Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dialogue JulySeptember, 2012, Volume 14 No.1
I. Introduction
The study of provincial politics and of native states in British India was an underdeveloped area. Native states in any case formed a
backyard of the British Raj, but politics, especially constitutional and institutional politics in British Indian provinces were also
largely eclipsed by the nationalist movement politics. But in retrospect, constitutional reforms introduced in the first half of the 20 th
century in the British Indian provinces by the imperial government in London were significant early experiments in representative,
responsible, and federal governance. Bolder moves in all these respects under the 1950 constitution after India’s independence must
be studied in this historical backdrop. Yet there are serious gaps in studies of devolution of powers to the provincial governments
under the government of India Act, 1909; this is also true of the studies of diarchy at the provincial level under the Government of
India Act, 1919, and of provincial autonomy under the first federal constitution in British India, the Government of India Act, 1935.
Study of State politics in independent India also continues to be a rather undercultivated field of inquiry. This state of affairs may be
explained in terms of a number of reasons. First, in the Nehru era there was a carryover of the nationalist ambience and fervour of the
freedom struggle, and for this reasons all that really mattered was the politics at the national level. Congress dominance at the union
as well as state levels submerged politics in the states under the overarching national patterns. Popular mass movements for the
creation of unilingual states in various parts of the country during the 1950s and 1960s briefly brought state politics to forefront, but
once such demands were conceded, the leaders of these movements in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat tended to join or
rejoin the Congress Party. And, the overarching oneparty dominance was easily restored.
Secondly, the breaches in Congress dominance in the late 1960s and the late 1970s were rather of relatively short spans of time after
which Congress dominance was restored. The emergence of states as important arenas of politics turned out to be rather brief episodes.
Thus, the Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras and Rajiv Gandhi years, especially the reigns of the first and the third prime ministers (Rajiv
Gandhi was the sixth PM), were characterized by a great deal of centralization or "nationalization" of the Indian political system. State
politics were then either a subsidiary arena or were appendage to national politics.
Thirdly, the distribution of powers and revenue resources in the Indian constitution is heavily skewed in favour of the centre. This
feature greatly reduces the importance and effectiveness of the state governments, and makes them heavily dependent on federal
mandatory and discretionary fiscal transfers under the constitution and sharedcostcentrallysponsored schemes of development
under the federal spending power. Notably the union and state jurisdictions are demarcated with at least some exclusive areas reserved
for each order of governments, but the constitution does not expressly prohibit the union government to spend its money even in
exclusive state concerns.
Fourthly, even though law and order is supposed to be an exclusive state concern, there has been an enormous expansion of the
central paramilitary police forces. The 42 nd constitutional amendment (1976) has made the deployment of armed forces and central
paramilitary forces in aid of civil power in a state an exclusive union competence. Incidence of internal disturbances and terrorist
activities by external and indigenous groups has resulted in a great deal of increase in the coercive power of governments and
centralization in the political system. These developments tend to overshadow the state governments and subordinate state politics to
the imperatives of national politics.
Nevertheless, there has been paradigm shifts in the politics and political economy of India since the 1990s which have enhanced the
role and autonomy of state governments, civil society, and the market forces. The arena of state politics has in this process acquired an
unprecedented importance. It might very well be said that state politics have really come into their own for the first time in the
contemporary history and politics of India. Our study of state politics at this moment is very timely and topical.
II. Analytical Framework
The analytical framework that we propose is developed in four components: (1) four overall processes of democratization,
multicultural secularization, federalization, and economic liberalization/privatization/globalization characterizing politics in India in
general; (2) the variations in the ways these processes manifest themselves in different states of India; (3) variables or factors at the
state level that may be accountable for the differential ways in which the three crucial processes identified above unfold in different
states; and (4) the varying state capabilities to ensure democracy, good governance and economic development. The four crucial
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dimensions of the political processes delineated here and the factors that affect their variability from state to state are mutually
interdependent and partly reinforcing or in some cases contradictory. The statelevel variations highlighted in parts 2 and 4 of this
analytical framework are the dependent variables or features that are in search of explanation. Factors identified in parts 1 and 3 are
causal or independent variables that help us explain statelevel differentials in political and economic performance.
1. The Four Overall Processes of Democratization, Multicultural Secularization, Federalization, and
Globalization
Democratization refers to the process of increasing politicization of the masses in general and of subaltern classes or groups in
particular through electoral mobilization and political participation. This process of democratization began to greatly affect the lower
social orders by the late 1960s and has continued unabated since. Under the impact of this process, India’s traditional and semifeudal
society is moving towards greater liberty and equity. Democratic politics tends to undermine caste and class differences and furthers
the cause of political participation in elections based on universal adult franchise. Democracy is also imbued with the ideal of popular
participation in the process of governance to the extent it is practicable in a representative and republican democracy. Fundamental
rights and directive principles of state policy provided in the Indian constitution contain the ideals of a free and egalitarian civil
society and state in India. The structures of governments outlined in the constitution at national, state, and local levels are
parliamentary federal. The 6th schedule of the constitution also makes special arrangements for autonomous district and regional
councils in tribal areas of states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. The 5 th Schedule makes provisions for tribes advisory
councils for administration and control of scheduled areas and scheduled tribes in other states of India. These advisory councils
consist of members of whom nearly 3/4 th (but not more than 20) must be the representatives of the scheduled tribes in the Legislative
Assembly of the state. The 73 rd and 74 th constitutional amendments (199293), in pursuit of gender justice, ensure 33 percent
reservation for women in executive positions in panchayats and municipal councils.
The chapter on fundamental rights is one of the strongest in the universe of liberal democratic states in the world. The constitutional,
legislative, and judicial discourses on fundamental rights in India are very extensive and intensively elaborated. In the case of law on
these two and other rights, new dimensions have been created and added on to them. The examples include extension of the right to
life to the right to live in human and healthy environment, the creation of the right to primary education to the children, etc. The right
to primary education was first created under case law and subsequently added on to part III of the constitution on fundamental rights
by an amendment. An implementing parliamentary enactment also subsequently followed in 2010. Moreover, several new legal rights
have been created under legislation, e.g. the right to information (2005), right to manual work in the rural employment sector in
public works (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005). A legislation guaranteeing the right to food is also
presently (August 2010) proposed in the Parliament. Since 1993, we also have an activist National Human Rights Commission under
a parliamentary statute. The mass media in India offers one of the most developed and independent democratic public spheres in the
Third World. Civil society vigour in India is more often seen in political and social movements than in the institutional domains. Yet
there are some indications of the revival or organizations of voluntary associations and nongovernmental organizations as well in the
more recent times.
Scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward classes (OBCs) have been granted reservations in education and employment
or legislative representation for specified time frames under the constitution and/or law. There are also schemes for their economic and
financial empowerment by the governments at union and state levels. India’s tryst with democratic destiny would not be complete
unless political democracy is supplemented by social and economic democracy. This point was fervently underlined by Dr. B.R.
Ambadkar, the chairman of the drafting committee in his last address to the Constituent Assembly when he chose to reply to the
marathon debate on the draft constitution.
Even political democracy is not yet fully attained. For example, take a look at the party system and social and political movements in
the country. Most political parties lack internal organizational elections. Personalism and amoral familism are the order of the day.
Corruption and criminalization afflict practically all political formations. The legitimacy of popular movements in the face of
governments and administration lacking in integrity, transparency, and accountability is unquestionable. However, not a few social
and political movements are mounted in pursuit of sectarian and selfish interests in disregard of public interest.
To take the tack of multicultural secularization, we mean by this term the process through which ethnic pluralities of a society are
brought into the public sphere for interaction and civic action in a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect. Multiculturalism goes
beyond the abstracted liberal individualism and assumes that "human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up
and live within a culturally structured world and organize their lives and social relations in terms of a culturally derived system of
meaning and significance ." Secondly, multiculturalism believes "that no culture is perfect and has a right to impose itself on others,
and that cultures are best changed from within." Thirdly, in a multicultural perspective "every culture is internally plural and reflects a
continuing conversation between its different traditions and strands of thought" (Bhikhu Parekh, "What is Multiculturalism?
www.indiaseminar.com/1999/484/484%20parekh.htm, accessed on 1 March2011). It is important to clarify the relationship between
secularism and multiculturalism in the Indian context. In Indian political thought, to take only two leading representative thinkers of
modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi espoused approaches to the relationship between religion and
politics that may be dubbed (a) secularist premised on the complete separation between state and religion in the Western
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revolutionary sense as in France and the USA (Nehru), and (b) multiculturalist in the traditional Indian sense of equal respect for all
religions (sarvadharmasamabhava; Gandhi). The Indian constitutional theory of multicultural secularism is built on a judicious
combination of both these perspectives. The major premise of the constitutional theory in this regard is liberal secularism in the sense
that most of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the constitution make individuals as the bearers of universal rights enjoyed by
all irrespective of ethnicity, gender, place of birth, etc. Yet some cultural rights of religious and linguistic minority communities are
also guarnteed to enable them to preserve their culture, language, and script and to establish educational institutions with certain
legal autonomies. Moreover, the state is prohibited to collect any taxes for the promotion of any particular religion. However, there is
no will of separation between the state and religion as legislation for religious and social reforms is not proscribed, although after the
initial spurt of religious reforms such as the Hindu reformist code, the state has for all practical purposes left the constitutional ideal of
a common civil code in splendid isolation.
It is for the foregoing features of the Indian constitutional approach to religion and politics that I think that it can best be
characterized as multicultural secularism. It draws attention to the question how democracy deals with the phenomenon of cultural
diversity. Whereas in political theory it was earlier thought that the universalist conception of citizenship was sufficient to deal with
diverse categories of citizens in a society (T. H. Marshall 1950), it came to be later realized that differenceblind laws with universal
scope were incapable of erasing deeply engrained socioeconomic disparities and discriminations. For these conditions differentialist
conceptions of citizenship came to be argued for recognition of difference and differential affirmative action for creating a level
playing field (Young 1989; Williams 1998). Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994) have talked about three kinds of provisions
and policies to deal with multiple diversities and cumulative inequalities.
Now, we come to the process of federalization that has gathered momentum since the 1980s, especially since the 1990s. The
constitution of India combines parliamentary as well as federal features of government. However, for about four decades after the
commencement of the constitution the parliamentary features practically overshadowed the federal features due to oneparty Congress
dominance and charismatic and imposing leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, the first and the third prime ministers.
Federal features gradually gained ground over the 1980s, when nonCongress state governments were elected to power in one state
after another, and when prime minister Rajiv Gandhi signed regional and ethnic peace accords with Akali Dal in Punjab, Asom Gana
Parishad in Assam, Mizo National Front in Mizoram, and Tripura National Volunteers in Tripura. The 1989 Lok Sabha election, in
particular, greatly accelerated the federalization process throughout the country, when a multiparty system with federal coalition /
minority governments was ushered in at the national level. In the new party system regional parties have gained considerable power at
the cost of national parties that have been diminished, fragmented, or have been unable to grow beyond a certain threshold of power.
Led by one of the national parties like the Janata Dal, Bharatiya Janata Party, or Indian National Congress, federal coalition
governments have been particularly vulnerable to the making and breaking power of the regional parties. Whereas regional parties
accounted for 8.10 percent of votes and 6.95 percent of parliamentary seats in the popularly elected house before the 1952 general
election, their corresponding shares have gone up respectively to 14.39 percent and 27.97 percent in 2009 general election.
The federal phase has witnessed an unprecedented increase in the autonomy and role of state governments. Toppling of state
governments by the wielders of central power for partisan political considerations has been considerably contained. A new grammar
of presidential, prime ministerial, and cabinet working has developed in the era of coalition and majority governments. The president
has acquired greater maneuverability in the exercise of discretionary powers, the prime minister must contend with powerful
ministerial colleagues representing various constituent parties in the coalition, and the cohesion and collective responsibility of the
cabinet to the Lok Sabha have become fragmented and stretched to extraparliamentary centres of regional power. However, there has
been an enormous expansion of the power and activism of the judiciary.
To take the tack of economic liberalization and globalization, the chipping at the Nehruvian mode of "Indian socialism" began in the
1980s. But a comprehensive package of reforms in this model of statedirected economic development was introduced in 1991 to deal
with a severe balance of payment crisis and recurrent losses in most public sector undertakings. By the end of the decade state
economies also faced a serious fiscal deficit that also necessitated neoliberal capitalist reforms. Both Union and state governments
gradually embraced policies of bureaucratic deregulation of the economy, disinvestment or privatization of public sector
undertakings, and globalization.
These economic reforms have augmented the scope of the private sector and autonomy of state governments. Like the Union
government, state governments are now also vying with each other to attract private capital — national, multinational, and global
multilateral — by offering better infrastructural facilities ("race to the top") or tax concessions and holidays ("race to the bottom").
India’s annual rate of growth has considerably improved. The growth rate during the British colonial rule was a paltry 1.5 percent. It
was around 3 percent in independent India before the 1980s. It moved up during the 1980s and jumped to above 5 or 8 percent since
the neoliberal capitalist reforms of 1991. However, the problem with this development has been that it has been a jobless growth with
negligible employment opportunities. It also lacks in distributive justice and inclusiveness. It has engendered a dual economy
comprising relatively small enclaves of affluence, on the one hand, and vast areas of abject poverty and destitution, on the other.
2. Variations in these Processes at State Level
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The three political processes outlined above have unfolded in an uneven way and their effects have not been uniform across the states
of India. Democratic transformation in some states has gone ahead in comparison to others. Some states still continue to be largely
steeped in tradition propped up by hangovers of caste and tribal structures and semifeudal economy. Some states are much more
mired in social and electoral violence and recurrent conflicts than others. Citizens of some states enjoy better democratic rights and
economic empowerment than those in others.
The same can be said about the process of federalization. Quantum of federal autonomy existent in various states are markedly
different. This not only because of asymmetrical federal autonomy granted to the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, and
Mizoram granted by the constitution itself under articles 370, 371A, and 371G. The rest of the states of the Indian union are federated
in a symmetrical way with uniform constitutional status. Yet federalization process is marked by considerable variations across the
states.
Very few systematic and substantive scholarly studies of macro scope of democratization and federalization are available in the
existing literature on state politics. The situation is a bit better with regard to economic liberalization and globalization. Since the
early 1990s, when these processes were accelerated, there has been a tremendous increase in regional economic disparities among
states. Even newspaper reports project a parallel development of two contrasting corridors of economic growth and radical class
violence. The Blue Corridor spanning Delhi Gurgaon/MumbaiPune/BangaloreChennai, on the one hand and the Red Corridor
stretching across the hinterland tribal belt from the IndoNepalese border to Andhra Pradesh, on the other.
Social science studies also reveal that during August 1991March 2000 the states, of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Kerala, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu got proposals of private capital investment to the tune of 66.7 percent as compared to only 27.4
percent received by the states of Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Differences in
regard to foreign direct investment (FDI) are even more glaring. In the phase of globalization, only five states Andhra Pradesh,
Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu got a disproportionately large 75 percent of the FDI invested in India.
3. Explanatory Factors for Variations Across States
How do we explain the differentials among the states of India on the dimensions of democratization, federalization, and
globalization? For this purpose, we may employ an explanatory framework comprising the following five factors: (1) geography and
history; (ii) demography, culture, and social capital; (iii) political economy with foci on macro economic sectors and class structure;
(iv) patterns of state party systems and social and political movements; and (v) the quality of political leadership with appropriate
motivation and skill.
Do history and geography matter? Are there any perceptible or measurable differences between the formerly British Indian provinces
and native Indian states? Between the border states and inland states? Between the coastal rimlands and the Hindi heartland?
Similarly, some states have dominant castes and communities whereas others have more pluralist and fragmented social structures.
Some states are parts of the cultural mainstream of classical Hindu civilization whereas others are more composite in terms of
multicultural fabric. Some states are multicultural whereas others are marked by ethnonationalist movements and even separatism.
Some states are endowed with greater degree of social capital measurable in terms of the vigour of associational, cooperative, and
corporate organizations than others. How far these differences, if any, are consequential for patterns and trends in state politics across
the country?
Likewise, how significant are the differences in historical patterns of the British land tenure system divided in terms of the zamindari,
the ryotwari, and mahalwari subsystems? Same with tribal and nontribal land holding systems. Similar questions arise with regard to
differences among the states in terms of their class systems and sectoral composition of the state economy. The same with differences
in material and human development indicators.
Moreover, there are marked differences among the states as to the patterns of their party systems and social movements. Some have
developed oneparty dominant systems (continued reelection of the same partly consecutively for at least three terms (Delhi,
Gujarat). Others have twoparty systems (e.g. Andhra Pradesh) or a multiparty bicoalitional system (e.g. West Bengal, Kerala). Some
states are more prone to the incidence of mass movements or sectarian movements than others. How consequential are these
differences, correlated with other dimensions of state politics?
Quality of political leadership at the state level is more difficult to conceptualize and operationalize in terms of measurable empirical
referents or indicators. Yet there are some palpable differences, including some studies by scholars, of leadership styles of Digvijay
Singh, Narendra Modi, Nitish Kumar, Mayawati, Chandrababu Naidu, J. Jayalalitha, Mamata Banerjee, Sheila Dikshit, etc.
4. The Varying State Capabilities
We have so far sought to describe and explain the patterns and trends of politics in the states of India in a general sort of way. Here we
narrow our conceptual and theoretical focus to the crucial problematique of state capability. This concept is defined as the ability of
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the government to achieve the objectives it sets for itself. These objective may be gleaned from the purposes of the social contract
that brings a civil society and state in existence in the first place, namely, security of life, liberty, and property on a universal and
equitable basis. This is proposed as the first indicator of good governance. Other dimensions of goals of governments may be
identified by scanning the constitution and laws, fiveyear plans, national policy statements, public policies, election manifestos,
Governor’s addresses to the state legislatures, budgets, legislative debates, chief ministers’ and other intergovernmental conferences,
etc. Since the paradigm shift to neoliberal economic reforms in 1991, the state chief ministers and their governments have acquired an
enhanced role in statelevel reforms with the diminished role of the state and public investment in the era of privatization and
globalization, the state governments must attract private capital domestic and external to ensure economic development. A
bureaucratic state must yield space to a regulatory state. The interventionist state must transform itself into a regulatory facilitator of
development. Yet we must remember that even in this changed scenario in political economy of India, the constitutional mandate is
for a democratic developmental state rather than just a developmental state in the mould of east Asian economies.
We propose to elaborate our concept of state capability in terms of good governance. Our index of good governance is
operationalized by including the following indicators: accountability of government to legislature and of administration to the
people, human development, poverty alleviation, quality of regulatory regime for economy, rule of law, and governmental stability.
Performance of a state on these indicators may be measured by objective quantitative data wherever available. Or, else, they may be
assessed in terms of subjective intuitive judgment with some supportive qualitative evidence or argument. We must endeavour to go
beyond mere description of the state of affairs and offer explanations that carry persuasiveness. As things are, some states have made
great strides of late (e. g. Bihar, Gujarat, Rajastan, Madhya Pradesh, and the states of western and southern India generally, some have
slided from higher water marks earlier (e. g. Punjab and Haryana), while others have lagged behind. We have yet a long way to go.
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