PHI319: The Philosophy of Language

Lecture 7: The Manifestation Problem & Responses

Reading: Today: Hale (Companion) Chapter 12, all of Section 2. Since Bob deals with
Manifestation rather briefly, I’ve posted links to two relevant secondary texts on the course
webpage: Currie and Eggenberger & Devitt. For keen students not afraid of technicality, I
might be able to mis-lay a copy of Dag Prawitz’s paper ‘Meaning and proofs’.

Last Time: We talked about the Acquisition Challenge, reviewed three apparently
unsuccessful responses (truth-value links, partial accessibility, enhanced recognitional
capacities) and one potentially successful one (compositionality).

This Time: (1) Look in some detail at the Manifestation Argument against semantic realism,
(2) Explore two responses (explanatory ascription and inferential practice), (3) Examine
Simon Blackburn’s attempt to neutralise the argument.

(1) The Manifestation Argument

The story so far:

• Dummett has offered us a new way of understanding the nature of R/AR

debates. This involves thinking of such disputes as concerned with the meaning
of disputed classes of statements.
• On this picture realism is a semantic thesis: it says that statements of the
disputed class have ‘objective’ or (more precisely) ‘verification-transcendent’
truth-conditions. Thus, a realist allows that some statements of a disputed class
could be undetectably true.
• Anti-realism, qua semantic thesis, has it that the meanings of statements of the
disputed class is better given by ‘verification-conditions’. Another way to phrase
this thesis is using a (Wittgensteinian?) slogan: meaning is determined by use.
• Dag Prawitz offers a clarification of this new characterisation:
• “The basic idea on which the semantical argument rests is expressed
in the principle that the meaning of a sentence is exhaustively
determined by its use, where it seems that use is to be taken in its
broadest possible sense, i.e., as total use in all its aspects. This is not
to say that the meaning causally determined by the use, because,
conversely, it is equally reasonable to hold that use is determined by
meaning; nor should it be included from this that meaning is identical
with use. What is claimed is only that if two expressions are used in
the same way, then they have the same meaning, or if two persons
agree completely about the use of an expression, then they should
also agree about its meaning. The principle could be expressed in

1
 another way by saying that the meaning of a sentence must be fully
manifest in some way in its use.”
• Last time we looked at an objection to which Dummett’s characterisation of
realism seems to give rise.
• The acquisition challenge says that realists may find it difficult (if not
impossible) to explain how we acquire an understanding of a statement of
the DC, if those statements have realist TCs.
• Today we look at a related problem for realism - the manifestation
challenge. This has a similar format: it says that realists may find it difficult
(if not impossible) to explain how we could possibly manifest an
understanding of a statement of the DC, if those statements have realist
TCs.
• We can formalise this challenge as follows:

(a) We understand the sentences of D.

(b) The sentences of D have verification-transcendent truth-conditions. [Realism
about D]
(c) We know the meanings of (understand) the sentences of D, which is to say, we
know their truth-conditions.
(d) If speakers possess a piece of knowledge that is constitutive of linguistic
understanding, then that knowledge should be manifested in speakers’ use of the
language, that is, in their exercise of the practical abilities which constitute the
linguistic understanding. [An interpretation of the lessons of the rule-following
considerations.]
(e) Our knowledge of the verification-transcendent truth-conditions of the sentences
of D should be manifested in our use of those sentences, that is, in our exercise
of the practical abilities that constitute our understanding of D. [Follows from a,
b and c]
(f) Such knowledge is never manifested in the exercise of the practical abilities
which constitute our understanding of D. [Crucial Premise]
(g) We do not possess knowledge of the truth-conditions of D. [From a, b, c, d, e
and f]
(h) The sentences of D do not have verification-transcendent truth-conditions, so
realism about the subject matter of D must be rejected. [By reductio from a and
g]

• Let’s look at each step in detail:

• (a) looks like an appeal to common sense. If the disputed class is ‘ethical
sentences’, then it means only that we understand what sentences such as ‘it is
wrong to lie’ mean. This seems pretty rock-solid doesn’t it?
• (b) is just the assumption of realism for D for the purposes of reductio.
• (c) once again reflects the assumption on Dummett’s part that understanding a
sentence means possessing knowledge of its meaning and that a sentence’s
meaning consists (at least partly) of its truth-conditions.
2
 • (d) adds to (c) the observation that knowledge of a sentence’s meaning must be
something we can manifest.

Digression on (d)

• We should note now for later in the course that premise (d) depends for its force
almost entirely on the plausibility of a particular interpretation of the rule-following
considerations.
• Why? The rule-following considerations are all about what – if anything – determines
what we mean (or more accurately what we meant in the past) when we used a certain
word.
• Without going into details yet, Kripke thinks Wittgenstein raises a serious problem
with our assumption that what determines meaning is some kind of psychological fact
about us (e.g. what we intended when we used a word).
• Kripke suggests the problem is so acute, that we are forced to realise that whatever
determines what we mean (or meant), it must be something external, or publicly
available.
• As we’ll see later, some philosophers, most notably John McDowell, disagree that
this is a consequence of the rule-following considerations. Those who are curious
could read Section 6.7 of Miller, but be aware that you will be reading this out of
context, and that the second half of this course is designed to provide the context for
you to understand this response.

Other Remarks on (d)

• Despite all that, premise (d) looks appealing in many or most cases, because it
seems intuitive that a person manifests their understanding of a sentence by
demonstrating that they possess the capacity to discriminate between cases where it is
true and cases where it is false.
• Example: a person who understands what ‘Daniel Day-Lewis won the Oscar
for Best Actor’ means, will use that sentence when it is appropriate, for
example, today in conversation about the recent Oscars. A person who does
not understand the sentence is someone who would use it in irrelevant
circumstances, for example to describe the layout of a room, or in
circumstances which are relevant but inappropriate (e.g. they would still use it
even if Tommy-Lee Jones had won).

• Prawitz gives the following argument for (d): on handout.

knowledge of meaning can sometimes have the form of explicit, verbalizable

knowledge, e.g. an ability to state a synonymous expression or the rules for the
use of the expression. But this presupposes that the language in which the

3
 knowledge is verbalized is already known… to avoid an infinite regress, we must
conclude that, in general, knowledge of meaning is implicit knowledge.
Furthermore, implicit knowledge must manifest itself in some way in behaviour,
and, hence, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence cannot consist in
anything else than the ability to use the sentence in a certain way or to respond in
a certain way to its use by others.

• Prawitz suggests this argument establishes the conclusion that knowledge of the
meaning of sentence consists in (implicit) knowledge of its use (the idea I
mentioned in section 1).

• (e) looks like a valid inference, while (f) looks much like the crucial premise in the
acquisition challenge and so a good candidate for the realist to attempt to attack.

(2) Two Responses to the Manifestation Argument

First Response: Explanatory Ascription

• This response seems to target premise (f), by suggesting we can see a grasp of realist
TCs being manifested in speakers’ behaviour.
• The response comes in two forms:
o Ascribing knowledge of realist TCs to a speaker, might form part of the best
theoretical explanation of their behaviour. It need not manifest itself directly,
but we may need to assume it in order to explain speaker’s behaviour.
o We can directly manifest knowledge of meaning by being able to interpret
what other people say and to attribute certain beliefs to them. If we can
attribute to other speakers’ beliefs of a realist character (beliefs in sentences
with VTTCs), we might thereby manifest knowledge of those TCs.

A Problem for Explanatory Ascription

• Bob Hale dismisses this rather out of hand. If you are interested in this
response, read one (or both) of the papers, links to which I posted on the
course page this morning by Currie and Eggenburger or Devitt. (These will be
seminar readings for next week).
• Bob’s thought however is that clearly the anti-realist will also provide an
account of our interpreting other speakers and attributing to them certain
beliefs. They will rightly ask why it would be necessary to attribute beliefs of
a realist character, rather than merely beliefs with justification-conditions.
• If you read the above texts, you should read them with this challenge in mind
(i.e. do they explain why the best theoretical account of our behaviour must

4
 assume understanding of sentences with realist truth-conditions, rather than
anti-realist ones?).

Second Response: Inferential Practice

• This response appeals to our practice of making certain inferences, or

employing certain forms or patterns of inference in our everyday reasoning.
• If, the realist will say, the syntax of our everyday reasoning shows a
commitment to unrestricted use of the LEM or double negation elimination,
then clearly through our practice we manifest an understanding of or (an
maybe this is equivalent?) commitment to the relevant statements’ having
realist truth-conditions.
• In other words if we reason as if realism were correct we could be said
thereby to manifest an understanding of realist TCs.

A Problem for Inferential Practice

• Why should we regard our actual inferential practice as sacrosanct?

• Simply put, our inferential practices might be misguided. We might be
assuming from our use and understanding of decidable statements, that the
LEM is appropriate for undecidable statements. Reflection upon this practice
might lead us to revise it, on the basis that it does not accord with the meaning
of undecidable statements.
• In other words, the realist will need an argument that says that certain
patterns of reasoning necessarily imply that the statements employed in such
reasoning have realist truth-conditions.

(3) Simon Blackburn’s Critique of the Argument

Simon Blackburn takes a different approach to responding to Dummett’s argument. He argues

that premise (d) is unnecessarily restrictive. His argument runs as follows.

• What a person can manifest to an audience depends partly on the nature of that
audience – what capacities they have.
o Example: ‘A man may manifest marvellous musicianship by blowing the
‘Pibroch of Donald Dubh’ if the hearers are capable of appreciating it, but he
may not manifest anything to me by his performance.’
• This raises a question for Dummett:
o If a person who understands a statement must be able to manifest that
understanding to an audience, what capacities must that audience possess?
• Blackburn thinks Dummett’s answer is to be found in this quotation, from one of his
papers:

5
 “An individual cannot communicate what he cannot be observed to
communicate.”

• Blackburn writes that this ‘last sentence suggests one who is capable of making
observations, but no more. But let us suppose that some things lie outside
observation: the past, or other peoples’ sensations, or sub-atomic particles. Then it is
clearly not a sensible requirement that a man should manifest his understanding of
these things to someone who himself is capable of only making observations.’
• Does this help the realist? Well, potentially yes. The realist can argue, with
Blackburn that the argument as stated ‘relies on some unduly restrictive assumption
about the capacities of suitable manifestees’ (Hale).
• However, Bob Hale asks two important questions about Blackburn’s critique:
(1) Is it textually accurate?
(2) Is it true that the argument is only plausible if it relies on this undue
restriction?

Answer to (1)

• No, Dummett does not impose any undue restriction on the capacities of manifestees.
• How can we tell? Dummett does not consider manifesting understanding of finitary
mathematical statements to be problematic, yet clearly these are examples of
statements about unobservable entities or states of affairs.
• The source of Blackburn’s reading seems to be a confusion between manifesting
our knowledge or understanding vs. manifesting the objects we are talking about.
• Just because what is in question is our understanding of a statement about
unobservable entities, it does not follow that our understanding itself must be
‘unobservable’.
• As Bob Hale puts it: “What has to be capable of manifestation is our supposed
knowledge or understanding, not the objects we talk about.”

Answer to (2)

• We can see that Blackburn’s point is not independently plausible by imagining a case
where the manifestees have much greater capacities.
• So, Bob Hale asks us to think of a case where a speaker is making a mathematical
statement before an audience of people also competent in number theory.
• The mathematical statement is one involving ‘unbounded quantification’ (i.e.
quantifies over an infinite domain, say the even numbers, Golbach’s conjecture).
• The question posed by the manifestation challenge seems in this case to remain
intact. It is: how does the speaker manifest knowledge of what it is involved in that
statement being true, yet undetectably so?