The Rise of Authoritarianism and Challenge to International Law

Seventh Reaction Paper - Ms. Shubh Tola

In the 2021, issue of Foreign Affairs. , “Venezuela’s Endless Crisis: A Mafia State Slides
Toward Anarchy”, the author throws light on Hugo Chávez's death and how it has led to the
unpopular Nicolás Maduro leading Venezuela in a more authoritarian direction. Since 2013, Maduro
has used elitism, disdain of political plurality, and militarization of state institutions as a few tactics
to increase his power. Venezuela's democratic downfall is not just a national concern; it is also a
global one. The issue of democracy has plagued the world for the past thirteen years. All types of
states, according to Freedom House, have seen a deterioration in democracy. As a result, over the
past thirteen years, the situation of civil liberties and political rights around the world has
deteriorated, and there are numerous reasons for this decrease. Venezuela's government differs from
other authoritarian ones in several ways. Due to the numerous difficulties the nation has experienced
since a few years ago, its autocratic transition has drawn attention on a global scale. Human rights
organisations have harshly criticised Maduro for being uninformed about the political, economic,
and humanitarian crises.

Next, I certainly believe that in contrast to the authoritarian leaders of the previous century,
leaders like Hungary's Orbán, Turkey's Erdoan, Venezuela's Chávez and Maduro, Poland's
Kaczyski, and Venezuela's Maduro all appear to be part of a new class. We might come to the
conclusion that our strongman problem is not attributable to a particular disease but rather to a
continuous, bellows-like oscillation of societies that advance toward openness and then close down
if the run of dictators is roughly the same as it has always been. Viktor Orbán has weakened
Hungary's democratic institutions ever since he took office in 2010 for a second term. Orbán, a
supporter of what he terms a "illiberal" system of governance, has enacted laws that are antagonistic
to immigrants and L.G.B.T.Q. people, and he has progressively extended his hold over Hungary's
public sphere by repressing the press, the academia, and the court. However, his time in office may
be coming to an end soon because a coalition of six opposition groups from the far left to the
extreme right has emerged to challenge him in the 2022 election. Contrastingly, Venezuela's
president, Nicolás Maduro, is fighting to maintain his position of authority as his nation is being
pummelling by an unparalleled economic crisis. And he's turning into an autocrat in the process.

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 Politicians opposed to Maduro are being imprisoned. At least 46 protesters have been killed by
government security forces in recent months as he uses deadly force to suppress escalating public
rallies. Elections for the regional government have been repeatedly postponed by him to fend off
challenges to the authority of his party. And in July, he organised a rigged election to replace the
nation's parliament, the one part of government that was under the hands of his political rivals, with
a special legislative assembly. The nation's constitution can be changed at any time, and the new
superbody is free to increase his executive authority. Furthermore, despite the fact that Min Aung
Hlaing's reign was unlawful, despite numerous reports of homicide, rape, torture, and mass
migration, Myanmar's suffering continues unabated.

Next, the author in the current piece goes on to say how the Venezuelan government is both a
criminal organisation and a military dictatorship. What Maduro governs is a loose alliance of
criminal chieftains where he assumes the title capo di tutti capi the boss of bosses, instead of a
Weberian rational-bureaucratic state. Maduro typically has the ability to mediate disagreements
between his captains. Violence does nonetheless occasionally break out when the technology
malfunctions, as in Apure. Also, the Bolivarian Joint Criminal Enterprise, a "trust-based multi-
nation social and criminal network" that spans the entire region and is supported by governments
from countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Suriname, El Salvador, as well as the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels, was established in the 2000s with the
consolidation of Hugo Chavez's as a regional leader. By aiding Venezuela economically and
militarily and acting as a potent anti-American force in the area, Russia also participates in this
criminal operation.

Next, as a crucial transatlantic associate, the EU would be most helpful by deferring to

American efforts to advance democracy in Venezuela. US sanctions have in fact forced the regime
to enter dialogue twice . Non-recognition [of Maduro] and sanctions are essential components of a
plan to restore democracy in Venezuela, according to two academics. However, in these two
instances, the EU made a mistaken departure from American policy and weakened the overall effect
that these moves aimed to have by inciting polarising disagreements. Therefore, the EU should make
changes to help trigger horizontal threats that challenge Venezuela's hegemonic autocracy, knowing
that hegemonic regimes adapt to sanctions and employ electoral and institutional tactics to divide the

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 opposition—hindering the prospects for democratisation through elections. The EU should
refrain from implementing an EU-led solution and instead completely or substantially align its
policies with those of the United States. This means that rather than opposing Washington's
initiatives, the EU must recognise and absorb its supportive yet significant role. For instance, the
Interim Government has once again received assistance and recognition from the United States.

Next, opposition leader Juan Guaido attempted to get past security personnel at one point, but
troops with riot shields stopped him and pulled him off the iron railings of the courtyard. He was
anticipated to be re-elected as the head of Congress. Luis Parra, a lawmaker who was recently
dismissed by an opposition party over accusations of corruption, was given the position by the ruling
Socialist Party thanks to the blockade. The European Union, the United States, and a dozen
countries from Latin America have criticised the President Nicolas Maduro's administration's ploy.
Some opposition figures in Venezuela blame López for the uprising's failure, claiming that his
sudden decision to address the media during the event was a poor attempt to project a favourable
image and that it upended carefully laid plans, driving away potential defectors. Even the author
reiterates how the brutally effective repressive techniques deployed against Guaidó and his friends
were influenced by Cuba. The populace gradually lost faith in and support for Guaido's interim
administration. Guaido's support dropped from 70% at the beginning of his challenge in 2019 to just
11% in January. For its part, the regime no longer views the opposition as an existential danger.
Instead, it views the opposition as, at most, a persistent condition that needs to be handled and, more
commonly, as an enemy that is simple to control.

Next, the Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro is being openly overthrown by the Trump
administration. It is a campaign to overthrow the government, and it is publicly marketed as a
chance for American firms to seize Venezuelan oil. They aren't even trying to pretend. The fresh
sanctions are the most recent effort in six months to remove Maduro, whose re-election in 2018 was
rejected as legitimate by the US and most Western countries. Maduro's son has benefited from
Venezuelan mining, participated in propaganda and censorship, and pushed the military to prevent
humanitarian aid from entering the nation. Nevertheless, as the author also extrapolated, Venezuela
was not helped by Trump's bellicose comments towards Maduro and the highest members of the
system. It contributed to the magical thinking that the Venezuelan opposition is known for. Some
fervent extreme opposition figures opted to call for American military intervention. These
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 demagogues privately acknowledged that the chances of a U.S. intervention actually occurring
were vanishingly slim, but that did not deter them from taking advantage of their followers'
desperation.

Next, if not for the assistance it receives from its five main allies—Russia, China, Cuba, Iran,
and Turkey—the Maduro dictatorship would not be in power today. These nations help the
Venezuelan government in varied degrees with money, diplomatic relations, and intelligence. Since
Hugo Chavez first took office, some of these nations have had close connections with Venezuela. As
the pressure from abroad has increased, new lifelines have appeared. Each country's financial and
geopolitical reasons for supporting the Maduro dictatorship are unique, necessitating tailored and
careful approaches to policy from Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Turkey. There has been a long-
standing diplomatic, political, and economic alliance between Russia and Venezuela. Russia
continues to serve as a lender of last resort, assist Venezuela in getting over oil sanctions, support
disinformation operations, and give the Maduro administration military supplies with little regard for
the potential financial consequences. Additionally, Venezuela owes at least $20 billion to China in
loans that were made before 2017. It still actively backs the Maduro government, albeit in the
background, and has considerably scaled back its business ventures there in recent years. Since the
beginning of the Chavez government, there has been a symbolic and strongly verbal alliance
between Iran and Venezuela. They have revived their relationship in recent months, finding common
ground despite being two extremely isolated states on the global arena.

Next, according to experts, Venezuela is the prototypical failed petrostate. Even after oil was
discovered there more than a century ago, it still dominates the economy of the nation. From over
$100 per barrel in 2014 to around $30 per barrel in early 2016, oil prices fell precipitously, plunging
Venezuela into an economic and political tailspin. Since then, the situation has only gotten worse.
Several ominous signs reveal the situation: Dependency on oil; 99 percent of export revenue and
about one-fourth of GDP come from sales of oil (GDP). Declining output; Oil production fell to its
lowest point in decades in 2020 due to a lack of proper maintenance and investment, though it is
now slowly starting to rise again. Expanding economy; Between 2014 and 2020, GDP decreased by
almost two-thirds. Experts predict that in 2022, as a result of the coronavirus pandemic's continued
impact on oil demand, GDP will decrease by an additional 5%. Rising debt; Venezuela has an
estimated debt burden of $150 billion or greater. These problems, along with international sanctions
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 and the coronavirus epidemic, have sparked a dire humanitarian catastrophe that has resulted in
significant shortages of necessities like food, water, gasoline, and medical supplies. The highest
percentage of extreme poverty in Latin America, at 77% of Venezuela's 28 million citizens.

In my opinion, while Chavismo will continue to be an important component of Venezuela's

political, economic, and cultural character, many Chavistas in the nation will accept a managed
transition as long as it also provides them with some safety because they have lost faith in Maduro's
administration. The division within Maduro's inner circle and the creation of a stable and united
political opposition lead to these developments. The international world will be able to accept a new
(democratically elected) administration and offer financial, judicial, economic, and humanitarian
support to help the nation and its numerous wounded institutions rebuild. Press freedom, debt relief,
aid for the sick and the needy, anti-corruption measures, and institutional reforms are only a few
examples of the potential advantages. A portion of the Venezuelan diaspora will also return, along
with their investments. Even though it's possible, this "best-case" scenario seems challenging to
realise in the near future. Apart from the existing consensus that Maduro must go, the opposition is
fragmented, and Maduro continues to receive support from the National Guard, armed militias,
Cuba, and transnational narco-trafficking organisations. These factors make it impossible to
negotiate in a way that would result in both humanitarian relief and a stable political transition.
Another possibility is that Maduro goes ahead with his proposal to call a "constituent" assembly that
is not elected, with the claimed goal of writing a new constitution that threatens to create a
"community state" akin to North Korea and Cuba. This system disallows calls for democratic
elections and rejects any referendum that would declare a constituent assembly to be unlawful. As
the government's failing economic policies including hyperinflation, corruption, and confiscation of
private property continue, the opposition becomes more fragmented, social unrest rises, violence and
criminality rise.

The subject-matter that grabbed my attention the most in the article is pertaining to the
Venezuelan regime being described as an a criminal enterprise. With the Maduro government
having decreasingly more authority over the nation's territory, the conditions in the country are
comparable to those of a failed state. In southern Venezuela, criminal organisations including gangs,
Colombian guerrilla groups, and colectivos are posing fresh dangers as they fight for control of the

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 area's significant mineral resources, such as bauxite, diamonds, gold, and oil. The government,
which has passed a number of laws allowing these activities in Southern Venezuela, frequently
collaborates with these rogue actors. Given that illegal mining also contributes to Maduro's
government's revenue, these measures are essential to extending his rule. The illegal industries of
narcotrafficking and human trafficking will expand as Venezuela's condition worsens. Since the
United States is the world's largest consumer of cocaine, the growth in South American cocaine
exports over the past five years should raise major concerns for the country's national security and
people' health.

Lastly, one thing I’d wish to get more insight into would most certainly be with regards to the policy
recommendations for the future. The United States has a number of tools to help stop the Maduro
regime's criminal acts and boost security in Venezuela. While conducting roundtable discussions,
expert interviews, and desk research at CSIS, some of these options were considered. Making a
special task force to gather all ongoing inquiries into Maduro's criminal actions is one approach.
Although different organisations would require different tactics to ensure the success of a special
task force, ideally this would happen through a multilateral entity. It would send a powerful message
to Maduro and the rest of the world if he were looked into and maybe convicted for his crimes since
he is the face of the criminal enterprise and the reason for human suffering in Venezuela. Supporting
Venezuelan non-profit organisations and technical specialists both locally and internationally who
are casting light on the criminal networks operating in Venezuela is another possible course of
action. Experts from Plan Pas, an initiative of the Venezuelan National Assembly and the Guaidó
administration, and other NGOs have laid out specific policy recommendations for how to improve
the security structure in the country; however, they depend on support from other nations to continue
promoting and putting their strategy into practise.