Carnap: Meaning and Synonymy Notes

Frankie Caruso

Theory of Extension: A theory of the relations between language and what language is about that deals
with concepts like denoting, naming, extension, truth, and related ones.

 Extension indicates the range of applicability of a concept or term by naming the particular
object it denotes.
 The extension of a term is the set of objects in the world to which it corresponds. (A term is
a category or subject of a statement.)
 Quine refers to extension as “reference.”

Theory of Intension: Theory that deals with concepts like intension, synonymy, analyticity, and related
ones.

 Intension indicates the internal content of a term or concept that constitutes its formal
definition
 Intension = attributes
 Quine refers to intension as “meaning”
 Allows us to understand the sentences of a given language
 The intension of a word is the general condition which an object must fulfill in order to be
denoted by this word
 ‘Intension’ is meant to apply only to the cognitive or designative meaning component –
cognitive meaning component = meaning component that is relevant for the determination
of truth.

Carnap’s goal in this paper: Clarify the nature of the (pragmatical) concept of intension in natural
language and provide an operational behavioristic procedure for it.

First: Determining the extension of a predicate in natural language.

Thought experiment: Scientist who doesn’t speak German at all can determine the extension of the
predicate ‘blau’ by observing a person’s (or group of people’s) behavior.

 On the basis of elicited or spontaneous utterances – basically, by observing a person’s behavior

– the scientist can determine the predicate’s extension, it’s contradictory’s extension, and its
zone of vagueness.
 The scientist can develop and test a hypothesis concerning responses that he has not yet
investigated – including even the extension of the whole universe.
 The determination of extension obviously involves uncertainty and possible error, but this is no
different from any other scientific concept.
Now: Determining the intension of a predicate in natural language.
Granted that the linguist can determine the extension of a given predicate, how can he go beyond this
and determine also its intension?

(Determining intensions introduces an added difficulty. Two predicates may have exactly the same
extensions (given a region of any size – even the whole world) and yet they may have different
intensions.)

What’s needed to determine the intension of a predicate is for the linguist to ask the German speaker
about not only actual cases but also possible cases – all logically possible cases come into consideration
for the determination of intensions.

So, to summarize:

Extension of a predicate: a set of objects in the actual world for which the predicate holds.

Intension of a predicate: a set of objects (actual as well as possible) for which the predicate holds. This
can be called the range of the predicate.

Similar to extensional vagueness, there is also intensional vagueness, which includes possible objects for
which it is not clear whether the predicate applies or not (e.g., a hawk-man, which is neither clearly a
hawk nor a man).

General Concept of Intension for a Predicate:

The intension of a predicate ‘Q’ for a speaker X is the general condition which an object y must fulfill in
order for X to be willing to ascribe the predicate ‘Q’ to y. (Omit, for simplicity, the reference to time t.)

More explicit:
Predicate ‘Q’ in a language L has the property F as its intension for X

(Property F = Q’s intension for X)

means:

Among the dispositions of X constituting the language L, there is the disposition of ascribing the
predicate ‘Q’ to any object y if and only if y has the property F.

<Note there is a potential ambiguity having to do with the scope of the bi-conditional. I will assume a
certain interpretation that seems to make sense to me.>

(X is disposed to ascribe ‘Q’ to y) just in case (y has the property F.)

Example: Being a horse-like thing with one horn is the intension of the predicate ‘is a unicorn,’ because:
If someone is disposed to ascribe ‘is a unicorn’ to something, then that thing has the property of being a
horse-like thing with one horn, and if something has the property of being a horse-like thing with one
horn, then it is a unicorn. (Here we assume that typical human errors don’t apply. See above)

By contrast, being yellow is not the intension of the predicate ‘is a unicorn,’ because something can have
this property, and yet X is not disposed to ascribe ‘unicorn’ to it.
//I think this is how the idea goes, but to be honest, I’m not quite sure. Carnap isn’t super helpful or
clear here.

Summary:
What does it mean for a property (F) to be the intension of a predicate (‘Q’) for a given speaker (X)?

Answer: Well, here’s one way to think about it. We essentially want to capture the idea that F is the
“internal content” of ‘Q,’ which constitutes its formal definition. So, intuitively, wherever we have an
instance of F, then a competent language-user ought to be disposed to ascribe ‘Q’ to that instance.
Similarly, if it’s the case that a competent language user is disposed to ascribe ‘Q’ to a particular
instance, it ought to be the case that the instance is an instance of F. Only when both these conditions
hold (i.e., the bi-conditional holds) can we say that F is the “internal content” of ‘Q.’

Imagine, for example, that the first conditional fails. Then, there is an instance of F but a lack of a
disposition to ascribe ‘Q.’ So, something can be F and we would not ascribe ‘Q’ to it. But if F did capture
the “meaning” of ‘Q,’ then obviously we would be so disposed (at least under ideal conditions).

Imagine that the second conditional fails. Then, there is a disposition to ascribe ‘Q’ but no instance of F
(and ideal conditions hold). But if F did capture the “meaning” of ‘Q,’ then there would have to be an
instance of F.

//This little, rough proof helps me to understand where Carnap is coming from with this more explicit
characterization that he provides.

The big concept here is intension. Once we have a suitable concept of intension, we can proceed to
define other important concepts in its terms.

Synonymy: Two expressions are synonymous in language L for X at time t if they have the same intension
in L for X at t.

Analyticity: A sentence in L is analytic for X at t if its intension (or range or truth-condition) in L for X at t
comprehends all possible cases.
Okay, so something that is kinda confusing and not exactly clear. I’ve spotted a lot of different uses of
the word ‘intension’ – sometimes applying to predicates and sometimes not. Let me summarize these
usages below. (The predicate usage is clear, given what Carnap says, but the other ones are not too clear
to me, so I will either leave them blank or fill in my best guess as to how he might understand the
usage.)

Term (Category) Predicate Concept Sentence Expression

Intension “Attributes” Set of possible The general Not too sure

Or better: objects for condition which here, as the
The general which the an object y term
condition which predicate holds. must fulfill in ‘expression’
an object y (A general order for it to isn’t exactly
must fulfill in account: The fall under the clear, at least
order to fall general given concept. outside of a
under the condition which logical context. I
category. an object y get the feeling
must fulfill in that this is a
order for X to sort of umbrella
be willing to term – maybe
ascribe the an expression
predicate to y.) could be a word
or a predicate
or even a
sentence.

Extension Set of actual Set of actual Set of actual Same as above.

objects that the objects for objects that fall
category picks which the under the
out predicate holds. concept.

What’s the pattern?

One way to think of it: Extension is the part of intension that “extends” (so to speak) into the actual
world – it is the region in which the general condition associated with the term, concept, or predicate
actually obtains in the world.
Predicates, categories (terms), and concepts may apply (or not) to a given object. Whether it applies or
not depends on the predicate/category/concept’s application condition. (It is possible, of course, for the
application condition to be such that it allows for a zone of vagueness.) The intension of a
predicate/category/concept is essentially its application condition.