selected.

This prevented any overfitting to the training data set. While it may be argued that this

approach could overfit the validation data set, this outcome is prevented with random

selection of the validation and training sets. In addition to parameters defining the ANN

architecture, training parameters are also necessary to initialize the learning algorithm

used by the ANN. Back propagation was the learning algorithm selected for this study

because it is the most widely established and pervasive algorithm available (Cawsey,

1998; NeuroDimension, 2012; Zhang et al., 1998). The back-propagation algorithm

requires two initialization parameters—the learning rate and the momentum rate. It is

impossible to know a priori optimal values for these parameters for a particular data set;

consequently, experimentation was required to establish suitable values.

Once the network architecture and training parameters were selected, an ANN

was iteratively trained. Each iteration represents one complete pass through a training

data set, otherwise known as an epoch. A measure of the discrepancy between observed

and predicted values of the dependent variable was calculated at the conclusion of each

iteration. This discrepancy is frequently expressed as a MSE, which for this study, is

represented by the error function illustrated in Equation 1.

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∑ (1)

Where is the MSE term, are the weights to be estimated during training, is

the number of observations (i.e., input) in the training set, and and are the target and

the predicted value of a single output node (Marzaban & Stumpf, 1998). The

observation vectors represent a training data set, which is used exclusively to train the

network to recognize the relationship between the independent and dependent variables

(e.g., to develop a classifier.) The classifier was used to predict class membership for

other vectors of input variables not included in the training data set. Notionally, the

back-propagation algorithm eventually finds a set of weights that minimizes .

The artificial network models used in this study have completely connected the

input, hidden, and output layers. Therefore, each node in layer was connected to all

nodes in layer (j + 1). The generalized delta rule (i.e., a gradient descent learning rule

normally used with the back-propagation learning algorithm) was integrated into the

learning process of each network. The activation function for the input layer of each

network was linear, while the hidden and output layers used logistic activation functions.

Initial weights were randomly selected by the NeuroDimension (2012) software, based

upon a random seed and no input noise.

Training patterns were submitted to the ANN randomly, with a calculation of the

MSE validation set performed every five epochs through the training data set. Training

was discontinued after either a minimum of 1,200 training epochs had been completed or

a validation MSE of .05 was attained. These criteria are based upon the default settings

of the NeuroDimension (2012) software.

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Validity and Reliability

This study applied a quantitative, correlational research design. Creswell (2009)

noted that validity plays a significant role in quantitative study due to its power in

determining the accuracy of the findings. Internal and external validity are also important

considerations (Creswell, 2012). Internal validity generally relates to the validity of

causal relationships between measures included in quantitative study. With respect to

this research, the predictor variables of terrain features and objects, visual line of sight,

radio-frequency line of sight, and observed target-traffic flow were considered the

predictors of IED placement. There is no question that these independent variables

influenced IED placement because there is no possible way for IED placement to directly

influence the independent measures. Consequently, there is no question that these

predictors, if they are found to significantly impact IED placement, would further serve

to indicate a causal association between the measures.

External validity relates to the extent to which the results obtained in a study can

be generalized to a larger population (Creswell, 2012). The extent of external validity

depends upon the data source and the methodology used to collect the data. Because

simulated data were collected in this current research, any generalization would be

tentative in nature because the extent to which these data are an accurate representation of

actual IED placement and the associated independent variables is unknown.

Validity and reliability are connected (Creswell, 2012). Creswell (2012) asserted

that reliability is a measure of consistency, and the more reliable the result from

instrument administration, the more valid may be the results. However, the results may
 106

still not represent a measure of the particular construct under study and hence remain

invalid. In this study, estimation of the NeuroDimension (2012) software reliability is

based upon past failure observations because failure cannot be predicted with absolute

certainty. The validity of the NeuroDimension software was based upon its past use in

other research and citation throughout related literature (Baesens, Setiono, Mues, &

Vanthienen, 2002; Oczkowski & Barreca, 1997; Pfurtscheller, Kalcher, Neuper,

Flotzinger, & Pregenzer, 1996; Sharda & Delen, 2006).

Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted in four distinct steps in this study. Initially, raw

simulated data were preprocessed. The NeuroDimension (2012) software facilitated

validation of data by performing a search and replace for invalid data such as missing

values, empty cells, and cells containing error codes. A series of descriptive statistics

subsequently described the data analyzed. This consisted of measures of central tendency

and variability (i.e., the mean, median, and mode) of all continuous variables, and

frequency tables was constructed for all categorical variables. These tables included the

sample sizes and percentages associated with each category of response for all categorical

variables. Creswell (2012) recommended the display of correlation coefficients within a

correlation matrix. Therefore, a matrix including all key variables of interest was

constructed. An ANN analysis was subsequently conducted to develop a predictive

model focused on IED placement.

The data analysis in this study examined the potential relationship between certain

terrain features and objects related to historical IED detonation events, the associated
 107

visual and radio-frequency line of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of

target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period. The analysis adhered to the following five

steps of hypothesis testing summarized by Creswell (2012):

1. Identify the null and alternative hypothesis.

2. Establish the level of significance or alpha level.

3. Collect the data.

4. Compute the sample statistic.

5. Accept or reject the null hypothesis.

Summary

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. A correlational research method was applied to allow statistical testing

to describe and measure the relationship between the variables (Creswell, 2012). The

appropriate nature of the correlational research design was examined, a hypothesis was

formulated, and the criterion variable and predictor variables were identified. The target

population, instrument validity and reliability, and the NeuroDimension (2012) software

application used to perform the data collection and analysis were described.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

Overview

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. The NeuroDimension (2012) ANN software was used to process the

data and provide key performance metrics. Specific metrics included MSE, correlation

( ), number of correct identifications, number of incorrect identifications, and percentage

of correct identifications. The study involved four predictor variables (a) terrain features

and objects related to historical IED detonation events, (b) the associated visual and

radio-frequency lines of sight of these features and objects, and (c) the volume of target

vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period), as well as a single criterion variable (i.e., IED

presence).

The analysis adhered to the following five steps of hypothesis testing summarized

by Creswell (2012):

1. Identify the null and alternative hypothesis.

2. Establish the level of significance or alpha level.

3. Collect the data.

4. Compute the sample statistic.

5. Accept or reject the null hypothesis.

 109

Through examination of the data, this study investigated the null and alternative

hypothesis. The hypothesis for this study stated that certain terrain features and objects

related to historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency

lines of sight of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during

a 24-hour period can be integrated with an ANN to predict the location of IED placement.

Conversely, the null hypothesis stated that certain terrain features and objects related to

historical IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of sight

of these features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour

period cannot be integrated with an ANN to predict the location of IED placement.

Statistical and ANN data analyses were conducted in four distinct steps. Initially,

a level of significance was selected. The raw simulated data were subsequently

preprocessed. NeuroDimension (2012) software facilitated the validation of data by

performing a search and replace for invalid data such as missing values, empty cells, and

cells containing error codes. A frequency table was constructed for all categorical

variables and included sample sizes and measurements of total and cumulative

percentages. A series of descriptive statistics consisting of measures of central tendency

and variability with regard to all continuous variables was then conducted to describe the

data analyzed.

Correlation and multiple regression testing were conducted to evaluate the

appropriate nature of the predictors (i.e., (a) terrain features and objects related to

historical IED detonation events, (b) the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of
 110

sight of these features and objects, and (c) the volume of target vehicle traffic during a

24-hour period) and examine the relationship among the predictors and a single criterion

variable (i.e., IED presence). A correlation matrix including all key variables of interest

was established, as well as a summary of correlation coefficients and the predictive

model developed from the testing. Following this testing, a comprehensive neural-

network analysis was conducted incorporating a supervised classification process to

classify each observation into either IED present or IED absent. Subsequently, a

correlation matrix including all key variables of interest was established to assist in

determining measures of association.

Findings

Descriptive Analysis

Authoritative data regarding the emplacement of IEDs is classified and was

therefore not eligible for use in this study. The two pseudopopulations of the study

analysis resemble the real world in relevant respects and were created using Monte Carlo

simulation and a logic-based examination of publicly available IED sources (Byford,

2010; Cordesman, 2008; DeFisher et al., 2006; DeTeresa & McErlean 2008; Guill 2009;

JIEDDO, 2012a; Kaminski, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007; Wheri, 2007). One population

was comprised of 2,000 individual observations of 27 types of terrain features and objects

that could potentially house an IED emplaced within flat terrain. The second population

was comprised of 2,000 individual observations of terrain features and objects that could
 111

potentially house an IED emplaced within mountainous terrain. Both populations

included the same terrain features and objects in different quantities.

The frequencies of terrain features and objects from the data collected in this

study are indicated in Table 1. The total number of elements in the terrain data set was

4,000. Of the 27 members of the data set, the elements which occur most frequently are

visible antennas and visible wires.

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Table 1
Terrain Feature and Object Frequencies
Flat Mountainous
Terrain feature f % Cumulative % f % Cumulative %
Abandoned structure 34 1.70 1.70 8 0.40 0.40
Abandoned vehicle 60 3.00 4.70 32 1.60 2.00
Animal carcass 85 4.25 8.95 99 4.95 6.95
Bridge span 100 5.00 13.95 8 0.40 7.35
Building 107 5.35 19.30 8 0.40 7.75
Cinderblock 43 2.15 21.45 20 1.00 8.75
Foliage 100 5.00 26.45 119 5.95 14.70
Graffiti 26 1.30 27.75 8 0.40 15.10
Guardrail 29 1.45 29.20 61 3.05 18.15
Incident control point 16 0.80 30.00 10 0.50 18.65
Isolated box 46 2.30 32.30 18 0.90 19.55
Light post 21 1.05 33.35 6 0.30 19.85
Median strip 35 1.75 35.10 35 1.75 21.60
New construction 35 1.75 36.85 4 0.20 21.80
Overpass 14 0.70 37.55 14 0.70 22.50
Pile of trash 75 3.75 41.30 137 6.85 29.35
Pothole 87 4.35 45.65 27 1.35 30.70
Previous IED attack 118 5.90 51.55 128 6.40 37.10
Road sign 30 1.50 53.05 50 2.50 39.60
Roadway shoulder 60 3.00 56.05 68 3.40 43.00
Scarecrow 9 0.45 56.50 1 0.05 43.05
Soda can 49 2.45 58.95 25 1.25 44.30
Stationary vehicle 59 2.95 61.90 83 4.15 48.45
Tape 17 0.85 62.75 3 0.15 48.60
Tire 33 1.65 64.40 13 0.65 49.25
Visible antenna 391 19.55 83.95 405 20.25 69.50
Visible wire 321 16.05 100.00 610 30.50 100.00
Total 2,000 100 2,000 100
Note . IED = improvised explosive device.
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The data ranges and descriptive statistics for the flat and mountainous terrain data

are summarized in Tables 2 through 5. In their respective data sets, visual and radio-

frequency lines of sight are highly correlated, having similar ranges, means and standard

deviations. No outliers were detected, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. In both

populations, no IED was present in 57% of the terrain cases compared to 43% with an

IED. Both data sets are marginally asymmetrical, with the flat population negatively

skewed and the mountainous population positively skewed. With Kurtosis values less

than 0, neither population is clustered around the mean and is instead spread out.

Table 2
Flat Terrain Data Ranges

Variable Range Minimum range Maximum range

TV 48 1 49
VLoS 148,193 66 148,259
RFLoS 159,308 409 159,717
IED 1 0 1
Note. TV = Target vehicles observed in last 24 hours; VLoS = Visual line of sight; RFLoS = Radio
frequency line of sight, IED = improvised explosive device.

Table 3
Flat Terrain Descriptive Statistics

Skewness Kurtosis
Variable SEM Statistic SE Statistic SE
TV 17.95 0.33 14.54 211.35 0.66 .05 -0.88 0.11
VLoS 71,217.80 948.26 42,407.35 1,798,383,672.84 0.11 .05 -1.20 0.11
RFLoS 77,867.63 1,031.93 46,149.28 2,129,755,592.44 0.11 .05 -1.20 0.11
IED 0.43 0.01 0.49 0.24 0.29 .05 -1.92 0.11
Note. TV = Target vehicles observed in last 24 hours; VLoS = Visual line of sight; RFLoS = Radio
frequency line of sight, IED = improvised explosive device.
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Table 4
Mountainous Terrain Data Ranges

Variable Range Minimum range Maximum range

TV 48 1 49
VLoS 13,981 966 14,947
RFLoS 14,877 4,858 19,735
IED 1 0 1
Note. TV = Target vehicles observed in last 24 hours; VLoS = Visual line of sight; RFLoS = Radio
frequency line of sight, IED = improvised explosive device.

Table 5
Mountainous Terrain Data Descriptive Statistics

Skewness Kurtosis
Variable SEM Statistic SE Statistic SE
TV 17.42 0.32 14.08 198.33 0.72 .05 -0.70 0.11
VLoS 7,899.44 89.51 4,003.01 16,024,124.71 -0.02 .05 -1.22 0.11
RFLoS 12,383.41 97.35 4,353.63 18,954,126.73 -0.02 .05 -1.22 0.11
IED 0.43 0.01 0.49 0.24 0.30 .05 -1.91 0.11
Note. TV = Target vehicles observed in last 24 hours; VLoS = Visual line of sight; RFLoS = Radio
frequency line of sight, IED = improvised explosive device.

Correlation and Regression Analysis

A Spearman’s rank-order correlation was performed to assess the relationship

between the predictor variables of (a) terrain features and objects related to historical IED

detonation events, (b) the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of sight of these

features and objects, and (c) the volume of target vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period)

as well as a single criterion variable (i.e., IED presence). For both the flat and
 115

mountainous data sets, preliminary analyses indicated that the relationships are

monotonic as assessed by visual inspection of a scatterplot.

As shown in Table 6, both the flat and mountainous data sets indicated strong

positive correlations between the criterion variable and each of the predictor variables of

visual line of sight, radio-frequency line of sight, and the volume of traffic during a 24-

hour period.

Table 6
Correlation Analysis

Variable rs p

Flat
TFO 0.008 0.733
TV 0.797 < .0005*
VLoS 0.795 < .0005*
RFLoS 0.794 < .0005*

Mountainous
TFO 0.016 0.483
TV 0.786 < .0005*
VLoS 0.788 < .0005*
RFLoS 0.787 < .0005*
Note. TFO = Terrain features and objects; TV = Target vehicles observed in last 24 hours; VLoS = Visual
line of sight; RFLoS = Radio frequency line of sight.
*p < .01 denotes statistical significance.

A weak positive correlation is evident between the criterion variable and terrain

features and objects related to historical IED detonation events within each of the data

sets. The terrain features and objects predictor variable did not add statistical
 116

significance to the prediction in either of the data sets. A binomial logistic regression test

was performed to evaluate the appropriate nature for ANN analysis. The logistic-

regression model for flat terrain was statistically significant, (3) = 1853.143, p < .0005.

The model explained 81.1% (Nagelkerke ) of the variance in IED presence and

correctly classified 86.5% of cases. Sensitivity was 83.4%, specificity was 89.3%,

positive predictive value was 85.04%, and negative predictive value was 87.54%.

The logistic-regression model for mountainous terrain was statistically significant,

(3) = 1790.740, p < .0005. The model explained 79.5% (Nagelkerke ) of the

variance in IED presence and correctly classified 86.3% of cases. Sensitivity was

83.8%, specificity was 88.2%, positive predictive value was 84.00%, and negative

predictive value was 88.00%. Of the four predictor variables used, visual and radio-

frequency lines of sight and the volume of target vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period

were significant (p < .0005) for both data sets.

An ANN analysis was performed on each data set to assess the relationship

between the predictor variables and the criterion variable. Positive correlations with the

predictor variables were observed between flat (r = 0.94) and mountainous (r = 0.81) data

during initial testing. The measured MSE indicated that the output of the ANN fit the

desired output, concurrently demonstrating fitness for placement prediction.

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Table 7

ANN Performance Metrics of the Artificial Neural Networks

Measure Training Cross validation Testing

Flat

n 1200 300 500

MSE 0.21 0.25 0.30
r 0.97 0.97 0.94
n correct 1060 267 426
n incorrect 140 33 74
% correct 88.33 89.00 85.20
Mountainous

n 1200 300 500

MSE 0.27 0.30 0.32
r 0.85 0.81 0.81
n correct 1068 261 435
n incorrect 132 39 65
% correct 89.00 87.00 87.00

To minimize prediction error and improve performance, the ANN models were

retrained 50 times, with the best parameters saved for a final test run. Overall training

results are summarized in Table 8. Cross-validation error measured during the initial

ANN analysis was reduced by 48.0% for flat and 40.0% for mountainous data.
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Table 8
Overall Training Results

Best network Training Cross validation

Flat

Run n 16 39
Epoch n 99 26
Minimum MSE .08 .10
Final MSE .08 .12

Mountainous

Run n 1 40
Epoch n 100 71
Minimum MSE .10 .11
Final MSE .10 .12

Table 9 presents the testing results of the trained ANN. The percentage correct

measured for IED presence was higher for both flat and mountainous data than for no

IED presence. Notably, the MSE remained lower than the initial ANN analysis.
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Table 9
Results of Trained Artificial-Neural-Networks Testing

Performance No IED present IED present

Flat

MSE .08 .07

r .82 .82
% correct 81.00 90.50

Mountainous

MSE .08 .07

r .83 .83
% correct 82.50 90.91
Note. IED = improvised explosive device.

Table 10 presents the performance of the trained ANN model in a confusion

matrix. Each column of the matrix represents the actual output, while each row

represents the desired output.

Table 10
Trained Artificial-Neural-Networks Model Confusion Matrix

Output / Desired No IED present IED present

Flat

No IED present 226 21

IED present 53 200

Mountainous

No IED present 231 20

IED present 49 200
Note. IED = improvised explosive device.
 120

Summary

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. A series of descriptive statistics was conducted to describe the data

analyzed. Correlation and multiple regression testing were conducted to examine the

relationship between the four potential predictors and a single criterion variable.

Correlation analysis revealed a statistically significant relationship between three of the

four predictor variables. Regression testing was performed to evaluate the appropriate

nature of potential predictor variables and examine the relationships among these

variables and the criterion variable. The predictors accounted for a significant amount of

the variance surrounding IED presence in both models. Regression testing revealed that

visual and radio-frequency lines of sight, as well as the volume of target vehicle traffic

during a 24-hour period were statistically significant.

An ANN analysis was subsequently performed to develop a predictive model

focused on IED placement. The initial analysis revealed a positive correlation of

predictor variables in both data sets. ANN training and a final round of testing resulted in

86% correct predictions of IED presence for flat terrain and 87% correct predictions for

mountainous terrain. The ANN analysis results supported acceptance of the study

hypothesis and rejection of the null hypothesis.

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

According to the JIEDDO (2012a), a wide range of efforts are required to

neutralize threat networks and IEDs. One way to decrease the number of soldiers injured

by IEDs is to develop a system for identifying likely placement locations prior to

deploying soldiers into danger. If a prediction tool can be developed that is able to predict

such locations from a secure locale, the deployment of operational military personnel

could be conducted with far greater safety than current practice.

The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine how IED

placement can be predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-

based techniques. Authoritative data regarding the emplacement of IEDs is classified so

Monte Carlo simulation and a logic-based examination of publicly available IED sources

was performed to simulate a population resembling the real world in relevant respects.

Correlation and multiple-regression testing were conducted to examine the relationship

between the potential predictors and criterion variable. NeuroDimension (2012) ANN

software was used to process the data and provide key performance metrics.

Limitations

This study was limited in size and scope. The research did not utilize official,

classified, or sensitive information. A theoretical data set was created for use in the

study. Selected IED locations were based upon analysis and understanding of present-day

areas of conflict, threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (Sundram & Sim, 2007). The

IED detonation method tested was limited manual operation (i.e., a malicious actor, at a

distance, visually determining when a target is in proximity to the IED and manually
 122

detonating the device via a radio-frequency signal). Automated detonation devices, such

as those pressure or heat sensitive, were beyond the scope of this research. Internal

validity was limited relative to the appropriate nature of the research controls.

Additionally, external validity was limited relative to the aptitude of the researcher and

the ability to generalize the findings to other studies.

Interpretations of the Findings

The literature review conducted for this research evidenced that the JIEDDO has

been responsible for developing and deploying a number of technologies and plans

conducive to its mission that have reduced casualties from IEDs (Spitzer, 2007;

Staszewski, 2007). Despite attempts within existing studies to address counter-IED

efforts through development of advanced, AI-based counter-IED prediction technologies,

the literature review revealed a gap in research contributing to resolving this challenge.

The theoretical framework of this current study focused on the theory of geospatial

abduction problems developed by Shakarian and Subrahmanian (2011). Based upon

correlational and regression testing, the study results indicated strong statistical support

for the predictor variables selected in this study. Results of the ANN analysis indicated

strong support for the research hypothesis over the null hypothesis across all predictor

variables.

Correlation and Regression

A Spearman's rank-order correlation was run to assess the relationship between

the predictor variables of (a) terrain features and objects related to historical IED

detonation events, (b) the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of sight of these
 123

features and objects, and (c) the volume of target vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period,

as well as a single criterion variable (i.e., IED presence). Results of the correlation

testing are provided in Table 6 and reveal a strong correlation for all predictor variables

with the exception of terrain features and objects related to historical IED detonation

events in flat terrain, rs (1998) = .008, p = 0.733, as well as mountainous terrain, rs

(1998) = .016, p = 0.483. The correlation coefficients calculated for terrain features and

objects related to historical IED detonation events were positive, but weak based upon

their low values. This indicated that the presence of an IED is weakly associated with the

terrain feature or object containing the IED.

Regression testing was performed to support the research hypothesis, to draw

inference, and to facilitate determination as to whether the predictor variables selected for

this study were contributing to the prediction model. It is important to note that the

results for each predictor variable were reported while controlling for the effects of the

other predictor variables. The results revealed a statistically significant relationship (p <

.0005) between visual and radio-frequency lines of sight of terrain features and objects,

the volume of target vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period, and IED presence. No

statistically significant relationship was evident between terrain features and objects

related to historical IED detonation events and IED presence. These findings reveal that

the selection of IED casing alone may contribute little to the ANN prediction model.

Artificial Neural Networks

A neural network model was applied to further analyze the data for any possible

nonlinear relationship. All observations for each terrain type were initially pooled into
 124

one large data set. Following input into the NeuroDimension (2012) software for

processing, two subsets were extracted from the full data set. The first extracted set

contained 1,200 randomly selected observations for each of the independent variables and

was used as the training data set. The second data set was extracted from the remaining

data and contained 300 randomly selected observations for each of the predictor variables

and became the validation data set. All remaining observations (i.e., 500) were placed in

the testing data set.

The initial testing results are provided in Table 7 and reveal positive correlations

between all of the predictor variables involving flat and mountainous data. The initial

model correctly classified 85.20% of the flat cases and 87.00% of the mountainous cases.

The ANN models were subsequently retrained 50 times with the goal of minimizing

prediction error and improving performance. The overall training results are summarized

in Table 8.

Table 9 indicates that the lowest MSE values were observed from the retrained

ANN models for in-sample (i.e., training and validation sets) and out of-sample (i.e.,

testing set) prediction. The initial MSE was reduced by 76.67% for the flat terrain data

and 78.13% for the mountainous terrain data. Surprisingly, the percentage of correct

identifications by the retrained ANN improved merely .01% for the flat terrain data, with

no observable improvement for the mountainous terrain data. Comparatively, the

reduction in MSE indicates that the architecture, training algorithm, and training patterns

of the trained ANN model are better than those of the untrained model. The retrained

ANN models resulted in 86% correct predictions of IED presence for flat terrain and 87%
 125

correct predictions for mountainous terrain, which reflect an important performance

measure for the task of classification. Notably, regression testing was only performed in

this study to measure suitability of the predictor variables for use in an ANN. Had

regression been used for prediction in the research, the ANN model would have

demonstrated a better fit and prediction of the data. Results of the ANN analysis

supported the hypothesis of the study and rejection of the null hypothesis.

Recommendations

The results of this study, combined with the findings of the literature review,

revealed opportunities for AI researchers, particularly those involved in IED

countermeasures, to shift the focus of attention from mitigation of the effects of IED

attacks to the detection of IEDs from a safe stand-off distance. The potential exists for

the development of sophisticated techniques grounded in AI and intended to predict the

location of emplaced IEDs. The findings of this study may also be of value to civilian

law-enforcement agencies and other organizations searching for innovative technologies

to protect the civilian population and critical physical assets. Furthermore, the study

results contribute valuable knowledge to the field as it relates to the use of ANNs for

prediction. Researchers promoting technologies to locate remote-controlled IEDs might

consider the use of visual and radio-frequency lines of sight in the course of their

development.

Notwithstanding the body of literature establishing how various counter-IED

efforts have evolved, the review of existing related study conducted for this research

established that minimal related publications have addressed the use of any method,
 126

model, or tool using AI to predict the location of emplaced IEDs. Moreover, a gap is

evident with regard to literature evaluating the application of AI to the problem of IED

placement prediction. Although this current research extends the existing body of

knowledge surrounding this topic, further exploration is needed into other aspects of IED

emplacement prediction.

Recommendations specific to future research populations include replication of

the correlational research design of this current study with historical IED placement data

supplied by the JIEDDO. This would address one of the limitations in this research while

potentially expanding the body of practical AI knowledge. The findings from such future

research may further establish that certain terrain features and objects related to historical

IED detonation events, the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of sight of these

features and objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period

could be used to predict the location of emplaced IEDs.

Recommendations specific to the correlational research design include replication

of this current study while employing alternative ANN computer software and models for

prediction. This may be of interest to AI researchers not employing the NeuroDimension

(2012) software. Moreover, examining IED placement data within the context of

alternate ANN computer software, using various ANN models, would contribute to the

body of existing research by establishing how IED placement prediction is accomplished

across a variety of modalities.

Summary

The problem statement motivating this study recognized the need for additional
 127

study investigating the methods, models, and tools using AI to predict the location of

emplaced IEDs. The purpose of this study was to examine how IED placement can be

predicted using related historical data processed with innovative ANN-based techniques.

The findings outlined the statistical basis for accepting the research hypothesis which

asserted that certain terrain features and objects related to historical IED detonation

events, the associated visual and radio-frequency lines of sight of these features and

objects, and the volume of target-vehicle traffic during a 24-hour period can be integrated

with an ANN to predict the location of IED placement. Rejection of the null hypothesis

was also supported. Therefore, the study addressed the problem statement to the extent

of its contribution to the body of research related to AI counter-IED efforts toward the

predict IED placement.

The findings of this study support the assertion that an ANN can be used to

predict the location of emplaced IEDs. Although limitations were present in the research,

the results are significant for the manner in which they extend counter-IED efforts using

AI to predict IED placement. Opportunities are revealed for military and civilian law-

enforcement that develop ANNs to safeguard military personnel and citizens. Moreover,

this study established an innovative framework for future investigation into other types of

IED emplacement-prediction scenarios using ANNs.

Sophisticated techniques grounded in AI and intended to predict the location of

emplaced IED delivery systems, identify hostile threats, and counter IEDs are core areas

of research within the military forces and military organizations, government and

political science, and the overarching realm of AI (Fienberg & Thomas, 2010;
 128

Golinghorst, 2010; Graham, 2010; Guill, 2009; Ho, 2006; Madera, 2006; Midgette, 2008;

Ntuen, 2009; Ntuen & Gwang-Myung, 2008; Sundram & Sim, 2007). This study may

provide incentive for future research investigating IED placement prediction. Promising

areas for such research include the examination of alternative ANN software applications,

and replication of this current study using IED placement data supplied by the JIEDDO.
 129

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