Mass Communication

DENIS McQUAIL
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Origins

The roots of the concept of mass communication are deep and complex, emerging
from the experiences of societies undergoing rapid social change in the latter 19th
century, especially in Europe and North America. These changes can themselves be var-
iously attributed to advances in science and technology and in both economic thinking
and actual business practice. Evidence of social change was apparent in the growth of
populations, the rapid industrialization of production, the shift from rural to urban
living, and the development of rapid transport networks, plus rising wealth and living
standards. Material change of this kind was related to a range of other developments at
the level of the “superstructure” (practices and ideas that characterize the social struc-
ture and institutions of society, including political arrangements and ideology). Most
prominent, as noted by a range of contemporary observers (soon to be represented by
the social scientists of the day), were: the relative decline of community and of tradi-
tional ways, including the influence of religion; greater individualism as well as inter-
dependence; the rise of popular forms of government, or moves in this direction; and
the self-organization of the new industrial working class seeking a share of political
power. These changes were accompanied by a trend towards centralized nation-states
competing with each other in a context of expanding colonial and trading empires. An
important specific element in the mixture was the underlying current of social conflict
unleashed and also a new and widespread fear of a lawless and irrational mob on the
part of the propertied classes.

The rise of mass media

The dawn of the 20th century marked the entry of a new factor in the potent mixture
briefly outlined, namely the appearance of more effective means of communication
between leading and following elements. The newspaper already provided some such
links, but on a very limited basis in most countries. Modern methods of production and
distribution, however, gave the press a new potential to reach large numbers on a contin-
uous basis, with information, opinions, advertising, and entertainment. Along with the
power of owners, the hand of central government was also strengthened, and forces for
national unity (but also division and conflict) were enhanced. The 20th century “mass
newspaper” was more of a potential than a reality, but still exerted a potent attraction
for political leaders and business entrepreneurs. The direction of their imaginings was

The International Encyclopedia of Political Communication, First Edition. Edited by Gianpietro Mazzoleni.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
DOI: 10.1002/9781118541555.wbiepc155
2 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

greatly strengthened by other inventions in the sphere of public communication, espe-

cially wireless broadcasting and the cinema. Wireless, from the 1920s onwards, truly
became a means of reaching a majority of the population, even if they were primar-
ily drawn by its entertainment content. The cinema was an even earlier and even more
widely appealing medium, although less continuous in its influence and also limited to
the sphere of entertainment and “culture.” The provision of music, drama, and stories
for the public at large became a major new industry. The contours of distribution of both
radio and film were largely shaped by the geography, politics, and values of separate
nation-states, although the culture of both had certain universal elements, stemming
from some cultural, practical, and professional tendencies.

Related concepts

Before a formal definition of mass communication is attempted, two or three other

concepts, relating to the same territory, can be introduced. The most fundamental of
these is the idea of a “mass” to characterize the large, featureless, or anonymous, popu-
lation thought to be consequent on social and industrial change. Ideas about the nature
of the “mass” were imprecise, but it was thought to be largely free from the traditional
restraints of family, religion, and community, typically composed of the uneducated
and propertyless classes, often irrational in tendency and easily led to acts of conflict
or violence. It would be particularly susceptible to political and ideological appeals and
amoral impulses, and subversive of settled society. The “mass” had little internal social
organization and was essentially unstable, made up of rootless individuals. It was con-
trasted with the more familiar social form of “public,” or the “group,” all known features
of society and integrated within it (Blumer, 1933).
A more complex version of the “mass” emerged in the course of the early 20th
century in the form of the idea of the mass society (Mills, 1956). The emphasis at
this point is less on the undesirable features of the people who made up the mass (as
noted above) than on the conditions typical of centralized, industrial, and bureaucratic
societies, in which the organization of work and political and social life reduces
the individual to a cog in a larger machine, with little autonomy or scope. In such
conditions, the power of industrial and political elites is enhanced at the expense of
the ordinary citizen. The process of achieving such psychological and social control is
very dependent on the application of mass media, themselves largely the property or
under the control of elites (Bramson, 1960).
A more specifically political version of the idea of mass society was advanced by
William Kornhauser (1960), based on the historical experience of totalitarian regimes
in Europe, mainly fascist or communist, that relied on mass media to inculcate entire
populations with a supportive ideology, suppressing deviance and alternative options.
The people were already organized in mass formations and open to manipulation from
above. The conditions of mass society were thought, in various degrees, to open the
way for patterns of “mass behavior.” This could take the form of aggressive or intolerant
collective action as witnessed in Nazi Germany and elsewhere, or else as mass protests,
or even riots, feared by rulers and authority. Such, or similar, forms of mass behavior
 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N 3

could also be viewed benignly by authority when they appeared as demonstrations of

widespread loyalty and support for a regime, often planned by the authorities.
Movements of opposition also tried to mobilize mass actions of protest, for instance
in general strikes or demonstrations. Although equivalent forms of mass behavior were
known from history, they had usually been localized, sporadic, and less broadly partici-
pant. In the mass society of the 20th century, they became a familiar feature of social and
political life. Later, the concept came to be applied to much more mundane phenom-
ena of the new age, in the form of audience choices for the same films, television, and
radio or for big sporting events and celebrity stars, sometimes transcending national
frontiers. Mass behavior applied to many forms of social activity that were uniformly
shared by large numbers of separate individuals, with no knowledge of each other but
united in their pattern of attention and interest.
A fourth concept is that of “mass culture,” a familiar idea from the late 19th century
onwards, although not formalized until the rise of mass media required more precision.
The core idea was always that there was a recognizable and clear distinction between the
culture (in the sense of arts and entertainments) of the mass of “ordinary people” and
those of an educated or elevated minority. A difference of quality was uncontroversially
imputed, until nearer our own time. Wilensky (1964) defined “high” culture (the oppo-
site of mass culture) as the “work of a cultural elite operating within some aesthetic,
literary or scientific tradition, with critical standards independent of the consumer of
the product systematically applied.” Mass culture, by contrast, refers to “products man-
ufactured solely for the mass market,” often in standardized forms and characterized
by wide and undiscriminating attention from the many. The broad implication of most
critical reflection on “mass culture” was to relate mass media, the main vehicle of pop-
ular arts and entertainments, closely to either the debasement of culture or the closure
of possibilities for wider dissemination of the best in culture. Some important elements
of later debate about mass communication are signaled by this comment (see below).
One central idea that unites the varied concepts outlined and has driven theory and
research ever since involves an attribution of “power to influence” to the new means of
communication in all their applications. This was on account of their wide appeal, high
status, and high levels of attention received. The purposes and forms of influence varied
greatly, but it was not much doubted that expert manipulators could achieve intended
results with large, attentive, and well-disposed publics. The most frequent purposes of
planned or expected influence were for commercial advertising and various kinds of
“propaganda,” often state sponsored. Critical theorists came subsequently to identify
many forms of hidden ideology in content with no ostensible propagandist purpose,
especially news information (journalism). Belief in the mass media as intrinsically
powerful extended to influence that might be considered harmful, without this being
the intention. Leaving aside the specific ground of the alleged harm (e.g., stimulus
to crime or immorality; encouragement of prejudice), its basis was still to be found
in the wide attraction of some content, the frequency or amount of “exposure,” its
inadvertent character, and the presence of many potentially susceptible or vulnerable
subgroups in the “mass audience.”
4 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

The concept of mass communication defined

The concept applies to mass media that were, and still are, generally identified as the
main organized means of public communication that are directed at (and can reach)
large sections of a given population (the media audience or public) with content that is
chosen and appreciated by very many individuals, who may have no other shared social
ties or even similarities.
Bringing together the different, but generally consistent, notions that have been intro-
duced, we can define mass communication as a process that delivers meaningful content
in a way that has some or most of the following features, in varying degrees:

• It is public, in respect of availability and actual content (unrestricted access).

• It is the outcome of work by complex, formal organizations, aiming to reach large
audiences.
• It is a predominantly one-way flow, as determined by the shape and technology of
the distribution systems.
• It offers the possibility of near immediate contact with very many widely dispersed
individuals.
• Relations between “senders” and “audiences” are necessarily impersonal and anony-
mous, but also voluntaristic.
• It is generally standardized in content, with small variations and a limited range, as
influenced by the economics of supply and demand.
• Flow is typically center–peripheral in terms of geography (of national society, or
international network) and asymmetrical in respect of elite–popular relations.
• Reception of mass communication by individuals shows very uniform and pre-
dictable patterns, despite the heterogeneity of any given audience sector.
• It is typically open to effective supervision, monitoring, and control by social insti-
tutions, and is thus less free than personal and minority communication processes.
• Often, public responsibilities are chosen or allocated.

The significance of the concept

The features outlined above describe a very general type and structure of
communication that rarely matched any existing reality. In most societies, society-
wide communications were still (as they remain) disparate and fragmentary, only
occasionally realizing the potential foreseen in what was more a vision of the future.
Nevertheless, it was widely taken as a guide to trends and key circumstances of the
moment. It went to the heart of concerns about the exercise of power in the emerging
modern industrial society, both political power and power in the form of control of
markets.
The media of mass communication collectively were seen as the primary means of
control and mobilization of the many, with the capacity to shape “mass identity” out of
scattered individuals and give rise to “mass behavior” in the spheres of politics, beliefs,
and consumption. For the potential to be fulfilled, what would be required would be
 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N 5

concentrated control over the centralized sources and production facilities, whether by
way of the market or the state. While the existing newspaper press was incorporated in
the array of media, the trend was towards new, “commercialized” forms aimed at the
“mass market.”

Testing the concept: Towards the model of “limited effects”

For the reasons indicated, research was directed from the outset at the question of media
power and effects. Nearly all the early evidence was derived from the experience of
the United States, which was the home both of the emerging tradition of communi-
cation research and of the most advanced and extensive applications of mass media,
an advantage accentuated by two world wars that held back European progress. This
limited the opportunities for close observation of the very different circumstances of
media (especially broadcasting) and of politics and social life in Europe. Nevertheless,
essential and generally valid lessons were learned from the early (very American) phase
of social scientific inquiry. Many of the more gloomy and critical ideas about mass com-
munication that were borne out of European theory and experience were, then and
later, filtered back to Europe by way of American writings, partly due to the influence
of 1930s émigrés from the Frankfurt School of Social Research, based on Marxist ideas.
The critical writings of Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and others influenced later
generations of theorists and researchers far beyond American shores.
The phase of close testing of the ideas about media effects outlined above involved
studies of election or public information campaigns, audience behavior and response,
and propaganda for various approved ends, including wartime propaganda and adver-
tising. It was also directed at possible negative effects, on youth in particular but also in
relation to social attitudes. The details of many studies cannot be recounted here, but a
brief résumé of the first phase of research lasting from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s
might highlight the following points. The overall consensus was that the power of “mass
communication” had been much exaggerated by its early exponents (Klapper, 1960).
The limits to power could be accounted for by a range of factors that offered obstacles
to the apparent ease of “mass persuasion.” Even in a “mass society,” most people are not
truly isolated, but are members of various personal networks that are likely to be more
influential for them than anonymous, distant, sources.
“Exposure” is far from assured by mass communication, since much selective
audience behavior occurs. Under free conditions, choice is generally guided by
personal preferences, beliefs, and allegiances. The audience has to be recognized as an
active participant in the communicative exchange, despite limits to “feedback.” The
interpretation of content may vary as much as the selection. The flow of content and its
reception are mediated by a number of intervening variables, often in systematic and
knowable ways. These variables include those of social structure, circumstances, and
lifestyle, as well as psychological and personality aspects, not to mention unpredictable
individual variations. The chances of influence as intended are dependent on several
aspects of the process: the primary source (status, appeal, trust, etc.); the actual channel
or medium involved; and the specific message content involved.
6 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

The revival of ideas of media power

In the period following World War II, the ideas summarized were being digested and
incorporated into a much less alarmist perspective on mass communication. This suited
most established institutions in politics and social life and was largely agreeable to the
media themselves, even though it did not support the claims made for the power of
advertising. It also made sense within the terms of the “normal” empirical social science
of the day, which seemed to have tamed this particular beast.
For a number of reasons, this peace did not hold beyond the beginning of the 1970s.
Several factors were responsible for reopening the issue of large media effects. One very
simple one was that the conditions of truly “massive” communication were only just
being realized with the consolidation of television as the dominant mass medium in
many countries. It deposed both radio and cinema from their once strong positions,
typically drawing by far the largest audiences of all media and occupying large swathes
of their time. It had the believed advantage of combining sound and vision, plus imme-
diacy of transmission and an assumed objectivity of gaze. Content was mainly news,
varied entertainment, and drama, plus spectacle (mainly sport). Moreover, it was gen-
erally concentrated in its sources, relatively uniform in content, and typically regarded
with trust by the majority. It might be said that mass communication, invented as an
idea 50 years or so earlier, had only just become established.
Other contributions to a revival of earlier imaginings of mass media power were a
revived sense of crisis and change in the world of the 1970s and the penetration of crit-
ical theories and new ways of thinking about communication. Among the causes of the
renewed sense of crisis were the Vietnam War and its domestic and international reper-
cussions, plus a heated-up Cold War, fuelled by unrest in Eastern Europe and US activity
directed against communism in Latin America. Radical democratic movements were
also stirring in many western societies. The economic crisis of the 1970s following the oil
price rise and the Arab–Israeli War were additional components in the mix that deeply
unsettled the relative tranquility of the postwar era. These conditions were thought to
be favorable for the deployment of propaganda and persuasion on a mass scale in the
interest of one side or another in different domestic and international conflicts.
Since we are speaking here of the world as viewed through the eyes of communication
theory and research, it should be noticed that the earlier complacency of the “minimal
effect” thesis was being challenged or ignored on a broad front. The revisionist
theme was expressed in a challenging way by the title of an article by Elisabeth
Noelle-Neumann, “Return to the concept of powerful mass media.” Her foremost
contribution was the theory of a “spiral of silence,” according to which a uniform view
tends to develop (especially in journalism) with a bias systematically in one direction
(Noelle-Neumann, 1974). This can gradually lead to the isolation and silencing of those
who think differently, further accentuating the false impression of actual majority
views.
This way of looking at things was supported by various new pieces of evidence as
well as being guided by critical social or political-economic theory. The essential gist
was that media influence operates over the longer term by consistent patterning of the
predominant media message, in both news and entertainment, usually in the direction
 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N 7

of beliefs and worldview (or ideology) supporting the outlook of media owners and
a state or government authority seeking to maintain order and the status quo. Influ-
ence should thus be conceived as essentially hegemonic rather than openly oppressive.
Critical observers were also inclined to dismiss the earlier theory of protective social
circles and personal relations as part of an overly benign view of mass media, even if
not deliberately obfuscating the reality (Gitlin, 1978). This complex mixture was fur-
ther complicated in the case of media news and entertainment by quite inconsistent
versions of the direction of the “powerful effects.” From the left, the villains were media
monopolists, hidden persuaders, and the state. From the right, blame fell on left-leaning
or liberal journalists seeking to impose their world outlook on the majority, in the cause
of social reform or transformation. Sometimes the same evidence served both view-
points, but sometimes not. At this time, much content analysis of news and other media
content seemed to confirm the existence of systematic distortions in the picture given of
social reality, whether intended or not. Certain lines and schools of empirical research,
independent of theory, supported the claim to something like “mass effects,” especially
from television. Two major examples are those of “agenda-setting” by news (McCombs
& Shaw, 1974) and the “cultivation” of unreliable worldviews by way of television fiction
(Signorielli & Morgan, 1980).

Mass media and political campaigning

The initial response of political thinkers and actors to the possibilities opened up for
mass communication was to suppose that it would tend to concentrate more power
in the hands of the emerging new type of media magnate, owning large numbers of
newspapers, and thus work against the interests of labor and other opposition inter-
ests. The reality proved less dramatic, but remained an issue without being subject to
much empirical inquiry. However, from the 1940s onwards, there was a more or less
continuous tradition of enquiry into national election campaigns, beginning in the
United States, focusing on the changing role and significance of mass media as a means
of political communication. The highlights of the findings are worth recalling. The first,
and very influential, study was of the 1940 US presidential election. Lazarsfeld, Berelson,
& Gaudet (1944) examined, with the aid of a panel survey, the effects of the then main
media of press and radio on campaign developments and outcomes. The expectation
was that media use would increase information about issues and candidates, stimulate
interest and participation, and possibly change some voting intentions in a system-
atic way. Some of these effects did occur, to a modest degree, but there was no real
evidence of substantial change in the electoral process or undue influence on the elec-
tion results. Later studies confirmed the overall stability of the process, rooted in fun-
damental allegiances and other social forces. The results were consistent with the broad
conclusion of “minimal effects” from mass media, as outlined.
It was not until the arrival and application of television that the full “mass
communication effect” was once more posited. New expectations were that the
intrinsic properties of the medium, especially its visual and personalized appeal, would
8 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

influence the choice and appeal of candidates, swaying the less committed or ill-
informed in particular. Techniques of artful persuasion borrowed from advertising and
entertainment television would be effectively applied. The more fundamental realities
of political issues and party allegiances would be subordinated to the superficialities of
the electoral race and to issues of personal qualities. The established grassroots party
organizations would tend to be weakened and wither, no longer needed to transmit the
party message. The way could even be open for a charismatic or demagogic figure in
the Hitlerian mode, vying for the popular vote on a national stage. Performance would
trump political virtue and skill, to the detriment of democracy. All of these were fears
rather than hopes of benefit, although claims were also made that television could
restore interest and raise attention in the wider nonpolitical majority, as well as lead to
a better informed public.
Certain new elements entered into campaign planning, including the problem of
differentiating appeals as between different localities, between constituencies of inter-
est, and even just between firm supporters and wavering opponents. Equally, or even
more, problematic was the need to ensure that access to the scarce and valuable channels
of large-scale communication would not be dominated by one party or faction. Much
effort was devoted in many countries to ensuring balance and fairness where possible
and to neutralizing the role of television where not.
Despite undramatic conclusions from most research into elections, there has been
some general agreement on the view that over time mass media had enhanced the role
of party leader, foregrounded personal qualities of candidates, given media “gatekeep-
ers” a greater share of power, and promoted their agenda and criteria of quality. The
great attention latterly given to the “mediatization” of politics and the supposed tri-
umph of “media logic” over political logic is largely based on the requirements of mass
media for forms of political communication that will have the widest possible appeal
and attention-gaining potential (thus, mass communication). Success in politics still
depends on gaining a large share of the popular vote over a short period of time.
The more nuanced thinking about mass communication that resulted from research
directed attention to new strategies of influence for political actors. Where permitted,
as in the United States, the techniques of mass advertising were widely applied,
resulting both in promoting the power of money and also in favoring the “soft sell,”
the fragmentation of issues, the truncation of political debate, and, some would argue,
a reduction in rationality and a broad “depoliticization.” A further effect, very widely
experienced, was a new emphasis on “managing” news and controlling the agenda
of current issues of concern, with the aim of manipulating the news media in their
gatekeeping role.

Decline and fall of a paradigm

The main challenge to the dominance of the mass communication concept has stemmed
from the same source as the original idea, namely the rise of new communication
technologies and their various applications. The first cracks in the edifice appeared
around 1970, with the gradual expansion of cable distribution systems, relieving the
 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N 9

bottleneck and the limited range of over-air broadcasting television signals. As early
as 1973, the “decline of mass media” was being predicted by Maisel. For those picking
up the theme, there were plenty of examples of old or emerging technologies that
did not fit the paradigm represented by “mass television.” These included photocopy
devices, small portable radios, telephones, cassette recorders, mail, and so on. In
Europe, broadcasting was dominated by public monopolies, but a wave of “pirate
radio” initiatives showed what might easily happen. Very soon the technologies
mentioned were joined by the even more significant and quasi-mass media of cassette
film and television, and then satellite broadcasting extending across national frontiers.
A slowly emerging possibility, with vast potential, was the Internet, still largely at
an experimental stage in the early 1980s. This medium was perceived to lack the
main attributes of “mass media” as perceived half a century earlier, but to have great
potential for public communication. There would be no channel scarcity, no public
dependency on the “providers” to choose and manage the supply of content according
to their own criteria and interests, few or no barriers to access by whoever wanted to
transmit in public, and no limitation to one-way transmission. Much depended on
a communication resource that already existed—the telecommunication network. A
condition for media change would be a transformation of existing potential, based
on new wireless and satellite technology stimulated by rewarding investment and
relaxation of state controls. The other component of change was the leap forward in
the digitization of communication made possible by computers.

A typology of alternatives

The most essential features of the “communications revolution” thus initiated are
captured by a scheme of “types of telecommunication traffic” that cross-classifies the
control of the information source with control of the time of use and choice of content,
in each case according to a second variable of central or individual locus of the control
(Bordewijk & van Kaam, 1986). First, the situation of mass communication (in its
broadcast form at least) corresponds to the type in which the control of source is
central and the timing and choice of subject are also largely determined centrally. An
alternative type (that of consultation) is formed in the case where there is a central
information store (as a library or database, or even a newspaper) and individuals have
complete freedom of choice about what they attend to and when. Third, there is a type
where both supply and choice/reception are controlled by individual participants. The
technology allows direct exchange and interaction on all kinds of content between all
those connected to the system, without reference to the “center.”
These options, despite opening up many new possibilities for private as well as public
communication (and, incidentally, blurring the distance between these two forms), still
depend on there being a communication “system” in place that is supported in material
ways by extensive hardware and software facilities and industrial or state management.
Access may be open to all, but there is a price to pay.
The fourth type of communication pattern indicated by the model has to be con-
sidered against this background. The authors of the model call it “registration” and it
10 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

involves individual control both of communication flow (freedom to transmit and to

use) and central control by the system of all traffic. This control involves oversight and
recording of uses made, patterns of use, and any information about participants needed
for managing the system. It is not a flow of communication in itself, except in the sense
that a vast amount of information about users and their use of the system is collected
and stored. The potential significance of this has become much more evident in the
light of efforts by authorities to monitor all communication traffic, once regarded as
impossible or unlikely to happen. The commercial applications of data obtained from
Internet traffic, not least from “social media,” have also multiplied and expanded. Mass
communication may have given way to some other communicative forms, but mass
surveillance has become reality.
The actual pattern of uses of the new online media has been continually developing
without any clear trajectory or common pattern. It cannot be said to offer a clear alterna-
tive to the former age of “mass communication” because of the diversity of applications
and uses and the settings in which it is placed (national, cultural, etc.).
Those who have followed the historical development of different mass media have
been struck by the extent to which media, once established, have adapted and survived,
despite an initial impression of the elimination of outdated forms. In fact there has been
a continuous process of adaptation in which niche uses have been found for existing
forms of the main media, with particular complementary or competing advantages for
application, production, distribution, or user. Many new applications have been discov-
ered and exploited. One clear lesson learnt is that it is a mistake to think of any single
communication medium as “dominant” except perhaps in some particular context, and
certainly not sufficiently so to shape the nature of society.

Continued significance or not of the concept

This multiplicity of types of flow has relevance for considering the continued
significance, or not, of the mass communication concept. While the Internet has clearly
challenged the hegemony of broadcast television and the already outdated newspaper
press and, by some measures, has moved ahead, it is no longer one single system or with
a defining application. It takes several major forms, including being a carrier of mail, a
public information resource, and a platform for distributing all the main original mass
media of film, press, broadcasting, and radio. In short, the Internet shows no dominant
use or form of content, but nevertheless has defining features that set it apart from the
earlier media forms that gave rise to the concept of mass communication in the first
place.
Many of what once seemed to be the defining features of mass media have been
greatly modified or even reversed by online communication applications. This applies,
for instance, to: having a center–periphery structure and one-way flow (limited inter-
activity); restricted channel capacity, access, and actual content, leading to low diversity
of content and audiences; an orientation to very large audiences; and a high potential
for social control of transmission.
 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N 11

In the period since the arrival of viable Internet services for the many and the new role
opened up by applications of the World Wide Web, much research has been directed at
the early indications of consequences, especially in the field of political communication.
The primary hypotheses guiding research have drawn on the characteristics of the “new
paradigm” as sketched above. The Internet opens up seemingly unlimited channels for
contact between citizens and parties, candidates, new movements, and special advocacy
or interest groups. These can cut across the traditional, mainly vertical, lines of commu-
nication in organized politics. There is potential for more diverse and better informed
citizens, the opportunity for more discussion and debate, a chance for new voices to be
heard by way of blogs and other free channels, and much more. The monopoly hold of
“Big Media” over debate and opinion should be loosened and politics should become
more fluid and diverse. In certain situations, as with authoritarian regimes, widely based
challenges to policies or rulers may be mounted spontaneously via alternative channels
of communication. These act both by relaying information and by supporting mobiliza-
tion and activation of large numbers at critical points.
Although traditional forms of political communication still seem to have survived, it
is too early to judge how much and how far any “new politics” for large-scale societies is
developing. It is still possible for Internet-based media to serve as centralizing channels
of influence in national societies, where the conditions are supportive. The mass com-
munication phenomenon was as much the product of society as of media, if not more
so. Arguably, despite much change, the essential dynamics of forces within societies and
in their relations have not changed in fundamental ways in the last hundred plus years.
The same kind of political and economic interests compete on much the same terms for
influence via channels of communication with “mass” capability, despite global changes
in the distribution of power. The ownership and control of relevant industrial structures
plus hardware and software property are still concentrated in relatively few private or
state hands. Certainly, there seems to have been no decline in interest in the possibility
and measurement of “effects,” defined in much the same way as they were in the early
days of mass media.
The mass communication concept has been effectively deconstructed but also
partially reassembled to take account of “new” (non-mass) media and advances in the-
ory (McQuail, 2013). Essential elements were a recognition of contextual determinants
of choice and response, and a typically active selection process. “Effects” were revealed
as predominantly “undetermined” and variable according to actual communication
situations. Mass communication should be seen as a process, not just an application
of a particular certain media technology and form. The purpose of communicating
with the many can employ all means available, including interactive, small-scale, and
“social” media. Even in the current age of “non-mass” media, there are circumstances
where “hegemonic” tendencies of influence in matters of information, ideas, culture,
and social action affecting the many are still likely to occur. The main conditions for
this will be monopolistic control of hardware and actual services, plus motivation to
use power for ideological, political, or commercial purposes. These are not fanciful
notions. What is needed, perhaps, is a new concept that is not a reversal of the old
one, but is capable of embracing the possibility of large numbers being enmeshed in a
12 MA S S CO M M U N I C AT I O N

network of communication, characterized by predominant uniformity and conformity

and by data-based control of use and reception by centralized authorities and sources.

SEE ALSO: Civil Society; Media Effects Theory; Mediatization; Propaganda; Public
Opinion; Spiral of Silence; Voting Behavior and Communication

References

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Denis McQuail is professor emeritus and honorary fellow at the Amsterdam School
for Communication Research (ASCOR), University of Amsterdam, where he taught
for 20 years until retirement in 1997. He is probably best known for his book McQuail’s
Mass Communication Theory, which has appeared in six editions and been translated
into numerous languages. His most recent book publication is Journalism and Society
(Sage, 2013). Although he is no longer actively engaged in research, his interests
remain in all aspects of communication and theory, with particular reference to public
communication, politics, and society.